_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use crate::chain;
  15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
  17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
  18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  20 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource};
  21 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
  22 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  23 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
  24 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
  25 use crate::ln::channel::{DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS, Channel, ChannelError};
  26 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  27 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  28 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
  29 use crate::routing::router::{Path, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
  30 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  31 use crate::ln::msgs;
  32 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  33 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
  34 use crate::util::test_utils;
  35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
  36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  37 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
  38 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
  39
  40 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  43 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  44 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  45 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
  46 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
  47
  48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  50
  51 use regex;
  52
  53 use crate::io;
  54 use crate::prelude::*;
  55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  56 use core::default::Default;
  57 use core::iter::repeat;
  58 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  59 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
  60
  61 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  62 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  63
  64 #[test]
  65 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  66         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  67         use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
  68         let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
  69         cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
  70         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  71         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  72         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
  73         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  74
  75         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  76         // funding satoshis
  77         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  78         let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
  79         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  80
  81         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  82         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
  83
  84         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  85         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  86
  87         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  88         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  89         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  90                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  91                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  92                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  93                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  94                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  95                         match action {
  96                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
  97                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager", expected_regex, 1);
  98                                 },
  99                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
 100                         }
 101                 } else { assert!(false); }
 102         };
 103
 104         use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
 105
 106         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 107         insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
 108         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
 109
 110         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 111
 112         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 113
 114         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 115
 116         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 117
 118         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 119
 120         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 121
 122         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 123 }
 124
 125 #[test]
 126 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
 127         // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
 128         // them.
 129         use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
 130         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 131         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 132         *node_cfgs[1].override_init_features.borrow_mut() = Some(channelmanager::provided_init_features(&test_default_channel_config()).clear_wumbo());
 133         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 134         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 135
 136         match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
 137                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
 138                         assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
 139                 },
 140                 _ => panic!()
 141         }
 142 }
 143
 144 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
 145         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
 146         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
 147         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
 148         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
 149         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 150         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 151         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 152         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 153         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 154
 155         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 156         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
 157         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
 158         let opt_anchors = false;
 159         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
 160         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
 161
 162         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
 163         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 164         if !send_from_initiator {
 165                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 166                 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 167         }
 168         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
 169
 170         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
 171         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 172         if send_from_initiator {
 173                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 174                 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 175         }
 176         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
 177         {
 178                 let sender_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] };
 179                 let counterparty_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
 180                 let mut sender_node_per_peer_lock;
 181                 let mut sender_node_peer_state_lock;
 182                 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
 183                 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 184                 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 185         }
 186
 187         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
 188         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
 189         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
 190
 191         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
 192         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
 193         if send_from_initiator {
 194                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
 195                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
 196                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
 197                         // well as an additional HTLC.
 198                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
 199         } else {
 200                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
 201         }
 202 }
 203
 204 #[test]
 205 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
 206         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
 207         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
 208 }
 209
 210 #[test]
 211 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 212         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 213         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 214         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 215         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 216         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 217
 218         // balancing
 219         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 220
 221         // A                                        B
 222         // update_fee                            ->
 223         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 224         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 225         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 226         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 227         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 228         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 229         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 230         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 231         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 232         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 233         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 234         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 235         //                                       <- RAA
 236         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 237
 238         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 239         {
 240                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 241                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 242         }
 243         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 244         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 245
 246         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 247         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 248         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 249                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 250                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 251                 },
 252                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 253         };
 254
 255         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 256
 257         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 258         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 259         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 260                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 261         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 262
 263         let payment_event = {
 264                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 265                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 266                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 267         };
 268         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 269         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 270
 271         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 272         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 273         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 274         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 275         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 276         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 277
 278         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 279         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 280         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 281         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 282         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 283
 284         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 285         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 286         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 287         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 288         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 289         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 290         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 291         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 292
 293         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 294         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 295         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 296         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 297         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 298         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 299         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 300         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 301
 302         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 303         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 304         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 305         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 306
 307         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 308         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 309         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 310
 311         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 312         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 313
 314         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 315         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 316         match events_2[0] {
 317                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 318                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 319         }
 320
 321         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 322         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 323 }
 324
 325 #[test]
 326 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 327         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 328         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 329         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 330         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 331         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 332         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 333         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 334
 335         // balancing
 336         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 337
 338         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 339         {
 340                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 341                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 342         }
 343         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 344         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 345
 346         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 347         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 348         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 349                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 350                         update_fee.as_ref()
 351                 },
 352                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 353         };
 354
 355         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 356
 357         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 358         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 359         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 360                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 361         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 362
 363         let payment_event = {
 364                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 365                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 366                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 367         };
 368         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 369         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 370
 371         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 372         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 373         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 374         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 375         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 376         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 377
 378         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 379         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 380
 381         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 382 }
 383
 384 #[test]
 385 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 386         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 387         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 388         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 389         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 390         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 391
 392         // A                                        B
 393         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 394         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 395         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 396         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 397         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 398         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 399         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 400         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 401         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 402         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 403         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 404         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 405         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 406         //                                          B should send no response here
 407         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 408         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 409         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 410
 411         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 412         let initial_feerate;
 413         {
 414                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 415                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 416                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 417         }
 418         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 419         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 420
 421         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 422         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 423         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 424                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 425                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 426                 },
 427                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 428         };
 429
 430         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 431         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 432         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 433         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 434         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 435
 436         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 437         // transaction:
 438         {
 439                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 440                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 441         }
 442         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 443         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 444         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 445
 446         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 447         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 448                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 449                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 450         };
 451
 452         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 453
 454         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 455         // Deliver (3)
 456         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 457
 458         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 459         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 460         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 461         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 462         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 463         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 464         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 465         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 466         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 467         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 468         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 469
 470         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 471         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 472         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 473         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 474         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 475
 476         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 477         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 478         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 479
 480         // Delever (4)
 481         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 482         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 483         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 484
 485         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 486         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 487         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 488
 489         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 490         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 491         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 492         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 493
 494         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 495         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 496         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 497 }
 498
 499 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 500         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 501         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 502         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 503         // Node objects.
 504
 505         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 506         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 507         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 508         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 509
 510         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 511                 let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
 512                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 513                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 514         }
 515
 516         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 517         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
 518         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 519
 520         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 521         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
 522         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 523
 524         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 525         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
 526
 527         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
 528
 529         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 530         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
 531         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 532         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 533
 534         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 535         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 536         {
 537                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 538                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 539                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 540                 added_monitors.clear();
 541         }
 542         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 543
 544         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 545
 546         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 547         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 548         {
 549                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 550                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 551                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 552                 added_monitors.clear();
 553         }
 554
 555         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 556         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 557         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 558
 559         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 560         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 561
 562         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 563         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 564         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 565         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 566         expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 567 }
 568
 569 #[test]
 570 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 571         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 572         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 573         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 574         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 575         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 576         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 577         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 578         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 579         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 580         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 581         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 582         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 583         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 584         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 585         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 586         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 587         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 588         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 589 }
 590
 591 #[test]
 592 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 593         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 594         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 595         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 596         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 597         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 598
 599         {
 600                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 601                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 602         }
 603         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 604         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 605
 606         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 607         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 608         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 609                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 610                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 611                 },
 612                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 613         };
 614         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 615
 616         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 617         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 618         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 619
 620         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 621         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 622         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 623
 624         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 625         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 626         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 627         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 628
 629         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 630         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 631         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 632 }
 633
 634 #[test]
 635 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 636         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 637         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 638         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 639         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 640         let channel_value = 5000;
 641         let push_sats = 700;
 642         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000);
 643         let channel_id = chan.2;
 644         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 645         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 646         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
 647
 648         let opt_anchors = false;
 649
 650         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 651         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 652         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 653         // remote limit.
 654         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 655         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
 656         {
 657                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 658                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 659         }
 660         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 661         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 662         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 663
 664         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 665
 666         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 667
 668         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 669         {
 670                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 671
 672                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 673                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 674                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
 675                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 676                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 677                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 678         }
 679
 680         {
 681                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 682                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 683                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 684         }
 685         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 686         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 687         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 688
 689         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 690
 691         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 692         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 693         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 694                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 695                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 696                 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 697                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 698                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 699                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 700                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 701         };
 702         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 703                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 704                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 705                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 706                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 707                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 708                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 709                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 710                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 711         };
 712
 713         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 714         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 715                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
 716
 717         let res = {
 718                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 719                 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 720                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 721                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 722                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 723                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 724                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 725                         push_sats,
 726                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
 727                         opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
 728                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 729                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 730                         &mut htlcs,
 731                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 732                 );
 733                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 734         };
 735
 736         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 737                 channel_id: chan.2,
 738                 signature: res.0,
 739                 htlc_signatures: res.1,
 740                 #[cfg(taproot)]
 741                 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
 742         };
 743
 744         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 745                 channel_id: chan.2,
 746                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 747         };
 748
 749         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 750
 751         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 752         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 753         //Should produce and error.
 754         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 755         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
 756         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 757         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 758         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
 759 }
 760
 761 #[test]
 762 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 763         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 764         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 765         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 766         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 767         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 768
 769         // balancing
 770         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 771
 772         {
 773                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 774                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 775         }
 776         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 777         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 778
 779         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 780         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 781         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 782                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 783                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 784                 },
 785                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 786         };
 787         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 788         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 789         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 790         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 791
 792         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 793
 794         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 795         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 796                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 797         {
 798                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 799                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 800                 added_monitors.clear();
 801         }
 802         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 803         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 804         // node[1] has nothing to do
 805
 806         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 807         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 808         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 809
 810         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 811         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 812         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 813         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 814         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 815         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 816         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 817
 818         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 819         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 820         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 821         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 822         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 823         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 824
 825         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 826         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 827         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 828         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 829
 830         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 831         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 832         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 833
 834         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 835         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 836         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 837         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 838
 839         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 840         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 841         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 842
 843         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 844
 845         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 846         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 847         match events[0] {
 848                 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => { },
 849                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 850         };
 851
 852         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 853
 854         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 855         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 856         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 857         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 858         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 859 }
 860
 861 #[test]
 862 fn test_update_fee() {
 863         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 864         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 865         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 866         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 867         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 868         let channel_id = chan.2;
 869
 870         // A                                        B
 871         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 872         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 873         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 874         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 875         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 876         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 877         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 878         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 879         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 880         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 881         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 882         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 883
 884         // Create and deliver (1)...
 885         let feerate;
 886         {
 887                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 888                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 889                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 890         }
 891         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 892         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 893
 894         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 895         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 896         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 897                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 898                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 899                 },
 900                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 901         };
 902         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 903
 904         // Generate (2) and (3):
 905         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 906         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 907         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 908
 909         // Deliver (2):
 910         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 911         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 912         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 913
 914         // Create and deliver (4)...
 915         {
 916                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 917                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 918         }
 919         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 920         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 921         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 922         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 923         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 924                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 925                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 926                 },
 927                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 928         };
 929
 930         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 931         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 932         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 933         // ... creating (5)
 934         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 935         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 936
 937         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 938         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 939         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 940         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 941         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 942
 943         // Deliver (5):
 944         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 945         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 946         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 947
 948         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 949         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 950         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 951         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 952         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 953         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 954         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 955         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 956         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 957
 958         // Deliver (7)
 959         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 960         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 961         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 962         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 963
 964         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 965         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 966         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 967
 968         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 969         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 970         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 971         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 972         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 973 }
 974
 975 #[test]
 976 fn fake_network_test() {
 977         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 978         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 979         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 980         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 981         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 982         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 983
 984         // Create some initial channels
 985         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 986         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
 987         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
 988
 989         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
 990         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 991         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 992         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 993         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 994
 995         // Send some more payments
 996         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 997         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
 998         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
 999
1000         // Test failure packets
1001         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
1002         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
1003
1004         // Add a new channel that skips 3
1005         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1006
1007         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1008         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1009         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1010         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1011         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1012         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1013         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1014
1015         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1016         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1017         hops.push(RouteHop {
1018                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1019                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1020                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1021                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1022                 fee_msat: 0,
1023                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1024         });
1025         hops.push(RouteHop {
1026                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1027                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1028                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1029                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1030                 fee_msat: 0,
1031                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1032         });
1033         hops.push(RouteHop {
1034                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1035                 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1036                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1037                 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1038                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1039                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1040         });
1041         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1042         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1043         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1044
1045         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1046         hops.push(RouteHop {
1047                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1048                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1049                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1050                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1051                 fee_msat: 0,
1052                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1053         });
1054         hops.push(RouteHop {
1055                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1056                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1057                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1058                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1059                 fee_msat: 0,
1060                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1061         });
1062         hops.push(RouteHop {
1063                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1064                 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1065                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1066                 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1067                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1068                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1069         });
1070         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1071         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1072         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1073
1074         // Claim the rebalances...
1075         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1076         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1077
1078         // Close down the channels...
1079         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1080         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1081         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1082         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1083         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1084         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1085         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1086         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1087         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1088         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1089         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1090         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1091 }
1092
1093 #[test]
1094 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1095         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1096         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1097         // commitment dance rounds.
1098         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1099         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1100         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1101         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1102         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1103         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1104
1105         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1106         for _ in 0..50 {
1107                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1108                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
1109                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1110                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1111         }
1112         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1113
1114         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1115         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1116         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1117         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1118
1119         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1120         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1121         // another HTLC.
1122         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1123         {
1124                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
1125                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)
1126                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1127                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1128                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1129                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs", 1);
1130         }
1131
1132         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1133         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1134         {
1135                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
1136                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1137                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1138         }
1139
1140         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1141         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1142         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1143         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1144
1145         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1146         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1147         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1148         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1149         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1150         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1151         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1152
1153         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1154         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1155         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1156
1157         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1158
1159         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1160         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1161         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1162         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1163
1164         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1165         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1166         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1167         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1168
1169         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1170         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1171         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1172
1173         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1174                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1175         }
1176         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1177         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1178         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1179         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1180         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1181
1182         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1183         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1184         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1185         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1186         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1187
1188         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1189         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1190
1191         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1192
1193         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1194         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1195         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1196                 match event {
1197                         &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1198                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1199                         },
1200                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1201                 };
1202         }
1203
1204         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1205                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1206         }
1207
1208         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1209 }
1210
1211 #[test]
1212 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1213         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1214         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1215         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1216         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1217         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1218         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1219
1220         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1221         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
1222         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1223         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1224         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
1225         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
1226
1227         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1228
1229         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1230         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1231
1232         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1233         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1234
1235         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1236         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1237         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1238 }
1239
1240 #[test]
1241 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1242         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1243         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1244         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1245         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1246         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1247         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1248         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1249
1250         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1251
1252         // balancing
1253         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1254
1255         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1256
1257         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1258         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
1259         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1260
1261         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1262         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1263         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1264         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1265
1266         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1267         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1268
1269         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1270         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1271         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1272                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1273                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1274                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1275                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1276                 }
1277         }
1278         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1279
1280         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1281         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1282         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1283         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1284
1285         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1286         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 3);
1287
1288         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1289         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
1290         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
1291         let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1292         let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1293                 (&claim_txn[1], &claim_txn[2])
1294         } else {
1295                 (&claim_txn[2], &claim_txn[1])
1296         };
1297
1298         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1299         assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1300
1301         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1302         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1303         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1304
1305         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1306         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1307         check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1308         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1309
1310         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1311         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1312         for e in events {
1313                 match e {
1314                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1315                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1316                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1317                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1318                         },
1319                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1320                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1321                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1322                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1323                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1324                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1325                         },
1326                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1327                 }
1328         }
1329 }
1330
1331 #[test]
1332 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1333         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1334         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1335         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1336         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1337         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1338
1339         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1340         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1341
1342         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1343         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2));
1344         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1345         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1346         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1347                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1348         match err {
1349                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
1350                         match &fails[0] {
1351                                 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1352                                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1353                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1354                         }
1355                 },
1356                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1357         }
1358         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1359         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value", 1);
1360
1361         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1362 }
1363
1364 #[test]
1365 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1366         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1367         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1368         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1369         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1370         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1371
1372         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1373         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1374         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1375         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1376
1377         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1378
1379         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1380         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1381                 3460001, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1382         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1383         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1384                 channel_id: chan.2,
1385                 htlc_id: 0,
1386                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1387                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1388                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1389                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1390         };
1391
1392         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1393
1394         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1395         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1396         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1397
1398         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1399
1400         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1401
1402         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1403         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1404         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1405                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1406                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1407                 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1408                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1409                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1410                 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1411
1412                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1413                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1414                  chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1415                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1416                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1417         };
1418         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1419                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1420                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1421                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1422                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1423                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1424                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1425                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1426                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1427         };
1428
1429         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1430         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1431                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
1432
1433         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1434         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1435         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1436
1437         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1438                 offered: false,
1439                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1440                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1441                 payment_hash,
1442                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1443         };
1444
1445         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1446
1447         let res = {
1448                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1449                 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1450                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1451                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1452                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1453                         commitment_number,
1454                         95000,
1455                         local_chan_balance,
1456                         local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1457                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1458                         feerate_per_kw,
1459                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1460                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1461                 );
1462                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1463         };
1464
1465         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1466                 channel_id: chan.2,
1467                 signature: res.0,
1468                 htlc_signatures: res.1,
1469                 #[cfg(taproot)]
1470                 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
1471         };
1472
1473         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1474         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1475         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1476
1477         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1478         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1479                 channel_id: chan.2,
1480                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1481                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point,
1482                 #[cfg(taproot)]
1483                 next_local_nonce: None,
1484         };
1485         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1486
1487         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1488         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1489         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1490         match events[0] {
1491                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1492                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1493                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1494                 },
1495                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1496         };
1497         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1498                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1499
1500         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1501 }
1502
1503 #[test]
1504 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1505         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1506         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1507         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1508         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1509         // this situation.
1510         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1511         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1512         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1513         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1514         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1515         let opt_anchors = false;
1516
1517         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1518         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1519
1520         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1521
1522         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1523
1524         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1525         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1526                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1527         }
1528
1529         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1530         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1531         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1532                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1533                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1534                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1535         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1536         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1537 }
1538
1539 #[test]
1540 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1541         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1542         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1543         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1544         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1545         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1546         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1547         let opt_anchors = false;
1548
1549         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1550         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1551         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1552         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1553         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1554         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1555         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1556
1557         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1558         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1559                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1560         }
1561
1562         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1563         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1564         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1565         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1566         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1567         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1568         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1569                 700_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1570         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1571         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1572                 channel_id: chan.2,
1573                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1574                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1575                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1576                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1577                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1578         };
1579
1580         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1581         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1582         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1583         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1584         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1585         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1586         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1587         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1588 }
1589
1590 #[test]
1591 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1592         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1593         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1594         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1595         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1596
1597         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1598         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1599         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1600         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1601         let opt_anchors = false;
1602
1603         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1604         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1605         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1606         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1607         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1608         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1609         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt);
1610
1611         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1612                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1613         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1614         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1615         // commitment transaction fee.
1616         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1617
1618         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1619         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1620                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1621         }
1622
1623         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1624         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1625         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1626                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1627                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1628                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1629 }
1630
1631 #[test]
1632 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1633         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1634         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1635         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1636         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1637         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1638         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1639         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1640         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1641         let opt_anchors = false;
1642
1643         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1644         // HTLC.
1645         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1646         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1647         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1648                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1649
1650         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1651         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1652         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1653         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1654         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1655         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1656         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
1657
1658         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1659         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1660         match msg_events[0] {
1661                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1662                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1663                 },
1664                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1665         }
1666 }
1667
1668 #[test]
1669 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1670         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1671         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1672         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1673         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1674         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1675         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1676         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000);
1677
1678         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1679         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1680         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1681         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1682         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1683         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1684
1685         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1686         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1687         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1688         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1689         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1690         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1691
1692         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1693         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1694         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1695         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1696 }
1697
1698 #[test]
1699 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1700         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1701         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1702         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1703         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1704         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1705         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
1706
1707         let feemsat = 239;
1708         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1709         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1710         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1711         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1712
1713         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1714         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1715         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1716         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1717
1718         // Add a pending HTLC.
1719         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1720         let payment_event_1 = {
1721                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1722                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1723                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1724
1725                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1726                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1727                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1728         };
1729         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1730
1731         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1732         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1733         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1734         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1735         let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1736
1737         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1738         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1739         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1740         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1741         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1742         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
1743                 &route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1744         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
1745         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1746                 channel_id: chan.2,
1747                 htlc_id: 1,
1748                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1749                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1750                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1751                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1752         };
1753
1754         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1755         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1756         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1757         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1758         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1759         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1760         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1761         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1762 }
1763
1764 #[test]
1765 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1766         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1767         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1768         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1769         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1770         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1771         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1772         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1773         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1774         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1775         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1776
1777         let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1778         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1779         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1780
1781         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1782         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1783 }
1784
1785 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1786         (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1787 }
1788
1789 #[test]
1790 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1791         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1792         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1793         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1794         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1795         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1796         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1797         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1798         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1799         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001);
1800         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001);
1801
1802         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1803         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1804
1805         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1806         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1807
1808         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1809                 ($node: expr) => {{
1810                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1811                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1812                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1813                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1814                         payment_event
1815                 }}
1816         }
1817
1818         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1819         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1820         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1821         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1822
1823         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1824
1825         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1826         {
1827                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1828                         .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1829                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0);
1830                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1831                 assert!(route.paths[0].hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1832
1833                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1834                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1835                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1836                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1837                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1838                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept", 1);
1839         }
1840
1841         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1842         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1843         loop {
1844                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1845                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1846                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1847                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1848                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1849                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1850                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1851                         break;
1852                 }
1853
1854                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1855                         .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1856                 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0).unwrap();
1857                 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1858                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1859
1860                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1861                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1862                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1863                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1864                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1865                 );
1866
1867                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1868                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1869                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1870                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1871                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1872         }
1873
1874         // adding pending output.
1875         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1876         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1877         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1878         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1879         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1880         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1881         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1882         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1883         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1884         // policy.
1885         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1886         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1887         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1888
1889         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1890         let payment_event_1 = {
1891                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1892                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1893                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1894
1895                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1896                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1897                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1898         };
1899         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1900
1901         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1902         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1903         {
1904                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1905                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1906                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1907                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1908                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1909                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1910         }
1911
1912         // split the rest to test holding cell
1913         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1914         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1915         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1916         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1917         {
1918                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1919                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1920         }
1921
1922         // now see if they go through on both sides
1923         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1924         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1925         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21,
1926                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
1927         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1928         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1929         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1930
1931         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1932         {
1933                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1934                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1935                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1936                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1937                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1938                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1939                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value", 2);
1940         }
1941
1942         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1943         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1944         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22,
1945                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
1946         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1947         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1948         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1949
1950         // flush the pending htlc
1951         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1952         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1953         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1954
1955         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1956         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1957         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1958         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1959
1960         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1961         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1962         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1963         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1964
1965         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1966         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1967         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1968
1969         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1970
1971         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1972         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1973         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1974
1975         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1976         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1977
1978         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1979         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1980         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1981         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1982         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1983         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1984
1985         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1986         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1987         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1988         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1989
1990         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1991         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1992
1993         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1994         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1995         match events[0] {
1996                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
1997                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1998                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
1999                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2000                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2001                         match &purpose {
2002                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2003                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2004                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
2005                                 },
2006                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2007                         }
2008                 },
2009                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2010         }
2011         match events[1] {
2012                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2013                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
2014                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
2015                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2016                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2017                         match &purpose {
2018                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2019                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2020                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
2021                                 },
2022                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2023                         }
2024                 },
2025                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2026         }
2027
2028         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
2029         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2030         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2031
2032         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
2033         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2034         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2035
2036         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
2037         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2038         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2039         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2040         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2041
2042         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
2043         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2044 }
2045
2046 #[test]
2047 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2048         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2049         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2050         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2051         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2052         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2053         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2054         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2055         // To test this we:
2056         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2057         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2058         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2059         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2060         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2061         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2062         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
2063         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2064         //    claim,
2065         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2066         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2067         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2068         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2069         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2070         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2071         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2072         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2073         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2074         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2075
2076         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2077         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2078         let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2079         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2080         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2081
2082         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2083         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2084         let send_1 = {
2085                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_3,
2086                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2087                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2088                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2089                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2090                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2091         };
2092
2093         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2094         // initial fulfill/CS.
2095         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2096         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2097         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2098         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2099
2100         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2101         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2102         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2103         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2104         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2105         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2106
2107         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2108         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2109         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2110         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2111         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2112
2113         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2114         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2115         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2116         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2117         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2118
2119         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2120         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2121         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2122
2123         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2124         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2125         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2126
2127         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2128         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2129         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2130
2131         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2132         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2133         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2134         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2135         // on-chain as necessary).
2136         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2137         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2138         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2139         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2140         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2141
2142         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2143         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2144         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2145
2146         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2147         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2148
2149         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2150         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2151         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2152         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2153         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2154         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2155
2156         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2157         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2158         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2159         let send_2 = {
2160                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_4,
2161                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2162                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2163                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2164                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2165                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2166         };
2167
2168         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2169         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2170         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2171         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2172
2173         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2174
2175         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2176         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2177         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2178
2179         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2180         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2181
2182         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2183         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2184         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2185         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2186
2187         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2188         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2189         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2190
2191         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2192         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2193
2194         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2195         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2196
2197         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2198         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2199 }
2200
2201 #[test]
2202 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2203         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2204         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2205         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2206         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2207         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2208         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2209
2210         // Create some initial channels
2211         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2212         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2213         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2214         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
2215
2216         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2217         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2218         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2219         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2220         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2221         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2222
2223         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2224         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2225         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2226         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2227         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2228
2229         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2230         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2231         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2232         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2233         {
2234                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2235                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2236                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2237                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2238                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2239         }
2240         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2241         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2242         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2243         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2244         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2245
2246         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2247         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2248
2249         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2250         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2251         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2252         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2253         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2254         {
2255                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2256                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2257                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2258                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2259                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2260                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2261         }
2262         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2263         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2264         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2265         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2266         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2267
2268         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2269                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2270                         {
2271                                 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2272                                 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2273                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2274
2275                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2276                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2277                                 match events[0] {
2278                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2279                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2280                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2281                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2282                                         },
2283                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2284                                 };
2285                         }
2286                 }
2287         }
2288
2289         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2290         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2291         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2292         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2293         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2294         let node2_commitment_txid;
2295         {
2296                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2297                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2298                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2299                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2300
2301                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2302                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2303                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2304                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2305                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2306         }
2307         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2308         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2309         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2310         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2311         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2312
2313         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2314         // confusing us in the following tests.
2315         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2316
2317         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2318         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2319         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2320         // buffer space).
2321
2322         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2323                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2324                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2325                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2326                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2327                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2328                                 msg.clone()
2329                         },
2330                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2331                 };
2332                 match events[1] {
2333                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2334                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2335                         },
2336                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2337                 }
2338                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2339
2340                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2341                 {
2342                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2343                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2344                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2345                                         false
2346                                 } else { true }
2347                         });
2348                 }
2349
2350                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2351
2352                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2353                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2354
2355                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2356                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2357                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2358                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2359                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2360                                 msg.clone()
2361                         },
2362                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2363                 };
2364                 match events[1] {
2365                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2366                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2367                         },
2368                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2369                 }
2370                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2371                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2372
2373                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2374                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2375                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2376         };
2377         nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2378         nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2379         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2380         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2381
2382         assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2383                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
2384         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2385         check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2386 }
2387
2388 #[test]
2389 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_timeout() {
2390         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Timeout tx, against both sides
2391         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2392         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2393         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2394         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2395         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2396         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2397         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2398         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2399         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2400         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2401         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2402         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2403         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2404         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2405         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2406         // Create some new channels:
2407         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2408
2409         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2410         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2411         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2412         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2413         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2414         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2415         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2416         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2417         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2418         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2419         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2420         // Revoke the old state
2421         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2422
2423         {
2424                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2425                 {
2426                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2427                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2428                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2429                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2430                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2431                 }
2432                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2433                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2434                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2435
2436                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2437                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2438                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2439                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2440                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2441                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2442                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2443                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2444                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2445         }
2446         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2447         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2448         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2449 }
2450
2451 #[test]
2452 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_success() {
2453         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2454         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2455         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2456         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2457         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2458         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2459         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2460         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2461         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2462         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2463         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2464         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2465         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2466         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2467         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2468         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2469         // Create some new channels:
2470         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2471
2472         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2473         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2474         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2475         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2476         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2477         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2478         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2479         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2480         // Revoke the old state
2481         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2482         {
2483                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2484                 {
2485                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2486                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2487                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2488
2489                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2490                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2491                 }
2492                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2493                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2494
2495                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2496                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2497                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2498                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2499                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2500                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2501                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2502         }
2503         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2504         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2505         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2506 }
2507
2508 #[test]
2509 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2510         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2511         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2512         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2513         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2514         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2515         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2516         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2517         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2518         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2519         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2520         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2521         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2522         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2523         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2524
2525         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2526         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2527         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2528         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2529         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2530         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output
2531
2532         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2533
2534         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2535         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2536         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2537         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2538         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2539 }
2540
2541 #[test]
2542 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2543         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2544         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2545         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2546         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2547         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2548         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2549
2550         // Create some new channel:
2551         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2552
2553         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2554         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2555         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2556         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2557         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2558
2559         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2560         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2561         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2562         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2563         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2564         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2565         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2566         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2567         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2568
2569         //Revoke the old state
2570         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2571
2572         {
2573                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2574                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2575                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2576                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2577                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2578                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2579                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2580                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2581
2582                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2583                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2584
2585                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2586                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2587
2588                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2589                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2590                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2591                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2592                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2593                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2594                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2595                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2596
2597                 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2598                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2599                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2600                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2601                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2602         }
2603         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2604         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2605         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2606 }
2607
2608 #[test]
2609 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2610         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2611         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2612         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2613         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2614         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2615         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2616
2617         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2618
2619         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2620         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2621         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2622         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2623         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2624         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2625
2626         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2627         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2628
2629         //Revoke the old state
2630         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2631
2632         {
2633                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2634                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2635                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2636                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2637                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2638                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2639                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2640                 match events.last().unwrap() {
2641                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2642                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2643                 }
2644
2645                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2646                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2647
2648                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2649
2650                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2651                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2652                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2653                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2654                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2655                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2656                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2657
2658                 // Filter out any non justice transactions.
2659                 node_txn.retain(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2660                 assert!(node_txn.len() > 3);
2661
2662                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2663                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2664                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2665
2666                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2667                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2668                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2669
2670                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2671                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2672                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2673                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2674                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2675                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2676                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2677                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2678
2679                 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2680                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2681                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2682                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2683                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2684                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2685                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2686         }
2687         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2688         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2689         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2690 }
2691
2692 #[test]
2693 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2694         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2695         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2696         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2697         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2698         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2699         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2700         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2701         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2702         // towards B.
2703         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2704         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2705         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2706         // PaymentSent event).
2707
2708         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2709         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2710         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2711         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2712
2713         // Create some initial channels
2714         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2715         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2716
2717         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2718         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2719         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2720         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2721         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2722
2723         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2724         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2725         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2726
2727         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2728         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2729
2730         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2731         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2732         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2733         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2734         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2735         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2736         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2737         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2738         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2739         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2740         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2741         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2742         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2743         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2744         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2745
2746         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2747         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2748         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2749         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2750         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2751         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2752         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2753         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2754         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2755         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2756         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2757         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2758         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2759         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2760
2761         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2762         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]));
2763         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2764         {
2765                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2766                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2767                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2768                 added_monitors.clear();
2769         }
2770         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2771         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2772         match forwarded_events[0] {
2773                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2774                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2775         }
2776         let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2777         match forwarded_events[1] {
2778                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
2779                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2780                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2781                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2782                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2783                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2784                 },
2785                 _ => panic!()
2786         }
2787         match forwarded_events[2] {
2788                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
2789                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2790                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2791                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2792                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2793                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2794                 },
2795                 _ => panic!()
2796         }
2797         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2798         {
2799                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2800                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2801                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2802                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2803                 added_monitors.clear();
2804         }
2805         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2806
2807         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2808         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2809
2810         match nodes_2_event {
2811                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2812                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2813         }
2814
2815         match nodes_0_event {
2816                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2817                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2818                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2819                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2820                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2821                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2822                 },
2823                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2824         };
2825
2826         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
2827         match events[0] {
2828                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2829                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2830         }
2831
2832         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2833                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => { {
2834                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2835                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2836                         // Node[1]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2837                         // Node[0]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2838                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx);
2839                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2840                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2841                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2842                         if $htlc_offered {
2843                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2844                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2845                                 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2846                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2847                         } else {
2848                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2849                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2850                                 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2851                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2852                         }
2853                         node_txn.clear();
2854                 } }
2855         }
2856         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2857         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0]);
2858
2859         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2860         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2861         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2862         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2863         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2864         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2865         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2866         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2867         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2868         assert!(node_txn.len() == 1 || node_txn.len() == 3); // HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn
2869         let commitment_spend =
2870                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2871                         &node_txn[0]
2872                 } else {
2873                         // Certain `ConnectStyle`s will cause RBF bumps of the previous HTLC transaction to be broadcast.
2874                         // FullBlockViaListen
2875                         if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2876                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2877                                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2878                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2879                                 &node_txn[0]
2880                         } else {
2881                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2882                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2883                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2884                                 &node_txn[2]
2885                         }
2886                 };
2887
2888         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2889         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2890         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2891         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2892         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2893         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2894         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2895         // we already checked the same situation with A.
2896
2897         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2898         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()]));
2899         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2900         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2901         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2902         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2903         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2904         let mut first_claimed = false;
2905         for event in events {
2906                 match event {
2907                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2908                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2909                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
2910                                         first_claimed = true;
2911                                 } else {
2912                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2913                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2914                                 }
2915                         },
2916                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2917                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2918                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2919                 }
2920         }
2921         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2922 }
2923
2924 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2925         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2926         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2927         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2928         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2929         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
2930         //            \                                  \
2931         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
2932
2933         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2934         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2935         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2936         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2937         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2938         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2939         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2940
2941         // Create some intial channels
2942         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2943         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2944
2945         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2946         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2947         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2948
2949         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2950
2951         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2952         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2953         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2954         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2955         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2956         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
2957         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2958
2959         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2960         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2961         match events[0] {
2962                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2963                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2964                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2965                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2966                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2967                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2968                 },
2969                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2970         };
2971         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2972         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2973         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2974         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2975         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2976         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2977
2978         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2979         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2980         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2981         check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false);
2982         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2983         let timeout_tx = {
2984                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2985                 if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
2986                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
2987                 } else {
2988                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 3); // Two extra fee bumps for timeout transaction
2989                 }
2990                 txn.iter().for_each(|tx| check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx[0]));
2991                 assert_eq!(txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2992                 txn.remove(0)
2993         };
2994
2995         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2996         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2997         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2998
2999         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3000
3001         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3002         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3003         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3004         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3005         match events[0] {
3006                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3007                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3008                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3009                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3010                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3011                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3012                 },
3013                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3014         };
3015
3016         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
3017         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3018         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
3019
3020         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
3021         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3022
3023         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3024         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3025         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3026         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // 1 timeout tx
3027         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3028         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
3029         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3030 }
3031
3032 #[test]
3033 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3034         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3035         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3036         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3037 }
3038
3039 #[test]
3040 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3041         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3042         // and fail backward accordingly.
3043
3044         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3045         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3046         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3047         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3048
3049         // Create some initial channels
3050         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3051         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3052
3053         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3054         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3055         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3056         // Revoke the old state
3057         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3058
3059         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3060
3061         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3062         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3063         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3064         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3065         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3066
3067         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3068         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3069         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3070         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3071         match events[0] {
3072                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3073                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3074                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3075                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3076                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3077                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3078
3079                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3080                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3081                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3082                 },
3083                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3084         }
3085 }
3086
3087 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3088         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3089         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3090         // commitment transaction anymore.
3091         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3092         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3093         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3094         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3095         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3096         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3097         // transactions:
3098         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3099         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3100         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3101         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3102         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3103         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3104         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3105         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3106         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3107
3108         // Create some initial channels
3109         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3110         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3111
3112         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3113         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3114         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3115         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3116         // Revoke the old state
3117         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3118
3119         let value = if use_dust {
3120                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3121                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3122                 nodes[2].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
3123                         .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3124         } else { 3000000 };
3125
3126         let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3127         let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3128         let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3129
3130         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3131         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3132         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3133         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3134         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3135         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3136         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3137         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3138         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3139         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3140         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3141         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3142
3143         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3144         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3145         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3146         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3147         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3148         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3149         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3150         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3151         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3152         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3153         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3154         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3155         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3156         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3157         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3158         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3159
3160         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3161         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3162         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3163         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3164         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3165         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3166         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3167         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3168         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3169         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3170         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3171         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3172         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3173         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3174         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3175         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3176         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3177         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3178
3179         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3180         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3181         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3182         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, fourth_payment_hash,
3183                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3184         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3185         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3186         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3187
3188         if deliver_bs_raa {
3189                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3190                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3191                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3192                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3193                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3194                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3195                 match events[0] {
3196                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3197                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3198                 };
3199                 match events[1] {
3200                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3201                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3202                 }
3203                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3204                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3205         }
3206
3207         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3208         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3209
3210         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3211         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3212         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3213
3214         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3215         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
3216         match events[0] {
3217                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3218                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3219         }
3220         match events[1] {
3221                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3222                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3223                 },
3224                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3225         }
3226         match events[2] {
3227                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3228                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3229                 },
3230                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3231         }
3232
3233         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3234         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3235
3236         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3237         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3238
3239         if deliver_bs_raa {
3240                 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3241                 match nodes_2_event {
3242                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3243                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3244                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3245                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3246                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3247                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3248                         },
3249                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3250                 }
3251         }
3252
3253         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3254         match nodes_2_event {
3255                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3256                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3257                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3258                 },
3259                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3260         }
3261
3262         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3263         match nodes_0_event {
3264                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3265                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3266                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3267                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3268                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3269                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3270
3271                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3272                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3273                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3274
3275                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3276
3277                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3278                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
3279                         match events[0] {
3280                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref failure, .. } => {
3281                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3282                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3283                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3284                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3285                                                 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure { } else { panic!("Unexpected path failure") }
3286                                         }
3287                                 },
3288                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3289                         }
3290                         match events[1] {
3291                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3292                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, first_payment_hash);
3293                                 },
3294                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3295                         }
3296                         match events[2] {
3297                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3298                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3299                                 },
3300                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3301                         }
3302                         match events[3] {
3303                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3304                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
3305                                 },
3306                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3307                         }
3308                         match events[4] {
3309                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3310                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3311                                 },
3312                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3313                         }
3314                         match events[5] {
3315                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3316                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, third_payment_hash);
3317                                 },
3318                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3319                         }
3320                 },
3321                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3322         }
3323
3324         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
3325         match events[0] {
3326                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3327                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3328         }
3329
3330         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3331         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3332         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3333 }
3334
3335 #[test]
3336 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3337         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3338         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3339         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3340         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3341 }
3342
3343 #[test]
3344 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3345         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3346         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3347         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3348         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3349 }
3350
3351 #[test]
3352 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3353         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3354         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3355         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3356         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3357         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
3358
3359         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3360         {
3361                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3362                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
3363                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3364                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3365
3366                 let payment_event = {
3367                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3368                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3369                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3370                 };
3371                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3372                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3373         }
3374
3375         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3376         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3377         {
3378                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, failed_payment_hash,
3379                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3380                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3381
3382                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3383         }
3384
3385         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3386         {
3387                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3388
3389                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3390                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3391                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3392                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
3393                         &route.paths[0], 50_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3394                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3395                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
3396
3397                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3398                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3399                         channel_id: chan.2,
3400                         htlc_id: 0,
3401                         amount_msat: 0,
3402                         payment_hash,
3403                         cltv_expiry,
3404                         onion_routing_packet,
3405                 };
3406                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3407         }
3408         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3409         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3410         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3411         match events[0] {
3412                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3413                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3414                 },
3415                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3416         }
3417         match events[1] {
3418                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3419                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3420                 },
3421                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3422         }
3423         match events[2] {
3424                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3425                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3426                 },
3427                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3428         }
3429         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3430         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3431 }
3432
3433 #[test]
3434 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3435         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3436         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3437         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3438         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3439         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3440         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3441         if *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
3442                 // We rely on the ability to connect a block redundantly, which isn't allowed via
3443                 // `chain::Listen`, so we never run the test if we randomly get assigned that
3444                 // connect_style.
3445                 return;
3446         }
3447         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3448
3449         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3450         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3451         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3452         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3453         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3454         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3455
3456         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3457         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3458         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].txid(), node_txn[1].txid());
3459
3460         let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]);
3461         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3462         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3463         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3464         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3465
3466         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3467         // registering new transactions
3468         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3469 }
3470
3471 #[test]
3472 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3473         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3474         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3475         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3476         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3477         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3478         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3479         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3480
3481         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3482
3483         let mut payment_event = {
3484                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
3485                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3486                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3487
3488                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3489                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3490                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3491         };
3492
3493         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3494         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3495
3496         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3497
3498         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3499         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3500         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3501         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3502
3503         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3504         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3505         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3506         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3507         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3508
3509         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3510         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3511         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3512
3513         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3514         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3515         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3516         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3517         let tx = {
3518                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3519                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3520                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3521                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3522                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3523                 node_txn.remove(0)
3524         };
3525
3526         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3527
3528         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3529         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3530         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3531         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3532
3533         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3534         {
3535                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3536                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3537         }
3538         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3539         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3540         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3541         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3542         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3543         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3544         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3545
3546         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3547 }
3548
3549 #[test]
3550 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3551         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3552         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3553         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3554         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3555
3556         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3557         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3558         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3559         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3560         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3561
3562         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3563
3564         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3565         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3566         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3567         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3568         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3569         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3570
3571         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3572         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3573
3574         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3575         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3576 }
3577
3578 #[test]
3579 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3580         // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3581         // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3582         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3583         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3584         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3585         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3586
3587         // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3588         // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3589         let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3590         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3591         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
3592         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3593         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
3594
3595         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3596         assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3597
3598         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3599
3600         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3601         assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3602
3603         // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3604         // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3605         // broadcasted.
3606         {
3607                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3608         }
3609
3610         // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3611         // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3612         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3613         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3614
3615         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3616         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3617 }
3618
3619 #[test]
3620 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3621         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3622         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3623         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3624         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3625         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3626         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3627         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3628
3629         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3630         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3631         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3632
3633         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3634         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3635         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3636         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3637
3638         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3639         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3640         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3641
3642         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3643         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3644         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3645         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3646
3647         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3648         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3649
3650         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3651         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3652
3653         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3654         {
3655                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3656                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
3657                 match events[0] {
3658                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3659                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3660                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3661                         },
3662                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3663                 }
3664                 match events[1] {
3665                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3666                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3667                 }
3668                 match events[2] {
3669                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3670                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3671                                 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3672                         },
3673                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3674                 }
3675                 match events[3] {
3676                         Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3677                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3678                         },
3679                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3680                 }
3681         }
3682
3683         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3684         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3685 }
3686
3687 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3688         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3689         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3690         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3691         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3692         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3693
3694         let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3695         let channel_id = if messages_delivered == 0 {
3696                 let (channel_ready, chan_id, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
3697                 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3698                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3699                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3700                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3701                 chan_id
3702         } else {
3703                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2
3704         };
3705
3706         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3707
3708         let payment_event = {
3709                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
3710                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3711                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3712
3713                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3714                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3715                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3716         };
3717         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3718
3719         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3720                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3721         } else {
3722                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3723                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3724                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3725                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3726                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3727
3728                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3729                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3730                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3731                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3732
3733                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3734                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3735                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3736                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3737                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3738
3739                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3740                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3741                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3742                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3743                                         }
3744                                 }
3745                         }
3746                 }
3747         }
3748
3749         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3750         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3751         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3752                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3753                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3754                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3755                         //
3756                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3757                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3758                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3759                         //
3760                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3761                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3762                 }
3763                 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3764                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3765                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3766         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3767                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3768                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3769         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3770                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3771                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3772         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3773                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3774                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3775         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3776                 // Everything was delivered...
3777                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3778         }
3779
3780         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3781         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3782                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3783                 match events_1[0] {
3784                         Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3785                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3786                 };
3787                 match events_1[1] {
3788                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3789                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3790                 };
3791         } else {
3792                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3793                 match events_1[0] {
3794                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3795                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3796                 };
3797         }
3798
3799         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3800         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3801         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3802
3803         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3804
3805         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3806         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3807         match events_2[0] {
3808                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
3809                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3810                         assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3811                         assert_eq!(receiver_node_id.unwrap(), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3812                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(channel_id));
3813                         match &purpose {
3814                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3815                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3816                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3817                                 },
3818                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3819                         }
3820                 },
3821                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3822         }
3823
3824         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3825         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3826         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3827
3828         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3829         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3830         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3831                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3832                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3833                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3834                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3835                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3836                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3837                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3838                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3839                 },
3840                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3841         };
3842
3843         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3844                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3845
3846                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3847                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3848                 match events_4[0] {
3849                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3850                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3851                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3852                         },
3853                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3854                 }
3855
3856                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3857                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3858                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3859                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3860
3861                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3862                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3863                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3864                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3865
3866                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3867                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3868                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3869                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3870                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3871
3872                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3873                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3874                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3875                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3876                                         }
3877                                 }
3878                         }
3879                 }
3880         }
3881
3882         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3883         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3884         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3885                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3886                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3887                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3888                 } else {
3889                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3890                 }
3891         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3892                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3893                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3894         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3895                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3896                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3897         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3898                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3899                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3900         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3901                 // Everything was delivered...
3902                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3903         }
3904
3905         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3906                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3907         }
3908         if messages_delivered <= 5 {
3909                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3910                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3911         }
3912         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3913
3914         if messages_delivered > 2 {
3915                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3916         }
3917
3918         // Channel should still work fine...
3919         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3920         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3921         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3922 }
3923
3924 #[test]
3925 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3926         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3927         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3928         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3929         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3930 }
3931
3932 #[test]
3933 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3934         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3935         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3936         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3937         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3938 }
3939
3940 #[test]
3941 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
3942         // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
3943         // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
3944         // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
3945         // channel_ready immediately instead.
3946         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3947         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3948         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3949         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3950         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
3951
3952         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
3953
3954         let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3955         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
3956         let block_txn = [funding_tx];
3957         let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
3958         let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
3959         nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
3960
3961         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
3962         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3963         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3964 }
3965
3966 #[test]
3967 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3968         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3969         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3970         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3971         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3972         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3973         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3974         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3975
3976         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3977
3978         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3979         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3980         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
3981                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
3982         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3983
3984         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3985         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3986         match events_1[0] {
3987                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3988                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3989         }
3990
3991         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3992         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3993         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3994
3995         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3996         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3997         match events_2[0] {
3998                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3999                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4000                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4001                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4002                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4003                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4004                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4005
4006                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4007                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4008                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4009                         match events_3[0] {
4010                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4011                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4012                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4013                                 },
4014                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4015                         }
4016
4017                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4018                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4019                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4020                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4021                 },
4022                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4023         }
4024
4025         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4026         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4027
4028         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
4029                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
4030         }, true).unwrap();
4031         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4032         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4033         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
4034                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
4035         }, false).unwrap();
4036         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4037         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4038
4039         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4040         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4041         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4042         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4043
4044         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4045         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4046
4047         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4048         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4049
4050         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4051
4052         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4053         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4054         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4055         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4056         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4057         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4058         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4059         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4060         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4061         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4062
4063         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4064         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4065         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4066         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4067         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4068         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4069         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4070         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4071
4072         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4073         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4074         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4075         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4076         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4077         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4078         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4079         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4080
4081         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4082         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4083         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4084         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4085
4086         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4087         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4088         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4089         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4090
4091         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4092         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4093         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4094
4095         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4096
4097         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4098         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4099         match events_5[0] {
4100                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4101                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4102                         match &purpose {
4103                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4104                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4105                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4106                                 },
4107                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4108                         }
4109                 },
4110                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4111         }
4112
4113         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4114         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4115         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4116
4117         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4118         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4119 }
4120
4121 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4122         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4123         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4124         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4125         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4126         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4127         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4128
4129         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4130
4131         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4132                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4133                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4134                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4135                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4136                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4137                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
4138                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4139                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
4140                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id,
4141                         &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4142                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4143                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4144                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4145                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4146                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentClaimable event(s).
4147                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4148                 our_payment_hash
4149         } else {
4150                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4151         };
4152
4153         let mut block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
4154         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4155         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4156         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4157         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4158                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4159                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4160                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4161         }
4162
4163         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4164
4165         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4166         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4167         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4168         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4169         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4170         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4171
4172         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4173         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4174         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4175         let mut expected_failure_data = (100_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4176         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&(block_count - 1).to_be_bytes());
4177         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4178 }
4179
4180 #[test]
4181 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4182         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4183         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4184 }
4185
4186 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4187         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4188         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4189         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4190         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4191         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4192         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4193         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4194
4195         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4196         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4197         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4198         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4199
4200         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4201         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4202         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, first_payment_hash,
4203                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4204         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4205         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4206
4207         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4208         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4209         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4210         sending_node.node.send_payment_with_route(&route, second_payment_hash,
4211                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4212         if forwarded_htlc {
4213                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4214                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4215                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4216                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4217                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4218         }
4219         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4220
4221         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4222         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4223         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4224         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4225
4226         if forwarded_htlc {
4227                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4228                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4229                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4230                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4231                 match fail_commit[0] {
4232                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4233                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4234                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4235                         },
4236                         _ => unreachable!(),
4237                 }
4238                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4239         } else {
4240                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4241         }
4242 }
4243
4244 #[test]
4245 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4246         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4247         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4248 }
4249
4250 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4251         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4252                 {
4253                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4254                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4255                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4256                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4257                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4258                                 match event {
4259                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4260                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4261                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4262                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4263                                                 }
4264                                         },
4265                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4266                                 };
4267                         }
4268                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4269                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx) {
4270                                         txn.push(tx);
4271                                 }
4272                         }
4273                         txn
4274                 }
4275         }
4276 }
4277
4278 #[test]
4279 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4280         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4281         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4282         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4283         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4284         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4285
4286         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4287         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4288         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4289         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4290         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4291         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4292         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4293         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4294         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4295
4296         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4297         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4298
4299         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4300         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4301         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4302         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4303         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4304 }
4305
4306 #[test]
4307 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4308         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4309         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4310         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4311         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4312         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4313         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4314
4315         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4316         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4317         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4318         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4319         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4320
4321         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4322         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4323         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4324         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4325
4326         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4327         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4328         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4329         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4330         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4331
4332         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4333         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4334         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4335 }
4336
4337 #[test]
4338 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4339         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4340         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4341
4342         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4343         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4344         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4345         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4346
4347         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
4348         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4349         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4350         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4351         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4352
4353         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4354         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4355         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4356         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4357         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4358
4359         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4360         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4361         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4362
4363         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4364         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4365         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4366         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4367         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4368 }
4369
4370 #[test]
4371 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4372         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4373         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4374         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4375         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4376
4377         // Create some initial channels
4378         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4379
4380         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4381
4382         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4383         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4384         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4385
4386         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4387         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4388         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4389         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4390         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4391         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4392         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4393         match events[0] {
4394                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4395                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4396         }
4397         match events[1] {
4398                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4399                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4400         }
4401
4402         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4403         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4404         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4405         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4406         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4407
4408         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4409         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4410         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4411
4412         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4413         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4414         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4415 }
4416
4417 #[test]
4418 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4419         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4420         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4421         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4422         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4423
4424         // Create some initial channels
4425         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4426
4427         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4428         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4429
4430         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4431
4432         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4433         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4434         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4435
4436         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4437         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4438         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4439         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4440         match events[0] {
4441                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4442                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4443         }
4444         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4445
4446         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4447         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4448         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4449         check_spends!(node_txn[0],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4450         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4451
4452         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4453         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4454         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4455         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4456
4457         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4458         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4459         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4460         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4461         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4462 }
4463
4464 #[test]
4465 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4466         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4467         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4468         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4469         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4470
4471         // Create some initial channels
4472         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4473
4474         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4475         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4476         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4477         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4478
4479         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4480
4481         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4482         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4483         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4484         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4485
4486         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4487         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4488         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4489         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4490
4491         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4492         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4493
4494         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4495         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4496         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4497 }
4498
4499 #[test]
4500 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4501         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4502         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4503         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4504         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4505         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4506
4507         // Create some initial channels
4508         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4509
4510         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4511         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4512         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4513         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4514
4515         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4516
4517         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4518         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4519         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4520         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4521         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4522         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4523
4524         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4525         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4526         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4527         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4528         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4529         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4530
4531         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4532         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4533         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4534         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4535         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4536
4537         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4538         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs
4539         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4540         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4541         // transactions next...
4542         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4543         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4544
4545         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4546         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4547         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4548                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4549         } else {
4550                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4551                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4552         }
4553
4554         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4555         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4556
4557         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4558         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4559         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4560         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4561         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4562 }
4563
4564 #[test]
4565 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4566         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4567         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4568         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4569         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4570         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4571
4572         // Create some initial channels
4573         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4574
4575         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4576         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4577         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4578         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4579
4580         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4581         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4582
4583         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4584
4585         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4586         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4587         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4588         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4589         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4590         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4591
4592         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4593         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4594         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4595         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4596
4597         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4598         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4599         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4600
4601         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4602         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4603         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4604         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4605         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4606
4607         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4608         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success
4609
4610         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4611         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4612         // transactions next...
4613         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4614         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4615         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4616                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4617         } else {
4618                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4619                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4620         }
4621
4622         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4623         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4624
4625         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4626         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4627
4628         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4629         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4630
4631         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4632         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4633         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4634         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4635         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4636         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4637         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4638         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4639 }
4640
4641 #[test]
4642 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4643         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4644         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4645         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4646         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4647         // channel.
4648         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4649         // gets broadcast.
4650
4651         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4652         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4653         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4654         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4655
4656         // Create some initial channels
4657         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4658         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4659
4660         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4661         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4662         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4663         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4664         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4665
4666         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4667         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4668         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4669
4670         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
4671         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4672         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4673         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4674         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4675         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4676         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4677         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4678         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4679         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4680         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4681
4682         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4683         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4684         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4685         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4686
4687         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4688         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 1);
4689         check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4690         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4691         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4692         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4693
4694         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4695         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), c_txn[0].clone()]));
4696         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4697         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4698         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4699         match events[0] {
4700                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4701                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4702         }
4703         match events[1] {
4704                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
4705                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4706                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
4707                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4708                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
4709                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
4710                 },
4711                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4712         }
4713         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4714         let mut msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4715         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4716         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4717         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4718
4719         match nodes_2_event {
4720                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4721                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4722         }
4723
4724         match nodes_0_event {
4725                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4726                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4727                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4728                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4729                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4730                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4731                 },
4732                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4733         };
4734
4735         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
4736         match msg_events[0] {
4737                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4738                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4739         }
4740
4741         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4742         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4743         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4744         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4745         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4746         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx
4747         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4748         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4749         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4750         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4751         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, nodes[1].best_block_info().1); // Success tx
4752
4753         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4754         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4755 }
4756
4757 #[test]
4758 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4759         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4760         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4761         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4762         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4763         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4764         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4765         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4766         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4767         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4768         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4769         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
4770                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4771         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4772
4773         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4774         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4775         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4776
4777         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4778         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4779         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4780         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4781         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
4782
4783         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
4784
4785         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
4786         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
4787         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
4788         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
4789         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40)
4790                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
4791         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 800_000);
4792         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 800_000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
4793
4794         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4795         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4796         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
4797
4798         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
4799         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4800         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4801         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4802         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4803
4804         let htlc_timeout_tx;
4805         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
4806                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4807                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3
4808                 assert!(node_txn.len() == 2 || node_txn.len() == 3);
4809
4810                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4811                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4812                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4813
4814                 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4815                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4816                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4817                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
4818                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4819
4820                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4821                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4822                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
4823                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
4824                 } else {
4825                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4826                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4827                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
4828                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4829                 }
4830
4831                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4832                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4833                 // Assign htlc_timeout_tx to the forwarded HTLC (with value ~800 sats). The received HTLC
4834                 // (with value 900 sats) will be claimed in the below `claim_funds` call.
4835                 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4836                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4837                         htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[2].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[2].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
4838                 } else {
4839                         htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[0].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[1].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
4840                 }
4841         }
4842
4843         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
4844         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
4845
4846         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
4847         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
4848         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4849         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4850         match events[0] {
4851                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4852                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4853         }
4854         match events[1] {
4855                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4856                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4857         }
4858         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4859         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
4860         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4861         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4862         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4863         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4864         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4865         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4866         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4867         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
4868
4869         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
4870         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4871         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4872         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4873         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4874         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4875         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
4876         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4877         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4878         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4879
4880         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4881         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4882         {
4883                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
4884         }
4885         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
4886
4887         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
4888         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[1]);
4889         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196), true, true);
4890         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4891         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4892         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4893         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4894         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
4895         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4896         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4897
4898         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4899         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
4900         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, None, true);
4901 }
4902
4903 #[test]
4904 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
4905         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4906         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4907         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4908         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4909
4910         // Create some initial channels
4911         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4912
4913         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
4914         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4915         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
4916         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4917         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4918
4919         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
4920         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4921         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
4922         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4923
4924         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
4925         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4926         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4927         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4928         match events[0] {
4929                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4930                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4931         }
4932         match events[1] {
4933                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4934                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4935         }
4936         let node_tx = {
4937                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4938                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4939                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4940                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4941                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
4942                 node_txn[0].clone()
4943         };
4944
4945         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
4946         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4947
4948         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
4949         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4950         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4951         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4952         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
4953         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4954 }
4955
4956 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
4957         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
4958         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
4959         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
4960         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
4961         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
4962         // use the same payment hashes.
4963         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
4964         //
4965         // A \         / E
4966         //    - C - D -
4967         // B /         \ F
4968         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
4969         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
4970         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
4971         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4972         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4973         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4974         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4975         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
4976                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4977         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4978
4979         let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
4980         let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4981         let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4982         let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4983         let chan_3_5  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
4984
4985         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
4986         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
4987         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
4988         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
4989
4990         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
4991                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
4992         // 0th HTLC:
4993         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4994         // 1st HTLC:
4995         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4996         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
4997         // 2nd HTLC:
4998         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4999         // 3rd HTLC:
5000         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5001         // 4th HTLC:
5002         let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5003         // 5th HTLC:
5004         let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5005         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5006         // 6th HTLC:
5007         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5008         // 7th HTLC:
5009         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5010
5011         // 8th HTLC:
5012         let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5013         // 9th HTLC:
5014         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5015         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5016
5017         // 10th HTLC:
5018         let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5019         // 11th HTLC:
5020         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5021         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5022
5023         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5024         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5025         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5026         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
5027         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5028
5029         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5030         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5031         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5032         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5033         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5034         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5035         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5036
5037         let failed_destinations = vec![
5038                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
5039                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
5040                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
5041                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
5042         ];
5043         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
5044         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5045
5046         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5047         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5048         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5049         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5050         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5051         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5052
5053         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5054         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5055         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5056         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5057
5058         let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5059                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5060                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5061         ];
5062         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5063         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5064
5065         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5066         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5067         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5068         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5069
5070         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5071
5072         // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5073         let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5074                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5075                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5076                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5077                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5078                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5079                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5080         ];
5081         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5082         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5083         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5084         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5085         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5086         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5087         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5088         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5089         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5090         if deliver_last_raa {
5091                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5092         } else {
5093                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5094         }
5095
5096         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5097         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5098         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5099         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5100         //
5101         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5102         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5103         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5104         //
5105         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5106         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5107         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5108
5109         if announce_latest {
5110                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5111         } else {
5112                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5113         }
5114         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5115         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5116                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5117                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5118         } else {
5119                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5120                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5121         };
5122         match close_event {
5123                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5124                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5125         }
5126
5127         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5128         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5129         if deliver_last_raa {
5130                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5131
5132                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5133                 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5134         } else {
5135                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5136                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5137                 } else {
5138                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5139                 };
5140
5141                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5142         }
5143         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5144
5145         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5146         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5147         let mut a_done = false;
5148         for msg in cs_msgs {
5149                 match msg {
5150                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5151                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5152                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5153                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5154                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5155                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5156                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5157                                         }
5158                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5159                                         assert!(!a_done);
5160                                         a_done = true;
5161                                         &nodes[0]
5162                                 } else {
5163                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5164                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5165                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5166                                         }
5167                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5168                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5169                                         &nodes[1]
5170                                 };
5171                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5172                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5173                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5174                                 if announce_latest {
5175                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5176                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5177                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5178                                         }
5179                                 }
5180                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5181                         },
5182                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5183                 }
5184         }
5185
5186         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5187         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 10 } else { 6 });
5188         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5189         let mut as_updates = 0;
5190         for event in as_events.iter() {
5191                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5192                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5193                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5194                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5195                         } else {
5196                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5197                         }
5198                         if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5199                                 as_updates += 1;
5200                         }
5201                 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5202                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5203         }
5204         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5205         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5206         if announce_latest {
5207                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5208                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5209         }
5210         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5211
5212         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5213         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 8 } else { 6 });
5214         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5215         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5216         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5217                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5218                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5219                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5220                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5221                         } else {
5222                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5223                         }
5224                         if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5225                                 bs_updates += 1;
5226                         }
5227                 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5228                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5229         }
5230         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5231         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5232         if announce_latest {
5233                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5234         }
5235         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5236
5237         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5238         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5239         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5240         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5241         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5242         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5243 }
5244
5245 #[test]
5246 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5247         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5248 }
5249
5250 #[test]
5251 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5252         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5253 }
5254
5255 #[test]
5256 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5257         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5258         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5259         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5260 }
5261
5262 #[test]
5263 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5264         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5265         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5266         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5267         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5268
5269         // Create some initial channels
5270         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5271
5272         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5273         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5274         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5275         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5276
5277         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5278         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5279         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5280         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5281         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5282         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5283
5284         let htlc_timeout = {
5285                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5286                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5287                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5288                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5289                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5290                 node_txn[0].clone()
5291         };
5292
5293         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5294         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5295         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5296
5297         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5298         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5299         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5300         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5301         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5302         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5303         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5304         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5305         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5306         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5307                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5308 }
5309
5310 #[test]
5311 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5312         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with a key
5313         // manager rotation to test that `channel_keys_id` returned in
5314         // [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] let us re-derive the channel key set to
5315         // then derive a `delayed_payment_key`.
5316
5317         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5318
5319         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5320         let seed = [42; 32];
5321         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5322         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5323         let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger));
5324         let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
5325         let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), &scorer);
5326         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, router, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, override_init_features: alloc::rc::Rc::new(core::cell::RefCell::new(None)) };
5327         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5328         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5329         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5330
5331         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5332         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5333
5334         // Create some initial channels
5335         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5336         // for node 0
5337         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5338         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5339         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5340
5341         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5342         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5343         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5344         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5345         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5346
5347         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5348         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5349         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5350         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5351         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5352
5353         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5354         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5355         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5356         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5357             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5358             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5359             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5360                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5361         }
5362
5363         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5364         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5365         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5366         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5367         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5368         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5369
5370         let htlc_timeout = {
5371                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5372                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5373                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5374                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5375                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5376                 node_txn[0].clone()
5377         };
5378
5379         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5380         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5381         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5382
5383         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5384         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5385         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5386         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5387         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5388         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5389         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5390         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5391         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5392         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5393         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5394                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5395 }
5396
5397 #[test]
5398 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5399         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5400         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5401         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5402         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5403
5404         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5405
5406         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5407         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5408
5409         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5410         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5411         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5412
5413         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5414         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5415         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5416
5417         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5418         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5419         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5420
5421         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5422         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5423         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5424 }
5425
5426 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5427         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5428         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5429         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5430         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5431         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5432
5433         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5434
5435         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5436         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5437         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5438         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5439         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5440
5441         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5442         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5443         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5444
5445         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5446         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5447         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5448         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5449         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5450
5451         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5452         let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5453         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5454                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5455                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5456         }
5457         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5458         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5459         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5460         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5461 }
5462
5463 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5464         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5465         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5466         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5467         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5468         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5469
5470         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5471         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
5472                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5473         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5474
5475         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5476
5477         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5478         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5479         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5480
5481         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5482         let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5483
5484         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5485                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5486                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5487         }
5488         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5489         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5490         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5491         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5492 }
5493
5494 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5495         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5496         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5497         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5498         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5499         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5500
5501         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5502         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5503         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5504         // actually revoked.
5505         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5506         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5507         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5508         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
5509         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5510
5511         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5512         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5513         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5514         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5515         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5516         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5517         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5518         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5519         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5520         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5521
5522         if check_revoke_no_close {
5523                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5524                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5525         }
5526
5527         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5528         let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5529         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5530                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5531                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5532         }
5533         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5534                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5535                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5536                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5537                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5538         } else {
5539                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5540         }
5541 }
5542
5543 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5544 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5545 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5546 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5547 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5548 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5549 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5550 // non-dust HTLCs.
5551 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5552 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5553 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5554 #[test]
5555 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5556         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5557         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5558
5559         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5560         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5561 }
5562
5563 #[test]
5564 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5565         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5566         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5567         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5568         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5569 }
5570
5571 #[test]
5572 #[should_panic]
5573 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5574         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5575         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5576         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5577         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5578         // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5579         for node in nodes.iter() {
5580                 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5581         }
5582
5583         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5584         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5585         let push_msat=10001;
5586         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5587         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5588         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5589         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5590
5591         // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5592         // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5593         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5594 }
5595
5596 #[test]
5597 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5598         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5599         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5600         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5601         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5602
5603         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5604         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5605         let push_msat=10001;
5606         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5607
5608         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5609         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5610         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5611         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5612         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5613
5614         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5615         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5616         let push_msat=10001;
5617         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5618         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5619         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5620
5621         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5622         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5623         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5624
5625         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5626         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5627         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5628
5629         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5630         let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5631         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5632
5633         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5634         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5635         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5636         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5637         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5638         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5639 }
5640
5641 #[test]
5642 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5643         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5644         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5645         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5646         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5647
5648         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5649         let push_msat=10001;
5650         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5651         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5652         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5653         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5654
5655         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5656         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5657         let err_msg = match events[0] {
5658                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5659                         msg.clone()
5660                 },
5661                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5662         };
5663         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5664 }
5665
5666 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5667 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5668 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5669 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5670 #[test]
5671 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5672         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5673         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5674         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5675         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5676         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5677
5678         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5679         // pending_update_fee.
5680         {
5681                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5682                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5683         }
5684         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5685         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5686
5687         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5688         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5689         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5690                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5691                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5692                 },
5693                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5694         };
5695
5696         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5697
5698         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5699         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5700         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5701         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5702
5703         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5704         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
5705         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5706
5707         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5708         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
5709                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5710         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5711         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5712
5713         // Flush the pending fee update.
5714         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5715         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5716         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5717         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5718         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5719
5720         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5721         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5722         // us to surface its failure to the user.
5723         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5724         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5725         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5726         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5727                 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5728         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5729
5730         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5731         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5732         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5733         match &events[0] {
5734                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5735                         assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5736                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5737                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5738                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
5739                 },
5740                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5741         }
5742         match &events[1] {
5743                 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5744                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5745                 },
5746                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5747         }
5748 }
5749
5750 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5751 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5752 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5753 #[test]
5754 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5755         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5756         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5757         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5758         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5759         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5760
5761         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5762         // pending_update_fee.
5763         {
5764                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5765                 *feerate_lock += 200;
5766         }
5767         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5768         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5769
5770         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5771         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5772         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5773                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5774                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5775                 },
5776                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5777         };
5778
5779         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5780
5781         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5782         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5783         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5784         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5785
5786         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5787         let amt_1 = 20000;
5788         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
5789         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
5790         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
5791
5792         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
5793         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, payment_hash_1,
5794                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
5795         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5796         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
5797         let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5798         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
5799                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
5800         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5801         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
5802
5803         // Flush the pending fee update.
5804         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5805         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5806         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5807         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
5808         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5809         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
5810
5811         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
5812         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
5813         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
5814         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5815         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5816         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5817         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5818                 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5819         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5820
5821         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
5822         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5823         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5824         match &events[0] {
5825                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5826                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5827                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5828                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5829                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
5830                 },
5831                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5832         }
5833         match &events[1] {
5834                 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5835                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5836                 },
5837                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5838         }
5839
5840         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
5841         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
5842                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5843                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
5844                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
5845         };
5846         let raa = match send_raa_event {
5847                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
5848                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5849         };
5850         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5851         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5852         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5853         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5854         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5855         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5856         match events[0] {
5857                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5858                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5859         }
5860         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5861         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5862         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5863         match events[0] {
5864                 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => {},
5865                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5866         }
5867         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5868         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5869         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
5870
5871         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5872         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5873         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
5874         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
5875 }
5876
5877 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
5878 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
5879 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
5880 // once it's freed.
5881 #[test]
5882 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
5883         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5884         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5885         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5886         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5887         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5888         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5889         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5890         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5891         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5892         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
5893
5894         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5895         // pending_update_fee.
5896         {
5897                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5898                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5899         }
5900         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5901         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5902
5903         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5904         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5905         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5906                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5907                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5908                 },
5909                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5910         };
5911
5912         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5913
5914         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5915         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5916         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5917         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5918
5919         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5920         let feemsat = 239;
5921         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
5922         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
5923         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
5924         let payment_event = {
5925                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
5926                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5927                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5928
5929                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5930                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5931
5932                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5933         };
5934         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5935         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5936         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5937         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5938
5939         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_1_2.2);
5940         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5941
5942         // Flush the pending fee update.
5943         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5944         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5945         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5946         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5947         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5948         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5949
5950         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
5951         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5952         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5953
5954         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
5955                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
5956                         msg.clone()
5957                 },
5958                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5959         };
5960
5961         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
5962         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5963         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5964
5965         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
5966         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5967         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
5968         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
5969                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5970                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5971         }
5972
5973         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
5974         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5975         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5976
5977         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
5978         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5979         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
5980         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
5981                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
5982                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
5983                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
5984                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
5985                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5986                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5987                 },
5988                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5989         };
5990
5991         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
5992         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
5993         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5994
5995         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
5996         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5997         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5998         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5999         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6000         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6001         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6002         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6003         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6004                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6005                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6006         };
6007         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6008         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6009         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6010 }
6011
6012 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6013 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6014 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6015
6016 #[test]
6017 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6018         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6019         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6020         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6021         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6022         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6023         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6024
6025         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6026         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 100;
6027
6028         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6029                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6030                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6031                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6032         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6033         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value", 1);
6034 }
6035
6036 #[test]
6037 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6038         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6039         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6040         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6041         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6042         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6043         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6044
6045         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6046         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 0;
6047         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6048                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)),
6049                 true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6050                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6051
6052         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6053         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC", 1);
6054 }
6055
6056 #[test]
6057 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6058         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6059         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6060         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6061         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6062         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6063         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6064
6065         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6066         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6067                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6068         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6069         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6070         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6071
6072         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6073         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6074         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6075         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6076         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6077 }
6078
6079 #[test]
6080 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6081         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6082         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6083         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6084         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6085         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6086         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6087         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6088
6089         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6090                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
6091         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000);
6092         route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6093         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6094                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6095                 ), true, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6096                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6097 }
6098
6099 #[test]
6100 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6101         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6102         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6103         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6104         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6105         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6106         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6107         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6108         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6109         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6110                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6111
6112         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6113                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6114                 let payment_event = {
6115                         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6116                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6117                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6118
6119                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6120                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6121                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6122                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6123                         } else {
6124                                 assert!(false);
6125                         }
6126                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6127                 };
6128                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6129                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6130                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6131
6132                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6133                 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6134         }
6135         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6136         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6137                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6138                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6139                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6140
6141         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6142         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs", 1);
6143 }
6144
6145 #[test]
6146 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6147         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6148         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6149         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6150         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6151         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6152         let channel_value = 100000;
6153         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0);
6154         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6155
6156         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6157
6158         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6159         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6160         // limits us to.
6161         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6162         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6163                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6164                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6165                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6166
6167         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6168         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept", 1);
6169
6170         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6171 }
6172
6173 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6174 #[test]
6175 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6176         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6177         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6178         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6179         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6180         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6181         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6182         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6183         {
6184                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6185                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6186                 let channel = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6187                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6188         }
6189
6190         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6191         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6192                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6193         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6194         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6195         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6196         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6197         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6198         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6199         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6200         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6201         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6202 }
6203
6204 #[test]
6205 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6206         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6207         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6208         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6209         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6210         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6211         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6212
6213         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6214         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6215         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6216         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6217         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6218         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6219
6220         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6221         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6222         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6223                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6224         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6225         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6226
6227         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6228         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6229         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6230         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6231         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6232
6233         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6234         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6235         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6236         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6237         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6238 }
6239
6240 #[test]
6241 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6242         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6243         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6244         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6245         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6246         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6247         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6248         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6249
6250         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6251         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6252         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6253         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6254         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
6255                 &route.paths[0], 3999999, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6256         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6257
6258         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6259                 channel_id: chan.2,
6260                 htlc_id: 0,
6261                 amount_msat: 1000,
6262                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6263                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6264                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6265         };
6266
6267         for i in 0..50 {
6268                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6269                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6270         }
6271         msg.htlc_id = (50) as u64;
6272         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6273
6274         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6275         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6276         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6277         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6278         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6279 }
6280
6281 #[test]
6282 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6283         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6284         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6285         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6286         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6287         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6288         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6289
6290         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6291         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6292                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6293         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6294         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6295         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6296         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6297
6298         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6299         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6300         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6301         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6302         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6303 }
6304
6305 #[test]
6306 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6307         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6308         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6309         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6310         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6311         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6312
6313         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6314         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6315         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6316                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6317         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6318         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6319         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6320         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6321
6322         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6323         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6324         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6325         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6326         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6327 }
6328
6329 #[test]
6330 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6331         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6332         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6333         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6334         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6335         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6336         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6337         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6338
6339         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6340         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6341         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6342                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6343         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6344         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6345         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6346
6347         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6348         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6349         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6350         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
6351                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
6352         }, true).unwrap();
6353         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6354         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6355         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
6356                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
6357         }, false).unwrap();
6358         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6359         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6360         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6361         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6362         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6363         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6364
6365         //Resend HTLC
6366         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6367         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6368         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6369         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6370         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6371
6372         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6373
6374         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6375         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6376         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6377         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6378         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6379 }
6380
6381 #[test]
6382 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6383         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6384
6385         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6386         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6387         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6388         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6389         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6390         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6391         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6392                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6393
6394         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6395         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6396         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6397
6398         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6399                 channel_id: chan.2,
6400                 htlc_id: 0,
6401                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6402         };
6403
6404         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6405
6406         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6407         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6408         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6409         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6410         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6411 }
6412
6413 #[test]
6414 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6415         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6416
6417         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6418         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6419         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6420         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6421         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6422
6423         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6424         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6425                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6426         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6427         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6428         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6429
6430         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6431                 channel_id: chan.2,
6432                 htlc_id: 0,
6433                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6434         };
6435
6436         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6437
6438         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6439         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6440         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6441         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6442         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6443 }
6444
6445 #[test]
6446 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6447         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6448
6449         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6450         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6451         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6452         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6453         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6454
6455         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6456         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6457                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6458         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6459         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6460         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6461         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6462                 channel_id: chan.2,
6463                 htlc_id: 0,
6464                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6465                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6466         };
6467
6468         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6469
6470         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6471         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6472         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6473         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6474         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6475 }
6476
6477 #[test]
6478 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6479         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6480
6481         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6482         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6483         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6484         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6485         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6486
6487         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6488
6489         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6490         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6491         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6492
6493         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6494         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6495         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6496                 match events[0] {
6497                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6498                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6499                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6500                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6501                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6502                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6503                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6504                         },
6505                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6506                 }
6507         };
6508
6509         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6510
6511         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6512
6513         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6514         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6515         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6516         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6517         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6518 }
6519
6520 #[test]
6521 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6522         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6523
6524         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6525         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6526         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6527         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6528         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6529
6530         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6531
6532         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6533         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6534         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6535
6536         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6537         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6538         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6539                 match events[0] {
6540                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6541                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6542                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6543                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6544                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6545                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6546                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6547                         },
6548                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6549                 }
6550         };
6551
6552         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6553
6554         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6555
6556         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6557         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6558         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6559         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6560         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6561 }
6562
6563 #[test]
6564 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6565         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6566
6567         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6568         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6569         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6570         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6571         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6572
6573         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6574         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6575                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6576         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6577
6578         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6579         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6580
6581         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6582         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6583         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6584
6585         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6586
6587         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6588                 match events[0] {
6589                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6590                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6591                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6592                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6593                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6594                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6595                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6596                         },
6597                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6598                 }
6599         };
6600         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6601         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6602
6603         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6604         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6605         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6606         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6607         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6608 }
6609
6610 #[test]
6611 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6612         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6613         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6614
6615         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6616         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6617         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6618         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6619         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6620         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000);
6621
6622         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6623
6624         //First hop
6625         let mut payment_event = {
6626                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6627                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6628                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6629                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6630                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6631                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6632         };
6633         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6634         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6635         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6636         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6637         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6638         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6639         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6640         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6641         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6642
6643         //Second Hop
6644         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6645         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6646         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6647         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6648
6649         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6650         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6651         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6652                 match events_3[0] {
6653                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6654                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6655                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6656                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6657                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6658                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6659                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6660                         },
6661                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6662                 }
6663         };
6664
6665         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6666
6667         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6668         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6669         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6670         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6671         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6672
6673         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6674         match events_4[0] {
6675                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6676                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6677                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6678                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6679                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6680                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6681                 },
6682                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6683         };
6684
6685         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6686 }
6687
6688 #[test]
6689 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
6690         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6691         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6692         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6693         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6694         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6695         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6696
6697         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
6698
6699         // First hop
6700         let mut payment_event = {
6701                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6702                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6703                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6704                 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
6705         };
6706
6707         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6708         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6709         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6710         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6711         payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
6712         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6713
6714         // Second Hop
6715         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
6716         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6717         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6718         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6719
6720         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6721         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6722         match events_3[0] {
6723                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6724                         let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
6725                         // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
6726                         update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
6727
6728                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6729                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6730                 },
6731                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6732         }
6733
6734         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
6735                 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
6736                         node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6737         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6738         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6739         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6740
6741         match events_4[0] {
6742                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6743                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6744                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6745                 },
6746                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6747         }
6748
6749         let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6750         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 2);
6751
6752         // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
6753         // the node originating the error to its next hop.
6754         match events_5[0] {
6755                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { error_code, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }) }, ..
6756                 } => {
6757                         assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
6758                         assert!(is_permanent);
6759                         assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
6760                 },
6761                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6762         }
6763         match events_5[1] {
6764                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6765                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6766                 },
6767                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6768         }
6769
6770         // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
6771 }
6772
6773 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6774         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6775         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6776         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6777
6778         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6779         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6780         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6781         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6782         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6783         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6784
6785         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6786                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6787
6788         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6789         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6790         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6791         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6792
6793         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6794         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6795
6796         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6797         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
6798         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6799         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
6800         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6801
6802         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6803         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6804         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6805         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6806
6807         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6808         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6809
6810         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6811         match events[0] {
6812                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6813                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6814                 },
6815                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6816         }
6817         match events[1] {
6818                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6819                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6820                 },
6821                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6822         }
6823
6824         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6825         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6826         if announce_latest {
6827                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6828         } else {
6829                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6830         }
6831
6832         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6833         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6834         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6835
6836         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6837         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6838         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6839         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6840         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
6841         let mut first_failed = false;
6842         for event in events {
6843                 match event {
6844                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6845                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6846                                         assert!(!first_failed);
6847                                         first_failed = true;
6848                                 } else {
6849                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6850                                 }
6851                         },
6852                         Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {}
6853                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6854                 }
6855         }
6856 }
6857
6858 #[test]
6859 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6860         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6861         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6862 }
6863
6864 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6865         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6866         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6867         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6868         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6869         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6870         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6871
6872         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6873         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6874         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6875         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6876         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6877
6878         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6879                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6880
6881         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6882         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6883
6884         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6885         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
6886
6887         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
6888         if revoked {
6889                 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6890                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
6891         }
6892
6893         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
6894         if local {
6895                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
6896                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
6897                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6898                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6899                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6900
6901                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
6902                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6903                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6904                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6905                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
6906                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6907                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
6908                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6909                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6910                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6911                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6912         } else {
6913                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
6914                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6915                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6916                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6917                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6918                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6919
6920                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
6921                 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
6922                         .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
6923                 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6924                 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
6925                 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
6926                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6927
6928                 if !revoked {
6929                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6930                 } else {
6931                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 11);
6932                 }
6933                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
6934                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6935                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6936                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6937                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6938         }
6939 }
6940
6941 #[test]
6942 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
6943         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
6944         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
6945         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
6946 }
6947
6948 #[test]
6949 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
6950         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
6951
6952         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6953         low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
6954         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6955         high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
6956         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
6957         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6958         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6959         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
6960         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6961
6962         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
6963         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6964                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
6965                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
6966         {
6967                 match error {
6968                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6969                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6970                 }
6971         } else { assert!(false) }
6972
6973         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6974         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6975         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6976         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6977         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6978                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6979                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6980         {
6981                 match error {
6982                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
6983                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6984                 }
6985         } else { assert!(false); }
6986
6987         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
6988         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6989         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
6990         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6991         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6992         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
6993         let reason_msg;
6994         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
6995                 match action {
6996                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
6997                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
6998                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
6999                         },
7000                         _ => { panic!(); }
7001                 }
7002         } else { panic!(); }
7003         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7004
7005         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7006         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7007         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7008         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7009         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7010                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7011                 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7012         {
7013                 match error {
7014                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7015                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7016                 }
7017         } else { assert!(false); }
7018 }
7019
7020 #[test]
7021 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7022         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7023         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7024         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7025
7026         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7027         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7028         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7029         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7030
7031         // Create some initial channels
7032         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7033
7034         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7035         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7036         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
7037         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7038         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7039         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
7040         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
7041                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7042         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7043
7044         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7045         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7046         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7047         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7048         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7049
7050         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7051         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7052         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7053         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7054
7055         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7056         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7057         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7058
7059         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7060         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7061         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7062                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7063                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7064                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7065                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7066                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7067                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7068                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7069                 },
7070                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7071         };
7072         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7073
7074         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7075         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7076
7077         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7078         let mut expected_failure_data = (10_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7079         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH.to_be_bytes());
7080         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7081 }
7082
7083 #[test]
7084 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7085         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7086         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7087
7088         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7089         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7090         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7091         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7092
7093         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7094         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0);
7095         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7096
7097         // Disconnect peers
7098         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7099         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7100
7101         for _ in 0..DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS + 1 {
7102                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7103         }
7104         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7105         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7106         let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7107         for e in msg_events {
7108                 match e {
7109                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7110                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7111                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7112                                 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7113                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7114                                 }
7115                         },
7116                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7117                 }
7118         }
7119         // Reconnect peers
7120         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
7121                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
7122         }, true).unwrap();
7123         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7124         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7125         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
7126                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
7127         }, false).unwrap();
7128         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7129         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7130
7131         // Reestablish chan_1
7132         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7133         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7134         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7135         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7136         // Reestablish chan_2
7137         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7138         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7139         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7140         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7141         // Reestablish chan_3
7142         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7143         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7144         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7145         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7146
7147         for _ in 0..ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
7148                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7149         }
7150         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7151         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7152         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7153         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7154         for e in msg_events {
7155                 match e {
7156                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7157                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7158                                 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7159                                         // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7160                                         // the old one.
7161                                         Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7162                                         None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7163                                 }
7164                         },
7165                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7166                 }
7167         }
7168         // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7169         assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7170 }
7171
7172 #[test]
7173 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7174         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7175         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7176
7177         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7178         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7179         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7180         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7181
7182         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7183
7184         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7185         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 30)
7186                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
7187         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000);
7188         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7189
7190         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7191         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7192         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7193         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7194         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7195         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7196
7197         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7198         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7199                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7200                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7201                 }
7202         }
7203
7204         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7205         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7206
7207         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7208         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7209         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(header_114, 42, vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()]));
7210         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7211
7212         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7213         let penalty_1;
7214         let feerate_1;
7215         {
7216                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7217                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor)
7218                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7219                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7220                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7221                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7222                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7223                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7224                 node_txn.clear();
7225         };
7226
7227         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7228         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7229         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7230         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7231         {
7232                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7233                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7234                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7235                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7236                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7237                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7238                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7239                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7240                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7241                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7242                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7243                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7244                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7245                         node_txn.clear();
7246                 }
7247         }
7248         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7249
7250         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7251         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7252         let penalty_3;
7253         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7254         {
7255                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7256                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7257                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7258                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7259                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7260                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7261                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7262                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7263                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7264                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7265                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7266                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7267                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7268                         node_txn.clear();
7269                 }
7270         }
7271         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7272
7273         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7274         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7275 }
7276
7277 #[test]
7278 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7279         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7280         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7281
7282         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7283         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7284         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7285         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7286         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7287
7288         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7289         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7290         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
7291         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7292         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7293         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7294                 3_000_000, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7295         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7296         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
7297         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7298                 3_000_000, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7299         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7300
7301         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7302         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7303         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7304
7305         // Revoke local commitment tx
7306         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7307
7308         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7309         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]));
7310         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7311         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7312         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7313         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 50); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7314
7315         let revoked_htlc_txn = {
7316                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
7317                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
7318
7319                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7320                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7321                 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7322
7323                 assert_eq!(txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7324                 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7325                 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 1);
7326                 check_spends!(txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7327
7328                 txn
7329         };
7330
7331         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7332         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7333         let block_11 = create_dummy_block(hash_128, 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]);
7334         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_11);
7335         let block_129 = create_dummy_block(block_11.block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()]);
7336         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_129);
7337         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7338         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7339         match events.last().unwrap() {
7340                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7341                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7342         }
7343         let first;
7344         let feerate_1;
7345         let penalty_txn;
7346         {
7347                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7348                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7349                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7350
7351                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7352                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7353                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7354                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7355                 // future).
7356                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7357                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7358                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7359                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7360                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7361                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7362
7363                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7364                 // available, which we check here:
7365                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7366                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7367                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7368
7369                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7370                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7371
7372                 // node_txn[3] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7373                 // output, checked above).
7374                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 2);
7375                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].output.len(), 1);
7376                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7377
7378                 first = node_txn[3].txid();
7379                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7380                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[3].output[0].value;
7381                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight() as u64;
7382                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7383                 node_txn.clear();
7384         }
7385
7386         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7387         let block_130 = create_dummy_block(block_129.block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn);
7388         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_130);
7389         let block_131 = create_dummy_block(block_130.block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
7390         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_131);
7391
7392         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7393         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7394         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7395         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7396         let node_txn = {
7397                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7398                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7399
7400                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7401                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7402                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7403                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7404                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7405                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7406                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7407                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7408                 node_txn.clear();
7409                 txn
7410         };
7411         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7412         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(header_144, 42, node_txn));
7413         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7414         {
7415                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7416                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7417                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7418                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7419                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7420                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7421                 // up bumped justice generation.
7422                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7423                 node_txn.clear();
7424         }
7425         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7426         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7427 }
7428
7429 #[test]
7430 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7431         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7432         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7433
7434         // Create 2 HTLCs
7435         // Provide preimage for one
7436         // Check aggregation
7437
7438         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7439         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7440         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7441         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7442
7443         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7444         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7445         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7446
7447         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7448         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7449         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7450         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7451         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7452
7453         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7454         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7455         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7456         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7457         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7458         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7459
7460         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7461         let timeout;
7462         let preimage;
7463         let preimage_bump;
7464         let feerate_timeout;
7465         let feerate_preimage;
7466         {
7467                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7468                 // 3 transactions including:
7469                 //   preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
7470                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7471                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7472                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7473                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7474                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7475                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
7476                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
7477
7478                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7479                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7480                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7481                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7482
7483                 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7484                         (node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[1].clone())
7485                 } else {
7486                         (node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone())
7487                 };
7488
7489                 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
7490                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7491                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
7492
7493                 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
7494                 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7495                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
7496                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight() as u64;
7497
7498                 node_txn.clear();
7499         };
7500         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7501         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7502
7503         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7504         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7505         {
7506                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7507                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7508                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7509                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7510                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7511                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7512
7513                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7514                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7515                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
7516                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7517                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7518
7519                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7520                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7521                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7522                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7523                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7524
7525                 node_txn.clear();
7526         }
7527
7528         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7529         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7530 }
7531
7532 #[test]
7533 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7534         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7535         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7536         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7537         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7538         // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7539         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7540         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7541         // implement that).
7542         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7543         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7544         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7545         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7546         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
7547
7548         let per_commitment_secret;
7549         let next_per_commitment_point;
7550         {
7551                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7552                 let mut guard = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7553                 let keys = guard.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7554
7555                 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7556
7557                 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7558                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7559                 per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7560
7561                 // Must revoke without gaps
7562                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7563                 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7564
7565                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7566                 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7567                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7568         }
7569
7570         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7571                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK {
7572                         channel_id,
7573                         per_commitment_secret,
7574                         next_per_commitment_point,
7575                         #[cfg(taproot)]
7576                         next_local_nonce: None,
7577                 });
7578         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7579         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7580         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7581 }
7582
7583 #[test]
7584 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7585         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7586         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7587
7588         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7589         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7590         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7591         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7592
7593         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7594         // Lock HTLC in both directions
7595         let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
7596         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
7597
7598         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7599         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7600         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7601
7602         // Revoke local commitment tx
7603         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
7604
7605         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7606         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7607         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7608         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7609
7610         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7611         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7612         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7613         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7614         let penalty_txn = {
7615                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7616                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3
7617                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7618                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7619                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7620                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7621                 node_txn.clear();
7622                 penalty_txn
7623         };
7624         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn));
7625         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7626         {
7627                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7628                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7629                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7630         }
7631 }
7632
7633 #[test]
7634 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
7635         // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
7636         // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
7637         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7638         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7639         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7640         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7641         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
7642
7643         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000);
7644         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7645         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_010_000);
7646         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7647         let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7648
7649         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7650         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
7651         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
7652         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7653         let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7654
7655         // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
7656         // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
7657         // can get our balance.
7658
7659         // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
7660         // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
7661         // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
7662         let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
7663         route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
7664         route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7665         let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7666         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
7667                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
7668
7669         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
7670 }
7671
7672 #[test]
7673 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7674         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7675         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7676         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7677         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7678         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7679         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7680
7681         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000);
7682
7683         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7684         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7685         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7686         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7687         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7688
7689         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7690         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7691         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7692         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7693
7694         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7695         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7696         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
7697         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7698         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7699         match close_ev[0] {
7700                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7701                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7702                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7703                 },
7704                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7705         }
7706 }
7707
7708 #[test]
7709 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7710         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7711         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7712         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7713         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7714
7715         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7716         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7717         override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7718
7719         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7720
7721         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7722         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7723         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
7724         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
7725 }
7726
7727 #[test]
7728 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7729         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7730         zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7731         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7732         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7733         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7734         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7735
7736         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7737         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7738         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7739
7740         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7741         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7742         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7743 }
7744
7745 #[test]
7746 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
7747         // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
7748         // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
7749         // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
7750         // 90% of the `channel_value`.
7751         // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
7752
7753         let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
7754         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7755         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
7756         let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
7757         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7758         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
7759         let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
7760         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7761         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
7762         let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
7763         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7764         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
7765
7766         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7767         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7768         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
7769         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7770
7771         let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
7772         let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7773         let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
7774         let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
7775         let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
7776
7777         let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7778         let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7779
7780         // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7781         // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7782         assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
7783         // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7784         // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7785         assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
7786
7787         // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7788         // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
7789         // `channel_value`.
7790         assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7791         // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7792         // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
7793         // `channel_value`.
7794         assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7795 }
7796
7797 #[test]
7798 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
7799         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7800         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7801         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7802         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7803         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7804         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7805
7806         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7807         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7808
7809         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7810
7811         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7812         // accepting the inbound channel request.
7813         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7814
7815         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7816         match events[0] {
7817                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7818                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
7819                 }
7820                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7821         }
7822
7823         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7824         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7825
7826         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7827                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7828                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7829                 }
7830                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7831         }
7832
7833         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7834
7835         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7836         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7837
7838         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7839         match events[0] {
7840                 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
7841                         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
7842                 }
7843                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7844         }
7845 }
7846
7847 #[test]
7848 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
7849         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7850         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7851         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7852         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7853         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7854         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7855
7856         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7857         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7858
7859         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7860
7861         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7862         // rejecting the inbound channel request.
7863         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7864
7865         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7866         match events[0] {
7867                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7868                         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7869                 }
7870                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7871         }
7872
7873         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7874         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7875
7876         match close_msg_ev[0] {
7877                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
7878                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7879                 }
7880                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7881         }
7882         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7883 }
7884
7885 #[test]
7886 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
7887         // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
7888         // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
7889         // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
7890         // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
7891         // and the channel should be closed.
7892         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7893         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7894         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7895         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7896         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7897         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7898
7899         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7900         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7901         let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
7902
7903         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7904
7905         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
7906         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7907
7908         // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
7909         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7910
7911         // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
7912         // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
7913         // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
7914         // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
7915         // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
7916         let accept_chan_msg = {
7917                 let mut node_1_per_peer_lock;
7918                 let mut node_1_peer_state_lock;
7919                 let channel =  get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], nodes[0], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
7920                 channel.get_accept_channel_message()
7921         };
7922         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
7923
7924         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
7925
7926         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7927         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7928
7929         // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
7930         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7931
7932         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7933         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7934
7935         let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
7936         match close_msg_ev[0] {
7937                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
7938                         assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
7939                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7940                         assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
7941                 }
7942                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7943         }
7944
7945         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
7946 }
7947
7948 #[test]
7949 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
7950         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7951         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7952         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7953         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7954         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7955         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7956
7957         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7958         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7959
7960         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7961
7962         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7963         // accepting the inbound channel request.
7964         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7965
7966         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7967         match events[0] {
7968                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7969                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
7970                         let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7971                         match api_res {
7972                                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
7973                                         assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
7974                                 },
7975                                 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
7976                                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7977                         }
7978                 }
7979                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7980         }
7981
7982         // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
7983         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7984         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7985
7986         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7987                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7988                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7989                 }
7990                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7991         }
7992 }
7993
7994 #[test]
7995 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
7996         let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7997         let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
7998         let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
7999         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8000
8001         let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
8002         let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8003         match api_res {
8004                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8005                         assert_eq!(err, format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(unknown_channel_id), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8006                 },
8007                 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8008                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8009         }
8010 }
8011
8012 #[test]
8013 fn test_onion_value_mpp_set_calculation() {
8014         // Test that we use the onion value `amt_to_forward` when
8015         // calculating whether we've reached the `total_msat` of an MPP
8016         // by having a routing node forward more than `amt_to_forward`
8017         // and checking that the receiving node doesn't generate
8018         // a PaymentClaimable event too early
8019         let node_count = 4;
8020         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8021         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8022         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8023         let mut nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8024
8025         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8026         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8027         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8028         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8029
8030         let total_msat = 100_000;
8031         let expected_paths: &[&[&Node]] = &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]];
8032         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], total_msat);
8033         let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8034
8035         let mut path_1 = sample_path.clone();
8036         path_1.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8037         path_1.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8038         path_1.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
8039         path_1.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8040         path_1.hops[1].fee_msat = 100_000;
8041         route.paths.push(path_1);
8042
8043         let mut path_2 = sample_path.clone();
8044         path_2.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8045         path_2.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8046         path_2.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
8047         path_2.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8048         path_2.hops[1].fee_msat = 1_000;
8049         route.paths.push(path_2);
8050
8051         // Send payment
8052         let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8053         let onion_session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8054                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8055         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8056                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8057         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], expected_paths.len());
8058
8059         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8060         assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8061
8062         // First path
8063         let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[0][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8064         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8065         let mut prev_node = &nodes[0];
8066
8067         for (idx, &node) in expected_paths[0].iter().enumerate() {
8068                 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
8069
8070                 if idx == 0 { // routing node
8071                         let session_priv = [3; 32];
8072                         let height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
8073                         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv).unwrap();
8074                         let mut onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
8075                         let (mut onion_payloads, _, _) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 100_000,
8076                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), height + 1, &None).unwrap();
8077                         // Edit amt_to_forward to simulate the sender having set
8078                         // the final amount and the routing node taking less fee
8079                         onion_payloads[1].amt_to_forward = 99_000;
8080                         let new_onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
8081                         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet = new_onion_packet;
8082                 }
8083
8084                 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8085                 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
8086                 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8087                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(node);
8088
8089                 if idx == 0 {
8090                         let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8091                         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8092                         check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
8093                         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
8094                         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
8095                 } else {
8096                         let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8097                         assert!(events_2.is_empty());
8098                 }
8099
8100                 prev_node = node;
8101         }
8102
8103         // Second path
8104         let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[1][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8105         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], expected_paths[1], 101_000, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, true, None);
8106
8107         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8108 }
8109
8110 fn do_test_overshoot_mpp(msat_amounts: &[u64], total_msat: u64) {
8111
8112         let routing_node_count = msat_amounts.len();
8113         let node_count = routing_node_count + 2;
8114
8115         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8116         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8117         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8118         let nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8119
8120         let src_idx = 0;
8121         let dst_idx = 1;
8122
8123         // Create channels for each amount
8124         let mut expected_paths = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8125         let mut src_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8126         let mut dst_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8127         for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8128                 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8129                 let src_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, src_idx, routing_node).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8130                 src_chan_ids.push(src_chan_id);
8131                 let dst_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, routing_node, dst_idx).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8132                 dst_chan_ids.push(dst_chan_id);
8133                 let path = vec![&nodes[routing_node], &nodes[dst_idx]];
8134                 expected_paths.push(path);
8135         }
8136         let expected_paths: Vec<&[&Node]> = expected_paths.iter().map(|route| route.as_slice()).collect();
8137
8138         // Create a route for each amount
8139         let example_amount = 100000;
8140         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[src_idx], nodes[dst_idx], example_amount);
8141         let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8142         for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8143                 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8144                 let mut path = sample_path.clone();
8145                 path.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[routing_node].node.get_our_node_id();
8146                 path.hops[0].short_channel_id = src_chan_ids[i];
8147                 path.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[dst_idx].node.get_our_node_id();
8148                 path.hops[1].short_channel_id = dst_chan_ids[i];
8149                 path.hops[1].fee_msat = msat_amounts[i];
8150                 route.paths.push(path);
8151         }
8152
8153         // Send payment with manually set total_msat
8154         let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[src_idx].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8155         let onion_session_privs = nodes[src_idx].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8156                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8157         nodes[src_idx].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8158                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8159         check_added_monitors!(nodes[src_idx], expected_paths.len());
8160
8161         let mut events = nodes[src_idx].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8162         assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8163         let mut amount_received = 0;
8164         for (path_idx, expected_path) in expected_paths.iter().enumerate() {
8165                 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_path[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8166
8167                 let current_path_amount = msat_amounts[path_idx];
8168                 amount_received += current_path_amount;
8169                 let became_claimable_now = amount_received >= total_msat && amount_received - current_path_amount < total_msat;
8170                 pass_along_path(&nodes[src_idx], expected_path, amount_received, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, became_claimable_now, None);
8171         }
8172
8173         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[src_idx], &expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8174 }
8175
8176 #[test]
8177 fn test_overshoot_mpp() {
8178         do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 101_000], 200_000);
8179         do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 10_000, 100_000], 200_000);
8180 }
8181
8182 #[test]
8183 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8184         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8185         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8186         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8187         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8188         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8189
8190         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8191         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8192         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8193         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8194
8195         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8196         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8197         route.paths.push(path);
8198         route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8199         route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8200         route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8201         route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8202         route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8203         route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8204         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8205         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8206 }
8207
8208 #[test]
8209 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8210         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8211         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8212         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8213         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8214         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8215
8216         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8217
8218         {
8219                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
8220                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8221                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8222                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8223                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8224                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8225                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8226                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8227                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8228         }
8229         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8230         // values from previous calls.
8231         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8232         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8233         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8234         match events[0] {
8235                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref purpose, .. } => {
8236                         match &purpose {
8237                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8238                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8239                                 },
8240                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8241                         }
8242                 },
8243                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8244         }
8245 }
8246
8247 #[test]
8248 #[allow(deprecated)]
8249 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8250         // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8251         // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8252         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8253         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8254         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8255         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8256
8257         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8258
8259         let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8260
8261         // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8262         // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8263         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8264                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8265         } else { panic!(); }
8266         let mut block = {
8267                 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8268                 create_dummy_block(node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(), node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, Vec::new())
8269         };
8270         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8271         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8272                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8273         } else { panic!(); }
8274
8275         // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8276         // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8277         block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8278         block.header.time += 1;
8279         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8280         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8281         assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8282
8283         {
8284                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8285                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8286                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8287                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8288                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8289                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8290                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8291                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8292         }
8293         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8294         // values from previous calls.
8295         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8296         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8297         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8298         match events[0] {
8299                 Event::PaymentClaimable { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8300                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8301                         assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8302                         // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8303                 },
8304                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8305         }
8306 }
8307
8308 #[test]
8309 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8310         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8311         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8312         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8313         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8314         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8315
8316         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8317
8318         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8319         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8320         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, None).unwrap();
8321         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8322
8323         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8324         // resulting events.
8325         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8326                 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8327                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8328                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8329                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8330                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8331                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8332
8333                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8334                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8335                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8336                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8337                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8338
8339                         // We should fail the payment back
8340                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8341                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8342                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8343                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8344                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8345                                 },
8346                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8347                         }
8348                 }
8349         }
8350
8351         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8352         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8353         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8354
8355         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8356         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
8357                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8358         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8359         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8360
8361         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8362         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8363                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8364         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8365         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8366
8367         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8368         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8369                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8370         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8371         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8372 }
8373
8374 #[test]
8375 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8376         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8377         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8378         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8379         // error.
8380         //
8381         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8382         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8383         // commitment at same time.
8384
8385         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8386         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8387         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8388         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8389
8390         // Create some initial channel
8391         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8392         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8393
8394         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8395         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8396
8397         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8398         let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8399
8400         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8401         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8402         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8403         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8404         let watchtower = {
8405                 let new_monitor = {
8406                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8407                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8408                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8409                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8410                         new_monitor
8411                 };
8412                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8413                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8414                 watchtower
8415         };
8416         let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8417         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8418         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8419         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 200));
8420         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8421
8422         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8423         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8424         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8425         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8426
8427         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8428         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8429         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8430         {
8431                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8432                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8433                 let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
8434                 if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8435                         assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8436                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8437                 } else { assert!(false); }
8438         }
8439         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8440         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8441         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8442         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8443 }
8444
8445 #[test]
8446 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8447         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8448         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8449         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8450         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8451
8452         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8453         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8454         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8455         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8456
8457         // Create some initial channel
8458         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8459         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8460
8461         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8462         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8463
8464         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8465         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8466
8467         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8468         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8469         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8470         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8471         let alice_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(
8472                 Arc::new(Mutex::new(nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().clone())),
8473         );
8474         let watchtower_alice = {
8475                 let new_monitor = {
8476                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8477                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8478                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8479                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8480                         new_monitor
8481                 };
8482                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &alice_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8483                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8484                 watchtower
8485         };
8486         let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8487         // Make Alice aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating transaction lock time
8488         // requirements here.
8489         const HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST: u32 = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8490         alice_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST) as usize, (block.clone(), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST));
8491         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8492
8493         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8494         let alice_state = {
8495                 let mut txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8496                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8497                 txn.remove(0)
8498         };
8499
8500         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8501         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8502         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8503         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8504         let bob_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(Arc::clone(&alice_broadcaster.blocks));
8505         let watchtower_bob = {
8506                 let new_monitor = {
8507                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8508                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8509                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8510                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8511                         new_monitor
8512                 };
8513                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &bob_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8514                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8515                 watchtower
8516         };
8517         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST - 1);
8518
8519         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8520         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8521         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8522                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8523         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8524
8525         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8526         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8527         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8528         {
8529                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8530                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8531                 let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
8532                 if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8533                         // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8534                         assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8535                         assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8536                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8537                 } else { assert!(false); }
8538         }
8539         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8540         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8541
8542         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8543         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8544
8545         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8546         let bob_state_y;
8547         {
8548                 let mut txn = bob_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8549                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8550                 bob_state_y = txn.remove(0);
8551         };
8552
8553         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8554         let height = HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST + 1;
8555         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
8556         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
8557         check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false);
8558         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, vec![bob_state_y.clone()]), height);
8559         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
8560         {
8561                 let htlc_txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8562                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8563                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8564                 // Alice doesn't clean up the old HTLC claim since it hasn't seen a conflicting spend for
8565                 // it. However, she should, because it now has an invalid parent.
8566                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], alice_state);
8567         }
8568 }
8569
8570 #[test]
8571 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8572         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8573         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8574         // message).
8575         //
8576         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8577         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8578         //
8579         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8580         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8581         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8582         // before receiving funding_signed.
8583         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8584         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8585         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8586         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8587
8588         // Create an initial channel
8589         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8590         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8591         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8592         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8593         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
8594
8595         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8596         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8597
8598         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8599         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8600
8601         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8602         let channel_id = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8603         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8604         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8605         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("Hi".to_string()) }, true);
8606 }
8607
8608 #[test]
8609 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8610         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8611         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8612         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8613         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8614         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8615         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8616
8617         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8618         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8619         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8620         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8621
8622         // Create some initial channels
8623         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8624
8625         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8626         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8627         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8628         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8629         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8630         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8631
8632         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8633         let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![local_txn[0].clone()]);
8634         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
8635         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8636         // this test before #653 fix.
8637         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &block, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8638         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8639         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8640         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8641         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
8642
8643         let htlc_timeout = {
8644                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8645                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8646                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8647                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8648                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
8649                 node_txn[0].clone()
8650         };
8651
8652         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![htlc_timeout.clone()]));
8653         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8654         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
8655 }
8656
8657 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8658         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8659         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8660         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8661         //
8662         // Steps of the test:
8663         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8664         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8665         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8666         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8667         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8668         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8669         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8670         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8671         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8672         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8673         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8674         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8675
8676         // Create some initial channels
8677         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8678         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001);
8679
8680         // Steps (1) and (2):
8681         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8682         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8683
8684         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8685         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8686         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8687         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8688         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8689         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8690         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8691
8692         // Steps (3) and (4):
8693         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8694         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8695         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8696         let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8697
8698         // Bob force-closes
8699         if !broadcast_alice {
8700                 force_closing_node = 1;
8701                 counterparty_node = 0;
8702         }
8703         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8704         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8705         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8706         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8707         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8708                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8709                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
8710                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8711                 };
8712                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8713                 if broadcast_alice {
8714                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8715                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8716                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8717                 }
8718         }
8719
8720         // Step (5):
8721         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8722         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8723         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8724         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8725         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8726
8727         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8728         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8729         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8730         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8731         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8732         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8733
8734         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8735         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
8736         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8737         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8738                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8739                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8740                 match events[0] {
8741                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8742                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8743                         },
8744                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8745                 };
8746         }
8747         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8748         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8749         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8750         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8751
8752         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8753         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8754         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8755                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8756                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8757                         (*msg).clone()
8758                 },
8759                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8760         };
8761         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8762                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8763                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8764                         (*updates).clone()
8765                 },
8766                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8767         };
8768
8769         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8770         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8771         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8772         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8773
8774         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8775         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8776         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8777                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8778                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8779                         (*msg).clone()
8780                 },
8781                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8782         };
8783         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8784         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8785
8786         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8787         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8788         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8789         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8790         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8791                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8792                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8793                 if broadcast_alice {
8794                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8795                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8796                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8797                 }
8798                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8799                 if broadcast_alice {
8800                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8801                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8802                 } else {
8803                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8804                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8805                 }
8806         }
8807
8808         // Step (6):
8809         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8810         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8811         {
8812                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8813                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8814                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8815                 };
8816                 // If Alice force-closed, Bob only broadcasts a HTLC-output-claiming transaction. Otherwise,
8817                 // Bob force-closed and broadcasts the commitment transaction along with a
8818                 // HTLC-output-claiming transaction.
8819                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8820                 if broadcast_alice {
8821                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8822                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8823                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8824                 } else {
8825                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8826                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8827                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8828                 }
8829         }
8830 }
8831
8832 #[test]
8833 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8834         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8835         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8836         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8837         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8838 }
8839
8840 #[test]
8841 fn test_duplicate_temporary_channel_id_from_different_peers() {
8842         // Tests that we can accept two different `OpenChannel` requests with the same
8843         // `temporary_channel_id`, as long as they are from different peers.
8844         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8845         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8846         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8847         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8848
8849         // Create an first channel channel
8850         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8851         let mut open_chan_msg_chan_1_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8852
8853         // Create an second channel
8854         nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None).unwrap();
8855         let mut open_chan_msg_chan_2_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8856
8857         // Modify the `OpenChannel` from `nodes[2]` to `nodes[0]` to ensure that it uses the same
8858         // `temporary_channel_id` as the `OpenChannel` from nodes[1] to nodes[0].
8859         open_chan_msg_chan_2_0.temporary_channel_id = open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id;
8860
8861         // Assert that `nodes[0]` can accept both `OpenChannel` requests, even though they use the same
8862         // `temporary_channel_id` as they are from different peers.
8863         nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_1_0);
8864         {
8865                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8866                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8867                 match &events[0] {
8868                         MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8869                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8870                                 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8871                         },
8872                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8873                 }
8874         }
8875
8876         nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_2_0);
8877         {
8878                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8879                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8880                 match &events[0] {
8881                         MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8882                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8883                                 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8884                         },
8885                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8886                 }
8887         }
8888 }
8889
8890 #[test]
8891 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8892         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8893         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8894         //
8895         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8896         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8897         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8898         // updating logic for the existing channel.
8899         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8900         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8901         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8902         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8903
8904         // Create an initial channel
8905         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8906         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8907         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8908         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8909
8910         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8911         // that it is rejected.
8912         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8913         {
8914                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8915                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8916                 match events[0] {
8917                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8918                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8919                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8920                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8921                                 // move forward with it.
8922                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8923                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8924                         },
8925                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8926                 }
8927         }
8928
8929         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8930         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8931
8932         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8933         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8934
8935         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8936         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8937         {
8938                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8939                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8940                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8941                 added_monitors.clear();
8942         }
8943         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8944
8945         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8946
8947         let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8948         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8949
8950         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8951         // temporary one).
8952
8953         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8954         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8955         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8956         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8957         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8958         {
8959                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8960                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8961                 match events[0] {
8962                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8963                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8964                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8965                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8966                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8967                         },
8968                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8969                 }
8970         }
8971
8972         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8973         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8974         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8975         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8976         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8977         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8978
8979         let funding_created = {
8980                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8981                 let mut a_peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8982                 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
8983                 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
8984                 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
8985                 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
8986                 let mut as_chan = a_peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8987                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8988                 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8989         };
8990         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8991         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8992         // At this point we'll look up if the channel_id is present and immediately fail the channel
8993         // without trying to persist the `ChannelMonitor`.
8994         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8995
8996         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8997         {
8998                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8999                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9000                 match events[0] {
9001                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9002                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9003                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9004                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9005                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9006                         },
9007                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9008                 }
9009         }
9010
9011         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9012         // everything is functional.
9013         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9014         {
9015                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9016                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9017                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9018                 added_monitors.clear();
9019         }
9020         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9021
9022         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9023         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9024         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9025         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9026
9027         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9028         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9029         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9030
9031         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9032 }
9033
9034 #[test]
9035 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9036         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9037         //
9038         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9039         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9040         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9041         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9042         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9043         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9044         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9045
9046         // Create some initial channels
9047         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9048         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9049         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001);
9050
9051         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9052         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9053         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9054
9055         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9056         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9057         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9058
9059         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9060         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9061         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9062         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9063         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) });
9064         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9065         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9066         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9067         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9068
9069         // A null channel ID should close all channels
9070         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9071         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9072         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9073         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) });
9074         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9075         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9076         match events[0] {
9077                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9078                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9079                 },
9080                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9081         }
9082         match events[1] {
9083                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9084                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9085                 },
9086                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9087         }
9088         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9089         // peer_disconnected.
9090         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9091         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9092
9093         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9094         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9095         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9096 }
9097
9098 #[test]
9099 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9100         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9101         //
9102         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9103         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9104         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9105         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9106         //
9107         // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
9108         // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
9109         // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
9110         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9111         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9112         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9113         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9114
9115         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9116         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9117         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9118
9119         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9120
9121         // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9122         // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9123         // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9124         // its length.
9125         let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9126         let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.into();
9127         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9128                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9129                 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9130         }
9131
9132         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9133         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9134         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9135         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9136
9137         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9138         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9139         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9140
9141         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9142         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9143
9144         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9145         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9146         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9147
9148         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9149         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9150         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9151         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9152         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9153         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9154         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9155                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9156                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9157                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9158                 } else { panic!(); }
9159         } else { panic!(); }
9160         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9161
9162         // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9163         // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9164         // as its not 32 bytes long.
9165         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9166                 version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9167                 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9168                         previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9169                                 txid: tx.txid(),
9170                                 vout: idx as u32,
9171                         },
9172                         script_sig: Script::new(),
9173                         sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
9174                         witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9175                 }).collect(),
9176                 output: vec![TxOut {
9177                         value: 1000,
9178                         script_pubkey: Script::new(),
9179                 }]
9180         };
9181         check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9182         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9183 }
9184
9185 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9186         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9187         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9188         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9189         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9190         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9191         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9192         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9193         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9194         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9195         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9196         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9197         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9198         // until we learned about an additional block.
9199         //
9200         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9201         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9202         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9203         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9204         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9205         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9206         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9207
9208         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9209         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9210         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9211         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9212         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9213
9214         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9215         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9216         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9217         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9218         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9219         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9220
9221         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9222         if !test_height_before_timelock {
9223                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9224         }
9225         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9226                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9227         if test_height_before_timelock {
9228                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9229                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9230                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9231                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9232         } else {
9233                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9234                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9235                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9236                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0].txid(), node_txn[0].txid());
9237                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9238                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9239                 // timelock is up).
9240                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9241                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9242
9243                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9244                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9245                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9246                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9247                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9248                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
9249                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9250
9251                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9252                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9253                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9254                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9255                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9256                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9257                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9258                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9259                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9260         }
9261 }
9262
9263 #[test]
9264 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9265         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9266         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9267 }
9268
9269 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9270         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9271         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9272         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9273         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9274
9275         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9276
9277         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9278                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
9279         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000).unwrap();
9280
9281         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9282
9283         {
9284                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9285                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9286                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9287                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9288                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9289                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9290                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9291                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9292         }
9293         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9294         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9295
9296         {
9297                 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
9298                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9299                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
9300                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9301                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9302                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9303                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9304                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9305                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9306                 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9307                 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9308                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9309                 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9310         }
9311
9312         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9313         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9314
9315         if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9316                 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9317                 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9318
9319                 let expected_destinations = vec![
9320                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9321                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9322                 ];
9323                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1],  expected_destinations);
9324                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9325
9326                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9327                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9328                 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9329
9330                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9331                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9332                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9333
9334                 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9335                 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 4);
9336                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9337                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9338                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
9339                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
9340         } else {
9341                 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9342                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9343                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9344
9345                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9346                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9347                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9348                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9349
9350                 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
9351
9352                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9353         }
9354 }
9355
9356 #[test]
9357 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9358         // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9359         // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentClaimable` event.
9360         // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9361         // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9362         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9363 }
9364
9365 #[test]
9366 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9367         // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9368         // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9369         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9370 }
9371
9372 #[test]
9373 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9374         // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9375         // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9376         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9377         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9378         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9379         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9380
9381         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9382         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9383         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9384         let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9385
9386         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9387                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
9388         let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000).unwrap();
9389         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9390         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9391                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9392                 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9393                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9394         });
9395
9396         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9397
9398         let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9399         let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9400
9401         let session_privs = {
9402                 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
9403                 // ultimately have, just not right away.
9404                 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
9405                 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9406                 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9407                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9408         };
9409         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9410                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9411                 &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9412         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9413
9414         {
9415                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9416                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9417                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9418         }
9419         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9420
9421         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9422                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9423         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9424
9425         {
9426                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9427                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9428                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9429
9430                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9431                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9432
9433                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9434                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9435
9436                 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9437                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9438                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9439
9440                 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9441                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9442                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9443
9444                 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9445                 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9446                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9447         }
9448         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9449         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9450         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9451         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9452
9453         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9454
9455         let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9456         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9457         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9458
9459         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9460         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9461
9462         let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9463         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9464         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9465
9466         expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9467
9468         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9469                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9470                 &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9471         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9472
9473         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9474         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9475         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9476
9477         do_claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9478         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, Some(None), true);
9479 }
9480
9481 #[test]
9482 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9483         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9484         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9485         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9486         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9487
9488         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9489         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9490         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9491         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9492         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9493                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
9494                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9495         };
9496         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9497         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9498         let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9499
9500         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9501         let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage),
9502                 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9503         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9504         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9505         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9506         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9507         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9508         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9509         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9510 }
9511
9512 #[test]
9513 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9514         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9515         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9516         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9517         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9518
9519         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9520         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9521
9522         let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9523         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9524                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
9525                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9526         };
9527         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9528         let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9529         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9530         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9531         let route = find_route(
9532                 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9533                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9534         ).unwrap();
9535
9536         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9537         let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage),
9538                 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9539         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9540         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9541         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9542         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9543         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9544         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9545         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9546 }
9547
9548 #[test]
9549 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9550         // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentClaimable event, the HTLCs
9551         // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9552         // PaymentClaimable event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9553         // amount.
9554         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9555         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9556         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9557         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9558
9559         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9560         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9561         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9562         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9563
9564         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9565         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9566         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9567                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9568                 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9569                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9570         });
9571
9572         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9573         // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentClaimable event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9574         // amount of time to respond to.
9575
9576         // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9577         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9578         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9579
9580         let failed_destinations = vec![
9581                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9582                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9583         ];
9584         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
9585
9586         pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash, PaymentFailureReason::RecipientRejected);
9587
9588         // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9589         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9590                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9591         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9592
9593         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9594         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9595         let node_1_msgs = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
9596         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), node_1_msgs, false, None);
9597
9598         // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9599         // that PaymentClaimable event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9600         nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9601         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9602         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9603 }
9604
9605 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9606 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9607 enum ExposureEvent {
9608         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9609         AtHTLCForward,
9610         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9611         AtHTLCReception,
9612         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9613         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9614 }
9615
9616 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9617         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9618         // policy.
9619         //
9620         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9621         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9622         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9623         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9624         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9625         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9626         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9627         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9628
9629         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9630         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9631         config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9632         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9633         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9634         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9635
9636         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9637         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9638         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9639         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9640         if on_holder_tx {
9641                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9642         }
9643         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9644         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9645         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9646
9647         let opt_anchors = false;
9648
9649         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9650
9651         if on_holder_tx {
9652                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
9653                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
9654                 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id);
9655                 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9656         }
9657
9658         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9659         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9660         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9661         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9662
9663         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9664         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9665         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9666
9667         let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9668         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9669         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9670
9671         let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9672                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9673                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9674                 let chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9675                 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9676         };
9677         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9678         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9679
9680         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9681         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9682
9683         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9684         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9685
9686         if on_holder_tx {
9687                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9688                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9689                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9690                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9691                         for _ in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9692                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9693                                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9694                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9695                         }
9696                 } else {
9697                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9698                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9699                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9700                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9701                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9702                         }
9703                 }
9704         } else {
9705                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9706                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9707                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9708                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9709                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9710                                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9711                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9712                         }
9713                 } else {
9714                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9715                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9716                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9717                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9718                         }
9719                 }
9720         }
9721
9722         let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9723         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9724                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9725                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9726                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9727                 if on_holder_tx {
9728                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9729                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9730                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9731                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
9732                                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
9733                                 assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9734                 } else {
9735                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9736                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
9737                                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
9738                                 assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9739                 }
9740         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9741                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9742                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9743                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9744                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9745                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9746                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9747                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9748                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9749                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9750                 if on_holder_tx {
9751                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9752                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9753                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9754                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9755                 } else {
9756                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9757                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9758                 }
9759         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9760                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9761                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9762                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9763                 {
9764                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9765                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9766                 }
9767                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9768                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9769                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel", "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure", 1);
9770         }
9771
9772         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9773         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9774         added_monitors.clear();
9775 }
9776
9777 #[test]
9778 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9779         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9780         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9781         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9782         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9783         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9784         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9785         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9786         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9787         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9788         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9789         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9790         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9791 }
9792
9793 #[test]
9794 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
9795         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9796         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9797         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9798         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9799
9800         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9801         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9802         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
9803         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9804         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
9805
9806         let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
9807
9808         let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
9809         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9810         let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
9811         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9812         let mut tx = match events[0] {
9813                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
9814                         // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 1.
9815                         Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 2), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
9816                                 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9817                         }]}
9818                 },
9819                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9820         };
9821         // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
9822         match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
9823                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9824                         assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
9825                 },
9826                 _ => panic!()
9827         }
9828
9829         // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +1 headroom from best block.
9830         tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(tx.lock_time.0 - 1);
9831         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
9832         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9833 }
9834
9835 #[test]
9836 fn accept_busted_but_better_fee() {
9837         // If a peer sends us a fee update that is too low, but higher than our previous channel
9838         // feerate, we should accept it. In the future we may want to consider closing the channel
9839         // later, but for now we only accept the update.
9840         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9841         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9842         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9843         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9844
9845         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9846
9847         // Set nodes[1] to expect 5,000 sat/kW.
9848         {
9849                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9850                 *feerate_lock = 5000;
9851         }
9852
9853         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept it.
9854         {
9855                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9856                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9857         }
9858         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9859         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9860
9861         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9862         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9863         match events[0] {
9864                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9865                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9866                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9867                 },
9868                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9869         };
9870
9871         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate further, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept
9872         // it.
9873         {
9874                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9875                 *feerate_lock = 2000;
9876         }
9877         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9878         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9879
9880         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9881         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9882         match events[0] {
9883                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9884                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9885                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9886                 },
9887                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9888         };
9889
9890         // However, if nodes[0] decreases their feerate, nodes[1] should reject it and close the
9891         // channel.
9892         {
9893                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9894                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9895         }
9896         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9897         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9898
9899         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9900         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9901         match events[0] {
9902                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
9903                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9904                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
9905                                 err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000 (- 250)".to_owned() });
9906                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9907                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9908                 },
9909                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9910         };
9911 }
9912
9913 fn do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(valid_delta: bool, use_user_hash: bool) {
9914         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9915         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9916         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9917         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9918         let min_final_cltv_expiry_delta = 120;
9919         let final_cltv_expiry_delta = if valid_delta { min_final_cltv_expiry_delta + 2 } else {
9920                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta - 2 };
9921         let recv_value = 100_000;
9922
9923         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9924
9925         let payment_parameters = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32);
9926         let (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = if use_user_hash {
9927                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1],
9928                         Some(recv_value), Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta));
9929                 (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret)
9930         } else {
9931                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(recv_value), 7200, Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)).unwrap();
9932                 (payment_hash, nodes[1].node.get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret).unwrap(), payment_secret)
9933         };
9934         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_parameters, recv_value).unwrap();
9935         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9936                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9937         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9938         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9939         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9940         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9941         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9942         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9943         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9944
9945         if valid_delta {
9946                 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, recv_value, if use_user_hash {
9947                         None } else { Some(payment_preimage) }, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9948
9949                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9950         } else {
9951                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9952
9953                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9954
9955                 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9956                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9957                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
9958
9959                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9960         }
9961 }
9962
9963 #[test]
9964 fn test_payment_with_custom_min_cltv_expiry_delta() {
9965         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, false);
9966         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, true);
9967         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, false);
9968         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, true);
9969 }
9970
9971 #[test]
9972 fn test_disconnects_peer_awaiting_response_ticks() {
9973         // Tests that nodes which are awaiting on a response critical for channel responsiveness
9974         // disconnect their counterparty after `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
9975         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9976         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9977         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9978         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9979
9980         // Asserts a disconnect event is queued to the user.
9981         let check_disconnect_event = |node: &Node, should_disconnect: bool| {
9982                 let disconnect_event = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
9983                         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action, .. } = event {
9984                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning { .. } = action {
9985                                         Some(())
9986                                 } else {
9987                                         None
9988                                 }
9989                         } else {
9990                                 None
9991                         }
9992                 );
9993                 assert_eq!(disconnect_event.is_some(), should_disconnect);
9994         };
9995
9996         // Fires timer ticks ensuring we only attempt to disconnect peers after reaching
9997         // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
9998         let check_disconnect = |node: &Node| {
9999                 // No disconnect without any timer ticks.
10000                 check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10001
10002                 // No disconnect with 1 timer tick less than required.
10003                 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS - 1 {
10004                         node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10005                         check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10006                 }
10007
10008                 // Disconnect after reaching the required ticks.
10009                 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10010                 check_disconnect_event(node, true);
10011
10012                 // Disconnect again on the next tick if the peer hasn't been disconnected yet.
10013                 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10014                 check_disconnect_event(node, true);
10015         };
10016
10017         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10018
10019         // We'll start by performing a fee update with Alice (nodes[0]) on the channel.
10020         *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
10021         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10022         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
10023         let alice_fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10024         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), alice_fee_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10025         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_fee_update.commitment_signed);
10026         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);
10027
10028         // This will prompt Bob (nodes[1]) to respond with his `CommitmentSigned` and `RevokeAndACK`.
10029         let (bob_revoke_and_ack, bob_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10030         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revoke_and_ack);
10031         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
10032         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_commitment_signed);
10033         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10034
10035         // Alice then needs to send her final `RevokeAndACK` to complete the commitment dance. We
10036         // pretend Bob hasn't received the message and check whether he'll disconnect Alice after
10037         // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10038         let alice_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10039         check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
10040
10041         // Now, we'll reconnect them to test awaiting a `ChannelReestablish` message.
10042         //
10043         // Note that since the commitment dance didn't complete above, Alice is expected to resend her
10044         // final `RevokeAndACK` to Bob to complete it.
10045         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10046         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10047         let bob_init = msgs::Init {
10048                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10049         };
10050         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_init, true).unwrap();
10051         let alice_init = msgs::Init {
10052                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10053         };
10054         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_init, true).unwrap();
10055
10056         // Upon reconnection, Alice sends her `ChannelReestablish` to Bob. Alice, however, hasn't
10057         // received Bob's yet, so she should disconnect him after reaching
10058         // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10059         let alice_channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
10060                 nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()
10061         );
10062         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_channel_reestablish);
10063         check_disconnect(&nodes[0]);
10064
10065         // Bob now sends his `ChannelReestablish` to Alice to resume the channel and consider it "live".
10066         let bob_channel_reestablish = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
10067                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = event {
10068                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10069                         Some(msg.clone())
10070                 } else {
10071                         None
10072                 }
10073         ).unwrap();
10074         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_channel_reestablish);
10075
10076         // Sanity check that Alice won't disconnect Bob since she's no longer waiting for any messages.
10077         for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
10078                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10079                 check_disconnect_event(&nodes[0], false);
10080         }
10081
10082         // However, Bob is still waiting on Alice's `RevokeAndACK`, so he should disconnect her after
10083         // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10084         check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
10085
10086         // Finally, have Bob process the last message.
10087         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_revoke_and_ack);
10088         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10089
10090         // At this point, neither node should attempt to disconnect each other, since they aren't
10091         // waiting on any messages.
10092         for node in &nodes {
10093                 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
10094                         node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10095                         check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10096                 }
10097         }
10098 }