1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
20 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, KeysInterface};
21 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
22 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
23 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
24 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
25 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
26 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
27 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
28 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
29 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
31 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
32 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
33 use crate::util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
34 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
37 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
39 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
43 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
44 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
45 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxMerkleNode, TxOut, Witness};
46 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
54 use crate::prelude::*;
55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
56 use core::default::Default;
57 use core::iter::repeat;
58 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
59 use crate::sync::Mutex;
61 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
62 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
65 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
66 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
67 use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
68 let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
69 cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
70 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
71 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
72 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
73 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
75 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
77 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
78 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
79 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
81 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
82 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
84 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
85 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
87 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
88 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
89 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
90 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
91 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
92 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
93 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
94 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
96 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
97 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
99 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
101 } else { assert!(false); }
104 use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
106 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
107 insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
108 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
110 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
112 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
114 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
116 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
118 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
120 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
122 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
126 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
127 // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
129 use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
130 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
131 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
132 node_cfgs[1].features = channelmanager::provided_init_features().clear_wumbo();
133 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
134 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
136 match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
137 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
138 assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
144 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
145 // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
146 // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
147 // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
148 // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
149 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
150 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
151 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
152 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
153 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
155 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
156 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
157 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
158 let opt_anchors = false;
159 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
160 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
162 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
163 let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
164 if !send_from_initiator {
165 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
166 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
168 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_message);
170 // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
171 let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
172 if send_from_initiator {
173 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
174 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
176 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel_message);
179 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
180 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
181 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
184 let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
185 let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
186 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
188 // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
189 // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
190 if send_from_initiator {
191 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
192 // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
193 // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
194 // well as an additional HTLC.
195 - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
197 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
202 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
203 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
204 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
208 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
209 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
210 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
211 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
212 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
213 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
216 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
220 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
221 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
222 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
223 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
224 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
225 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
226 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
227 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
228 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
229 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
231 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
233 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
235 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
237 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
240 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
241 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
243 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
244 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
245 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
246 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
247 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
249 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
252 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
254 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
255 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
256 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
257 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
259 let payment_event = {
260 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
261 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
262 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
264 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
265 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
267 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
268 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
269 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
270 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
271 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
274 // deliver(1), generate (3):
275 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
276 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
277 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
278 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
280 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
281 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
282 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
283 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
284 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
285 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
286 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
287 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
289 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
290 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
291 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
292 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
293 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
294 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
295 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
296 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
298 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
299 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
300 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
303 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
304 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
307 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
308 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
310 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
311 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
313 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
314 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
317 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
322 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
323 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
324 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
325 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
326 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
327 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
328 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
329 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
332 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
334 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
336 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
339 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
340 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
342 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
343 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
344 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
345 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
348 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
351 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
353 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
354 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
355 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
358 let payment_event = {
359 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
360 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
361 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
363 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
364 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
366 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
367 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
368 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
369 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
370 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
371 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
373 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
374 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
376 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
380 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
381 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
382 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
383 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
384 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
385 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
388 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
389 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
390 // update_fee (never committed) ->
392 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
393 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
394 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
395 // <- (1) RAA delivered
396 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
397 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
398 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
399 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
401 // B should send no response here
402 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
403 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
406 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
409 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
410 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
411 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
413 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
414 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
416 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
417 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
418 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
419 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
420 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
422 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
425 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
426 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
427 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
428 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
429 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
431 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
434 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
435 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
437 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
438 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
439 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
441 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
442 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
443 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
444 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
447 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
449 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
451 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
453 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
454 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
455 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
457 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
458 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
459 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
460 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
461 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
462 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
463 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
465 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
466 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
467 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
469 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
471 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
472 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
476 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
477 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
478 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
480 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
481 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
484 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
485 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
486 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
487 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
489 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
490 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
494 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
495 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
496 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
497 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
500 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
501 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
502 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
503 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
505 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
507 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
510 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
511 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
514 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
515 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
516 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
518 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
519 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
520 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
522 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
523 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
525 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
527 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
528 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
530 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
532 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
533 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
535 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
536 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
537 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
538 added_monitors.clear();
540 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
542 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
543 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
545 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
546 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
547 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
548 added_monitors.clear();
551 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
552 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
554 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
555 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
557 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
558 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
559 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
560 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
561 expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
565 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
566 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
567 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
568 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
569 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
570 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
571 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
572 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
573 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
574 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
575 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
576 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
577 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
578 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
579 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
580 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
581 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
582 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
583 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
587 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
588 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
589 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
590 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
591 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
592 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
595 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
598 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
599 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
601 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
602 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
603 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
604 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
605 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
607 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
609 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
611 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
612 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
613 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
615 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
616 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
617 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
619 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
620 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
621 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
622 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
624 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
625 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
626 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
630 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
631 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
632 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
633 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
634 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
635 let channel_value = 5000;
637 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
638 let channel_id = chan.2;
639 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
640 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
641 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
643 let opt_anchors = false;
645 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
646 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
647 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
649 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
650 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
652 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
653 *feerate_lock = feerate;
655 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
656 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
657 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
659 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
661 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
663 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
665 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
667 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
668 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
669 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
670 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
671 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
672 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
676 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
677 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
680 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
681 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
682 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
684 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
686 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
687 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
688 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
689 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
690 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
691 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
692 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
693 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
694 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
696 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
697 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
698 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
699 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
700 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
701 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
702 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
703 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
706 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
707 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
708 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
711 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
712 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
713 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
714 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
715 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
716 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
718 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
719 opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
720 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
721 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
723 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
725 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
728 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
731 htlc_signatures: res.1
734 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
736 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
739 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
741 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
742 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
743 //Should produce and error.
744 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
745 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
746 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
747 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
748 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
752 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
753 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
754 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
755 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
756 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
757 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
760 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
763 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
766 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
767 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
769 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
770 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
771 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
772 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
773 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
775 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
777 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
778 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
779 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
780 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
782 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
784 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
785 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
787 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
788 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
789 added_monitors.clear();
791 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
792 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
793 // node[1] has nothing to do
795 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
796 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
797 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
799 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
800 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
801 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
803 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
804 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
805 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
807 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
808 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
809 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
810 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
811 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
812 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
814 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
815 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
816 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
817 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
819 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
820 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
821 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
823 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
824 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
825 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
826 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
828 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
829 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
830 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
832 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
834 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
835 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
837 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
838 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
841 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
843 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
844 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
845 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
846 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
847 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
851 fn test_update_fee() {
852 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
853 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
854 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
855 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
856 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
857 let channel_id = chan.2;
860 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
861 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
862 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
863 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
864 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
865 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
866 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
867 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
868 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
869 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
870 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
873 // Create and deliver (1)...
876 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
877 feerate = *feerate_lock;
878 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
880 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
881 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
883 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
884 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
885 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
886 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
887 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
889 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
891 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
893 // Generate (2) and (3):
894 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
895 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
896 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
899 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
900 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
901 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
903 // Create and deliver (4)...
905 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
906 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
908 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
909 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
910 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
911 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
912 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
913 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
914 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
916 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
919 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
920 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
921 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
923 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
924 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
926 // Handle (3), creating (6):
927 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
928 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
929 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
930 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
933 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
934 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
935 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
937 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
938 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
939 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
940 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
941 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
942 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
943 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
944 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
945 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
948 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
949 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
950 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
951 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
953 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
955 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
957 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
958 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
959 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
960 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
961 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
965 fn fake_network_test() {
966 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
967 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
968 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
969 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
970 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
971 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
973 // Create some initial channels
974 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
975 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
976 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
978 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
979 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
980 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
981 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
982 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
984 // Send some more payments
985 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
986 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
987 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
989 // Test failure packets
990 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
991 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
993 // Add a new channel that skips 3
994 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
996 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
997 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
998 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
999 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1000 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1001 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1002 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1004 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1005 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1006 hops.push(RouteHop {
1007 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1008 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1009 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1010 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1012 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1014 hops.push(RouteHop {
1015 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1016 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1017 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1018 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1020 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1022 hops.push(RouteHop {
1023 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1024 node_features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
1025 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1026 channel_features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
1028 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1030 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1031 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1032 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1034 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1035 hops.push(RouteHop {
1036 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1037 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1038 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1039 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1041 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1043 hops.push(RouteHop {
1044 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1045 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1046 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1047 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1049 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1051 hops.push(RouteHop {
1052 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1053 node_features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
1054 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1055 channel_features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
1057 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1059 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1060 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1061 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1063 // Claim the rebalances...
1064 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1065 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1067 // Close down the channels...
1068 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1069 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1070 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1071 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1072 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1073 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1074 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1075 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1076 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1077 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1078 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1079 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1083 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1084 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1085 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1086 // commitment dance rounds.
1087 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1088 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1089 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1090 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1091 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1092 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1094 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1095 for _ in 0..crate::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1096 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1097 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1098 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1100 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1102 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1103 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1104 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1105 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1107 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1108 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1110 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1112 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1113 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1114 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1115 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1118 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1119 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1121 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1122 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1125 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1126 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1127 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1128 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1130 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1131 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1132 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1133 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1134 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1135 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1136 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1138 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1139 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1140 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1142 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1144 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1145 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1146 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1149 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1150 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1152 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1154 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1155 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1156 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1158 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1159 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1161 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1163 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1164 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1165 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1167 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1169 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1170 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1171 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1173 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1174 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1176 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1178 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1179 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1180 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1182 &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1183 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1185 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1189 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1190 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1193 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1197 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1198 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1199 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1200 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1201 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1202 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1203 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1205 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1206 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1207 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1208 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1209 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1210 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1212 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1214 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1215 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1217 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1218 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1220 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1221 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1222 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1226 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1227 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1228 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1229 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1230 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1231 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1232 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1233 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1235 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1238 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1240 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1242 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1243 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1244 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1246 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1247 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1248 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1249 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1251 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1252 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1254 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1255 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1256 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1257 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1258 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1259 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1260 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1263 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1265 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1266 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1267 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1268 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1270 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1271 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 5);
1273 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1274 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Alternative commitment tx
1275 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC spend in alternative commitment tx
1277 check_spends!(claim_txn[3], remote_txn[0]);
1278 check_spends!(claim_txn[4], remote_txn[0]);
1279 let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1280 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1281 (&claim_txn[3], &claim_txn[4])
1283 (&claim_txn[4], &claim_txn[3])
1286 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1287 assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1289 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1290 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1291 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1293 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1294 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1295 check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1296 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1298 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1299 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1302 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1303 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1304 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1305 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1307 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1308 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1309 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1310 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1311 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1312 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1314 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1320 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1321 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1322 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1323 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1324 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1325 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1327 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1328 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1330 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1331 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2));
1332 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1333 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1334 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1336 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
1338 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1339 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1340 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1343 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1345 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1346 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1348 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1352 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1353 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1354 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1355 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1356 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1357 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1359 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1360 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1361 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1362 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1364 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1366 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1367 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1368 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1369 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1372 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1373 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1374 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1375 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1378 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1380 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1381 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1382 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1384 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1386 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1388 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1389 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1390 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1391 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1392 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1393 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1394 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1395 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1397 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1398 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1399 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1400 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1401 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1403 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1404 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1405 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1406 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1407 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1408 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1409 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1410 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1413 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1414 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1415 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1417 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1418 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1419 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1421 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1423 amount_msat: 3460001,
1424 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1426 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1429 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1432 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1433 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1434 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1435 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1439 local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1440 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1442 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1443 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1445 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1448 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1451 htlc_signatures: res.1
1454 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1455 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1456 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1458 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1459 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1461 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1462 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1464 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1466 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1467 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1468 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1470 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1471 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1472 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1474 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1476 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1477 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1479 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1483 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1484 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1485 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1486 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1487 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1489 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1490 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1491 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1492 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1493 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1494 let opt_anchors = false;
1496 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1497 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1499 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1501 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1503 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1504 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1505 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1508 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1509 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1510 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1511 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1512 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1513 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1517 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1518 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1519 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1520 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1521 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1522 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1523 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1524 let opt_anchors = false;
1526 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1527 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1528 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1529 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1530 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1531 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1532 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1534 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1535 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1536 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1539 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1540 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1541 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1542 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1543 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1544 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1545 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1546 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1547 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1549 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1550 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1551 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1552 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1553 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1556 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1557 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1558 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1559 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1560 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1561 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1562 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1563 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1567 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1568 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1569 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1570 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1571 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1573 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1574 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1575 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1576 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1577 let opt_anchors = false;
1579 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1580 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1581 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1582 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1583 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1584 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1585 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1587 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1588 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1589 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1590 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1591 // commitment transaction fee.
1592 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1594 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1595 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1596 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1599 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1600 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1601 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1602 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1606 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1607 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1608 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1609 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1610 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1611 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1612 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1613 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1614 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1615 let opt_anchors = false;
1617 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1619 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1620 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1621 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1622 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1624 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1625 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1626 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1627 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1628 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1629 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1630 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg);
1632 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1633 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1634 match msg_events[0] {
1635 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1636 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1638 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1643 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1644 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1645 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1646 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1647 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1648 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1649 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1650 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1652 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1653 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1654 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1655 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1656 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1657 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1659 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1660 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1661 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1662 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1663 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1664 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1666 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1667 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1668 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1669 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1673 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1674 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1675 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1676 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1677 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1678 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1679 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1682 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1683 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1684 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1685 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1687 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1688 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1689 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1690 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1692 // Add a pending HTLC.
1693 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1694 let payment_event_1 = {
1695 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1696 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1698 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1699 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1700 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1702 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1704 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1705 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1706 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1707 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1708 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1710 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1711 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1712 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1713 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1714 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1715 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1716 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1717 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1720 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1721 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1722 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1723 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1726 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1727 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1728 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1729 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1730 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1731 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1732 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1733 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1737 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1738 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1739 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1740 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1741 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1742 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1743 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1744 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1745 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1746 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1747 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1749 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1750 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1751 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1753 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1754 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1757 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1758 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1762 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1763 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1764 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1765 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1766 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1767 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1768 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1769 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1770 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1771 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1772 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1774 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1775 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1777 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1778 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1780 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1782 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1783 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1784 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1785 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1790 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1791 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1792 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1793 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1795 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1797 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1799 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1800 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1801 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1802 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1803 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1805 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1806 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1807 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1808 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1811 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1812 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1814 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1815 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1816 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1817 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1818 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1819 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1820 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1824 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1825 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1826 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
1827 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1828 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1830 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1831 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1832 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1833 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1834 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1837 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1838 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1839 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1840 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1841 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1844 // adding pending output.
1845 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1846 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1847 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1848 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1849 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1850 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1851 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1852 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1853 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1855 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1856 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1857 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1859 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1860 let payment_event_1 = {
1861 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1862 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1864 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1865 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1866 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1868 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1870 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1871 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1873 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1874 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1875 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1876 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1879 // split the rest to test holding cell
1880 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1881 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1882 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1883 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1885 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1886 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1889 // now see if they go through on both sides
1890 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1891 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1892 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
1893 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1894 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1895 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1897 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1899 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1900 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1901 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1902 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1903 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1906 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1907 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1908 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
1909 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1910 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1911 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1913 // flush the pending htlc
1914 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1915 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1916 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1918 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1919 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1920 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1921 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1923 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1924 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1925 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1928 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1929 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1930 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1932 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1934 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1935 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1936 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1938 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1939 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1941 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1942 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1943 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1944 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1945 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1946 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1948 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1949 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1950 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1951 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1953 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1954 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1956 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1957 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1959 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id } => {
1960 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1961 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
1962 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
1964 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1965 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1966 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1968 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1971 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1974 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id } => {
1975 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1976 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
1977 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
1979 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1980 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1981 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1983 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1986 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1989 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1990 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1991 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1993 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
1994 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1995 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1997 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
1998 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1999 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2000 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2001 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2003 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2004 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2008 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2009 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2010 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2011 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2012 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2013 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2014 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2015 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2017 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2018 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2019 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2020 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2021 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2022 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2023 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
2024 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2026 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2027 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2028 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2029 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2030 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2031 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2032 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2033 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2034 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2035 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2037 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2038 // Route the first two HTLCs.
2039 let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2040 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2041 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2043 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2044 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2046 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2047 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2048 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2049 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2050 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2053 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2054 // initial fulfill/CS.
2055 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2056 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2057 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2058 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2060 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2061 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2062 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2063 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2064 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2065 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2067 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2068 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2069 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2070 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2071 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2073 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2074 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2075 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2076 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2077 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2079 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2080 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2081 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2083 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2084 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2085 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2087 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2088 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2089 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2091 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2092 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2093 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2094 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2095 // on-chain as necessary).
2096 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2097 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2098 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2099 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2100 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2102 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2103 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2104 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2106 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2107 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2109 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2110 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2111 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2112 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2113 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2114 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2116 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2117 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2118 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2120 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2122 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2123 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2124 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2127 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2128 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2129 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2130 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2132 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2134 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2135 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2136 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2138 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2139 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2141 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2142 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2143 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2144 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2146 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2148 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2150 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2153 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2154 expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2156 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2157 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2161 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2162 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2163 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2164 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2165 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2166 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2167 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2169 // Create some initial channels
2170 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2171 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2172 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2173 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2175 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2176 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2177 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2178 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2179 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2180 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2182 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2183 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2184 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2185 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2186 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2188 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2189 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2190 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2191 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2193 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2194 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2195 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2196 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2197 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2199 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2200 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2201 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2202 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2203 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2205 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2206 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2208 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2209 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2210 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2211 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2212 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2214 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2215 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2216 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2217 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2218 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2219 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2221 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2222 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2223 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2224 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2225 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2227 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2228 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2230 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2231 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2232 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2234 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2235 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2237 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2238 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2239 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2240 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2242 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2248 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2249 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2250 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2251 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2252 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2253 let node2_commitment_txid;
2255 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2256 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2257 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2258 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2260 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2261 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2262 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2263 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2264 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2266 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2267 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2268 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2269 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2270 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2272 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2273 // confusing us in the following tests.
2274 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2276 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2277 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2278 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2281 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2282 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2283 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2284 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2285 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2286 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2289 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2292 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2293 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2295 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2297 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2299 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2301 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2302 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2303 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2309 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2311 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2312 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2314 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2315 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2316 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2317 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2318 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2321 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2324 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2325 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2327 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2329 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2330 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2332 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2333 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2334 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2336 nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2337 nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2338 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2339 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2341 assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2342 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
2343 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2344 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2348 fn test_justice_tx() {
2349 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2350 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2351 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2352 alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2353 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2354 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2355 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2356 bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2357 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2358 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2359 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2360 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2361 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2362 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2363 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2364 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2365 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen;
2366 // Create some new channels:
2367 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2369 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2370 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2371 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2372 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2373 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2374 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2375 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2376 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2377 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2378 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2379 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2380 // Revoke the old state
2381 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2384 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2386 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2387 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2388 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2390 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2391 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2392 node_txn.truncate(1);
2394 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2395 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2396 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2398 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2399 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2400 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2401 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2402 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2403 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2404 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2405 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2406 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2408 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2410 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2411 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2413 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2414 // Create some new channels:
2415 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2417 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2421 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2422 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2423 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2424 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2425 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2426 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2427 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2428 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2429 // Revoke the old state
2430 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2432 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2434 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2435 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2436 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2438 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2439 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2441 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2442 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2444 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2445 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2446 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2447 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2448 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2449 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2450 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2452 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2453 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2454 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2458 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2459 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2460 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2461 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2462 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2463 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2464 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2465 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2466 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2467 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2468 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2469 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2470 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2471 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2472 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2474 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2475 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2476 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2477 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2478 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2479 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2481 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2482 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2484 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2485 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2486 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2487 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2488 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2492 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2493 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2494 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2495 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2496 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2497 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2498 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2500 // Create some new channel:
2501 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2503 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2504 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2505 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2506 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2507 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2509 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2510 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2511 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2512 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2513 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2514 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2515 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2516 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2517 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2519 //Revoke the old state
2520 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2523 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2524 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2525 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2526 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2527 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2528 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2529 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2530 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2532 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2533 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2535 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2536 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2538 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2539 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2540 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2541 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2542 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2543 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2544 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2545 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2547 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2548 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2549 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2551 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2552 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2553 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2554 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2555 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2557 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2558 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2559 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2563 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2564 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2565 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2566 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2567 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2568 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2569 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2571 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2573 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2574 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2575 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2576 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2577 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2578 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2580 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2581 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2583 //Revoke the old state
2584 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2587 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2588 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2589 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2590 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2591 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2592 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2593 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2594 match events.last().unwrap() {
2595 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2596 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2599 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2600 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2602 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2603 assert!(node_txn.len() == 9 || node_txn.len() == 10);
2605 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2606 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2607 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2608 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2609 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2610 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2611 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2613 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2614 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2615 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2616 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2618 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2619 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2620 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2622 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2623 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2624 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2625 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2626 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2627 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2628 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2629 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2631 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2632 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2633 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2634 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[3]);
2635 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[4]);
2636 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2637 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2639 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2640 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2641 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2645 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2646 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2647 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2648 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2649 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2650 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2651 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2652 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2653 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2655 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2656 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2657 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2658 // PaymentSent event).
2660 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2661 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2662 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2663 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2665 // Create some initial channels
2666 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2667 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2669 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2670 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2671 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2672 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2673 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2675 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2676 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2677 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2679 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2680 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2682 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2683 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2684 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2685 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2686 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2687 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2688 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2689 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2690 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2691 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2692 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2693 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2694 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2695 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2696 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2698 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2699 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2700 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2701 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2702 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2703 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2704 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2705 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2706 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2707 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2708 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2709 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2710 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2711 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2712 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2713 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2714 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2716 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2717 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2718 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2719 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2721 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2722 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2723 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2724 added_monitors.clear();
2726 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2727 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2728 match forwarded_events[0] {
2729 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2730 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2732 let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2733 match forwarded_events[1] {
2734 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2735 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2736 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2737 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2738 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2742 match forwarded_events[2] {
2743 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2744 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2745 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2746 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2747 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2751 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2753 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2754 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2755 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2756 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2757 added_monitors.clear();
2759 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2761 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2762 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2765 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2766 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2770 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2771 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2772 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2773 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2774 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2775 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2777 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2779 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2780 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2781 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2782 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2783 // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2784 // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2785 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2786 check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2787 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2788 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time.0, 0);
2790 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2791 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2792 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2793 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2795 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2796 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2797 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2798 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2800 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2801 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2805 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2806 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2807 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2808 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2810 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2811 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2812 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2813 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2814 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2815 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2816 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2817 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2818 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2819 assert!(node_txn.len() == 4 || node_txn.len() == 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2820 let commitment_spend =
2821 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2822 if node_txn.len() == 6 {
2823 // In some block `ConnectionStyle`s we may avoid broadcasting the double-spending
2824 // transactions spending the HTLC outputs of C's commitment transaction. Otherwise,
2825 // check that the extra broadcasts (double-)spend those here.
2826 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2827 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2828 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2832 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2833 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2834 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2838 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2839 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2840 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2841 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2842 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, 0);
2843 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2844 let funding_spend_offset = if node_txn.len() == 6 { 3 } else { 1 };
2845 check_spends!(node_txn[funding_spend_offset], chan_1.3);
2846 assert_eq!(node_txn[funding_spend_offset].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2847 check_spends!(node_txn[funding_spend_offset + 1], node_txn[funding_spend_offset]);
2848 check_spends!(node_txn[funding_spend_offset + 2], node_txn[funding_spend_offset]);
2849 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2850 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2852 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2853 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2854 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2855 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2856 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2857 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2858 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2859 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2860 let mut first_claimed = false;
2861 for event in events {
2863 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2864 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2865 assert!(!first_claimed);
2866 first_claimed = true;
2868 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2869 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2872 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2873 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2874 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2877 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2880 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2881 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2882 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2883 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2884 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2885 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2887 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2889 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2890 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2891 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2892 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2893 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2894 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2895 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2897 // Create some intial channels
2898 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2899 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2901 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2902 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2903 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2905 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2907 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2908 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2909 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2910 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2911 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2912 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
2913 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2915 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2916 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2918 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2919 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2920 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2921 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2922 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2923 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2925 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2927 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2928 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2929 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2930 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2931 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2932 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2933 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2934 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2936 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2937 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2938 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2939 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2940 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2943 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2944 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2945 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2946 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2948 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2949 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2951 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2952 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2953 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2954 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2956 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2960 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2961 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2962 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2964 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2966 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
2967 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2968 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2969 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2971 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2972 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2973 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2974 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2975 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2976 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2978 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2981 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2982 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2983 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2985 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2986 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2988 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2989 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2990 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2991 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2992 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2993 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2994 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2995 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2996 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3000 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3001 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3002 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3003 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3007 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3008 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3009 // and fail backward accordingly.
3011 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3012 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3013 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3014 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3016 // Create some initial channels
3017 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3018 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3020 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3021 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3022 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3023 // Revoke the old state
3024 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3026 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3028 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3029 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3030 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3031 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3032 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3034 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3035 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3036 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3037 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3039 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3040 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3041 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3042 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3043 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3044 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3046 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3047 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3048 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3050 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3054 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3055 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3056 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3057 // commitment transaction anymore.
3058 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3059 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3060 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3061 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3062 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3063 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3065 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3066 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3067 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3068 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3069 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3070 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3071 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3072 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3073 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3075 // Create some initial channels
3076 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3077 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3079 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3080 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3081 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3082 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3083 // Revoke the old state
3084 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3086 let value = if use_dust {
3087 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3088 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3089 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3092 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3093 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3094 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3096 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3097 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3098 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3099 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3100 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3101 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3102 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3103 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3104 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3105 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3106 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3107 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3109 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3110 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3112 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3113 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3114 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3115 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3116 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3117 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3118 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3119 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3120 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3121 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3122 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3123 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3124 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3126 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3127 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3128 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3129 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3130 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3131 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3132 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3133 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3134 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3135 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3136 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3137 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3138 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3139 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3140 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3141 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3142 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3145 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3146 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3147 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3148 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3149 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3150 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3154 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3155 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3156 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3157 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3158 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3159 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3161 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3162 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3165 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3166 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3168 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3169 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3172 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3173 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3175 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3176 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3177 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3179 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3180 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 3 + nodes.len() });
3182 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3183 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3186 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3187 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3189 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3191 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3193 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3194 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3196 nodes[1].node.abandon_payment(PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0));
3197 let payment_failed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3198 assert_eq!(payment_failed_events.len(), 1);
3199 match payment_failed_events[0] {
3200 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3201 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3203 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3206 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3207 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3209 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3210 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3211 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3212 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3213 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3215 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3216 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3217 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3218 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3220 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3224 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3225 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3226 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3227 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3228 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3229 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3231 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3234 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3235 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3236 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3237 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3238 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3239 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3240 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3242 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3243 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3244 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3246 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3248 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3249 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3251 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3252 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3253 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3254 // that we should update our routing table for.
3255 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3256 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3259 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3262 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3263 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3264 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3266 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3269 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3270 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3271 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3273 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3276 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3279 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3280 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3281 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3285 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3286 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3287 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3288 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3289 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3293 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3294 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3295 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3296 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3297 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3301 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3302 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3303 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3304 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3305 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3306 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3308 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3310 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3311 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3312 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3314 let payment_event = {
3315 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3316 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3317 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3319 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3320 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3323 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3324 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3326 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3327 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3329 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3332 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3334 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3336 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3337 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3338 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3339 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3340 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3341 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3343 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3344 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3350 onion_routing_packet,
3352 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3354 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3355 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3356 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3358 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3359 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3361 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3364 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3365 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3367 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3369 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3370 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3374 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3375 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3376 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3377 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3378 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3379 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3380 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3381 if *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
3382 // We rely on the ability to connect a block redundantly, which isn't allowed via
3383 // `chain::Listen`, so we never run the test if we randomly get assigned that
3387 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3389 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3390 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3391 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3392 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3393 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3394 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3396 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3397 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3398 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3400 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3401 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3402 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3403 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3404 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3406 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3407 // registering new transactions
3408 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3412 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3413 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3414 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3415 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3416 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3417 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3418 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3419 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3421 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3423 let mut payment_event = {
3424 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3425 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3427 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3428 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3429 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3432 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3433 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3435 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3437 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3438 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3439 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3440 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3442 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3443 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3444 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3445 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3446 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3448 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3449 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3450 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3452 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3453 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3454 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3455 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3457 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3458 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3459 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3460 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3461 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3465 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3467 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3468 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3469 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3470 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3472 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3474 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3475 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3477 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3478 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3479 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3480 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3481 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3482 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3483 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3485 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3489 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3490 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3491 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3492 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3493 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3495 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3496 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3497 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3498 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3499 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3501 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3503 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3504 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3505 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3506 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3507 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3508 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3510 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3511 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3513 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3514 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3518 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3519 // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3520 // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3521 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3522 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3523 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3524 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3526 // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3527 // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3528 let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3529 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3530 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
3531 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3532 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
3534 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3535 assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3537 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3539 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3540 assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3542 // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3543 // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3546 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3549 // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3550 // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3551 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3552 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3554 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3555 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3559 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3560 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3561 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3562 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3563 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3564 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3565 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3566 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3568 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3569 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3570 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3572 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3573 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3574 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3575 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3577 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3578 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3579 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3581 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3582 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3583 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3584 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3586 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3587 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3589 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3590 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3592 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3594 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3595 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3597 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3598 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3599 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3601 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3604 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3605 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3606 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3608 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3611 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3612 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3616 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3617 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3620 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3621 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3622 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3623 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3624 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3625 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3627 let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3628 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3629 let (channel_ready, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3630 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3631 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3632 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3633 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3635 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3638 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3640 let payment_event = {
3641 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3642 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3644 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3645 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3646 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3648 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3650 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3651 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3653 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3654 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3655 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3656 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3657 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3659 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3660 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3661 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3662 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3664 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3665 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3666 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3667 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3668 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3670 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3671 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3672 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3673 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3680 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3681 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3682 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3683 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3684 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3685 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3687 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3688 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3689 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3691 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3692 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3694 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3695 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3696 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3697 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3698 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3699 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3700 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3701 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3702 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3703 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3704 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3705 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3706 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3707 // Everything was delivered...
3708 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3711 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3712 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3713 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3715 Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3716 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3719 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3720 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3723 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3725 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3726 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3730 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3731 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3732 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3734 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3736 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3737 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3739 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id } => {
3740 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3741 assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3742 assert_eq!(receiver_node_id.unwrap(), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3744 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3745 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3746 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3748 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3751 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3754 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3755 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3756 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3758 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3759 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3760 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3761 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3762 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3763 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3764 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3765 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3766 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3767 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3768 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3770 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3773 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3774 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3776 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3777 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3779 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3780 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3781 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3783 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3786 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3787 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3788 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3789 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3791 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3792 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3793 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3794 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3796 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3797 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3798 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3799 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3800 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3802 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3803 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3804 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3805 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3812 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3813 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3814 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3815 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3816 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3817 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3819 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3821 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3822 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3823 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3824 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3825 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3826 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3827 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3828 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3829 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3830 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3831 // Everything was delivered...
3832 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3835 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3836 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3839 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3840 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3841 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3843 if messages_delivered > 2 {
3844 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3847 // Channel should still work fine...
3848 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3849 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3850 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3854 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3855 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3856 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3857 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3858 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3862 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3863 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3864 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3865 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3866 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3870 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
3871 // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
3872 // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
3873 // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
3874 // channel_ready immediately instead.
3875 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3876 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3877 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3878 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3879 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
3881 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3883 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3884 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
3885 let block_txn = [funding_tx];
3886 let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
3887 let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
3888 nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
3890 // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
3891 let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3892 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3896 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3897 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3898 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3899 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3900 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3901 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3902 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3903 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3905 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3907 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3908 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3909 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
3910 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3912 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3913 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3915 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3916 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3919 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3920 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3921 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3923 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3924 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3926 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3927 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3928 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3929 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3930 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3931 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3932 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3934 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3935 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3936 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3938 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3939 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3940 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3942 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3945 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3946 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3947 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3948 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3950 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3953 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3954 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3956 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
3957 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3958 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3959 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
3960 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3961 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3963 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3964 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3965 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3966 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3968 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
3969 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
3971 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
3972 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
3974 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
3976 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3977 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3978 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3979 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3980 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
3981 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
3982 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
3983 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3984 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3985 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3987 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
3988 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3989 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3990 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3991 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3992 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3993 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3994 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3996 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3997 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3998 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3999 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4000 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4001 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4002 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4003 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4005 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4006 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4007 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4008 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4010 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4011 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4012 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4013 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4015 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4016 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4017 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4019 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4021 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4022 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4024 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4025 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4027 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4028 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4029 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4031 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4034 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4037 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4038 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4039 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4041 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4042 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4045 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4046 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4047 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4048 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4049 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4050 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4051 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4053 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4055 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4056 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4057 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4058 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4059 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4060 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4061 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4062 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4063 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4064 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4065 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4066 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4067 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4068 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4071 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4074 let mut block = Block {
4075 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4078 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4079 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4080 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4081 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4082 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4083 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4084 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4087 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4089 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4090 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4091 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4092 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4093 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4094 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4096 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4097 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4098 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4099 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4100 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4101 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4105 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4106 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4107 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4110 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4111 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4112 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4113 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4114 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4115 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4116 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4117 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4119 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4120 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4121 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4122 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4124 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4125 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4127 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4129 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4132 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4133 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4134 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4135 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4137 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4138 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4139 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4140 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4141 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4145 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4146 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4147 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4148 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4151 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4152 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4153 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4154 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4155 match fail_commit[0] {
4156 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4157 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4158 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4160 _ => unreachable!(),
4162 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4164 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4169 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4170 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4171 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4174 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4175 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4177 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4178 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4179 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4180 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4181 for event in events.drain(..) {
4183 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4184 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4185 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4186 all_outputs.push(outp);
4189 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4192 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4193 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4203 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4204 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4205 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4206 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4207 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4208 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4210 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4211 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4212 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4213 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4214 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4215 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4216 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4217 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4218 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4220 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4221 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4223 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4224 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4225 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4226 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4227 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4231 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4232 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4233 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4234 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4235 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4236 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4237 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4239 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4240 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4241 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4242 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4243 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4245 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4246 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4247 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4248 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4250 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4251 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4252 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4253 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4254 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4256 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4257 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4258 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4262 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4263 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4264 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4266 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4267 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4268 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4269 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4271 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4272 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4273 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4274 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4275 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4277 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4278 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4279 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4280 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4281 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4283 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4284 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4285 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4287 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4288 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4289 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4290 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4291 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4295 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4296 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4297 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4298 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4299 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4301 // Create some initial channels
4302 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4304 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4306 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4307 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4308 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4310 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4311 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4312 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4313 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4314 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4315 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4316 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4318 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4319 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4322 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4323 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4326 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4327 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4328 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4329 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4330 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4331 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4332 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4334 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4335 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4336 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4338 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4339 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4340 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4344 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4345 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4346 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4347 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4348 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4350 // Create some initial channels
4351 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4353 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4354 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4356 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4358 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4359 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4360 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4362 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4363 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4364 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4365 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4367 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4368 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4370 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4372 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4373 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4374 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4375 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4376 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4377 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4379 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4380 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4381 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4382 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4384 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4385 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4386 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4387 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4388 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4392 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4393 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4394 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4395 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4396 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4398 // Create some initial channels
4399 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4401 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4402 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4403 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4404 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4406 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4408 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4409 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4410 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4411 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4413 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4414 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4415 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4416 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4418 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4419 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4421 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4422 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4423 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4427 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4428 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4429 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4430 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4431 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4432 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4434 // Create some initial channels
4435 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4437 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4438 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4439 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4440 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4442 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4444 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4445 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4446 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4447 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4448 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4449 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4451 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4452 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4453 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4454 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4455 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4456 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4457 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4459 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4460 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4461 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4462 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4463 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4464 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4466 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4467 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4468 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4469 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4470 // transactions next...
4471 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4472 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4474 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4475 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4476 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4477 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4479 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4480 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4483 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4484 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4486 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4487 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4489 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4490 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4491 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4492 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4493 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4497 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4498 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4499 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4500 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4501 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4502 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4504 // Create some initial channels
4505 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4507 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4508 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4509 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4510 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4512 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4513 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4515 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4517 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4518 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4519 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4520 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4521 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4522 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4524 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4525 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4526 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4527 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4529 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4530 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4531 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4533 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4534 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4535 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4536 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4537 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4538 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4540 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4541 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4543 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4544 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4545 // transactions next...
4546 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4547 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4548 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4549 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4551 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4552 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4555 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4556 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4558 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4560 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4561 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4563 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4564 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4566 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4567 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4568 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4569 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4570 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4571 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4572 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4573 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4577 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4578 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4579 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4580 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4581 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4583 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4586 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4587 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4588 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4589 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4591 // Create some initial channels
4592 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4593 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4595 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4596 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4597 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4598 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4599 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4601 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4602 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4603 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4605 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
4606 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4607 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4608 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4609 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4610 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4611 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4612 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4613 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4614 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4615 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4617 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4618 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4619 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4620 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4622 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4623 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
4624 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
4625 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
4626 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
4627 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
4628 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
4629 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4630 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4631 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4633 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4634 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
4635 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
4636 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4637 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4638 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4640 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4641 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4644 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
4645 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4646 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
4647 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4648 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
4650 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4653 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4654 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
4655 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4656 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
4659 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4660 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4661 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4662 match msg_events[0] {
4663 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4664 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4666 match msg_events[1] {
4667 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4668 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4670 match msg_events[2] {
4671 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4672 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4673 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4674 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4675 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4676 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4678 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4680 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4681 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4682 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4683 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4684 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4685 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
4686 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
4687 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4688 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
4689 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4690 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4691 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4692 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4694 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4695 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4699 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4700 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4701 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4702 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4703 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4704 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4705 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4706 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4707 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4708 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4709 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4710 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
4711 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4712 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4714 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4715 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4716 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4718 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4719 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4720 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4721 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4722 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
4724 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
4726 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
4727 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
4728 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
4729 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
4730 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
4731 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
4732 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
4733 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
4735 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4736 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4737 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
4739 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
4740 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4741 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4742 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4743 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4745 let htlc_timeout_tx;
4746 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
4747 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4748 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4749 assert!(node_txn.len() == 4 || node_txn.len() == 3);
4750 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
4752 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4753 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4755 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
4756 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4757 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4758 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
4760 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
4761 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
4763 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4764 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
4767 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4768 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4769 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
4770 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4772 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
4775 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
4776 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
4778 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
4779 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
4780 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4781 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4783 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4784 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4787 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4788 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4790 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4791 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
4792 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4793 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4794 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4795 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4796 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4797 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4798 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4799 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4800 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
4801 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
4802 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
4804 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
4805 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4806 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4807 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4808 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4809 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4810 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
4811 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4812 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4813 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4815 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4816 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4818 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
4820 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
4822 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
4823 // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
4824 // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
4825 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
4826 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196*2), true, true);
4827 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4828 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4829 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4830 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4831 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
4832 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4833 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4835 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4836 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
4838 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4840 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4841 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
4842 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
4844 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4849 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
4850 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4851 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4852 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4853 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4855 // Create some initial channels
4856 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4858 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
4859 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4860 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
4861 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4862 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4864 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
4865 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4866 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
4867 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4869 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
4870 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4871 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4872 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4874 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4875 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4878 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4879 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4882 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4883 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4884 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
4885 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
4886 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4887 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4888 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
4892 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
4893 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4895 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
4896 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4897 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4898 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4899 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
4900 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4903 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
4904 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
4905 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
4906 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
4907 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
4908 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
4909 // use the same payment hashes.
4910 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
4915 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
4916 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
4917 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
4918 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4919 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4920 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4921 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4922 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
4923 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4924 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4926 let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4927 let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4928 let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4929 let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4930 let chan_3_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4932 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
4933 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
4934 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
4935 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
4937 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
4939 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4941 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4942 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
4944 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4946 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4948 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4950 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4951 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
4953 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
4955 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
4958 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4960 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
4961 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4964 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4966 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
4967 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
4969 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
4970 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
4971 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
4972 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
4973 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
4975 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
4976 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
4977 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
4978 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
4979 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
4980 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
4981 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
4983 let failed_destinations = vec![
4984 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
4985 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
4986 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
4987 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
4989 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
4990 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
4992 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
4993 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4994 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
4995 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
4996 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
4997 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
4999 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5000 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5001 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5002 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5004 let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5005 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5006 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5008 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5009 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5011 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5012 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5013 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5014 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5016 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5018 // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5019 let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5020 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5021 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5022 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5023 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5024 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5025 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5027 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5028 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5029 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5030 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5031 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5032 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5033 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5034 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5035 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5036 if deliver_last_raa {
5037 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5039 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5042 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5043 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5044 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5045 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5047 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5048 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5049 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5051 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5052 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5053 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5055 if announce_latest {
5056 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5058 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5060 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5061 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5062 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5063 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5065 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5066 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5069 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5070 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5073 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5074 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5075 if deliver_last_raa {
5076 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5078 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5079 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5081 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5082 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5084 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5087 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5089 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5091 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5092 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5093 let mut a_done = false;
5094 for msg in cs_msgs {
5096 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5097 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5098 // should be failed-backwards here.
5099 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5100 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5101 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5102 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5104 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5109 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5110 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5111 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5113 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5114 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5117 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5118 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5119 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5120 if announce_latest {
5121 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5122 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5123 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5126 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5128 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5132 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5133 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5134 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5135 let mut as_updates = 0;
5136 for event in as_events.iter() {
5137 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5138 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5139 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5140 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5142 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5144 if network_update.is_some() {
5147 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5149 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5150 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5151 if announce_latest {
5152 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5153 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5155 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5157 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5158 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5159 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5160 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5161 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5162 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5163 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5164 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5165 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5167 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5169 if network_update.is_some() {
5172 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5174 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5175 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5176 if announce_latest {
5177 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5179 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5181 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5182 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5183 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5184 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5185 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5186 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5190 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5191 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5195 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5196 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5200 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5201 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5202 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5203 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5207 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5208 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5209 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5210 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5211 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5213 // Create some initial channels
5214 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5216 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5217 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5218 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5219 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5221 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5222 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5223 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5224 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5225 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5226 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5228 let htlc_timeout = {
5229 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5230 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5231 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5232 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5233 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5234 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5238 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5239 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5240 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5242 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5243 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5244 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5245 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5246 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5247 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5248 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5249 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5250 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5251 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5252 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5256 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5257 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5258 // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5259 // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5261 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5263 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5264 let seed = [42; 32];
5265 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5266 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5267 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source.genesis_hash, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger);
5268 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: channelmanager::provided_init_features() };
5269 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5270 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5271 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5273 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5274 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5276 // Create some initial channels
5277 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5279 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5280 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5281 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5283 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5284 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5285 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5286 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5287 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5289 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5290 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5291 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5292 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5293 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5295 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5296 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5297 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5298 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5299 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5300 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5301 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5302 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5305 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5306 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5307 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5308 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5309 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5310 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5312 let htlc_timeout = {
5313 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5314 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5315 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5316 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5320 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5321 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5322 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5324 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5325 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5326 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5327 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5328 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5329 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5330 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5331 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5332 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5333 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5334 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5335 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5339 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5340 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5341 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5342 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5343 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5345 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5347 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5348 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5350 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5351 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5352 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5354 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5355 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5356 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5358 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5359 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5360 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5362 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5363 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5364 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5367 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5368 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5369 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5370 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5371 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5372 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5374 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5376 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5377 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5378 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5379 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5380 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5382 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5383 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5384 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5386 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5387 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5388 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5389 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5390 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5392 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5393 let mut block = Block {
5394 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5397 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5398 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5399 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5401 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5402 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5403 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5404 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5407 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5408 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5409 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5410 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5411 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5412 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5414 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5415 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5416 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5418 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5420 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5421 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5422 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5424 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5425 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5427 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5428 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5429 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5431 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5432 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5433 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5434 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5437 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5438 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5439 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5440 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5441 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5442 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5444 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5445 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5446 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5447 // actually revoked.
5448 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5449 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5450 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5451 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
5452 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5454 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5455 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5456 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5457 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5458 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5459 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5460 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5461 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5462 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5463 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5465 if check_revoke_no_close {
5466 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5467 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5470 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5471 let mut block = Block {
5472 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5475 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5476 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5477 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5479 if !check_revoke_no_close {
5480 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5481 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5483 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5485 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5489 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5490 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5491 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5492 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5493 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5494 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5495 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5497 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5498 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5499 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5501 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5502 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5503 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5505 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5506 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5510 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5511 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5512 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5513 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5514 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5519 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5520 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5521 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5522 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5523 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5524 // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5525 for node in nodes.iter() {
5526 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5529 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5530 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5531 let push_msat=10001;
5532 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5533 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5534 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5535 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5537 // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5538 // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5539 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5543 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5544 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5545 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5546 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5547 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5549 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5550 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5551 let push_msat=10001;
5552 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5554 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5555 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5556 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5557 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5558 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5560 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5561 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5562 let push_msat=10001;
5563 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5564 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5565 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5567 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5568 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5569 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5571 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5572 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5573 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5575 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5576 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5577 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5579 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5580 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5581 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5582 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5583 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5584 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5588 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5589 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5590 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5591 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5592 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5594 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5595 let push_msat=10001;
5596 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5597 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5598 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5599 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5601 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5602 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5603 let err_msg = match events[0] {
5604 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5607 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5609 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5612 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5613 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5614 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5615 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5617 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5618 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5619 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5620 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5621 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5622 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5624 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5625 // pending_update_fee.
5627 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5628 *feerate_lock += 20;
5630 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5631 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5633 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5634 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5635 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5636 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5637 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5639 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5642 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5644 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5645 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5646 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5647 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5649 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5650 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
5651 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5653 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5654 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5655 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5656 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5658 // Flush the pending fee update.
5659 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5660 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5661 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5662 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5663 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5665 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5666 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5667 // us to surface its failure to the user.
5668 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5669 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5670 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5671 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5672 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5673 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5675 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5676 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5677 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5679 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5680 assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5681 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5682 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5683 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5684 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5685 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
5687 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5691 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5692 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5693 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5695 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5696 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5697 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5698 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5699 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5700 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5702 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5703 // pending_update_fee.
5705 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5706 *feerate_lock += 200;
5708 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5709 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5711 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5712 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5713 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5714 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5715 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5717 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5720 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5722 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5723 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5724 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5725 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5727 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5729 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
5730 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
5731 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
5733 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
5734 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
5735 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5736 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
5737 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5738 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
5739 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5740 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
5742 // Flush the pending fee update.
5743 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5744 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5745 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5746 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
5747 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5748 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
5750 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
5751 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
5752 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
5753 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5754 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5755 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5756 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5757 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5758 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5760 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
5761 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5762 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5764 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5765 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5766 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5767 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5768 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5769 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5770 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
5772 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5775 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
5776 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
5777 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5778 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
5779 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
5781 let raa = match send_raa_event {
5782 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
5783 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5785 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5786 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5787 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5788 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5789 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5790 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5792 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5793 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5795 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5796 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5797 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5799 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
5800 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5802 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5803 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5804 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
5806 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5807 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5808 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
5809 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
5812 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
5813 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
5814 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
5817 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
5818 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5819 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5820 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5821 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5822 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5823 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5824 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5825 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5826 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5827 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5829 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5830 // pending_update_fee.
5832 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5833 *feerate_lock += 20;
5835 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5836 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5838 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5839 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5840 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5841 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5842 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5844 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5847 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5849 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
5850 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5851 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
5852 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
5854 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5856 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
5857 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
5858 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
5859 let payment_event = {
5860 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5861 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5863 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5864 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5866 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5868 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5869 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5870 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5871 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5873 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
5874 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5876 // Flush the pending fee update.
5877 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5878 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5879 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5880 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5881 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5882 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5884 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
5885 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5886 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5888 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
5889 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
5892 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5895 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
5896 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5897 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5899 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
5900 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5901 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
5902 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
5903 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5904 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5907 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
5908 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5909 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5911 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
5912 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5913 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
5914 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
5915 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
5916 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
5917 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
5918 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
5919 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5920 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5922 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5925 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
5926 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
5927 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5929 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
5930 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5931 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5932 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5933 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5934 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5935 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5936 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
5937 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
5938 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
5939 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5941 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5942 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
5943 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5946 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
5947 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
5948 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
5951 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
5952 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
5953 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5954 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5955 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5956 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5957 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5959 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
5960 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
5962 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
5963 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
5964 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5965 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
5969 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
5970 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
5971 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5972 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5973 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5974 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5975 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5977 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
5978 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
5979 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
5980 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
5982 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5983 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
5987 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
5988 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
5989 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5990 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5991 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5992 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5993 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5995 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
5996 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5997 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5998 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5999 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6001 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6002 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6003 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6004 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6005 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6009 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6010 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6011 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6012 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6013 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6014 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6015 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6016 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6018 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
6019 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
6020 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6021 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6022 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6023 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6027 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6028 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6029 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6030 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6031 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6032 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6033 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6034 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6035 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6036 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6038 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6039 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6040 let payment_event = {
6041 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6042 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6044 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6045 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6046 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6047 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6051 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6053 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6054 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6055 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6057 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6058 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6060 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6061 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6062 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6064 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6065 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6069 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6070 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6071 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6072 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6073 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6074 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6075 let channel_value = 100000;
6076 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6077 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6079 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6081 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6082 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6084 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6085 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6086 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6088 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6089 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6091 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6094 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6096 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6097 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6098 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6099 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6100 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6101 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6102 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6103 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6105 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6106 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6107 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6110 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6111 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6112 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6113 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6114 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6115 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6116 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6117 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6118 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6119 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6120 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6124 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6125 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6126 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6127 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6128 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6129 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6130 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6132 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6133 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6134 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6135 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6136 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6137 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6139 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6140 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6141 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6142 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6143 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6145 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6146 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6147 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6148 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6149 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6151 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6152 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6153 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6154 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6155 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6159 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6160 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6161 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6162 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6163 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6164 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6165 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6166 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6168 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6169 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6170 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6171 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6172 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6173 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6175 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6179 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6180 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6181 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6184 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6185 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6186 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6188 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6189 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6191 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6192 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6193 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6194 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6195 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6199 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6200 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6201 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6202 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6203 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6204 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6205 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6207 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6208 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6209 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6210 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6211 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6212 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6214 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6215 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6216 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6217 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6218 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6222 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6223 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6224 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6225 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6226 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6227 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6229 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6230 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6231 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6232 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6233 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6234 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6235 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6237 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6238 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6239 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6240 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6241 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6245 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6246 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6247 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6248 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6249 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6250 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6251 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6252 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6254 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6255 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6256 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6257 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6258 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6259 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6261 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6262 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6263 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6264 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6265 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6266 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6267 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6268 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6269 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6270 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6271 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6272 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6273 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6276 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6277 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6278 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6280 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6282 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6284 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6285 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6286 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6287 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6288 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6292 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6293 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6295 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6296 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6297 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6298 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6299 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6300 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6301 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6303 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6304 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6305 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6307 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6310 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6313 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6315 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6316 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6317 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6319 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6323 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6324 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6326 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6327 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6328 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6329 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6330 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6332 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6333 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6334 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6335 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6336 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6338 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6341 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6344 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6346 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6347 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6348 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6349 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6350 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6354 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6355 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6357 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6358 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6359 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6360 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6361 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6363 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6364 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6365 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6366 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6367 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6368 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6371 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6372 failure_code: 0x8000,
6375 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6377 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6378 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6379 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6380 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6381 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6385 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6386 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6388 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6389 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6390 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6391 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6392 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6394 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6396 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6397 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6398 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6400 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6401 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6402 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6404 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6405 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6406 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6407 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6408 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6409 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6410 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6412 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6416 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6418 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6420 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6421 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6422 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6423 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6424 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6428 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6429 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6431 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6432 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6433 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6434 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6435 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6437 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6439 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6440 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6441 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6443 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6444 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6445 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6447 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6448 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6449 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6450 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6451 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6452 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6453 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6455 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6459 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6461 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6463 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6464 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6465 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6466 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6467 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6471 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6472 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6474 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6475 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6476 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6477 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6478 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6480 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6481 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6484 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6485 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6487 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6488 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6489 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6491 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6493 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6495 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6496 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6497 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6498 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6499 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6500 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6501 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6503 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6506 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6507 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6509 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6510 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6511 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6512 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6513 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6517 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6518 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6519 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6521 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6522 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6523 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6524 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6525 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6526 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6528 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6531 let mut payment_event = {
6532 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6533 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6534 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6535 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6536 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6538 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6539 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6540 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6541 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6542 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6543 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6544 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6545 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6546 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6549 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6550 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6551 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6552 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6554 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6555 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6556 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6558 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6559 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6560 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6561 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6562 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6563 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6564 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6566 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6570 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6572 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6573 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6574 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6575 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6576 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6578 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6580 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6581 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6582 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6583 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6584 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6585 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6587 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6590 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6594 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
6595 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6596 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6597 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6598 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6599 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6600 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6602 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
6605 let mut payment_event = {
6606 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6607 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6608 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
6611 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6612 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6613 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6614 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6615 payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
6616 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6619 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
6620 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6621 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6622 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6624 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6625 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6627 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6628 let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
6629 // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
6630 update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
6632 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6633 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6635 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6638 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
6639 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
6640 node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6641 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6642 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6643 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6646 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6647 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6648 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6650 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6653 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6654 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
6656 // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
6657 // the node originating the error to its next hop.
6659 Event::PaymentPathFailed { network_update:
6660 Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }), error_code, ..
6662 assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
6663 assert!(is_permanent);
6664 assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
6666 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6669 // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
6672 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6673 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6674 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6675 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6677 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6678 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6679 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6680 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6681 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6682 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6684 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6686 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6687 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6688 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6689 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6691 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6692 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6694 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6695 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
6696 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6697 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
6698 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6700 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6701 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6702 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6703 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6705 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6706 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6708 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6710 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6711 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6713 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6716 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6717 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6719 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6722 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6723 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6724 if announce_latest {
6725 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6727 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6730 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6731 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6732 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6734 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6735 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6736 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6737 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6738 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6739 let mut first_failed = false;
6740 for event in events {
6742 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6743 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6744 assert!(!first_failed);
6745 first_failed = true;
6747 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6750 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6756 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6757 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6758 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6761 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6762 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6763 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6764 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6765 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6766 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6767 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6769 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6770 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6771 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6772 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6773 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6775 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6777 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6778 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6780 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6781 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
6783 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
6785 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6786 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
6789 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
6791 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
6792 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
6793 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6794 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6795 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6797 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
6798 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6799 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6800 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6801 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
6802 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6803 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
6804 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6805 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6806 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6807 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6809 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
6810 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6811 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6812 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6813 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6814 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6816 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
6817 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
6818 .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
6819 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6820 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
6821 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
6822 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6825 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6827 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 0);
6829 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
6830 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6831 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6832 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6833 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6838 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
6839 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
6840 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
6841 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
6845 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
6846 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
6848 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6849 low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
6850 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6851 high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
6852 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
6853 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6854 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6855 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
6856 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6858 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
6859 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6860 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
6861 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
6864 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6865 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6867 } else { assert!(false) }
6869 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6870 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6871 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6872 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6873 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6874 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6875 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6878 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6879 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6881 } else { assert!(false); }
6883 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
6884 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6885 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
6886 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6887 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6888 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
6890 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
6892 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
6893 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
6894 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
6898 } else { panic!(); }
6899 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
6901 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6902 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6903 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6904 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6905 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6906 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6907 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6910 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6911 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6913 } else { assert!(false); }
6917 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
6918 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
6919 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
6920 // to B, B should refuse payment.
6922 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6923 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6924 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6925 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6927 // Create some initial channels
6928 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6930 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
6931 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
6932 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
6933 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
6934 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6935 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
6936 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6937 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6939 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6940 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6941 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
6942 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6943 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6945 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
6946 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
6947 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6948 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
6950 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
6951 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
6952 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6954 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6955 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6956 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6957 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6958 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6959 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6960 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6961 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6962 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6963 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
6965 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6967 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6969 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
6970 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
6972 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
6973 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
6974 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
6975 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
6979 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
6980 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
6981 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
6983 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6984 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6985 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6986 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6988 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6989 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6990 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6993 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6994 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6996 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
6997 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
6998 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6999 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7000 let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7001 for e in msg_events {
7003 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7004 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7005 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7006 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7007 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7010 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7014 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7015 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7016 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7017 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7018 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7019 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7021 // Reestablish chan_1
7022 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7023 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7024 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7025 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7026 // Reestablish chan_2
7027 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7028 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7029 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7030 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7031 // Reestablish chan_3
7032 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7033 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7034 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7035 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7037 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7038 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7039 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7040 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7041 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7042 for e in msg_events {
7044 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7045 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7046 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7047 // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7049 Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7050 None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7053 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7056 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7057 assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7061 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7062 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7063 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7065 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7066 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7067 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7068 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7070 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7072 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7073 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7074 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7075 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7076 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7078 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7079 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7080 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7081 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7082 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7083 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7085 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7086 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7087 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7088 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7092 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7093 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7095 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7096 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7097 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7098 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7099 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7101 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7105 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7106 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7107 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7108 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7109 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7110 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7111 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7112 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7116 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7117 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7118 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7119 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7121 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7122 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7123 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7124 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7125 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7126 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7127 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7128 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7129 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7130 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7131 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7132 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7133 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7137 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7139 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7140 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7142 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7144 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7145 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7146 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7147 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7148 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7149 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7150 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7151 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7152 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7153 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7154 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7155 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7156 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7160 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7162 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7163 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7167 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7168 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7169 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7171 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7172 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7173 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7174 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7175 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7177 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7178 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7179 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7180 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7181 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7182 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7183 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7184 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7185 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7186 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7187 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7188 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7190 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7191 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7192 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7194 // Revoke local commitment tx
7195 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7197 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7198 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7199 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7200 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7201 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7202 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7203 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7205 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
7206 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7207 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7209 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7210 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7211 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7213 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7214 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7215 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7216 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7218 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7219 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7220 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7221 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7222 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7223 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7224 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7225 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7226 match events.last().unwrap() {
7227 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7228 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7234 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7235 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7236 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7238 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7239 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7240 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7241 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7243 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7244 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7245 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7246 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7247 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7248 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7250 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7251 // available, which we check here:
7252 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7253 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7254 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7256 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7257 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7259 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7260 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7261 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7262 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7264 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7265 // output, checked above).
7266 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7267 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7268 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7270 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7271 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7272 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7273 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].weight() as u64;
7274 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7278 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7279 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7280 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7281 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7282 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7284 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7285 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7286 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7287 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7289 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7290 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7292 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7293 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7294 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7295 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7296 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7297 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7298 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7299 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7303 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7304 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7305 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7306 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7308 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7309 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7310 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7311 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7312 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7313 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7314 // up bumped justice generation.
7315 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7318 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7319 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7323 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7324 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7325 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7328 // Provide preimage for one
7329 // Check aggregation
7331 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7332 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7333 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7334 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7336 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7337 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7338 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7340 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7341 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7342 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7343 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7344 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7346 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7347 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7348 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7349 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7350 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7351 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7353 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7357 let feerate_timeout;
7358 let feerate_preimage;
7360 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7361 // 5 transactions including:
7362 // local commitment + HTLC-Success
7363 // preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
7364 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
7365 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7366 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
7367 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
7368 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7369 check_spends!(node_txn[3], remote_txn[0]);
7370 check_spends!(node_txn[4], remote_txn[0]);
7372 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3); // local commitment
7373 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]); // local HTLC-Success
7375 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7376 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7377 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7378 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7380 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7381 (node_txn[3].clone(), node_txn[4].clone())
7383 (node_txn[4].clone(), node_txn[3].clone())
7386 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
7387 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7388 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
7390 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
7391 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7392 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
7393 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight() as u64;
7397 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7398 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7400 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7401 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7403 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7404 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7405 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7406 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7407 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7408 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7410 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7411 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7412 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
7413 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7414 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7416 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7417 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7418 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7419 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7420 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7425 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7426 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7430 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7431 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7432 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7433 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7434 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7435 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7436 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7437 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7439 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7440 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7441 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7442 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7443 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
7445 let per_commitment_secret;
7446 let next_per_commitment_point;
7448 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7449 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7451 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7453 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7454 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7455 per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7457 // Must revoke without gaps
7458 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7459 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7461 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7462 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7463 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7466 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7467 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
7468 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7469 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7470 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7474 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7475 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7476 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7478 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7479 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7480 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7481 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7483 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7484 // Lock HTLC in both directions
7485 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
7486 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
7488 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7489 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7490 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7492 // Revoke local commitment tx
7493 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
7495 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7496 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7497 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7498 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7500 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7501 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7502 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7503 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7505 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7506 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
7507 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7508 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7509 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7510 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7514 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7515 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7516 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7518 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7519 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7520 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7525 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
7526 // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
7527 // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
7528 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7529 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7530 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7531 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7532 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7534 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000);
7535 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7536 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_010_000);
7537 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7538 let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7540 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7541 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
7542 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
7543 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7544 let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7546 // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
7547 // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
7548 // can get our balance.
7550 // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
7551 // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
7552 // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
7553 let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
7554 route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
7555 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7556 let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7557 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
7559 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
7563 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7564 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7565 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7566 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7567 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7568 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7569 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7571 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7573 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7574 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7575 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7576 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7577 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7579 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7580 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7581 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7582 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7584 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7585 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7586 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
7587 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7588 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7590 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7591 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7592 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7594 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7599 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7600 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7601 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7602 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7603 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7605 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7606 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7607 override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7609 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7611 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7612 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7613 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
7614 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
7618 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7619 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7620 zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7621 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7622 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7623 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7624 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7626 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7627 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7628 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7630 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7631 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7632 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7636 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
7637 // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
7638 // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
7639 // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
7640 // 90% of the `channel_value`.
7641 // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
7643 let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
7644 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7645 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
7646 let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
7647 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7648 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
7649 let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
7650 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7651 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
7652 let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
7653 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7654 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
7656 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7657 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7658 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
7659 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7661 let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
7662 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7663 let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
7664 let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
7665 let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
7667 let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7668 let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7670 // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7671 // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7672 assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
7673 // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7674 // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7675 assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
7677 // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7678 // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
7680 assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7681 // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7682 // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
7684 assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7688 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
7689 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7690 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7691 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7692 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7693 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7694 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7696 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7697 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7699 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7701 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7702 // accepting the inbound channel request.
7703 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7705 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7707 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7708 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
7710 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7713 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7714 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7716 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7717 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7718 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7720 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7723 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7725 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7726 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7728 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7730 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
7731 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
7733 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7738 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
7739 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7740 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7741 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7742 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7743 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7744 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7746 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7747 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7749 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7751 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7752 // rejecting the inbound channel request.
7753 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7755 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7757 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7758 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7760 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7763 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7764 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7766 match close_msg_ev[0] {
7767 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
7768 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7770 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7772 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7776 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
7777 // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
7778 // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
7779 // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
7780 // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
7781 // and the channel should be closed.
7782 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7783 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7784 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7785 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7786 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7787 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7789 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7790 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7791 let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
7793 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7795 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
7796 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7798 // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
7799 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7801 // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
7802 // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
7803 // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
7804 // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
7805 // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
7806 let accept_chan_msg = {
7808 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], lock, temp_channel_id);
7809 channel.get_accept_channel_message()
7811 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_chan_msg);
7813 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
7815 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7816 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7818 // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
7819 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7821 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7822 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7824 let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
7825 match close_msg_ev[0] {
7826 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
7827 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
7828 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7829 assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
7831 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7834 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
7838 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
7839 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7840 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7841 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7842 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7843 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7844 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7846 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7847 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7849 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
7851 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7852 // accepting the inbound channel request.
7853 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7855 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7857 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7858 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
7859 let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7861 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
7862 assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
7864 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
7865 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7868 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7871 // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
7872 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7873 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7875 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7876 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7877 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7879 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7884 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
7885 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7886 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
7887 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
7888 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
7890 let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
7891 let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7893 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
7894 assert_eq!(err, "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist");
7896 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
7897 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7902 fn test_simple_mpp() {
7903 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
7904 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7905 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7906 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7907 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7909 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7910 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7911 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7912 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7914 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7915 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7916 route.paths.push(path);
7917 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7918 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7919 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7920 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7921 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7922 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7923 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
7924 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
7928 fn test_preimage_storage() {
7929 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
7930 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7931 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7932 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7933 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7935 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7938 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7939 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7940 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7941 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7942 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7943 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7944 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7945 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7947 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
7948 // values from previous calls.
7949 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7950 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7951 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7953 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
7955 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
7956 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
7958 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
7961 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7966 #[allow(deprecated)]
7967 fn test_secret_timeout() {
7968 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
7969 // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
7970 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7971 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7972 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7973 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7975 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7977 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
7979 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
7980 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
7981 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
7982 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
7983 } else { panic!(); }
7985 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
7987 header: BlockHeader {
7989 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
7990 merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(),
7991 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7995 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
7996 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
7997 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
7998 } else { panic!(); }
8000 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8001 // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8002 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8003 block.header.time += 1;
8004 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8005 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8006 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8009 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8010 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8011 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8012 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8013 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8014 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8015 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8017 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8018 // values from previous calls.
8019 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8020 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8021 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8023 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8024 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8025 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8026 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8028 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8033 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8034 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8035 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8036 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8037 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8038 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8040 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8042 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8043 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8044 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8045 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8047 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8048 // resulting events.
8049 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8050 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8051 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8052 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8053 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8054 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8055 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8057 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8058 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8059 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8060 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8061 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8063 // We should fail the payment back
8064 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8065 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8066 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8067 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8068 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8070 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8075 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8076 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8077 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8079 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8080 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8081 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8082 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8084 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8085 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8086 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8087 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8089 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8090 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8091 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8092 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8096 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8097 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8098 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8099 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8102 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8103 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8104 // commitment at same time.
8106 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8107 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8108 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8109 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8111 // Create some initial channel
8112 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8113 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8115 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8116 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8118 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8119 let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8121 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8122 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8123 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8124 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8126 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8127 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8128 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8129 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8130 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8131 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8132 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8133 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8136 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8137 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8138 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8139 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8140 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 0));
8141 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8143 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8144 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8145 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8146 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8148 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8149 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8150 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8151 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8152 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8153 assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8154 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8155 } else { assert!(false); }
8156 } else { assert!(false); };
8157 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8158 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8159 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8160 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8164 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8165 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8166 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8167 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8168 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8170 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8171 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8172 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8173 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8175 // Create some initial channel
8176 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8177 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8179 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8180 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8182 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8183 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8185 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8186 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8187 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8188 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8189 let watchtower_alice = {
8190 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8191 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8192 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8193 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8194 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8195 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8196 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8197 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8200 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8201 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8202 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8203 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8204 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (block.clone(), 0));
8205 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8207 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8209 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8210 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8214 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8215 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8216 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8217 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8218 let watchtower_bob = {
8219 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8220 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8221 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8222 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8223 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8224 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8225 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8226 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8229 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8230 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8232 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8233 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8235 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8237 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8239 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8240 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8241 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8242 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8243 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8244 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8245 assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8246 assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8247 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8248 } else { assert!(false); }
8249 } else { assert!(false); };
8250 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8251 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8253 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8254 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8255 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8257 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8260 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8261 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8262 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8266 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8267 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8268 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8270 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8271 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
8272 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8277 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8278 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8279 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8282 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8283 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8285 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8286 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8287 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8288 // before receiving funding_signed.
8289 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8290 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8291 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8292 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8294 // Create an initial channel
8295 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8296 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8297 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
8298 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8299 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_chan_msg);
8301 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8302 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8304 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8307 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8308 let channel_id = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8309 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8310 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8311 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8315 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8316 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8317 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8318 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8319 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8320 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8321 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8323 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8324 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8325 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8326 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8328 // Create some initial channels
8329 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8331 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8332 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8333 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8334 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8335 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8336 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8338 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8339 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8340 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8341 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8342 // this test before #653 fix.
8343 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8344 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8345 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8346 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8347 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8349 let htlc_timeout = {
8350 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8351 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8352 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8353 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8357 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8358 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8359 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8360 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
8363 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8364 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8365 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8366 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8368 // Steps of the test:
8369 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8370 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8371 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8372 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8373 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8374 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8375 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8376 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8377 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8378 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8379 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8380 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8382 // Create some initial channels
8383 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8384 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8386 // Steps (1) and (2):
8387 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8388 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8390 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8391 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8392 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8393 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8394 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8395 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8396 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8398 // Steps (3) and (4):
8399 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8400 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8401 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8402 let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8405 if !broadcast_alice {
8406 force_closing_node = 1;
8407 counterparty_node = 0;
8409 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8410 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8411 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8412 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8413 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8414 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8415 true => alice_txn.clone(),
8416 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8418 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8419 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8420 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8421 if broadcast_alice {
8422 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8423 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8424 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8426 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8427 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8431 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8432 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8433 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8434 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8435 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8437 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8438 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8439 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8440 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8441 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8442 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8444 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8445 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
8446 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8447 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8448 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8449 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8451 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8452 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8454 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8457 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8458 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8459 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8460 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8462 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8463 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8464 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8465 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8466 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8469 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8471 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8472 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8473 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8476 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8479 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8480 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8481 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8484 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8485 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8486 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8487 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8488 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8491 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8493 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8494 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8496 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8497 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8498 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8499 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8500 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8501 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8502 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8503 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8504 if broadcast_alice {
8505 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8506 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8507 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8509 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8510 if broadcast_alice {
8511 // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8512 // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8513 // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8514 // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8516 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8517 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8519 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8520 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8525 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8526 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8528 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8529 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8530 // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8531 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8533 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8534 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8535 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8537 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8538 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8539 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8540 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8541 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8542 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8543 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8545 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8546 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8552 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8553 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8554 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8555 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8556 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8560 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8561 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8562 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8564 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8565 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8566 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8567 // updating logic for the existing channel.
8568 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8569 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8570 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8571 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8573 // Create an initial channel
8574 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8575 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8576 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
8577 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8579 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8580 // that it is rejected.
8581 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
8583 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8584 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8586 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8587 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8588 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8589 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8590 // move forward with it.
8591 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8592 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8594 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8598 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8599 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8601 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8602 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8604 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8605 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8607 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8608 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8609 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8610 added_monitors.clear();
8612 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8614 let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8615 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8617 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8620 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8621 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8622 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8623 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8624 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
8626 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8627 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8629 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8630 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8631 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8632 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8633 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8635 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8639 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8640 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8641 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8642 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8643 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8644 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8646 let funding_created = {
8647 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8648 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
8649 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
8650 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
8651 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
8652 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8653 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8654 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8656 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8657 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8658 // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8659 // still needs to be cleared here.
8660 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8662 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8664 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8665 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8667 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8668 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8669 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8670 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8671 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8673 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8677 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8678 // everything is functional.
8679 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8681 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8682 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8683 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8684 added_monitors.clear();
8687 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8688 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8689 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8690 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8692 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8693 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8694 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8696 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8700 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8701 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8703 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8704 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8705 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8706 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8707 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8708 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8709 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8711 // Create some initial channels
8712 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8713 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8714 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8716 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8717 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8718 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8720 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8721 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8722 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8724 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8725 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8726 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8727 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8728 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8729 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8730 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8731 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8732 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8734 // A null channel ID should close all channels
8735 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8736 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8737 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8738 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8739 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8740 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8742 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8743 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8745 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8748 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8749 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8751 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8753 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
8754 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
8755 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
8756 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
8757 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8758 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8760 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
8761 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8762 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8766 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
8767 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
8769 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
8770 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
8771 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
8772 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
8774 // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
8775 // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
8776 // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
8777 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8778 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8779 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8780 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8782 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8783 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8784 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8786 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8788 // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
8789 // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
8790 // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
8792 let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
8793 let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.into();
8794 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
8795 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
8796 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
8799 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
8800 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8801 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8803 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8804 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8806 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8807 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
8809 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8810 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8811 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
8813 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
8814 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
8815 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8816 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8817 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8818 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8819 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
8820 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8821 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
8822 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
8823 } else { panic!(); }
8824 } else { panic!(); }
8825 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
8827 // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
8828 // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
8829 // as its not 32 bytes long.
8830 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8831 version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
8832 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
8833 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
8837 script_sig: Script::new(),
8838 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
8839 witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
8841 output: vec![TxOut {
8843 script_pubkey: Script::new(),
8846 check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
8847 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
8850 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
8851 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
8852 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
8853 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
8854 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
8855 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
8856 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
8857 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
8858 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
8859 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
8860 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
8861 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
8862 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
8863 // until we learned about an additional block.
8865 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
8866 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
8867 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8868 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8869 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8870 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8871 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
8873 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8874 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8875 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
8876 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8877 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8879 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8880 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8881 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8882 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8883 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8884 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8886 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
8887 if !test_height_before_timelock {
8888 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
8890 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8891 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
8892 if test_height_before_timelock {
8893 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
8894 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
8895 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8896 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8898 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
8899 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8900 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
8901 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
8902 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
8903 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
8905 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
8906 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
8908 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
8909 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
8910 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
8911 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8912 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
8913 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
8914 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8916 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8917 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8918 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8919 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8920 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8921 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8922 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8923 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8924 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
8929 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
8930 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
8931 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
8934 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
8935 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8936 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8937 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8938 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8940 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8942 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
8943 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
8944 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
8946 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
8949 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8950 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8951 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8952 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8953 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8954 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8955 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8957 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8958 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
8961 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
8962 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
8963 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8964 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8965 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8966 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8967 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8968 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8969 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
8970 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
8971 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
8972 // the first HTLC delivered above.
8975 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
8976 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8978 if test_for_second_fail_panic {
8979 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
8980 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
8982 let expected_destinations = vec![
8983 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
8984 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
8986 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], expected_destinations);
8987 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
8989 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8990 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8991 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
8993 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8994 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
8995 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
8997 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8998 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
8999 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9000 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9002 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9003 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9004 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9006 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9007 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9008 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9009 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9011 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9013 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9018 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9019 // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9020 // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentReceived` event.
9021 // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9022 // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9023 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9027 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9028 // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9029 // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9030 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9034 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9035 // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9036 // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9037 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9038 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9039 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9040 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9042 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9043 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9044 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9045 let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9047 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
9048 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
9049 let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9050 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9051 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9052 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9053 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9054 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9056 let payment_params_opt = Some(payment_params);
9058 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9060 let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9061 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9063 let session_privs = {
9064 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
9065 // ultimately have, just not right away.
9066 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
9067 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9068 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9071 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9072 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9074 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9075 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9076 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9078 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9081 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9082 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9084 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9085 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9086 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9088 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9089 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9091 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9092 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9094 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9095 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9096 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9098 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9099 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9100 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9102 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9103 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9104 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9106 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9107 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9108 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9109 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9113 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9114 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9115 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9117 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9118 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9120 let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9121 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9122 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9124 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9126 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9127 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9129 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9130 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9131 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9133 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9137 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9138 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9139 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9140 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9141 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9143 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9144 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9145 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9146 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9147 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9148 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9149 final_value_msat: 10000,
9150 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9152 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9153 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9154 let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9156 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9157 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9158 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9159 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9160 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9161 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9162 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9163 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9164 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9168 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9169 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9170 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9171 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9172 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9174 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9175 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9176 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
9177 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
9179 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9180 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9181 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9182 final_value_msat: 10000,
9183 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9185 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9186 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9187 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9188 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9189 let route = find_route(
9190 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9191 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
9194 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9195 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9196 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9197 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9198 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9199 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9200 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9201 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9202 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9206 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9207 // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentReceived event, the HTLCs
9208 // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9209 // PaymentReceived event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9211 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9212 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9213 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9214 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9216 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9217 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9218 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9219 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9221 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9222 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9223 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9224 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9225 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9226 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9229 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9230 // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentReceived event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9231 // amount of time to respond to.
9233 // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9234 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9235 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9237 let failed_destinations = vec![
9238 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9239 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9241 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
9243 pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash);
9245 // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9246 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9247 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9249 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9250 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9251 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
9253 // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9254 // that PaymentReceived event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9255 nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9256 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9257 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9260 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9261 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9262 enum ExposureEvent {
9263 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9265 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9267 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9268 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9271 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9272 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9275 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9276 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9277 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9278 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9279 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9280 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9281 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9282 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9284 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9285 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9286 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9287 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9288 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9289 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9291 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9292 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9293 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9294 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9296 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9298 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
9299 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9300 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
9302 let opt_anchors = false;
9304 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9307 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9308 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9312 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9313 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9314 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9316 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9317 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9319 let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9320 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9321 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9323 let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9324 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9325 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9326 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9328 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9329 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9331 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9332 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9334 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9335 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9338 if dust_outbound_balance {
9339 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9340 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9341 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9342 for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9343 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9344 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9347 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9348 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9349 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9350 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9351 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9355 if dust_outbound_balance {
9356 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9357 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9358 for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9359 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9360 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9363 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9364 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9365 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9366 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9371 let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9372 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9373 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9374 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9375 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9377 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9378 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9379 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9381 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9383 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9384 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9385 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9386 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9387 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9388 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9389 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9390 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9391 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9393 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9394 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9395 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9396 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9398 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9399 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9401 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9402 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9403 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9405 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9406 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9408 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9409 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9410 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9413 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9414 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9415 added_monitors.clear();
9419 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9420 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9421 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9422 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9423 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9424 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9425 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9426 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9427 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9428 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9429 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9430 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9431 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9435 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
9436 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9437 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9438 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9439 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9441 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9442 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9443 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_message);
9444 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9445 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel_message);
9447 let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
9449 let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
9450 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9451 let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
9452 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9453 let mut tx = match events[0] {
9454 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
9455 // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 2.
9456 Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 3), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
9457 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9460 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9462 // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
9463 match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
9464 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9465 assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
9470 // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +2 headroom from best block.
9471 tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(tx.lock_time.0 - 1);
9472 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
9473 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9477 fn accept_busted_but_better_fee() {
9478 // If a peer sends us a fee update that is too low, but higher than our previous channel
9479 // feerate, we should accept it. In the future we may want to consider closing the channel
9480 // later, but for now we only accept the update.
9481 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9482 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9483 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9484 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9486 create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9488 // Set nodes[1] to expect 5,000 sat/kW.
9490 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9491 *feerate_lock = 5000;
9494 // If nodes[0] increases their feerate, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept it.
9496 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9497 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9499 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9500 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9502 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9503 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9505 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9506 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9507 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9509 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9512 // If nodes[0] increases their feerate further, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept
9515 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9516 *feerate_lock = 2000;
9518 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9519 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9521 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9522 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9524 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9525 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9526 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9528 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9531 // However, if nodes[0] decreases their feerate, nodes[1] should reject it and close the
9534 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9535 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9537 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9538 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9540 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9541 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9543 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
9544 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9545 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
9546 err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000 (- 250)".to_owned() });
9547 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9548 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9550 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),