1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
20 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
21 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
22 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
23 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, COINBASE_MATURITY, ChannelPhase};
24 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
25 use crate::ln::channel::{DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS, ChannelError};
26 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
27 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
28 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
29 use crate::routing::router::{Path, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, get_route, RouteParameters};
30 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
32 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
33 use crate::util::test_channel_signer::TestChannelSigner;
34 use crate::util::test_utils::{self, WatchtowerPersister};
35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
37 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
38 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
40 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
43 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
44 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
45 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
46 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
54 use crate::prelude::*;
55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
56 use core::default::Default;
57 use core::iter::repeat;
58 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
59 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
61 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
62 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
64 use super::channel::UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS;
67 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
68 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
69 use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
70 let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
71 cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
72 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
73 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
74 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
75 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
77 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
79 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
80 let channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
81 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
83 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
84 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
86 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
87 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
89 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
90 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
91 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
92 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
93 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
94 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
95 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
96 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
98 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
99 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager", expected_regex, 1);
101 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
103 } else { assert!(false); }
106 use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
108 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
109 insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
110 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
112 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
114 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
116 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
118 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
120 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
122 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
124 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
128 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
129 // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
131 use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
132 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
133 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
134 *node_cfgs[1].override_init_features.borrow_mut() = Some(channelmanager::provided_init_features(&test_default_channel_config()).clear_wumbo());
135 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
136 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
138 match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
139 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
140 assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
146 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
147 // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
148 // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
149 // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
150 // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
151 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
152 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
153 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
154 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
155 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
157 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
158 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
159 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
160 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
161 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
162 push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
164 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
165 let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
166 if !send_from_initiator {
167 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
168 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
170 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
172 // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
173 let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
174 if send_from_initiator {
175 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
176 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
178 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
180 let sender_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] };
181 let counterparty_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
182 let mut sender_node_per_peer_lock;
183 let mut sender_node_peer_state_lock;
184 if send_from_initiator {
185 let chan = get_inbound_v1_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
186 chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
187 chan.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
189 let chan = get_outbound_v1_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
190 chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
191 chan.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
195 let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
196 let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
197 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
199 // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
200 // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
201 if send_from_initiator {
202 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
203 // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
204 // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
205 // well as an additional HTLC.
206 - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, &channel_type_features));
208 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
213 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
214 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
215 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
219 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
220 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
221 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
222 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
223 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
224 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
227 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
231 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
232 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
233 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
234 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
235 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
236 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
237 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
238 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
239 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
240 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
242 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
244 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
246 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
248 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
251 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
252 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
254 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
255 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
256 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
257 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
258 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
260 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
263 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
265 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
266 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
267 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
268 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
269 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
271 let payment_event = {
272 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
273 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
274 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
276 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
277 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
279 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
280 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
281 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
282 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
283 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
284 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
286 // deliver(1), generate (3):
287 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
288 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
289 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
290 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
292 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
293 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
294 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
295 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
296 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
297 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
298 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
299 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
301 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
302 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
303 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
304 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
305 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
306 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
307 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
308 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
310 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
311 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
312 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
313 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
315 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
316 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
317 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
319 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
320 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
322 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
323 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
325 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
326 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
329 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
330 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
334 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
335 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
336 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
337 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
338 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
339 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
340 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
341 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
344 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
346 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
348 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
351 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
352 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
354 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
355 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
356 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
357 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
360 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
363 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
365 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
366 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
367 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
368 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
369 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
371 let payment_event = {
372 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
373 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
374 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
376 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
377 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
379 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
380 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
381 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
382 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
383 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
384 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
386 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
387 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
389 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
393 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
394 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
395 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
396 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
397 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
398 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
401 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
402 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
403 // update_fee (never committed) ->
405 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
406 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
407 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
408 // <- (1) RAA delivered
409 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
410 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
411 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
412 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
414 // B should send no response here
415 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
416 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
419 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
422 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
423 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
424 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
426 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
429 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
430 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
431 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
432 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
433 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
435 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
438 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
439 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
440 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
441 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
442 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
444 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
447 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
448 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
450 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
451 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
452 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
454 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
455 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
456 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
457 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
460 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
462 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
464 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
466 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
467 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
468 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
469 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
470 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
471 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
472 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
473 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
474 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
475 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
476 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
478 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
479 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
480 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
481 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
482 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
484 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
485 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
486 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
489 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
490 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
493 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
494 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
495 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
497 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
498 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
499 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
500 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
502 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
503 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
504 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
507 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
508 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
509 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
510 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
513 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
514 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
515 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
516 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
518 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
519 let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
520 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
521 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
524 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
525 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
526 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
528 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
529 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
530 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
532 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
533 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
535 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
537 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
538 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
539 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
540 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
542 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
543 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
545 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
546 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
547 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
548 added_monitors.clear();
550 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
552 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
554 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
555 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
557 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
558 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
559 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
560 added_monitors.clear();
563 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
564 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
565 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
567 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
568 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
570 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
571 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
572 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
573 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
574 expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
578 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
579 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
580 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
581 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
582 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
583 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
584 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
585 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
586 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
587 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
588 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
589 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
590 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
591 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
592 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
593 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
594 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
595 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
596 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
600 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
601 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
602 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
603 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
604 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
605 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
608 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
611 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
612 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
614 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
615 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
616 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
617 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
618 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
620 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
622 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
624 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
625 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
626 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
628 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
629 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
630 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
632 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
633 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
634 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
635 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
637 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
638 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
639 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
643 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
644 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
645 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
646 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
647 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
648 let channel_value = 5000;
650 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000);
651 let channel_id = chan.2;
652 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
653 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
654 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
656 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
658 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
659 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
660 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
662 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
663 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features)) as u32;
665 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
666 *feerate_lock = feerate;
668 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
669 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
670 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
672 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
674 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
676 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
678 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
680 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
681 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
682 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000;
683 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
684 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
685 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
689 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
690 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
693 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
694 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
695 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
697 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
699 // Get the TestChannelSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
700 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
701 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
702 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
703 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
704 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
705 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
706 ).flatten().unwrap();
707 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
708 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
709 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
710 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
712 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
713 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
714 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
715 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
716 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
717 ).flatten().unwrap();
718 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
719 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
720 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
721 chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
722 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
725 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
726 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
727 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
730 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
731 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
732 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
733 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
734 ).flatten().unwrap();
735 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
736 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
737 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
738 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
740 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000,
741 local_funding, remote_funding,
742 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
743 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
745 &local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
747 local_chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
750 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
753 htlc_signatures: res.1,
755 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
758 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
760 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
763 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
765 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
766 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
767 //Should produce and error.
768 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
769 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
770 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
771 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
772 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") },
773 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], channel_value);
777 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
778 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
779 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
780 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
781 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
782 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
785 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
788 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
791 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
792 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
794 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
795 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
796 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
797 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
798 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
800 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
802 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
803 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
804 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
805 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
807 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
809 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
810 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
811 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
813 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
814 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
815 added_monitors.clear();
817 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
818 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
819 // node[1] has nothing to do
821 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
822 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
823 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
825 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
826 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
827 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
828 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
829 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
830 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
831 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
833 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
834 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
835 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
836 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
837 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
838 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
840 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
841 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
842 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
843 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
845 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
846 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
847 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
849 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
850 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
851 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
852 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
854 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
855 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
856 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
858 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
860 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
861 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
863 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => { },
864 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
867 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
869 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
870 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
871 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
872 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
873 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
877 fn test_update_fee() {
878 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
879 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
880 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
881 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
882 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
883 let channel_id = chan.2;
886 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
887 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
888 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
889 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
890 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
891 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
892 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
893 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
894 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
895 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
896 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
899 // Create and deliver (1)...
902 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
903 feerate = *feerate_lock;
904 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
906 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
907 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
909 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
910 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
911 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
912 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
913 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
915 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
917 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
919 // Generate (2) and (3):
920 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
921 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
922 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
925 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
926 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
929 // Create and deliver (4)...
931 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
932 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
934 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
935 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
936 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
937 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
938 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
939 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
940 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
942 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
945 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
946 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
947 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
949 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
950 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
952 // Handle (3), creating (6):
953 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
955 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
956 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
959 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
960 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
961 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
963 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
964 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
965 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
966 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
967 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
968 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
969 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
970 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
971 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
974 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
975 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
976 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
977 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
979 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
980 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
981 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
983 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
984 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
985 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
986 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
987 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
991 fn fake_network_test() {
992 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
993 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
994 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
995 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
996 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
997 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
999 // Create some initial channels
1000 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1001 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1002 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1004 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
1005 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1006 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1007 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1008 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1010 // Send some more payments
1011 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1012 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
1013 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
1015 // Test failure packets
1016 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
1017 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
1019 // Add a new channel that skips 3
1020 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1022 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1023 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1024 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1025 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1026 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1027 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1028 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1030 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1031 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1032 hops.push(RouteHop {
1033 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1034 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1035 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1036 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1038 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1040 hops.push(RouteHop {
1041 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1042 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1043 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1044 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1046 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1048 hops.push(RouteHop {
1049 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1050 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1051 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1052 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1054 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1056 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1057 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1058 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1],
1059 Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], route_params: None },
1060 &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1062 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1063 hops.push(RouteHop {
1064 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1065 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1066 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1067 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1069 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1071 hops.push(RouteHop {
1072 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1073 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1074 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1075 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1077 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1079 hops.push(RouteHop {
1080 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1081 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1082 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1083 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1085 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1087 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1088 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1089 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1],
1090 Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], route_params: None },
1091 &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1093 // Claim the rebalances...
1094 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1095 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1097 // Close down the channels...
1098 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1099 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1100 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1101 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1102 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1103 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1104 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1105 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1106 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1107 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1108 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1109 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1113 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1114 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1115 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1116 // commitment dance rounds.
1117 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1118 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1119 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1120 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1121 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1122 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1124 // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
1125 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1127 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1129 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1130 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
1131 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1132 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1134 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1136 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1137 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1138 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1139 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1141 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1142 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1145 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
1146 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)
1147 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1148 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1151 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1152 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1154 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
1155 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1159 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1160 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1161 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1162 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1164 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1165 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1166 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1167 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1168 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1169 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1170 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1172 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1173 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1174 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1176 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1178 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1179 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1180 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1181 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1183 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1184 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1185 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1186 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1188 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1189 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1190 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1192 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1193 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1195 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1196 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1197 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1198 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1199 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1201 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1202 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1203 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1205 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1207 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1208 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1210 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1212 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1213 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1214 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1216 &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1217 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1219 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1223 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1224 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1227 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1231 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1232 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1233 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1234 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1235 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1236 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1237 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1239 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1240 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
1241 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1242 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1243 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
1244 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
1246 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1248 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1249 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1251 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1252 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1254 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1255 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1256 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1260 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1261 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1262 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1263 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1264 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1265 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1266 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1267 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1269 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1272 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1274 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1276 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1277 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
1278 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1280 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1281 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1282 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1283 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1285 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1286 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1288 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1289 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1290 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1291 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1292 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1293 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1294 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1297 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1299 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1300 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1301 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1302 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1304 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1305 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 3);
1307 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1308 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
1309 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
1310 let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1311 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1312 (&claim_txn[1], &claim_txn[2])
1314 (&claim_txn[2], &claim_txn[1])
1317 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1318 assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1320 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1321 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1322 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1324 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1325 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1326 check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1327 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1329 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1330 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1333 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1334 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1335 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1336 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1338 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1339 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1340 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1341 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1342 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1343 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1345 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1351 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1352 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1353 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1354 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1355 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1356 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1358 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1359 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1361 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1362 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2), 1 + 1, &get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2));
1363 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1364 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1365 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
1366 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1367 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1368 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1370 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
1371 if let &APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. } = &fails[0] {}
1372 else { panic!("Unexpected error variant"); }
1374 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1376 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1378 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1382 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1383 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1384 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1385 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1386 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1387 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1389 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
1390 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460000);
1391 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
1392 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1393 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1394 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1396 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1398 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1399 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1400 3460001, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1401 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1402 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1405 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1406 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1407 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1408 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1409 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1412 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1414 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1415 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1416 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1418 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1420 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1422 // Get the TestChannelSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1423 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1424 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1425 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1426 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1427 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
1428 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
1429 ).flatten().unwrap();
1430 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1431 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1432 chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1434 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
1435 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1436 chan_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1437 chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1438 chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1440 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1441 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1442 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1443 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
1444 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
1445 ).flatten().unwrap();
1446 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1447 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
1448 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1449 chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1450 chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1453 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1454 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1455 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
1457 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1458 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1459 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1461 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1463 amount_msat: 3460001,
1464 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1466 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1469 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1472 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1473 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1474 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
1475 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
1476 ).flatten().unwrap();
1477 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1478 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1482 local_funding, remote_funding,
1483 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1485 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1486 &local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1488 local_chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1491 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1494 htlc_signatures: res.1,
1496 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
1499 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1500 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1501 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1503 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1504 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1506 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1507 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point,
1509 next_local_nonce: None,
1511 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1513 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1514 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1515 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1517 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1518 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1519 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1521 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1523 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1524 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", raa_msg.channel_id), 1);
1526 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1530 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1531 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1532 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1533 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1534 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1536 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1537 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1538 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1539 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1540 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1541 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1543 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1544 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1546 push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1548 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1550 // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
1551 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1552 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1553 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1554 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1557 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1558 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1559 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1560 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1561 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1565 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1566 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1567 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1568 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1569 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1570 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1571 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1572 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1574 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1575 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1576 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1577 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1578 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1579 push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1580 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1582 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1583 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1584 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1587 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
1588 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1000);
1589 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 700_000;
1590 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1591 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1592 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1593 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1594 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1595 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1596 700_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1597 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1598 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1600 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1601 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1602 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1603 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1604 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1605 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1608 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1609 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1610 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1611 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1612 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1613 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1614 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1615 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() },
1616 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1620 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1621 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1622 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1623 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1624 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1626 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1627 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1628 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1629 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1630 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1632 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1633 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1634 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1635 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1636 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1637 push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1638 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt);
1640 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1641 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1642 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1643 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1644 // commitment transaction fee.
1645 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1647 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1648 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1649 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1652 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1653 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1654 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt);
1655 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
1656 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1657 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1658 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1662 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1663 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1664 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1665 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1666 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1667 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1668 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1669 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1670 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1671 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1673 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1675 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1676 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1677 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1678 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1680 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1681 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1682 push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1683 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1684 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1685 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1686 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
1688 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1689 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1690 match msg_events[0] {
1691 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1692 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1694 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1699 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1700 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1701 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1702 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1703 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1704 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1705 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1706 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000);
1708 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1709 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1710 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1711 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1712 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1713 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1715 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1716 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1717 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1718 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1719 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1720 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1722 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1723 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1724 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1725 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1729 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1730 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1731 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1732 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1733 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1734 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1735 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
1738 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1739 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1740 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1741 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1743 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1744 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1745 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1746 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1748 // Add a pending HTLC.
1749 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1750 let payment_event_1 = {
1751 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1752 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1753 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1755 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1756 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1757 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1759 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1761 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1762 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, &channel_type_features);
1763 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1764 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1765 let mut route_2 = route_1.clone();
1766 route_2.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = amt_msat_2;
1768 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1769 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1770 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1771 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1772 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1773 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
1774 &route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1775 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
1776 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1779 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1780 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1781 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1782 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1783 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1786 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1787 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1788 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1789 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1790 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1791 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1792 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1793 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() },
1794 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1798 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1799 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1800 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1801 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1802 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1803 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1804 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1805 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1806 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1807 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1808 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1810 let reserve = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1811 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1812 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1814 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1815 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1818 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
1819 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1823 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1824 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1825 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1826 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1827 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1828 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1829 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1830 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1831 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1832 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001);
1833 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001);
1835 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1836 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1838 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1839 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1841 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1843 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1844 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1845 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1846 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1851 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1852 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1853 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1854 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1856 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1858 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1860 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1861 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1862 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0);
1863 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1864 assert!(route.paths[0].hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1866 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1867 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1868 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1869 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1872 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1873 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1875 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1876 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1877 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1878 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1879 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1880 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1881 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1885 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1886 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1887 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0).unwrap();
1888 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1889 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1891 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1892 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1893 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1894 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1895 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1898 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1899 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1900 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1901 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1902 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1905 // adding pending output.
1906 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1907 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1908 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1909 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1910 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1911 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1912 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1913 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1914 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1916 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1917 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1918 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1920 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1921 let payment_event_1 = {
1922 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1923 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1924 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1926 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1927 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1928 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1930 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1932 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1933 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1935 let mut route = route_1.clone();
1936 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = recv_value_2 + 1;
1937 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
1938 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1939 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1940 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1941 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1944 // split the rest to test holding cell
1945 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1946 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1947 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1948 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1950 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1951 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1954 // now see if they go through on both sides
1955 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1956 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1957 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21,
1958 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
1959 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1960 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1961 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1963 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1965 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1966 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1967 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1968 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1969 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1970 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1971 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1974 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1975 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1976 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22,
1977 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
1978 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1979 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1980 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1982 // flush the pending htlc
1983 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1984 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1985 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1987 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1988 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1989 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1990 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1992 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1993 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1994 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1995 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1997 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1998 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1999 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2001 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2003 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
2004 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
2005 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
2007 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2008 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
2010 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
2011 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
2012 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
2013 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
2014 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
2015 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2017 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
2018 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
2019 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
2020 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
2022 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
2023 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2025 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2026 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2028 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2029 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
2030 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
2031 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2032 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2034 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2035 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2036 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
2038 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2041 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2044 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2045 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
2046 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
2047 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2048 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2050 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2051 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2052 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
2054 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2057 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2060 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
2061 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2062 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2064 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, &channel_type_features);
2065 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2066 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2068 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
2069 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2070 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2071 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2072 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2074 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
2075 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2079 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2080 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2081 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2082 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2083 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2084 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2085 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2086 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2088 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2089 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2090 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2091 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2092 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2093 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2094 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
2095 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2097 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2098 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2099 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2100 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2101 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2102 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2103 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2104 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2105 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2106 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2108 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2109 // Route the first two HTLCs.
2110 let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2111 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2112 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2114 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2115 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2117 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_3,
2118 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2119 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2120 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2121 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2122 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2125 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2126 // initial fulfill/CS.
2127 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2128 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2129 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2130 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2132 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2133 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2134 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2135 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2136 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2137 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2139 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2140 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2141 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2142 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2143 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_1, None, false, false);
2145 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2146 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2148 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2149 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2151 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2152 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2153 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2155 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2157 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2159 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2161 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2163 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2164 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2165 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2166 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2167 // on-chain as necessary).
2168 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2169 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2170 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2171 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2172 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, false, false);
2174 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2175 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2176 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2178 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2179 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2181 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2182 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2183 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2184 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2185 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2186 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2188 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2189 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2190 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2192 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_4,
2193 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2194 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2195 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2196 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2197 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2200 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2201 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2202 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2203 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2205 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2207 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2208 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2209 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2211 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2212 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2214 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2215 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2216 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2217 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2219 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2220 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2221 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2223 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2224 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2226 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2227 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2229 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2230 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2234 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2235 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2236 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2237 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2238 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2239 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2240 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2242 // Create some initial channels
2243 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2244 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2245 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2246 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
2248 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2249 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2250 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2251 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2252 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2253 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2255 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2256 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2257 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2258 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2259 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2261 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2262 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2263 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2264 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2266 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2267 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2268 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2269 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2270 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2272 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2273 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2274 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2275 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2276 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2278 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2279 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2281 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2282 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2283 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2284 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2285 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2287 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2288 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2289 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2290 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2291 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2292 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2294 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2295 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2296 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2297 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2298 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2300 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2301 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2303 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2304 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2305 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2307 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2308 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2310 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2311 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2312 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2313 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2315 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2321 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2322 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2323 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2324 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2325 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2326 let node2_commitment_txid;
2328 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2329 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2330 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2331 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2333 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2334 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2335 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2336 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2337 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2339 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2340 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2341 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2342 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2343 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2345 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2346 // confusing us in the following tests.
2347 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2349 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2350 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2351 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2354 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2355 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2356 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2357 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2358 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2359 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2362 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2365 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2366 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2368 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2370 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2372 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2374 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2375 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2376 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2382 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2384 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2385 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2387 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2388 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2389 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2390 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2391 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2394 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2397 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2398 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2400 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2402 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2403 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2405 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2406 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2407 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2409 nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2410 nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2411 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2412 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2414 assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2415 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
2416 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2417 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2421 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_timeout() {
2422 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Timeout tx, against both sides
2423 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2424 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2425 alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2426 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2427 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2428 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2429 bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2430 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2431 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2432 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2433 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2434 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2435 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2436 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2437 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2438 // Create some new channels:
2439 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2441 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2442 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2443 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2444 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2445 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2446 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2447 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2448 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2449 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2450 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2451 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2452 // Revoke the old state
2453 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2456 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2458 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2459 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2460 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2461 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2462 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2464 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2465 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2466 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2468 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2469 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2470 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2471 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2472 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2473 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2474 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2475 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2476 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2478 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2479 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2480 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2484 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_success() {
2485 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2486 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2487 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2488 alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2489 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2490 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2491 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2492 bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2493 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2494 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2495 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2496 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2497 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2498 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2499 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2500 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2501 // Create some new channels:
2502 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2504 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2505 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2506 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2507 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2508 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2509 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2510 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2511 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2512 // Revoke the old state
2513 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2515 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2517 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2518 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2519 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2521 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2522 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2524 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2525 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2527 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2528 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2529 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2530 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2531 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2532 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2533 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2535 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2536 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2537 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2541 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2542 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2543 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2544 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2545 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2546 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2547 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2548 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2549 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2550 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2551 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2552 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2553 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2554 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2555 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2557 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2558 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2559 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2560 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2561 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2562 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output
2564 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2566 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2567 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2568 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2569 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2570 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2574 fn test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates() {
2575 do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(true);
2576 do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(false);
2579 fn do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(broadcast_initial_commitment: bool) {
2580 // Simple test to make sure that the justice tx formed in WatchtowerPersister
2581 // is properly formed and can be broadcasted/confirmed successfully in the event
2582 // that a revoked commitment transaction is broadcasted
2583 // (Similar to `revoked_output_claim` test but we get the justice tx + broadcast manually)
2584 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2585 let destination_script0 = chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.get_destination_script().unwrap();
2586 let destination_script1 = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_destination_script().unwrap();
2587 let persisters = vec![WatchtowerPersister::new(destination_script0),
2588 WatchtowerPersister::new(destination_script1)];
2589 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs_with_persisters(2, &chanmon_cfgs, persisters.iter().collect());
2590 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2591 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2592 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2593 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
2595 if !broadcast_initial_commitment {
2596 // Send a payment to move the channel forward
2597 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5_000_000);
2600 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output.
2601 // We'll keep this commitment transaction to broadcast once it's revoked.
2602 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel_id);
2603 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2604 let revoked_commitment_tx = &revoked_local_txn[0];
2606 // Send another payment, now revoking the previous commitment tx
2607 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5_000_000);
2609 let justice_tx = persisters[1].justice_tx(funding_txo, &revoked_commitment_tx.txid()).unwrap();
2610 check_spends!(justice_tx, revoked_commitment_tx);
2612 mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[revoked_commitment_tx, &justice_tx]);
2613 mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[revoked_commitment_tx, &justice_tx]);
2615 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2616 check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2617 &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100_000);
2618 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 0);
2620 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2621 check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2622 &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100_000);
2624 // Check that the justice tx has sent the revoked output value to nodes[1]
2625 let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel_id);
2626 let total_claimable_balance = monitor.get_claimable_balances().iter().fold(0, |sum, balance| {
2628 channelmonitor::Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { amount_satoshis, .. } => sum + amount_satoshis,
2629 _ => panic!("Unexpected balance type"),
2632 // On the first commitment, node[1]'s balance was below dust so it didn't have an output
2633 let node1_channel_balance = if broadcast_initial_commitment { 0 } else { revoked_commitment_tx.output[0].value };
2634 let expected_claimable_balance = node1_channel_balance + justice_tx.output[0].value;
2635 assert_eq!(total_claimable_balance, expected_claimable_balance);
2640 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2641 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2642 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2643 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2644 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2645 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2646 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2648 // Create some new channel:
2649 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2651 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2652 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2653 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2654 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2655 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2657 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2658 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2659 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2660 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2661 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2662 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2663 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2664 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2665 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2667 //Revoke the old state
2668 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2671 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2672 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2673 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2674 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2675 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2676 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2677 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2678 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2680 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2681 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2683 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2684 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2686 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2687 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2688 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2689 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2690 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2691 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2692 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2693 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2695 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2696 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2697 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2698 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2699 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2701 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2702 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2703 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2707 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2708 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2709 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2710 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2711 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2712 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2713 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2715 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2717 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2718 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2719 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2720 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2721 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2722 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2724 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2725 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2727 //Revoke the old state
2728 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2731 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2732 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2733 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2734 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2735 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2736 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2737 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2738 match events.last().unwrap() {
2739 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2740 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2743 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2744 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2746 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2748 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2749 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2750 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2751 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2752 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2753 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2754 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2756 // Filter out any non justice transactions.
2757 node_txn.retain(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2758 assert!(node_txn.len() > 3);
2760 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2761 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2762 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2764 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2765 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2766 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2768 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2769 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2770 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2771 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2772 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2773 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2774 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2775 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2777 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2778 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2779 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2780 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2781 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2782 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2783 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2785 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2786 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2787 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2791 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2792 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2793 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2794 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2795 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2796 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2797 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2798 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2799 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2801 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2802 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2803 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2804 // PaymentSent event).
2806 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2807 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2808 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2809 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2811 // Create some initial channels
2812 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2813 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2815 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2816 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2817 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2818 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2819 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2821 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2822 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2823 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2825 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2826 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2828 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2829 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2830 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2831 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2832 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2833 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2834 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2835 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2836 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2837 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2838 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2839 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2840 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2841 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2842 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2844 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2845 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2846 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2847 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2848 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2849 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2850 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2851 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2852 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2853 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2854 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2855 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2856 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2857 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2859 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2860 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]));
2861 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2863 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2864 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2865 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2866 added_monitors.clear();
2868 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2869 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2870 match forwarded_events[0] {
2871 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2872 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2874 let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2875 match forwarded_events[1] {
2876 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
2877 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2878 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2879 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2880 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2881 assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2885 match forwarded_events[2] {
2886 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
2887 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2888 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2889 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2890 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2891 assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2895 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2897 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2898 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2899 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2900 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2901 added_monitors.clear();
2903 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2905 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2906 let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2908 match nodes_2_event {
2909 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2910 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2913 match nodes_0_event {
2914 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2915 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2916 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2917 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2918 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2919 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2921 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2924 // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
2926 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2927 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2930 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2931 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => { {
2932 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2933 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2934 // Node[1]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2935 // Node[0]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2936 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx);
2937 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2938 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2939 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2941 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2942 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2943 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2944 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2946 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2947 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2948 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2949 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2954 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2955 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0]);
2957 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2958 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2959 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2960 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2961 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2962 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2963 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2964 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2965 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2966 assert!(node_txn.len() == 1 || node_txn.len() == 3); // HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn
2967 let commitment_spend =
2968 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2971 // Certain `ConnectStyle`s will cause RBF bumps of the previous HTLC transaction to be broadcast.
2972 // FullBlockViaListen
2973 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2974 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2975 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2976 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2979 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2980 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2981 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2986 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2987 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2988 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2989 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2990 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2991 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2992 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2993 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2995 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2996 connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()]));
2997 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2998 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2999 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3000 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3001 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
3002 let mut first_claimed = false;
3003 for event in events {
3005 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3006 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
3007 assert!(!first_claimed);
3008 first_claimed = true;
3010 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
3011 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
3014 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3015 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
3016 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3019 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
3022 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
3023 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
3024 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
3025 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
3026 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
3027 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
3029 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
3031 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3032 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3033 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3034 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3035 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
3036 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
3037 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
3039 // Create some intial channels
3040 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3041 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3043 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
3044 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
3045 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
3047 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
3049 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
3050 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3051 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
3052 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
3053 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
3054 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
3055 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3057 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3058 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3060 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3061 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3062 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3063 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3064 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3065 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3067 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3069 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
3070 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3071 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3072 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3073 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
3074 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
3076 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
3077 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
3078 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
3079 check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false
3080 , [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3081 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
3083 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
3084 if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
3085 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
3087 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 3); // Two extra fee bumps for timeout transaction
3089 txn.iter().for_each(|tx| check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx[0]));
3090 assert_eq!(txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3094 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
3095 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3096 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3098 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3100 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3101 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3102 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3103 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3105 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3106 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3107 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3108 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3109 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3110 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3112 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3115 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
3116 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3117 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
3119 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
3120 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3122 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3123 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3124 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3125 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // 1 timeout tx
3126 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3127 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
3128 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3132 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3133 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3134 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3135 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3139 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3140 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3141 // and fail backward accordingly.
3143 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3144 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3145 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3146 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3148 // Create some initial channels
3149 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3150 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3152 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3153 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3154 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3155 // Revoke the old state
3156 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3158 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3160 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3161 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3162 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3163 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3164 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3166 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3167 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3168 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3169 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3171 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3172 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3173 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3174 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3175 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3176 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3178 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3179 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3180 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3182 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3186 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3187 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3188 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3189 // commitment transaction anymore.
3190 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3191 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3192 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3193 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3194 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3195 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3197 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3198 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3199 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3200 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3201 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3202 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3203 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3204 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3205 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3207 // Create some initial channels
3208 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3209 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3211 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3212 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3213 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3214 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3215 // Revoke the old state
3216 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3218 let value = if use_dust {
3219 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3220 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3221 nodes[2].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
3222 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3225 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3226 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3227 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3229 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3230 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3231 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3232 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3233 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3234 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3235 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3236 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3237 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3238 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3239 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3240 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3242 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3243 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3244 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3245 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3246 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3247 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3248 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3249 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3250 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3251 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3252 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3253 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3254 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3255 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3256 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3257 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3259 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3260 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3261 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3262 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3263 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3264 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3265 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3266 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3267 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3268 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3269 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3270 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3271 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3273 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3274 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3275 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3276 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3278 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3279 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3280 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3281 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, fourth_payment_hash,
3282 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3283 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3284 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3285 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3288 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3289 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3290 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3291 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3292 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3293 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3295 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3296 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3299 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3300 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3302 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3303 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3306 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3307 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3309 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3310 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3311 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3313 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3314 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
3316 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3317 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3320 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3321 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3323 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3326 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3327 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3329 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3332 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3335 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3336 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3339 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3340 match nodes_2_event {
3341 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3342 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3343 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3344 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3345 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3346 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3348 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3352 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3353 match nodes_2_event {
3354 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3355 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3356 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3358 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3361 let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3362 match nodes_0_event {
3363 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3364 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3365 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3366 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3367 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3368 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3370 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3371 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3372 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3374 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3376 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3377 assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
3379 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref failure, .. } => {
3380 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3381 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3382 // that we should update our routing table for.
3383 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3384 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure { } else { panic!("Unexpected path failure") }
3387 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3390 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3391 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, first_payment_hash);
3393 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3396 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3397 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3399 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3402 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3403 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
3405 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3408 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3409 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3411 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3414 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3415 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, third_payment_hash);
3417 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3420 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3423 // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
3425 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3426 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3429 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3430 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3431 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3435 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3436 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3437 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3438 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3439 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3443 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3444 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3445 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3446 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3447 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3451 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3452 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3453 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3454 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3455 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3456 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
3458 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3460 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3461 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
3462 PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3463 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3465 let payment_event = {
3466 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3467 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3468 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3470 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3471 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3474 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3475 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3477 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, failed_payment_hash,
3478 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3479 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3481 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3484 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3486 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3488 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3489 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3490 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3491 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
3492 &route.paths[0], 50_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3493 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3494 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
3496 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3497 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3503 onion_routing_packet,
3504 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
3506 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3508 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3509 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3510 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3512 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3513 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3515 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3518 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3519 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3521 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3524 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3525 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3527 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3529 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3530 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3534 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3535 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3536 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3537 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3538 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3539 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3540 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3541 if *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
3542 // We rely on the ability to connect a block redundantly, which isn't allowed via
3543 // `chain::Listen`, so we never run the test if we randomly get assigned that
3547 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3549 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3550 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3551 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3552 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3553 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3554 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3556 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3557 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3558 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].txid(), node_txn[1].txid());
3560 let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]);
3561 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3562 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3563 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3564 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3566 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3567 // registering new transactions
3568 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3572 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3573 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3574 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3575 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3576 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3577 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3578 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3579 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3581 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3583 let mut payment_event = {
3584 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
3585 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3586 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3588 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3589 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3590 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3593 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3594 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3596 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3598 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3599 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3600 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3601 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3603 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3604 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3605 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3606 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3607 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3609 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3610 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3611 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3613 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3614 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3615 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3616 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3618 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3619 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3620 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3621 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3622 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3626 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3628 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3629 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3630 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3631 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3633 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3635 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3636 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3638 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3639 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3640 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3641 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3642 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3643 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3644 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3646 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3650 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3651 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3652 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3653 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3654 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3656 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3657 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3658 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3659 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3660 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3662 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3664 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3665 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3666 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3667 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3668 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3669 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
3671 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3672 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3674 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3675 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
3676 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3677 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3681 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3682 // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3683 // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3684 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3685 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3686 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3687 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3689 // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3690 // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3691 let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3692 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3693 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
3694 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3695 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
3697 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3698 assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3700 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3702 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3703 assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3705 // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3706 // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3709 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3712 // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3713 // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3714 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3715 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3717 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, false
3718 , [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
3719 check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, false
3720 , [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
3724 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3725 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3726 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3727 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3728 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3729 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3730 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3731 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3733 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3734 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3735 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3736 reconnect_args.send_channel_ready = (true, true);
3737 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3739 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3740 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3741 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3742 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3744 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3745 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3746 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3748 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3749 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3750 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3751 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3753 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3754 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3756 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3757 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3759 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3760 reconnect_args.pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 = 1;
3761 reconnect_args.pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
3762 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3764 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3765 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
3767 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3768 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3769 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3771 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3774 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3775 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3778 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3779 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3780 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3782 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3785 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3786 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3788 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3791 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
3793 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3794 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3797 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3798 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3799 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3800 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3801 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3802 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3804 let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3805 let channel_id = if messages_delivered == 0 {
3806 let (channel_ready, chan_id, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
3807 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3808 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3809 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3810 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3813 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2
3816 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3818 let payment_event = {
3819 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
3820 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3821 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3823 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3824 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3825 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3827 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3829 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3830 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3832 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3833 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3834 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3835 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3836 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3838 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3839 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3840 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3841 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3843 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3844 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3845 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3846 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3847 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3849 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3850 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3851 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3852 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3859 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3860 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3861 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3862 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3863 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3864 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3866 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3867 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3868 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3870 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3871 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3873 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3874 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3875 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3876 reconnect_args.send_channel_ready = (true, true);
3877 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_adds.1 = 1;
3878 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3879 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3880 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3881 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3882 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_adds.0 = -1;
3883 reconnect_args.pending_raa.0 = true;
3884 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3885 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3886 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3887 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3888 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_adds.0 = -1;
3889 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3890 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3891 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3892 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3893 reconnect_args.pending_raa.1 = true;
3894 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3895 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3896 // Everything was delivered...
3897 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3900 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3901 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3902 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3904 Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3905 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3908 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3909 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3912 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3914 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3915 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3919 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3920 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3921 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3923 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3925 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3926 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3928 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
3929 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3930 assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3931 assert_eq!(receiver_node_id.unwrap(), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3932 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(channel_id));
3934 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3935 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3936 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3938 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3941 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3944 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3945 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3946 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3948 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3949 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3950 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3951 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3952 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3953 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3954 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3955 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3956 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3957 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3958 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3960 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3963 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3964 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3966 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3967 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3969 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3970 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3971 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3973 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3976 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3977 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3978 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3979 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3981 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3982 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3983 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3984 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3986 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3987 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3988 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3989 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3990 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3992 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3993 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3994 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3995 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4002 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4003 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4004 if messages_delivered < 2 {
4005 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4006 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
4007 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4008 if messages_delivered < 1 {
4009 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
4011 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4013 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
4014 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
4015 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4016 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_adds.1 = -1;
4017 reconnect_args.pending_raa.1 = true;
4018 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4019 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
4020 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
4021 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4022 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_adds.1 = -1;
4023 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4024 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
4025 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
4026 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4027 reconnect_args.pending_raa.0 = true;
4028 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4029 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
4030 // Everything was delivered...
4031 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
4034 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
4035 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4037 if messages_delivered <= 5 {
4038 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4039 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4041 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
4043 if messages_delivered > 2 {
4044 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4047 // Channel should still work fine...
4048 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4049 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
4050 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4054 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
4055 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
4056 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
4057 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
4058 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
4062 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
4063 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
4064 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
4065 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
4066 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
4070 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
4071 // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
4072 // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
4073 // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
4074 // channel_ready immediately instead.
4075 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4076 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4077 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4078 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4079 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
4081 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
4083 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4084 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4085 let block_txn = [funding_tx];
4086 let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
4087 let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
4088 nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
4090 // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4091 let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4092 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4096 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4097 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4098 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4099 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4100 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4101 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4102 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4103 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4105 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
4107 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4108 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4109 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
4110 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
4111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4113 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4114 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4116 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4117 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4120 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4121 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
4122 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4124 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4125 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4127 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4128 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4129 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4130 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4131 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4132 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4133 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4135 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4136 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4137 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4139 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4140 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4141 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4143 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4146 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4147 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4148 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4149 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4151 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4154 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4155 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4157 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
4158 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
4160 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4161 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4162 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
4163 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
4165 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4166 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4168 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4169 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4170 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4171 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4173 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4174 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4176 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4177 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4179 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4181 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4182 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4183 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4184 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4185 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4186 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4187 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4188 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4189 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4190 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4192 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4193 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4194 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4195 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4196 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4197 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4198 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4201 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4202 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4203 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4204 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4205 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4206 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4207 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4208 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4210 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4211 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4212 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4213 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4215 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4216 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4217 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4218 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4220 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4221 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4222 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4224 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4226 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4227 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4229 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4230 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4232 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4233 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4234 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4236 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4239 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4242 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4243 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4244 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4246 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4247 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4250 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4251 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4252 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4253 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4254 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4255 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4256 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4258 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4260 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4261 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4262 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4263 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4264 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4265 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4266 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
4267 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4268 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
4269 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id,
4270 &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4272 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4273 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4274 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4275 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentClaimable event(s).
4276 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4279 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4282 let mut block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
4283 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4284 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4285 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4286 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4287 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4288 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4289 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4292 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4294 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4295 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4296 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4297 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4298 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4299 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4301 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4302 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4303 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4304 let mut expected_failure_data = (100_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4305 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&(block_count - 1).to_be_bytes());
4306 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4310 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4311 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4312 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4315 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4316 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4317 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4318 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4319 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4320 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4321 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4322 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4324 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4325 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4326 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4327 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4329 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4330 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4331 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, first_payment_hash,
4332 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4333 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4334 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4336 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4337 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4338 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4339 sending_node.node.send_payment_with_route(&route, second_payment_hash,
4340 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4342 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4343 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4344 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4345 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4346 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4348 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4350 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4351 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4352 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4353 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4356 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4357 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4358 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4359 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4360 match fail_commit[0] {
4361 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4362 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4363 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4365 _ => unreachable!(),
4367 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4369 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4374 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4375 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4376 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4379 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4380 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4382 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4383 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4384 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4385 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4386 for event in events.drain(..) {
4388 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs, channel_id: _ } => {
4389 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4390 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4391 all_outputs.push(outp);
4394 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4397 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4398 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx) {
4408 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4409 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4410 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4411 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4412 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4413 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4415 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4416 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4417 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4418 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4419 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4420 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4421 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4422 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4423 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4425 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4426 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4428 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4429 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4430 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4431 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4432 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4436 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4437 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4438 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4439 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4440 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4441 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4442 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4444 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4445 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4446 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4447 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4448 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4450 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4451 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4452 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4453 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4455 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4456 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4457 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4458 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4459 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4461 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4462 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4463 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4467 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4468 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4469 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4471 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4472 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4473 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4474 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4476 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
4477 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4478 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4479 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4480 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4482 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4483 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4484 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4485 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4486 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4488 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4489 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4490 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4492 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4493 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4494 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4495 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4496 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4500 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4501 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4502 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4503 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4504 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4506 // Create some initial channels
4507 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4509 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4511 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4512 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4513 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4515 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4516 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4517 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4518 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4519 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4520 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4521 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4523 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4524 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4527 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4528 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4531 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4532 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4533 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4534 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4535 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4537 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4538 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4539 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4541 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4542 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4543 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4547 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4548 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4549 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4550 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4551 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4553 // Create some initial channels
4554 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4556 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4557 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4559 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4561 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4562 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4563 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4565 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4566 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4567 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4568 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4570 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4571 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4573 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4575 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4576 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4577 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4578 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4579 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4581 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4582 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4583 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4584 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4586 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4587 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4588 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4589 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4590 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4594 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4595 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4596 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4597 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4598 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4600 // Create some initial channels
4601 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4603 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4604 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4605 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4606 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4608 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4610 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4611 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4612 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4613 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4615 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4616 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4617 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4618 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4620 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4621 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4623 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4624 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4625 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4629 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4630 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4631 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4632 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4633 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4634 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4636 // Create some initial channels
4637 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4639 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4640 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4641 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4642 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4644 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4646 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4647 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4648 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4649 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4650 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4651 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4653 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4654 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4655 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4656 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4657 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4658 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4660 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4661 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4662 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4663 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4664 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4666 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4667 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs
4668 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4669 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4670 // transactions next...
4671 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4672 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4674 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4675 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4676 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4677 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4679 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4680 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4683 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4684 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4686 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4687 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4688 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4689 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4690 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4694 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4695 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4696 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4697 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4698 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4699 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4701 // Create some initial channels
4702 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4704 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4705 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4706 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4707 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4709 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4710 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4712 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4714 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4715 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4716 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4717 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4718 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4719 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4721 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4722 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4723 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4724 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4726 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4727 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4728 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4730 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4731 connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4732 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4733 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4734 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4736 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4737 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success
4739 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4740 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4741 // transactions next...
4742 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4743 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4744 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4745 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4747 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4748 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4751 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4752 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4754 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4755 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4757 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4758 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4760 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4761 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4762 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4763 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4764 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4765 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4766 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4767 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4771 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4772 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4773 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4774 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4775 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4777 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4780 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4781 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4782 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4783 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4785 // Create some initial channels
4786 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4787 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4789 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4790 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4791 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4792 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4793 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4795 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4796 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4797 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4799 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
4800 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4801 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4802 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4803 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4804 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4805 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4806 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4807 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4808 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4809 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4811 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4812 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4813 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4814 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4816 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4817 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 1);
4818 check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4819 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4820 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4821 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4823 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4824 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), c_txn[0].clone()]));
4825 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4826 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4827 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4829 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4830 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4833 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
4834 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4835 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
4836 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4837 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
4838 assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
4840 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4842 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4843 let mut msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4844 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4845 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4846 let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4848 match nodes_2_event {
4849 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4850 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4853 match nodes_0_event {
4854 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4855 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4856 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4857 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4858 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4859 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4861 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4864 // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
4865 match msg_events[0] {
4866 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4867 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4870 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4871 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4872 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4873 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4874 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4875 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx
4876 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4877 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4878 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4879 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4880 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, nodes[1].best_block_info().1); // Success tx
4882 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4883 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4887 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4888 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4889 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4890 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4891 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4892 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4893 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4894 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4895 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4896 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4897 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4898 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
4899 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4900 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4902 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4903 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4904 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4906 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4907 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4908 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4909 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4910 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
4912 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
4914 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
4915 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
4916 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
4917 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
4918 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40)
4919 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
4920 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 800_000);
4921 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 800_000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
4923 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4924 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4925 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
4927 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
4928 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4929 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4930 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4931 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4933 let htlc_timeout_tx;
4934 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
4935 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4936 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3
4937 assert!(node_txn.len() == 2 || node_txn.len() == 3);
4939 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4940 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4941 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4943 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4944 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4945 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4946 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
4947 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4949 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4950 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4951 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
4952 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
4954 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4955 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4956 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
4957 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4960 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4961 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4962 // Assign htlc_timeout_tx to the forwarded HTLC (with value ~800 sats). The received HTLC
4963 // (with value 900 sats) will be claimed in the below `claim_funds` call.
4964 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4965 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4966 htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[2].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[2].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
4968 htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[0].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[1].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
4972 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
4973 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
4975 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
4976 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
4977 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4978 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4980 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4981 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4984 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4985 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4987 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4988 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
4989 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4990 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4991 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4992 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4993 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4994 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4995 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4996 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
4998 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
4999 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5000 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
5001 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5002 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5003 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5004 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5005 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5006 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5007 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5009 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5010 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5012 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5014 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5016 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5017 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[1]);
5018 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196), true, true);
5019 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5020 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5021 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5022 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5023 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5024 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5025 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5027 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5028 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5029 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, None, true, true);
5033 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5034 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5035 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5036 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5037 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5039 // Create some initial channels
5040 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5042 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
5043 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5044 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5045 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5046 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5048 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5049 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5050 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
5051 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5053 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5054 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5055 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5056 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5058 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5059 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5062 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5063 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5066 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5067 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5068 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5069 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5070 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5074 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5075 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5077 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5078 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5079 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5080 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5081 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5082 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5085 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5086 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5087 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5088 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5089 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5090 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5091 // use the same payment hashes.
5092 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5097 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5098 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5099 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5100 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5101 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5102 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5103 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5104 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5105 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5106 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5108 let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5109 let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5110 let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5111 let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5112 let chan_3_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
5114 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5115 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5116 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5117 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5119 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
5120 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5122 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5124 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5125 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5127 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5129 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5131 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5133 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5134 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5136 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5138 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5141 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5143 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5144 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5147 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5149 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5150 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5152 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5153 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5154 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5155 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
5156 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5158 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5159 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5160 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5161 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5162 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5163 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5166 let failed_destinations = vec![
5167 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
5168 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
5169 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
5170 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
5172 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
5173 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5175 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5176 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5177 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5178 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5179 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5180 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5182 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5183 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5184 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5185 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5187 let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5188 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5189 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5191 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5192 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5194 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5195 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5196 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5197 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5199 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5201 // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5202 let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5203 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5204 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5205 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5206 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5207 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5208 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5210 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5211 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5212 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5213 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5214 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5215 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5216 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5217 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5218 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5219 if deliver_last_raa {
5220 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5222 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5225 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5226 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5227 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5228 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5230 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5231 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5232 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5234 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5235 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5236 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5238 if announce_latest {
5239 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5241 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5243 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5244 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5245 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5246 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5248 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5249 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5252 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5253 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5256 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5257 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5258 if deliver_last_raa {
5259 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5261 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5262 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5264 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5265 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5267 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5270 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5274 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5275 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5276 let mut a_done = false;
5277 for msg in cs_msgs {
5279 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5280 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5281 // should be failed-backwards here.
5282 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5283 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5284 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5285 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5287 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5292 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5293 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5294 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5296 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5297 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5300 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5301 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5302 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5303 if announce_latest {
5304 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5305 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5306 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5309 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5311 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5315 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5316 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 10 } else { 6 });
5317 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5318 let mut as_updates = 0;
5319 for event in as_events.iter() {
5320 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5321 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5322 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5323 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5325 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5327 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5330 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5331 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5333 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5334 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5335 if announce_latest {
5336 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5337 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5339 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5341 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5342 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 8 } else { 6 });
5343 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5344 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5345 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5346 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5347 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5348 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5349 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5351 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5353 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5356 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5357 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5359 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5360 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5361 if announce_latest {
5362 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5364 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5366 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5367 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5368 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5369 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5370 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5371 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5375 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5376 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5380 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5381 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5385 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5386 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5387 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5388 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5392 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5393 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5394 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5395 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5396 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5398 // Create some initial channels
5399 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5401 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5402 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5403 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5404 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5406 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5407 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5408 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5409 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5410 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5411 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5413 let htlc_timeout = {
5414 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5415 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5416 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5417 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5418 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5422 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5423 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5424 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5426 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5427 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5428 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5429 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5430 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5431 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5432 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5433 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5434 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5435 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5436 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5440 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5441 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with a key
5442 // manager rotation to test that `channel_keys_id` returned in
5443 // [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] let us re-derive the channel key set to
5444 // then derive a `delayed_payment_key`.
5446 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5448 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5449 let seed = [42; 32];
5450 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5451 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5452 let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger));
5453 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
5454 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), &scorer);
5455 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, router, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, override_init_features: alloc::rc::Rc::new(core::cell::RefCell::new(None)) };
5456 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5457 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5458 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5460 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5461 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5463 // Create some initial channels
5464 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5466 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5467 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5468 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5470 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5471 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5472 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5473 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5474 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5476 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5477 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5478 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5479 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5480 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5482 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5483 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5484 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5485 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5486 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5487 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5488 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5489 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5492 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5493 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5494 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5495 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5496 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5497 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5499 let htlc_timeout = {
5500 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5501 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5502 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5503 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5504 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5508 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5509 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5510 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5512 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5513 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5514 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5515 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5516 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5517 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5518 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5519 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5520 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5521 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5522 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5523 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5527 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5528 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5529 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5530 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5531 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5533 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5535 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5536 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5538 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5539 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5540 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5542 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5543 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5544 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5546 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5547 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5548 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5550 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5551 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5552 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5555 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5556 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5557 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5558 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5559 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5560 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5562 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5564 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5565 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5566 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5567 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5568 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5570 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5571 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5572 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
5574 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5575 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5576 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5577 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5578 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5580 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5581 let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5582 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5583 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5584 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5586 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5587 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5588 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5589 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5592 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5593 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5594 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5595 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5596 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5597 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5599 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5600 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
5601 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5602 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5604 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5606 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5607 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5608 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5610 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5611 let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5613 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5614 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5615 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5617 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5618 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5619 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5620 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5623 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5624 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5625 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5626 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5627 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5628 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5630 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5631 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5632 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5633 // actually revoked.
5634 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5635 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5636 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5637 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
5638 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5640 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5641 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5642 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5643 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5644 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5645 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5646 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5647 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5648 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5649 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5651 if check_revoke_no_close {
5652 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5653 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5656 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5657 let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5658 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5659 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5660 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5662 if !check_revoke_no_close {
5663 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5664 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5665 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5666 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5668 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5672 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5673 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5674 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5675 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5676 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5677 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5678 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5680 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5681 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5682 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5684 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5685 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5686 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5688 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5689 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5693 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5694 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5695 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5696 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5697 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5702 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5703 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5704 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5705 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5706 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5707 // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5708 for node in nodes.iter() {
5709 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5712 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5713 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5714 let push_msat=10001;
5715 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5716 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5717 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5718 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5720 // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5721 // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5722 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5726 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5727 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5728 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5729 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5730 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5732 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5733 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5734 let push_msat=10001;
5735 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5737 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5738 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5739 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5740 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5741 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5743 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5744 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5745 let push_msat=10001;
5746 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5747 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5748 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5750 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5751 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5752 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5754 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5755 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5756 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5758 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5759 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5760 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5762 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5763 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5764 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5765 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5766 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5767 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5771 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5772 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5773 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5774 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5775 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5777 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5778 let push_msat=10001;
5779 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5780 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5781 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5782 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5784 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5785 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5786 let err_msg = match events[0] {
5787 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5790 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5792 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5795 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5796 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5797 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5798 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5800 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5801 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5802 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5803 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5804 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5805 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5807 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5808 // pending_update_fee.
5810 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5811 *feerate_lock += 20;
5813 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5814 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5816 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5817 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5818 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5819 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5820 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5822 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5825 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5827 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5828 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5829 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5830 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5832 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5833 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
5834 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5836 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5837 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
5838 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5839 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5840 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5842 // Flush the pending fee update.
5843 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5844 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5845 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5846 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5847 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5849 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5850 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5851 // us to surface its failure to the user.
5852 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5853 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5854 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", chan.2), 1);
5856 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5857 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5858 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5860 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5861 assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5862 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5863 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5864 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
5866 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5869 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5870 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5872 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5876 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5877 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5878 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5880 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5881 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5882 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5883 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5884 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5885 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5887 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5888 // pending_update_fee.
5890 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5891 *feerate_lock += 200;
5893 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5894 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5896 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5897 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5898 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5899 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5900 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5902 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5905 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5907 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5908 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5909 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5910 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5912 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5914 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features) - amt_1;
5915 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
5916 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
5918 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
5919 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, payment_hash_1,
5920 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
5921 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5922 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
5923 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5924 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
5925 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
5926 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5927 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
5929 // Flush the pending fee update.
5930 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5931 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5932 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5933 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
5934 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5935 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
5937 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
5938 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
5939 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
5940 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5941 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5942 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", chan.2), 1);
5944 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
5945 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5946 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5948 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5949 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5950 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5951 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5952 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
5954 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5957 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5958 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5960 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5963 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
5964 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
5965 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5966 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
5967 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
5969 let raa = match send_raa_event {
5970 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
5971 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5973 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5974 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5975 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5976 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5977 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5978 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5980 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5981 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5983 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5984 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5985 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5987 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => {},
5988 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5990 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5991 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5992 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
5994 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5995 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5996 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
5997 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6000 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6001 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6002 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6005 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6006 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6007 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6008 // Avoid having to include routing fees in calculations
6009 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6010 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 0;
6011 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
6012 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6013 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6014 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6015 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
6017 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6018 // pending_update_fee.
6020 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6021 *feerate_lock += 20;
6023 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6024 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6026 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6027 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6028 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6029 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6030 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6032 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6035 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6037 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
6038 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6039 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
6040 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
6042 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6043 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
6044 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6045 let payment_event = {
6046 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6047 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6048 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6050 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6051 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6053 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6055 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6056 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6057 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6058 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6060 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_1_2.2);
6061 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6063 // Flush the pending fee update.
6064 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6065 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6066 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6067 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6068 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6069 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6071 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6072 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6073 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6075 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6076 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6079 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6082 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6083 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6084 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6086 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6087 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6088 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
6089 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6090 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6091 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6094 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6095 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6096 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6098 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6099 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6100 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6101 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6102 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6103 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6104 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6105 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6106 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6107 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6109 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6112 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6113 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6114 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6116 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6117 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6118 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6119 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6120 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6122 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6123 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6124 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6125 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6126 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6128 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6129 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6133 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6134 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6135 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6138 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6139 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6140 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6141 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6142 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6143 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6144 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6146 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6147 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 100;
6149 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6150 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6151 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6152 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6156 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6157 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6158 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6159 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6160 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6161 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6162 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6164 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6165 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 0;
6166 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6167 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)),
6168 true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6169 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6171 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6172 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC", 1);
6176 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6177 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6178 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6179 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6180 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6181 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6182 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6184 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6185 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6186 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6187 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6188 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6189 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6191 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6192 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6193 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6194 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6195 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() },
6196 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6200 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6201 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6202 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6203 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6204 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6205 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6206 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6207 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6209 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6210 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
6211 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000);
6212 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6213 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6214 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6215 ), true, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6216 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6220 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6221 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6222 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6223 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6224 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6225 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6226 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6227 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6228 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6229 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6230 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6232 // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
6233 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6234 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6235 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6236 let payment_event = {
6237 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6238 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6239 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6241 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6242 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6243 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6244 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6248 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6250 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6251 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6252 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6254 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6255 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6257 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6258 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6259 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6261 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6265 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6266 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6267 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6268 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6269 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6270 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6271 let channel_value = 100000;
6272 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0);
6273 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6275 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6277 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6278 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6280 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6281 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6282 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6283 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6284 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6286 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6289 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6291 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6292 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6293 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6294 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6295 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6296 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6297 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6298 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6300 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6301 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6302 let channel = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6303 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.context().get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6306 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6307 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6308 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6309 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6310 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6311 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6312 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6313 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6314 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6315 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6316 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6317 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6321 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6322 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6323 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6324 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6325 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6326 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6327 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6329 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6330 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6331 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6332 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6333 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6334 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
6336 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6337 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6338 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6339 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6340 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6341 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6343 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6344 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6345 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6346 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6347 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6349 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6350 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6351 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6352 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6353 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6357 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6358 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6359 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6360 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6361 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6362 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6363 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6364 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6366 let send_amt = 3999999;
6367 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
6368 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
6369 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = send_amt;
6370 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6371 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6372 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6373 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
6374 &route.paths[0], send_amt, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6375 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6377 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6381 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6382 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6383 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6384 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6388 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6389 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6391 msg.htlc_id = (50) as u64;
6392 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6394 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6395 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6396 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6397 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6398 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6402 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6403 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6404 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6405 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6406 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6407 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6408 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6410 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6411 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6412 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6413 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6414 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6415 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6416 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6418 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6419 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6420 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6421 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6422 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
6426 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6427 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6428 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6429 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6430 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6431 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6433 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6434 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6435 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6436 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6437 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6438 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6439 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6440 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6442 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6443 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6444 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6445 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6446 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6450 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6451 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6452 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6453 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6454 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6455 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6456 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6457 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6459 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6460 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6461 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6462 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6463 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6464 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6465 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6467 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6468 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6469 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6470 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
6471 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
6473 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6474 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6475 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
6476 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
6478 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6479 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6480 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6481 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6482 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6483 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6486 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6487 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6488 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6489 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6490 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6492 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6494 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6495 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6496 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6497 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6498 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6502 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6503 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6505 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6506 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6507 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6508 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6509 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6510 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6511 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6512 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6514 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6515 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6516 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6518 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6521 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6524 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6526 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6527 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6528 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6530 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6534 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6535 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6537 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6538 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6539 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6540 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6541 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6543 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6544 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6545 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6546 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6547 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6548 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6550 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6553 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6556 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6558 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6559 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6560 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6561 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6562 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6566 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6567 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6569 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6570 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6571 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6572 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6573 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6575 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6576 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6577 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6578 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6579 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6580 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6581 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6584 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6585 failure_code: 0x8000,
6588 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6590 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6591 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6592 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6593 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6594 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6598 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6599 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6601 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6602 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6603 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6604 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6605 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6607 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6609 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6610 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6611 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6613 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6614 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6615 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6617 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6618 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6619 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6620 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6621 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6622 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6623 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6625 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6629 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6631 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6633 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6634 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6635 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6636 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6637 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6641 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6642 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6644 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6645 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6646 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6647 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6648 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6650 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6652 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6653 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6654 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6656 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6657 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6658 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6660 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6661 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6662 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6663 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6664 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6665 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6666 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6668 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6672 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6674 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6676 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6677 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6678 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6679 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6680 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6684 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6685 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6687 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6688 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6689 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6690 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6691 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6693 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6694 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6695 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6696 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6698 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6699 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6701 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6702 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6703 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6705 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6707 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6709 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6710 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6711 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6712 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6713 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6714 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6715 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6717 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6720 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6721 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6723 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6724 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6725 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6726 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6727 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
6731 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6732 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6733 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6735 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6736 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6737 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6738 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6739 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6740 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000);
6742 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6745 let mut payment_event = {
6746 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6747 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6748 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6749 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6750 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6751 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6753 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6754 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6755 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6756 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6757 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6758 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6759 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6760 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6761 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6764 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6765 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6766 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6767 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6769 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6770 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6771 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6773 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6774 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6775 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6776 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6777 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6778 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6779 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6781 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6785 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6787 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6788 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6789 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6790 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6791 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6793 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6795 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6796 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6797 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6798 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6799 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6800 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6802 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6805 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6809 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
6810 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6811 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6812 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6813 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6814 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6815 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6817 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
6820 let mut payment_event = {
6821 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6822 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6823 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6824 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
6827 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6828 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6829 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6830 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6831 payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
6832 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6835 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
6836 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6837 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6838 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6840 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6841 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6843 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6844 let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
6845 // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
6846 update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
6848 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6849 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6851 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6854 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
6855 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
6856 node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6857 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6858 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6859 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6862 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6863 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6864 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6866 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6869 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6870 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 2);
6872 // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
6873 // the node originating the error to its next hop.
6875 Event::PaymentPathFailed { error_code, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }) }, ..
6877 assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
6878 assert!(is_permanent);
6879 assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
6881 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6884 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6885 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6887 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6890 // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
6893 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6894 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6895 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6896 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6898 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6899 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6900 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6901 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6902 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6903 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6905 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6906 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6908 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6909 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6910 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6911 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6913 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6914 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6916 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6917 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
6918 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6919 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
6920 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6922 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6923 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6924 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6925 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6927 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6928 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6930 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6932 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6933 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6935 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6938 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6939 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6941 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6944 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6945 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6946 if announce_latest {
6947 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6949 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6952 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6953 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6954 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6956 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6957 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6958 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6959 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6960 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
6961 let mut first_failed = false;
6962 for event in events {
6964 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6965 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6966 assert!(!first_failed);
6967 first_failed = true;
6969 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6972 Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {}
6973 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6979 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6980 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6981 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6984 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6985 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6986 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6987 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6988 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6989 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6990 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6992 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6993 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6994 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6995 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6996 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6998 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6999 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7001 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7002 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7004 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7005 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7007 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7009 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7010 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7013 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7015 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7016 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7017 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7018 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7019 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7021 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7022 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7023 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7024 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7025 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
7026 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7027 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7028 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7029 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7030 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7031 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7033 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7034 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7035 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7036 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7037 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7038 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7040 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7041 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
7042 .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
7043 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7044 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
7045 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
7046 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7049 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7051 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 11);
7053 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
7054 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7055 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7056 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7057 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7062 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7063 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7064 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7065 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7069 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7070 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7072 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7073 low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7074 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7075 high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7076 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7077 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7078 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7079 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7080 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7082 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in OutboundV1Channel::new()
7083 if let Err(error) = OutboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7084 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7085 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
7088 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7089 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7091 } else { assert!(false) }
7093 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
7094 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7095 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7096 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7097 if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7098 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7099 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7102 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7103 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7105 } else { assert!(false); }
7107 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7108 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7109 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7110 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7111 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7112 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
7114 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7116 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7117 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7118 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7122 } else { panic!(); }
7123 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7125 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
7126 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7127 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7128 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7129 if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7130 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7131 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7134 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7135 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7137 } else { assert!(false); }
7141 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7142 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7143 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7144 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7146 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7147 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7148 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7149 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7151 // Create some initial channels
7152 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7154 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7155 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7156 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
7157 TEST_FINAL_CLTV).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
7158 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000);
7159 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(),
7160 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7161 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7162 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
7163 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
7164 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7165 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7167 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7168 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7169 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7170 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7171 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7173 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7174 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7175 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7176 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7178 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7179 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7180 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7182 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7183 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7184 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7185 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7186 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7187 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7188 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7189 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7190 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7191 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7193 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7195 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7197 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7198 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7200 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7201 let mut expected_failure_data = (10_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7202 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH.to_be_bytes());
7203 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7207 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7208 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7209 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7211 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7212 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7213 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7214 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7216 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7217 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0);
7218 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7221 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7222 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7224 for _ in 0..DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS + 1 {
7225 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7227 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7228 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7229 let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7230 for e in msg_events {
7232 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7233 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7234 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7235 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7236 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7239 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7243 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
7244 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
7246 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7247 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7248 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
7249 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
7251 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7252 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7254 // Reestablish chan_1
7255 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7256 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7257 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7258 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7259 // Reestablish chan_2
7260 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7261 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7262 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7263 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7264 // Reestablish chan_3
7265 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7266 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7267 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7268 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7270 for _ in 0..ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
7271 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7273 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7274 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7275 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7276 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7277 for e in msg_events {
7279 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7280 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7281 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7282 // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7284 Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7285 None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7288 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7291 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7292 assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7296 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7297 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7298 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7300 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7301 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7302 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7303 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7305 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7307 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7308 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 30)
7309 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
7310 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000);
7311 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7313 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7314 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7315 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7316 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7317 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7318 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7320 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7321 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7322 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7323 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7327 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7328 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7330 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7331 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7332 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(header_114, 42, vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()]));
7333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7335 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7339 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7340 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor)
7341 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7342 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7343 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7344 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7345 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7346 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7350 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7351 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7352 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7353 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7355 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7356 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7357 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7358 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7359 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7360 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7361 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7362 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7363 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7364 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7365 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7366 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7367 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7371 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7373 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7374 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7376 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7378 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7379 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7380 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7381 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7382 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7383 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7384 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7385 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7386 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7387 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7388 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7389 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7390 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7394 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7396 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7397 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7401 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7402 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7403 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7405 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7406 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7407 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7408 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7409 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7411 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7412 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7413 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
7414 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7415 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7416 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 3_000_000);
7417 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7418 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7419 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7420 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
7421 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 3_000_000);
7422 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7423 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7424 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7426 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7427 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7428 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7430 // Revoke local commitment tx
7431 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7433 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7434 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]));
7435 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7436 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7437 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7438 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 50); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7440 let revoked_htlc_txn = {
7441 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
7442 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
7444 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7445 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7446 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7448 assert_eq!(txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7449 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7450 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 1);
7451 check_spends!(txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7456 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7457 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7458 let block_11 = create_dummy_block(hash_128, 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]);
7459 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_11);
7460 let block_129 = create_dummy_block(block_11.block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()]);
7461 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_129);
7462 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7463 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7464 match events.last().unwrap() {
7465 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7466 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7472 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7473 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7474 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7476 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7477 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7478 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7479 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7481 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7482 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7483 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7484 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7485 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7486 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7488 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7489 // available, which we check here:
7490 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7491 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7492 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7494 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7495 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7497 // node_txn[3] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7498 // output, checked above).
7499 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 2);
7500 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].output.len(), 1);
7501 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7503 first = node_txn[3].txid();
7504 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7505 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[3].output[0].value;
7506 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight() as u64;
7507 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7511 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7512 let block_130 = create_dummy_block(block_129.block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn);
7513 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_130);
7514 let block_131 = create_dummy_block(block_130.block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
7515 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_131);
7517 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7518 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7519 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7520 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7522 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7523 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7525 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7526 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7527 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7528 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7529 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7530 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7531 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7532 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7536 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7537 connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(header_144, 42, node_txn));
7538 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7540 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7541 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7542 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7543 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7544 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7545 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7546 // up bumped justice generation.
7547 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7550 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7551 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7555 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7556 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7557 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7560 // Provide preimage for one
7561 // Check aggregation
7563 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7564 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7565 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7566 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7568 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7569 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7570 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7572 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7573 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7574 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7575 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7576 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7578 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7579 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7580 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7581 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7582 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7583 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7585 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7589 let feerate_timeout;
7590 let feerate_preimage;
7592 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7593 // 3 transactions including:
7594 // preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
7595 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7596 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7597 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7598 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7599 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7600 check_spends!(node_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
7601 check_spends!(node_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
7603 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7604 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7605 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7606 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7608 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7609 (node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[1].clone())
7611 (node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone())
7614 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
7615 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7616 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
7618 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
7619 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7620 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
7621 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight() as u64;
7625 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7626 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7628 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7629 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7631 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7632 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7633 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7634 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7635 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7636 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7638 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7639 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7640 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
7641 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7642 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7644 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7645 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7646 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7647 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7648 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7653 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7654 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7658 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7659 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7660 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7661 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7662 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7663 // TestChannelSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7664 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7665 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7667 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7668 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7669 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7670 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7671 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
7673 let per_commitment_secret;
7674 let next_per_commitment_point;
7676 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7677 let mut guard = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7678 let keys = guard.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).map(
7679 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7680 ).flatten().unwrap().get_signer();
7682 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7684 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7685 keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7686 per_commitment_secret = keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7688 // Must revoke without gaps
7689 keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7690 keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7692 keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7693 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7694 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7697 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7698 &msgs::RevokeAndACK {
7700 per_commitment_secret,
7701 next_per_commitment_point,
7703 next_local_nonce: None,
7705 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7706 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7707 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() }
7708 , [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7712 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7713 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7714 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7716 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7717 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7718 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7719 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7721 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7722 // Lock HTLC in both directions
7723 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
7724 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
7726 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7727 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7728 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7730 // Revoke local commitment tx
7731 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
7733 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7734 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7735 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7736 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7738 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7739 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7740 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7741 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7743 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7744 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3
7745 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7746 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7747 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7748 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7752 connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn));
7753 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7755 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7756 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7757 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7762 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7763 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7764 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7765 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7766 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7767 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7768 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7770 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000);
7772 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7773 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7774 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7775 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7776 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7778 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7779 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7780 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7781 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7783 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7784 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7785 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7786 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7787 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7789 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7790 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7791 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7793 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7798 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7799 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7800 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7801 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7802 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7804 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7805 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7806 override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7808 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7810 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7811 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7812 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
7813 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
7817 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7818 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7819 zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7820 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7821 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7822 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7823 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7825 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7826 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7827 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7829 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7830 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7831 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7835 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
7836 // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
7837 // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
7838 // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
7839 // 90% of the `channel_value`.
7840 // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
7842 let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
7843 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7844 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
7845 let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
7846 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7847 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
7848 let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
7849 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7850 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
7851 let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
7852 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7853 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
7855 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7856 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7857 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
7858 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7860 let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
7861 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7862 let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
7863 let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
7864 let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
7866 let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7867 let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7869 // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7870 // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7871 assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
7872 // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7873 // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7874 assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
7876 // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7877 // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
7879 assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7880 // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7881 // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
7883 assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7887 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
7888 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7889 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7890 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7891 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7892 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7893 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7895 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7896 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7898 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7900 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7901 // accepting the inbound channel request.
7902 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7904 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7906 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7907 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
7909 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7912 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7913 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7915 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7916 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7917 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7919 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7922 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7924 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7925 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7927 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7929 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
7930 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
7932 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7937 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
7938 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7939 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7940 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7941 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7942 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7943 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7945 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7946 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7948 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7950 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7951 // rejecting the inbound channel request.
7952 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7954 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7956 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7957 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7959 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7962 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7963 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7965 match close_msg_ev[0] {
7966 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
7967 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7969 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7972 // There should be no more events to process, as the channel was never opened.
7973 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
7977 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
7978 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7979 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7980 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7981 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7982 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7983 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7985 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7986 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7988 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7990 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7991 // accepting the inbound channel request.
7992 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7994 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7996 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7997 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
7998 let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8000 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8001 assert_eq!(err, "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.");
8003 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8004 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected Error {:?}", e),
8007 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8010 // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8011 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8012 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8014 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8015 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8016 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8018 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8023 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8024 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8025 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8026 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8027 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8029 let unknown_channel_id = ChannelId::new_zero();
8030 let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8032 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8033 assert_eq!(err, "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.");
8035 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8036 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected Error: {:?}", e),
8041 fn test_onion_value_mpp_set_calculation() {
8042 // Test that we use the onion value `amt_to_forward` when
8043 // calculating whether we've reached the `total_msat` of an MPP
8044 // by having a routing node forward more than `amt_to_forward`
8045 // and checking that the receiving node doesn't generate
8046 // a PaymentClaimable event too early
8048 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8049 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8050 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8051 let mut nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8053 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8054 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8055 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8056 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8058 let total_msat = 100_000;
8059 let expected_paths: &[&[&Node]] = &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]];
8060 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], total_msat);
8061 let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8063 let mut path_1 = sample_path.clone();
8064 path_1.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8065 path_1.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8066 path_1.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
8067 path_1.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8068 path_1.hops[1].fee_msat = 100_000;
8069 route.paths.push(path_1);
8071 let mut path_2 = sample_path.clone();
8072 path_2.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8073 path_2.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8074 path_2.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
8075 path_2.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8076 path_2.hops[1].fee_msat = 1_000;
8077 route.paths.push(path_2);
8080 let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8081 let onion_session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8082 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8083 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8084 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8085 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], expected_paths.len());
8087 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8088 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8091 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[0][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8092 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8093 let mut prev_node = &nodes[0];
8095 for (idx, &node) in expected_paths[0].iter().enumerate() {
8096 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
8098 if idx == 0 { // routing node
8099 let session_priv = [3; 32];
8100 let height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
8101 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv).unwrap();
8102 let mut onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
8103 let (mut onion_payloads, _, _) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 100_000,
8104 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), height + 1, &None).unwrap();
8105 // Edit amt_to_forward to simulate the sender having set
8106 // the final amount and the routing node taking less fee
8107 if let msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive { ref mut amt_msat, .. } = onion_payloads[1] {
8110 let new_onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
8111 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet = new_onion_packet;
8114 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8115 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
8116 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8117 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(node);
8120 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8121 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8122 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
8123 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
8124 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
8126 let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8127 assert!(events_2.is_empty());
8134 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[1][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8135 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], expected_paths[1], 101_000, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, true, None);
8137 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8140 fn do_test_overshoot_mpp(msat_amounts: &[u64], total_msat: u64) {
8142 let routing_node_count = msat_amounts.len();
8143 let node_count = routing_node_count + 2;
8145 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8146 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8147 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8148 let nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8153 // Create channels for each amount
8154 let mut expected_paths = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8155 let mut src_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8156 let mut dst_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8157 for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8158 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8159 let src_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, src_idx, routing_node).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8160 src_chan_ids.push(src_chan_id);
8161 let dst_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, routing_node, dst_idx).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8162 dst_chan_ids.push(dst_chan_id);
8163 let path = vec![&nodes[routing_node], &nodes[dst_idx]];
8164 expected_paths.push(path);
8166 let expected_paths: Vec<&[&Node]> = expected_paths.iter().map(|route| route.as_slice()).collect();
8168 // Create a route for each amount
8169 let example_amount = 100000;
8170 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[src_idx], nodes[dst_idx], example_amount);
8171 let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8172 for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8173 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8174 let mut path = sample_path.clone();
8175 path.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[routing_node].node.get_our_node_id();
8176 path.hops[0].short_channel_id = src_chan_ids[i];
8177 path.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[dst_idx].node.get_our_node_id();
8178 path.hops[1].short_channel_id = dst_chan_ids[i];
8179 path.hops[1].fee_msat = msat_amounts[i];
8180 route.paths.push(path);
8183 // Send payment with manually set total_msat
8184 let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[src_idx].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8185 let onion_session_privs = nodes[src_idx].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8186 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8187 nodes[src_idx].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8188 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8189 check_added_monitors!(nodes[src_idx], expected_paths.len());
8191 let mut events = nodes[src_idx].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8192 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8193 let mut amount_received = 0;
8194 for (path_idx, expected_path) in expected_paths.iter().enumerate() {
8195 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_path[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8197 let current_path_amount = msat_amounts[path_idx];
8198 amount_received += current_path_amount;
8199 let became_claimable_now = amount_received >= total_msat && amount_received - current_path_amount < total_msat;
8200 pass_along_path(&nodes[src_idx], expected_path, amount_received, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, became_claimable_now, None);
8203 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[src_idx], &expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8207 fn test_overshoot_mpp() {
8208 do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 101_000], 200_000);
8209 do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 10_000, 100_000], 200_000);
8213 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8214 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8215 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8216 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8217 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8218 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8220 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8221 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8222 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8223 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8225 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8226 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8227 route.paths.push(path);
8228 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8229 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8230 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8231 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8232 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8233 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8234 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8235 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8239 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8240 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8241 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8242 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8243 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8244 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8246 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8249 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
8250 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8251 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8252 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8253 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8254 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8255 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8256 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8257 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8259 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8260 // values from previous calls.
8261 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8262 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8263 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8265 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref purpose, .. } => {
8267 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8268 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8270 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8273 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8278 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8279 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8280 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8281 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8282 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8283 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8285 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8287 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8288 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8289 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, None).unwrap();
8290 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8292 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8293 // resulting events.
8294 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8295 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8296 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8297 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8298 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8299 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8300 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8302 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8303 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8304 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8305 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8308 // We should fail the payment back
8309 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8310 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8311 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8312 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8313 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8315 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8320 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8321 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8322 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8324 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8325 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
8326 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8327 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8328 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8330 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8331 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8332 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8333 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8334 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8336 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8337 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8338 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8339 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8340 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8344 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8345 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8346 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8347 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8350 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8351 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8352 // commitment at same time.
8354 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8355 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8356 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8357 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8359 // Create some initial channel
8360 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8361 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8363 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8364 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8366 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8367 let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8369 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8370 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8371 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8372 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8375 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8376 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
8377 &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8378 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8381 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8382 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8385 let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8386 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8387 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8388 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 200));
8389 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8391 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8392 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8393 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8394 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8396 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8397 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8398 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8400 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8401 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8402 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut channel) = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2) {
8403 if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8404 assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8405 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8406 } else { assert!(false); }
8411 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8412 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8413 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8414 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8418 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8419 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8420 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8421 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8422 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8424 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8425 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8426 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8427 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8429 // Create some initial channel
8430 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8431 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8433 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8434 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8436 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8437 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8439 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8440 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8441 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8442 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8443 let alice_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(
8444 Arc::new(Mutex::new(nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().clone())),
8446 let watchtower_alice = {
8448 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8449 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
8450 &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8451 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8454 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &alice_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8455 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8458 let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8459 // Make Alice aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating transaction lock time
8460 // requirements here.
8461 const HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST: u32 = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8462 alice_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST) as usize, (block.clone(), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST));
8463 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8465 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8467 let mut txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8468 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8472 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8473 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8474 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8475 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8476 let bob_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(Arc::clone(&alice_broadcaster.blocks));
8477 let watchtower_bob = {
8479 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8480 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
8481 &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8482 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8485 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &bob_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8486 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8489 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST - 1);
8491 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8492 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8493 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8494 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8495 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8497 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8498 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8499 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8501 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8502 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8503 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut channel) = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2) {
8504 if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8505 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8506 assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8507 assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8508 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8509 } else { assert!(false); }
8514 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8515 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8517 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8518 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8520 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8523 let mut txn = bob_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8524 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8525 bob_state_y = txn.remove(0);
8528 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8529 let height = HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST + 1;
8530 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
8531 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
8532 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
8533 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8534 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, vec![bob_state_y.clone()]), height);
8535 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
8537 let htlc_txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8538 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8539 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8540 // Alice doesn't clean up the old HTLC claim since it hasn't seen a conflicting spend for
8541 // it. However, she should, because it now has an invalid parent.
8542 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], alice_state);
8547 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8548 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8549 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8552 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8553 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8555 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8556 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8557 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8558 // before receiving funding_signed.
8559 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8560 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8561 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8562 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8564 // Create an initial channel
8565 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8566 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8567 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8568 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8569 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
8571 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8572 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8574 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8575 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8577 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8578 let channel_id = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8579 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8580 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8581 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("Hi".to_string()) }, true,
8582 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 100000);
8586 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8587 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8588 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8589 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8590 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8591 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8592 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8594 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8595 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8596 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8597 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8599 // Create some initial channels
8600 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8602 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8603 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8604 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8605 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8606 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8607 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8609 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8610 let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![local_txn[0].clone()]);
8611 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
8612 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8613 // this test before #653 fix.
8614 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &block, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8615 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8616 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8617 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8618 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
8620 let htlc_timeout = {
8621 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8622 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8623 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8624 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8625 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
8629 connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![htlc_timeout.clone()]));
8630 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8631 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
8634 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8635 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8636 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8637 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8639 // Steps of the test:
8640 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8641 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8642 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8643 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8644 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8645 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8646 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8647 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8648 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8649 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8650 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8651 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8653 // Create some initial channels
8654 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8655 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001);
8657 // Steps (1) and (2):
8658 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8659 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8661 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8662 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8663 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8664 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8665 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8666 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8667 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8669 // Steps (3) and (4):
8670 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8671 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8672 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8673 let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8676 if !broadcast_alice {
8677 force_closing_node = 1;
8678 counterparty_node = 0;
8680 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8681 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8682 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8683 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8684 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8685 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8686 true => alice_txn.clone(),
8687 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8689 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8690 if broadcast_alice {
8691 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8692 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8693 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8698 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8699 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8700 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8701 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8702 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8704 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8705 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8706 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8707 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8708 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8709 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8711 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8712 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
8713 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8714 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8715 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8716 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8718 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8719 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8721 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8724 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8725 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8726 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8727 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8729 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8730 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8731 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8732 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8733 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8736 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8738 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8739 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8740 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8743 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8746 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8747 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8748 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8749 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8751 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8752 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8753 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8754 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8755 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8758 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8760 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8761 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8763 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8764 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8765 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8766 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8767 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8768 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8769 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8770 if broadcast_alice {
8771 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8772 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8773 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8775 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8776 if broadcast_alice {
8777 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8778 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8780 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8781 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8786 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8787 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8789 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8790 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8791 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8793 // If Alice force-closed, Bob only broadcasts a HTLC-output-claiming transaction. Otherwise,
8794 // Bob force-closed and broadcasts the commitment transaction along with a
8795 // HTLC-output-claiming transaction.
8796 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8797 if broadcast_alice {
8798 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8799 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8800 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8802 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8803 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8804 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8810 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8811 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8812 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8813 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8814 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8818 fn test_duplicate_temporary_channel_id_from_different_peers() {
8819 // Tests that we can accept two different `OpenChannel` requests with the same
8820 // `temporary_channel_id`, as long as they are from different peers.
8821 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8822 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8823 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8824 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8826 // Create an first channel channel
8827 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8828 let mut open_chan_msg_chan_1_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8830 // Create an second channel
8831 nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None).unwrap();
8832 let mut open_chan_msg_chan_2_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8834 // Modify the `OpenChannel` from `nodes[2]` to `nodes[0]` to ensure that it uses the same
8835 // `temporary_channel_id` as the `OpenChannel` from nodes[1] to nodes[0].
8836 open_chan_msg_chan_2_0.temporary_channel_id = open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id;
8838 // Assert that `nodes[0]` can accept both `OpenChannel` requests, even though they use the same
8839 // `temporary_channel_id` as they are from different peers.
8840 nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_1_0);
8842 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8843 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8845 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8846 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8847 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8849 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8853 nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_2_0);
8855 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8856 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8858 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8859 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8860 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8862 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8868 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8869 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8870 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8872 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8873 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8874 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8875 // updating logic for the existing channel.
8876 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8877 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8878 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8879 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8881 // Create an initial channel
8882 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8883 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8884 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8885 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8887 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8888 // that it is rejected.
8889 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8891 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8892 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8894 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8895 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8896 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8897 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8898 // move forward with it.
8899 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8900 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8902 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8906 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8907 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8909 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8910 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8912 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8913 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8915 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8916 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8917 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8918 added_monitors.clear();
8920 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8922 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8924 let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8925 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8927 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8930 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8931 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8932 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8933 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8934 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8936 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8937 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8939 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8940 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8941 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8942 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8943 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8945 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8949 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8950 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8951 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8952 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8953 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8954 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8956 let (_, funding_created) = {
8957 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8958 let mut a_peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8959 // Once we call `get_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
8960 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
8961 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
8962 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
8963 let mut as_chan = a_peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8964 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8965 as_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap()
8967 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8968 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8969 // At this point we'll look up if the channel_id is present and immediately fail the channel
8970 // without trying to persist the `ChannelMonitor`.
8971 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8973 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8975 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8976 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8978 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8979 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8980 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8981 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8982 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8984 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8988 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8989 // everything is functional.
8990 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8992 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8993 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8994 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8995 added_monitors.clear();
8997 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8999 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9000 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9001 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9002 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9004 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9005 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9006 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9008 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9012 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9013 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9015 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9016 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9017 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9018 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9019 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9020 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9021 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9023 // Create some initial channels
9024 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9025 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9026 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001);
9028 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9029 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9030 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9032 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9033 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9034 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9036 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9037 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9038 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9039 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9040 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) },
9041 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9042 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9043 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9044 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9045 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9047 // A null channel ID should close all channels
9048 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9049 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(), data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9050 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9051 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) },
9052 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 100000);
9053 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9054 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9056 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9057 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9059 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9062 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9063 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9065 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9067 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9068 // peer_disconnected.
9069 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9070 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9072 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9073 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9074 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9078 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9079 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9081 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9082 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9083 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9084 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9086 // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
9087 // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
9088 // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
9089 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9090 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9091 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9092 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9094 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9095 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9096 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9098 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9100 // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9101 // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9102 // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9104 let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9105 let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.into();
9106 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9107 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9108 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9111 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9112 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9113 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9114 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9116 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9118 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9120 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9121 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9123 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9124 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9125 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9127 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9128 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9129 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() },
9130 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9131 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9132 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9133 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9134 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9135 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9136 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9137 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9138 } else { panic!(); }
9139 } else { panic!(); }
9140 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9142 // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9143 // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9144 // as its not 32 bytes long.
9145 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9146 version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9147 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9148 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9152 script_sig: Script::new(),
9153 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
9154 witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9156 output: vec![TxOut {
9158 script_pubkey: Script::new(),
9161 check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9162 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9166 fn test_coinbase_funding_tx() {
9167 // Miners are able to fund channels directly from coinbase transactions, however
9168 // by consensus rules, outputs of a coinbase transaction are encumbered by a 100
9169 // block maturity timelock. To ensure that a (non-0conf) channel like this is enforceable
9170 // on-chain, the minimum depth is updated to 100 blocks for coinbase funding transactions.
9172 // Note that 0conf channels with coinbase funding transactions are unaffected and are
9173 // immediately operational after opening.
9174 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9175 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9176 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9177 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9179 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9180 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9182 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9183 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9185 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9187 // Create the coinbase funding transaction.
9188 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_coinbase_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9190 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9191 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9192 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9194 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9195 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9196 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9198 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9200 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9201 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9203 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9204 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9206 // Starting at height 0, we "confirm" the coinbase at height 1.
9207 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 1);
9208 // We connect 98 more blocks to have 99 confirmations for the coinbase transaction.
9209 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], COINBASE_MATURITY - 2);
9210 // Check that we have no pending message events (we have not queued a `channel_ready` yet).
9211 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9212 // Now connect one more block which results in 100 confirmations of the coinbase transaction.
9213 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
9214 // There should now be a `channel_ready` which can be handled.
9215 let _ = &nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(&nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9217 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9218 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], COINBASE_MATURITY - 2);
9219 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9220 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
9221 expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9222 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9225 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9226 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9227 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9228 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9229 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9230 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9231 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9232 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9233 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9234 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9235 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9236 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9237 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9238 // until we learned about an additional block.
9240 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9241 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9242 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9243 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9244 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9245 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9246 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9248 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9249 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9250 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9251 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9252 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9254 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9255 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9256 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9257 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9258 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9259 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9261 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9262 if !test_height_before_timelock {
9263 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9265 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9266 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9267 if test_height_before_timelock {
9268 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9269 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9270 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9271 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9273 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9274 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9275 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9276 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0].txid(), node_txn[0].txid());
9277 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9278 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9280 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9281 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9283 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9284 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9285 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9286 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9287 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9288 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
9289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9291 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9292 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9293 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9294 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9295 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9296 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9297 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9298 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9299 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9304 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9305 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9306 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9309 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9310 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9311 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9312 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9313 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9315 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9317 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9318 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
9319 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000).unwrap();
9321 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9324 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9325 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9326 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9327 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9328 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9329 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9330 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9331 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9333 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9334 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9337 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
9338 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9339 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
9340 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9341 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9342 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9343 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9344 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9345 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9346 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9347 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9348 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9349 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9352 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9353 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9355 if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9356 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9357 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9359 let expected_destinations = vec![
9360 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9361 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9363 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], expected_destinations);
9364 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9366 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9367 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9368 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9370 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9371 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9372 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9374 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9375 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 4);
9376 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9377 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9378 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
9379 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
9381 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9382 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9383 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9386 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9387 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9388 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9390 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
9392 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9397 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9398 // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9399 // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentClaimable` event.
9400 // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9401 // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9402 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9406 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9407 // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9408 // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9409 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9413 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9414 // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9415 // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9416 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9417 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9418 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9419 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9421 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9422 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9423 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9424 let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9426 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9427 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features()).unwrap();
9428 let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000).unwrap();
9429 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9430 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9431 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9432 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9433 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9436 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9438 let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9439 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9441 let session_privs = {
9442 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
9443 // ultimately have, just not right away.
9444 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
9445 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9446 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9447 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9449 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9450 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9451 &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9452 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9455 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9456 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9457 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9459 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9461 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9462 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9463 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9466 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9467 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9468 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9470 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9471 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9473 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9474 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9476 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9477 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9478 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9480 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9481 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9482 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9484 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9485 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9486 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9488 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9489 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9490 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9491 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9493 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9495 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9496 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9497 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9499 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9500 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9502 let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9503 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9504 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9506 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9508 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9509 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9510 &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9511 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9513 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9514 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9515 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9517 do_claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9518 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, Some(None), true, true);
9522 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9523 // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentClaimable event, the HTLCs
9524 // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9525 // PaymentClaimable event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9527 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9528 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9529 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9530 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9532 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9533 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9534 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9535 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9537 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9538 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9539 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9540 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9541 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9542 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9545 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9546 // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentClaimable event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9547 // amount of time to respond to.
9549 // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9550 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9551 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9553 let failed_destinations = vec![
9554 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9555 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9557 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
9559 pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash, PaymentFailureReason::RecipientRejected);
9561 // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9562 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9563 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9564 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9566 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9567 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9568 let node_1_msgs = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
9569 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), node_1_msgs, false, None);
9571 // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9572 // that PaymentClaimable event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9573 nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9574 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9575 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9578 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9579 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9580 enum ExposureEvent {
9581 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9583 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9585 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9586 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9589 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool, multiplier_dust_limit: bool) {
9590 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9593 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9594 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9595 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9596 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9597 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9598 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9599 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9600 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9602 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9603 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9604 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = if multiplier_dust_limit {
9605 // Default test fee estimator rate is 253 sat/kw, so we set the multiplier to 5_000_000 / 253
9606 // to get roughly the same initial value as the default setting when this test was
9607 // originally written.
9608 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253)
9609 } else { MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(5_000_000) }; // initial default setting value
9610 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9611 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9612 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9614 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9615 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9616 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9617 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9619 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9621 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9622 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9623 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9625 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9627 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9630 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
9631 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
9632 let mut chan = get_outbound_v1_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id);
9633 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9636 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9637 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9638 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9639 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9641 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9642 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9643 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9645 let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9646 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9647 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9649 // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
9650 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
9651 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
9653 let (dust_buffer_feerate, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat) = {
9654 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9655 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9656 let chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9657 (chan.context().get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64,
9658 chan.context().get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator(nodes[0].fee_estimator)))
9660 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9661 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9663 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9664 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9666 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 4;
9667 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9670 if dust_outbound_balance {
9671 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9672 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9673 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9674 for _ in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9675 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9676 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9677 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9680 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9681 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9682 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9683 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9684 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9688 if dust_outbound_balance {
9689 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9690 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9691 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
9692 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9693 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9694 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9697 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9698 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9699 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
9700 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9705 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9706 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat =
9707 if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 1 };
9708 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9710 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9711 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
9712 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
9714 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9715 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
9716 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
9718 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9719 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 4 });
9720 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9721 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9722 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9723 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9724 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9725 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9726 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9727 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9729 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9730 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9731 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9732 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9734 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9735 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
9736 format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
9737 dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1) + dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 4,
9738 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9740 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9741 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = 2_500_000;
9742 // For the multiplier dust exposure limit, since it scales with feerate,
9743 // we need to add a lot of HTLCs that will become dust at the new feerate
9744 // to cross the threshold.
9746 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash(&nodes[1], Some(1_000), None);
9747 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9748 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9751 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9752 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9754 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9755 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9756 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel", "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure", 1);
9759 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9760 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9761 added_monitors.clear();
9764 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(multiplier_dust_limit: bool) {
9765 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
9766 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
9767 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
9768 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
9769 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
9770 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
9771 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
9772 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
9773 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
9774 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
9775 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
9776 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
9780 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9781 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(false);
9782 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(true);
9786 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
9787 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9788 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9789 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9790 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9792 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9793 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9794 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
9795 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9796 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
9798 let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
9800 let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
9801 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9802 let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
9803 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9804 let mut tx = match events[0] {
9805 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
9806 // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 1.
9807 Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 2), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
9808 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9811 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9813 // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
9814 match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
9815 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9816 assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
9821 // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +1 headroom from best block.
9822 tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(tx.lock_time.0 - 1);
9823 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
9824 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9828 fn accept_busted_but_better_fee() {
9829 // If a peer sends us a fee update that is too low, but higher than our previous channel
9830 // feerate, we should accept it. In the future we may want to consider closing the channel
9831 // later, but for now we only accept the update.
9832 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9833 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9834 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9835 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9837 create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9839 // Set nodes[1] to expect 5,000 sat/kW.
9841 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9842 *feerate_lock = 5000;
9845 // If nodes[0] increases their feerate, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept it.
9847 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9848 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9850 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9851 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9853 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9854 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9856 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9857 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9858 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9860 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9863 // If nodes[0] increases their feerate further, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept
9866 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9867 *feerate_lock = 2000;
9869 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9870 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9872 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9873 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9875 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9876 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9877 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9879 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9882 // However, if nodes[0] decreases their feerate, nodes[1] should reject it and close the
9885 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9886 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9888 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9889 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9891 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9892 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9894 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
9895 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9896 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
9897 err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000 (- 250)".to_owned() },
9898 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9899 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9900 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9902 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9906 fn do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(valid_delta: bool, use_user_hash: bool) {
9907 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9908 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9909 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9910 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9911 let min_final_cltv_expiry_delta = 120;
9912 let final_cltv_expiry_delta = if valid_delta { min_final_cltv_expiry_delta + 2 } else {
9913 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta - 2 };
9914 let recv_value = 100_000;
9916 create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9918 let payment_parameters = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32);
9919 let (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = if use_user_hash {
9920 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1],
9921 Some(recv_value), Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta));
9922 (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret)
9924 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(recv_value), 7200, Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)).unwrap();
9925 (payment_hash, nodes[1].node.get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret).unwrap(), payment_secret)
9927 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_parameters, recv_value).unwrap();
9928 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9929 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9930 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9931 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9932 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9933 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9934 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9935 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9936 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9939 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, recv_value, if use_user_hash {
9940 None } else { Some(payment_preimage) }, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9942 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9944 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9946 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9948 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9949 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9950 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
9952 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9957 fn test_payment_with_custom_min_cltv_expiry_delta() {
9958 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, false);
9959 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, true);
9960 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, false);
9961 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, true);
9965 fn test_disconnects_peer_awaiting_response_ticks() {
9966 // Tests that nodes which are awaiting on a response critical for channel responsiveness
9967 // disconnect their counterparty after `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
9968 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9969 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9970 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9971 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9973 // Asserts a disconnect event is queued to the user.
9974 let check_disconnect_event = |node: &Node, should_disconnect: bool| {
9975 let disconnect_event = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
9976 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action, .. } = event {
9977 if let msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning { .. } = action {
9986 assert_eq!(disconnect_event.is_some(), should_disconnect);
9989 // Fires timer ticks ensuring we only attempt to disconnect peers after reaching
9990 // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
9991 let check_disconnect = |node: &Node| {
9992 // No disconnect without any timer ticks.
9993 check_disconnect_event(node, false);
9995 // No disconnect with 1 timer tick less than required.
9996 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS - 1 {
9997 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
9998 check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10001 // Disconnect after reaching the required ticks.
10002 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10003 check_disconnect_event(node, true);
10005 // Disconnect again on the next tick if the peer hasn't been disconnected yet.
10006 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10007 check_disconnect_event(node, true);
10010 create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10012 // We'll start by performing a fee update with Alice (nodes[0]) on the channel.
10013 *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
10014 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10015 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
10016 let alice_fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10017 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), alice_fee_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10018 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_fee_update.commitment_signed);
10019 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);
10021 // This will prompt Bob (nodes[1]) to respond with his `CommitmentSigned` and `RevokeAndACK`.
10022 let (bob_revoke_and_ack, bob_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10023 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revoke_and_ack);
10024 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
10025 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_commitment_signed);
10026 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10028 // Alice then needs to send her final `RevokeAndACK` to complete the commitment dance. We
10029 // pretend Bob hasn't received the message and check whether he'll disconnect Alice after
10030 // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10031 let alice_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10032 check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
10034 // Now, we'll reconnect them to test awaiting a `ChannelReestablish` message.
10036 // Note that since the commitment dance didn't complete above, Alice is expected to resend her
10037 // final `RevokeAndACK` to Bob to complete it.
10038 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10039 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10040 let bob_init = msgs::Init {
10041 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10043 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_init, true).unwrap();
10044 let alice_init = msgs::Init {
10045 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10047 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_init, true).unwrap();
10049 // Upon reconnection, Alice sends her `ChannelReestablish` to Bob. Alice, however, hasn't
10050 // received Bob's yet, so she should disconnect him after reaching
10051 // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10052 let alice_channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
10053 nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()
10055 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_channel_reestablish);
10056 check_disconnect(&nodes[0]);
10058 // Bob now sends his `ChannelReestablish` to Alice to resume the channel and consider it "live".
10059 let bob_channel_reestablish = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
10060 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = event {
10061 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10067 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_channel_reestablish);
10069 // Sanity check that Alice won't disconnect Bob since she's no longer waiting for any messages.
10070 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
10071 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10072 check_disconnect_event(&nodes[0], false);
10075 // However, Bob is still waiting on Alice's `RevokeAndACK`, so he should disconnect her after
10076 // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10077 check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
10079 // Finally, have Bob process the last message.
10080 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_revoke_and_ack);
10081 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10083 // At this point, neither node should attempt to disconnect each other, since they aren't
10084 // waiting on any messages.
10085 for node in &nodes {
10086 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
10087 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10088 check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10094 fn test_remove_expired_outbound_unfunded_channels() {
10095 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10096 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10097 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10098 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10100 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10101 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10102 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10103 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10104 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10106 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10107 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10109 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => (),
10110 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10113 // Asserts the outbound channel has been removed from a nodes[0]'s peer state map.
10114 let check_outbound_channel_existence = |should_exist: bool| {
10115 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10116 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10117 assert_eq!(chan_lock.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(&temp_channel_id), should_exist);
10120 // Channel should exist without any timer ticks.
10121 check_outbound_channel_existence(true);
10123 // Channel should exist with 1 timer tick less than required.
10124 for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS - 1 {
10125 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10126 check_outbound_channel_existence(true)
10129 // Remove channel after reaching the required ticks.
10130 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10131 check_outbound_channel_existence(false);
10133 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10134 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10135 match msg_events[0] {
10136 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
10137 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake");
10139 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10141 check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10145 fn test_remove_expired_inbound_unfunded_channels() {
10146 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10147 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10148 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10149 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10151 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10152 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10153 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10154 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10155 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10157 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10158 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10160 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => (),
10161 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10164 // Asserts the inbound channel has been removed from a nodes[1]'s peer state map.
10165 let check_inbound_channel_existence = |should_exist: bool| {
10166 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10167 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10168 assert_eq!(chan_lock.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(&temp_channel_id), should_exist);
10171 // Channel should exist without any timer ticks.
10172 check_inbound_channel_existence(true);
10174 // Channel should exist with 1 timer tick less than required.
10175 for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS - 1 {
10176 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10177 check_inbound_channel_existence(true)
10180 // Remove channel after reaching the required ticks.
10181 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10182 check_inbound_channel_existence(false);
10184 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10185 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10186 match msg_events[0] {
10187 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
10188 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake");
10190 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10192 check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10195 fn do_test_multi_post_event_actions(do_reload: bool) {
10196 // Tests handling multiple post-Event actions at once.
10197 // There is specific code in ChannelManager to handle channels where multiple post-Event
10198 // `ChannelMonitorUpdates` are pending at once. This test exercises that code.
10200 // Specifically, we test calling `get_and_clear_pending_events` while there are two
10201 // PaymentSents from different channels and one channel has two pending `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s
10202 // - one from an RAA and one from an inbound commitment_signed.
10203 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10204 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10205 let (persister, chain_monitor);
10206 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10207 let nodes_0_deserialized;
10208 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10210 let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
10211 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).2;
10213 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
10214 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
10216 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
10217 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
10219 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
10220 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10221 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 1_000_000);
10223 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
10224 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
10225 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 1_000_000);
10227 for dest in &[1, 2] {
10228 let htlc_fulfill_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[*dest], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10229 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[*dest].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fulfill_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10230 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[*dest], htlc_fulfill_updates.commitment_signed, false);
10231 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 0);
10234 let (route, payment_hash_3, _, payment_secret_3) =
10235 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
10236 let payment_id = PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0);
10237 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_3,
10238 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_3), payment_id).unwrap();
10239 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10241 let send_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
10242 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]);
10243 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg);
10244 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10247 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
10248 let chan_0_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).encode();
10249 let chan_1_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_2).encode();
10250 reload_node!(nodes[0], test_default_channel_config(), &nodes_0_serialized, &[&chan_0_monitor_serialized, &chan_1_monitor_serialized], persister, chain_monitor, nodes_0_deserialized);
10252 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10253 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10255 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
10256 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[2]));
10259 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10260 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
10261 if let Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } = events[0] {
10262 assert!(payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage || payment_preimage == payment_preimage_2);
10263 } else { panic!(); }
10264 if let Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } = events[1] {
10265 assert!(payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage || payment_preimage == payment_preimage_2);
10266 } else { panic!(); }
10267 if let Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } = events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
10268 if let Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } = events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
10270 // After the events are processed, the ChannelMonitorUpdates will be released and, upon their
10271 // completion, we'll respond to nodes[1] with an RAA + CS.
10272 get_revoke_commit_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10273 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 3);
10277 fn test_multi_post_event_actions() {
10278 do_test_multi_post_event_actions(true);
10279 do_test_multi_post_event_actions(false);