_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use crate::chain;
  15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
  17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
  18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  20 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelSigner, EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource};
  21 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
  22 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  23 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
  24 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
  25 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
  26 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  27 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  28 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
  29 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
  30 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  31 use crate::ln::msgs;
  32 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  33 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
  34 use crate::util::test_utils;
  35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
  36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  37 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
  38 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
  39
  40 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
  43 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  44 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  45 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  46 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxMerkleNode, TxOut, Witness};
  47 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
  48
  49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  50 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  51
  52 use regex;
  53
  54 use crate::io;
  55 use crate::prelude::*;
  56 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  57 use core::default::Default;
  58 use core::iter::repeat;
  59 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  60 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
  61
  62 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  63 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  64
  65 #[test]
  66 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  67         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  68         use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
  69         let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
  70         cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
  71         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  72         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  73         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
  74         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  75
  76         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  77         // funding satoshis
  78         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  79         let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
  80         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  81
  82         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  83         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
  84
  85         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  86         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  87
  88         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  89         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  90         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  91                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  92                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  93                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  94                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  95                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  96                         match action {
  97                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
  98                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager", expected_regex, 1);
  99                                 },
 100                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
 101                         }
 102                 } else { assert!(false); }
 103         };
 104
 105         use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
 106
 107         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 108         insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
 109         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
 110
 111         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 112
 113         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 114
 115         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 116
 117         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 118
 119         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 120
 121         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 122
 123         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 124 }
 125
 126 #[test]
 127 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
 128         // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
 129         // them.
 130         use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
 131         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 132         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 133         *node_cfgs[1].override_init_features.borrow_mut() = Some(channelmanager::provided_init_features(&test_default_channel_config()).clear_wumbo());
 134         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 135         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 136
 137         match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
 138                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
 139                         assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
 140                 },
 141                 _ => panic!()
 142         }
 143 }
 144
 145 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
 146         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
 147         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
 148         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
 149         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
 150         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 151         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 152         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 153         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 154         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 155
 156         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 157         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
 158         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
 159         let opt_anchors = false;
 160         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
 161         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
 162
 163         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
 164         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 165         if !send_from_initiator {
 166                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 167                 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 168         }
 169         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
 170
 171         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
 172         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 173         if send_from_initiator {
 174                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 175                 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 176         }
 177         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
 178         {
 179                 let sender_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] };
 180                 let counterparty_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
 181                 let mut sender_node_per_peer_lock;
 182                 let mut sender_node_peer_state_lock;
 183                 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
 184                 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 185                 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 186         }
 187
 188         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
 189         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
 190         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
 191
 192         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
 193         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
 194         if send_from_initiator {
 195                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
 196                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
 197                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
 198                         // well as an additional HTLC.
 199                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
 200         } else {
 201                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
 202         }
 203 }
 204
 205 #[test]
 206 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
 207         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
 208         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
 209 }
 210
 211 #[test]
 212 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 213         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 214         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 215         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 216         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 217         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 218
 219         // balancing
 220         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 221
 222         // A                                        B
 223         // update_fee                            ->
 224         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 225         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 226         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 227         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 228         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 229         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 230         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 231         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 232         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 233         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 234         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 235         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 236         //                                       <- RAA
 237         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 238
 239         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 240         {
 241                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 242                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 243         }
 244         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 245         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 246
 247         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 248         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 249         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 250                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 251                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 252                 },
 253                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 254         };
 255
 256         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 257
 258         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 259         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 260         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 261         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 262
 263         let payment_event = {
 264                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 265                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 266                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 267         };
 268         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 269         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 270
 271         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 272         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 273         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 274         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 275         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 276         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 277
 278         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 279         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 280         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 281         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 282         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 283
 284         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 285         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 286         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 287         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 288         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 289         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 290         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 291         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 292
 293         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 294         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 295         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 296         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 297         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 298         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 299         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 300         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 301
 302         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 303         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 304         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 305         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 306
 307         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 308         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 309         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 310
 311         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 312         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 313
 314         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 315         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 316         match events_2[0] {
 317                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 318                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 319         }
 320
 321         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 322         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 323 }
 324
 325 #[test]
 326 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 327         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 328         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 329         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 330         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 331         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 332         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 333         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 334
 335         // balancing
 336         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 337
 338         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 339         {
 340                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 341                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 342         }
 343         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 344         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 345
 346         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 347         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 348         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 349                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 350                         update_fee.as_ref()
 351                 },
 352                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 353         };
 354
 355         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 356
 357         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 358         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 359         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 360         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 361
 362         let payment_event = {
 363                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 364                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 365                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 366         };
 367         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 368         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 369
 370         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 371         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 372         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 373         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 374         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 375         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 376
 377         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 378         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 379
 380         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 381 }
 382
 383 #[test]
 384 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 385         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 386         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 387         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 388         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 389         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 390
 391         // A                                        B
 392         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 393         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 394         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 395         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 396         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 397         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 398         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 399         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 400         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 401         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 402         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 403         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 404         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 405         //                                          B should send no response here
 406         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 407         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 408         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 409
 410         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 411         let initial_feerate;
 412         {
 413                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 414                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 415                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 416         }
 417         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 418         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 419
 420         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 421         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 422         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 423                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 424                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 425                 },
 426                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 427         };
 428
 429         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 430         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 431         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 432         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 433         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 434
 435         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 436         // transaction:
 437         {
 438                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 439                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 440         }
 441         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 442         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 443         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 444
 445         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 446         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 447                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 448                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 449         };
 450
 451         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 452
 453         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 454         // Deliver (3)
 455         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 456
 457         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 458         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 459         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 460         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 461         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 462         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 463         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 464         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 465         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 466         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 467         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 468
 469         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 470         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 471         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 472         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 473         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 474
 475         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 476         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 477         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 478
 479         // Delever (4)
 480         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 481         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 482         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 483
 484         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 485         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 486         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 487
 488         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 489         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 490         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 491         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 492
 493         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 494         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 495         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 496 }
 497
 498 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 499         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 500         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 501         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 502         // Node objects.
 503
 504         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 505         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 506         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 507         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 508
 509         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 510                 let block = Block {
 511                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
 512                         txdata: vec![],
 513                 };
 514                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 515                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 516         }
 517
 518         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 519         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
 520         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 521
 522         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 523         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
 524         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 525
 526         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 527         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
 528
 529         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
 530
 531         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 532         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
 533         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 534         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 535
 536         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 537         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 538         {
 539                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 540                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 541                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 542                 added_monitors.clear();
 543         }
 544         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 545
 546         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 547
 548         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 549         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 550         {
 551                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 552                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 553                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 554                 added_monitors.clear();
 555         }
 556
 557         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 558         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 559         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 560
 561         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 562         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 563
 564         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 565         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 566         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 567         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 568         expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 569 }
 570
 571 #[test]
 572 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 573         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 574         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 575         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 576         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 577         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 578         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 579         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 580         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 581         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 582         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 583         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 584         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 585         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 586         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 587         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 588         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 589         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 590         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 591 }
 592
 593 #[test]
 594 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 595         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 596         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 597         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 598         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 599         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 600
 601         {
 602                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 603                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 604         }
 605         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 606         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 607
 608         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 609         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 610         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 611                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 612                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 613                 },
 614                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 615         };
 616         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 617
 618         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 619         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 620         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 621
 622         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 623         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 624         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 625
 626         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 627         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 628         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 629         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 630
 631         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 632         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 633         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 634 }
 635
 636 #[test]
 637 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 638         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 639         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 640         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 641         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 642         let channel_value = 5000;
 643         let push_sats = 700;
 644         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000);
 645         let channel_id = chan.2;
 646         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 647         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 648         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
 649
 650         let opt_anchors = false;
 651
 652         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 653         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 654         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 655         // remote limit.
 656         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 657         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
 658         {
 659                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 660                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 661         }
 662         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 663         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 664         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 665
 666         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 667
 668         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 669
 670         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 671         {
 672                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 673
 674                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 675                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 676                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
 677                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 678                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 679                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 680         }
 681
 682         {
 683                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 684                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 685                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 686         }
 687         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 688         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 689         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 690
 691         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 692
 693         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 694         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 695         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 696                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 697                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 698                 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 699                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 700                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 701                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 702                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 703         };
 704         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 705                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 706                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 707                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 708                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 709                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 710                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 711                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 712                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 713         };
 714
 715         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 716         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 717                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
 718
 719         let res = {
 720                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 721                 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 722                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 723                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 724                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 725                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 726                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 727                         push_sats,
 728                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
 729                         opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
 730                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 731                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 732                         &mut htlcs,
 733                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 734                 );
 735                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 736         };
 737
 738         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 739                 channel_id: chan.2,
 740                 signature: res.0,
 741                 htlc_signatures: res.1,
 742                 #[cfg(taproot)]
 743                 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
 744         };
 745
 746         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 747                 channel_id: chan.2,
 748                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 749         };
 750
 751         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 752
 753         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 754         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 755         //Should produce and error.
 756         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 757         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
 758         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 759         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 760         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
 761 }
 762
 763 #[test]
 764 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 765         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 766         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 767         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 768         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 769         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 770
 771         // balancing
 772         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 773
 774         {
 775                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 776                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 777         }
 778         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 779         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 780
 781         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 782         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 783         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 784                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 785                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 786                 },
 787                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 788         };
 789         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 790         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 791         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 792         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 793
 794         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 795
 796         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 797         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 798         {
 799                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 800                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 801                 added_monitors.clear();
 802         }
 803         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 804         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 805         // node[1] has nothing to do
 806
 807         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 808         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 809         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 810
 811         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 812         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 813         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 814         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 815         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 816         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 817         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 818
 819         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 820         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 821         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 822         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 823         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 824         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 825
 826         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 827         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 828         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 829         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 830
 831         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 832         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 833         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 834
 835         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 836         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 837         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 838         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 839
 840         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 841         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 842         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 843
 844         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 845
 846         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 847         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 848         match events[0] {
 849                 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => { },
 850                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 851         };
 852
 853         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 854
 855         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 856         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 857         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 858         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 859         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 860 }
 861
 862 #[test]
 863 fn test_update_fee() {
 864         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 865         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 866         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 867         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 868         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 869         let channel_id = chan.2;
 870
 871         // A                                        B
 872         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 873         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 874         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 875         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 876         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 877         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 878         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 879         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 880         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 881         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 882         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 883         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 884
 885         // Create and deliver (1)...
 886         let feerate;
 887         {
 888                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 889                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 890                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 891         }
 892         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 893         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 894
 895         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 896         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 897         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 898                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 899                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 900                 },
 901                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 902         };
 903         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 904
 905         // Generate (2) and (3):
 906         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 907         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 908         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 909
 910         // Deliver (2):
 911         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 912         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 913         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 914
 915         // Create and deliver (4)...
 916         {
 917                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 918                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 919         }
 920         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 921         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 922         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 923         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 924         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 925                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 926                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 927                 },
 928                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 929         };
 930
 931         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 932         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 933         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 934         // ... creating (5)
 935         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 936         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 937
 938         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 939         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 940         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 941         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 942         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 943
 944         // Deliver (5):
 945         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 946         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 947         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 948
 949         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 950         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 951         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 952         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 953         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 954         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 955         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 956         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 957         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 958
 959         // Deliver (7)
 960         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 961         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 962         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 963         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 964
 965         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 966         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 967         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 968
 969         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 970         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 971         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 972         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 973         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 974 }
 975
 976 #[test]
 977 fn fake_network_test() {
 978         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 979         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 980         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 981         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 982         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 983         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 984
 985         // Create some initial channels
 986         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 987         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
 988         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
 989
 990         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
 991         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 992         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 993         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 994         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 995
 996         // Send some more payments
 997         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 998         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
 999         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
1000
1001         // Test failure packets
1002         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
1003         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
1004
1005         // Add a new channel that skips 3
1006         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1007
1008         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1009         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1010         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1011         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1012         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1013         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1014         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1015
1016         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1017         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1018         hops.push(RouteHop {
1019                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1020                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1021                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1022                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1023                 fee_msat: 0,
1024                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1025         });
1026         hops.push(RouteHop {
1027                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1028                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1029                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1030                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1031                 fee_msat: 0,
1032                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1033         });
1034         hops.push(RouteHop {
1035                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1036                 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1037                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1038                 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1039                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1040                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1041         });
1042         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1043         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1044         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1045
1046         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1047         hops.push(RouteHop {
1048                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1049                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1050                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1051                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1052                 fee_msat: 0,
1053                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1054         });
1055         hops.push(RouteHop {
1056                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1057                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1058                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1059                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1060                 fee_msat: 0,
1061                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1062         });
1063         hops.push(RouteHop {
1064                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1065                 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1066                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1067                 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1068                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1069                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1070         });
1071         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1072         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1073         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1074
1075         // Claim the rebalances...
1076         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1077         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1078
1079         // Close down the channels...
1080         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1081         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1082         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1083         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1084         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1085         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1086         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1087         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1088         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1089         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1090         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1091         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1092 }
1093
1094 #[test]
1095 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1096         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1097         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1098         // commitment dance rounds.
1099         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1100         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1101         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1102         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1103         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1104         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1105
1106         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1107         for _ in 0..crate::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1108                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1109                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1110                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1111         }
1112         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1113
1114         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1115         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1116         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1117         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1118
1119         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1120         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1121         // another HTLC.
1122         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1123         {
1124                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1125                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1126                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1127                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs", 1);
1128         }
1129
1130         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1131         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1132         {
1133                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1134                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1135         }
1136
1137         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1138         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1139         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1140         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1141
1142         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1143         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1144         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1145         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1146         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1147         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1148         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1149
1150         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1151         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1152         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1153
1154         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1155
1156         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1157         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1158         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1159         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1160
1161         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1162         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1163         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1164         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1165
1166         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1167         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1168         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1169
1170         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1171                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1172         }
1173         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1174         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1175         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1176         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1177         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1178
1179         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1180         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1181         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1182         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1183         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1184
1185         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1186         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1187
1188         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1189
1190         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1191         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1192         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1193                 match event {
1194                         &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1195                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1196                         },
1197                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1198                 };
1199         }
1200
1201         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1202                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1203         }
1204
1205         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1206 }
1207
1208 #[test]
1209 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1210         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1211         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1212         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1213         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1214         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1215         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1216
1217         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1218         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
1219         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1220         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1221         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
1222         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
1223
1224         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1225
1226         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1227         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1228
1229         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1230         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1231
1232         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1233         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1234         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1235 }
1236
1237 #[test]
1238 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1239         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1240         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1241         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1242         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1243         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1244         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1245         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1246
1247         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1248
1249         // balancing
1250         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1251
1252         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1253
1254         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1255         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
1256         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1257
1258         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1259         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1260         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1261         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1262
1263         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1264         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1265
1266         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1267         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1268         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1269                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1270                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1271                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1272                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1273                 }
1274         }
1275         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1276
1277         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1278         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1279         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1280         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1281
1282         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1283         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 3);
1284
1285         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1286         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
1287         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
1288         let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1289         let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1290                 (&claim_txn[1], &claim_txn[2])
1291         } else {
1292                 (&claim_txn[2], &claim_txn[1])
1293         };
1294
1295         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1296         assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1297
1298         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1299         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1300         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1301
1302         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1303         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1304         check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1305         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1306
1307         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1308         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1309         for e in events {
1310                 match e {
1311                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1312                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1313                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1314                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1315                         },
1316                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1317                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1318                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1319                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1320                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1321                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1322                         },
1323                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1324                 }
1325         }
1326 }
1327
1328 #[test]
1329 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1330         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1331         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1332         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1333         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1334         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1335
1336         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1337         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1338
1339         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1340         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2));
1341         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1342         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1343         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1344         match err {
1345                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
1346                         match &fails[0] {
1347                                 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1348                                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1349                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1350                         }
1351                 },
1352                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1353         }
1354         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1355         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value", 1);
1356
1357         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1358 }
1359
1360 #[test]
1361 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1362         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1363         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1364         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1365         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1366         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1367
1368         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1369         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1370         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1371         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1372
1373         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1374
1375         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1376         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1377         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1378         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1379                 channel_id: chan.2,
1380                 htlc_id: 0,
1381                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1382                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1383                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1384                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1385         };
1386
1387         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1388
1389         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1390         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1391         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1392
1393         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1394
1395         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1396
1397         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1398         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1399         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1400                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1401                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1402                 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1403                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1404                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1405                 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1406
1407                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1408                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1409                  chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1410                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1411                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1412         };
1413         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1414                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1415                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1416                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1417                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1418                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1419                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1420                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1421                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1422         };
1423
1424         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1425         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1426                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
1427
1428         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1429         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1430         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1431
1432         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1433                 offered: false,
1434                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1435                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1436                 payment_hash,
1437                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1438         };
1439
1440         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1441
1442         let res = {
1443                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1444                 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1445                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1446                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1447                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1448                         commitment_number,
1449                         95000,
1450                         local_chan_balance,
1451                         local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1452                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1453                         feerate_per_kw,
1454                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1455                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1456                 );
1457                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1458         };
1459
1460         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1461                 channel_id: chan.2,
1462                 signature: res.0,
1463                 htlc_signatures: res.1,
1464                 #[cfg(taproot)]
1465                 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
1466         };
1467
1468         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1469         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1470         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1471
1472         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1473         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1474                 channel_id: chan.2,
1475                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1476                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point,
1477                 #[cfg(taproot)]
1478                 next_local_nonce: None,
1479         };
1480         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1481
1482         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1483         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1484         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1485         match events[0] {
1486                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1487                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1488                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1489                 },
1490                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1491         };
1492         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1493                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1494
1495         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1496 }
1497
1498 #[test]
1499 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1500         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1501         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1502         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1503         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1504         // this situation.
1505         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1506         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1507         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1508         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1509         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1510         let opt_anchors = false;
1511
1512         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1513         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1514
1515         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1516
1517         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1518
1519         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1520         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1521                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1522         }
1523
1524         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1525         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1526         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1527                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1528         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1529         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1530 }
1531
1532 #[test]
1533 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1534         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1535         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1536         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1537         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1538         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1539         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1540         let opt_anchors = false;
1541
1542         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1543         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1544         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1545         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1546         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1547         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1548         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1549
1550         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1551         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1552                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1553         }
1554
1555         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1556         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1557         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1558         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1559         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1560         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1561         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1562         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1563         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1564                 channel_id: chan.2,
1565                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1566                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1567                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1568                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1569                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1570         };
1571
1572         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1573         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1574         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1575         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1576         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1577         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1578         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1579         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1580 }
1581
1582 #[test]
1583 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1584         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1585         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1586         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1587         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1588
1589         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1590         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1591         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1592         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1593         let opt_anchors = false;
1594
1595         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1596         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1597         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1598         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1599         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1600         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1601         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt);
1602
1603         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1604                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1605         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1606         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1607         // commitment transaction fee.
1608         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1609
1610         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1611         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1612                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1613         }
1614
1615         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1616         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1617         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1618                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1619 }
1620
1621 #[test]
1622 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1623         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1624         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1625         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1626         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1627         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1628         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1629         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1630         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1631         let opt_anchors = false;
1632
1633         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1634         // HTLC.
1635         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1636         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1637         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1638                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1639
1640         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1641         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1642         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1643         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1644         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1645         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1646         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
1647
1648         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1649         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1650         match msg_events[0] {
1651                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1652                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1653                 },
1654                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1655         }
1656 }
1657
1658 #[test]
1659 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1660         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1661         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1662         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1663         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1664         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1665         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1666         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000);
1667
1668         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1669         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1670         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1671         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1672         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1673         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1674
1675         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1676         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1677         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1678         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1679         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1680         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1681
1682         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1683         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1684         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1685         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1686 }
1687
1688 #[test]
1689 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1690         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1691         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1692         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1693         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1694         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1695         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
1696
1697         let feemsat = 239;
1698         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1699         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1700         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1701         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1702
1703         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1704         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1705         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1706         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1707
1708         // Add a pending HTLC.
1709         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1710         let payment_event_1 = {
1711                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1712                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1713
1714                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1715                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1716                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1717         };
1718         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1719
1720         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1721         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1722         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1723         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1724         let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1725
1726         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1727         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1728         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1729         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1730         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1731         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1732         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1733         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1734                 channel_id: chan.2,
1735                 htlc_id: 1,
1736                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1737                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1738                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1739                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1740         };
1741
1742         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1743         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1744         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1745         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1746         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1747         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1748         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1749         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1750 }
1751
1752 #[test]
1753 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1754         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1755         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1756         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1757         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1758         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1759         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1760         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1761         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1762         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1763         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1764
1765         let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1766         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1767         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1768
1769         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1770         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1771 }
1772
1773 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1774         (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1775 }
1776
1777 #[test]
1778 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1779         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1780         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1781         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1782         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1783         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1784         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1785         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1786         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1787         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001);
1788         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001);
1789
1790         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1791         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1792
1793         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1794         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1795
1796         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1797                 ($node: expr) => {{
1798                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1799                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1800                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1801                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1802                         payment_event
1803                 }}
1804         }
1805
1806         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1807         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1808         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1809         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1810
1811         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1812
1813         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1814         {
1815                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1816                         .with_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1817                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1818                 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1819                 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1820
1821                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1822                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1823                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1824                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept", 1);
1825         }
1826
1827         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1828         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1829         loop {
1830                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1831                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1832                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1833                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1834                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1835                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1836                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1837                         break;
1838                 }
1839
1840                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1841                         .with_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1842                 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
1843                 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1844                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1845
1846                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1847                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1848                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1849                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1850                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1851                 );
1852
1853                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1854                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1855                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1856                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1857                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1858         }
1859
1860         // adding pending output.
1861         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1862         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1863         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1864         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1865         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1866         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1867         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1868         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1869         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1870         // policy.
1871         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1872         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1873         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1874
1875         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1876         let payment_event_1 = {
1877                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1878                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1879
1880                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1881                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1882                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1883         };
1884         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1885
1886         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1887         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1888         {
1889                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1890                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1891                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1892                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1893         }
1894
1895         // split the rest to test holding cell
1896         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1897         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1898         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1899         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1900         {
1901                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1902                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1903         }
1904
1905         // now see if they go through on both sides
1906         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1907         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1908         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
1909         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1910         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1911         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1912
1913         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1914         {
1915                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1916                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1917                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1918                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1919                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value", 2);
1920         }
1921
1922         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1923         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1924         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
1925         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1926         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1927         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1928
1929         // flush the pending htlc
1930         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1931         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1932         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1933
1934         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1935         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1936         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1937         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1938
1939         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1940         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1941         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1942         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1943
1944         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1945         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1946         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1947
1948         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1949
1950         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1951         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1952         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1953
1954         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1955         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1956
1957         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1958         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1959         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1960         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1961         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1962         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1963
1964         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1965         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1966         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1967         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1968
1969         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1970         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1971
1972         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1973         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1974         match events[0] {
1975                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
1976                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1977                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
1978                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
1979                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
1980                         match &purpose {
1981                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1982                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1983                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1984                                 },
1985                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1986                         }
1987                 },
1988                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1989         }
1990         match events[1] {
1991                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
1992                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1993                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
1994                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
1995                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
1996                         match &purpose {
1997                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1998                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1999                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
2000                                 },
2001                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2002                         }
2003                 },
2004                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2005         }
2006
2007         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
2008         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2009         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2010
2011         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
2012         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2013         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2014
2015         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
2016         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2017         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2018         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2019         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2020
2021         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
2022         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2023 }
2024
2025 #[test]
2026 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2027         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2028         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2029         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2030         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2031         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2032         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2033         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2034         // To test this we:
2035         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2036         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2037         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2038         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2039         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2040         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2041         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
2042         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2043         //    claim,
2044         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2045         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2046         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2047         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2048         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2049         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2050         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2051         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2052         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2053         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2054
2055         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2056         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2057         let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2058         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2059         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2060
2061         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2062         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2063         let send_1 = {
2064                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2065                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2066                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2067                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2068                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2069         };
2070
2071         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2072         // initial fulfill/CS.
2073         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2074         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2075         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2076         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2077
2078         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2079         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2080         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2081         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2082         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2083         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2084
2085         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2086         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2087         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2088         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2089         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2090
2091         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2092         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2093         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2094         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2095         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2096
2097         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2098         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2099         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2100
2101         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2102         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2103         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2104
2105         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2106         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2107         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2108
2109         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2110         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2111         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2112         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2113         // on-chain as necessary).
2114         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2115         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2116         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2117         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2118         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2119
2120         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2121         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2122         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2123
2124         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2125         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2126
2127         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2128         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2129         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2130         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2131         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2132         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2133
2134         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2135         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2136         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2137         let send_2 = {
2138                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2139                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2140                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2141                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2142                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2143         };
2144
2145         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2146         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2147         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2148         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2149
2150         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2151
2152         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2153         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2154         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2155
2156         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2157         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2158
2159         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2160         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2161         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2162         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2163
2164         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2165         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2166         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2167
2168         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2169         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2170
2171         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2172         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2173
2174         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2175         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2176 }
2177
2178 #[test]
2179 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2180         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2181         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2182         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2183         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2184         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2185         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2186
2187         // Create some initial channels
2188         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2189         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2190         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2191         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
2192
2193         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2194         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2195         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2196         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2197         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2198         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2199
2200         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2201         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2202         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2203         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2204         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2205
2206         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2207         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2208         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2209         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2210         {
2211                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2212                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2213                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2214                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2215                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2216         }
2217         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2218         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2219         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2220         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2221         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2222
2223         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2224         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2225
2226         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2227         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2228         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2229         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2230         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2231         {
2232                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2233                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2234                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2235                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2236                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2237                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2238         }
2239         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2240         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2241         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2242         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2243         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2244
2245         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2246                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2247                         {
2248                                 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2249                                 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2250                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2251
2252                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2253                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2254                                 match events[0] {
2255                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2256                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2257                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2258                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2259                                         },
2260                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2261                                 };
2262                         }
2263                 }
2264         }
2265
2266         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2267         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2268         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2269         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2270         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2271         let node2_commitment_txid;
2272         {
2273                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2274                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2275                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2276                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2277
2278                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2279                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2280                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2281                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2282                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2283         }
2284         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2285         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2286         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2287         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2288         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2289
2290         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2291         // confusing us in the following tests.
2292         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2293
2294         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2295         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2296         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2297         // buffer space).
2298
2299         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2300                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2301                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2302                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2303                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2304                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2305                                 msg.clone()
2306                         },
2307                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2308                 };
2309                 match events[1] {
2310                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2311                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2312                         },
2313                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2314                 }
2315                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2316
2317                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2318                 {
2319                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2320                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2321                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2322                                         false
2323                                 } else { true }
2324                         });
2325                 }
2326
2327                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2328
2329                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2330                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2331
2332                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2333                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2334                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2335                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2336                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2337                                 msg.clone()
2338                         },
2339                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2340                 };
2341                 match events[1] {
2342                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2343                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2344                         },
2345                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2346                 }
2347                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2348                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2349
2350                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2351                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2352                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2353         };
2354         nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2355         nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2356         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2357         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2358
2359         assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2360                 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
2361         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2362         check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2363 }
2364
2365 #[test]
2366 fn test_justice_tx() {
2367         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2368         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2369         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2370         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2371         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2372         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2373         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2374         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2375         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2376         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2377         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2378         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2379         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2380         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2381         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2382         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2383         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen;
2384         // Create some new channels:
2385         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2386
2387         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2388         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2389         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2390         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2391         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2392         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2393         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2394         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2395         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2396         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2397         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2398         // Revoke the old state
2399         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2400
2401         {
2402                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2403                 {
2404                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2405                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2406                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2407
2408                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2409                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2410                 }
2411                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2412                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2413                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2414
2415                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2416                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2417                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2418                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2419                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2420                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2421                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2422                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2423                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2424         }
2425         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2426
2427         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2428         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2429
2430         // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2431         // Create some new channels:
2432         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2433         {
2434                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2435                 node_txn.clear();
2436         }
2437
2438         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2439         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2440         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2441         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2442         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2443         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2444         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2445         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2446         // Revoke the old state
2447         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2448         {
2449                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2450                 {
2451                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2452                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2453                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2454
2455                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2456                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2457                 }
2458                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2459                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2460
2461                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2462                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2463                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2464                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2465                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2466                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2467                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2468         }
2469         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2470         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2471         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2472 }
2473
2474 #[test]
2475 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2476         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2477         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2478         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2479         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2480         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2481         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2482         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2483         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2484         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2485         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2486         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2487         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2488         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2489         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2490
2491         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2492         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2493         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2494         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2495         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2496         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output
2497
2498         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2499
2500         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2501         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2502         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2503         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2504         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2505 }
2506
2507 #[test]
2508 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2509         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2510         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2511         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2512         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2513         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2514         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2515
2516         // Create some new channel:
2517         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2518
2519         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2520         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2521         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2522         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2523         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2524
2525         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2526         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2527         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2528         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2529         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2530         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2531         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2532         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2533         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2534
2535         //Revoke the old state
2536         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2537
2538         {
2539                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2540                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2541                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2542                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2543                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2544                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2545                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2546                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2547
2548                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2549                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2550
2551                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2552                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2553
2554                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2555                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2556                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2557                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2558                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2559                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2560                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2561                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2562
2563                 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2564                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2565                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2566                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2567                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2568         }
2569         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2570         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2571         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2572 }
2573
2574 #[test]
2575 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2576         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2577         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2578         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2579         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2580         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2581         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2582
2583         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2584
2585         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2586         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2587         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2588         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2589         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2590         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2591
2592         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2593         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2594
2595         //Revoke the old state
2596         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2597
2598         {
2599                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2600                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2601                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2602                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2603                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2604                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2605                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2606                 match events.last().unwrap() {
2607                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2608                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2609                 }
2610
2611                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2612                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2613
2614                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2615                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7);
2616
2617                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2618                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2619                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2620                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2621                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2622                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2623                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2624
2625                 // Justice transactions are indices 2-3-4
2626                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2627                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2628                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2629
2630                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2631                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2632                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2633
2634                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2635                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2636                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2637                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2638                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2639                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2640                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2641                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2642
2643                 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2644                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2645                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2646                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[3]);
2647                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[4]);
2648                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2649                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2650         }
2651         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2652         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2653         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2654 }
2655
2656 #[test]
2657 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2658         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2659         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2660         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2661         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2662         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2663         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2664         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2665         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2666         // towards B.
2667         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2668         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2669         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2670         // PaymentSent event).
2671
2672         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2673         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2674         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2675         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2676
2677         // Create some initial channels
2678         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2679         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2680
2681         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2682         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2683         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2684         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2685         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2686
2687         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2688         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2689         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2690
2691         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2692         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2693
2694         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2695         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2696         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2697         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2698         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2699         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2700         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2701         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2702         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2703         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2704         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2705         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2706         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2707         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2708         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2709
2710         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2711         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2712         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2713         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2714         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2715         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2716         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2717         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2718         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2719         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2720         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2721         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2722         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2723         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2724
2725         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2726         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2727         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
2728         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2729         {
2730                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2731                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2732                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2733                 added_monitors.clear();
2734         }
2735         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2736         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2737         match forwarded_events[0] {
2738                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2739                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2740         }
2741         let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2742         match forwarded_events[1] {
2743                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
2744                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2745                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2746                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2747                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2748                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2749                 },
2750                 _ => panic!()
2751         }
2752         match forwarded_events[2] {
2753                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
2754                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2755                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2756                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2757                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2758                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2759                 },
2760                 _ => panic!()
2761         }
2762         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2763         {
2764                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2765                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2766                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2767                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2768                 added_monitors.clear();
2769         }
2770         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2771
2772         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2773         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2774
2775         match nodes_2_event {
2776                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2777                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2778         }
2779
2780         match nodes_0_event {
2781                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2782                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2783                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2784                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2785                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2786                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2787                 },
2788                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2789         };
2790
2791         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
2792         match events[0] {
2793                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2794                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2795         }
2796
2797         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2798                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => { {
2799                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2800                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2801                         // Node[1]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2802                         // Node[0]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2803                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx);
2804                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2805                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2806                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2807                         if $htlc_offered {
2808                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2809                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2810                                 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2811                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2812                         } else {
2813                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2814                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2815                                 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2816                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2817                         }
2818                         node_txn.clear();
2819                 } }
2820         }
2821         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2822         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0]);
2823
2824         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2825         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2826         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2827         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2828         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2829         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2830         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2831         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2832         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2833         assert!(node_txn.len() == 1 || node_txn.len() == 3); // HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn
2834         let commitment_spend =
2835                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2836                         &node_txn[0]
2837                 } else {
2838                         // Certain `ConnectStyle`s will cause RBF bumps of the previous HTLC transaction to be broadcast.
2839                         // FullBlockViaListen
2840                         if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2841                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2842                                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2843                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2844                                 &node_txn[0]
2845                         } else {
2846                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2847                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2848                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2849                                 &node_txn[2]
2850                         }
2851                 };
2852
2853         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2854         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2855         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2856         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2857         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1);
2858         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2859         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2860         // we already checked the same situation with A.
2861
2862         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2863         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2864         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2865         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2866         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2867         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2868         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2869         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2870         let mut first_claimed = false;
2871         for event in events {
2872                 match event {
2873                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2874                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2875                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
2876                                         first_claimed = true;
2877                                 } else {
2878                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2879                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2880                                 }
2881                         },
2882                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2883                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2884                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2885                 }
2886         }
2887         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2888 }
2889
2890 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2891         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2892         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2893         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2894         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2895         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
2896         //            \                                  \
2897         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
2898
2899         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2900         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2901         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2902         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2903         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2904         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2905         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2906
2907         // Create some intial channels
2908         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2909         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2910
2911         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2912         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2913         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2914
2915         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2916
2917         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2918         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2919         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2920         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2921         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2922         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
2923         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2924
2925         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2926         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2927         match events[0] {
2928                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2929                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2930                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2931                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2932                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2933                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2934                 },
2935                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2936         };
2937         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2938         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2939         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2940         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2941         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2942         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2943
2944         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2945         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2946         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2947         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2948         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2949         let timeout_tx;
2950         {
2951                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2952                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2953
2954                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2955                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2956
2957                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2958                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2959                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2960                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2961
2962                 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2963                 node_txn.clear();
2964         }
2965
2966         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2967         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2968         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2969
2970         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2971
2972         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
2973         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2974         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2975         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2976         match events[0] {
2977                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2978                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2979                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2980                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2981                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2982                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2983                 },
2984                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2985         };
2986
2987         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2988         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2989         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2990
2991         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2992         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2993
2994         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2995         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2996         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2997         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // 1 timeout tx
2998         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2999         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
3000         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3001 }
3002
3003 #[test]
3004 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3005         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3006         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3007         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3008 }
3009
3010 #[test]
3011 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3012         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3013         // and fail backward accordingly.
3014
3015         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3016         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3017         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3018         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3019
3020         // Create some initial channels
3021         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3022         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3023
3024         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3025         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3026         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3027         // Revoke the old state
3028         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3029
3030         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3031
3032         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3033         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3034         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3035         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3036         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3037
3038         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3039         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3040         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3041         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3042         match events[0] {
3043                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3044                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3045                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3046                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3047                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3048                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3049
3050                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3051                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3052                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3053                 },
3054                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3055         }
3056 }
3057
3058 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3059         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3060         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3061         // commitment transaction anymore.
3062         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3063         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3064         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3065         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3066         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3067         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3068         // transactions:
3069         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3070         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3071         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3072         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3073         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3074         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3075         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3076         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3077         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3078
3079         // Create some initial channels
3080         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3081         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3082
3083         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3084         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3085         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3086         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3087         // Revoke the old state
3088         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3089
3090         let value = if use_dust {
3091                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3092                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3093                 nodes[2].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
3094                         .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3095         } else { 3000000 };
3096
3097         let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3098         let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3099         let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3100
3101         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3102         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3103         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3104         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3105         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3106         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3107         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3108         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3109         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3110         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3111         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3112         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3113
3114         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3115         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3116         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3117         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3118         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3119         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3120         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3121         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3122         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3123         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3124         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3125         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3126         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3127         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3128         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3129         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3130
3131         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3132         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3133         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3134         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3135         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3136         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3137         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3138         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3139         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3140         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3141         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3142         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3143         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3144         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3145         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3146         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3147         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3148         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3149
3150         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3151         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3152         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3153         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3154         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3155         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3156         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3157
3158         if deliver_bs_raa {
3159                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3160                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3161                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3162                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3163                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3164                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3165                 match events[0] {
3166                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3167                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3168                 };
3169                 match events[1] {
3170                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3171                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3172                 }
3173                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3174                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3175         }
3176
3177         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3178         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3179
3180         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3181         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3182         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3183
3184         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3185         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
3186         match events[0] {
3187                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3188                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3189         }
3190         match events[1] {
3191                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3192                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3193                 },
3194                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3195         }
3196         match events[2] {
3197                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3198                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3199                 },
3200                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3201         }
3202
3203         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3204         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3205
3206         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3207         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3208
3209         if deliver_bs_raa {
3210                 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3211                 match nodes_2_event {
3212                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3213                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3214                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3215                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3216                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3217                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3218                         },
3219                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3220                 }
3221         }
3222
3223         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3224         match nodes_2_event {
3225                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3226                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3227                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3228                 },
3229                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3230         }
3231
3232         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3233         match nodes_0_event {
3234                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3235                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3236                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3237                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3238                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3239                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3240
3241                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3242                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3243                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3244
3245                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3246
3247                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3248                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
3249                         match events[0] {
3250                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref failure, .. } => {
3251                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3252                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3253                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3254                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3255                                                 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure { } else { panic!("Unexpected path failure") }
3256                                         }
3257                                 },
3258                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3259                         }
3260                         match events[1] {
3261                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3262                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, first_payment_hash);
3263                                 },
3264                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3265                         }
3266                         match events[2] {
3267                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3268                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3269                                 },
3270                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3271                         }
3272                         match events[3] {
3273                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3274                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
3275                                 },
3276                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3277                         }
3278                         match events[4] {
3279                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3280                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3281                                 },
3282                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3283                         }
3284                         match events[5] {
3285                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3286                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, third_payment_hash);
3287                                 },
3288                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3289                         }
3290                 },
3291                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3292         }
3293
3294         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
3295         match events[0] {
3296                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3297                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3298         }
3299
3300         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3301         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3302         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3303 }
3304
3305 #[test]
3306 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3307         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3308         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3309         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3310         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3311 }
3312
3313 #[test]
3314 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3315         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3316         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3317         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3318         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3319 }
3320
3321 #[test]
3322 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3323         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3324         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3325         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3326         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3327         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
3328
3329         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3330         {
3331                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3332                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3333                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3334
3335                 let payment_event = {
3336                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3337                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3338                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3339                 };
3340                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3341                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3342         }
3343
3344         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3345         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3346         {
3347                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3348                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3349
3350                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3351         }
3352
3353         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3354         {
3355                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3356
3357                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3358                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3359                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3360                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3361                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3362                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3363
3364                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3365                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3366                         channel_id: chan.2,
3367                         htlc_id: 0,
3368                         amount_msat: 0,
3369                         payment_hash,
3370                         cltv_expiry,
3371                         onion_routing_packet,
3372                 };
3373                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3374         }
3375         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3376         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3377         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3378         match events[0] {
3379                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3380                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3381                 },
3382                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3383         }
3384         match events[1] {
3385                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3386                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3387                 },
3388                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3389         }
3390         match events[2] {
3391                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3392                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3393                 },
3394                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3395         }
3396         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3397         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3398 }
3399
3400 #[test]
3401 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3402         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3403         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3404         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3405         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3406         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3407         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3408         if *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
3409                 // We rely on the ability to connect a block redundantly, which isn't allowed via
3410                 // `chain::Listen`, so we never run the test if we randomly get assigned that
3411                 // connect_style.
3412                 return;
3413         }
3414         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3415
3416         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3417         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3418         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3419         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3420         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3421         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3422
3423         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3424         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3425         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3426
3427         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3428         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3429         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3430         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3431         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3432
3433         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3434         // registering new transactions
3435         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3436 }
3437
3438 #[test]
3439 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3440         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3441         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3442         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3443         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3444         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3445         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3446         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3447
3448         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3449
3450         let mut payment_event = {
3451                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3452                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3453
3454                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3455                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3456                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3457         };
3458
3459         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3460         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3461
3462         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3463
3464         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3465         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3466         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3467         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3468
3469         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3470         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3471         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3472         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3473         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3474
3475         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3476         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3477         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3478
3479         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3480         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3481         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3482         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3483         let tx = {
3484                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3485                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3486                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3487                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3488                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3489                 node_txn.remove(0)
3490         };
3491
3492         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3493
3494         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3495         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3496         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3497         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3498
3499         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3500         {
3501                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3502                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3503         }
3504         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3505         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3506         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3507         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3508         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3509         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3510         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3511
3512         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3513 }
3514
3515 #[test]
3516 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3517         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3518         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3519         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3520         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3521
3522         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3523         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3524         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3525         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3526         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3527
3528         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3529
3530         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3531         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3532         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3533         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3534         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3535         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3536
3537         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3538         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3539
3540         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3541         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3542 }
3543
3544 #[test]
3545 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3546         // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3547         // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3548         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3549         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3550         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3551         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3552
3553         // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3554         // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3555         let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3556         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3557         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
3558         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3559         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
3560
3561         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3562         assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3563
3564         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3565
3566         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3567         assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3568
3569         // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3570         // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3571         // broadcasted.
3572         {
3573                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3574         }
3575
3576         // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3577         // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3578         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3579         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3580
3581         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3582         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3583 }
3584
3585 #[test]
3586 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3587         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3588         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3589         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3590         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3591         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3592         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3593         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3594
3595         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3596         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3597         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3598
3599         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3600         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3601         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3602         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3603
3604         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3605         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3606         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3607
3608         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3609         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3610         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3611         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3612
3613         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3614         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3615
3616         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3617         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3618
3619         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3620         {
3621                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3622                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
3623                 match events[0] {
3624                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3625                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3626                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3627                         },
3628                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3629                 }
3630                 match events[1] {
3631                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3632                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3633                 }
3634                 match events[2] {
3635                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3636                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3637                                 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3638                         },
3639                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3640                 }
3641                 match events[3] {
3642                         Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3643                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3644                         },
3645                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3646                 }
3647         }
3648
3649         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3650         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3651 }
3652
3653 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3654         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3655         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3656         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3657         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3658         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3659
3660         let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3661         let channel_id = if messages_delivered == 0 {
3662                 let (channel_ready, chan_id, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
3663                 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3664                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3665                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3666                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3667                 chan_id
3668         } else {
3669                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2
3670         };
3671
3672         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3673
3674         let payment_event = {
3675                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3676                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3677
3678                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3679                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3680                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3681         };
3682         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3683
3684         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3685                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3686         } else {
3687                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3688                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3689                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3690                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3691                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3692
3693                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3694                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3695                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3696                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3697
3698                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3699                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3700                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3701                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3702                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3703
3704                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3705                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3706                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3707                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3708                                         }
3709                                 }
3710                         }
3711                 }
3712         }
3713
3714         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3715         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3716         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3717                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3718                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3719                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3720                         //
3721                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3722                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3723                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3724                         //
3725                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3726                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3727                 }
3728                 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3729                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3730                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3731         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3732                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3733                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3734         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3735                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3736                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3737         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3738                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3739                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3740         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3741                 // Everything was delivered...
3742                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3743         }
3744
3745         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3746         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3747                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3748                 match events_1[0] {
3749                         Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3750                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3751                 };
3752                 match events_1[1] {
3753                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3754                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3755                 };
3756         } else {
3757                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3758                 match events_1[0] {
3759                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3760                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3761                 };
3762         }
3763
3764         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3765         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3766         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3767
3768         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3769
3770         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3771         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3772         match events_2[0] {
3773                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
3774                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3775                         assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3776                         assert_eq!(receiver_node_id.unwrap(), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3777                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(channel_id));
3778                         match &purpose {
3779                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3780                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3781                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3782                                 },
3783                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3784                         }
3785                 },
3786                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3787         }
3788
3789         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3790         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3791         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3792
3793         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3794         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3795         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3796                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3797                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3798                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3799                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3800                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3801                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3802                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3803                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3804                 },
3805                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3806         };
3807
3808         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3809                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3810
3811                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3812                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3813                 match events_4[0] {
3814                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3815                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3816                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3817                         },
3818                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3819                 }
3820
3821                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3822                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3823                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3824                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3825
3826                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3827                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3828                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3829                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3830
3831                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3832                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3833                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3834                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3835                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3836
3837                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3838                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3839                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3840                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3841                                         }
3842                                 }
3843                         }
3844                 }
3845         }
3846
3847         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3848         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3849         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3850                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3851                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3852                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3853                 } else {
3854                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3855                 }
3856         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3857                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3858                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3859         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3860                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3861                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3862         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3863                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3864                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3865         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3866                 // Everything was delivered...
3867                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3868         }
3869
3870         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3871                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3872         }
3873         if messages_delivered <= 5 {
3874                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3875                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3876         }
3877         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3878
3879         if messages_delivered > 2 {
3880                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3881         }
3882
3883         // Channel should still work fine...
3884         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3885         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3886         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3887 }
3888
3889 #[test]
3890 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3891         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3892         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3893         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3894         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3895 }
3896
3897 #[test]
3898 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3899         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3900         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3901         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3902         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3903 }
3904
3905 #[test]
3906 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
3907         // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
3908         // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
3909         // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
3910         // channel_ready immediately instead.
3911         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3912         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3913         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3914         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3915         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
3916
3917         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
3918
3919         let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3920         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
3921         let block_txn = [funding_tx];
3922         let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
3923         let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
3924         nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
3925
3926         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
3927         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3928         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3929 }
3930
3931 #[test]
3932 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3933         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3934         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3935         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3936         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3937         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3938         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3939         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3940
3941         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3942
3943         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3944         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3945         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
3946         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3947
3948         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3949         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3950         match events_1[0] {
3951                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3952                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3953         }
3954
3955         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3956         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3957         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3958
3959         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3960         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3961         match events_2[0] {
3962                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3963                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3964                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3965                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3966                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3967                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3968                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3969
3970                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3971                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3972                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3973                         match events_3[0] {
3974                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3975                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3976                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3977                                 },
3978                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3979                         }
3980
3981                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3982                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3983                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3984                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3985                 },
3986                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3987         }
3988
3989         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3990         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3991
3992         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
3993         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3994         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3995         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
3996         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3997         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3998
3999         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4000         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4001         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4002         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4003
4004         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4005         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4006
4007         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4008         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4009
4010         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4011
4012         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4013         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4014         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4015         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4016         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4017         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4018         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4019         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4020         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4021         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4022
4023         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4024         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4025         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4026         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4027         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4028         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4029         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4030         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4031
4032         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4033         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4034         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4035         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4036         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4037         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4038         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4039         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4040
4041         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4042         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4043         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4044         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4045
4046         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4047         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4048         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4049         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4050
4051         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4052         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4053         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4054
4055         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4056
4057         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4058         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4059         match events_5[0] {
4060                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4061                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4062                         match &purpose {
4063                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4064                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4065                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4066                                 },
4067                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4068                         }
4069                 },
4070                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4071         }
4072
4073         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4074         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4075         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4076
4077         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4078         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4079 }
4080
4081 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4082         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4083         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4084         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4085         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4086         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4087         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4088
4089         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4090
4091         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4092                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4093                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4094                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4095                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4096                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4097                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4098                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4099                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4100                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4101                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4102                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4103                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentClaimable event(s).
4104                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4105                 our_payment_hash
4106         } else {
4107                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4108         };
4109
4110         let mut block = Block {
4111                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4112                 txdata: vec![],
4113         };
4114         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4115         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4116         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4117         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4118                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4119                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4120                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4121         }
4122
4123         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4124
4125         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4126         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4127         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4128         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4129         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4130         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4131
4132         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4133         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4134         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4135         let mut expected_failure_data = (100_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4136         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&(block_count - 1).to_be_bytes());
4137         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4138 }
4139
4140 #[test]
4141 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4142         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4143         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4144 }
4145
4146 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4147         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4148         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4149         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4150         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4151         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4152         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4153         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4154
4155         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4156         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4157         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4158         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4159
4160         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4161         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4162         {
4163                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4164         }
4165         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4166         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4167
4168         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4169         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4170         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4171         sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4172         if forwarded_htlc {
4173                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4174                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4175                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4176                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4177                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4178         }
4179         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4180
4181         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4182         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4183         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4184         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4185
4186         if forwarded_htlc {
4187                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4188                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4189                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4190                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4191                 match fail_commit[0] {
4192                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4193                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4194                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4195                         },
4196                         _ => unreachable!(),
4197                 }
4198                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4199         } else {
4200                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4201         }
4202 }
4203
4204 #[test]
4205 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4206         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4207         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4208 }
4209
4210 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4211         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4212                 {
4213                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4214                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4215                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4216                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4217                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4218                                 match event {
4219                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4220                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4221                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4222                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4223                                                 }
4224                                         },
4225                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4226                                 };
4227                         }
4228                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4229                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4230                                         txn.push(tx);
4231                                 }
4232                         }
4233                         txn
4234                 }
4235         }
4236 }
4237
4238 #[test]
4239 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4240         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4241         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4242         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4243         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4244         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4245
4246         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4247         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4248         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4249         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4250         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4251         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4252         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4253         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4254         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4255
4256         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4257         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4258
4259         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4260         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4261         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4262         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4263         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4264 }
4265
4266 #[test]
4267 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4268         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4269         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4270         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4271         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4272         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4273         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4274
4275         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4276         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4277         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4278         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4279         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4280
4281         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4282         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4283         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4284         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4285
4286         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4287         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4288         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4289         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4290         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4291
4292         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4293         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4294         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4295 }
4296
4297 #[test]
4298 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4299         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4300         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4301
4302         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4303         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4304         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4305         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4306
4307         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
4308         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4309         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4310         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4311         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4312
4313         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4314         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4315         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4316         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4317         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4318
4319         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4320         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4321         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4322
4323         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4324         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4325         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4326         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4327         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4328 }
4329
4330 #[test]
4331 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4332         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4333         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4334         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4335         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4336
4337         // Create some initial channels
4338         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4339
4340         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4341
4342         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4343         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4344         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4345
4346         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4347         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4348         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4349         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4350         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4351         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4352         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4353         match events[0] {
4354                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4355                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4356         }
4357         match events[1] {
4358                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4359                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4360         }
4361
4362         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4363         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4364         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4365         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4366         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4367
4368         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4369         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4370         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4371
4372         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4373         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4374         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4375 }
4376
4377 #[test]
4378 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4379         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4380         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4381         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4382         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4383
4384         // Create some initial channels
4385         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4386
4387         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4388         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4389
4390         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4391
4392         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4393         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4394         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4395
4396         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4397         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4398         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4399         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4400         match events[0] {
4401                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4402                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4403         }
4404         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4405
4406         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4407         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4408         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4409         check_spends!(node_txn[0],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4410         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4411
4412         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4413         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4414         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4415         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4416
4417         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4418         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4419         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4420         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4421         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4422 }
4423
4424 #[test]
4425 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4426         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4427         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4428         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4429         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4430
4431         // Create some initial channels
4432         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4433
4434         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4435         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4436         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4437         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4438
4439         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4440
4441         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4442         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4443         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4444         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4445
4446         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4447         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4448         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4449         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4450
4451         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4452         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4453
4454         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4455         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4456         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4457 }
4458
4459 #[test]
4460 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4461         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4462         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4463         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4464         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4465         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4466
4467         // Create some initial channels
4468         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4469
4470         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4471         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4472         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4473         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4474
4475         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4476
4477         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4478         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4479         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4480         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4481         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4482         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4483
4484         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4485         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4486         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4487         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4488         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4489         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4490
4491         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4492         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4493         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4494         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4495         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4496         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4497
4498         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4499         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs
4500         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4501         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4502         // transactions next...
4503         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4504         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4505
4506         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4507         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4508         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4509                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4510         } else {
4511                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4512                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4513         }
4514
4515         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4516         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4517
4518         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4519         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4520         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4521         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4522         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4523 }
4524
4525 #[test]
4526 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4527         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4528         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4529         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4530         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4531         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4532
4533         // Create some initial channels
4534         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4535
4536         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4537         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4538         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4539         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4540
4541         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4542         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4543
4544         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4545
4546         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4547         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4548         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4549         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4550         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4551         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4552
4553         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4554         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4555         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4556         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4557
4558         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4559         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4560         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4561
4562         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4563         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4564         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4565         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4566         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4567         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4568
4569         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4570         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success
4571
4572         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4573         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4574         // transactions next...
4575         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4576         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4577         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4578                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4579         } else {
4580                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4581                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4582         }
4583
4584         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4585         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4586
4587         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4588         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4589
4590         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4591         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4592
4593         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4594         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4595         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4596         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4597         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4598         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4599         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4600         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4601 }
4602
4603 #[test]
4604 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4605         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4606         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4607         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4608         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4609         // channel.
4610         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4611         // gets broadcast.
4612
4613         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4614         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4615         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4616         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4617
4618         // Create some initial channels
4619         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4620         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4621
4622         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4623         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4624         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4625         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4626         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4627
4628         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4629         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4630         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4631
4632         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
4633         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4634         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4635         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4636         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4637         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4638         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4639         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4640         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4641         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4642         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4643
4644         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4645         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4646         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4647         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4648
4649         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4650         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 1);
4651         check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4652         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4653         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4654         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4655
4656         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4657         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
4658         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), c_txn[0].clone()]});
4659         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4660         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4661         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4662         match events[0] {
4663                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4664                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4665         }
4666         match events[1] {
4667                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
4668                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4669                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
4670                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4671                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
4672                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
4673                 },
4674                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4675         }
4676         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4677         let mut msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4678         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4679         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4680         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4681
4682         match nodes_2_event {
4683                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4684                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4685         }
4686
4687         match nodes_0_event {
4688                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4689                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4690                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4691                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4692                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4693                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4694                 },
4695                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4696         };
4697
4698         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
4699         match msg_events[0] {
4700                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4701                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4702         }
4703
4704         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4705         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4706         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4707         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4708         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4709         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx
4710         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4711         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4712         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4713         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4714         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1); // Success tx
4715
4716         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4717         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4718 }
4719
4720 #[test]
4721 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4722         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4723         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4724         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4725         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4726         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4727         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4728         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4729         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4730         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4731         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4732         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
4733                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4734         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4735
4736         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4737         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4738         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4739
4740         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4741         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4742         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4743         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4744         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
4745
4746         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
4747
4748         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
4749         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
4750         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
4751         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
4752         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40)
4753                 .with_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features());
4754         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 800_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
4755         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 800_000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
4756
4757         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4758         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4759         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
4760
4761         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
4762         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4763         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4764         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4765         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4766
4767         let htlc_timeout_tx;
4768         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
4769                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4770                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3
4771                 assert!(node_txn.len() == 2 || node_txn.len() == 3);
4772
4773                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4774                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4775                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4776
4777                 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4778                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4779                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4780                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
4781                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4782
4783                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4784                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4785                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
4786                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
4787                 } else {
4788                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4789                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4790                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
4791                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4792                 }
4793
4794                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4795                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4796                 // Assign htlc_timeout_tx to the forwarded HTLC (with value ~800 sats). The received HTLC
4797                 // (with value 900 sats) will be claimed in the below `claim_funds` call.
4798                 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4799                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4800                         htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[2].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[2].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
4801                 } else {
4802                         htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[0].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[1].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
4803                 }
4804         }
4805
4806         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
4807         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
4808
4809         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
4810         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
4811         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4812         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4813         match events[0] {
4814                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4815                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4816         }
4817         match events[1] {
4818                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4819                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4820         }
4821         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4822         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
4823         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4824         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4825         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4826         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4827         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4828         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4829         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4830         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
4831
4832         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
4833         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4834         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4835         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4836         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4837         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4838         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
4839         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4840         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4841         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4842
4843         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4844         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4845         {
4846                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
4847         }
4848         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
4849
4850         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
4851         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[1]);
4852         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196), true, true);
4853         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4854         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4855         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4856         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4857         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
4858         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4859         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4860
4861         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4862         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
4863
4864         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4865         match events[0] {
4866                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4867                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
4868                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
4869                 }
4870                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4871         }
4872 }
4873
4874 #[test]
4875 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
4876         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4877         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4878         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4879         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4880
4881         // Create some initial channels
4882         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4883
4884         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
4885         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4886         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
4887         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4888         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4889
4890         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
4891         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4892         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
4893         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4894
4895         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
4896         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4897         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4898         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4899         match events[0] {
4900                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4901                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4902         }
4903         match events[1] {
4904                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4905                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4906         }
4907         let node_tx = {
4908                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4909                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4910                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4911                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4912                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
4913                 node_txn[0].clone()
4914         };
4915
4916         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
4917         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4918
4919         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
4920         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4921         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4922         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4923         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
4924         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4925 }
4926
4927 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
4928         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
4929         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
4930         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
4931         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
4932         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
4933         // use the same payment hashes.
4934         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
4935         //
4936         // A \         / E
4937         //    - C - D -
4938         // B /         \ F
4939         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
4940         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
4941         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
4942         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4943         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4944         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4945         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4946         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
4947                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4948         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4949
4950         let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
4951         let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4952         let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4953         let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4954         let chan_3_5  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
4955
4956         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
4957         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
4958         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
4959         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
4960
4961         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
4962                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
4963         // 0th HTLC:
4964         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4965         // 1st HTLC:
4966         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4967         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
4968         // 2nd HTLC:
4969         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4970         // 3rd HTLC:
4971         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4972         // 4th HTLC:
4973         let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4974         // 5th HTLC:
4975         let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4976         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
4977         // 6th HTLC:
4978         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
4979         // 7th HTLC:
4980         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
4981
4982         // 8th HTLC:
4983         let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4984         // 9th HTLC:
4985         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
4986         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4987
4988         // 10th HTLC:
4989         let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4990         // 11th HTLC:
4991         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
4992         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
4993
4994         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
4995         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
4996         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
4997         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
4998         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
4999
5000         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5001         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5002         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5003         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5004         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5005         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5006         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5007
5008         let failed_destinations = vec![
5009                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
5010                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
5011                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
5012                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
5013         ];
5014         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
5015         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5016
5017         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5018         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5019         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5020         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5021         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5022         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5023
5024         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5025         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5026         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5027         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5028
5029         let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5030                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5031                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5032         ];
5033         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5034         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5035
5036         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5037         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5038         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5039         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5040
5041         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5042
5043         // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5044         let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5045                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5046                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5047                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5048                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5049                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5050                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5051         ];
5052         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5053         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5054         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5055         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5056         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5057         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5058         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5059         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5060         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5061         if deliver_last_raa {
5062                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5063         } else {
5064                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5065         }
5066
5067         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5068         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5069         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5070         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5071         //
5072         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5073         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5074         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5075         //
5076         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5077         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5078         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5079
5080         if announce_latest {
5081                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5082         } else {
5083                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5084         }
5085         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5086         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5087                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5088                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5089         } else {
5090                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5091                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5092         };
5093         match close_event {
5094                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5095                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5096         }
5097
5098         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5099         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5100         if deliver_last_raa {
5101                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5102
5103                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5104                 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5105         } else {
5106                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5107                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5108                 } else {
5109                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5110                 };
5111
5112                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5113         }
5114         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5115
5116         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5117         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5118         let mut a_done = false;
5119         for msg in cs_msgs {
5120                 match msg {
5121                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5122                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5123                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5124                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5125                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5126                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5127                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5128                                         }
5129                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5130                                         assert!(!a_done);
5131                                         a_done = true;
5132                                         &nodes[0]
5133                                 } else {
5134                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5135                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5136                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5137                                         }
5138                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5139                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5140                                         &nodes[1]
5141                                 };
5142                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5143                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5144                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5145                                 if announce_latest {
5146                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5147                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5148                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5149                                         }
5150                                 }
5151                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5152                         },
5153                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5154                 }
5155         }
5156
5157         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5158         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 10 } else { 6 });
5159         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5160         let mut as_updates = 0;
5161         for event in as_events.iter() {
5162                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5163                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5164                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5165                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5166                         } else {
5167                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5168                         }
5169                         if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5170                                 as_updates += 1;
5171                         }
5172                 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5173                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5174         }
5175         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5176         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5177         if announce_latest {
5178                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5179                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5180         }
5181         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5182
5183         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5184         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 8 } else { 6 });
5185         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5186         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5187         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5188                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5189                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5190                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5191                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5192                         } else {
5193                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5194                         }
5195                         if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5196                                 bs_updates += 1;
5197                         }
5198                 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5199                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5200         }
5201         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5202         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5203         if announce_latest {
5204                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5205         }
5206         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5207
5208         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5209         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5210         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5211         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5212         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5213         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5214 }
5215
5216 #[test]
5217 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5218         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5219 }
5220
5221 #[test]
5222 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5223         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5224 }
5225
5226 #[test]
5227 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5228         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5229         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5230         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5231 }
5232
5233 #[test]
5234 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5235         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5236         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5237         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5238         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5239
5240         // Create some initial channels
5241         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5242
5243         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5244         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5245         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5246         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5247
5248         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5249         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5250         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5251         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5252         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5253         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5254
5255         let htlc_timeout = {
5256                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5257                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5258                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5259                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5260                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5261                 node_txn[0].clone()
5262         };
5263
5264         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5265         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5266         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5267
5268         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5269         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5270         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5271         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5272         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5273         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5274         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5275         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5276         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5277         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5278                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5279 }
5280
5281 #[test]
5282 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5283         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with a key
5284         // manager rotation to test that `channel_keys_id` returned in
5285         // [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] let us re-derive the channel key set to
5286         // then derive a `delayed_payment_key`.
5287
5288         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5289
5290         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5291         let seed = [42; 32];
5292         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5293         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5294         let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger));
5295         let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
5296         let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), &scorer);
5297         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, router, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, override_init_features: alloc::rc::Rc::new(core::cell::RefCell::new(None)) };
5298         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5299         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5300         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5301
5302         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5303         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5304
5305         // Create some initial channels
5306         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5307         // for node 0
5308         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5309         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5310         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5311
5312         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5313         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5314         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5315         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5316         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5317
5318         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5319         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5320         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5321         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5322         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5323
5324         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5325         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5326         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5327         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5328             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5329             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5330             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5331                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5332         }
5333
5334         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5335         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5336         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5337         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5338         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5339         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5340
5341         let htlc_timeout = {
5342                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5343                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5344                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5345                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5346                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5347                 node_txn[0].clone()
5348         };
5349
5350         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5351         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5352         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5353
5354         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5355         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5356         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5357         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5358         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5359         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5360         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5361         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5362         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5363         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5364         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5365                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5366 }
5367
5368 #[test]
5369 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5370         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5371         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5372         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5373         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5374
5375         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5376
5377         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5378         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5379
5380         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5381         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5382         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5383
5384         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5385         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5386         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5387
5388         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5389         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5390         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5391
5392         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5393         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5394         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5395 }
5396
5397 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5398         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5399         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5400         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5401         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5402         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5403
5404         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5405
5406         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5407         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5408         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5409         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5410         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5411
5412         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5413         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5414         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5415
5416         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5417         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5418         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5419         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5420         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5421
5422         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5423         let mut block = Block {
5424                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5425                 txdata: vec![],
5426         };
5427         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5428                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5429                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5430         }
5431         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5432         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5433         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5434         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5435 }
5436
5437 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5438         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5439         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5440         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5441         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5442         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5443
5444         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5445         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5446         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5447
5448         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5449
5450         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5451         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5452         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5453
5454         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5455         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5456
5457         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5458                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5459                 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5460         }
5461         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5462         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5463         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5464         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5465 }
5466
5467 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5468         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5469         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5470         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5471         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5472         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5473
5474         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5475         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5476         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5477         // actually revoked.
5478         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5479         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5480         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5481         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
5482         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5483
5484         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5485         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5486         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5487         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5488         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5489         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5490         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5491         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5492         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5493         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5494
5495         if check_revoke_no_close {
5496                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5497                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5498         }
5499
5500         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5501         let mut block = Block {
5502                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5503                 txdata: vec![],
5504         };
5505         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5506                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5507                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5508         }
5509         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5510                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5511                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5512                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5513                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5514         } else {
5515                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5516         }
5517 }
5518
5519 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5520 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5521 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5522 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5523 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5524 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5525 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5526 // non-dust HTLCs.
5527 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5528 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5529 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5530 #[test]
5531 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5532         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5533         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5534
5535         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5536         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5537 }
5538
5539 #[test]
5540 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5541         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5542         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5543         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5544         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5545 }
5546
5547 #[test]
5548 #[should_panic]
5549 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5550         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5551         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5552         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5553         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5554         // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5555         for node in nodes.iter() {
5556                 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5557         }
5558
5559         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5560         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5561         let push_msat=10001;
5562         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5563         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5564         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5565         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5566
5567         // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5568         // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5569         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5570 }
5571
5572 #[test]
5573 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5574         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5575         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5576         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5577         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5578
5579         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5580         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5581         let push_msat=10001;
5582         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5583
5584         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5585         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5586         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5587         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5588         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5589
5590         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5591         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5592         let push_msat=10001;
5593         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5594         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5595         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5596
5597         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5598         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5599         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5600
5601         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5602         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5603         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5604
5605         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5606         let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5607         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5608
5609         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5610         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5611         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5612         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5613         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5614         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5615 }
5616
5617 #[test]
5618 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5619         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5620         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5621         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5622         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5623
5624         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5625         let push_msat=10001;
5626         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5627         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5628         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5629         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5630
5631         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5632         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5633         let err_msg = match events[0] {
5634                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5635                         msg.clone()
5636                 },
5637                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5638         };
5639         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5640 }
5641
5642 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5643 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5644 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5645 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5646 #[test]
5647 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5648         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5649         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5650         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5651         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5652         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5653
5654         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5655         // pending_update_fee.
5656         {
5657                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5658                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5659         }
5660         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5661         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5662
5663         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5664         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5665         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5666                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5667                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5668                 },
5669                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5670         };
5671
5672         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5673
5674         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5675         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5676         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5677         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5678
5679         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5680         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
5681         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5682
5683         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5684         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5685         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5686         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5687
5688         // Flush the pending fee update.
5689         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5690         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5691         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5692         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5693         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5694
5695         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5696         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5697         // us to surface its failure to the user.
5698         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5699         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5700         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5701         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5702                 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5703         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5704
5705         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5706         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5707         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5708         match &events[0] {
5709                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5710                         assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5711                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5712                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5713                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
5714                 },
5715                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5716         }
5717         match &events[1] {
5718                 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5719                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5720                 },
5721                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5722         }
5723 }
5724
5725 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5726 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5727 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5728 #[test]
5729 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5730         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5731         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5732         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5733         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5734         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5735
5736         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5737         // pending_update_fee.
5738         {
5739                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5740                 *feerate_lock += 200;
5741         }
5742         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5743         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5744
5745         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5746         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5747         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5748                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5749                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5750                 },
5751                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5752         };
5753
5754         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5755
5756         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5757         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5758         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5759         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5760
5761         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5762         let amt_1 = 20000;
5763         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
5764         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
5765         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
5766
5767         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
5768         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
5769         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5770         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
5771         let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5772         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
5773         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5774         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
5775
5776         // Flush the pending fee update.
5777         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5778         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5779         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5780         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
5781         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5782         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
5783
5784         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
5785         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
5786         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
5787         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5788         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5789         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5790         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5791                 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5792         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5793
5794         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
5795         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5796         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5797         match &events[0] {
5798                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5799                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5800                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5801                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5802                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
5803                 },
5804                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5805         }
5806         match &events[1] {
5807                 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5808                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5809                 },
5810                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5811         }
5812
5813         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
5814         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
5815                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5816                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
5817                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
5818         };
5819         let raa = match send_raa_event {
5820                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
5821                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5822         };
5823         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5824         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5825         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5826         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5827         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5828         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5829         match events[0] {
5830                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5831                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5832         }
5833         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5834         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5835         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5836         match events[0] {
5837                 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => {},
5838                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5839         }
5840         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5841         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5842         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
5843
5844         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5845         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5846         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
5847         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
5848 }
5849
5850 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
5851 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
5852 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
5853 // once it's freed.
5854 #[test]
5855 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
5856         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5857         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5858         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5859         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5860         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5861         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5862         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5863         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5864         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5865         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
5866
5867         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5868         // pending_update_fee.
5869         {
5870                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5871                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5872         }
5873         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5874         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5875
5876         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5877         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5878         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5879                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5880                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5881                 },
5882                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5883         };
5884
5885         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5886
5887         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5888         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5889         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5890         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5891
5892         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5893         let feemsat = 239;
5894         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
5895         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
5896         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
5897         let payment_event = {
5898                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5899                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5900
5901                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5902                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5903
5904                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5905         };
5906         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5907         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5908         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5909         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5910
5911         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_1_2.2);
5912         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5913
5914         // Flush the pending fee update.
5915         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5916         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5917         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5918         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5919         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5920         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5921
5922         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
5923         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5924         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5925
5926         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
5927                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
5928                         msg.clone()
5929                 },
5930                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5931         };
5932
5933         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
5934         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5935         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5936
5937         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
5938         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5939         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
5940         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
5941                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5942                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5943         }
5944
5945         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
5946         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5947         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5948
5949         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
5950         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5951         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
5952         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
5953                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
5954                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
5955                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
5956                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
5957                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5958                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5959                 },
5960                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5961         };
5962
5963         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
5964         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
5965         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5966
5967         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
5968         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5969         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5970         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5971         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5972         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5973         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5974         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
5975         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
5976                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
5977                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5978         };
5979         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5980         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
5981         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5982 }
5983
5984 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
5985 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
5986 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
5987
5988 #[test]
5989 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
5990         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
5991         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5992         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5993         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5994         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5995         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5996
5997         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
5998         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
5999
6000         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6001                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6002         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6003         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value", 1);
6004 }
6005
6006 #[test]
6007 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6008         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6009         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6010         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6011         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6012         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6013         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6014
6015         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6016         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6017         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6018                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6019
6020         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6021         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC", 1);
6022 }
6023
6024 #[test]
6025 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6026         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6027         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6028         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6029         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6030         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6031         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6032
6033         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6034         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6035         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6036         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6037         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6038
6039         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6040         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6041         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6042         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6043         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6044 }
6045
6046 #[test]
6047 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6048         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6049         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6050         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6051         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6052         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6053         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6054         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6055
6056         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6057                 .with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
6058         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6059         route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6060         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6061                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6062 }
6063
6064 #[test]
6065 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6066         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6067         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6068         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6069         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6070         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6071         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6072         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6073         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6074         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6075                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6076
6077         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6078                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6079                 let payment_event = {
6080                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6081                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6082
6083                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6084                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6085                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6086                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6087                         } else {
6088                                 assert!(false);
6089                         }
6090                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6091                 };
6092                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6093                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6094                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6095
6096                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6097                 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6098         }
6099         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6100         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6101                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6102
6103         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6104         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs", 1);
6105 }
6106
6107 #[test]
6108 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6109         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6110         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6111         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6112         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6113         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6114         let channel_value = 100000;
6115         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0);
6116         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6117
6118         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6119
6120         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6121         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6122         // limits us to.
6123         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6124         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6125                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6126
6127         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6128         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept", 1);
6129
6130         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6131 }
6132
6133 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6134 #[test]
6135 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6136         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6137         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6138         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6139         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6140         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6141         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6142         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6143         {
6144                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6145                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6146                 let channel = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6147                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6148         }
6149
6150         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6151         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6152         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6153         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6154         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6155         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6156         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6157         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6158         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6159         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6160         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6161 }
6162
6163 #[test]
6164 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6165         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6166         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6167         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6168         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6169         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6170         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6171
6172         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6173         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6174         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6175         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6176         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6177         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6178
6179         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6180         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6181         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6182         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6183         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6184
6185         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6186         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6187         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6188         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6189         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6190
6191         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6192         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6193         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6194         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6195         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6196 }
6197
6198 #[test]
6199 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6200         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6201         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6202         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6203         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6204         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6205         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6206         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6207
6208         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6209         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6210         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6211         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6212         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6213         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6214
6215         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6216                 channel_id: chan.2,
6217                 htlc_id: 0,
6218                 amount_msat: 1000,
6219                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6220                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6221                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6222         };
6223
6224         for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6225                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6226                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6227         }
6228         msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6229         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6230
6231         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6232         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6233         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6234         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6235         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6236 }
6237
6238 #[test]
6239 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6240         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6241         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6242         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6243         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6244         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6245         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6246
6247         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6248         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6249         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6250         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6251         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6252         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6253
6254         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6255         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6256         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6257         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6258         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6259 }
6260
6261 #[test]
6262 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6263         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6264         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6265         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6266         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6267         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6268
6269         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6270         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6271         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6272         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6273         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6274         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6275         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6276
6277         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6278         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6279         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6280         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6281         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6282 }
6283
6284 #[test]
6285 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6286         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6287         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6288         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6289         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6290         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6291         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6292         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6293
6294         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6295         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6296         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6297         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6298         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6299         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6300
6301         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6302         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6303         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6304         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
6305         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6306         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6307         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
6308         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6309         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6310         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6311         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6312         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6313         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6314
6315         //Resend HTLC
6316         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6317         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6318         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6319         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6320         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6321
6322         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6323
6324         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6325         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6326         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6327         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6328         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6329 }
6330
6331 #[test]
6332 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6333         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6334
6335         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6336         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6337         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6338         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6339         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6340         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6341         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6342
6343         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6344         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6345         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6346
6347         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6348                 channel_id: chan.2,
6349                 htlc_id: 0,
6350                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6351         };
6352
6353         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6354
6355         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6356         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6357         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6358         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6359         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6360 }
6361
6362 #[test]
6363 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6364         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6365
6366         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6367         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6368         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6369         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6370         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6371
6372         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6373         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6374         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6375         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6376         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6377
6378         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6379                 channel_id: chan.2,
6380                 htlc_id: 0,
6381                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6382         };
6383
6384         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6385
6386         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6387         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6388         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6389         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6390         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6391 }
6392
6393 #[test]
6394 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6395         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6396
6397         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6398         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6399         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6400         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6401         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6402
6403         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6404         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6405         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6406         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6407         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6408         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6409                 channel_id: chan.2,
6410                 htlc_id: 0,
6411                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6412                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6413         };
6414
6415         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6416
6417         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6418         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6419         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6420         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6421         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6422 }
6423
6424 #[test]
6425 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6426         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6427
6428         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6429         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6430         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6431         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6432         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6433
6434         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6435
6436         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6437         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6438         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6439
6440         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6441         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6442         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6443                 match events[0] {
6444                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6445                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6446                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6447                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6448                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6449                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6450                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6451                         },
6452                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6453                 }
6454         };
6455
6456         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6457
6458         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6459
6460         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6461         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6462         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6463         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6464         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6465 }
6466
6467 #[test]
6468 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6469         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6470
6471         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6472         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6473         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6474         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6475         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6476
6477         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6478
6479         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6480         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6481         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6482
6483         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6484         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6485         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6486                 match events[0] {
6487                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6488                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6489                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6490                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6491                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6492                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6493                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6494                         },
6495                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6496                 }
6497         };
6498
6499         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6500
6501         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6502
6503         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6504         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6505         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6506         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6507         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6508 }
6509
6510 #[test]
6511 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6512         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6513
6514         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6515         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6516         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6517         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6518         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6519
6520         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6521         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6522         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6523
6524         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6525         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6526
6527         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6528         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6529         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6530
6531         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6532
6533         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6534                 match events[0] {
6535                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6536                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6537                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6538                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6539                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6540                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6541                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6542                         },
6543                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6544                 }
6545         };
6546         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6547         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6548
6549         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6550         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6551         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6552         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6553         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6554 }
6555
6556 #[test]
6557 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6558         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6559         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6560
6561         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6562         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6563         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6564         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6565         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6566         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000);
6567
6568         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6569
6570         //First hop
6571         let mut payment_event = {
6572                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6573                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6574                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6575                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6576                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6577         };
6578         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6579         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6580         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6581         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6582         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6583         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6584         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6585         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6586         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6587
6588         //Second Hop
6589         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6590         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6591         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6592         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6593
6594         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6595         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6596         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6597                 match events_3[0] {
6598                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6599                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6600                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6601                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6602                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6603                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6604                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6605                         },
6606                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6607                 }
6608         };
6609
6610         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6611
6612         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6613         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6614         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6615         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6616         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6617
6618         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6619         match events_4[0] {
6620                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6621                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6622                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6623                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6624                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6625                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6626                 },
6627                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6628         };
6629
6630         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6631 }
6632
6633 #[test]
6634 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
6635         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6636         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6637         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6638         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6639         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6640         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6641
6642         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
6643
6644         // First hop
6645         let mut payment_event = {
6646                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6647                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6648                 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
6649         };
6650
6651         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6652         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6653         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6654         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6655         payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
6656         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6657
6658         // Second Hop
6659         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
6660         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6661         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6662         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6663
6664         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6665         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6666         match events_3[0] {
6667                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6668                         let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
6669                         // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
6670                         update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
6671
6672                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6673                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6674                 },
6675                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6676         }
6677
6678         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
6679                 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
6680                         node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6681         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6682         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6683         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6684
6685         match events_4[0] {
6686                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6687                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6688                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6689                 },
6690                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6691         }
6692
6693         let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6694         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 2);
6695
6696         // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
6697         // the node originating the error to its next hop.
6698         match events_5[0] {
6699                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { error_code, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }) }, ..
6700                 } => {
6701                         assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
6702                         assert!(is_permanent);
6703                         assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
6704                 },
6705                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6706         }
6707         match events_5[1] {
6708                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6709                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6710                 },
6711                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6712         }
6713
6714         // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
6715 }
6716
6717 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6718         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6719         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6720         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6721
6722         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6723         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6724         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6725         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6726         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6727         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6728
6729         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6730                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6731
6732         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6733         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6734         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6735         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6736
6737         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6738         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6739
6740         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6741         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
6742         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6743         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
6744         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6745
6746         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6747         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6748         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6749         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6750
6751         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6752         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6753
6754         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6755         match events[0] {
6756                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6757                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6758                 },
6759                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6760         }
6761         match events[1] {
6762                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6763                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6764                 },
6765                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6766         }
6767
6768         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6769         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6770         if announce_latest {
6771                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6772         } else {
6773                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6774         }
6775
6776         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6777         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6778         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6779
6780         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6781         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6782         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6783         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6784         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
6785         let mut first_failed = false;
6786         for event in events {
6787                 match event {
6788                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6789                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6790                                         assert!(!first_failed);
6791                                         first_failed = true;
6792                                 } else {
6793                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6794                                 }
6795                         },
6796                         Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {}
6797                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6798                 }
6799         }
6800 }
6801
6802 #[test]
6803 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6804         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6805         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6806 }
6807
6808 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6809         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6810         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6811         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6812         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6813         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6814         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6815
6816         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6817         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6818         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6819         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6820         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6821
6822         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6823                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6824
6825         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6826         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6827
6828         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6829         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
6830
6831         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
6832         if revoked {
6833                 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6834                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
6835         }
6836
6837         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
6838         if local {
6839                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
6840                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
6841                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6842                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6843                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6844
6845                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
6846                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6847                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6848                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6849                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
6850                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6851                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
6852                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6853                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6854                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6855                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6856         } else {
6857                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
6858                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6859                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6860                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6861                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6862                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6863
6864                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
6865                 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
6866                         .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
6867                 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6868                 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
6869                 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
6870                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6871
6872                 if !revoked {
6873                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6874                 } else {
6875                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 12);
6876                 }
6877                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
6878                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6879                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6880                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6881                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6882         }
6883 }
6884
6885 #[test]
6886 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
6887         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
6888         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
6889         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
6890 }
6891
6892 #[test]
6893 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
6894         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
6895
6896         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6897         low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
6898         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6899         high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
6900         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
6901         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6902         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6903         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
6904         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6905
6906         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
6907         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6908                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
6909                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
6910         {
6911                 match error {
6912                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6913                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6914                 }
6915         } else { assert!(false) }
6916
6917         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6918         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6919         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6920         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6921         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6922                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6923                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6924         {
6925                 match error {
6926                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
6927                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6928                 }
6929         } else { assert!(false); }
6930
6931         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
6932         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6933         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
6934         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6935         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6936         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
6937         let reason_msg;
6938         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
6939                 match action {
6940                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
6941                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
6942                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
6943                         },
6944                         _ => { panic!(); }
6945                 }
6946         } else { panic!(); }
6947         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
6948
6949         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6950         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6951         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6952         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6953         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6954                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6955                 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6956         {
6957                 match error {
6958                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6959                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6960                 }
6961         } else { assert!(false); }
6962 }
6963
6964 #[test]
6965 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
6966         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
6967         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
6968         // to B, B should refuse payment.
6969
6970         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6971         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6972         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6973         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6974
6975         // Create some initial channels
6976         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6977
6978         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
6979         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
6980         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV).with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
6981         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
6982         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6983         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
6984         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6985         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6986
6987         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6988         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6989         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
6990         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6991         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6992
6993         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
6994         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
6995         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6996         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
6997
6998         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
6999         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7000         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7001
7002         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7003         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7004         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7005                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7006                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7007                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7008                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7009                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7010                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7011                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7012                 },
7013                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7014         };
7015         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7016
7017         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7018         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7019
7020         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7021         let mut expected_failure_data = (10_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7022         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH.to_be_bytes());
7023         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7024 }
7025
7026 #[test]
7027 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7028         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7029         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7030
7031         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7032         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7033         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7034         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7035
7036         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7037         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0);
7038         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7039
7040         // Disconnect peers
7041         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7042         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7043
7044         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7045         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7046         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7047         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7048         let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7049         for e in msg_events {
7050                 match e {
7051                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7052                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7053                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7054                                 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7055                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7056                                 }
7057                         },
7058                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7059                 }
7060         }
7061         // Reconnect peers
7062         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
7063         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7064         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7065         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
7066         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7067         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7068
7069         // Reestablish chan_1
7070         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7071         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7072         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7073         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7074         // Reestablish chan_2
7075         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7076         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7077         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7078         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7079         // Reestablish chan_3
7080         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7081         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7082         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7083         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7084
7085         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7086         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7087         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7088         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7089         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7090         for e in msg_events {
7091                 match e {
7092                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7093                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7094                                 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7095                                         // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7096                                         // the old one.
7097                                         Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7098                                         None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7099                                 }
7100                         },
7101                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7102                 }
7103         }
7104         // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7105         assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7106 }
7107
7108 #[test]
7109 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7110         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7111         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7112
7113         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7114         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7115         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7116         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7117
7118         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7119
7120         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7121         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 30)
7122                 .with_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features());
7123         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7124         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7125
7126         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7127         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7128         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7129         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7130         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7131         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7132
7133         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7134         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7135                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7136                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7137                 }
7138         }
7139
7140         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7141         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7142
7143         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7144         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7145         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7146         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7147         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7148
7149         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7150         let penalty_1;
7151         let feerate_1;
7152         {
7153                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7154                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor)
7155                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7156                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7157                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7158                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7159                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7160                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7161                 node_txn.clear();
7162         };
7163
7164         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7165         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7166         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7167         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7168         {
7169                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7170                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7171                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7172                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7173                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7174                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7175                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7176                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7177                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7178                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7179                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7180                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7181                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7182                         node_txn.clear();
7183                 }
7184         }
7185         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7186
7187         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7188         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7189         let penalty_3;
7190         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7191         {
7192                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7193                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7194                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7195                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7196                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7197                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7198                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7199                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7200                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7201                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7202                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7203                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7204                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7205                         node_txn.clear();
7206                 }
7207         }
7208         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7209
7210         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7211         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7212 }
7213
7214 #[test]
7215 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7216         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7217         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7218
7219         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7220         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7221         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7222         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7223         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7224
7225         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7226         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7227         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
7228         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7229         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7230         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7231                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7232         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7233         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features());
7234         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7235                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7236         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7237
7238         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7239         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7240         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7241
7242         // Revoke local commitment tx
7243         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7244
7245         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7246         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7247         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7248         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7249         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7250         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7251         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7252
7253         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
7254         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
7255
7256         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7257         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7258         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7259
7260         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7261         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7262         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
7263         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7264
7265         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7266         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7267         let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7268         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7269         let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7270         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
7271         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7272         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7273         match events.last().unwrap() {
7274                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7275                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7276         }
7277         let first;
7278         let feerate_1;
7279         let penalty_txn;
7280         {
7281                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7282                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7283                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7284
7285                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7286                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7287                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7288                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7289                 // future).
7290                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7291                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7292                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7293                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7294                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7295                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7296
7297                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7298                 // available, which we check here:
7299                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7300                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7301                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7302
7303                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7304                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7305
7306                 // node_txn[3] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7307                 // output, checked above).
7308                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 2);
7309                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].output.len(), 1);
7310                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7311
7312                 first = node_txn[3].txid();
7313                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7314                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[3].output[0].value;
7315                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight() as u64;
7316                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7317                 node_txn.clear();
7318         }
7319
7320         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7321         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7322         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7323         let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7324         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7325
7326         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7327         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7328         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7329         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7330         let node_txn = {
7331                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7332                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7333
7334                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7335                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7336                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7337                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7338                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7339                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7340                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7341                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7342                 node_txn.clear();
7343                 txn
7344         };
7345         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7346         let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7347         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7348         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7349         {
7350                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7351                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7352                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7353                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7354                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7355                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7356                 // up bumped justice generation.
7357                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7358                 node_txn.clear();
7359         }
7360         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7361         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7362 }
7363
7364 #[test]
7365 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7366         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7367         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7368
7369         // Create 2 HTLCs
7370         // Provide preimage for one
7371         // Check aggregation
7372
7373         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7374         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7375         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7376         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7377
7378         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7379         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7380         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7381
7382         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7383         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7384         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7385         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7386         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7387
7388         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7389         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7390         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7391         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7392         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7393         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7394
7395         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7396         let timeout;
7397         let preimage;
7398         let preimage_bump;
7399         let feerate_timeout;
7400         let feerate_preimage;
7401         {
7402                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7403                 // 3 transactions including:
7404                 //   preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
7405                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7406                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7407                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7408                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7409                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7410                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
7411                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
7412
7413                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7414                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7415                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7416                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7417
7418                 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7419                         (node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[1].clone())
7420                 } else {
7421                         (node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone())
7422                 };
7423
7424                 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
7425                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7426                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
7427
7428                 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
7429                 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7430                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
7431                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight() as u64;
7432
7433                 node_txn.clear();
7434         };
7435         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7436         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7437
7438         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7439         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7440         {
7441                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7442                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7443                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7444                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7445                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7446                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7447
7448                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7449                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7450                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
7451                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7452                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7453
7454                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7455                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7456                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7457                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7458                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7459
7460                 node_txn.clear();
7461         }
7462
7463         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7464         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7465 }
7466
7467 #[test]
7468 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7469         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7470         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7471         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7472         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7473         // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7474         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7475         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7476         // implement that).
7477         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7478         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7479         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7480         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7481         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
7482
7483         let per_commitment_secret;
7484         let next_per_commitment_point;
7485         {
7486                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7487                 let mut guard = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7488                 let keys = guard.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7489
7490                 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7491
7492                 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7493                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7494                 per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7495
7496                 // Must revoke without gaps
7497                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7498                 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7499
7500                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7501                 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7502                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7503         }
7504
7505         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7506                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK {
7507                         channel_id,
7508                         per_commitment_secret,
7509                         next_per_commitment_point,
7510                         #[cfg(taproot)]
7511                         next_local_nonce: None,
7512                 });
7513         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7514         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7515         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7516 }
7517
7518 #[test]
7519 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7520         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7521         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7522
7523         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7524         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7525         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7526         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7527
7528         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7529         // Lock HTLC in both directions
7530         let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
7531         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
7532
7533         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7534         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7535         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7536
7537         // Revoke local commitment tx
7538         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
7539
7540         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7541         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7542         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7543         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7544
7545         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7546         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7547         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7548         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7549         let penalty_txn = {
7550                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7551                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3
7552                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7553                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7554                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7555                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7556                 node_txn.clear();
7557                 penalty_txn
7558         };
7559         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7560         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7561         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7562         {
7563                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7564                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7565                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7566         }
7567 }
7568
7569 #[test]
7570 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
7571         // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
7572         // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
7573         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7574         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7575         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7576         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7577         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
7578
7579         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000);
7580         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7581         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_010_000);
7582         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7583         let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7584
7585         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7586         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
7587         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
7588         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7589         let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7590
7591         // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
7592         // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
7593         // can get our balance.
7594
7595         // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
7596         // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
7597         // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
7598         let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
7599         route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
7600         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7601         let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7602         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
7603
7604         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
7605 }
7606
7607 #[test]
7608 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7609         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7610         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7611         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7612         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7613         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7614         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7615
7616         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000);
7617
7618         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7619         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7620         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7621         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7622         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7623
7624         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7625         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7626         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7627         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7628
7629         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7630         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7631         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
7632         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7633         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7634         match close_ev[0] {
7635                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7636                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7637                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7638                 },
7639                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7640         }
7641 }
7642
7643 #[test]
7644 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7645         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7646         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7647         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7648         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7649
7650         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7651         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7652         override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7653
7654         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7655
7656         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7657         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7658         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
7659         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
7660 }
7661
7662 #[test]
7663 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7664         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7665         zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7666         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7667         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7668         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7669         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7670
7671         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7672         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7673         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7674
7675         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7676         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7677         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7678 }
7679
7680 #[test]
7681 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
7682         // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
7683         // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
7684         // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
7685         // 90% of the `channel_value`.
7686         // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
7687
7688         let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
7689         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7690         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
7691         let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
7692         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7693         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
7694         let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
7695         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7696         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
7697         let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
7698         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7699         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
7700
7701         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7702         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7703         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
7704         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7705
7706         let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
7707         let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7708         let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
7709         let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
7710         let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
7711
7712         let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7713         let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7714
7715         // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7716         // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7717         assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
7718         // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7719         // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7720         assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
7721
7722         // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7723         // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
7724         // `channel_value`.
7725         assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7726         // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7727         // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
7728         // `channel_value`.
7729         assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7730 }
7731
7732 #[test]
7733 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
7734         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7735         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7736         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7737         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7738         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7739         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7740
7741         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7742         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7743
7744         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7745
7746         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7747         // accepting the inbound channel request.
7748         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7749
7750         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7751         match events[0] {
7752                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7753                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
7754                 }
7755                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7756         }
7757
7758         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7759         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7760
7761         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7762                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7763                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7764                 }
7765                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7766         }
7767
7768         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7769
7770         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7771         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7772
7773         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7774         match events[0] {
7775                 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
7776                         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
7777                 }
7778                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7779         }
7780 }
7781
7782 #[test]
7783 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
7784         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7785         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7786         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7787         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7788         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7789         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7790
7791         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7792         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7793
7794         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7795
7796         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7797         // rejecting the inbound channel request.
7798         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7799
7800         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7801         match events[0] {
7802                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7803                         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7804                 }
7805                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7806         }
7807
7808         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7809         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7810
7811         match close_msg_ev[0] {
7812                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
7813                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7814                 }
7815                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7816         }
7817         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7818 }
7819
7820 #[test]
7821 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
7822         // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
7823         // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
7824         // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
7825         // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
7826         // and the channel should be closed.
7827         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7828         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7829         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7830         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7831         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7832         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7833
7834         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7835         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7836         let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
7837
7838         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7839
7840         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
7841         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7842
7843         // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
7844         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7845
7846         // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
7847         // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
7848         // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
7849         // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
7850         // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
7851         let accept_chan_msg = {
7852                 let mut node_1_per_peer_lock;
7853                 let mut node_1_peer_state_lock;
7854                 let channel =  get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], nodes[0], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
7855                 channel.get_accept_channel_message()
7856         };
7857         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
7858
7859         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
7860
7861         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7862         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7863
7864         // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
7865         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7866
7867         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7868         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7869
7870         let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
7871         match close_msg_ev[0] {
7872                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
7873                         assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
7874                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7875                         assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
7876                 }
7877                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7878         }
7879
7880         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
7881 }
7882
7883 #[test]
7884 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
7885         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7886         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7887         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7888         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7889         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7890         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7891
7892         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7893         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7894
7895         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7896
7897         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7898         // accepting the inbound channel request.
7899         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7900
7901         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7902         match events[0] {
7903                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7904                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
7905                         let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7906                         match api_res {
7907                                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
7908                                         assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
7909                                 },
7910                                 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
7911                                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7912                         }
7913                 }
7914                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7915         }
7916
7917         // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
7918         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7919         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7920
7921         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7922                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7923                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7924                 }
7925                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7926         }
7927 }
7928
7929 #[test]
7930 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
7931         let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7932         let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
7933         let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
7934         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
7935
7936         let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
7937         let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7938         match api_res {
7939                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
7940                         assert_eq!(err, format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(unknown_channel_id), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7941                 },
7942                 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
7943                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7944         }
7945 }
7946
7947 #[test]
7948 fn test_onion_value_mpp_set_calculation() {
7949         // Test that we use the onion value `amt_to_forward` when
7950         // calculating whether we've reached the `total_msat` of an MPP
7951         // by having a routing node forward more than `amt_to_forward`
7952         // and checking that the receiving node doesn't generate
7953         // a PaymentClaimable event too early
7954         let node_count = 4;
7955         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
7956         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
7957         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
7958         let mut nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7959
7960         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7961         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7962         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7963         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7964
7965         let total_msat = 100_000;
7966         let expected_paths: &[&[&Node]] = &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]];
7967         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], total_msat);
7968         let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
7969
7970         let mut path_1 = sample_path.clone();
7971         path_1[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7972         path_1[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7973         path_1[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
7974         path_1[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7975         path_1[1].fee_msat = 100_000;
7976         route.paths.push(path_1);
7977
7978         let mut path_2 = sample_path.clone();
7979         path_2[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7980         path_2[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7981         path_2[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
7982         path_2[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7983         path_2[1].fee_msat = 1_000;
7984         route.paths.push(path_2);
7985
7986         // Send payment
7987         let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
7988         let onion_session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
7989         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
7990         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], expected_paths.len());
7991
7992         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7993         assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
7994
7995         // First path
7996         let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[0][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
7997         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7998         let mut prev_node = &nodes[0];
7999
8000         for (idx, &node) in expected_paths[0].iter().enumerate() {
8001                 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
8002
8003                 if idx == 0 { // routing node
8004                         let session_priv = [3; 32];
8005                         let height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
8006                         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv).unwrap();
8007                         let mut onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
8008                         let (mut onion_payloads, _, _) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 100_000, &Some(our_payment_secret), height + 1, &None).unwrap();
8009                         // Edit amt_to_forward to simulate the sender having set
8010                         // the final amount and the routing node taking less fee
8011                         onion_payloads[1].amt_to_forward = 99_000;
8012                         let new_onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
8013                         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet = new_onion_packet;
8014                 }
8015
8016                 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8017                 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
8018                 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8019                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(node);
8020
8021                 if idx == 0 {
8022                         let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8023                         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8024                         check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
8025                         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
8026                         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
8027                 } else {
8028                         let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8029                         assert!(events_2.is_empty());
8030                 }
8031
8032                 prev_node = node;
8033         }
8034
8035         // Second path
8036         let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[1][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8037         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], expected_paths[1], 101_000, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, true, None);
8038
8039         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8040 }
8041
8042 fn do_test_overshoot_mpp(msat_amounts: &[u64], total_msat: u64) {
8043
8044         let routing_node_count = msat_amounts.len();
8045         let node_count = routing_node_count + 2;
8046
8047         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8048         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8049         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8050         let nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8051
8052         let src_idx = 0;
8053         let dst_idx = 1;
8054
8055         // Create channels for each amount
8056         let mut expected_paths = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8057         let mut src_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8058         let mut dst_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8059         for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8060                 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8061                 let src_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, src_idx, routing_node).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8062                 src_chan_ids.push(src_chan_id);
8063                 let dst_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, routing_node, dst_idx).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8064                 dst_chan_ids.push(dst_chan_id);
8065                 let path = vec![&nodes[routing_node], &nodes[dst_idx]];
8066                 expected_paths.push(path);
8067         }
8068         let expected_paths: Vec<&[&Node]> = expected_paths.iter().map(|route| route.as_slice()).collect();
8069
8070         // Create a route for each amount
8071         let example_amount = 100000;
8072         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[src_idx], nodes[dst_idx], example_amount);
8073         let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8074         for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8075                 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8076                 let mut path = sample_path.clone();
8077                 path[0].pubkey = nodes[routing_node].node.get_our_node_id();
8078                 path[0].short_channel_id = src_chan_ids[i];
8079                 path[1].pubkey = nodes[dst_idx].node.get_our_node_id();
8080                 path[1].short_channel_id = dst_chan_ids[i];
8081                 path[1].fee_msat = msat_amounts[i];
8082                 route.paths.push(path);
8083         }
8084
8085         // Send payment with manually set total_msat
8086         let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[src_idx].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8087         let onion_session_privs = nodes[src_idx].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8088         nodes[src_idx].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8089         check_added_monitors!(nodes[src_idx], expected_paths.len());
8090
8091         let mut events = nodes[src_idx].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8092         assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8093         let mut amount_received = 0;
8094         for (path_idx, expected_path) in expected_paths.iter().enumerate() {
8095                 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_path[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8096
8097                 let current_path_amount = msat_amounts[path_idx];
8098                 amount_received += current_path_amount;
8099                 let became_claimable_now = amount_received >= total_msat && amount_received - current_path_amount < total_msat;
8100                 pass_along_path(&nodes[src_idx], expected_path, amount_received, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, became_claimable_now, None);
8101         }
8102
8103         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[src_idx], &expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8104 }
8105
8106 #[test]
8107 fn test_overshoot_mpp() {
8108         do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 101_000], 200_000);
8109         do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 10_000, 100_000], 200_000);
8110 }
8111
8112 #[test]
8113 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8114         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8115         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8116         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8117         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8118         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8119
8120         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8121         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8122         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8123         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8124
8125         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8126         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8127         route.paths.push(path);
8128         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8129         route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8130         route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8131         route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8132         route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8133         route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8134         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8135         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8136 }
8137
8138 #[test]
8139 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8140         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8141         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8142         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8143         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8144         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8145
8146         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8147
8148         {
8149                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
8150                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8151                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8152                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8153                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8154                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8155                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8156                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8157         }
8158         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8159         // values from previous calls.
8160         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8161         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8162         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8163         match events[0] {
8164                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref purpose, .. } => {
8165                         match &purpose {
8166                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8167                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8168                                 },
8169                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8170                         }
8171                 },
8172                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8173         }
8174 }
8175
8176 #[test]
8177 #[allow(deprecated)]
8178 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8179         // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8180         // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8181         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8182         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8183         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8184         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8185
8186         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8187
8188         let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8189
8190         // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8191         // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8192         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8193                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8194         } else { panic!(); }
8195         let mut block = {
8196                 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8197                 Block {
8198                         header: BlockHeader {
8199                                 version: 0x2000000,
8200                                 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8201                                 merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(),
8202                                 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8203                         txdata: vec![],
8204                 }
8205         };
8206         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8207         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8208                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8209         } else { panic!(); }
8210
8211         // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8212         // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8213         block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8214         block.header.time += 1;
8215         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8216         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8217         assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8218
8219         {
8220                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8221                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8222                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8223                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8224                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8225                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8226                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8227         }
8228         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8229         // values from previous calls.
8230         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8231         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8232         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8233         match events[0] {
8234                 Event::PaymentClaimable { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8235                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8236                         assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8237                         // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8238                 },
8239                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8240         }
8241 }
8242
8243 #[test]
8244 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8245         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8246         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8247         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8248         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8249         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8250
8251         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8252
8253         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8254         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8255         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, None).unwrap();
8256         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8257
8258         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8259         // resulting events.
8260         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8261                 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8262                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8263                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8264                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8265                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8266                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8267
8268                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8269                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8270                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8271                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8272                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8273
8274                         // We should fail the payment back
8275                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8276                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8277                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8278                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8279                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8280                                 },
8281                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8282                         }
8283                 }
8284         }
8285
8286         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8287         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8288         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8289
8290         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8291         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8292         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8293         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8294
8295         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8296         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8297         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8298         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8299
8300         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8301         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8302         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8303         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8304 }
8305
8306 #[test]
8307 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8308         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8309         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8310         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8311         // error.
8312         //
8313         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8314         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8315         // commitment at same time.
8316
8317         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8318         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8319         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8320         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8321
8322         // Create some initial channel
8323         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8324         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8325
8326         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8327         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8328
8329         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8330         let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8331
8332         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8333         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8334         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8335         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8336         let watchtower = {
8337                 let new_monitor = {
8338                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8339                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8340                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8341                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8342                         new_monitor
8343                 };
8344                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8345                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8346                 watchtower
8347         };
8348         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8349         let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8350         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8351         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8352         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 0));
8353         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8354
8355         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8356         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8357         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8358         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8359
8360         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8361         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8362         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8363         {
8364                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8365                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8366                 let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
8367                 if let Ok(update) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8368                         assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8369                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8370                 } else { assert!(false); }
8371         }
8372         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8373         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8374         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8375         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8376 }
8377
8378 #[test]
8379 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8380         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8381         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8382         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8383         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8384
8385         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8386         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8387         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8388         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8389
8390         // Create some initial channel
8391         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8392         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8393
8394         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8395         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8396
8397         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8398         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8399
8400         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8401         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8402         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8403         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8404         let watchtower_alice = {
8405                 let new_monitor = {
8406                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8407                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8408                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8409                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8410                         new_monitor
8411                 };
8412                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8413                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8414                 watchtower
8415         };
8416         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8417         let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8418         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8419         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8420         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (block.clone(), 0));
8421         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8422
8423         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8424         {
8425                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8426                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8427                 txn.clear();
8428         }
8429
8430         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8431         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8432         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8433         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8434         let watchtower_bob = {
8435                 let new_monitor = {
8436                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8437                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8438                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8439                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8440                         new_monitor
8441                 };
8442                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8443                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8444                 watchtower
8445         };
8446         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8447         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8448
8449         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8450         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8451         {
8452                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8453         }
8454         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8455
8456         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8457         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8458         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8459         {
8460                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8461                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8462                 let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
8463                 if let Ok(update) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8464                         // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8465                         assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8466                         assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8467                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8468                 } else { assert!(false); }
8469         }
8470         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8471         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8472
8473         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8474         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8475         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8476
8477         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8478         let bob_state_y;
8479         {
8480                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8481                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8482                 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8483                 txn.clear();
8484         };
8485
8486         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8487         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8488         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8489         {
8490                 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8491                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
8492                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8493         }
8494 }
8495
8496 #[test]
8497 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8498         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8499         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8500         // message).
8501         //
8502         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8503         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8504         //
8505         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8506         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8507         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8508         // before receiving funding_signed.
8509         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8510         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8511         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8512         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8513
8514         // Create an initial channel
8515         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8516         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8517         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8518         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8519         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
8520
8521         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8522         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8523
8524         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8525         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8526
8527         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8528         let channel_id = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8529         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8530         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8531         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("Hi".to_string()) }, true);
8532 }
8533
8534 #[test]
8535 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8536         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8537         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8538         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8539         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8540         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8541         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8542
8543         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8544         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8545         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8546         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8547
8548         // Create some initial channels
8549         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8550
8551         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8552         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8553         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8554         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8555         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8556         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8557
8558         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8559         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8560         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8561         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8562         // this test before #653 fix.
8563         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8564         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8565         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8566         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8567         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8568
8569         let htlc_timeout = {
8570                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8571                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8572                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8573                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8574                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
8575                 node_txn[0].clone()
8576         };
8577
8578         let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8579         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8580         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8581         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
8582 }
8583
8584 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8585         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8586         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8587         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8588         //
8589         // Steps of the test:
8590         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8591         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8592         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8593         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8594         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8595         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8596         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8597         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8598         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8599         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8600         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8601         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8602
8603         // Create some initial channels
8604         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8605         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001);
8606
8607         // Steps (1) and (2):
8608         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8609         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8610
8611         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8612         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8613         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8614         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8615         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8616         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8617         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8618
8619         // Steps (3) and (4):
8620         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8621         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8622         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8623         let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8624
8625         // Bob force-closes
8626         if !broadcast_alice {
8627                 force_closing_node = 1;
8628                 counterparty_node = 0;
8629         }
8630         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8631         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8632         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8633         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8634         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8635                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8636                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
8637                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8638                 };
8639                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8640                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8641                 if broadcast_alice {
8642                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8643                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8644                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8645                 }
8646         }
8647
8648         // Step (5):
8649         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8650         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8651         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8652         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8653         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8654
8655         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8656         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8657         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8658         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8659         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8660         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8661
8662         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8663         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
8664         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8665         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8666                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8667                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8668                 match events[0] {
8669                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8670                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8671                         },
8672                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8673                 };
8674         }
8675         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8676         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8677         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8678         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8679
8680         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8681         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8682         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8683                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8684                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8685                         (*msg).clone()
8686                 },
8687                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8688         };
8689         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8690                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8691                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8692                         (*updates).clone()
8693                 },
8694                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8695         };
8696
8697         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8698         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8699         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8700         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8701
8702         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8703         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8704         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8705                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8706                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8707                         (*msg).clone()
8708                 },
8709                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8710         };
8711         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8712         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8713
8714         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8715         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8716         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8717         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8718         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8719                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8720                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8721                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8722                 if broadcast_alice {
8723                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8724                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8725                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8726                 }
8727                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8728                 if broadcast_alice {
8729                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8730                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8731                 } else {
8732                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8733                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8734                 }
8735         }
8736
8737         // Step (6):
8738         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8739         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8740         {
8741                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8742                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8743                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8744                 };
8745                 // If Alice force-closed, Bob only broadcasts a HTLC-output-claiming transaction. Otherwise,
8746                 // Bob force-closed and broadcasts the commitment transaction along with a
8747                 // HTLC-output-claiming transaction.
8748                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8749                 if broadcast_alice {
8750                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8751                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8752                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8753                 } else {
8754                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8755                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8756                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8757                 }
8758         }
8759 }
8760
8761 #[test]
8762 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8763         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8764         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8765         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8766         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8767 }
8768
8769 #[test]
8770 fn test_duplicate_temporary_channel_id_from_different_peers() {
8771         // Tests that we can accept two different `OpenChannel` requests with the same
8772         // `temporary_channel_id`, as long as they are from different peers.
8773         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8774         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8775         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8776         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8777
8778         // Create an first channel channel
8779         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8780         let mut open_chan_msg_chan_1_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8781
8782         // Create an second channel
8783         nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None).unwrap();
8784         let mut open_chan_msg_chan_2_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8785
8786         // Modify the `OpenChannel` from `nodes[2]` to `nodes[0]` to ensure that it uses the same
8787         // `temporary_channel_id` as the `OpenChannel` from nodes[1] to nodes[0].
8788         open_chan_msg_chan_2_0.temporary_channel_id = open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id;
8789
8790         // Assert that `nodes[0]` can accept both `OpenChannel` requests, even though they use the same
8791         // `temporary_channel_id` as they are from different peers.
8792         nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_1_0);
8793         {
8794                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8795                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8796                 match &events[0] {
8797                         MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8798                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8799                                 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8800                         },
8801                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8802                 }
8803         }
8804
8805         nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_2_0);
8806         {
8807                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8808                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8809                 match &events[0] {
8810                         MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8811                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8812                                 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8813                         },
8814                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8815                 }
8816         }
8817 }
8818
8819 #[test]
8820 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8821         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8822         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8823         //
8824         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8825         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8826         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8827         // updating logic for the existing channel.
8828         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8829         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8830         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8831         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8832
8833         // Create an initial channel
8834         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8835         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8836         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8837         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8838
8839         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8840         // that it is rejected.
8841         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8842         {
8843                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8844                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8845                 match events[0] {
8846                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8847                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8848                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8849                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8850                                 // move forward with it.
8851                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8852                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8853                         },
8854                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8855                 }
8856         }
8857
8858         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8859         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8860
8861         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8862         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8863
8864         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8865         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8866         {
8867                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8868                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8869                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8870                 added_monitors.clear();
8871         }
8872         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8873
8874         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8875
8876         let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8877         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8878
8879         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8880         // temporary one).
8881
8882         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8883         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8884         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8885         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8886         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8887         {
8888                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8889                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8890                 match events[0] {
8891                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8892                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8893                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8894                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8895                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8896                         },
8897                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8898                 }
8899         }
8900
8901         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8902         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8903         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8904         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8905         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8906         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8907
8908         let funding_created = {
8909                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8910                 let mut a_peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8911                 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
8912                 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
8913                 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
8914                 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
8915                 let mut as_chan = a_peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8916                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8917                 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8918         };
8919         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8920         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8921         // At this point we'll look up if the channel_id is present and immediately fail the channel
8922         // without trying to persist the `ChannelMonitor`.
8923         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8924
8925         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8926         {
8927                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8928                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8929                 match events[0] {
8930                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8931                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8932                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8933                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8934                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8935                         },
8936                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8937                 }
8938         }
8939
8940         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8941         // everything is functional.
8942         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8943         {
8944                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8945                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8946                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8947                 added_monitors.clear();
8948         }
8949         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8950
8951         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8952         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8953         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8954         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8955
8956         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8957         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8958         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8959
8960         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8961 }
8962
8963 #[test]
8964 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8965         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8966         //
8967         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8968         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8969         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8970         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8971         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8972         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8973         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8974
8975         // Create some initial channels
8976         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8977         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8978         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001);
8979
8980         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8981         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8982         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8983
8984         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8985         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8986         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8987
8988         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8989         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8990         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8991         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8992         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) });
8993         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8994         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8995         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8996         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8997
8998         // A null channel ID should close all channels
8999         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9000         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9001         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9002         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) });
9003         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9004         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9005         match events[0] {
9006                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9007                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9008                 },
9009                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9010         }
9011         match events[1] {
9012                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9013                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9014                 },
9015                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9016         }
9017         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9018         // peer_disconnected.
9019         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9020         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9021
9022         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9023         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9024         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9025 }
9026
9027 #[test]
9028 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9029         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9030         //
9031         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9032         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9033         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9034         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9035         //
9036         // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
9037         // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
9038         // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
9039         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9040         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9041         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9042         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9043
9044         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9045         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9046         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9047
9048         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9049
9050         // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9051         // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9052         // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9053         // its length.
9054         let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9055         let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.into();
9056         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9057                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9058                 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9059         }
9060
9061         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9062         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9063         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9064         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9065
9066         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9067         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9068         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9069
9070         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9071         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9072
9073         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9074         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9075         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9076
9077         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9078         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9079         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9080         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9081         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9082         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9083         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9084                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9085                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9086                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9087                 } else { panic!(); }
9088         } else { panic!(); }
9089         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9090
9091         // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9092         // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9093         // as its not 32 bytes long.
9094         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9095                 version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9096                 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9097                         previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9098                                 txid: tx.txid(),
9099                                 vout: idx as u32,
9100                         },
9101                         script_sig: Script::new(),
9102                         sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
9103                         witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9104                 }).collect(),
9105                 output: vec![TxOut {
9106                         value: 1000,
9107                         script_pubkey: Script::new(),
9108                 }]
9109         };
9110         check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9111         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9112 }
9113
9114 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9115         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9116         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9117         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9118         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9119         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9120         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9121         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9122         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9123         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9124         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9125         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9126         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9127         // until we learned about an additional block.
9128         //
9129         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9130         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9131         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9132         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9133         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9134         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9135         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9136
9137         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9138         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9139         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9140         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9141         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9142
9143         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9144         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9145         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9146         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9147         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9148         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9149
9150         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9151         if !test_height_before_timelock {
9152                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9153         }
9154         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9155                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9156         if test_height_before_timelock {
9157                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9158                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9159                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9160                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9161         } else {
9162                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9163                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9164                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9165                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9166                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9167                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9168                 // timelock is up).
9169                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9170                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9171
9172                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9173                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9174                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9175                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9176                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9177                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
9178                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9179
9180                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9181                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9182                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9183                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9184                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9185                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9186                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9187                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9188                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9189         }
9190 }
9191
9192 #[test]
9193 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9194         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9195         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9196 }
9197
9198 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9199         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9200         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9201         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9202         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9203
9204         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9205
9206         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9207                 .with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
9208         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9209
9210         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9211
9212         {
9213                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9214                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9215                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9216                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9217                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9218                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9219                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9220         }
9221         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9222         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9223
9224         {
9225                 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
9226                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
9227                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9228                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9229                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9230                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9231                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9232                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9233                 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9234                 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9235                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9236                 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9237         }
9238
9239         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9240         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9241
9242         if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9243                 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9244                 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9245
9246                 let expected_destinations = vec![
9247                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9248                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9249                 ];
9250                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1],  expected_destinations);
9251                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9252
9253                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9254                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9255                 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9256
9257                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9258                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9259                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9260
9261                 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9262                 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 4);
9263                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9264                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9265                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
9266                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
9267         } else {
9268                 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9269                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9270                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9271
9272                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9273                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9274                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9275                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9276
9277                 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
9278
9279                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9280         }
9281 }
9282
9283 #[test]
9284 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9285         // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9286         // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentClaimable` event.
9287         // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9288         // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9289         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9290 }
9291
9292 #[test]
9293 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9294         // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9295         // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9296         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9297 }
9298
9299 #[test]
9300 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9301         // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9302         // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9303         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9304         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9305         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9306         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9307
9308         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9309         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9310         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9311         let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9312
9313         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9314                 .with_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features());
9315         let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9316         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9317         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9318                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9319                 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9320                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9321         });
9322
9323         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9324
9325         let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9326         let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9327
9328         let session_privs = {
9329                 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
9330                 // ultimately have, just not right away.
9331                 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
9332                 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9333                 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9334         };
9335         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9336         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9337
9338         {
9339                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9340                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9341                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9342         }
9343         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9344
9345         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9346         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9347
9348         {
9349                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9350                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9351                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9352
9353                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9354                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9355
9356                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9357                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9358
9359                 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9360                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9361                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9362
9363                 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9364                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9365                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9366
9367                 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9368                 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9369                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9370         }
9371         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9372         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9373         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9374         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9375
9376         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9377
9378         let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9379         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9380         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9381
9382         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9383         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9384
9385         let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9386         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9387         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9388
9389         expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9390
9391         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9392         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9393
9394         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9395         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9396         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9397
9398         do_claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9399         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9400         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
9401         match events[0] {
9402                 Event::PaymentSent { payment_hash, .. } => { // The payment was abandoned earlier, so the fee paid will be None
9403                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
9404                 },
9405                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event")
9406         }
9407         match events[1] {
9408                 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_hash, .. } => {
9409                         assert_eq!(payment_hash.unwrap(), our_payment_hash);
9410                 },
9411                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event")
9412         }
9413         match events[2] {
9414                 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_hash, .. } => {
9415                         assert_eq!(payment_hash.unwrap(), our_payment_hash);
9416                 },
9417                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event")
9418         }
9419 }
9420
9421 #[test]
9422 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9423         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9424         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9425         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9426         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9427
9428         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9429         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9430         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9431         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9432         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9433                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
9434                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9435         };
9436         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9437         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9438         let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9439
9440         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9441         let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9442         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9443         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9444         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9445         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9446         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9447         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9448         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9449 }
9450
9451 #[test]
9452 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9453         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9454         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9455         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9456         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9457
9458         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9459         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9460
9461         let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9462         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9463                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
9464                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9465         };
9466         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9467         let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9468         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9469         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9470         let route = find_route(
9471                 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9472                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
9473         ).unwrap();
9474
9475         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9476         let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9477         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9478         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9479         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9480         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9481         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9482         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9483         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9484 }
9485
9486 #[test]
9487 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9488         // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentClaimable event, the HTLCs
9489         // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9490         // PaymentClaimable event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9491         // amount.
9492         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9493         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9494         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9495         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9496
9497         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9498         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9499         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9500         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9501
9502         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9503         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9504         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9505                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9506                 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9507                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9508         });
9509
9510         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9511         // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentClaimable event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9512         // amount of time to respond to.
9513
9514         // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9515         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9516         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9517
9518         let failed_destinations = vec![
9519                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9520                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9521         ];
9522         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
9523
9524         pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash);
9525
9526         // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9527         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9528         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9529
9530         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9531         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9532         let node_1_msgs = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
9533         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), node_1_msgs, false, None);
9534
9535         // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9536         // that PaymentClaimable event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9537         nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9538         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9539         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9540 }
9541
9542 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9543 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9544 enum ExposureEvent {
9545         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9546         AtHTLCForward,
9547         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9548         AtHTLCReception,
9549         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9550         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9551 }
9552
9553 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9554         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9555         // policy.
9556         //
9557         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9558         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9559         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9560         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9561         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9562         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9563         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9564         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9565
9566         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9567         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9568         config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9569         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9570         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9571         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9572
9573         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9574         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9575         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9576         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9577         if on_holder_tx {
9578                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9579         }
9580         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9581         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9582         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9583
9584         let opt_anchors = false;
9585
9586         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9587
9588         if on_holder_tx {
9589                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
9590                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
9591                 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id);
9592                 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9593         }
9594
9595         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9596         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9597         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9598         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9599
9600         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9601         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9602         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9603
9604         let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9605         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9606         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9607
9608         let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9609                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9610                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9611                 let chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9612                 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9613         };
9614         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9615         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9616
9617         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9618         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9619
9620         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9621         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9622
9623         if on_holder_tx {
9624                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9625                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9626                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9627                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9628                         for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9629                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9630                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9631                         }
9632                 } else {
9633                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9634                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9635                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9636                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9637                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9638                         }
9639                 }
9640         } else {
9641                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9642                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9643                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9644                         for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9645                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9646                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9647                         }
9648                 } else {
9649                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9650                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9651                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9652                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9653                         }
9654                 }
9655         }
9656
9657         let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9658         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9659                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9660                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9661                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9662                 if on_holder_tx {
9663                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9664                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9665                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9666                 } else {
9667                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9668                 }
9669         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9670                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9671                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9672                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9673                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9674                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9675                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9676                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9677                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9678                 if on_holder_tx {
9679                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9680                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9681                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9682                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9683                 } else {
9684                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9685                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9686                 }
9687         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9688                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9689                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9690                 {
9691                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9692                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9693                 }
9694                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9695                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9696                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel", "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure", 1);
9697         }
9698
9699         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9700         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9701         added_monitors.clear();
9702 }
9703
9704 #[test]
9705 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9706         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9707         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9708         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9709         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9710         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9711         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9712         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9713         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9714         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9715         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9716         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9717         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9718 }
9719
9720 #[test]
9721 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
9722         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9723         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9724         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9725         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9726
9727         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9728         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9729         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
9730         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9731         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
9732
9733         let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
9734
9735         let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
9736         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9737         let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
9738         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9739         let mut tx = match events[0] {
9740                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
9741                         // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 2.
9742                         Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 3), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
9743                                 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9744                         }]}
9745                 },
9746                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9747         };
9748         // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
9749         match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
9750                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9751                         assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
9752                 },
9753                 _ => panic!()
9754         }
9755
9756         // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +2 headroom from best block.
9757         tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(tx.lock_time.0 - 1);
9758         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
9759         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9760 }
9761
9762 #[test]
9763 fn accept_busted_but_better_fee() {
9764         // If a peer sends us a fee update that is too low, but higher than our previous channel
9765         // feerate, we should accept it. In the future we may want to consider closing the channel
9766         // later, but for now we only accept the update.
9767         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9768         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9769         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9770         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9771
9772         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9773
9774         // Set nodes[1] to expect 5,000 sat/kW.
9775         {
9776                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9777                 *feerate_lock = 5000;
9778         }
9779
9780         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept it.
9781         {
9782                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9783                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9784         }
9785         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9786         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9787
9788         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9789         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9790         match events[0] {
9791                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9792                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9793                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9794                 },
9795                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9796         };
9797
9798         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate further, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept
9799         // it.
9800         {
9801                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9802                 *feerate_lock = 2000;
9803         }
9804         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9805         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9806
9807         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9808         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9809         match events[0] {
9810                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9811                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9812                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9813                 },
9814                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9815         };
9816
9817         // However, if nodes[0] decreases their feerate, nodes[1] should reject it and close the
9818         // channel.
9819         {
9820                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9821                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9822         }
9823         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9824         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9825
9826         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9827         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9828         match events[0] {
9829                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
9830                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9831                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
9832                                 err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000 (- 250)".to_owned() });
9833                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9834                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9835                 },
9836                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9837         };
9838 }
9839
9840 fn do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(valid_delta: bool, use_user_hash: bool) {
9841         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9842         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9843         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9844         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9845         let min_final_cltv_expiry_delta = 120;
9846         let final_cltv_expiry_delta = if valid_delta { min_final_cltv_expiry_delta + 2 } else {
9847                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta - 2 };
9848         let recv_value = 100_000;
9849
9850         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9851
9852         let payment_parameters = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32);
9853         let (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = if use_user_hash {
9854                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1],
9855                         Some(recv_value), Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta));
9856                 (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret)
9857         } else {
9858                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(recv_value), 7200, Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)).unwrap();
9859                 (payment_hash, nodes[1].node.get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret).unwrap(), payment_secret)
9860         };
9861         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_parameters, recv_value, final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32).unwrap();
9862         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9863         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9864         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9865         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9866         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9867         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9868         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9869         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9870
9871         if valid_delta {
9872                 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, recv_value, if use_user_hash {
9873                         None } else { Some(payment_preimage) }, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9874
9875                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9876         } else {
9877                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9878
9879                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9880
9881                 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9882                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9883                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
9884
9885                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9886         }
9887 }
9888
9889 #[test]
9890 fn test_payment_with_custom_min_cltv_expiry_delta() {
9891         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, false);
9892         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, true);
9893         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, false);
9894         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, true);
9895 }