_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use chain;
  15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use chain::channelmonitor;
  17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  19 use chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, KeysInterface};
  20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  21 use ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
  22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS };
  23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
  24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  25 use ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  26 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
  27 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  28 use ln::msgs;
  29 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  30 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
  31 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
  32 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
  33 use util::errors::APIError;
  34 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  35 use util::config::UserConfig;
  36
  37 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  38 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
  39 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  40 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  42 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  43
  44 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  45 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  46
  47 use regex;
  48
  49 use io;
  50 use prelude::*;
  51 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  52 use core::default::Default;
  53 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
  54
  55 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  56 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  57
  58 #[test]
  59 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  60         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  61         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  62         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  63         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
  64         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  65
  66         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  67         // funding satoshis
  68         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  69         let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
  70         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  71
  72         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  73         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
  74
  75         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  76         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  77
  78         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  79         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  80         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  81                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  82                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  83                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  84                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  85                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  86                         match action {
  87                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
  88                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
  89                                 },
  90                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
  91                         }
  92                 } else { assert!(false); }
  93         };
  94
  95         use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
  96         use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
  97
  98         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
  99         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
 100
 101         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 102
 103         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than funding value \d+", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 104
 105         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 106
 107         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 108
 109         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 110
 111         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 112
 113         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 114 }
 115
 116 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
 117         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
 118         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
 119         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
 120         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
 121         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 122         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 123         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 124         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 125
 126         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 127         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
 128         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
 129         let opt_anchors = false;
 130         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
 131         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
 132
 133         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
 134         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 135         if !send_from_initiator {
 136                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 137                 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 138         }
 139         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
 140
 141         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
 142         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 143         if send_from_initiator {
 144                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 145                 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 146         }
 147         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
 148         {
 149                 let mut lock;
 150                 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
 151                 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 152                 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 153         }
 154
 155         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
 156         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
 157         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
 158
 159         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
 160         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
 161         if send_from_initiator {
 162                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
 163                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
 164                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
 165                         // well as an additional HTLC.
 166                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
 167         } else {
 168                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
 169         }
 170 }
 171
 172 #[test]
 173 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
 174         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
 175         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
 176 }
 177
 178 #[test]
 179 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 180         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 181         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 182         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 183         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 184         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 185
 186         // balancing
 187         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 188
 189         // A                                        B
 190         // update_fee                            ->
 191         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 192         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 193         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 194         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 195         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 196         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 197         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 198         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 199         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 200         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 201         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 202         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 203         //                                       <- RAA
 204         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 205
 206         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 207         {
 208                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 209                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 210         }
 211         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 212         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 213
 214         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 215         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 216         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 217                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 218                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 219                 },
 220                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 221         };
 222
 223         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 224
 225         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 226         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 227         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 228         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 229
 230         let payment_event = {
 231                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 232                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 233                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 234         };
 235         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 236         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 237
 238         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 239         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 240         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 241         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 242         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 243         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 244
 245         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 246         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 247         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 248         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 249         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 250
 251         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 252         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 253         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 254         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 255         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 256         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 257         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 258         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 259
 260         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 261         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 262         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 263         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 264         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 265         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 266         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 267         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 268
 269         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 270         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 271         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 272         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 273
 274         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 275         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 276         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 277
 278         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 279         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 280
 281         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 282         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 283         match events_2[0] {
 284                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 285                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 286         }
 287
 288         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 289         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 290 }
 291
 292 #[test]
 293 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 294         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 295         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 296         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 297         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 298         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 299         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 300         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 301
 302         // balancing
 303         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 304
 305         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 306         {
 307                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 308                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 309         }
 310         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 311         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 312
 313         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 314         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 315         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 316                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 317                         update_fee.as_ref()
 318                 },
 319                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 320         };
 321
 322         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 323
 324         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 325         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 326         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 327         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 328
 329         let payment_event = {
 330                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 331                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 332                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 333         };
 334         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 335         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 336
 337         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 338         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 339         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 340         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 341         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 342         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 343
 344         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 345         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 346
 347         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 348 }
 349
 350 #[test]
 351 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 352         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 353         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 354         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 355         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 356         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 357
 358         // A                                        B
 359         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 360         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 361         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 362         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 363         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 364         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 365         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 366         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 367         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 368         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 369         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 370         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 371         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 372         //                                          B should send no response here
 373         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 374         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 375         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 376
 377         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 378         let initial_feerate;
 379         {
 380                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 381                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 382                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 383         }
 384         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 385         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 386
 387         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 388         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 389         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 390                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 391                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 392                 },
 393                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 394         };
 395
 396         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 397         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 398         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 399         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 400         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 401
 402         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 403         // transaction:
 404         {
 405                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 406                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 407         }
 408         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 409         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 410         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 411
 412         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 413         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 414                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 415                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 416         };
 417
 418         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 419
 420         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 421         // Deliver (3)
 422         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 423
 424         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 425         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 426         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 427         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 428         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 429         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 430         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 431         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 432         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 433         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 434         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 435
 436         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 437         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 438         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 439         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 440         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 441
 442         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 443         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 444         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 445
 446         // Delever (4)
 447         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 448         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 449         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 450
 451         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 452         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 453         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 454
 455         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 456         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 457         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 458         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 459
 460         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 461         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 462         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 463 }
 464
 465 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 466         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 467         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 468         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 469         // Node objects.
 470
 471         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 472         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 473         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 474         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 475
 476         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 477                 let block = Block {
 478                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
 479                         txdata: vec![],
 480                 };
 481                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 482                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 483         }
 484
 485         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 486         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
 487         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 488
 489         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 490         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
 491         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 492
 493         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 494         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
 495
 496         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
 497
 498         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 499         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
 500         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 501         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 502
 503         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 504         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 505         {
 506                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 507                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 508                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 509                 added_monitors.clear();
 510         }
 511         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 512
 513         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 514         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 515         {
 516                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 517                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 518                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 519                 added_monitors.clear();
 520         }
 521
 522         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 523         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 524
 525         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 526         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 527
 528         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 529         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 530         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 531         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 532 }
 533
 534 #[test]
 535 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 536         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 537         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 538         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 539         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 540         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 541         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 542         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 543         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 544         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 545         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 546         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 547         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 548         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 549         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 550         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 551         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 552         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 553         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 554 }
 555
 556 #[test]
 557 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 558         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 559         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 560         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 561         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 562         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 563
 564         {
 565                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 566                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 567         }
 568         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 569         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 570
 571         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 572         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 573         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 574                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 575                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 576                 },
 577                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 578         };
 579         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 580
 581         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 582         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 583         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 584
 585         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 586         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 587         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 588
 589         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 590         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 591         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 592         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 593
 594         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 595         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 596         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 597 }
 598
 599 #[test]
 600 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 601         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 602         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 603         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 604         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 605         let channel_value = 5000;
 606         let push_sats = 700;
 607         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 608         let channel_id = chan.2;
 609         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 610         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value);
 611
 612         let opt_anchors = false;
 613
 614         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 615         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 616         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 617         // remote limit.
 618         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 619         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
 620         {
 621                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 622                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 623         }
 624         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 625         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 626         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 627
 628         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 629
 630         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 631
 632         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 633         {
 634                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 635
 636                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 637                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 638                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
 639                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 640                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 641                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 642         }
 643
 644         {
 645                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 646                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 647                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 648         }
 649         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 650         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 651         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 652
 653         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 654
 655         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 656         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 657         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 658                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 659                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 660                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 661                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 662                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 663                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 664         };
 665         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 666                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 667                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 668                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 669                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 670                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 671                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 672                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 673         };
 674
 675         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 676         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 677                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
 678
 679         let res = {
 680                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 681                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 682                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 683                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 684                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 685                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 686                         push_sats,
 687                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
 688                         opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
 689                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 690                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 691                         &mut htlcs,
 692                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 693                 );
 694                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 695         };
 696
 697         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 698                 channel_id: chan.2,
 699                 signature: res.0,
 700                 htlc_signatures: res.1
 701         };
 702
 703         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 704                 channel_id: chan.2,
 705                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 706         };
 707
 708         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 709
 710         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 711         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 712         //Should produce and error.
 713         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 714         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
 715         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 716         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 717         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
 718 }
 719
 720 #[test]
 721 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 722         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 723         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 724         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 725         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 726         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 727
 728         // balancing
 729         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 730
 731         {
 732                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 733                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 734         }
 735         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 736         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 737
 738         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 739         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 740         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 741                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 742                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 743                 },
 744                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 745         };
 746         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 747         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 748         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 749         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 750
 751         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 752
 753         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 754         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 755         {
 756                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 757                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 758                 added_monitors.clear();
 759         }
 760         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 761         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 762         // node[1] has nothing to do
 763
 764         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 765         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 766         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 767
 768         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 769         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 770         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 771         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 772         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 773         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 774         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 775
 776         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 777         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 778         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 779         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 780         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 781         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 782
 783         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 784         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 785         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 786         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 787
 788         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 789         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 790         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 791
 792         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 793         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 794         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 795         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 796
 797         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 798         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 799         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 800
 801         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 802
 803         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 804         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 805         match events[0] {
 806                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
 807                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 808         };
 809
 810         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 811
 812         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 813         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 814         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 815         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 816         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 817 }
 818
 819 #[test]
 820 fn test_update_fee() {
 821         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 822         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 823         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 824         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 825         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 826         let channel_id = chan.2;
 827
 828         // A                                        B
 829         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 830         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 831         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 832         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 833         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 834         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 835         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 836         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 837         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 838         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 839         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 840         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 841
 842         // Create and deliver (1)...
 843         let feerate;
 844         {
 845                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 846                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 847                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 848         }
 849         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 850         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 851
 852         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 853         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 854         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 855                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 856                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 857                 },
 858                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 859         };
 860         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 861
 862         // Generate (2) and (3):
 863         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 864         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 865         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 866
 867         // Deliver (2):
 868         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 869         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 870         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 871
 872         // Create and deliver (4)...
 873         {
 874                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 875                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 876         }
 877         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 878         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 879         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 880         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 881         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 882                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 883                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 884                 },
 885                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 886         };
 887
 888         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 889         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 890         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 891         // ... creating (5)
 892         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 893         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 894
 895         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 896         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 897         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 898         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 899         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 900
 901         // Deliver (5):
 902         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 903         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 904         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 905
 906         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 907         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 908         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 909         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 910         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 911         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 912         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 913         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 914         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 915
 916         // Deliver (7)
 917         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 918         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 919         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 920         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 921
 922         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 923         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 924         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 925
 926         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 927         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 928         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 929         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 930         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 931 }
 932
 933 #[test]
 934 fn fake_network_test() {
 935         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 936         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 937         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 938         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 939         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 940         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 941
 942         // Create some initial channels
 943         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 944         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 945         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 946
 947         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
 948         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 949         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 950         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 951         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 952
 953         // Send some more payments
 954         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 955         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
 956         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
 957
 958         // Test failure packets
 959         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
 960         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
 961
 962         // Add a new channel that skips 3
 963         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 964
 965         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 966         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 967         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 968         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 969         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 970         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 971         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 972
 973         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
 974         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
 975         hops.push(RouteHop {
 976                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
 977                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
 978                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 979                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
 980                 fee_msat: 0,
 981                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
 982         });
 983         hops.push(RouteHop {
 984                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
 985                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
 986                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 987                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
 988                 fee_msat: 0,
 989                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
 990         });
 991         hops.push(RouteHop {
 992                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
 993                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
 994                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 995                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
 996                 fee_msat: 1000000,
 997                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
 998         });
 999         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1000         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1001         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1002
1003         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1004         hops.push(RouteHop {
1005                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1006                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1007                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1008                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1009                 fee_msat: 0,
1010                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1011         });
1012         hops.push(RouteHop {
1013                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1014                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1015                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1016                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1017                 fee_msat: 0,
1018                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1019         });
1020         hops.push(RouteHop {
1021                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1022                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1023                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1024                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1025                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1026                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1027         });
1028         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1029         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1030         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1031
1032         // Claim the rebalances...
1033         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1034         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1035
1036         // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1037         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1038
1039         // Send some payments across both channels
1040         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1041         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1042         let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1043
1044
1045         route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1046         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1047         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1048         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1049
1050         //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1051
1052         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1053         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1054         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1055
1056         // Close down the channels...
1057         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1058         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1059         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1060         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1061         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1062         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1063         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1064         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1065         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1066         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1067         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1068         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1069         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1070         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1071         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1072 }
1073
1074 #[test]
1075 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1076         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1077         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1078         // commitment dance rounds.
1079         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1080         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1081         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1082         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1083         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1084         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1085
1086         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1087         for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1088                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1089                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1090                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1091         }
1092         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1093
1094         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1095         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1096         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1097         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1098
1099         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1100         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1101         // another HTLC.
1102         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1103         {
1104                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1105                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1106                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1107                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1108         }
1109
1110         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1111         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1112         {
1113                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1114                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1115         }
1116
1117         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1118         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1119         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1120         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1121
1122         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1123         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1124         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1125         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1126         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1127         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1128         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1129
1130         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1131         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1132         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1133
1134         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1135
1136         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1137         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1138         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1139         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1140
1141         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1142         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1143         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1144         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1145
1146         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1147         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1148         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1149
1150         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1151                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1152         }
1153         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1154         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1155         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1156         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1157         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1158
1159         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1160         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1161         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1162         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1163         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1164
1165         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1166         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1167
1168         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1169
1170         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1171         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1172         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1173                 match event {
1174                         &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1175                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1176                         },
1177                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1178                 };
1179         }
1180
1181         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1182                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1183         }
1184
1185         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1186 }
1187
1188 #[test]
1189 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1190         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1191         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1192         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1193         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1194         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1195         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1196
1197         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1198         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1199         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1200         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1201         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1202         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1203
1204         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1205
1206         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1207         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1208
1209         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1210         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1211
1212         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1213         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1214         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1215 }
1216
1217 #[test]
1218 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1219         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1220         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1221         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1222         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1223         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1224         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1225         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1226
1227         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1228
1229         // balancing
1230         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1231
1232         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1233
1234         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1235         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1236         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1237
1238         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1239         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1240         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1241
1242         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1243         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1244
1245         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1246         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1247         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1248                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1249                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1250                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1251                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1252                 }
1253         }
1254         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1255
1256         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1257         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1258         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1259         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1260
1261         // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1262         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1263         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1264         assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1265         assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1266         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1267         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1268         check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1269
1270         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1271         assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1272         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1273
1274         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1275         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1276         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1277         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1278         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1279         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1280         check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1281         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1282
1283         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1284         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1285         for e in events {
1286                 match e {
1287                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1288                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1289                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1290                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1291                         },
1292                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1293                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1294                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1295                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1296                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1297                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1298                         },
1299                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1300                 }
1301         }
1302 }
1303
1304 #[test]
1305 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1306         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1307         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1308         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1309         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1310         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1311
1312         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1313         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1314
1315         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1316         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2));
1317         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1318         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1319         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1320         match err {
1321                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1322                         match &fails[0] {
1323                                 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1324                                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1325                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1326                         }
1327                 },
1328                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1329         }
1330         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1331         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1332
1333         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1334 }
1335
1336 #[test]
1337 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1338         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1339         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1340         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1341         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1342         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1343
1344         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1345         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1346         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1347         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1348
1349         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1350
1351         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1352         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1353         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1354         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1355                 channel_id: chan.2,
1356                 htlc_id: 0,
1357                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1358                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1359                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1360                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1361         };
1362
1363         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1364
1365         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1366         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1367         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1368
1369         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1370
1371         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1372
1373         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1374         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1375         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1376                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1377                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1378                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1379                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1380                 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1381
1382                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1383                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1384                  chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1385                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1386                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1387         };
1388         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1389                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1390                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1391                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1392                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1393                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1394                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1395                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1396         };
1397
1398         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1399         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1400                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1401
1402         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1403         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1404         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1405
1406         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1407                 offered: false,
1408                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1409                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1410                 payment_hash,
1411                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1412         };
1413
1414         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1415
1416         let res = {
1417                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1418                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1419                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1420                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1421                         commitment_number,
1422                         95000,
1423                         local_chan_balance,
1424                         local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1425                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1426                         feerate_per_kw,
1427                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1428                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1429                 );
1430                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1431         };
1432
1433         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1434                 channel_id: chan.2,
1435                 signature: res.0,
1436                 htlc_signatures: res.1
1437         };
1438
1439         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1440         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1441         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1442
1443         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1444         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1445                 channel_id: chan.2,
1446                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1447                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1448         };
1449         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1450
1451         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1452         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1453         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1454         match events[0] {
1455                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1456                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1457                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1458                 },
1459                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1460         };
1461         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1462                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1463
1464         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1465 }
1466
1467 #[test]
1468 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1469         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1470         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1471         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1472         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1473         // this situation.
1474         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1475         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1476         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1477         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1478
1479         let opt_anchors = false;
1480
1481         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1482         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1483         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1484
1485         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1486
1487         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1488         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1489                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1490         }
1491
1492         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1493         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1494         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1495                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1496         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1497         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1498 }
1499
1500 #[test]
1501 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1502         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1503         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1504         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1505         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1506         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1507
1508         let opt_anchors = false;
1509
1510         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1511         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1512         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1513         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1514         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1515         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1516         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1517
1518         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1519         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1520                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1521         }
1522
1523         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1524         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1525         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1526         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1527         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1528         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1529         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1530         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1531         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1532                 channel_id: chan.2,
1533                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1534                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1535                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1536                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1537                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1538         };
1539
1540         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1541         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1542         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1543         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1544         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1545         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1546         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1547         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1548 }
1549
1550 #[test]
1551 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1552         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1553         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1554         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1555         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1556
1557         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1558         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1559         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1560
1561         let opt_anchors = false;
1562
1563         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1564         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1565         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1566         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1567         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1568         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1569         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1570
1571         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1572                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1573         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1574         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1575         // commitment transaction fee.
1576         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1577
1578         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1579         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1580                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1581         }
1582
1583         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1584         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1585         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1586                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1587 }
1588
1589 #[test]
1590 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1591         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1592         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1593         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1594         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1595         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1596         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1597         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1598
1599         let opt_anchors = false;
1600
1601         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1602         // HTLC.
1603         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1604         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1605         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1606                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1607
1608         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1609         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1610         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1611         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1612         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1613         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1614         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg);
1615
1616         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1617         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1618         match msg_events[0] {
1619                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1620                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1621                 },
1622                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1623         }
1624 }
1625
1626 #[test]
1627 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1628         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1629         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1630         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1631         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1632         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1633         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1634         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1635
1636         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1637         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1638         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1639         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1640         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1641         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1642
1643         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1644         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1645         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1646         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1647         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1648         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1649
1650         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1651         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1652         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1653         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1654 }
1655
1656 #[test]
1657 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1658         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1659         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1660         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1661         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1662         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1663         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1664
1665         let feemsat = 239;
1666         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1667         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1668         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1669         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1670
1671         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1672         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1673         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1674         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1675
1676         // Add a pending HTLC.
1677         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1678         let payment_event_1 = {
1679                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1680                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1681
1682                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1683                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1684                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1685         };
1686         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1687
1688         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1689         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1690         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1691         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1692         let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1693
1694         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1695         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1696         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1697         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1698         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1699         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1700         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1701         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1702                 channel_id: chan.2,
1703                 htlc_id: 1,
1704                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1705                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1706                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1707                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1708         };
1709
1710         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1711         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1712         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1713         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1714         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1715         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1716         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1717         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1718 }
1719
1720 #[test]
1721 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1722         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1723         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1724         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1725         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1726         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1727         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1728         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1729         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1730         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1731
1732         let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1733         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1734         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1735
1736         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1737         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1738 }
1739
1740 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1741         (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1742 }
1743
1744 #[test]
1745 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1746         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1747         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1748         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1749         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1750         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1751         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1752         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1753         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1754         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1755         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1756
1757         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1758         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1759
1760         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1761         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1762
1763         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1764                 ($node: expr) => {{
1765                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1766                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1767                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1768                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1769                         payment_event
1770                 }}
1771         }
1772
1773         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1774         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1775         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1776         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1777
1778         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1779
1780         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1781         {
1782                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1783                 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1784                 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1785                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1786                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1787                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1788                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1789         }
1790
1791         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1792         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1793         loop {
1794                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1795                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1796                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1797                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1798                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1799                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1800                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1801                         break;
1802                 }
1803                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1804
1805                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1806                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1807                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1808                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1809                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1810                 );
1811
1812                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1813                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1814                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1815                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1816                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1817         }
1818
1819         // adding pending output.
1820         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1821         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1822         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1823         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1824         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1825         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1826         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1827         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1828         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1829         // policy.
1830         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1831         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1832         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1833
1834         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1835         let payment_event_1 = {
1836                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1837                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1838
1839                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1840                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1841                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1842         };
1843         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1844
1845         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1846         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1847         {
1848                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1849                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1850                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1851                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1852         }
1853
1854         // split the rest to test holding cell
1855         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1856         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1857         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1858         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1859         {
1860                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1861                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1862         }
1863
1864         // now see if they go through on both sides
1865         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1866         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1867         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1868         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1869         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1870         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1871
1872         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1873         {
1874                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1875                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1876                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1877                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1878                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1879         }
1880
1881         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1882         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1883         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1884         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1885         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1886         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1887
1888         // flush the pending htlc
1889         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1890         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1891         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1892
1893         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1894         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1895         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1896         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1897
1898         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1899         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1900         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1901         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1902
1903         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1904         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1905         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1906
1907         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1908
1909         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1910         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1911         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1912
1913         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1914         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1915
1916         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1917         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1918         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1919         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1920         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1921         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1922
1923         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1924         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1925         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1926         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1927
1928         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1929         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1930
1931         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1932         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1933         match events[0] {
1934                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1935                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1936                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
1937                         match &purpose {
1938                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1939                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1940                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1941                                 },
1942                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1943                         }
1944                 },
1945                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1946         }
1947         match events[1] {
1948                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1949                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1950                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
1951                         match &purpose {
1952                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1953                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1954                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1955                                 },
1956                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1957                         }
1958                 },
1959                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1960         }
1961
1962         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1963         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1964         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1965
1966         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
1967         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1968         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1969
1970         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
1971         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1972         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1973         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
1974         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
1975
1976         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1977         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
1978 }
1979
1980 #[test]
1981 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
1982         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
1983         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
1984         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
1985         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
1986         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
1987         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
1988         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
1989         // To test this we:
1990         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
1991         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
1992         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
1993         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
1994         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
1995         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
1996         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
1997         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
1998         //    claim,
1999         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2000         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2001         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2002         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2003         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2004         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2005         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2006         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2007         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2008         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2009
2010         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2011         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2012         let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
2013         let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
2014
2015         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2016         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2017         let send_1 = {
2018                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
2019                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2020                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2021                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2022                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2023         };
2024
2025         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2026         // initial fulfill/CS.
2027         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
2028         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2029         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2030
2031         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2032         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2033         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
2034         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2035         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2036
2037         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2038         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2039         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2040         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2041         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2042
2043         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2044         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2045         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2046         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2047         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2048
2049         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2050         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2051         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2052
2053         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2054         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2055         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2056
2057         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2058         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2059         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2060
2061         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2062         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2063         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2064         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2065         // on-chain as necessary).
2066         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2067         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2068         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2069         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2070         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2071
2072         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2073         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2074         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2075
2076         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2077         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2078
2079         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2080         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2081         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2082         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2083         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2084         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2085
2086         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2087         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2088         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2089         let send_2 = {
2090                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2091                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2092                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2093                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2094                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2095         };
2096
2097         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2098         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2099         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2100         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2101
2102         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2103
2104         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2105         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2106         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2107
2108         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2109         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2110
2111         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2112         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2113         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2114         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2115
2116         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2117         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2118         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2119
2120         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2121         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2122
2123         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2124         expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2125
2126         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2127         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2128 }
2129
2130 #[test]
2131 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2132         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2133         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2134         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2135         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2136         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2137         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2138
2139         // Create some initial channels
2140         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2141         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2142         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2143         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2144
2145         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2146         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2147         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2148         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2149         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2150         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2151
2152         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2153         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2154         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2155         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2156         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2157
2158         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2159         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2160         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2161         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2162         {
2163                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2164                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2165                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2166                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2167                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2168         }
2169         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2170         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2171         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2172         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2173         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2174
2175         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2176         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2177
2178         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2179         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2180         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2181         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2182         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2183         {
2184                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2185                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2186                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2187                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2188                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2189                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2190         }
2191         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2192         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2193         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2194         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2195         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2196
2197         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2198                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2199                         {
2200                                 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2201                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2202
2203                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2204                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2205                                 match events[0] {
2206                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2207                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2208                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2209                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2210                                         },
2211                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2212                                 };
2213                         }
2214                 }
2215         }
2216
2217         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2218         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2219         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2220         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2221         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
2222         let node2_commitment_txid;
2223         {
2224                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2225                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2226                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2227                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2228
2229                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2230                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2231                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2232                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2233                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2234         }
2235         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2236         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2237         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2238         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2239         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2240
2241         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2242         // confusing us in the following tests.
2243         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2244
2245         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2246         let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2247         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2248         // buffer space).
2249
2250         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2251                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2252                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2253                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2254                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2255                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2256                                 msg.clone()
2257                         },
2258                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2259                 };
2260                 match events[1] {
2261                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2262                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2263                         },
2264                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2265                 }
2266                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2267
2268                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2269                 {
2270                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2271                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2272                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2273                                         false
2274                                 } else { true }
2275                         });
2276                 }
2277
2278                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2279
2280                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2281                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2282
2283                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2284                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2285                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2286                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2287                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2288                                 msg.clone()
2289                         },
2290                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2291                 };
2292                 match events[1] {
2293                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2294                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2295                         },
2296                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2297                 }
2298                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2299                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2300
2301                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2302                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2303                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2304         };
2305         nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2306         nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2307         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2308         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2309
2310         nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2311         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2312         check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2313 }
2314
2315 #[test]
2316 fn test_justice_tx() {
2317         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2318         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2319         alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2320         alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2321         alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2322         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2323         bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2324         bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2325         bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2326         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2327         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2328         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2329         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2330         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2331         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2332         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2333         // Create some new channels:
2334         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2335
2336         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2337         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2338         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2339         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2340         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2341         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2342         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2343         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2344         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2345         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2346         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2347         // Revoke the old state
2348         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2349
2350         {
2351                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2352                 {
2353                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2354                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2355                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2356
2357                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2358                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2359                         node_txn.truncate(1);
2360                 }
2361                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2362                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2363                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2364
2365                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2366                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2367                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2368                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2369                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2370                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2371                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2372                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2373                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2374         }
2375         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2376
2377         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2378         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2379
2380         // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2381         // Create some new channels:
2382         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2383         {
2384                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2385                 node_txn.clear();
2386         }
2387
2388         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2389         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2390         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2391         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2392         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2393         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2394         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2395         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2396         // Revoke the old state
2397         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2398         {
2399                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2400                 {
2401                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2402                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2403                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2404
2405                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2406                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2407                 }
2408                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2409                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2410
2411                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2412                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2413                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2414                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2415                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2416                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2417                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2418         }
2419         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2420         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2421         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2422 }
2423
2424 #[test]
2425 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2426         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2427         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2428         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2429         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2430         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2431         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2432         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2433         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2434         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2435         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2436         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2437         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2438         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2439         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2440
2441         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2442         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2443         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2444         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2445         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2446         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2447
2448         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2449         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2450
2451         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2452         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2453         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2454         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2455         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2456 }
2457
2458 #[test]
2459 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2460         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2461         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2462         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2463         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2464         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2465         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2466
2467         // Create some new channel:
2468         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2469
2470         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2471         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2472         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2473         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2474         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2475
2476         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2477         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2478         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2479         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2480         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2481         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2482         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2483         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2484         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2485
2486         //Revoke the old state
2487         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2488
2489         {
2490                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2491                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2492                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2493                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2494                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2495                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2496                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2497                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2498
2499                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2500                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2501
2502                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2503                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2504
2505                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2506                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2507                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2508                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2509                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2510                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2511                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2512                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2513
2514                 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2515                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2516                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2517         }
2518         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2519         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2520         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2521 }
2522
2523 #[test]
2524 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2525         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2526         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2527         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2528         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2529         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2530         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2531
2532         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2533
2534         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2535         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2536         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2537         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2538         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2539         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2540
2541         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2542         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2543
2544         //Revoke the old state
2545         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2546
2547         {
2548                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2549                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2550                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2551                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2552                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2553                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2554                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2555                 match events[1] {
2556                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2557                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2558                 }
2559
2560                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2561                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2562
2563                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2564                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2565                 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2566                 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2567                 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2568                 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2569
2570                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2571                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2572                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2573                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2574                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2575                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2576                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2577
2578                 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2579                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2580                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2581                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2582
2583                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2584                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2585                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2586
2587                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2588                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2589                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2590                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2591                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2592                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2593                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2594                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2595         }
2596         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2597         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2598         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2599 }
2600
2601 #[test]
2602 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2603         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2604         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2605         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2606         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2607         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2608         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2609         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2610         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2611         // towards B.
2612         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2613         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2614         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2615         // PaymentSent event).
2616
2617         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2618         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2619         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2620         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2621
2622         // Create some initial channels
2623         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2624         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2625
2626         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2627         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2628         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2629         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2630         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2631
2632         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2633         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2634         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2635
2636         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2637         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2638
2639         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2640         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2641         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2642         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2643         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2644         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2645         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2646         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2647         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2648         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2649         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2650         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2651         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2652
2653         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2654         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2655         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2656         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2657         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2658         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2659         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2660         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2661         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2662         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2663         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2664         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2665         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2666         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2667         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2668         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2669         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2670
2671         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2672         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2673         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2674         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2675         {
2676                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2677                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2678                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2679                 added_monitors.clear();
2680         }
2681         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2682         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2683         match forwarded_events[0] {
2684                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2685                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2686         }
2687         if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[1] {
2688                 } else { panic!(); }
2689         if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[2] {
2690                 } else { panic!(); }
2691         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2692         {
2693                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2694                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2695                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2696                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2697                 added_monitors.clear();
2698         }
2699         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2700         match events[0] {
2701                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2702                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2703         }
2704         match events[1] {
2705                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2706                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2707         }
2708
2709         match events[2] {
2710                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2711                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2712                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2713                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2714                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2715                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2716                 },
2717                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2718         };
2719         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2720                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2721                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2722                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2723                         // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2724                         // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2725                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2726                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2727                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2728                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2729                         if $htlc_offered {
2730                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2731                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2732                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2733                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2734                         } else {
2735                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2736                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2737                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2738                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2739                         }
2740                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2741                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2742                         node_txn.clear();
2743                 } }
2744         }
2745         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2746         // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2747         // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2748         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2749
2750         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2751         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2752         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2753         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2754         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2755         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2756         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2757         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2758         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2759         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2760         let commitment_spend =
2761                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2762                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2763                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2764                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2765                         &node_txn[0]
2766                 } else {
2767                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2768                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2769                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2770                         &node_txn[2]
2771                 };
2772
2773         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2774         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2775         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2776         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2777         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2778         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2779         check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2780         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2781         check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2782         check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2783         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2784         // we already checked the same situation with A.
2785
2786         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2787         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2788         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2789         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2790         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2791         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2792         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2793         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2794         let mut first_claimed = false;
2795         for event in events {
2796                 match event {
2797                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2798                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2799                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
2800                                         first_claimed = true;
2801                                 } else {
2802                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2803                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2804                                 }
2805                         },
2806                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2807                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2808                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2809                 }
2810         }
2811         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2812 }
2813
2814 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2815         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2816         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2817         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2818         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2819         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
2820         //            \                                  \
2821         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
2822
2823         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2824         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2825         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2826         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2827         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2828         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2829         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2830
2831         // Create some intial channels
2832         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2833         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2834
2835         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2836         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2837         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2838
2839         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2840
2841         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2842         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2843         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2844         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2845         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2846         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2847         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2848
2849         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2850         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2851         match events[0] {
2852                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2853                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2854                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2855                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2856                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2857                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2858                 },
2859                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2860         };
2861         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2862         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2863         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2864         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2865         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2866         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2867         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2868         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2869
2870         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2871         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2872         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2873         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2874         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2875         let timeout_tx;
2876         {
2877                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2878                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2879                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2880                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2881
2882                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2883                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2884
2885                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2886                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2887                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2888                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2889
2890                 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2891                 node_txn.clear();
2892         }
2893
2894         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2895         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2896         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2897         {
2898                 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2899                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2900                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2901                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2902         }
2903
2904         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2905         {
2906                 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2907                 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2908                 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2909                 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2910                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2911                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2912                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2913                 } else {
2914                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2915                 }
2916         }
2917
2918         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2919         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2920         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2921         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2922         match events[0] {
2923                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2924                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2925                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2926                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2927                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2928                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2929                 },
2930                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2931         };
2932
2933         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2934         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2935         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2936
2937         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2938         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2939
2940         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2941         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2942         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2943         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2944         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2945         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2946         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2947         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2948         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2949 }
2950
2951 #[test]
2952 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2953         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2954         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2955         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2956 }
2957
2958 #[test]
2959 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
2960         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
2961         // and fail backward accordingly.
2962
2963         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2964         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2965         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2966         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2967
2968         // Create some initial channels
2969         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2970         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2971
2972         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2973         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
2974         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2975         // Revoke the old state
2976         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
2977
2978         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2979
2980         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2981         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2982         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2983         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2984         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2985
2986         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2987         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2988         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2989         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2990         match events[0] {
2991                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
2992                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2993                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2994                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2995                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2996                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2997
2998                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2999                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3000                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3001                 },
3002                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3003         }
3004 }
3005
3006 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3007         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3008         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3009         // commitment transaction anymore.
3010         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3011         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3012         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3013         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3014         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3015         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3016         // transactions:
3017         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3018         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3019         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3020         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3021         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3022         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3023         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3024         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3025         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3026
3027         // Create some initial channels
3028         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3029         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3030
3031         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3032         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3033         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3034         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3035         // Revoke the old state
3036         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3037
3038         let value = if use_dust {
3039                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3040                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3041                 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3042         } else { 3000000 };
3043
3044         let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3045         let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3046         let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3047
3048         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
3049         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3050         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3051         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3052         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3053         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3054         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3055         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3056         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3057         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3058         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3059         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3060
3061         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
3062         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3063         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3064         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3065         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3066         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3067         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3068         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3069         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3070         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3071         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3072         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3073         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3074         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3075         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3076         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3077
3078         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
3079         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3080         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3081         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3082         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3083         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3084         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3085         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3086         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3087         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3088         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3089         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3090         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3091         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3092         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3093         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3094         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3095         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3096
3097         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3098         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3099         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3100         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3101         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3102         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3103         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3104
3105         if deliver_bs_raa {
3106                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3107                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3108                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3109                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3110                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3111                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3112                 match events[0] {
3113                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3114                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3115                 };
3116                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3117                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3118         }
3119
3120         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3121         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3122
3123         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3124         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3125         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3126         assert!(ANTI_REORG_DELAY > PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS); // We assume payments will also expire
3127
3128         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3129         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 4 });
3130         match events[0] {
3131                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3132                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3133         }
3134         match events[1] {
3135                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3136                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3137                 },
3138                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3139         }
3140         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3141                 match events[2] {
3142                         Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3143                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3144                         },
3145                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3146                 }
3147                 match events[3] {
3148                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3149                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3150                 };
3151         }
3152         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3153         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3154
3155         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3156         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3157         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3158                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3159                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3160         }
3161         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3162                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3163                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3164                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3165                 },
3166                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3167         }
3168         if deliver_bs_raa {
3169                 match events[0] {
3170                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3171                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3172                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3173                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3174                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3175                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3176                         },
3177                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3178                 }
3179         }
3180         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3181                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3182                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3183                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3184                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3185                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3186                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3187
3188                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3189                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3190                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3191
3192                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3193
3194                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3195                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3196                         match events[0] {
3197                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3198                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3199                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3200                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3201                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3202                                                 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3203                                         }
3204                                 },
3205                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3206                         }
3207                         match events[1] {
3208                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3209                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3210                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3211                                 },
3212                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3213                         }
3214                         match events[2] {
3215                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3216                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3217                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3218                                 },
3219                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3220                         }
3221                 },
3222                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3223         }
3224
3225         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3226         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3227         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3228 }
3229
3230 #[test]
3231 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3232         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3233         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3234         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3235         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3236 }
3237
3238 #[test]
3239 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3240         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3241         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3242         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3243         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3244 }
3245
3246 #[test]
3247 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3248         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3249         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3250         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3251         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3252         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3253
3254         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3255         {
3256                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3257                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3258                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3259
3260                 let payment_event = {
3261                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3262                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3263                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3264                 };
3265                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3266                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3267         }
3268
3269         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3270         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3271         {
3272                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3273                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3274
3275                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3276         }
3277
3278         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3279         {
3280                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3281
3282                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3283                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3284                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3285                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3286                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3287                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3288
3289                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3290                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3291                         channel_id: chan.2,
3292                         htlc_id: 0,
3293                         amount_msat: 0,
3294                         payment_hash,
3295                         cltv_expiry,
3296                         onion_routing_packet,
3297                 };
3298                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3299         }
3300         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3301         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3302         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3303         match events[0] {
3304                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3305                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3306                 },
3307                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3308         }
3309         match events[1] {
3310                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3311                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3312                 },
3313                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3314         }
3315         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3316         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3317 }
3318
3319 #[test]
3320 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3321         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3322         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3323         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3324         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3325         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3326         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3327         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3328
3329         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3330         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
3331         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3332         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3333         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3334         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3335
3336         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3337         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3338         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3339
3340         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3341         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3342         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3343         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3344         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3345
3346         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3347         // registering new transactions
3348         header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3349         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3350 }
3351
3352 #[test]
3353 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3354         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3355         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3356         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3357         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3358         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3359         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3360         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3361
3362         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3363
3364         let mut payment_event = {
3365                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3366                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3367
3368                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3369                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3370                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3371         };
3372
3373         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3374         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3375
3376         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3377
3378         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3379         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3380         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3381         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3382
3383         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3384         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3385         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3386         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3387         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3388
3389         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3390         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3391         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3392
3393         nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
3394         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3395         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3396         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3397         let tx = {
3398                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3399                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3400                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3401                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3402                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3403                 node_txn.remove(0)
3404         };
3405
3406         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3407
3408         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3409         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3410         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3411         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3412
3413         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3414         {
3415                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3416                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3417         }
3418         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3419         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3420         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3421         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3422         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3423         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3424         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3425
3426         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3427 }
3428
3429 #[test]
3430 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3431         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3432         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3433         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3434         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3435
3436         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3437         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3438         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3439         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3440         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3441
3442         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3443
3444         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3445         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3446         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3447         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3448         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3449
3450         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3451         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3452
3453         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3454         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3455 }
3456
3457 #[test]
3458 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3459         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3460         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3461         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3462         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3463         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3464         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3465         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3466
3467         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3468         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3469         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3470
3471         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3472         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3473         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3474         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3475
3476         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3477         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3478         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3479
3480         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3481         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3482         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3483         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3484
3485         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3486         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3487
3488         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3489         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3490
3491         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3492         {
3493                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3494                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3495                 match events[0] {
3496                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3497                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3498                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3499                         },
3500                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3501                 }
3502                 match events[1] {
3503                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3504                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3505                                 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3506                         },
3507                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3508                 }
3509                 match events[2] {
3510                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3511                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3512                 }
3513         }
3514
3515         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3516         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3517 }
3518
3519 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3520         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3521         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3522         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3523         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3524         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3525
3526         let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3527         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3528                 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3529                 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3530                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3531                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3532                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3533         } else {
3534                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3535         }
3536
3537         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3538
3539         let payment_event = {
3540                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3541                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3542
3543                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3544                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3545                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3546         };
3547         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3548
3549         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3550                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3551         } else {
3552                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3553                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3554                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3555                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3556                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3557
3558                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3559                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3560                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3561                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3562
3563                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3564                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3565                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3566                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3567                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3568
3569                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3570                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3571                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3572                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3573                                         }
3574                                 }
3575                         }
3576                 }
3577         }
3578
3579         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3580         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3581         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3582                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3583                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3584                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3585                         //
3586                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3587                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3588                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3589                         //
3590                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3591                         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3592                 }
3593                 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3594                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3595                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3596         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3597                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3598                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3599         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3600                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3601                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3602         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3603                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3604                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3605         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3606                 // Everything was delivered...
3607                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3608         }
3609
3610         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3611         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3612         match events_1[0] {
3613                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3614                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3615         };
3616
3617         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3618         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3619         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3620
3621         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3622
3623         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3624         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3625         match events_2[0] {
3626                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3627                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3628                         assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3629                         match &purpose {
3630                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3631                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3632                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3633                                 },
3634                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3635                         }
3636                 },
3637                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3638         }
3639
3640         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3641         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3642
3643         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3644         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3645         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3646                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3647                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3648                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3649                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3650                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3651                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3652                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3653                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3654                 },
3655                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3656         };
3657
3658         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3659                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3660
3661                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3662                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3663                 match events_4[0] {
3664                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3665                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3666                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3667                         },
3668                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3669                 }
3670
3671                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3672                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3673                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3674                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3675
3676                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3677                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3678                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3679                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3680
3681                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3682                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3683                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3684                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3685                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3686
3687                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3688                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3689                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3690                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3691                                         }
3692                                 }
3693                         }
3694                 }
3695         }
3696
3697         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3698         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3699         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3700                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3701                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3702                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3703                 } else {
3704                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3705                 }
3706         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3707                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3708                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3709         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3710                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3711                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3712         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3713                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3714                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3715         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3716                 // Everything was delivered...
3717                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3718         }
3719
3720         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3721                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3722         }
3723
3724         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3725         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3726         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3727
3728         if messages_delivered > 2 {
3729                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3730         }
3731
3732         // Channel should still work fine...
3733         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3734         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3735         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3736 }
3737
3738 #[test]
3739 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3740         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3741         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3742         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3743         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3744 }
3745
3746 #[test]
3747 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3748         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3749         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3750         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3751         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3752 }
3753
3754 #[test]
3755 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3756         // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3757         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3758         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3759         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3760         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3761         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3762         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3763         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3764         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3765
3766         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3767         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3768
3769         confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3770         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3771         assert!(events_1.is_empty());
3772
3773         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3774
3775         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3776         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3777
3778         confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3779         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3780         assert!(events_2.is_empty());
3781
3782         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3783         let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3784         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3785         let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3786
3787         // nodes[0] hasn't yet received a funding_locked, so it only sends that on reconnect.
3788         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
3789         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3790         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3791         let as_funding_locked = match events_3[0] {
3792                 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3793                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3794                         msg.clone()
3795                 },
3796                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_3[0]),
3797         };
3798
3799         // nodes[1] received nodes[0]'s funding_locked on the first reconnect above, so it should send
3800         // announcement_signatures as well as channel_update.
3801         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
3802         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3803         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 3);
3804         let chan_id;
3805         let bs_funding_locked = match events_4[0] {
3806                 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3807                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3808                         chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3809                         msg.clone()
3810                 },
3811                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[0]),
3812         };
3813         let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_4[1] {
3814                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3815                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3816                         msg.clone()
3817                 },
3818                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[1]),
3819         };
3820         match events_4[2] {
3821                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3822                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3823                 },
3824                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[2]),
3825         }
3826
3827         // Re-deliver nodes[0]'s funding_locked, which nodes[1] can safely ignore. It currently
3828         // generates a duplicative private channel_update
3829         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
3830         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3831         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3832         match events_5[0] {
3833                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3834                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3835                 },
3836                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_5[0]),
3837         };
3838
3839         // When we deliver nodes[1]'s funding_locked, however, nodes[0] will generate its
3840         // announcement_signatures.
3841         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_locked);
3842         let events_6 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3843         assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
3844         let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
3845                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3846                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3847                         msg.clone()
3848                 },
3849                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_6[0]),
3850         };
3851
3852         // When we deliver nodes[1]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[0], nodes[0] should immediately
3853         // broadcast the channel announcement globally, as well as re-send its (now-public)
3854         // channel_update.
3855         nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3856         let events_7 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3857         assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3858         let (chan_announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
3859                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3860                         (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3861                 },
3862                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_7[0]),
3863         };
3864
3865         // Finally, deliver nodes[0]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[1] and make sure it creates the
3866         // same channel_announcement.
3867         nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3868         let events_8 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3869         assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3870         let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
3871                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3872                         assert_eq!(*msg, chan_announcement);
3873                         update_msg.clone()
3874                 },
3875                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_8[0]),
3876         };
3877
3878         // Provide the channel announcement and public updates to the network graph
3879         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap();
3880         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3881         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3882
3883         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3884         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3885         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3886
3887         // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3888         // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3889         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3890
3891         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3892         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3893         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3894
3895         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3896         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3897         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3898         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3899         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3900         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3901                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3902         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3903
3904         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3905         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3906                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3907                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3908                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3909                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3910                         keys_manager,
3911                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3912                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3913                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3914                         logger: nodes[0].logger,
3915                         channel_monitors,
3916                 }).unwrap()
3917         };
3918         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
3919         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
3920
3921         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
3922         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
3923         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3924
3925         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3926
3927         // The channel announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
3928         nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
3929         let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3930         let mut found_announcement = false;
3931         for event in msgs.iter() {
3932                 match event {
3933                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
3934                                 if *msg == chan_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
3935                         },
3936                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
3937                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3938                 }
3939         }
3940         assert!(found_announcement);
3941 }
3942
3943 #[test]
3944 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3945         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3946         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3947         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3948         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3949         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3950         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3951         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3952
3953         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
3954
3955         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3956         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3957         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
3958         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3959
3960         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3961         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3962         match events_1[0] {
3963                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3964                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3965         }
3966
3967         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
3968         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3969
3970         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3971         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3972         match events_2[0] {
3973                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3974                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3975                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3976                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3977                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3978                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3979                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3980
3981                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3982                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3983                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3984                         match events_3[0] {
3985                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3986                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3987                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3988                                 },
3989                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3990                         }
3991
3992                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3993                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3994                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3995                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3996                 },
3997                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3998         }
3999
4000         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4001         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4002
4003         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4004         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4005         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4006         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4007         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4008         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4009
4010         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4011         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4012         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4013         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4014
4015         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4016         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4017
4018         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4019         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4020
4021         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4022
4023         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4024         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4025         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4026         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4027         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4028         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4029         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4030         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4031         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4032         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4033
4034         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4035         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4036         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4037         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4038         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4039         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4040         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4041         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4042
4043         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4044         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4045         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4046         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4047         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4048         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4049         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4050         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4051
4052         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4053         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4054         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4055         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4056
4057         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4058         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4059         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4060         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4061
4062         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4063         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4064         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4065
4066         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4067
4068         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4069         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4070         match events_5[0] {
4071                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4072                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4073                         match &purpose {
4074                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4075                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4076                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4077                                 },
4078                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4079                         }
4080                 },
4081                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4082         }
4083
4084         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4085         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4086         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4087
4088         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4089         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4090 }
4091
4092 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4093         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4094         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4095         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4096         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4097         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4098         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4099
4100         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4101
4102         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4103                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4104                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4105                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4106                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4107                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4108                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4109                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4110                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4111                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4112                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4113                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4114                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4115                 our_payment_hash
4116         } else {
4117                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4118         };
4119
4120         let mut block = Block {
4121                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4122                 txdata: vec![],
4123         };
4124         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4125         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4126         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4127         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4128                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4129                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4130                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4131         }
4132
4133         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4134
4135         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4136         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4137         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4138         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4139         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4140         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4141
4142         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4143         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4144         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4145         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4146         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4147         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4148 }
4149
4150 #[test]
4151 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4152         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4153         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4154 }
4155
4156 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4157         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4158         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4159         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4160         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4161         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4162         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4163         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4164
4165         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4166         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4167         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4168         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4169
4170         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4171         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4172         {
4173                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4174         }
4175         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4176         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4177
4178         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4179         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4180         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4181         sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4182         if forwarded_htlc {
4183                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4184                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4185                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4186                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4187                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4188         }
4189         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4190
4191         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4192         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4193         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4194         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4195
4196         if forwarded_htlc {
4197                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4198                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4199                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4200                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4201                 match fail_commit[0] {
4202                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4203                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4204                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4205                         },
4206                         _ => unreachable!(),
4207                 }
4208                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4209         } else {
4210                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4211                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4212                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
4213                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4214                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4215                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
4216                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4217                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4218         }
4219 }
4220
4221 #[test]
4222 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4223         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4224         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4225 }
4226
4227 #[test]
4228 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4229         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4230         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4231         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4232         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4233         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4234         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4235         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4236         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4237         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4238
4239         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4240
4241         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4242
4243         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4244         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4245         get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4246                 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4247
4248         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4249         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4250         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4251         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4252         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4253         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4254         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4255         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4256                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4257         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4258
4259         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4260         let config = UserConfig::default();
4261         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4262                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4263                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4264                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4265                         default_config: config,
4266                         keys_manager,
4267                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4268                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4269                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4270                         logger: &logger,
4271                         channel_monitors,
4272                 }).unwrap()
4273         };
4274         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4275         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4276
4277         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4278         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4279         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4280         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4281
4282         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4283         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4284         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4285         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4286
4287         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4288         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4289         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4290         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4291
4292         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4293         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4294         for node in nodes.iter() {
4295                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4296                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4297                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4298         }
4299
4300         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4301 }
4302
4303 #[test]
4304 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4305         // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4306         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4307         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4308         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4309         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4310         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4311         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4312         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4313         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4314         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4315
4316         // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4317         let channel_value = 100000;
4318         let push_msat = 10001;
4319         let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4320         let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4321         let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4322         let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4323         node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4324         node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4325         node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4326
4327         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
4328
4329         node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4330         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4331
4332         node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4333         {
4334                 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4335                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4336                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4337                 added_monitors.clear();
4338         }
4339
4340         let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4341         node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4342         {
4343                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4344                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4345                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4346                 added_monitors.clear();
4347         }
4348         // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4349
4350         nodes.push(node_a);
4351         nodes.push(node_b);
4352
4353         // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4354         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4355         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4356         get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4357
4358         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4359         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4360         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4361         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4362         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4363         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4364         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4365         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4366                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4367         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4368
4369         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4370         let config = UserConfig::default();
4371         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4372                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4373                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4374                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4375                         default_config: config,
4376                         keys_manager,
4377                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4378                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4379                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4380                         logger: &logger,
4381                         channel_monitors,
4382                 }).unwrap()
4383         };
4384         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4385         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4386
4387         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4388
4389         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4390         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4391
4392         // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4393         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4394         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4395         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4396         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4397
4398         // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4399         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4400         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4401
4402         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4403         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4404         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4405         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4406
4407         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4408         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4409         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4410         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4411
4412         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4413         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4414         for node in nodes.iter() {
4415                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4416                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4417                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4418         }
4419
4420         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4421 }
4422
4423 #[test]
4424 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4425         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4426         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4427         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4428         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4429         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4430         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4431         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4432         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4433         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4434         let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4435
4436         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4437         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4438
4439         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4440
4441         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4442         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4443         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4444
4445         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4446         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4447         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4448         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4449         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4450         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4451         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4452         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4453                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4454         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4455
4456         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4457         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4458                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4459                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4460                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4461                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4462                         keys_manager,
4463                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4464                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4465                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4466                         logger: &logger,
4467                         channel_monitors,
4468                 }).unwrap()
4469         };
4470         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4471         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4472
4473         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4474         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4475         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4476
4477         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4478
4479         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4480         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4481 }
4482
4483 #[test]
4484 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4485         // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4486         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4487         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4488         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4489         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4490         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4491         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4492         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4493         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4494         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4495         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4496         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4497         let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4498
4499         let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4500         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4501                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4502                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4503                 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4504         }
4505
4506         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4507
4508         // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4509         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4510
4511         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4512         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4513         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4514         nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4515
4516         // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4517         // nodes[3])
4518         let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4519         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4520                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4521                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4522                 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4523         }
4524
4525         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4526         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4527         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4528         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4529         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4530         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4531
4532
4533         let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4534         for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4535                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4536                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4537                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4538                 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4539         }
4540
4541         let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4542         for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4543                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4544                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4545                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4546                 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4547         }
4548
4549         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4550         if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4551                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4552                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4553                 keys_manager,
4554                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4555                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4556                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4557                 logger: &logger,
4558                 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4559         }) { } else {
4560                 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4561         };
4562
4563         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4564         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4565                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4566                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4567                 keys_manager,
4568                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4569                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4570                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4571                 logger: &logger,
4572                 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4573         }).unwrap();
4574         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4575         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4576
4577         { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4578                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4579                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4580                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4581                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4582         }
4583
4584         for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4585                 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4586                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4587         }
4588         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4589         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4590
4591         // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4592         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4593         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4594         //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4595         claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4596
4597         nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4598         let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4599         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4600         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4601         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4602         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4603         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4604                 match action {
4605                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4606                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4607                         },
4608                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4609                 }
4610         }
4611 }
4612
4613 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4614         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4615                 {
4616                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4617                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4618                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4619                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4620                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4621                                 match event {
4622                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4623                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4624                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4625                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4626                                                 }
4627                                         },
4628                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4629                                 };
4630                         }
4631                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4632                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4633                                         txn.push(tx);
4634                                 }
4635                         }
4636                         txn
4637                 }
4638         }
4639 }
4640
4641 #[test]
4642 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4643         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4644         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4645         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4646         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4647         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4648
4649         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4650         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4651         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4652         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4653         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4654         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4655         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4656         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4657         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4658
4659         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4660         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4661
4662         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4663         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4664         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4665         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4666         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4667 }
4668
4669 #[test]
4670 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4671         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4672         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4673         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4674         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4675         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4676         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4677
4678         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4679         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4680         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4681         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4682         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4683
4684         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4685         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4686         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4687         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4688
4689         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4690         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4691         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4692         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4693         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4694
4695         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4696         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4697         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4698 }
4699
4700 #[test]
4701 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4702         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4703         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4704
4705         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4706         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4707         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4708         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4709
4710         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4711         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4712         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4713         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4714         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4715
4716         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4717         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4718         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4719         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4720         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4721
4722         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4723         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4724         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4725
4726         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4727         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4728         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4729         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4730         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4731 }
4732
4733 #[test]
4734 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4735         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4736         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4737         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4738         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4739
4740         // Create some initial channels
4741         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4742
4743         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4744
4745         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4746         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4747         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4748
4749         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4750         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4751         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4752         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4753         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4754         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4755         match events[0] {
4756                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4757                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4758         }
4759         match events[1] {
4760                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4761                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4762         }
4763
4764         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4765         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4766         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4767         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4768         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4769         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4770         check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4771
4772         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4773         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4774         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4775
4776         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4777         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4778         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4779 }
4780
4781 #[test]
4782 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4783         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4784         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4785         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4786         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4787
4788         // Create some initial channels
4789         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4790
4791         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4792         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4793
4794         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4795
4796         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4797         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4798         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4799
4800         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4801         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4802         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4803         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4804         match events[0] {
4805                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4806                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4807         }
4808         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4809
4810         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4811         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4812         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4813         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4814         check_spends!(node_txn[1],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4815         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4816
4817         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4818         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4819         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4820         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4821
4822         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4823         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4824         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4825         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4826         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4827 }
4828
4829 #[test]
4830 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4831         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4832         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4833         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4834         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4835
4836         // Create some initial channels
4837         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4838
4839         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4840         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4841         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4842         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4843
4844         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4845
4846         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4847         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4848         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4849         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4850
4851         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4852         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4853         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4854         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4855
4856         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4857         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4858
4859         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4860         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4861         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4862 }
4863
4864 #[test]
4865 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4866         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4867         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4868         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4869         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4870         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4871
4872         // Create some initial channels
4873         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4874
4875         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4876         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4877         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4878         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4879
4880         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4881
4882         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4883         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4884         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4885         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4886         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4887         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4888
4889         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4890         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4891         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4892         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4893         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4894         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4895         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4896
4897         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4898         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4899         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4900         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4901         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4902         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4903
4904         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4905         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4906         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4907         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4908         // transactions next...
4909         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4910         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4911
4912         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4913         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4914         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4915                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4916         } else {
4917                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4918                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4919         }
4920
4921         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4922         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4923
4924         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4925         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4926
4927         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4928         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4929         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4930         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4931         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4932 }
4933
4934 #[test]
4935 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4936         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4937         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4938         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4939         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4940         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4941
4942         // Create some initial channels
4943         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4944
4945         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4946         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4947         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4948         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4949
4950         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4951         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4952
4953         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4954
4955         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4956         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4957         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4958         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4959         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4960         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4961
4962         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4963         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4964         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4965         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4966
4967         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4968         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4969         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4970
4971         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4972         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4973         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4974         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4975         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4976         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4977
4978         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4979         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4980
4981         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4982         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4983         // transactions next...
4984         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4985         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4986         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4987                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4988         } else {
4989                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4990                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4991         }
4992
4993         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4994         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4995
4996         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4997
4998         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4999         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5000
5001         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
5002         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
5003
5004         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5005         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5006         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5007         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5008         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
5009         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5010         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
5011         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
5012 }
5013
5014 #[test]
5015 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
5016         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
5017         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
5018         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
5019         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
5020         // channel.
5021         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
5022         // gets broadcast.
5023
5024         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5025         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5026         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5027         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5028
5029         // Create some initial channels
5030         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5031         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5032
5033         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5034         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5035         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5036         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5037         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5038
5039         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5040         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5041         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5042
5043         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
5044         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5045         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5046         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5047         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5048         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5049         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5050         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5051         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5052         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5053
5054         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5055         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5056         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5057         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5058
5059         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5060         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5061         assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5062         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5063         check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5064         check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5065         assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5066         assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5067         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5068         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5069
5070         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5071         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5072         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5073         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5074         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5075         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5076         match events[0] {
5077                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5078                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5079         }
5080         match events[1] {
5081                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
5082                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5083                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5084                 },
5085                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5086         }
5087         {
5088                 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5089                 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5090                 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5091                 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5092                 b_txn.clear();
5093         }
5094         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5095         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5096         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5097         match msg_events[0] {
5098                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5099                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5100         }
5101         match msg_events[1] {
5102                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5103                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5104         }
5105         match msg_events[2] {
5106                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5107                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5108                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5109                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5110                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5111                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5112                 },
5113                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5114         };
5115         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5116         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5117         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5118         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5119         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5120         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5121         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5122         check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5123         check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5124         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5125         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5126         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5127         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5128
5129         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5130         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5131 }
5132
5133 #[test]
5134 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5135         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5136         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5137         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5138         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5139         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5140         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5141         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5142         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5143         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5144         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5145         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5146                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5147         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5148
5149         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5150         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5151         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5152
5153         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5154         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5155         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5156         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5157         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5158
5159         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
5160
5161         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5162         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5163         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5164         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5165         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], vec![], 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5166         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5167
5168         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5169         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5170         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5171
5172         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5173         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5174         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5175         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5176         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5177
5178         let htlc_timeout_tx;
5179         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5180                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5181                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5182                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5183                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5184
5185                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5186                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5187                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5188                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5189                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5190                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5191                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5192
5193                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5194                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5195                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5196                 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5197         }
5198
5199         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5200         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5201         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5202         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5203         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5204         match events[0] {
5205                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5206                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5207         }
5208         match events[1] {
5209                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5210                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5211         }
5212         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5213         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5214         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5215         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5216         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5217         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5218         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5219         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5220         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5221         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5222         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5223         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5224         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5225
5226         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5227         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5228         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5229         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5230         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5231         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5232         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5233         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5234         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5235         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5236
5237         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5238         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5239         {
5240                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5241         }
5242         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5243
5244         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5245         // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5246         // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5247         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5248         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], Some(196*2), true);
5249         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5250         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5251         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5252         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5253         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5254         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5255         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5256
5257         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5258         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5259
5260         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5261         match events[0] {
5262                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5263                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5264                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5265                 }
5266                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5267         }
5268 }
5269
5270 #[test]
5271 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5272         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5273         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5274         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5275         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5276
5277         // Create some initial channels
5278         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5279
5280         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5281         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5282         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5283         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5284         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5285
5286         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5287         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5288         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5289         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5290         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5291         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5292         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5293         match events[0] {
5294                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5295                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5296         }
5297         match events[1] {
5298                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5299                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5300         }
5301         let node_tx = {
5302                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5303                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5304                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5305                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5306                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5307                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5308                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5309                 node_txn[0].clone()
5310         };
5311
5312         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5313         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5314
5315         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5316         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5317         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5318         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5319         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5320         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5321 }
5322
5323 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5324         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5325         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5326         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5327         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5328         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5329         // use the same payment hashes.
5330         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5331         //
5332         // A \         / E
5333         //    - C - D -
5334         // B /         \ F
5335         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5336         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5337         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5338         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5339         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5340         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5341         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5342         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5343                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5344         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5345
5346         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5347         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5348         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5349         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5350         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5351
5352         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5353         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5354         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5355         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5356
5357         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5358         // 0th HTLC:
5359         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5360         // 1st HTLC:
5361         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5362         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5363         // 2nd HTLC:
5364         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5365         // 3rd HTLC:
5366         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5367         // 4th HTLC:
5368         let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5369         // 5th HTLC:
5370         let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5371         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5372         // 6th HTLC:
5373         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5374         // 7th HTLC:
5375         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5376
5377         // 8th HTLC:
5378         let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5379         // 9th HTLC:
5380         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5381         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5382
5383         // 10th HTLC:
5384         let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5385         // 11th HTLC:
5386         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5387         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5388
5389         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5390         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5391         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5392         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5393         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5394
5395         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5396         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5397         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5398         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5399         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5400         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5401         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5402         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5403         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5404
5405         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5406         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5407         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5408         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5409         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5410         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5411
5412         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5413         assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5414         assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5415         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5416         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5417         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5418
5419         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5420         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5421         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5422         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5423
5424         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5425
5426         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5427         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5428         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5429         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5430         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5431         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5432         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5433         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5434         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5435         if deliver_last_raa {
5436                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5437         } else {
5438                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5439         }
5440
5441         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5442         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5443         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5444         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5445         //
5446         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5447         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5448         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5449         //
5450         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5451         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5452         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5453
5454         if announce_latest {
5455                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5456         } else {
5457                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5458         }
5459         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5460         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5461                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5462                 events[1].clone()
5463         } else {
5464                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5465                 events[0].clone()
5466         };
5467         match close_event {
5468                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5469                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5470         }
5471
5472         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5473         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5474         if deliver_last_raa {
5475                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5476         } else {
5477                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5478         }
5479         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5480
5481         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5482         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5483         let mut a_done = false;
5484         for msg in cs_msgs {
5485                 match msg {
5486                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5487                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5488                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5489                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5490                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5491                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5492                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5493                                         }
5494                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5495                                         assert!(!a_done);
5496                                         a_done = true;
5497                                         &nodes[0]
5498                                 } else {
5499                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5500                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5501                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5502                                         }
5503                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5504                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5505                                         &nodes[1]
5506                                 };
5507                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5508                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5509                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5510                                 if announce_latest {
5511                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5512                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5513                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5514                                         }
5515                                 }
5516                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5517                         },
5518                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5519                 }
5520         }
5521
5522         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5523         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5524         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5525         let mut as_updates = 0;
5526         for event in as_events.iter() {
5527                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5528                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5529                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5530                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5531                         } else {
5532                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5533                         }
5534                         if network_update.is_some() {
5535                                 as_updates += 1;
5536                         }
5537                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5538         }
5539         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5540         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5541         if announce_latest {
5542                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5543                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5544         }
5545         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5546
5547         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5548         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5549         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5550         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5551         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5552                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5553                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5554                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5555                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5556                         } else {
5557                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5558                         }
5559                         if network_update.is_some() {
5560                                 bs_updates += 1;
5561                         }
5562                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5563         }
5564         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5565         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5566         if announce_latest {
5567                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5568         }
5569         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5570
5571         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5572         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5573         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5574         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5575         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5576         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5577 }
5578
5579 #[test]
5580 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5581         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5582 }
5583
5584 #[test]
5585 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5586         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5587 }
5588
5589 #[test]
5590 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5591         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5592         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5593         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5594 }
5595
5596 #[test]
5597 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5598         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5599         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5600         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5601         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5602
5603         // Create some initial channels
5604         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5605
5606         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5607         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5608         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5609         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5610
5611         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5612         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5613         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5614         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5615         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5616         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5617
5618         let htlc_timeout = {
5619                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5620                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5621                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5622                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5623                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5624                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5625                 node_txn[1].clone()
5626         };
5627
5628         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5629         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5630         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5631
5632         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5633         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5634         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5635         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5636         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5637         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5638         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5639         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5640         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5641         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5642                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5643 }
5644
5645 #[test]
5646 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5647         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5648         // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5649         // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5650
5651         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5652
5653         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5654         let seed = [42; 32];
5655         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5656         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5657         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph: &chanmon_cfgs[0].network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5658         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5659         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5660         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5661
5662         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5663         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5664
5665         // Create some initial channels
5666         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5667         // for node 0
5668         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5669         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5670         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5671
5672         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5673         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5674         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5675         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5676         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5677
5678         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5679         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5680         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5681         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5682         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5683
5684         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5685         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5686         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5687         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5688             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5689             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5690             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5691                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5692         }
5693
5694         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5695         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5696         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5697         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5698         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5699         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5700
5701         let htlc_timeout = {
5702                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5703                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5704                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5705                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5706                 node_txn[1].clone()
5707         };
5708
5709         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5710         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5711         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5712
5713         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5714         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5715         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5716         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5717         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5718         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5719         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5720         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5721         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5722         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5723         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5724                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5725 }
5726
5727 #[test]
5728 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5729         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5730         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5731         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5732         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5733
5734         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5735
5736         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5737         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5738
5739         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5740         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5741         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5742
5743         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5744         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5745         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5746
5747         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5748         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5749         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5750
5751         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5752         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5753         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5754 }
5755
5756 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5757         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5758         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5759         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5760         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5761         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5762
5763         let (payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5764
5765         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5766         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5767         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5768         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5769
5770         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5771         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5772         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5773
5774         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5775         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5776         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5777         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5778         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5779
5780         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5781         let mut block = Block {
5782                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5783                 txdata: vec![],
5784         };
5785         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5786                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5787                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5788         }
5789         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5790         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5791         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5792         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5793 }
5794
5795 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5796         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5797         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5798         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5799         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5800         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5801
5802         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5803         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5804         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5805
5806         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5807
5808         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5809         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5810         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5811
5812         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5813         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5814
5815         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5816                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5817                 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5818         }
5819         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5820         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5821         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5822         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5823 }
5824
5825 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5826         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5827         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5828         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5829         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5830         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5831
5832         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5833         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5834         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5835         // actually revoked.
5836         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5837         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5838         assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5839         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5840         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5841
5842         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5843         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5844         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5845         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5846         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5847         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5848         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5849         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5850         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5851         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5852
5853         if check_revoke_no_close {
5854                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5855                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5856         }
5857
5858         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5859         let mut block = Block {
5860                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5861                 txdata: vec![],
5862         };
5863         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5864                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5865                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5866         }
5867         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5868                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5869                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5870                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5871                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5872         } else {
5873                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5874                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5875                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
5876                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5877                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5878                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
5879                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5880                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5881         }
5882 }
5883
5884 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5885 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5886 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5887 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5888 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5889 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5890 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5891 // non-dust HTLCs.
5892 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5893 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5894 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5895 #[test]
5896 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5897         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5898         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5899
5900         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5901         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5902 }
5903
5904 #[test]
5905 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5906         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5907         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5908         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5909         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5910 }
5911
5912 #[test]
5913 #[should_panic]
5914 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5915         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5916         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5917         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5918         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5919         // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5920         for node in nodes.iter() {
5921                 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5922         }
5923
5924         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5925         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5926         let push_msat=10001;
5927         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5928         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5929         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5930         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5931
5932         // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5933         // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5934         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5935 }
5936
5937 #[test]
5938 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5939         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5940         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5941         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5942         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5943
5944         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5945         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5946         let push_msat=10001;
5947         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5948
5949         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5950         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5951         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5952         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5953         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5954
5955         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5956         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5957         let push_msat=10001;
5958         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5959         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5960         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5961
5962         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5963         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5964         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5965
5966         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5967         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5968         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5969
5970         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5971         let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5972         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5973
5974         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5975         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5976         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5977         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5978         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5979         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5980 }
5981
5982 #[test]
5983 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5984         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5985         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5986         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5987         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5988
5989         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5990         let push_msat=10001;
5991         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5992         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5993         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5994         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5995
5996         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5997         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5998         let err_msg = match events[0] {
5999                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
6000                         msg.clone()
6001                 },
6002                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6003         };
6004         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
6005 }
6006
6007 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
6008 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
6009 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
6010 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
6011 #[test]
6012 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
6013         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6014         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6015         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6016         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6017         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6018
6019         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6020         // pending_update_fee.
6021         {
6022                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6023                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6024         }
6025         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6026         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6027
6028         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6029         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6030         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6031                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6032                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6033                 },
6034                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6035         };
6036
6037         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6038
6039         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6040         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6041         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6042         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6043
6044         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6045         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6046         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6047
6048         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6049         let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6050         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6051         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6052
6053         // Flush the pending fee update.
6054         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6055         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6056         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6057         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6058         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6059
6060         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6061         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6062         // us to surface its failure to the user.
6063         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6064         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6065         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6066         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6067                 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6068         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6069
6070         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6071         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6072         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6073         match &events[0] {
6074                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6075                         assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6076                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6077                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6078                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6079                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6080                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6081                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6082                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6083                 },
6084                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6085         }
6086 }
6087
6088 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6089 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6090 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6091 #[test]
6092 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6093         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6094         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6095         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6096         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6097         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6098
6099         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6100         // pending_update_fee.
6101         {
6102                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6103                 *feerate_lock += 200;
6104         }
6105         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6106         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6107
6108         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6109         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6110         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6111                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6112                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6113                 },
6114                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6115         };
6116
6117         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6118
6119         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6120         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6121         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6122         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6123
6124         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6125         let amt_1 = 20000;
6126         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
6127         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6128         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6129
6130         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6131         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6132         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6133         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6134         let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6135         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6136         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6137
6138         // Flush the pending fee update.
6139         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6140         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6141         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6142         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6143         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6144         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6145
6146         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6147         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6148         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6149         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6150         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6151         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6152         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6153                 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6154         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6155
6156         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6157         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6158         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6159         match &events[0] {
6160                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6161                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6162                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6163                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6164                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6165                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6166                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6167                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6168                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6169                 },
6170                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6171         }
6172
6173         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6174         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6175                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6176                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6177                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6178         };
6179         let raa = match send_raa_event {
6180                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6181                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6182         };
6183         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6184         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6185         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6186         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6187         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6188         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6189         match events[0] {
6190                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6191                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6192         }
6193         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6194         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6195         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6196         match events[0] {
6197                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6198                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6199         }
6200         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6201         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6202         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6203         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6204         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6205         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6206 }
6207
6208 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6209 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6210 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6211 // once it's freed.
6212 #[test]
6213 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6214         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6215         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6216         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6217         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6218         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6219         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6220         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6221         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6222         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6223         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6224
6225         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6226         // pending_update_fee.
6227         {
6228                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6229                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6230         }
6231         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6232         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6233
6234         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6235         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6236         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6237                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6238                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6239                 },
6240                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6241         };
6242
6243         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6244
6245         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6246         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6247         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6248         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6249
6250         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6251         let feemsat = 239;
6252         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6253         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6254         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6255         let payment_event = {
6256                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6257                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6258
6259                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6260                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6261
6262                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6263         };
6264         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6265         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6266         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6267         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6268
6269         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6270         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6271
6272         // Flush the pending fee update.
6273         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6274         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6275         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6276         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6277         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6278         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6279
6280         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6281         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6282         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6283
6284         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6285                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6286                         msg.clone()
6287                 },
6288                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6289         };
6290
6291         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6292         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6293         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6294
6295         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6296         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6297         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6298         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6299                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6300                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6301         }
6302
6303         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6304         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6305         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6306
6307         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6308         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6309         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6310         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6311                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6312                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6313                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6314                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6315                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6316                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6317                 },
6318                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6319         };
6320
6321         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6322         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6323         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6324
6325         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6326         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6327         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6328         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6329         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6330         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6331         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6332         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6333         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6334                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6335                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6336         };
6337         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6338         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6339         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6340 }
6341
6342 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6343 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6344 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6345
6346 #[test]
6347 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6348         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6349         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6350         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6351         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6352         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6353         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6354
6355         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6356         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6357
6358         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6359                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6360         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6361         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6362 }
6363
6364 #[test]
6365 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6366         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6367         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6368         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6369         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6370         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6371         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6372
6373         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6374         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6375         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6376                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6377
6378         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6379         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6380 }
6381
6382 #[test]
6383 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6384         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6385         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6386         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6387         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6388         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6389         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6390
6391         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6392         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6393         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6394         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6395         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6396
6397         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6398         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6399         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6400         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6401         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6402 }
6403
6404 #[test]
6405 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6406         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6407         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6408         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6409         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6410         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6411         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6412         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6413
6414         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], vec![], 100000000, 0);
6415         route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6416         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6417                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6418 }
6419
6420 #[test]
6421 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6422         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6423         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6424         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6425         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6426         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6427         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6428         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6429         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6430         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6431
6432         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6433                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6434                 let payment_event = {
6435                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6436                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6437
6438                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6439                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6440                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6441                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6442                         } else {
6443                                 assert!(false);
6444                         }
6445                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6446                 };
6447                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6448                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6449                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6450
6451                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6452                 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6453         }
6454         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6455         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6456                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6457
6458         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6459         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6460 }
6461
6462 #[test]
6463 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6464         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6465         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6466         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6467         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6468         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6469         let channel_value = 100000;
6470         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6471         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6472
6473         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6474
6475         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6476         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6477         // limits us to.
6478         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6479         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6480                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6481
6482         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6483         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6484
6485         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6486 }
6487
6488 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6489 #[test]
6490 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6491         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6492         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6493         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6494         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6495         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6496         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6497         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6498         {
6499                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6500                 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6501                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6502         }
6503
6504         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6505         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6506         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6507         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6508         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6509         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6510         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6511         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6512         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6513         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6514         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6515 }
6516
6517 #[test]
6518 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6519         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6520         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6521         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6522         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6523         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6524         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6525
6526         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6527         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6528         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6529         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6530         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6531         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6532
6533         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6534         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6535         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6536         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6537         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6538
6539         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6540         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6541         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6542         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6543         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6544
6545         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6546         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6547         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6548         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6549         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6550 }
6551
6552 #[test]
6553 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6554         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6555         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6556         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6557         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6558         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6559         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6560         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6561
6562         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6563         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6564         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6565         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6566         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6567         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6568
6569         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6570                 channel_id: chan.2,
6571                 htlc_id: 0,
6572                 amount_msat: 1000,
6573                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6574                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6575                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6576         };
6577
6578         for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6579                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6580                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6581         }
6582         msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6583         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6584
6585         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6586         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6587         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6588         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6589         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6590 }
6591
6592 #[test]
6593 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6594         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6595         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6596         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6597         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6598         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6599         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6600
6601         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6602         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6603         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6604         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6605         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6606         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6607
6608         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6609         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6610         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6611         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6612         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6613 }
6614
6615 #[test]
6616 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6617         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6618         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6619         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6620         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6621         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6622
6623         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6624         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6625         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6626         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6627         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6628         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6629         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6630
6631         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6632         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6633         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6634         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6635         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6636 }
6637
6638 #[test]
6639 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6640         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6641         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6642         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6643         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6644         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6645         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6646         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6647
6648         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6649         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6650         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6651         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6652         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6653         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6654
6655         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6656         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6657         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6658         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6659         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6660         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6661         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6662         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6663         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6664         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6665         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6666         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6667         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6668
6669         //Resend HTLC
6670         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6671         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6672         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6673         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6674         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6675
6676         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6677
6678         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6679         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6680         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6681         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6682         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6683 }
6684
6685 #[test]
6686 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6687         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6688
6689         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6690         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6691         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6692         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6693         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6694         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6695         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6696
6697         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6698         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6699         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6700
6701         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6702                 channel_id: chan.2,
6703                 htlc_id: 0,
6704                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6705         };
6706
6707         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6708
6709         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6710         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6711         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6712         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6713         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6714 }
6715
6716 #[test]
6717 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6718         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6719
6720         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6721         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6722         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6723         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6724         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6725
6726         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6727         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6728         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6729         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6730         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6731
6732         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6733                 channel_id: chan.2,
6734                 htlc_id: 0,
6735                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6736         };
6737
6738         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6739
6740         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6741         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6742         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6743         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6744         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6745 }
6746
6747 #[test]
6748 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6749         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6750
6751         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6752         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6753         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6754         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6755         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6756
6757         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6758         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6759         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6760         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6761         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6762         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6763                 channel_id: chan.2,
6764                 htlc_id: 0,
6765                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6766                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6767         };
6768
6769         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6770
6771         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6772         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6773         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6774         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6775         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6776 }
6777
6778 #[test]
6779 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6780         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6781
6782         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6783         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6784         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6785         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6786         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6787
6788         let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6789
6790         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6791         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6792
6793         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6794         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6795         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6796                 match events[0] {
6797                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6798                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6799                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6800                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6801                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6802                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6803                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6804                         },
6805                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6806                 }
6807         };
6808
6809         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6810
6811         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6812
6813         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6814         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6815         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6816         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6817         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6818 }
6819
6820 #[test]
6821 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6822         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6823
6824         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6825         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6826         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6827         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6828         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6829
6830         let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6831
6832         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6833         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6834
6835         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6836         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6837         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6838                 match events[0] {
6839                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6840                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6841                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6842                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6843                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6844                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6845                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6846                         },
6847                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6848                 }
6849         };
6850
6851         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6852
6853         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6854
6855         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6856         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6857         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6858         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6859         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6860 }
6861
6862 #[test]
6863 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6864         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6865
6866         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6867         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6868         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6869         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6870         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6871
6872         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6873         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6874         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6875
6876         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6877         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6878
6879         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6880         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6881         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6882
6883         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6884
6885         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6886                 match events[0] {
6887                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6888                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6889                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6890                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6891                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6892                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6893                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6894                         },
6895                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6896                 }
6897         };
6898         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6899         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6900
6901         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6902         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6903         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6904         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6905         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6906 }
6907
6908 #[test]
6909 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6910         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6911         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6912
6913         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6914         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6915         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6916         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6917         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6918         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6919
6920         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6921
6922         //First hop
6923         let mut payment_event = {
6924                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6925                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6926                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6927                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6928                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6929         };
6930         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6931         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6932         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6933         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6934         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6935         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6936         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6937         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6938         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6939
6940         //Second Hop
6941         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6942         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6943         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6944         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6945
6946         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6947         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6948         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6949                 match events_3[0] {
6950                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6951                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6952                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6953                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6954                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6955                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6956                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6957                         },
6958                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6959                 }
6960         };
6961
6962         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6963
6964         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6965         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6966         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6967         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6968         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6969
6970         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6971         match events_4[0] {
6972                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6973                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6974                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6975                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6976                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6977                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6978                 },
6979                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6980         };
6981
6982         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6983 }
6984
6985 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6986         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6987         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6988         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6989
6990         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6991         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6992         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6993         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6994         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6995         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6996
6997         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6998
6999         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7000         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7001         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7002         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7003
7004         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7005         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7006
7007         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7008         assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
7009         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7010         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7011         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7012
7013         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7014         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7015         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7016         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7017
7018         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7019         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7020
7021         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7022         match events[0] {
7023                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7024                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7025                 },
7026                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7027         }
7028         match events[1] {
7029                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7030                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7031                 },
7032                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7033         }
7034
7035         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7036         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7037         if announce_latest {
7038                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7039         } else {
7040                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7041         }
7042
7043         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7044         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7045         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7046
7047         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7048         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7049         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7050         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7051         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7052         let mut first_failed = false;
7053         for event in events {
7054                 match event {
7055                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7056                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7057                                         assert!(!first_failed);
7058                                         first_failed = true;
7059                                 } else {
7060                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7061                                 }
7062                         }
7063                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7064                 }
7065         }
7066 }
7067
7068 #[test]
7069 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7070         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7071         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7072 }
7073
7074 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7075         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7076         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7077         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7078         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7079         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7080         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7081
7082         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7083         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7084         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7085         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7086         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7087
7088         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7089
7090         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7091         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7092
7093         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7094         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7095
7096         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7097         if revoked {
7098                 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7099                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7100         }
7101
7102         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7103         if local {
7104                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7105                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7106                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7107                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7108                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7109
7110                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7111                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7112                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7113                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7114                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7115                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7116                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7117                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7118                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7119                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7120                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7121         } else {
7122                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7123                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7124                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7125                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7126                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7127                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7128                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7129                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7130                 if !revoked {
7131                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7132                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7133                         // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
7134                         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7135                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7136                         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7137                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7138                 } else {
7139                         // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
7140                         // commitment tx
7141                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7142                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7143                         let first;
7144                         match events[0] {
7145                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7146                                         if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7147                                         else { first = false; }
7148                                 },
7149                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7150                         }
7151                         match events[1] {
7152                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7153                                         if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7154                                         else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7155                                 },
7156                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7157                         }
7158                 }
7159         }
7160 }
7161
7162 #[test]
7163 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7164         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7165         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7166         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7167 }
7168
7169 #[test]
7170 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7171         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7172
7173         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7174         low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7175         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7176         high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7177         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7178         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7179         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7180         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7181         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7182
7183         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7184         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
7185                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7186                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
7187         {
7188                 match error {
7189                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7190                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7191                 }
7192         } else { assert!(false) }
7193
7194         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7195         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7196         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7197         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7198         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
7199                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0,
7200                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7201         {
7202                 match error {
7203                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
7204                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7205                 }
7206         } else { assert!(false); }
7207
7208         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7209         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7210         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7211         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7212         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7213         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7214         let reason_msg;
7215         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7216                 match action {
7217                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7218                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7219                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7220                         },
7221                         _ => { panic!(); }
7222                 }
7223         } else { panic!(); }
7224         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7225
7226         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7227         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7228         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7229         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7230         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
7231                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0,
7232                 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7233         {
7234                 match error {
7235                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7236                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7237                 }
7238         } else { assert!(false); }
7239 }
7240
7241 #[test]
7242 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7243         // We want to be sure that :
7244         // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7245         //   (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7246         // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7247         // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7248         // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7249         let persister;
7250         let logger;
7251         let fee_estimator;
7252         let tx_broadcaster;
7253         let chain_source;
7254         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7255         // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7256         // during signing due to revoked tx
7257         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7258         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7259         let monitor;
7260         let node_state_0;
7261         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7262         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7263         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7264
7265         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7266
7267         // Cache node A state before any channel update
7268         let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7269         let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7270         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7271
7272         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7273         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7274
7275         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7276         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7277
7278         // Restore node A from previous state
7279         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7280         let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7281         chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7282         tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7283         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7284         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7285         monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7286         node_state_0 = {
7287                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7288                 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7289                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7290                         keys_manager: keys_manager,
7291                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7292                         chain_monitor: &monitor,
7293                         logger: &logger,
7294                         tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7295                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7296                         channel_monitors,
7297                 }).unwrap().1
7298         };
7299         nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7300         assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7301         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7302         nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7303
7304         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7305
7306         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7307         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7308
7309         let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7310
7311         // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7312         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7313         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7314
7315         {
7316                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7317                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7318         }
7319
7320         let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7321         for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7322                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7323                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7324                         reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7325                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7326                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7327                         match action {
7328                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7329                                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7330                                 },
7331                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7332                         }
7333                 } else {
7334                         panic!("Unexpected event")
7335                 }
7336         }
7337
7338         // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7339         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7340         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_string() });
7341         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction");
7342         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7343
7344         // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7345         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7346         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7347         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
7348         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
7349         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
7350         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7351         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting".to_string() });
7352         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
7353         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7354         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
7355 }
7356
7357 #[test]
7358 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7359         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7360         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7361         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7362
7363         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7364         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7365         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7366         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7367
7368         // Create some initial channels
7369         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7370
7371         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7372         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7373         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7374         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7375         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7376         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7377         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7378         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7379
7380         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7381         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7382         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7383         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7384         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7385
7386         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7387         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7388         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7389         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7390
7391         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7392         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7393         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7394
7395         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7396         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7397         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7398                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7399                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7400                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7401                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7402                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7403                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7404                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7405                 },
7406                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7407         };
7408         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7409
7410         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7411         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7412
7413         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7414         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7415         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7416         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7417 }
7418
7419 #[test]
7420 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7421         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7422         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7423
7424         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7425         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7426         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7427         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7428
7429         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7430         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7431         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7432
7433         // Disconnect peers
7434         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7435         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7436
7437         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7438         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7439         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7440         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7441         let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7442         for e in msg_events {
7443                 match e {
7444                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7445                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7446                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7447                                 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7448                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7449                                 }
7450                         },
7451                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7452                 }
7453         }
7454         // Reconnect peers
7455         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7456         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7457         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7458         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7459         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7460         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7461
7462         // Reestablish chan_1
7463         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7464         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7465         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7466         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7467         // Reestablish chan_2
7468         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7469         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7470         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7471         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7472         // Reestablish chan_3
7473         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7474         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7475         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7476         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7477
7478         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7479         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7480         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7481         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7482         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7483         for e in msg_events {
7484                 match e {
7485                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7486                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7487                                 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7488                                         // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7489                                         // the old one.
7490                                         Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7491                                         None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7492                                 }
7493                         },
7494                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7495                 }
7496         }
7497         // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7498         assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7499 }
7500
7501 #[test]
7502 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7503         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7504         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7505
7506         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7507         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7508         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7509         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7510
7511         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7512
7513         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7514         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], vec![], 3000000, 30);
7515         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7516
7517         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7518         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7519         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7520         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7521         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7522         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7523
7524         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7525         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7526                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7527                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7528                 }
7529         }
7530
7531         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7532         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7533
7534         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7535         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7536         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7537         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7538         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7539
7540         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7541         let penalty_1;
7542         let feerate_1;
7543         {
7544                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7545                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7546                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7547                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7548                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7549                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7550                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7551                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7552                 node_txn.clear();
7553         };
7554
7555         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7556         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7557         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7558         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7559         {
7560                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7561                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7562                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7563                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7564                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7565                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7566                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7567                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7568                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7569                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7570                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7571                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7572                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7573                         node_txn.clear();
7574                 }
7575         }
7576         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7577
7578         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7579         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7580         let penalty_3;
7581         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7582         {
7583                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7584                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7585                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7586                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7587                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7588                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7589                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7590                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7591                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7592                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7593                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7594                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7595                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7596                         node_txn.clear();
7597                 }
7598         }
7599         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7600
7601         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7602         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7603 }
7604
7605 #[test]
7606 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7607         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7608         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7609
7610         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7611         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7612         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7613         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7614         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7615
7616         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7617         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7618         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7619         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7620         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7621         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7622                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7623         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7624         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7625         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7626                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7627         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7628
7629         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7630         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7631         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7632
7633         // Revoke local commitment tx
7634         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7635
7636         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7637         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7638         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7639         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7640         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7641         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7642         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7643
7644         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7645         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7646         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7647
7648         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7649         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7650         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7651
7652         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7653         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7654         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7655         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7656
7657         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7658         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7659         let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7660         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7661         let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7662         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7663         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7664         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7665         match events[1] {
7666                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7667                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7668         }
7669         let first;
7670         let feerate_1;
7671         let penalty_txn;
7672         {
7673                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7674                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7675                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7676
7677                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7678                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7679                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7680                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7681                 // future).
7682                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7683                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7684                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7685                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7686                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7687                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7688
7689                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7690                 // available, which we check here:
7691                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7692                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7693                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7694
7695                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7696                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7697
7698                 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7699                 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7700                 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7701                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7702
7703                 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7704                 // output, checked above).
7705                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7706                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7707                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7708
7709                 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7710                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7711                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7712                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
7713                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7714                 node_txn.clear();
7715         }
7716
7717         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7718         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7719         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7720         let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7721         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7722         {
7723                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7724                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7725
7726                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7727                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7728                 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7729                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output  {
7730                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7731                 } else {
7732                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7733                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7734                 }
7735
7736                 node_txn.clear();
7737         };
7738
7739         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7740         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7741         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7742         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7743         let node_txn = {
7744                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7745                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7746
7747                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7748                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7749                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7750                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7751                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7752                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7753                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7754                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7755                 node_txn.clear();
7756                 txn
7757         };
7758         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7759         let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7760         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7761         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7762         {
7763                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7764                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7765                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7766                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7767                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7768                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7769                 // up bumped justice generation.
7770                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7771                 node_txn.clear();
7772         }
7773         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7774         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7775 }
7776
7777 #[test]
7778 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7779         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7780         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7781
7782         // Create 2 HTLCs
7783         // Provide preimage for one
7784         // Check aggregation
7785
7786         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7787         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7788         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7789         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7790
7791         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7792         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7793         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7794
7795         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7796         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7797         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7798         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7799         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7800
7801         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7802         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7803         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7804         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7805         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7806
7807         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7808         let timeout;
7809         let preimage;
7810         let preimage_bump;
7811         let feerate_timeout;
7812         let feerate_preimage;
7813         {
7814                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7815                 // 9 transactions including:
7816                 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
7817                 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
7818                 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
7819                 // 1 * HTLC-Timeout
7820                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
7821                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7822                 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
7823                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7824                 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
7825                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
7826                 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
7827
7828                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
7829                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
7830                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
7831                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
7832
7833                 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
7834                 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7835                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
7836                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].get_weight() as u64;
7837
7838                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7839                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7840                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7841                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7842
7843                 node_txn.clear();
7844         };
7845         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7846         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7847
7848         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7849         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7850         {
7851                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7852                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7853                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7854                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7855                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7856                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7857
7858                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7859                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7860                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.get_weight() as u64;
7861                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7862                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7863
7864                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7865                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7866                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7867                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7868                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7869
7870                 node_txn.clear();
7871         }
7872
7873         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7874         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7875 }
7876
7877 #[test]
7878 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7879         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7880         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7881         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7882         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7883         // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7884         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7885         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7886         // implement that).
7887         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7888         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7889         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7890         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7891         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7892
7893         let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7894         let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7895
7896         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7897
7898         // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7899         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7900         let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7901
7902         // Must revoke without gaps
7903         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7904         keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7905
7906         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7907         let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7908                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7909
7910         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7911                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
7912         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7913         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7914         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7915 }
7916
7917 #[test]
7918 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7919         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7920         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7921
7922         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7923         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7924         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7925         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7926
7927         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7928         // Lock HTLC in both directions
7929         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7930         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7931
7932         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7933         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7934         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7935
7936         // Revoke local commitment tx
7937         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7938
7939         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7940         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7941         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
7942         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7943
7944         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7945         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7946         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7947         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7948         let penalty_txn = {
7949                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7950                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
7951                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7952                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7953                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7954                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7955                 node_txn.clear();
7956                 penalty_txn
7957         };
7958         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7959         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7960         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7961         {
7962                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7963                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7964                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7965         }
7966 }
7967
7968 #[test]
7969 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
7970         // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
7971         // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
7972         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7973         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7974         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7975         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7976         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7977
7978         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000).0;
7979         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7980         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7981         let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7982
7983         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7984         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
7985         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
7986         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7987         let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7988
7989         // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
7990         // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
7991         // can get our balance.
7992
7993         // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
7994         // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
7995         // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
7996         let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
7997         route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
7998         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7999         let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8000         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
8001
8002         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
8003 }
8004
8005 #[test]
8006 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8007         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8008         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8009         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8010         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8011         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8012         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8013
8014         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8015
8016         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8017         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8018         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8019         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8020         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8021
8022         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8023         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8024         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8025         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8026
8027         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8028         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8029         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8030         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8031         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8032         match close_ev[0] {
8033                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8034                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8035                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8036                 },
8037                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8038         }
8039 }
8040
8041 #[test]
8042 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8043         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8044         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8045         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8046         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8047
8048         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8049         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8050         override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8051
8052         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8053
8054         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8055         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8056         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8057         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8058 }
8059
8060 #[test]
8061 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8062         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8063         zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8064         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8065         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8066         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8067         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8068
8069         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8070         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8071         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8072
8073         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8074         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8075         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8076 }
8077
8078 #[test]
8079 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
8080         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8081         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8082         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8083         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8084         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8085         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8086
8087         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8088         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8089
8090         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8091
8092         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8093         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8094         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8095
8096         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8097         match events[0] {
8098                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8099                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8100                 }
8101                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8102         }
8103
8104         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8105         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8106
8107         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8108                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8109                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8110                 }
8111                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8112         }
8113 }
8114
8115 #[test]
8116 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
8117         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8118         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8119         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8120         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8121         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8122         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8123
8124         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8125         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8126
8127         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8128
8129         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8130         // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8131         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8132
8133         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8134         match events[0] {
8135                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8136                         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8137                 }
8138                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8139         }
8140
8141         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8142         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8143
8144         match close_msg_ev[0] {
8145                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8146                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8147                 }
8148                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8149         }
8150         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8151 }
8152
8153 #[test]
8154 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
8155         // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
8156         // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
8157         // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
8158         // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
8159         // and the channel should be closed.
8160         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8161         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8162         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8163         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8164         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8165         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8166
8167         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8168         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8169         let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
8170
8171         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8172
8173         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
8174         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8175
8176         // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
8177         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8178
8179         // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
8180         // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
8181         // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
8182         // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
8183         // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
8184         {
8185                 let mut lock;
8186                 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], lock, temp_channel_id);
8187                 let accept_chan_msg = channel.get_accept_channel_message();
8188                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8189         }
8190
8191         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8192
8193         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8194         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8195
8196         // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
8197         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8198
8199         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8200         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8201
8202         let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
8203         match close_msg_ev[0] {
8204                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
8205                         assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
8206                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8207                         assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
8208                 }
8209                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8210         }
8211
8212         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8213 }
8214
8215 #[test]
8216 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8217         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8218         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8219         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8220         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8221         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8222         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8223
8224         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8225         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8226
8227         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8228
8229         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8230         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8231         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8232
8233         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8234         match events[0] {
8235                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8236                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8237                         let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id);
8238                         match api_res {
8239                                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8240                                         assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
8241                                 },
8242                                 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8243                                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8244                         }
8245                 }
8246                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8247         }
8248
8249         // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8250         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8251         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8252
8253         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8254                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8255                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8256                 }
8257                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8258         }
8259 }
8260
8261 #[test]
8262 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8263         let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
8264         let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
8265         let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
8266         let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr)[0].node;
8267
8268         let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
8269         let api_res = node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id);
8270         match api_res {
8271                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8272                         assert_eq!(err, "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist");
8273                 },
8274                 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8275                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8276         }
8277 }
8278
8279 #[test]
8280 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8281         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8282         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8283         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8284         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8285         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8286
8287         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8288         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8289         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8290         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8291
8292         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8293         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8294         route.paths.push(path);
8295         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8296         route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8297         route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8298         route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8299         route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8300         route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8301         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8302         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8303 }
8304
8305 #[test]
8306 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8307         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8308         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8309         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8310         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8311         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8312
8313         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8314
8315         {
8316                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
8317                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8318                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8319                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8320                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8321                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8322                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8323                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8324         }
8325         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8326         // values from previous calls.
8327         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8328         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8329         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8330         match events[0] {
8331                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8332                         match &purpose {
8333                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8334                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8335                                 },
8336                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8337                         }
8338                 },
8339                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8340         }
8341 }
8342
8343 #[test]
8344 #[allow(deprecated)]
8345 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8346         // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8347         // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8348         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8349         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8350         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8351         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8352
8353         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8354
8355         let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8356
8357         // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8358         // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8359         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8360                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8361         } else { panic!(); }
8362         let mut block = {
8363                 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8364                 Block {
8365                         header: BlockHeader {
8366                                 version: 0x2000000,
8367                                 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8368                                 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8369                                 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8370                         txdata: vec![],
8371                 }
8372         };
8373         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8374         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8375                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8376         } else { panic!(); }
8377
8378         // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8379         // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8380         block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8381         block.header.time += 1;
8382         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8383         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8384         assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8385
8386         {
8387                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8388                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8389                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8390                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8391                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8392                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8393                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8394         }
8395         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8396         // values from previous calls.
8397         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8398         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8399         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8400         match events[0] {
8401                 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8402                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8403                         assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8404                         // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8405                 },
8406                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8407         }
8408 }
8409
8410 #[test]
8411 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8412         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8413         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8414         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8415         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8416         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8417
8418         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8419
8420         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8421         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8422         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8423         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8424
8425         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8426         // resulting events.
8427         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8428                 () => {
8429                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8430                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8431                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8432                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8433                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8434
8435                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8436                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8437                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8438                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8439                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8440
8441                         // We should fail the payment back
8442                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8443                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8444                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8445                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8446                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8447                                 },
8448                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8449                         }
8450                 }
8451         }
8452
8453         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8454         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8455         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8456
8457         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8458         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8459         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8460         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8461
8462         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8463         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8464         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8465         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8466
8467         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8468         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8469         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8470         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8471 }
8472
8473 #[test]
8474 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8475         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8476         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8477         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8478         //
8479         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8480         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8481         // commitment at same time.
8482
8483         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8484         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8485         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8486         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8487
8488         // Create some initial channel
8489         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8490         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8491
8492         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8493         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8494
8495         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8496         let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8497
8498         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8499         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8500         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8501         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8502         let watchtower = {
8503                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8504                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8505                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8506                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8507                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8508                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8509                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8510                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8511                 watchtower
8512         };
8513         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8514         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8515         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8516         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8517         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8518
8519         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8520         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8521         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8522         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8523         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8524         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8525         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8526                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8527                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8528                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8529                 } else { assert!(false); }
8530         } else { assert!(false); };
8531         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8532         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8533         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8534         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8535 }
8536
8537 #[test]
8538 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8539         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8540         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8541         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8542         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8543
8544         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8545         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8546         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8547         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8548
8549         // Create some initial channel
8550         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8551         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8552
8553         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8554         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8555
8556         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8557         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8558
8559         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8560         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8561         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8562         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8563         let watchtower_alice = {
8564                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8565                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8566                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8567                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8568                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8569                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8570                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8571                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8572                 watchtower
8573         };
8574         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8575         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8576         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8577         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8578         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8579
8580         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8581         {
8582                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8583                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8584                 txn.clear();
8585         }
8586
8587         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8588         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8589         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8590         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8591         let watchtower_bob = {
8592                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8593                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8594                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8595                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8596                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8597                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8598                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8599                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8600                 watchtower
8601         };
8602         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8603         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8604
8605         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8606         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8607         {
8608                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8609         }
8610         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8611
8612         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8613         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8614         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8615         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8616                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8617                         // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8618                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8619                         if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8620                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8621                 } else { assert!(false); }
8622         } else { assert!(false); };
8623         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8624         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8625
8626         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8627         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8628         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8629
8630         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8631         let bob_state_y;
8632         {
8633                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8634                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8635                 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8636                 txn.clear();
8637         };
8638
8639         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8640         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8641         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8642         {
8643                 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8644                 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8645                 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8646                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8647                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8648                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8649         }
8650 }
8651
8652 #[test]
8653 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8654         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8655         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8656         // message).
8657         //
8658         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8659         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8660         //
8661         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8662         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8663         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8664         // before receiving funding_signed.
8665         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8666         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8667         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8668         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8669
8670         // Create an initial channel
8671         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8672         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8673         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8674         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8675         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8676
8677         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8678         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8679
8680         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8681         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8682
8683         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8684         let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8685         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8686         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8687         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8688 }
8689
8690 #[test]
8691 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8692         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8693         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8694         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8695         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8696         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8697         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8698
8699         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8700         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8701         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8702         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8703
8704         // Create some initial channels
8705         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8706
8707         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8708         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8709         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8710         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8711         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8712         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8713
8714         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8715         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8716         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8717         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8718         // this test before #653 fix.
8719         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8720         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8721         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8722         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8723         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8724
8725         let htlc_timeout = {
8726                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8727                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8728                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8729                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8730                 node_txn[1].clone()
8731         };
8732
8733         let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8734         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8735         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8736         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8737 }
8738
8739 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8740         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8741         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8742         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8743         //
8744         // Steps of the test:
8745         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8746         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8747         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8748         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8749         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8750         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8751         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8752         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8753         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8754         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8755         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8756         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8757
8758         // Create some initial channels
8759         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8760         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8761
8762         // Steps (1) and (2):
8763         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8764         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8765
8766         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8767         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8768         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8769         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8770         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8771         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8772         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8773
8774         // Steps (3) and (4):
8775         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8776         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8777         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8778         if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
8779         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
8780         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8781         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8782         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8783         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8784                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8785                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
8786                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8787                 };
8788                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8789                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8790                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8791                 if broadcast_alice {
8792                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8793                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8794                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8795                 }
8796                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8797                 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8798         }
8799
8800         // Step (5):
8801         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8802         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8803         assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8804         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8805         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8806         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8807         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8808         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8809         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8810         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8811
8812         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8813         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false);
8814         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8815         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8816                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8817                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8818                 match events[0] {
8819                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8820                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8821                         },
8822                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8823                 };
8824         }
8825         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8826         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8827         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8828         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8829
8830         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8831         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8832         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8833                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8834                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8835                         (*msg).clone()
8836                 },
8837                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8838         };
8839         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8840                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8841                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8842                         (*updates).clone()
8843                 },
8844                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8845         };
8846
8847         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8848         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8849         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8850         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8851
8852         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8853         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8854         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8855                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8856                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8857                         (*msg).clone()
8858                 },
8859                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8860         };
8861         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8862         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8863
8864         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8865         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8866         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8867         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8868         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8869                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8870                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8871                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8872                 if broadcast_alice {
8873                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8874                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8875                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8876                 }
8877                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8878                 if broadcast_alice {
8879                         // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8880                         // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8881                         // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8882                         // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8883                         // broadcasted.
8884                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8885                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8886                 } else {
8887                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8888                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8889                 }
8890         }
8891
8892         // Step (6):
8893         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8894         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8895         {
8896                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8897                 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8898                         // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8899                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8900                 }
8901                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8902                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8903                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8904                 };
8905                 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8906                 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8907                 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8908                 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8909                 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8910                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8911                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8912                 } else {
8913                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8914                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8915                 }
8916         }
8917 }
8918
8919 #[test]
8920 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8921         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8922         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8923         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8924         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8925 }
8926
8927 #[test]
8928 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8929         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8930         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8931         //
8932         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8933         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8934         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8935         // updating logic for the existing channel.
8936         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8937         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8938         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8939         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8940
8941         // Create an initial channel
8942         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8943         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8944         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8945         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8946
8947         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8948         // that it is rejected.
8949         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8950         {
8951                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8952                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8953                 match events[0] {
8954                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8955                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8956                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8957                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8958                                 // move forward with it.
8959                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8960                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8961                         },
8962                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8963                 }
8964         }
8965
8966         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8967         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8968
8969         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8970         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8971
8972         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8973         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8974         {
8975                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8976                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8977                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8978                 added_monitors.clear();
8979         }
8980         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8981
8982         let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8983         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8984
8985         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8986         // temporary one).
8987
8988         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8989         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8990         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8991         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8992         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8993         {
8994                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8995                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8996                 match events[0] {
8997                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8998                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8999                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9000                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9001                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9002                         },
9003                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9004                 }
9005         }
9006
9007         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9008         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9009         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9010         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9011         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9012         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9013
9014         let funding_created = {
9015                 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9016                 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
9017                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9018                 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
9019         };
9020         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9021         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9022         // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
9023         // still needs to be cleared here.
9024         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9025
9026         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9027         {
9028                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9029                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9030                 match events[0] {
9031                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9032                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9033                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9034                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9035                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9036                         },
9037                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9038                 }
9039         }
9040
9041         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9042         // everything is functional.
9043         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9044         {
9045                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9046                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9047                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9048                 added_monitors.clear();
9049         }
9050
9051         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9052         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9053         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9054         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
9055
9056         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9057         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9058         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9059         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9060 }
9061
9062 #[test]
9063 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9064         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9065         //
9066         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9067         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9068         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9069         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9070         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9071         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9072         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9073
9074         // Create some initial channels
9075         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9076         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9077         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9078
9079         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9080         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9081         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9082
9083         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9084         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9085         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9086
9087         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9088         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9089         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9090         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9091         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9092         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9093         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9094         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9095         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9096
9097         // A null channel ID should close all channels
9098         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9099         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9100         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9101         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9102         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9103         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9104         match events[0] {
9105                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9106                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9107                 },
9108                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9109         }
9110         match events[1] {
9111                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9112                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9113                 },
9114                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9115         }
9116         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9117         // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
9118         // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
9119         // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
9120         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9121         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9122
9123         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
9124         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9125         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9126 }
9127
9128 #[test]
9129 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9130         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9131         //
9132         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9133         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9134         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9135         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9136         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9137         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9138         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9139         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9140
9141         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9142         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9143         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9144
9145         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42);
9146         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9147                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9148                 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
9149         }
9150
9151         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9152         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9153         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9154
9155         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9156         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9157
9158         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9159         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9160
9161         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9162         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9163         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9164
9165         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9166         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9167         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9168         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9169         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9170         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9171         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9172                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9173                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9174                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9175                 } else { panic!(); }
9176         } else { panic!(); }
9177         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9178 }
9179
9180 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9181         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9182         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9183         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9184         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9185         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9186         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9187         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9188         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9189         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9190         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9191         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9192         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9193         // until we learned about an additional block.
9194         //
9195         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9196         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9197         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9198         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9199         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9200         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9201         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9202
9203         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9204         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9205         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9206         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9207         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9208
9209         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
9210         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9211         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9212         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9213         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9214         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9215
9216         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9217         if !test_height_before_timelock {
9218                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9219         }
9220         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9221                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9222         if test_height_before_timelock {
9223                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9224                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9225                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9226                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9227         } else {
9228                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9229                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9230                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9231                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9232                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9233                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9234                 // timelock is up).
9235                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9236                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9237
9238                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9239                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9240                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9241                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9242                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9243                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9244                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9245
9246                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9247                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9248                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9249                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9250                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9251                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9252                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9253                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9254                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9255         }
9256 }
9257
9258 #[test]
9259 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9260         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9261         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9262 }
9263
9264 #[test]
9265 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9266         // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9267         // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9268         // HTLCs.
9269         // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9270
9271         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9272         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9273         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9274         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9275         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9276         let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9277         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9278         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9279         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9280
9281         // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9282         let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9283         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9284         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9285
9286         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9287         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9288         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9289         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9290         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9291
9292         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9293
9294         // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9295         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9296         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9297         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9298
9299         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9300         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9301         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9302         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9303         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9304
9305         // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9306         // generated
9307         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9308
9309         // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9310         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9311         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9312
9313         let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9314         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9315         let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9316         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9317         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9318
9319         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9320         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9321         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9322         nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9323
9324         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9325         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9326                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9327         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9328         let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9329         let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9330                 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9331         assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9332
9333         let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9334         let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9335                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9336                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9337                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9338                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9339                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9340                         keys_manager,
9341                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9342                         chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9343                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9344                         logger: nodes[1].logger,
9345                         channel_monitors,
9346                 }).unwrap()
9347         };
9348         nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9349         assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9350
9351         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9352         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9353         nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9354         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9355
9356         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9357         // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9358         // the commitment state.
9359         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9360
9361         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9362
9363         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9364         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9365         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9366
9367         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9368         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9369         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9370         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9371         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9372         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9373         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9374
9375         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9376         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9377 }
9378
9379 #[test]
9380 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9381         // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9382         // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentReceived` event.
9383         // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9384         // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9385         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9386         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9387         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9388         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9389
9390         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9391
9392         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
9393                 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
9394         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9395         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9396         let route = get_route(
9397                 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(),
9398                 Some(&nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9399                 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9400
9401         let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9402
9403         {
9404                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9405                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9406                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9407                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9408                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9409                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9410                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9411         }
9412         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9413         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9414
9415         {
9416                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9417                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9418                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9419                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9420                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9421                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9422                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9423                 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9424                 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9425                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9426                 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9427         }
9428
9429         // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9430         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9431         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9432         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9433
9434         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9435         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9436
9437         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9438         let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9439         assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9440
9441         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9442         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9443         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9444
9445         let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9446         assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
9447         if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9448         if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9449 }
9450
9451 #[test]
9452 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9453         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9454         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9455         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9456         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9457
9458         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9459         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9460         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9461         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9462         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9463                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9464                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9465                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9466         };
9467         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9468         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9469         let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9470
9471         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9472         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9473         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9474         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9475         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9476         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9477         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9478         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9479         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9480 }
9481
9482 #[test]
9483 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9484         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9485         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9486         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9487         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9488
9489         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9490         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9491         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9492         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9493
9494         let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9495         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9496                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9497                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9498                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9499         };
9500         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9501         let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9502         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9503         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9504         let route = find_route(
9505                 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9506                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
9507         ).unwrap();
9508
9509         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9510         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9511         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9512         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9513         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9514         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9515         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9516         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9517         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9518 }
9519
9520 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9521 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9522 enum ExposureEvent {
9523         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9524         AtHTLCForward,
9525         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9526         AtHTLCReception,
9527         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9528         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9529 }
9530
9531 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9532         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9533         // policy.
9534         //
9535         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9536         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9537         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9538         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9539         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9540         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9541         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9542         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9543
9544         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9545         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9546         config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9547         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9548         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9549         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9550
9551         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9552         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9553         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9554         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9555         if on_holder_tx {
9556                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9557         }
9558         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
9559         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9560         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
9561
9562         let opt_anchors = false;
9563
9564         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 1_000_000, 42);
9565
9566         if on_holder_tx {
9567                 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9568                         chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9569                 }
9570         }
9571
9572         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9573         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9574         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9575
9576         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9577         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9578
9579         let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9580         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9581         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9582
9583         let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9584                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9585                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9586                 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9587         };
9588         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9589         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9590
9591         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9592         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9593
9594         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9595         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9596
9597         if on_holder_tx {
9598                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9599                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9600                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9601                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9602                         for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9603                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9604                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9605                         }
9606                 } else {
9607                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9608                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9609                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9610                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9611                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9612                         }
9613                 }
9614         } else {
9615                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9616                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9617                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9618                         for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9619                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9620                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9621                         }
9622                 } else {
9623                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9624                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9625                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9626                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9627                         }
9628                 }
9629         }
9630
9631         let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9632         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9633                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9634                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9635                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9636                 if on_holder_tx {
9637                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9638                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9639                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9640                 } else {
9641                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9642                 }
9643         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9644                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9645                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9646                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9647                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9648                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9649                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9650                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9651                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9652                 if on_holder_tx {
9653                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9654                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9655                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9656                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9657                 } else {
9658                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9659                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9660                 }
9661         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9662                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9663                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9664                 {
9665                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9666                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9667                 }
9668                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9669                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9670                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9671         }
9672
9673         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9674         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9675         added_monitors.clear();
9676 }
9677
9678 #[test]
9679 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9680         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9681         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9682         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9683         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9684         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9685         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9686         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9687         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9688         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9689         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9690         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9691         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9692 }