_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use chain;
  15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use chain::channelmonitor;
  17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  19 use chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
  20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  21 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC};
  22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
  23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
  24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  25 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  26 use routing::network_graph::{NetworkUpdate, RoutingFees};
  27 use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
  28 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  29 use ln::msgs;
  30 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  31 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
  32 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
  33 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
  34 use util::errors::APIError;
  35 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  36 use util::config::UserConfig;
  37
  38 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  39 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
  40 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  43 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  44
  45 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
  46 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  47
  48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  50
  51 use regex;
  52
  53 use io;
  54 use prelude::*;
  55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  56 use core::default::Default;
  57 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
  58
  59 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  60 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  61
  62 #[test]
  63 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  64         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  65         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  66         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  67         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
  68         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  69
  70         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  71         // funding satoshis
  72         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  73         let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
  74         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  75
  76         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  77         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
  78
  79         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  80         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  81
  82         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  83         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  84         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  85                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  86                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  87                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  88                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  89                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  90                         match action {
  91                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
  92                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
  93                                 },
  94                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
  95                         }
  96                 } else { assert!(false); }
  97         };
  98
  99         use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
 100         use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
 101
 102         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 103         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
 104
 105         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 106
 107         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than funding value \d+", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 108
 109         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 110
 111         insane_open_helper(r"Bogus; channel reserve \(\d+\) is less than dust limit \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis + 1; msg });
 112
 113         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 114
 115         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 116
 117         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 118
 119         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 120 }
 121
 122 #[test]
 123 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 124         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 125         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 126         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 127         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 128         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 129
 130         // balancing
 131         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 132
 133         // A                                        B
 134         // update_fee                            ->
 135         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 136         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 137         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 138         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 139         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 140         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 141         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 142         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 143         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 144         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 145         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 146         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 147         //                                       <- RAA
 148         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 149
 150         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 151         {
 152                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 153                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 154         }
 155         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 156         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 157
 158         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 159         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 160         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 161                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 162                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 163                 },
 164                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 165         };
 166
 167         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 168
 169         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 170         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 171         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 172         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 173
 174         let payment_event = {
 175                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 176                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 177                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 178         };
 179         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 180         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 181
 182         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 183         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 184         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 185         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 186         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 187         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 188
 189         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 190         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 191         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 192         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 193         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 194
 195         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 196         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 197         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 198         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 199         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 200         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 201         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 202         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 203
 204         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 205         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 206         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 207         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 208         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 209         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 210         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 211         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 212
 213         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 214         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 215         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 216         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 217
 218         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 219         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 220         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 221
 222         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 223         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 224
 225         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 226         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 227         match events_2[0] {
 228                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 229                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 230         }
 231
 232         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 233         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 234 }
 235
 236 #[test]
 237 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 238         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 239         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 240         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 241         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 242         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 243         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 244         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 245
 246         // balancing
 247         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 248
 249         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 250         {
 251                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 252                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 253         }
 254         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 255         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 256
 257         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 258         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 259         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 260                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 261                         update_fee.as_ref()
 262                 },
 263                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 264         };
 265
 266         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 267
 268         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 269         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 270         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 271         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 272
 273         let payment_event = {
 274                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 275                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 276                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 277         };
 278         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 279         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 280
 281         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 282         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 283         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 284         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 285         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 286         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 287
 288         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 289         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 290
 291         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 292 }
 293
 294 #[test]
 295 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 296         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 297         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 298         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 299         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 300         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 301
 302         // A                                        B
 303         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 304         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 305         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 306         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 307         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 308         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 309         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 310         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 311         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 312         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 313         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 314         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 315         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 316         //                                          B should send no response here
 317         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 318         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 319         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 320
 321         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 322         let initial_feerate;
 323         {
 324                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 325                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 326                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 327         }
 328         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 329         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 330
 331         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 332         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 333         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 334                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 335                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 336                 },
 337                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 338         };
 339
 340         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 341         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 342         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 343         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 344         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 345
 346         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 347         // transaction:
 348         {
 349                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 350                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 351         }
 352         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 353         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 354         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 355
 356         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 357         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 358                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 359                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 360         };
 361
 362         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 363
 364         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 365         // Deliver (3)
 366         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 367
 368         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 369         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 370         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 371         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 372         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 373         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 374         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 375         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 376         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 377         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 378         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 379
 380         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 381         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 382         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 383         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 384         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 385
 386         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 387         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 388         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 389
 390         // Delever (4)
 391         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 392         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 393         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 394
 395         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 396         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 397         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 398
 399         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 400         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 401         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 402         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 403
 404         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 405         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 406         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 407 }
 408
 409 fn do_test_1_conf_open(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
 410         // Previously, if the minium_depth config was set to 1, we'd never send a funding_locked. This
 411         // tests that we properly send one in that case.
 412         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
 413         alice_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
 414         alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
 415         alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
 416         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
 417         bob_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
 418         bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
 419         bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
 420         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 421         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 422         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
 423         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 424         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
 425
 426         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 427         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
 428         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
 429
 430         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
 431         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 432         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
 433
 434         for node in nodes {
 435                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
 436                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
 437                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
 438         }
 439 }
 440 #[test]
 441 fn test_1_conf_open() {
 442         do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst);
 443         do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst);
 444         do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
 445 }
 446
 447 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 448         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 449         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 450         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 451         // Node objects.
 452
 453         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 454         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 455         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 456         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 457
 458         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 459                 let block = Block {
 460                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
 461                         txdata: vec![],
 462                 };
 463                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 464                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 465         }
 466
 467         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 468         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
 469         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 470
 471         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 472         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
 473         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 474
 475         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 476         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
 477
 478         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
 479
 480         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 481         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
 482         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 483         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 484
 485         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 486         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 487         {
 488                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 489                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 490                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 491                 added_monitors.clear();
 492         }
 493         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 494
 495         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 496         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 497         {
 498                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 499                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 500                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 501                 added_monitors.clear();
 502         }
 503
 504         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 505         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 506
 507         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 508         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 509
 510         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 511         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 512         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 513         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 514 }
 515
 516 #[test]
 517 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 518         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 519         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 520         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 521         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 522         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 523         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 524         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 525         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 526         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 527         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 528         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 529         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 530         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 531         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 532         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 533         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 534         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 535         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 536 }
 537
 538 #[test]
 539 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 540         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 541         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 542         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 543         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 544         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 545
 546         {
 547                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 548                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 549         }
 550         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 551         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 552
 553         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 554         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 555         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 556                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 557                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 558                 },
 559                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 560         };
 561         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 562
 563         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 564         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 565         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 566
 567         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 568         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 569         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 570
 571         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 572         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 573         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 574         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 575
 576         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 577         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 578         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 579 }
 580
 581 #[test]
 582 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 583         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 584         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 585         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 586         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 587         let channel_value = 1977;
 588         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 700000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 589         let channel_id = chan.2;
 590         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 591
 592         let feerate = 260;
 593         {
 594                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 595                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 596         }
 597         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 598         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 599         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 600
 601         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 602
 603         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 604
 605         //Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate of 260 set above.
 606         //This value results in a fee that is exactly what the funder can afford (277 sat + 1000 sat channel reserve)
 607         {
 608                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 609
 610                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit so -2 non-HTLC txns from number of outputs
 611                 let num_htlcs = commitment_tx.output.len() - 2;
 612                 let total_fee: u64 = feerate as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
 613                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 614                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 615                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 616         }
 617
 618         //Add 2 to the previous fee rate to the final fee increases by 1 (with no HTLCs the fee is essentially
 619         //fee_rate*(724/1000) so the increment of 1*0.724 is rounded back down)
 620         {
 621                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 622                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 2;
 623         }
 624         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 625         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 2), 1);
 626         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 627
 628         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 629
 630         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 631         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 632         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 633                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 634                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 635                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 636                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 637                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 638                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 639         };
 640         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 641                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 642                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 643                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 644                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 645                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 646                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 647                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 648         };
 649
 650         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 651         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 652                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
 653
 654         let res = {
 655                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 656                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 657                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 658                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 659                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 660                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 661                         700,
 662                         999,
 663                         false, local_funding, remote_funding,
 664                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 665                         feerate + 124,
 666                         &mut htlcs,
 667                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 668                 );
 669                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 670         };
 671
 672         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 673                 channel_id: chan.2,
 674                 signature: res.0,
 675                 htlc_signatures: res.1
 676         };
 677
 678         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 679                 channel_id: chan.2,
 680                 feerate_per_kw: feerate + 124,
 681         };
 682
 683         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 684
 685         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 686         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 687         //Should produce and error.
 688         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 689         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
 690         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 691         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 692         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
 693 }
 694
 695 #[test]
 696 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 697         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 698         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 699         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 700         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 701         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 702
 703         // balancing
 704         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 705
 706         {
 707                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 708                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 709         }
 710         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 711         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 712
 713         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 714         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 715         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 716                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 717                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 718                 },
 719                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 720         };
 721         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 722         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 723         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 724         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 725
 726         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 727
 728         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 729         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 730         {
 731                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 732                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 733                 added_monitors.clear();
 734         }
 735         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 736         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 737         // node[1] has nothing to do
 738
 739         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 740         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 741         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 742
 743         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 744         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 745         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 746         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 747         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 748         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 749         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 750
 751         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 752         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 753         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 754         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 755         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 756         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 757
 758         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 759         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 760         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 761         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 762
 763         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 764         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 765         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 766
 767         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 768         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 769         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 770         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 771
 772         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 773         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 774         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 775
 776         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 777
 778         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 779         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 780         match events[0] {
 781                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
 782                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 783         };
 784
 785         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 786
 787         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 788         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 789         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 790         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 791         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 792 }
 793
 794 #[test]
 795 fn test_update_fee() {
 796         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 797         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 798         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 799         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 800         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 801         let channel_id = chan.2;
 802
 803         // A                                        B
 804         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 805         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 806         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 807         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 808         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 809         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 810         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 811         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 812         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 813         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 814         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 815         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 816
 817         // Create and deliver (1)...
 818         let feerate;
 819         {
 820                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 821                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 822                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 823         }
 824         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 825         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 826
 827         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 828         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 829         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 830                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 831                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 832                 },
 833                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 834         };
 835         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 836
 837         // Generate (2) and (3):
 838         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 839         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 840         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 841
 842         // Deliver (2):
 843         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 844         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 845         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 846
 847         // Create and deliver (4)...
 848         {
 849                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 850                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 851         }
 852         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 853         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 854         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 855         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 856         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 857                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 858                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 859                 },
 860                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 861         };
 862
 863         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 864         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 865         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 866         // ... creating (5)
 867         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 868         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 869
 870         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 871         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 872         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 873         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 874         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 875
 876         // Deliver (5):
 877         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 878         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 879         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 880
 881         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 882         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 883         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 884         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 885         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 886         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 887         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 888         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 889         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 890
 891         // Deliver (7)
 892         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 893         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 894         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 895         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 896
 897         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 898         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 899         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 900
 901         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 902         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 903         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 904         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 905         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 906 }
 907
 908 #[test]
 909 fn fake_network_test() {
 910         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 911         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 912         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 913         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 914         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 915         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 916
 917         // Create some initial channels
 918         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 919         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 920         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 921
 922         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
 923         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 924         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 925         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 926         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 927
 928         // Send some more payments
 929         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 930         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
 931         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
 932
 933         // Test failure packets
 934         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
 935         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
 936
 937         // Add a new channel that skips 3
 938         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 939
 940         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 941         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 942         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 943         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 944         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 945         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 946         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 947
 948         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
 949         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
 950         hops.push(RouteHop {
 951                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
 952                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
 953                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 954                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
 955                 fee_msat: 0,
 956                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
 957         });
 958         hops.push(RouteHop {
 959                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
 960                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
 961                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 962                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
 963                 fee_msat: 0,
 964                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
 965         });
 966         hops.push(RouteHop {
 967                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
 968                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
 969                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 970                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
 971                 fee_msat: 1000000,
 972                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
 973         });
 974         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
 975         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
 976         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
 977
 978         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
 979         hops.push(RouteHop {
 980                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
 981                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
 982                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 983                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
 984                 fee_msat: 0,
 985                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
 986         });
 987         hops.push(RouteHop {
 988                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
 989                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
 990                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 991                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
 992                 fee_msat: 0,
 993                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
 994         });
 995         hops.push(RouteHop {
 996                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
 997                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
 998                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
 999                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1000                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1001                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1002         });
1003         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1004         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1005         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1006
1007         // Claim the rebalances...
1008         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1009         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1010
1011         // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1012         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1013
1014         // Send some payments across both channels
1015         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1016         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1017         let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1018
1019
1020         route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1021         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1022         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1023         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1024
1025         //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1026
1027         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1028         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1029         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1030
1031         // Close down the channels...
1032         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1033         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1034         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1035         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1036         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1037         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1038         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1039         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1040         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1041         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1042         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1043         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1044         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1045         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1046         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1047 }
1048
1049 #[test]
1050 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1051         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1052         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1053         // commitment dance rounds.
1054         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1055         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1056         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1057         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1058         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1059         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1060
1061         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1062         for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1063                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1064                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1065                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1066         }
1067         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1068
1069         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1070         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1071         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1072         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1073
1074         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1075         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1076         // another HTLC.
1077         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1078         {
1079                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1080                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1081                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1082                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1083         }
1084
1085         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1086         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1087         {
1088                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1089                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1090         }
1091
1092         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1093         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1094         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1095         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1096
1097         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1098         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1099         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1100         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1101         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1102         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1103         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1104
1105         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1106         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1107         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1108
1109         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1110
1111         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1112         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1113         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1114         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1115
1116         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1117         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1118         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1119         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1120
1121         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1122         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1123         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1124
1125         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1126                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1127         }
1128         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1129         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1130         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1131         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1132         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1133
1134         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1135         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1136         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1137         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1138         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1139
1140         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1141         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1142
1143         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1144
1145         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1146         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1147         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1148                 match event {
1149                         &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1150                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1151                         },
1152                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1153                 };
1154         }
1155
1156         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1157                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1158         }
1159
1160         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1161 }
1162
1163 #[test]
1164 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1165         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1166         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1167         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1168         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1169         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1170         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1171
1172         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1173         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1174         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1175         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1176         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1177         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1178
1179         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1180
1181         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1182         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1183
1184         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1185         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1186
1187         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1188         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1189         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1190 }
1191
1192 #[test]
1193 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1194         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1195         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1196         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1197         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1198         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1199         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1200         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1201
1202         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1203
1204         // balancing
1205         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1206
1207         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1208
1209         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1210         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
1211         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1212
1213         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1214         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1215         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1216
1217         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1218         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1219
1220         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1221         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1222         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1223                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1224                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1225                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1226                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1227                 }
1228         }
1229         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1230
1231         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1232         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1233         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1234         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1235
1236         // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1237         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1238         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1239         assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1240         assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1241         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1242         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1243         check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1244
1245         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1246         assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1247         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1248
1249         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1250         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1251         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1252         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1253         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1254         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1255         check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1256         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1257
1258         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1259         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1260         for e in events {
1261                 match e {
1262                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1263                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1264                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1265                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1266                         },
1267                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1268                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1269                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1270                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1271                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1272                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1273                         },
1274                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1275                 }
1276         }
1277 }
1278
1279 #[test]
1280 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1281         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1282         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1283         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1284         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1285         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1286
1287         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1288         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1289
1290         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1291         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1);
1292         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1293         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1294         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1295         match err {
1296                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1297                         match &fails[0] {
1298                                 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1299                                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1300                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1301                         }
1302                 },
1303                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1304         }
1305         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1306         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1307
1308         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1309 }
1310
1311 #[test]
1312 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1313         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1314         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1315         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1316         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1317         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1318
1319         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1320         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1321         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1322         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1323
1324         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1325
1326         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1327         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1328         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1329         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1330                 channel_id: chan.2,
1331                 htlc_id: 0,
1332                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1333                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1334                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1335                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1336         };
1337
1338         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1339
1340         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1341         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1342         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1343
1344         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1345
1346         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1347
1348         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1349         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1350         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1351                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1352                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1353                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1354                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1355                 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1356
1357                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1358                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1359                  chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1360                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1361                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1362         };
1363         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1364                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1365                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1366                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1367                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1368                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1369                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1370                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1371         };
1372
1373         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1374         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1375                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1376
1377         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1378         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1379         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1380
1381         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1382                 offered: false,
1383                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1384                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1385                 payment_hash,
1386                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1387         };
1388
1389         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1390
1391         let res = {
1392                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1393                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1394                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1395                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1396                         commitment_number,
1397                         95000,
1398                         local_chan_balance,
1399                         false, local_funding, remote_funding,
1400                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1401                         feerate_per_kw,
1402                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1403                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1404                 );
1405                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1406         };
1407
1408         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1409                 channel_id: chan.2,
1410                 signature: res.0,
1411                 htlc_signatures: res.1
1412         };
1413
1414         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1415         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1416         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1417
1418         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1419         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1420                 channel_id: chan.2,
1421                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1422                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1423         };
1424         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1425
1426         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1427         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1428         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1429         match events[0] {
1430                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1431                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1432                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1433                 },
1434                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1435         };
1436         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1437                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1438
1439         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1440 }
1441
1442 #[test]
1443 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1444         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1445         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1446         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1447         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1448         // this situation.
1449         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
1450         chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1451         chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1452         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1453         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1454         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1455
1456         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1457         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
1458         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1459
1460         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1461
1462         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1463         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1464
1465         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1466         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1467         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1468                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1469         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1470         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1471 }
1472
1473 #[test]
1474 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1475         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1476         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the funder
1477         // receiving 1 update_add_htlc would result in them closing the channel due
1478         // to channel reserve violation. This close could also happen if the fee went
1479         // up a more realistic amount, but many HTLCs were outstanding at the time of
1480         // the update_add_htlc.
1481         chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(6000) };
1482         chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(6000) };
1483         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1484         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1485         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1486         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1487
1488         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1000);
1489         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1490         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1491         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1492         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1493         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1494         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 1000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1495         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1496         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1497                 channel_id: chan.2,
1498                 htlc_id: 1,
1499                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1500                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1501                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1502                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1503         };
1504
1505         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1506         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1507         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1508         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1509         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1510         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1511         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1512         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1513 }
1514
1515 #[test]
1516 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1517         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1518         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1519         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1520         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
1521         chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1522         chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(feerate_per_kw) };
1523
1524         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1525         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1526         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1527
1528         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1529         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1530         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1531         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1532         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT) / 1000 * 1000;
1533         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1534         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1535
1536         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1537                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1538         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1539         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1540         // commitment transaction fee.
1541         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1542
1543         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1544         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1545         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1546                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1547 }
1548
1549 #[test]
1550 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1551         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1552         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1553         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1554         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1555         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1556         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1557         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1558
1559         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1560         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1561         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1562         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1563         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1564         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1565
1566         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1567         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1568         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1569         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1570         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1571         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1572
1573         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1574         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1575         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1576         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1577 }
1578
1579 #[test]
1580 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1581         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1582         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1583         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1584         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1585         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1586         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1587
1588         let feemsat = 239;
1589         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1590         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1591         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1592
1593         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1594         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1595         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1596         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1597
1598         // Add a pending HTLC.
1599         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1600         let payment_event_1 = {
1601                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1602                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1603
1604                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1605                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1606                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1607         };
1608         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1609
1610         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1611         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2);
1612         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1613         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1614         let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1615
1616         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1617         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1618         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1619         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1620         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1621         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1622         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1623         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1624                 channel_id: chan.2,
1625                 htlc_id: 1,
1626                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1627                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1628                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1629                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1630         };
1631
1632         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1633         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1634         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1635         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1636         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1637         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1638         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1639         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1640 }
1641
1642 #[test]
1643 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1644         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1645         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1646         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1647         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1648         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1649         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1650         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1651         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1652         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1653
1654         let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1655         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1656         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1657
1658         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1659         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1660 }
1661
1662 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64) -> u64 {
1663         (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1664 }
1665
1666 #[test]
1667 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1668         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1669         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1670         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1671         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1672         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1673         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1674         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1675         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1676         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1677         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1678
1679         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1680         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1681
1682         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1683         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1684
1685         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1686                 ($node: expr) => {{
1687                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1688                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1689                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1690                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1691                         payment_event
1692                 }}
1693         }
1694
1695         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1696         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1697         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1698
1699         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1700
1701         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1702         {
1703                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1704                 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1705                 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1706                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1707                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1708                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1709                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1710         }
1711
1712         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1713         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1714         loop {
1715                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1716                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1717                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1718                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1719                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1720                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1721                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1722                         break;
1723                 }
1724                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1725
1726                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1727                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1728                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1729                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1730                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1731                 );
1732
1733                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1734                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1735                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1736                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1737                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1738         }
1739
1740         // adding pending output.
1741         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1742         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1743         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1744         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1745         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1746         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1747         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1748         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1749         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1750         // policy.
1751         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1752         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1753         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1754
1755         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1756         let payment_event_1 = {
1757                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1758                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1759
1760                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1761                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1762                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1763         };
1764         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1765
1766         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1767         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1768         {
1769                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1770                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1771                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1772                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1773         }
1774
1775         // split the rest to test holding cell
1776         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1777         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1778         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1779         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1780         {
1781                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1782                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1783         }
1784
1785         // now see if they go through on both sides
1786         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1787         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1788         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1789         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1790         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1791         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1792
1793         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1794         {
1795                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1796                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1797                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1798                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1799                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1800         }
1801
1802         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1803         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1804         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1805         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1806         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1807         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1808
1809         // flush the pending htlc
1810         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1811         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1812         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1813
1814         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1815         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1816         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1817         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1818
1819         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1820         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1821         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1822         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1823
1824         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1825         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1826         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1827
1828         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1829
1830         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1831         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1832         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1833
1834         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1835         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1836
1837         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1838         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1839         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1840         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1841         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1842         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1843
1844         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1845         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1846         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1847         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1848
1849         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1850         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1851
1852         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1853         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1854         match events[0] {
1855                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1856                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1857                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
1858                         match &purpose {
1859                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1860                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1861                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1862                                 },
1863                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1864                         }
1865                 },
1866                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1867         }
1868         match events[1] {
1869                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1870                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1871                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
1872                         match &purpose {
1873                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1874                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1875                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1876                                 },
1877                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1878                         }
1879                 },
1880                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1881         }
1882
1883         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1884         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1885         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1886
1887         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1);
1888         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1889         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1890
1891         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
1892         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1893         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1894         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
1895         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
1896
1897         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1898         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
1899 }
1900
1901 #[test]
1902 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
1903         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
1904         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
1905         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
1906         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
1907         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
1908         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
1909         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
1910         // To test this we:
1911         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
1912         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
1913         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
1914         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
1915         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
1916         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
1917         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
1918         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
1919         //    claim,
1920         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
1921         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
1922         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
1923         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
1924         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
1925         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1926         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1927         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1928         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1929         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1930
1931         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1932         // Route the first two HTLCs.
1933         let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
1934         let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
1935
1936         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
1937         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
1938         let send_1 = {
1939                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
1940                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1941                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1942                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1943                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1944         };
1945
1946         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
1947         // initial fulfill/CS.
1948         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
1949         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1950         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1951
1952         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
1953         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
1954         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
1955         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1956         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1957
1958         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
1959         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
1960         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1961         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1962         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
1963
1964         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
1965         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
1966         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1967         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
1968         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1969
1970         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1971         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1972         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1973
1974         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
1975         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1976         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1977
1978         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
1979         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1980         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1981
1982         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
1983         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
1984         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
1985         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
1986         // on-chain as necessary).
1987         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
1988         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
1989         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1990         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1991         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
1992
1993         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1994         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1995         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1996
1997         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1998         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
1999
2000         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2001         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2002         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2003         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2004         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2005
2006         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2007         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2008         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2009         let send_2 = {
2010                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2011                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2012                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2013                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2014                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2015         };
2016
2017         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2018         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2019         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2020         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2021
2022         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2023
2024         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2025         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2026         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2027
2028         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2029         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2030
2031         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2032         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2033         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2034
2035         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2036         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2037         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2038
2039         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2040         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2041
2042         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2043         expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2044
2045         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2046         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2047 }
2048
2049 #[test]
2050 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2051         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2052         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2053         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2054         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2055         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2056         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2057
2058         // Create some initial channels
2059         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2060         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2061         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2062         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2063
2064         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2065         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2066         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2067         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2068         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2069         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2070
2071         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2072         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2073         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2074         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2075         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2076
2077         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2078         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2079         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2080         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2081         {
2082                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2083                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2084                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2085                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2086                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2087         }
2088         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2089         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2090         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2091         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2092         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2093
2094         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2095         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2096
2097         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2098         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2099         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2100         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2101         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2102         {
2103                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2104                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2105                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2106                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2107                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2108                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2109         }
2110         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2111         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2112         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2113         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2114         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2115
2116         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2117                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2118                         {
2119                                 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2120                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2121
2122                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2123                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2124                                 match events[0] {
2125                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2126                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2127                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2128                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2129                                         },
2130                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2131                                 };
2132                         }
2133                 }
2134         }
2135
2136         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2137         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2138         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2139         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2140         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
2141         let node2_commitment_txid;
2142         {
2143                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2144                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2145                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2146                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2147
2148                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2149                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2150                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2151                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2152                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2153         }
2154         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2155         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2156         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2157         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2158         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2159
2160         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2161         // confusing us in the following tests.
2162         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2163
2164         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2165         let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2166         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2167         // buffer space).
2168
2169         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2170                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2171                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2172                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2173                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2174                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2175                                 msg.clone()
2176                         },
2177                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2178                 };
2179                 match events[1] {
2180                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2181                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2182                         },
2183                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2184                 }
2185                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2186
2187                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2188                 {
2189                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2190                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2191                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2192                                         false
2193                                 } else { true }
2194                         });
2195                 }
2196
2197                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2198
2199                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2200                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2201
2202                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2203                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2204                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2205                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2206                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2207                                 msg.clone()
2208                         },
2209                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2210                 };
2211                 match events[1] {
2212                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2213                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2214                         },
2215                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2216                 }
2217                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2218                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2219
2220                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2221                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2222                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2223         };
2224         nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2225         nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2226         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2227         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2228
2229         nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2230         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2231         check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2232 }
2233
2234 #[test]
2235 fn test_justice_tx() {
2236         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2237         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2238         alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2239         alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2240         alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2241         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2242         bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2243         bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2244         bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2245         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2246         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2247         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2248         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2249         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2250         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2251         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2252         // Create some new channels:
2253         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2254
2255         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2256         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2257         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2258         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2259         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2260         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2261         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2262         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2263         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2264         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2265         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2266         // Revoke the old state
2267         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2268
2269         {
2270                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2271                 {
2272                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2273                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2274                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2275
2276                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2277                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2278                         node_txn.truncate(1);
2279                 }
2280                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2281                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2282                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2283
2284                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2285                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2286                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2287                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2288                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2289                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2290                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2291                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2292                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2293         }
2294         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2295
2296         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2297         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2298
2299         // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2300         // Create some new channels:
2301         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2302         {
2303                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2304                 node_txn.clear();
2305         }
2306
2307         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2308         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2309         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2310         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2311         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2312         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2313         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2314         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2315         // Revoke the old state
2316         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2317         {
2318                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2319                 {
2320                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2321                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2322                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2323
2324                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2325                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2326                 }
2327                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2328                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2329
2330                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2331                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2332                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2333                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2334                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2335                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2336                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2337         }
2338         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2339         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2340         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2341 }
2342
2343 #[test]
2344 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2345         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2346         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2347         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2348         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2349         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2350         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2351         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2352         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2353         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2354         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2355         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2356         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2357         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2358         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2359
2360         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2361         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2362         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2363         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2364         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2365         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2366
2367         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2368         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2369
2370         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2371         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2372         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2373         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2374         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2375 }
2376
2377 #[test]
2378 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2379         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2380         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2381         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2382         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2383         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2384         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2385
2386         // Create some new channel:
2387         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2388
2389         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2390         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2391         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2392         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2393         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2394
2395         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2396         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2397         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2398         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2399         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2400         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2401         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2402         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2403         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2404
2405         //Revoke the old state
2406         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2407
2408         {
2409                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2410                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2411                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2412                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2413                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2414                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2415                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2416                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2417
2418                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2419                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2420
2421                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2422                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2423
2424                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2425                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2426                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2427                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2428                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2429                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2430                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2431                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2432
2433                 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2434                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2435                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2436         }
2437         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2438         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2439         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2440 }
2441
2442 #[test]
2443 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2444         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2445         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2446         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2447         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2448         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2449         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2450
2451         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2452
2453         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2454         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2455         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2456         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2457         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2458         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2459
2460         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2461         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2462
2463         //Revoke the old state
2464         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2465
2466         {
2467                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2468                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2469                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2470                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2471                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2472                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2473                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2474                 match events[1] {
2475                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2476                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2477                 }
2478
2479                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2480                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2481
2482                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2483                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2484                 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2485                 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2486                 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2487                 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2488
2489                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2490                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2491                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2492                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2493                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2494                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2495                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2496
2497                 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2498                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2499                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2500                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2501
2502                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2503                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2504                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2505
2506                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2507                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2508                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2509                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2510                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2511                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2512                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2513                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2514         }
2515         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2516         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2517         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2518 }
2519
2520 #[test]
2521 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2522         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2523         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2524         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2525         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2526         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2527         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2528         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2529         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2530         // towards B.
2531         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2532         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2533         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2534         // PaymentSent event).
2535
2536         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2537         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2538         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2539         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2540
2541         // Create some initial channels
2542         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2543         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2544
2545         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2546         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2547         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2548         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2549         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2550
2551         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2552         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2553         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2554
2555         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2556         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2557
2558         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2559         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2560         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2561         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2562         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2563         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2564         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2565         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2566         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2567         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2568         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2569         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2570         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2571
2572         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2573         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2574         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2575         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2576         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2577         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2578         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2579         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2580         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2581         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2582         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2583         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2584         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2585         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2586         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2587         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2588         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2589
2590         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2591         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2592         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2593         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2594         {
2595                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2596                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2597                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2598                 added_monitors.clear();
2599         }
2600         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2601         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2602         match forwarded_events[0] {
2603                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2604                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2605         }
2606         if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[1] {
2607                 } else { panic!(); }
2608         if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[2] {
2609                 } else { panic!(); }
2610         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2611         {
2612                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2613                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2614                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2615                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2616                 added_monitors.clear();
2617         }
2618         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2619         match events[0] {
2620                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2621                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2622         }
2623         match events[1] {
2624                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2625                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2626         }
2627
2628         match events[2] {
2629                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2630                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2631                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2632                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2633                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2634                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2635                 },
2636                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2637         };
2638         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2639                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2640                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2641                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2642                         // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2643                         // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2644                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2645                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2646                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2647                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2648                         if $htlc_offered {
2649                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2650                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2651                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2652                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2653                         } else {
2654                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2655                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2656                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2657                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2658                         }
2659                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2660                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2661                         node_txn.clear();
2662                 } }
2663         }
2664         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2665         // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2666         // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2667         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2668
2669         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2670         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2671         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2672         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2673         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2674         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2675         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2676         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2677         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2678         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2679         let commitment_spend =
2680                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2681                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2682                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2683                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2684                         &node_txn[0]
2685                 } else {
2686                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2687                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2688                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2689                         &node_txn[2]
2690                 };
2691
2692         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2693         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2694         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2695         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2696         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2697         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2698         check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2699         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2700         check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2701         check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2702         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2703         // we already checked the same situation with A.
2704
2705         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2706         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2707         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2708         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2709         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2710         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2711         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2712         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2713         let mut first_claimed = false;
2714         for event in events {
2715                 match event {
2716                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2717                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2718                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
2719                                         first_claimed = true;
2720                                 } else {
2721                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2722                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2723                                 }
2724                         },
2725                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2726                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2727                 }
2728         }
2729         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2730 }
2731
2732 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2733         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2734         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2735         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2736         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2737         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
2738         //            \                                  \
2739         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
2740
2741         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2742         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2743         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2744         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2745         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2746         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2747         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2748
2749         // Create some intial channels
2750         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2751         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2752
2753         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2754         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2755         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2756
2757         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2758
2759         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2760         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2761         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2762         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2763         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2764         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2765         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2766
2767         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2768         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2769         match events[0] {
2770                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2771                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2772                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2773                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2774                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2775                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2776                 },
2777                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2778         };
2779         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2780         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2781         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2782         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2783         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2784         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2785         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2786         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2787
2788         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2789         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2790         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2791         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2792         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2793         let timeout_tx;
2794         {
2795                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2796                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2797                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2798                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2799
2800                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2801                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2802
2803                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2804                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2805                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2806                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2807
2808                 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2809                 node_txn.clear();
2810         }
2811
2812         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2813         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2814         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2815         {
2816                 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2817                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2818                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2819                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2820         }
2821
2822         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2823         {
2824                 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2825                 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2826                 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2827                 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2828                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2829                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2830                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2831                 } else {
2832                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2833                 }
2834         }
2835
2836         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2837         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2838         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2839         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2840         match events[0] {
2841                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2842                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2843                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2844                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2845                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2846                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2847                 },
2848                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2849         };
2850
2851         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2852         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2853         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2854
2855         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2856         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2857
2858         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2859         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2860         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2861         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2862         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2863         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2864         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2865         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2866         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2867 }
2868
2869 #[test]
2870 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2871         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2872         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2873         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2874 }
2875
2876 #[test]
2877 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
2878         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
2879         // and fail backward accordingly.
2880
2881         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2882         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2883         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2884         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2885
2886         // Create some initial channels
2887         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2888         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2889
2890         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2891         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
2892         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2893         // Revoke the old state
2894         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
2895
2896         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2897
2898         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2899         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2900         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2901         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2902         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2903
2904         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2905         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2906         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2907         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2908         match events[0] {
2909                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
2910                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2911                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2912                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2913                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2914                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2915
2916                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2917                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
2918                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
2919                 },
2920                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2921         }
2922 }
2923
2924 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
2925         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
2926         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
2927         // commitment transaction anymore.
2928         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
2929         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
2930         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
2931         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
2932         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
2933         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
2934         // transactions:
2935         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
2936         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
2937         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
2938         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
2939         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
2940         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2941         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2942         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2943         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2944
2945         // Create some initial channels
2946         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2947         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2948
2949         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
2950         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
2951         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2952         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
2953         // Revoke the old state
2954         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
2955
2956         let value = if use_dust {
2957                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
2958                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
2959                 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
2960         } else { 3000000 };
2961
2962         let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
2963         let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
2964         let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
2965
2966         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
2967         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2968         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2969         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2970         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2971         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2972         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2973         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2974         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
2975         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2976         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
2977         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
2978
2979         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
2980         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2981         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2982         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2983         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2984         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2985         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2986         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2987         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
2988         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2989         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
2990         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2991         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
2992         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
2993         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2994         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2995
2996         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
2997         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2998         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2999         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3000         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3001         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3002         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3003         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3004         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3005         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3006         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3007         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3008         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3009         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3010         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3011         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3012         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3013         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3014
3015         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3016         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3017         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3018         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3019         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3020         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3021         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3022
3023         if deliver_bs_raa {
3024                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3025                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3026                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3027                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3028                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3029                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3030                 match events[0] {
3031                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3032                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3033                 };
3034                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3035                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3036         }
3037
3038         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3039         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3040
3041         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3042         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3043         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3044
3045         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3046         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 3 });
3047         match events[0] {
3048                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3049                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3050         }
3051         match events[1] {
3052                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3053                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3054                 },
3055                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3056         }
3057         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3058                 match events[2] {
3059                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3060                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3061                 };
3062         }
3063         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3064         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3065
3066         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3067         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3068         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3069                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3070                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3071         }
3072         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3073                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3074                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3075                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3076                 },
3077                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3078         }
3079         if deliver_bs_raa {
3080                 match events[0] {
3081                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3082                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3083                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3084                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3085                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3086                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3087                         },
3088                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3089                 }
3090         }
3091         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3092                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3093                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3094                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3095                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3096                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3097                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3098
3099                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3100                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3101                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3102
3103                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3104
3105                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3106                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3107                         match events[0] {
3108                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3109                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3110                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3111                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3112                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3113                                                 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3114                                         }
3115                                 },
3116                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3117                         }
3118                         match events[1] {
3119                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3120                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3121                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3122                                 },
3123                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3124                         }
3125                         match events[2] {
3126                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3127                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3128                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3129                                 },
3130                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3131                         }
3132                 },
3133                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3134         }
3135
3136         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3137         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3138         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3139 }
3140
3141 #[test]
3142 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3143         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3144         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3145         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3146         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3147 }
3148
3149 #[test]
3150 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3151         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3152         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3153         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3154         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3155 }
3156
3157 #[test]
3158 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3159         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3160         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3161         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3162         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3163         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3164
3165         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3166         {
3167                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3168                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3169                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3170
3171                 let payment_event = {
3172                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3173                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3174                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3175                 };
3176                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3177                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3178         }
3179
3180         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3181         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3182         {
3183                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3184                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3185
3186                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3187         }
3188
3189         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3190         {
3191                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3192
3193                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3194                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3195                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3196                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3197                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3198                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3199
3200                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3201                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3202                         channel_id: chan.2,
3203                         htlc_id: 0,
3204                         amount_msat: 0,
3205                         payment_hash,
3206                         cltv_expiry,
3207                         onion_routing_packet,
3208                 };
3209                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3210         }
3211         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3212         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3213         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3214         match events[0] {
3215                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3216                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3217                 },
3218                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3219         }
3220         match events[1] {
3221                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3222                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3223                 },
3224                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3225         }
3226         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3227         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3228 }
3229
3230 #[test]
3231 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3232         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3233         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3234         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3235         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3236         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3237         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3238         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3239
3240         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3241         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
3242         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3243         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3244         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3245         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3246
3247         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3248         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3249         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3250
3251         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3252         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3253         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3254         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3255         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3256
3257         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3258         // registering new transactions
3259         header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3260         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3261 }
3262
3263 #[test]
3264 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3265         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3266         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3267         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3268         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3269         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3270         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3271         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3272
3273         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3274
3275         let mut payment_event = {
3276                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3277                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3278
3279                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3280                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3281                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3282         };
3283
3284         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3285         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3286
3287         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3288
3289         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3290         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3291         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3292         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3293
3294         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3295         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3296         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3297         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3298         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3299
3300         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3301         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3302         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3303
3304         nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
3305         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3306         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3307         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3308         let tx = {
3309                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3310                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3311                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3312                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3313                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3314                 node_txn.remove(0)
3315         };
3316
3317         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3318
3319         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3320         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3321         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3322         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3323
3324         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3325         {
3326                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3327                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3328         }
3329         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3330         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3331         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3332         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3333         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3334         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3335         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3336
3337         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3338 }
3339
3340 #[test]
3341 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3342         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3343         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3344         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3345         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3346
3347         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3348         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3349         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3350         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3351         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3352
3353         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3354
3355         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3356         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3357         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3358         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3359         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3360
3361         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3362         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3363
3364         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3365         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3366 }
3367
3368 #[test]
3369 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3370         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3371         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3372         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3373         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3374         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3375         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3376         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3377
3378         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3379         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3380         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3381
3382         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3383         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3384         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3385         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3386
3387         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3388         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3389         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3390
3391         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3392         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3393         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3394         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3395
3396         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3397         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3398
3399         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3400         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3401
3402         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3403         {
3404                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3405                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3406                 match events[0] {
3407                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3408                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3409                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3410                         },
3411                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3412                 }
3413                 match events[1] {
3414                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3415                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3416                                 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3417                         },
3418                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3419                 }
3420         }
3421
3422         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3423         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3424 }
3425
3426 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3427         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3428         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3429         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3430         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3431         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3432
3433         let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3434         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3435                 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3436                 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3437                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3438                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3439                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3440         } else {
3441                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3442         }
3443
3444         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3445
3446         let payment_event = {
3447                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3448                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3449
3450                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3451                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3452                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3453         };
3454         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3455
3456         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3457                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3458         } else {
3459                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3460                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3461                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3462                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3463                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3464
3465                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3466                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3467                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3468                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3469
3470                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3471                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3472                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3473                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3474                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3475
3476                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3477                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3478                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3479                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3480                                         }
3481                                 }
3482                         }
3483                 }
3484         }
3485
3486         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3487         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3488         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3489                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3490                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3491                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3492                         //
3493                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3494                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3495                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3496                         //
3497                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3498                         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3499                 }
3500                 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3501                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3502                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3503         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3504                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3505                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3506         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3507                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3508                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3509         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3510                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3511                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3512         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3513                 // Everything was delivered...
3514                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3515         }
3516
3517         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3518         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3519         match events_1[0] {
3520                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3521                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3522         };
3523
3524         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3525         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3526         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3527
3528         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3529
3530         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3531         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3532         match events_2[0] {
3533                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3534                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3535                         assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3536                         match &purpose {
3537                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3538                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3539                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3540                                 },
3541                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3542                         }
3543                 },
3544                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3545         }
3546
3547         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3548         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3549
3550         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3551         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3552         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3553                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3554                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3555                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3556                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3557                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3558                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3559                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3560                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3561                 },
3562                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3563         };
3564
3565         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3566                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3567
3568                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3569                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3570                 match events_4[0] {
3571                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3572                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3573                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3574                         },
3575                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3576                 }
3577
3578                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3579                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3580                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3581                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3582
3583                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3584                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3585                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3586                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3587
3588                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3589                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3590                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3591                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3592                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3593
3594                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3595                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3596                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3597                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3598                                         }
3599                                 }
3600                         }
3601                 }
3602         }
3603
3604         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3605         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3606         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3607                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3608                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3609                         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3610                         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3611                         match events_4[0] {
3612                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3613                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3614                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3615                                 },
3616                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3617                         }
3618                 } else {
3619                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3620                 }
3621         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3622                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3623                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3624         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3625                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3626                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3627         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3628                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3629                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3630         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3631                 // Everything was delivered...
3632                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3633         }
3634
3635         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3636         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3637         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3638
3639         // Channel should still work fine...
3640         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3641         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3642         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3643 }
3644
3645 #[test]
3646 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3647         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3648         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3649         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3650         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3651 }
3652
3653 #[test]
3654 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3655         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3656         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3657         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3658         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3659 }
3660
3661 #[test]
3662 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3663         // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3664         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3665         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3666         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3667         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3668         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3669         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3670         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3671         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3672
3673         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3674         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3675
3676         confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3677         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3678         let chan_id;
3679         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3680         match events_1[0] {
3681                 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3682                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3683                         chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3684                 },
3685                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3686         }
3687
3688         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3689
3690         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3691         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3692
3693         confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3694         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3695         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
3696         let funding_locked = match events_2[0] {
3697                 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3698                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3699                         msg.clone()
3700                 },
3701                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3702         };
3703         let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_2[1] {
3704                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3705                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3706                         msg.clone()
3707                 },
3708                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3709         };
3710
3711         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3712
3713         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_locked);
3714         nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3715         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3716         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2);
3717         let as_announcement_sigs = match events_3[0] {
3718                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3719                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3720                         msg.clone()
3721                 },
3722                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3723         };
3724         let (as_announcement, as_update) = match events_3[1] {
3725                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3726                         (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3727                 },
3728                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3729         };
3730
3731         nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3732         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3733         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3734         let (_, bs_update) = match events_4[0] {
3735                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3736                         (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3737                 },
3738                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3739         };
3740
3741         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&as_announcement).unwrap();
3742         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3743         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3744
3745         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3746         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3747         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3748
3749         // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3750         // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3751         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3752
3753         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3754         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3755         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3756
3757         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3758         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3759         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3760         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3761         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3762         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3763                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3764         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3765
3766         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3767         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3768                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3769                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3770                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3771                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3772                         keys_manager,
3773                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3774                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3775                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3776                         logger: nodes[0].logger,
3777                         channel_monitors,
3778                 }).unwrap()
3779         };
3780         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
3781         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
3782
3783         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
3784         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
3785         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3786
3787         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3788
3789         // as_announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
3790         nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
3791         let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3792         let mut found_announcement = false;
3793         for event in msgs.iter() {
3794                 match event {
3795                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
3796                                 if *msg == as_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
3797                         },
3798                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
3799                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3800                 }
3801         }
3802         assert!(found_announcement);
3803 }
3804
3805 #[test]
3806 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3807         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3808         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3809         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3810         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3811         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3812         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3813         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3814
3815         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
3816
3817         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3818         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3819         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
3820         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3821
3822         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3823         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3824         match events_1[0] {
3825                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3826                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3827         }
3828
3829         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
3830         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3831
3832         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3833         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3834         match events_2[0] {
3835                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3836                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3837                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3838                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3839                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3840                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3841                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3842
3843                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3844                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3845                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3846                         match events_3[0] {
3847                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3848                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3849                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3850                                 },
3851                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3852                         }
3853
3854                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3855                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3856                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3857                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3858                 },
3859                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3860         }
3861
3862         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3863         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3864
3865         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3866         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3867         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3868         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3869         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3870         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3871
3872         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3873         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3874         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3875         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3876
3877         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
3878         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
3879
3880         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
3881         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
3882
3883         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
3884
3885         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3886         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3887         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3888         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3889         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
3890         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
3891         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
3892         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3893         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3894         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3895
3896         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
3897         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3898         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3899         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3900         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3901         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3902         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3903         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3904
3905         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3906         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3907         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3908         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3909         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3910         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3911         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3912         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3913
3914         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3915         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3916         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3917         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3918
3919         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3920         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3921         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3922         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3923
3924         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3925         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3926         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3927
3928         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3929
3930         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3931         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3932         match events_5[0] {
3933                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
3934                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
3935                         match &purpose {
3936                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3937                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3938                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
3939                                 },
3940                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3941                         }
3942                 },
3943                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3944         }
3945
3946         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
3947         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3948         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3949
3950         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3951 }
3952
3953 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
3954         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
3955         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
3956         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3957         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3958         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3959         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3960
3961         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3962
3963         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
3964                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
3965                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
3966                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
3967                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
3968                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
3969                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
3970                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3971                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3972                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3973                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
3974                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
3975                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
3976                 our_payment_hash
3977         } else {
3978                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
3979         };
3980
3981         let mut block = Block {
3982                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
3983                 txdata: vec![],
3984         };
3985         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
3986         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3987         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
3988         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
3989                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
3990                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
3991                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3992         }
3993
3994         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3995
3996         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3997         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3998         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3999         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4000         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4001         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4002
4003         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4004         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4005         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4006         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4007         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4008         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4009 }
4010
4011 #[test]
4012 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4013         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4014         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4015 }
4016
4017 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4018         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4019         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4020         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4021         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4022         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4023         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4024         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4025
4026         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4027         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4028         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4029         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4030
4031         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4032         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4033         {
4034                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4035         }
4036         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4037         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4038
4039         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4040         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4041         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4042         sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4043         if forwarded_htlc {
4044                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4045                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4046                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4047                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4048                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4049         }
4050         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4051
4052         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4053         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4054         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4055         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4056
4057         if forwarded_htlc {
4058                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4059                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4060                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4061                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4062                 match fail_commit[0] {
4063                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4064                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4065                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4066                         },
4067                         _ => unreachable!(),
4068                 }
4069                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4070         } else {
4071                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, true);
4072         }
4073 }
4074
4075 #[test]
4076 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4077         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4078         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4079 }
4080
4081 #[test]
4082 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4083         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4084         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4085         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4086         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4087         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4088         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4089         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4090         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4091         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4092
4093         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4094
4095         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4096
4097         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4098         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4099         get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4100                 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4101
4102         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4103         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4104         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4105         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4106         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4107         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4108         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4109         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4110                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4111         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4112
4113         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4114         let config = UserConfig::default();
4115         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4116                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4117                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4118                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4119                         default_config: config,
4120                         keys_manager,
4121                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4122                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4123                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4124                         logger: &logger,
4125                         channel_monitors,
4126                 }).unwrap()
4127         };
4128         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4129         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4130
4131         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4132         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4133         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4134         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4135
4136         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4137         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4138         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4139         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4140
4141         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4142         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4143         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4144         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4145
4146         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4147         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4148         for node in nodes.iter() {
4149                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4150                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4151                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4152         }
4153
4154         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4155 }
4156
4157 #[test]
4158 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4159         // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4160         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4161         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4162         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4163         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4164         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4165         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4166         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4167         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4168         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4169
4170         // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4171         let channel_value = 100000;
4172         let push_msat = 10001;
4173         let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4174         let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4175         let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4176         let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4177         node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4178         node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4179         node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4180
4181         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
4182
4183         node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4184         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4185
4186         node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4187         {
4188                 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4189                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4190                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4191                 added_monitors.clear();
4192         }
4193
4194         let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4195         node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4196         {
4197                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4198                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4199                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4200                 added_monitors.clear();
4201         }
4202         // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4203
4204         nodes.push(node_a);
4205         nodes.push(node_b);
4206
4207         // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4208         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4209         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4210         get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4211
4212         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4213         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4214         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4215         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4216         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4217         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4218         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4219         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4220                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4221         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4222
4223         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4224         let config = UserConfig::default();
4225         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4226                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4227                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4228                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4229                         default_config: config,
4230                         keys_manager,
4231                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4232                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4233                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4234                         logger: &logger,
4235                         channel_monitors,
4236                 }).unwrap()
4237         };
4238         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4239         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4240
4241         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4242
4243         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4244         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4245
4246         // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4247         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4248         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4249         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4250         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4251
4252         // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4253         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4254         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4255
4256         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4257         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4258         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4259         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4260
4261         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4262         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4263         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4264         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4265
4266         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4267         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4268         for node in nodes.iter() {
4269                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4270                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4271                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4272         }
4273
4274         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4275 }
4276
4277 #[test]
4278 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4279         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4280         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4281         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4282         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4283         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4284         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4285         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4286         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4287         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4288         let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4289
4290         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4291         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4292
4293         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4294
4295         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4296         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4297         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4298
4299         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4300         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4301         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4302         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4303         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4304         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4305         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4306         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4307                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4308         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4309
4310         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4311         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4312                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4313                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4314                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4315                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4316                         keys_manager,
4317                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4318                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4319                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4320                         logger: &logger,
4321                         channel_monitors,
4322                 }).unwrap()
4323         };
4324         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4325         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4326
4327         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4328         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4329         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4330
4331         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4332
4333         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4334         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4335 }
4336
4337 #[test]
4338 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4339         // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4340         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4341         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4342         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4343         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4344         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4345         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4346         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4347         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4348         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4349         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4350         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4351         let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4352
4353         let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4354         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4355                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4356                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4357                 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4358         }
4359
4360         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4361
4362         // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4363         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4364
4365         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4366         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4367         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4368         nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4369
4370         // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4371         // nodes[3])
4372         let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4373         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4374                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4375                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4376                 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4377         }
4378
4379         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4380         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4381         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4382         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4383         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4384         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4385
4386
4387         let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4388         for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4389                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4390                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4391                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4392                 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4393         }
4394
4395         let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4396         for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4397                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4398                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4399                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4400                 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4401         }
4402
4403         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4404         if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4405                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4406                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4407                 keys_manager,
4408                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4409                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4410                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4411                 logger: &logger,
4412                 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4413         }) { } else {
4414                 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4415         };
4416
4417         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4418         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4419                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4420                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4421                 keys_manager,
4422                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4423                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4424                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4425                 logger: &logger,
4426                 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4427         }).unwrap();
4428         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4429         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4430
4431         { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4432                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4433                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4434                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4435                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4436         }
4437
4438         for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4439                 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4440                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4441         }
4442         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4443         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4444
4445         // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4446         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4447         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4448         //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4449         claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4450
4451         nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4452         let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4453         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4454         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4455         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4456         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4457         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4458                 match action {
4459                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4460                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4461                         },
4462                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4463                 }
4464         }
4465 }
4466
4467 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4468         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4469                 {
4470                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4471                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4472                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4473                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4474                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4475                                 match event {
4476                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4477                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4478                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4479                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4480                                                 }
4481                                         },
4482                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4483                                 };
4484                         }
4485                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4486                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4487                                         txn.push(tx);
4488                                 }
4489                         }
4490                         txn
4491                 }
4492         }
4493 }
4494
4495 #[test]
4496 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4497         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4498         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4499         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4500         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4501         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4502
4503         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4504         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4505         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4506         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4507         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4508         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4509         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4510         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4511         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4512
4513         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4514         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4515
4516         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4517         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4518         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4519         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4520         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4521 }
4522
4523 #[test]
4524 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4525         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4526         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4527         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4528         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4529         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4530         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4531
4532         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 99000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4533         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4534         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4535         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4536         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4537
4538         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4539         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4540         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4541         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4542
4543         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4544         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4545         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4546         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4547         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4548
4549         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4550         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4551         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4552 }
4553
4554 #[test]
4555 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4556         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4557         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4558
4559         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4560         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4561         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4562         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4563
4564         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4565         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4566         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4567         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4568         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4569
4570         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4571         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4572         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4573         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4574         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4575
4576         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4577         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4578         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4579
4580         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4581         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4582         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4583         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4584         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4585 }
4586
4587 #[test]
4588 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4589         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4590         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4591         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4592         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4593
4594         // Create some initial channels
4595         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4596
4597         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4598
4599         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4600         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4601         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4602
4603         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4604         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4605         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4606         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4607         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4608         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4609         match events[0] {
4610                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4611                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4612         }
4613         match events[1] {
4614                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4615                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4616         }
4617
4618         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4619         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4620         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4621         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4622         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4623         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4624         check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4625
4626         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4627         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4628         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4629
4630         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4631         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4632         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4633 }
4634
4635 #[test]
4636 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4637         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4638         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4639         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4640         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4641
4642         // Create some initial channels
4643         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4644
4645         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4646         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4647
4648         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4649
4650         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4651         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4652         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4653
4654         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4655         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4656         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4657         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4658         match events[0] {
4659                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4660                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4661         }
4662         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4663
4664         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4665         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4666         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4667         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4668         check_spends!(node_txn[1],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4669         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4670
4671         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4672         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4673         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4674         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4675
4676         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4677         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4678         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4679         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4680         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4681 }
4682
4683 #[test]
4684 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4685         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4686         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4687         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4688         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4689
4690         // Create some initial channels
4691         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4692
4693         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4694         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4695         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4696         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4697
4698         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4699
4700         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4701         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4702         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4703         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4704
4705         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4706         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4707         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4708         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4709
4710         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4711         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4712
4713         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4714         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4715         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4716 }
4717
4718 #[test]
4719 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4720         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4721         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4722         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4723         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4724         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4725
4726         // Create some initial channels
4727         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4728
4729         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4730         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4731         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4732         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4733
4734         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4735
4736         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4737         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4738         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4739         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4740         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4741         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4742
4743         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4744         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4745         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4746         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4747         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4748         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4749         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4750
4751         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4752         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4753         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4754         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4755         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4756         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4757
4758         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4759         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4760         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4761         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4762         // transactions next...
4763         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4764         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4765
4766         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4767         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4768         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4769                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4770         } else {
4771                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4772                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4773         }
4774
4775         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4776         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4777
4778         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4779         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4780
4781         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4782         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4783         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4784         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4785         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4786 }
4787
4788 #[test]
4789 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4790         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4791         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4792         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4793         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4794         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4795
4796         // Create some initial channels
4797         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4798
4799         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4800         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4801         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4802         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4803
4804         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4805         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4806
4807         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4808
4809         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4810         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4811         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4812         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4813         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4814         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4815
4816         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4817         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4818         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4819         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4820
4821         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4822         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4823         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4824
4825         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4826         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4827         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4828         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4829         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4830         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4831
4832         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4833         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4834
4835         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4836         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4837         // transactions next...
4838         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4839         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4840         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4841                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4842         } else {
4843                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4844                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4845         }
4846
4847         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4848         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4849
4850         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4851
4852         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4853         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4854
4855         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4856         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4857
4858         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4859         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4860         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4861         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4862         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4863         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4864         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4865         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4866 }
4867
4868 #[test]
4869 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4870         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4871         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4872         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4873         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4874         // channel.
4875         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4876         // gets broadcast.
4877
4878         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4879         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4880         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4881         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4882
4883         // Create some initial channels
4884         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4885         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4886
4887         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4888         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4889         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4890         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4891         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4892
4893         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4894         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4895         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4896
4897         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
4898         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4899         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4900         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4901         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4902         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4903         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4904         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4905         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4906         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4907
4908         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4909         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4910         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4911         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4912
4913         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4914         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
4915         assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
4916         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
4917         check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
4918         check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
4919         assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
4920         assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4921         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4922         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
4923
4924         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4925         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
4926         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
4927         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4928         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4929         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4930         match events[0] {
4931                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4932                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4933         }
4934         match events[1] {
4935                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
4936                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4937                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4938                 },
4939                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4940         }
4941         {
4942                 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4943                 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
4944                 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4945                 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
4946                 b_txn.clear();
4947         }
4948         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4949         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4950         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4951         match msg_events[0] {
4952                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4953                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4954         }
4955         match msg_events[1] {
4956                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4957                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4958         }
4959         match msg_events[2] {
4960                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4961                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4962                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4963                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4964                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4965                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4966                 },
4967                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4968         };
4969         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4970         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4971         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4972         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4973         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4974         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
4975         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
4976         check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4977         check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
4978         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4979         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4980         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4981         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
4982
4983         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4984         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4985 }
4986
4987 #[test]
4988 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4989         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4990         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4991         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4992         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4993         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4994         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4995         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4996         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4997         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4998         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4999         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5000                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5001         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5002
5003         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5004         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5005         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5006
5007         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5008         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5009         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5010         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5011         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5012
5013         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
5014
5015         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
5016         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5017         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5018         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5019         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], vec![], 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5020         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5021
5022         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5023         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5024         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5025
5026         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5027         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5028         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5029         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5030         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5031
5032         let htlc_timeout_tx;
5033         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5034                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5035                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5036                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5037                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5038
5039                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5040                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5041                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5042                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5043                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5044                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5045                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5046
5047                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5048                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5049                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5050                 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5051         }
5052
5053         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5054         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5055         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5056         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5057         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5058         match events[0] {
5059                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5060                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5061         }
5062         match events[1] {
5063                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5064                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5065         }
5066         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5067         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5068         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5069         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5070         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5071         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5072         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5073         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5074         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5075         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5076         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5077         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5078         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5079
5080         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5081         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5082         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5083         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5084         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5085         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5086         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5087         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5088         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5089         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5090
5091         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5092         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5093         {
5094                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5095         }
5096         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5097
5098         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5099         // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5100         // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5101         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5102         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], Some(196*2), true);
5103         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5104         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5105         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5106         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5107         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5108         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5109         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5110
5111         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5112         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5113
5114         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5115         match events[0] {
5116                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5117                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5118                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5119                 }
5120                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5121         }
5122 }
5123
5124 #[test]
5125 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5126         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5127         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5128         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5129         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5130
5131         // Create some initial channels
5132         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5133
5134         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5135         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5136         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5137         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5138         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5139
5140         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5141         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5142         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5143         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5144         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5145         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5146         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5147         match events[0] {
5148                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5149                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5150         }
5151         match events[1] {
5152                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5153                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5154         }
5155         let node_tx = {
5156                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5157                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5158                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5159                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5160                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5161                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5162                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5163                 node_txn[0].clone()
5164         };
5165
5166         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5167         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5168
5169         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5170         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5171         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5172         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5173         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5174         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5175 }
5176
5177 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5178         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5179         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5180         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5181         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5182         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5183         // use the same payment hashes.
5184         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5185         //
5186         // A \         / E
5187         //    - C - D -
5188         // B /         \ F
5189         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5190         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5191         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5192         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5193         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5194         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5195         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5196         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5197                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5198         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5199
5200         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5201         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5202         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5203         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5204         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5205
5206         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5207         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5208         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5209         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5210
5211         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5212         // 0th HTLC:
5213         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5214         // 1st HTLC:
5215         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5216         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5217         // 2nd HTLC:
5218         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, 0).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5219         // 3rd HTLC:
5220         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, 0).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5221         // 4th HTLC:
5222         let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5223         // 5th HTLC:
5224         let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5225         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5226         // 6th HTLC:
5227         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, 0).unwrap());
5228         // 7th HTLC:
5229         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, 0).unwrap());
5230
5231         // 8th HTLC:
5232         let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5233         // 9th HTLC:
5234         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5235         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, 0).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5236
5237         // 10th HTLC:
5238         let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5239         // 11th HTLC:
5240         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5241         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, 0).unwrap());
5242
5243         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5244         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5245         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5246         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5247         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5248
5249         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5250         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5251         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5252         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5253         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5254         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5255         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5256         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5257         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5258
5259         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5260         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5261         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5262         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5263         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5264         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5265
5266         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5267         assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5268         assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5269         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5270         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5271         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5272
5273         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5274         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5275         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5276         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5277
5278         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5279
5280         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5281         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5282         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5283         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5284         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5285         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5286         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5287         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5288         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5289         if deliver_last_raa {
5290                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5291         } else {
5292                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5293         }
5294
5295         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5296         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5297         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5298         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5299         //
5300         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5301         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5302         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5303         //
5304         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5305         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5306         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5307
5308         if announce_latest {
5309                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5310         } else {
5311                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5312         }
5313         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5314         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5315                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5316                 events[1].clone()
5317         } else {
5318                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5319                 events[0].clone()
5320         };
5321         match close_event {
5322                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5323                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5324         }
5325
5326         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5327         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5328         if deliver_last_raa {
5329                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5330         } else {
5331                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5332         }
5333         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5334
5335         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5336         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5337         let mut a_done = false;
5338         for msg in cs_msgs {
5339                 match msg {
5340                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5341                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5342                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5343                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5344                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5345                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5346                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5347                                         }
5348                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5349                                         assert!(!a_done);
5350                                         a_done = true;
5351                                         &nodes[0]
5352                                 } else {
5353                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5354                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5355                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5356                                         }
5357                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5358                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5359                                         &nodes[1]
5360                                 };
5361                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5362                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5363                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5364                                 if announce_latest {
5365                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5366                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5367                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5368                                         }
5369                                 }
5370                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5371                         },
5372                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5373                 }
5374         }
5375
5376         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5377         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5378         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5379         let mut as_updates = 0;
5380         for event in as_events.iter() {
5381                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5382                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5383                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5384                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5385                         } else {
5386                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5387                         }
5388                         if network_update.is_some() {
5389                                 as_updates += 1;
5390                         }
5391                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5392         }
5393         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5394         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5395         if announce_latest {
5396                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5397                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5398         }
5399         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5400
5401         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5402         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5403         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5404         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5405         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5406                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5407                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5408                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5409                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5410                         } else {
5411                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5412                         }
5413                         if network_update.is_some() {
5414                                 bs_updates += 1;
5415                         }
5416                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5417         }
5418         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5419         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5420         if announce_latest {
5421                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5422         }
5423         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5424
5425         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5426         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5427         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5428         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5429         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5430         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5431 }
5432
5433 #[test]
5434 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5435         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5436 }
5437
5438 #[test]
5439 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5440         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5441 }
5442
5443 #[test]
5444 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5445         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5446         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5447         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5448 }
5449
5450 #[test]
5451 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5452         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5453         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5454         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5455         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5456
5457         // Create some initial channels
5458         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5459
5460         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5461         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5462         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5463         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5464
5465         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5466         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5467         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5468         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5469         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5470         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5471
5472         let htlc_timeout = {
5473                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5474                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5475                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5476                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5477                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5478                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5479                 node_txn[1].clone()
5480         };
5481
5482         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5483         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5484         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5485
5486         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5487         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5488         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5489         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5490         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5491         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5492         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5493         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5494         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5495         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5496                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5497 }
5498
5499 #[test]
5500 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5501         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5502         // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5503         // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5504
5505         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5506
5507         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5508         let seed = [42; 32];
5509         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5510         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5511         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph: &chanmon_cfgs[0].network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5512         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5513         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5514         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5515
5516         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5517         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5518
5519         // Create some initial channels
5520         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5521         // for node 0
5522         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5523         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5524         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5525
5526         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5527         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5528         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5529         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5530         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5531
5532         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5533         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5534         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5535         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5536         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5537
5538         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5539         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5540         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5541         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5542             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5543             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5544             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5545                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5546         }
5547
5548         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5549         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5550         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5551         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5552         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5553         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5554
5555         let htlc_timeout = {
5556                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5557                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5558                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5559                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5560                 node_txn[1].clone()
5561         };
5562
5563         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5564         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5565         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5566
5567         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5568         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5569         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5570         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5571         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5572         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5573         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5574         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5575         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5576         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5577         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5578                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5579 }
5580
5581 #[test]
5582 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5583         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5584         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5585         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5586         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5587
5588         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5589
5590         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5591         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5592
5593         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5594         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5595         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5596
5597         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5598         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5599         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5600
5601         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5602         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5603         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5604
5605         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5606         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5607         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5608 }
5609
5610 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5611         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5612         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5613         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5614         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5615         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5616
5617         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5618
5619         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5620         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5621         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage));
5622         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5623
5624         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5625         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5626         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5627         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5628         match events[0] {
5629                 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
5630                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5631                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5632                 },
5633                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5634         }
5635
5636         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5637         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5638         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5639         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5640         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5641
5642         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5643         let mut block = Block {
5644                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5645                 txdata: vec![],
5646         };
5647         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5648                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5649                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5650         }
5651         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5652         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5653         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5654         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5655 }
5656
5657 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5658         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5659         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5660         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5661         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5662         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5663
5664         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5665         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5666         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5667
5668         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5669
5670         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5671         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5672         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5673
5674         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5675         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5676
5677         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5678                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5679                 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5680         }
5681         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5682         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5683         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5684         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5685 }
5686
5687 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5688         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5689         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5690         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5691         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5692         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5693
5694         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5695         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5696         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5697         // actually revoked.
5698         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5699         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5700         assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5701         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5702         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5703
5704         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5705         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5706         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5707         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5708         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5709         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5710         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5711         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5712         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5713         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5714
5715         if check_revoke_no_close {
5716                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5717                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5718         }
5719
5720         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5721         let mut block = Block {
5722                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5723                 txdata: vec![],
5724         };
5725         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5726                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5727                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5728         }
5729         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5730                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5731                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5732                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5733                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5734         } else {
5735                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5736         }
5737 }
5738
5739 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5740 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5741 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5742 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5743 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5744 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5745 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5746 // non-dust HTLCs.
5747 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5748 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5749 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5750 #[test]
5751 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5752         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5753         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5754
5755         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5756         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5757 }
5758
5759 #[test]
5760 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5761         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5762         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5763         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5764         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5765 }
5766
5767 #[test]
5768 #[should_panic]
5769 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5770         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5771         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5772         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5773         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5774         //Force duplicate channel ids
5775         for node in nodes.iter() {
5776                 *node.keys_manager.override_channel_id_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5777         }
5778
5779         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5780         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5781         let push_msat=10001;
5782         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5783         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5784         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5785
5786         //Create a second channel with a channel_id collision
5787         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5788 }
5789
5790 #[test]
5791 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5792         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5793         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5794         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5795         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5796
5797         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5798         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5799         let push_msat=10001;
5800         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5801
5802         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5803         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5804         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5805         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5806         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5807
5808         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5809         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5810         let push_msat=10001;
5811         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5812         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5813         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5814
5815         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5816         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5817         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5818
5819         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5820         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5821         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5822
5823         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5824         let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5825         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5826
5827         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5828         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5829         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5830         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5831         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5832         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5833 }
5834
5835 #[test]
5836 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5837         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5838         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5839         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5840         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5841
5842         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5843         let push_msat=10001;
5844         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5845         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5846         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5847         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5848
5849         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5850         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5851         let err_msg = match events[0] {
5852                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5853                         msg.clone()
5854                 },
5855                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5856         };
5857         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5858 }
5859
5860 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5861 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5862 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5863 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5864 #[test]
5865 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5866         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5867         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5868         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5869         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5870         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5871
5872         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5873         // pending_update_fee.
5874         {
5875                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5876                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5877         }
5878         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5879         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5880
5881         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5882         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5883         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5884                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5885                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5886                 },
5887                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5888         };
5889
5890         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5891
5892         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5893         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5894         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5895
5896         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5897         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
5898         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5899
5900         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5901         let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
5902         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5903         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5904
5905         // Flush the pending fee update.
5906         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5907         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5908         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5909         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5910         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5911
5912         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5913         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5914         // us to surface its failure to the user.
5915         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5916         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5917         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5918         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5919                 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5920         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5921
5922         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5923         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5924         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5925         match &events[0] {
5926                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
5927                         assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5928                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5929                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
5930                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5931                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5932                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
5933                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
5934                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
5935                 },
5936                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5937         }
5938 }
5939
5940 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5941 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5942 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5943 #[test]
5944 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5945         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5946         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5947         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5948         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5949         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5950
5951         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5952         // pending_update_fee.
5953         {
5954                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5955                 *feerate_lock += 200;
5956         }
5957         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5958         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5959
5960         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5961         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5962         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5963                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5964                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5965                 },
5966                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5967         };
5968
5969         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5970
5971         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5972         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5973         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5974
5975         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5976         let amt_1 = 20000;
5977         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1) - amt_1;
5978         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
5979         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
5980
5981         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
5982         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
5983         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5984         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
5985         let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
5986         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5987         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
5988
5989         // Flush the pending fee update.
5990         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5991         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5992         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5993         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
5994         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5995         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
5996
5997         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
5998         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
5999         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6000         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6001         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6002         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6003         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6004                 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6005         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6006
6007         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6008         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6009         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6010         match &events[0] {
6011                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6012                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6013                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6014                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6015                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6016                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6017                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6018                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6019                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6020                 },
6021                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6022         }
6023
6024         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6025         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6026                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6027                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6028                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6029         };
6030         let raa = match send_raa_event {
6031                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6032                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6033         };
6034         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6035         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6036         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6037         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6038         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6039         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6040         match events[0] {
6041                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6042                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6043         }
6044         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6045         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6046         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6047         match events[0] {
6048                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6049                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6050         }
6051         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6052         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6053         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6054         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6055         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6056         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6057         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6058         match events[0] {
6059                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6060                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
6061                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
6062                 }
6063                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6064         }
6065 }
6066
6067 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6068 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6069 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6070 // once it's freed.
6071 #[test]
6072 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6073         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6074         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6075         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6076         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6077         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6078         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6079         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6080         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6081         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6082         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6083
6084         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6085         // pending_update_fee.
6086         {
6087                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6088                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6089         }
6090         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6091         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6092
6093         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6094         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6095         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6096                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6097                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6098                 },
6099                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6100         };
6101
6102         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6103
6104         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6105         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6106         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6107
6108         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6109         let feemsat = 239;
6110         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6111         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6112         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6113         let payment_event = {
6114                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6115                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6116
6117                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6118                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6119
6120                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6121         };
6122         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6123         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6124         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6125         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6126
6127         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6128         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6129
6130         // Flush the pending fee update.
6131         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6132         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6133         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6134         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6135         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6136         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6137
6138         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6139         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6140         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6141
6142         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6143                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6144                         msg.clone()
6145                 },
6146                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6147         };
6148
6149         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6150         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6151         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6152
6153         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6154         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6155         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6156         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6157                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6158                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6159         }
6160
6161         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6162         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6163         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6164
6165         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6166         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6167         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6168         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6169                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6170                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6171                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6172                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6173                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6174                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6175                 },
6176                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6177         };
6178
6179         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6180         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6181         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6182
6183         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6184         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6185         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6186         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6187         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6188         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6189         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6190         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6191         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6192                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6193                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6194         };
6195         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6196         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6197         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6198 }
6199
6200 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6201 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6202 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6203
6204 #[test]
6205 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6206         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6207         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6208         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6209         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6210         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6211         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6212
6213         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6214         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6215
6216         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6217                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6218         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6219         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6220 }
6221
6222 #[test]
6223 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6224         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6225         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6226         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6227         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6228         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6229         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6230
6231         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6232         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6233         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6234                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6235
6236         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6237         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6238 }
6239
6240 #[test]
6241 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6242         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6243         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6244         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6245         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6246         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6247         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6248
6249         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6250         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6251         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6252         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6253         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6254
6255         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6256         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6257         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6258         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6259         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6260 }
6261
6262 #[test]
6263 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6264         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6265         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6266         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6267         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6268         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6269         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6270         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6271
6272         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], vec![], 100000000, 500000001);
6273         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6274                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6275 }
6276
6277 #[test]
6278 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6279         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6280         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6281         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6282         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6283         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6284         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6285         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6286         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6287         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6288
6289         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6290                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6291                 let payment_event = {
6292                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6293                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6294
6295                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6296                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6297                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6298                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6299                         } else {
6300                                 assert!(false);
6301                         }
6302                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6303                 };
6304                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6305                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6306                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6307
6308                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6309                 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6310         }
6311         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6312         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6313                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6314
6315         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6316         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6317 }
6318
6319 #[test]
6320 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6321         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6322         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6323         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6324         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6325         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6326         let channel_value = 100000;
6327         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6328         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6329
6330         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6331
6332         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6333         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6334         // limits us to.
6335         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6336         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6337                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6338
6339         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6340         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6341
6342         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6343 }
6344
6345 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6346 #[test]
6347 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6348         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6349         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6350         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6351         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6352         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6353         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6354         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6355         {
6356                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6357                 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6358                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6359         }
6360
6361         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6362         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6363         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6364         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6365         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6366         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6367         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6368         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6369         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6370         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6371         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6372 }
6373
6374 #[test]
6375 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6376         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6377         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6378         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6379         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6380         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6381         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6382
6383         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6384         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6385         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6386         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6387         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
6388
6389         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6390         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6391         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6392         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6393         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6394
6395         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6396         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6397         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6398         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6399         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6400
6401         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6402         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6403         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6404         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6405         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6406 }
6407
6408 #[test]
6409 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6410         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6411         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6412         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6413         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6414         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6415         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6416         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6417
6418         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6419         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6420         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6421         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6422         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6423         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6424
6425         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6426                 channel_id: chan.2,
6427                 htlc_id: 0,
6428                 amount_msat: 1000,
6429                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6430                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6431                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6432         };
6433
6434         for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6435                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6436                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6437         }
6438         msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6439         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6440
6441         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6442         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6443         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6444         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6445         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6446 }
6447
6448 #[test]
6449 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6450         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6451         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6452         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6453         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6454         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6455         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6456
6457         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6458         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6459         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6460         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6461         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6462         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6463
6464         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6465         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6466         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6467         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6468         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6469 }
6470
6471 #[test]
6472 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6473         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6474         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6475         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6476         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6477         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6478
6479         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6480         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6481         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6482         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6483         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6484         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6485         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6486
6487         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6488         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6489         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6490         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6491         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6492 }
6493
6494 #[test]
6495 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6496         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6497         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6498         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6499         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6500         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6501         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6502         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6503
6504         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6505         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6506         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6507         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6508         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6509         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6510
6511         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6512         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6513         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6514         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6515         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6516         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6517         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6518         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6519         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6520         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6521         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6522         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6523         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6524
6525         //Resend HTLC
6526         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6527         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6528         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6529         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6530         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6531
6532         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6533
6534         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6535         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6536         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6537         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6538         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6539 }
6540
6541 #[test]
6542 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6543         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6544
6545         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6546         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6547         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6548         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6549         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6550         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6551         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6552
6553         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6554         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6555         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6556
6557         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6558                 channel_id: chan.2,
6559                 htlc_id: 0,
6560                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6561         };
6562
6563         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6564
6565         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6566         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6567         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6568         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6569         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6570 }
6571
6572 #[test]
6573 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6574         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6575
6576         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6577         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6578         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6579         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6580         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6581
6582         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6583         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6584         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6585         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6586         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6587
6588         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6589                 channel_id: chan.2,
6590                 htlc_id: 0,
6591                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6592         };
6593
6594         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6595
6596         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6597         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6598         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6599         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6600         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6601 }
6602
6603 #[test]
6604 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6605         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6606
6607         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6608         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6609         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6610         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6611         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6612
6613         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6614         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6615         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6616         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6617         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6618         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6619                 channel_id: chan.2,
6620                 htlc_id: 0,
6621                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6622                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6623         };
6624
6625         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6626
6627         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6628         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6629         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6630         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6631         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6632 }
6633
6634 #[test]
6635 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6636         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6637
6638         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6639         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6640         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6641         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6642         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6643
6644         let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6645
6646         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6647         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6648
6649         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6650         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6651         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6652                 match events[0] {
6653                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6654                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6655                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6656                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6657                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6658                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6659                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6660                         },
6661                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6662                 }
6663         };
6664
6665         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6666
6667         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6668
6669         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6670         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6671         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6672         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6673         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6674 }
6675
6676 #[test]
6677 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6678         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6679
6680         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6681         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6682         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6683         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6684         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6685
6686         let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6687
6688         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6689         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6690
6691         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6692         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6693         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6694                 match events[0] {
6695                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6696                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6697                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6698                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6699                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6700                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6701                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6702                         },
6703                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6704                 }
6705         };
6706
6707         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6708
6709         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6710
6711         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6712         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6713         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6714         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6715         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6716 }
6717
6718 #[test]
6719 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6720         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6721
6722         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6723         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6724         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6725         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6726         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6727
6728         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6729         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6730         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6731
6732         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6733         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6734
6735         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6736         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6737         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6738
6739         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6740
6741         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6742                 match events[0] {
6743                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6744                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6745                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6746                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6747                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6748                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6749                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6750                         },
6751                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6752                 }
6753         };
6754         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6755         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6756
6757         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6758         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6759         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6760         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6761         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6762 }
6763
6764 #[test]
6765 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6766         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6767         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6768
6769         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6770         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6771         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6772         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6773         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6774         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6775
6776         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6777
6778         //First hop
6779         let mut payment_event = {
6780                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6781                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6782                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6783                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6784                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6785         };
6786         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6787         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6788         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6789         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6790         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6791         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6792         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6793         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6794         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6795
6796         //Second Hop
6797         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6798         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6799         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6800         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6801
6802         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6803         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6804         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6805                 match events_3[0] {
6806                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6807                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6808                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6809                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6810                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6811                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6812                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6813                         },
6814                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6815                 }
6816         };
6817
6818         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6819
6820         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6821         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6822         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6823         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6824         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6825
6826         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6827         match events_4[0] {
6828                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6829                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6830                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6831                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6832                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6833                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6834                 },
6835                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6836         };
6837
6838         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6839 }
6840
6841 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6842         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6843         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6844         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6845
6846         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6847         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6848         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6849         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6850         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6851         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6852
6853         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6854
6855         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6856         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6857         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6858         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6859
6860         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6861         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6862
6863         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6864         assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
6865         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6866         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6867         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6868
6869         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6870         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6871         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6872         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6873
6874         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6875         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6876
6877         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6878         match events[0] {
6879                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6880                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6881                 },
6882                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6883         }
6884         match events[1] {
6885                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6886                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6887                 },
6888                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6889         }
6890
6891         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6892         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6893         if announce_latest {
6894                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6895         } else {
6896                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6897         }
6898
6899         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6900         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6901         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6902
6903         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6904         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6905         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6906         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6907         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6908         let mut first_failed = false;
6909         for event in events {
6910                 match event {
6911                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6912                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6913                                         assert!(!first_failed);
6914                                         first_failed = true;
6915                                 } else {
6916                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6917                                 }
6918                         }
6919                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6920                 }
6921         }
6922 }
6923
6924 #[test]
6925 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6926         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6927         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6928 }
6929
6930 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6931         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6932         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6933         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6934         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6935         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6936         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6937
6938         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6939         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6940         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6941         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6942         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6943
6944         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6945
6946         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6947         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6948
6949         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6950         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
6951
6952         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
6953         if revoked {
6954                 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6955                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
6956         }
6957
6958         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
6959         if local {
6960                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
6961                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
6962                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6963                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6964                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
6965
6966                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
6967                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6968                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6969                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6970                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
6971                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6972                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
6973                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6974                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6975                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6976                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
6977         } else {
6978                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
6979                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6980                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6981                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6982                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6983                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6984                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
6985                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
6986                 if !revoked {
6987                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
6988                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6989                         // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
6990                         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6991                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6992                         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6993                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
6994                 } else {
6995                         // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
6996                         // commitment tx
6997                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6998                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6999                         let first;
7000                         match events[0] {
7001                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7002                                         if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7003                                         else { first = false; }
7004                                 },
7005                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7006                         }
7007                         match events[1] {
7008                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7009                                         if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7010                                         else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7011                                 },
7012                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7013                         }
7014                 }
7015         }
7016 }
7017
7018 #[test]
7019 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7020         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7021         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7022         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7023 }
7024
7025 #[test]
7026 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7027         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7028
7029         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7030         low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7031         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7032         high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7033         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7034         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7035         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7036         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7037         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7038
7039         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7040         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0) {
7041                 match error {
7042                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7043                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7044                 }
7045         } else { assert!(false) }
7046
7047         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7048         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7049         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7050         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7051         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0) {
7052                 match error {
7053                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
7054                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7055                 }
7056         } else { assert!(false); }
7057
7058         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7059         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7060         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7061         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7062         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7063         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7064         let reason_msg;
7065         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7066                 match action {
7067                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7068                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7069                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7070                         },
7071                         _ => { panic!(); }
7072                 }
7073         } else { panic!(); }
7074         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7075
7076         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7077         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7078         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7079         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7080         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &high_their_to_self_config, 0) {
7081                 match error {
7082                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7083                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7084                 }
7085         } else { assert!(false); }
7086 }
7087
7088 #[test]
7089 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7090         // We want to be sure that :
7091         // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7092         //   (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7093         // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7094         // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7095         // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7096         let persister;
7097         let logger;
7098         let fee_estimator;
7099         let tx_broadcaster;
7100         let chain_source;
7101         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7102         // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7103         // during signing due to revoked tx
7104         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7105         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7106         let monitor;
7107         let node_state_0;
7108         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7109         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7110         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7111
7112         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7113
7114         // Cache node A state before any channel update
7115         let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7116         let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7117         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7118
7119         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7120         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7121
7122         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7123         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7124
7125         // Restore node A from previous state
7126         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7127         let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7128         chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7129         tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7130         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7131         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7132         monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7133         node_state_0 = {
7134                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7135                 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7136                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7137                         keys_manager: keys_manager,
7138                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7139                         chain_monitor: &monitor,
7140                         logger: &logger,
7141                         tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7142                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7143                         channel_monitors,
7144                 }).unwrap().1
7145         };
7146         nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7147         assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7148         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7149         nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7150
7151         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7152
7153         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7154         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7155
7156         let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7157
7158         // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7159         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7160         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7161
7162         {
7163                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7164                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7165         }
7166
7167         let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7168         for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7169                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7170                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7171                         reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7172                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7173                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7174                         match action {
7175                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7176                                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7177                                 },
7178                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7179                         }
7180                 } else {
7181                         panic!("Unexpected event")
7182                 }
7183         }
7184
7185         // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7186         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7187         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_string() });
7188         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction");
7189         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7190
7191         // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7192         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7193         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7194         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
7195         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
7196         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
7197         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7198         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting".to_string() });
7199         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
7200         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7201         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
7202 }
7203
7204 #[test]
7205 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7206         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7207         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7208         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7209
7210         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7211         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7212         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7213         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7214
7215         // Create some initial channels
7216         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7217
7218         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7219         let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7220         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[0].network_graph, None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7221         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7222         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, 0).unwrap();
7223         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7224         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7225
7226         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7227         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7228         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7229         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7230         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7231
7232         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7233         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7234         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7235         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7236
7237         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7238         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7239         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7240
7241         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7242         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7243         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7244                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7245                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7246                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7247                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7248                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7249                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7250                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7251                 },
7252                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7253         };
7254         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7255
7256         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7257         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7258
7259         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7260         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7261         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7262         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7263 }
7264
7265 #[test]
7266 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7267         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7268         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7269
7270         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7271         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7272         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7273         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7274
7275         let short_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7276         let short_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7277         let short_id_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7278
7279         // Disconnect peers
7280         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7281         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7282
7283         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7284         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7285         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7286         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7287         let mut chans_disabled: HashSet<u64> = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7288         for e in msg_events {
7289                 match e {
7290                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7291                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7292                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7293                                 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7294                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7295                                 }
7296                         },
7297                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7298                 }
7299         }
7300         // Reconnect peers
7301         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7302         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7303         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7304         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7305         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7306         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7307
7308         // Reestablish chan_1
7309         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7310         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7311         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7312         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7313         // Reestablish chan_2
7314         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7315         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7316         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7317         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7318         // Reestablish chan_3
7319         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7320         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7321         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7322         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7323
7324         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7325         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7326         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7327         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7328         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7329         chans_disabled = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7330         for e in msg_events {
7331                 match e {
7332                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7333                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7334                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7335                                 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7336                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7337                                 }
7338                         },
7339                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7340                 }
7341         }
7342 }
7343
7344 #[test]
7345 fn test_priv_forwarding_rejection() {
7346         // If we have a private channel with outbound liquidity, and
7347         // UserConfig::accept_forwards_to_priv_channels is set to false, we should reject any attempts
7348         // to forward through that channel.
7349         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7350         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7351         let mut no_announce_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
7352         no_announce_cfg.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
7353         no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = false;
7354         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(no_announce_cfg), None]);
7355         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
7356         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
7357         let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
7358         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7359
7360         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7361
7362         // Note that the create_*_chan functions in utils requires announcement_signatures, which we do
7363         // not send for private channels.
7364         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7365         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7366         nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
7367         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7368         nodes[1].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7369
7370         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[1], 1_000_000, 42);
7371         nodes[1].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7372         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()));
7373         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
7374
7375         let cs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7376         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_funding_signed);
7377         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7378
7379         let conf_height = core::cmp::max(nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1, nodes[2].best_block_info().1 + 1);
7380         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, conf_height);
7381         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7382         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[2], &tx, conf_height);
7383         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7384         let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7385         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7386         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7387         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
7388         get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7389
7390         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7391         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
7392         assert!(!nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7393
7394         // We should always be able to forward through nodes[1] as long as its out through a public
7395         // channel:
7396         send_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], 10_000);
7397
7398         // ... however, if we send to nodes[2], we will have to pass the private channel from nodes[1]
7399         // to nodes[2], which should be rejected:
7400         let route_hint = RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
7401                 src_node_id: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
7402                 short_channel_id: nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(),
7403                 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 1000, proportional_millionths: 0 },
7404                 cltv_expiry_delta: MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
7405                 htlc_minimum_msat: None,
7406                 htlc_maximum_msat: None,
7407         }]);
7408         let last_hops = vec![route_hint];
7409         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], last_hops, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
7410
7411         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7412         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7413         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
7414         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7415         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7416
7417         let htlc_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7418         assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7419         assert_eq!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7420         assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7421         assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fee.is_none());
7422
7423         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7424         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7425         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(), true);
7426
7427         // Now disconnect nodes[1] from its peers and restart with accept_forwards_to_priv_channels set
7428         // to true. Sadly there is currently no way to change it at runtime.
7429
7430         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7431         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7432
7433         let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
7434         let mut monitor_a_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7435         let mut monitor_b_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7436         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut monitor_a_serialized).unwrap();
7437         get_monitor!(nodes[1], cs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut monitor_b_serialized).unwrap();
7438
7439         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7440         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
7441         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7442         nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
7443
7444         let mut monitor_a_read = &monitor_a_serialized.0[..];
7445         let mut monitor_b_read = &monitor_b_serialized.0[..];
7446         let (_, mut monitor_a) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_a_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7447         let (_, mut monitor_b) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_b_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7448         assert!(monitor_a_read.is_empty());
7449         assert!(monitor_b_read.is_empty());
7450
7451         no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = true;
7452
7453         let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
7454         let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
7455                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7456                 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_a);
7457                 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_b);
7458                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7459                         default_config: no_announce_cfg,
7460                         keys_manager,
7461                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
7462                         chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
7463                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7464                         logger: nodes[1].logger,
7465                         channel_monitors,
7466                 }).unwrap()
7467         };
7468         assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
7469         nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
7470
7471         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_a).is_ok());
7472         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_b).is_ok());
7473         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7474         nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
7475
7476         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7477         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7478         let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7479         let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7480         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
7481         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7482         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7483         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7484
7485         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7486         nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7487         let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7488         let cs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7489         nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7490         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_reestablish);
7491         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7492         get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7493
7494         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7495         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7496         pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], 10_000, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret);
7497         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], our_payment_preimage);
7498 }
7499
7500 #[test]
7501 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7502         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7503         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7504
7505         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7506         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7507         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7508         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7509
7510         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7511
7512         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7513         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], vec![], 3000000, 30);
7514         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7515
7516         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7517         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7518         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7519         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7520         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7521         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7522
7523         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7524         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7525                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7526                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7527                 }
7528         }
7529
7530         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7531         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7532
7533         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7534         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7535         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7536         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7537         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7538
7539         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7540         let penalty_1;
7541         let feerate_1;
7542         {
7543                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7544                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7545                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7546                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7547                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7548                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7549                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7550                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7551                 node_txn.clear();
7552         };
7553
7554         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7555         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7556         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7557         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7558         {
7559                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7560                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7561                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7562                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7563                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7564                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7565                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7566                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7567                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7568                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7569                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7570                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7571                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7572                         node_txn.clear();
7573                 }
7574         }
7575         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7576
7577         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7578         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7579         let penalty_3;
7580         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7581         {
7582                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7583                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7584                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7585                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7586                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7587                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7588                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7589                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7590                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7591                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7592                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7593                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7594                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7595                         node_txn.clear();
7596                 }
7597         }
7598         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7599
7600         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7601         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7602 }
7603
7604 #[test]
7605 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7606         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7607         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7608
7609         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7610         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7611         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7612         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7613         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7614
7615         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7616         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7617         let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7618         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7619         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7620                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7621         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7622         let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7623         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[1].network_graph, None,
7624                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7625         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7626
7627         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7628         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7629         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7630
7631         // Revoke local commitment tx
7632         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7633
7634         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7635         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7636         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7637         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7638         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7639         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7640         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7641
7642         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7643         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7644         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7645
7646         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7647         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7648         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7649
7650         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7651         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7652         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7653         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7654
7655         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7656         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7657         let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7658         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7659         let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7660         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7661         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7662         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7663         match events[1] {
7664                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7665                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7666         }
7667         let first;
7668         let feerate_1;
7669         let penalty_txn;
7670         {
7671                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7672                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7673                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7674
7675                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7676                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7677                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7678                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7679                 // future).
7680                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7681                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7682                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7683                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7684                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7685                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7686
7687                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7688                 // available, which we check here:
7689                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7690                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7691                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7692
7693                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7694                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7695
7696                 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7697                 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7698                 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7699                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7700
7701                 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7702                 // output, checked above).
7703                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7704                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7705                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7706
7707                 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7708                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7709                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7710                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
7711                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7712                 node_txn.clear();
7713         }
7714
7715         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7716         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7717         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7718         let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7719         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7720         {
7721                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7722                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7723
7724                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7725                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7726                 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7727                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output  {
7728                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7729                 } else {
7730                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7731                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7732                 }
7733
7734                 node_txn.clear();
7735         };
7736
7737         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7738         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7739         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7740         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7741         let node_txn = {
7742                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7743                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7744
7745                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7746                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7747                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7748                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7749                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7750                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7751                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7752                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7753                 node_txn.clear();
7754                 txn
7755         };
7756         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7757         let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7758         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7759         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7760         {
7761                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7762                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7763                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7764                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7765                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7766                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7767                 // up bumped justice generation.
7768                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7769                 node_txn.clear();
7770         }
7771         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7772         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7773 }
7774
7775 #[test]
7776 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7777         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7778         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7779
7780         // Create 2 HTLCs
7781         // Provide preimage for one
7782         // Check aggregation
7783
7784         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7785         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7786         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7787         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7788
7789         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7790         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7791         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7792
7793         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7794         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7795         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7796         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7797         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7798
7799         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7800         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7801         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7802         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7803         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7804
7805         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7806         let timeout;
7807         let preimage;
7808         let preimage_bump;
7809         let feerate_timeout;
7810         let feerate_preimage;
7811         {
7812                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7813                 // 9 transactions including:
7814                 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
7815                 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
7816                 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
7817                 // 1 * HTLC-Timeout
7818                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
7819                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7820                 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
7821                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7822                 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
7823                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
7824                 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
7825
7826                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
7827                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
7828                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
7829                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
7830
7831                 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
7832                 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7833                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
7834                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].get_weight() as u64;
7835
7836                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7837                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7838                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7839                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7840
7841                 node_txn.clear();
7842         };
7843         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7844         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7845
7846         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7847         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7848         {
7849                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7850                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7851                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7852                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7853                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7854                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7855
7856                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7857                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7858                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.get_weight() as u64;
7859                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7860                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7861
7862                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7863                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7864                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7865                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7866                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7867
7868                 node_txn.clear();
7869         }
7870
7871         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7872         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7873 }
7874
7875 #[test]
7876 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7877         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7878         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7879         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7880         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7881         // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7882         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7883         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7884         // implement that).
7885         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7886         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7887         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7888         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7889         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7890
7891         let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7892         let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7893
7894         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7895
7896         // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7897         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7898         let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7899
7900         // Must revoke without gaps
7901         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7902         keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7903
7904         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7905         let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7906                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7907
7908         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7909                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
7910         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7911         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7912         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7913 }
7914
7915 #[test]
7916 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7917         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7918         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7919
7920         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7921         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7922         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7923         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7924
7925         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7926         // Lock HTLC in both directions
7927         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7928         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7929
7930         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7931         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7932         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7933
7934         // Revoke local commitment tx
7935         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7936
7937         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7938         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7939         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
7940         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7941
7942         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7943         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7944         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7945         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7946         let penalty_txn = {
7947                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7948                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
7949                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7950                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7951                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7952                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7953                 node_txn.clear();
7954                 penalty_txn
7955         };
7956         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7957         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7958         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7959         {
7960                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7961                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7962                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7963         }
7964 }
7965
7966 #[test]
7967 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7968         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7969         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7970         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7971         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7972         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7973         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7974
7975         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7976
7977         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7978         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7979         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7980         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7981         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7982
7983         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7984         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7985         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7986         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7987
7988         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7989         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7990         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
7991         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7992         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7993         match close_ev[0] {
7994                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7995                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7996                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7997                 },
7998                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7999         }
8000 }
8001
8002 #[test]
8003 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8004         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8005         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8006         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8007         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8008
8009         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8010         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8011         override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8012
8013         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8014
8015         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8016         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8017         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8018         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8019 }
8020
8021 #[test]
8022 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8023         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8024         zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8025         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8026         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8027         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8028         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8029
8030         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8031         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8032         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8033
8034         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8035         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8036         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8037 }
8038
8039 #[test]
8040 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8041         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8042         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8043         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8044         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8045         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8046
8047         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8048         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8049         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8050         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8051
8052         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8053         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8054         route.paths.push(path);
8055         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8056         route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8057         route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8058         route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8059         route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8060         route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8061         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8062         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8063 }
8064
8065 #[test]
8066 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8067         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8068         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8069         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8070         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8071         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8072
8073         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8074
8075         {
8076                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200, 42);
8077                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8078                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8079                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8080                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8081                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8082                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8083                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8084         }
8085         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8086         // values from previous calls.
8087         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8088         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8089         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8090         match events[0] {
8091                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8092                         match &purpose {
8093                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, user_payment_id, .. } => {
8094                                         assert_eq!(*user_payment_id, 42);
8095                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8096                                 },
8097                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8098                         }
8099                 },
8100                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8101         }
8102 }
8103
8104 #[test]
8105 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8106         // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs
8107         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8108         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8109         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8110         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8111
8112         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8113
8114         let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, 0);
8115
8116         // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8117         // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8118         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2, 0) {
8119                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8120         } else { panic!(); }
8121         let mut block = {
8122                 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8123                 Block {
8124                         header: BlockHeader {
8125                                 version: 0x2000000,
8126                                 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8127                                 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8128                                 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8129                         txdata: vec![],
8130                 }
8131         };
8132         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8133         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2, 0) {
8134                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8135         } else { panic!(); }
8136
8137         // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8138         // again with a different user_payment_id (this time getting a new payment secret).
8139         block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8140         block.header.time += 1;
8141         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8142         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2, 42).unwrap();
8143         assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8144
8145         {
8146                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8147                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8148                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8149                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8150                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8151                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8152                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8153         }
8154         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8155         // values from previous calls.
8156         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8157         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8158         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8159         match events[0] {
8160                 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, user_payment_id }, .. } => {
8161                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8162                         assert_eq!(user_payment_id, 42);
8163                         assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8164                         // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8165                 },
8166                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8167         }
8168 }
8169
8170 #[test]
8171 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8172         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8173         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8174         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8175         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8176         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8177
8178         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8179
8180         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8181         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8182         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, 0);
8183         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8184
8185         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8186         // resulting events.
8187         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8188                 () => {
8189                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8190                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8191                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8192                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8193                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8194
8195                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8196                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8197                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8198                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8199                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8200
8201                         // We should fail the payment back
8202                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8203                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8204                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8205                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8206                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8207                                 },
8208                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8209                         }
8210                 }
8211         }
8212
8213         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8214         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8215         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8216
8217         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8218         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8219         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8220         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8221
8222         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8223         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8224         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8225         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8226
8227         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8228         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8229         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8230         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8231 }
8232
8233 #[test]
8234 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8235         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8236         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8237         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8238         //
8239         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8240         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8241         // commitment at same time.
8242
8243         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8244         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8245         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8246         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8247
8248         // Create some initial channel
8249         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8250         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8251
8252         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8253         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8254
8255         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8256         let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8257
8258         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8259         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8260         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8261         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8262         let watchtower = {
8263                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8264                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8265                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8266                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8267                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8268                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8269                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8270                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8271                 watchtower
8272         };
8273         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8274         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8275         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8276         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8277         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8278
8279         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8280         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8281         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8282         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8283         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8284         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8285         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8286                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8287                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8288                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8289                 } else { assert!(false); }
8290         } else { assert!(false); };
8291         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8292         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8293         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8294         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8295 }
8296
8297 #[test]
8298 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8299         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8300         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8301         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8302         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8303
8304         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8305         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8306         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8307         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8308
8309         // Create some initial channel
8310         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8311         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8312
8313         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8314         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8315
8316         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8317         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8318
8319         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8320         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8321         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8322         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8323         let watchtower_alice = {
8324                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8325                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8326                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8327                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8328                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8329                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8330                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8331                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8332                 watchtower
8333         };
8334         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8335         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8336         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8337         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8338         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8339
8340         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8341         {
8342                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8343                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8344                 txn.clear();
8345         }
8346
8347         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8348         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8349         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8350         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8351         let watchtower_bob = {
8352                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8353                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8354                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8355                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8356                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8357                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8358                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8359                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8360                 watchtower
8361         };
8362         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8363         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8364
8365         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8366         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8367         {
8368                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8369         }
8370         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8371
8372         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8373         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8374         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8375         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8376                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8377                         // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8378                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8379                         if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8380                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8381                 } else { assert!(false); }
8382         } else { assert!(false); };
8383         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8384         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8385
8386         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8387         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8388         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8389
8390         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8391         let bob_state_y;
8392         {
8393                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8394                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8395                 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8396                 txn.clear();
8397         };
8398
8399         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8400         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8401         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8402         {
8403                 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8404                 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8405                 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8406                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8407                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8408                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8409         }
8410 }
8411
8412 #[test]
8413 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8414         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8415         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8416         // message).
8417         //
8418         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8419         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8420         //
8421         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8422         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8423         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8424         // before receiving funding_signed.
8425         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8426         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8427         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8428         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8429
8430         // Create an initial channel
8431         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8432         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8433         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8434         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8435         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8436
8437         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8438         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8439
8440         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8441         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8442
8443         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8444         let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8445         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8446         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8447         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8448 }
8449
8450 #[test]
8451 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8452         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8453         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8454         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8455         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8456         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8457         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8458
8459         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8460         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8461         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8462         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8463
8464         // Create some initial channels
8465         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8466
8467         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8468         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8469         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8470         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8471         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8472         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8473
8474         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8475         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8476         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8477         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8478         // this test before #653 fix.
8479         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8480         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8481         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8482         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8483         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8484
8485         let htlc_timeout = {
8486                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8487                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8488                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8489                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8490                 node_txn[1].clone()
8491         };
8492
8493         let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8494         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8495         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8496         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8497 }
8498
8499 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8500         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8501         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8502         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8503         //
8504         // Steps of the test:
8505         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8506         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8507         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8508         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8509         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8510         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8511         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8512         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8513         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8514         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8515         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8516         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8517
8518         // Create some initial channels
8519         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8520         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8521
8522         // Steps (1) and (2):
8523         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8524         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8525
8526         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8527         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8528         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8529         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8530         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8531         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8532         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8533
8534         // Steps (3) and (4):
8535         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8536         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8537         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8538         if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
8539         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
8540         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8541         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8542         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8543         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8544                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8545                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
8546                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8547                 };
8548                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8549                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8550                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8551                 if broadcast_alice {
8552                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8553                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8554                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8555                 }
8556                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8557                 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8558         }
8559
8560         // Step (5):
8561         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8562         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8563         assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8564         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8565         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8566         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8567         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8568         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8569         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8570         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8571
8572         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8573         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false);
8574         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8575         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8576                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8577                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8578                 match events[0] {
8579                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8580                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8581                         },
8582                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8583                 };
8584         }
8585         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8586         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8587         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8588         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8589
8590         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8591         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8592         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8593                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8594                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8595                         (*msg).clone()
8596                 },
8597                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8598         };
8599         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8600                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8601                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8602                         (*updates).clone()
8603                 },
8604                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8605         };
8606
8607         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8608         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8609         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8610         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8611
8612         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8613         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8614         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8615                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8616                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8617                         (*msg).clone()
8618                 },
8619                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8620         };
8621         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8622         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8623
8624         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8625         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8626         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8627         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8628         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8629                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8630                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8631                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8632                 if broadcast_alice {
8633                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8634                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8635                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8636                 }
8637                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8638                 if broadcast_alice {
8639                         // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8640                         // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8641                         // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8642                         // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8643                         // broadcasted.
8644                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8645                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8646                 } else {
8647                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8648                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8649                 }
8650         }
8651
8652         // Step (6):
8653         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8654         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8655         {
8656                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8657                 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8658                         // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8659                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8660                 }
8661                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8662                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8663                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8664                 };
8665                 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8666                 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8667                 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8668                 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8669                 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8670                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8671                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8672                 } else {
8673                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8674                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8675                 }
8676         }
8677 }
8678
8679 #[test]
8680 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8681         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8682         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8683         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8684         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8685 }
8686
8687 #[test]
8688 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8689         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8690         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8691         //
8692         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8693         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8694         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8695         // updating logic for the existing channel.
8696         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8697         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8698         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8699         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8700
8701         // Create an initial channel
8702         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8703         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8704         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8705         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8706
8707         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8708         // that it is rejected.
8709         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8710         {
8711                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8712                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8713                 match events[0] {
8714                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8715                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8716                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8717                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8718                                 // move forward with it.
8719                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8720                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8721                         },
8722                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8723                 }
8724         }
8725
8726         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8727         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8728
8729         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8730         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8731
8732         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8733         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8734         {
8735                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8736                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8737                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8738                 added_monitors.clear();
8739         }
8740         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8741
8742         let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8743         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8744
8745         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8746         // temporary one).
8747
8748         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8749         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8750         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8751         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8752         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8753         {
8754                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8755                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8756                 match events[0] {
8757                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8758                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8759                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8760                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8761                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8762                         },
8763                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8764                 }
8765         }
8766
8767         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8768         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8769         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8770         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8771         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8772         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8773
8774         let funding_created = {
8775                 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8776                 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8777                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8778                 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8779         };
8780         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8781         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8782         // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8783         // still needs to be cleared here.
8784         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8785
8786         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8787         {
8788                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8789                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8790                 match events[0] {
8791                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8792                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8793                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8794                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8795                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8796                         },
8797                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8798                 }
8799         }
8800
8801         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8802         // everything is functional.
8803         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8804         {
8805                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8806                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8807                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8808                 added_monitors.clear();
8809         }
8810
8811         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8812         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8813         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8814         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
8815
8816         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8817         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
8818         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8819         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8820 }
8821
8822 #[test]
8823 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8824         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8825         //
8826         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8827         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8828         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8829         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8830         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8831         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8832         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8833
8834         // Create some initial channels
8835         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8836         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8837         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8838
8839         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8840         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8841         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8842
8843         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8844         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8845         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8846
8847         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8848         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8849         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8850         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8851         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8852         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8853         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8854         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8855         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8856
8857         // A null channel ID should close all channels
8858         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8859         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8860         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8861         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8862         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8863         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8864         match events[0] {
8865                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8866                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8867                 },
8868                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8869         }
8870         match events[1] {
8871                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8872                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8873                 },
8874                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8875         }
8876         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
8877         // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
8878         // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
8879         // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
8880         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8881         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8882
8883         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
8884         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8885         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8886 }
8887
8888 #[test]
8889 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
8890         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
8891         //
8892         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
8893         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
8894         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
8895         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
8896         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8897         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8898         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8899         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8900
8901         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8902         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8903         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8904
8905         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42);
8906         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
8907                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
8908                 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
8909         }
8910
8911         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
8912         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8913         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8914
8915         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8916         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8917
8918         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8919         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
8920
8921         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8922         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8923         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
8924
8925         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
8926         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
8927         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8928         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8929         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8930         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8931         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
8932                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8933                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
8934                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
8935                 } else { panic!(); }
8936         } else { panic!(); }
8937         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
8938 }
8939
8940 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
8941         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
8942         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
8943         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
8944         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
8945         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
8946         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
8947         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
8948         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
8949         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
8950         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
8951         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
8952         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
8953         // until we learned about an additional block.
8954         //
8955         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
8956         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
8957         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8958         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8959         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8960         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8961         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
8962
8963         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8964         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8965         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
8966         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8967         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
8968
8969         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
8970         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8971         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8972         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8973         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8974         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8975
8976         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
8977         if !test_height_before_timelock {
8978                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
8979         }
8980         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8981                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
8982         if test_height_before_timelock {
8983                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
8984                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
8985                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8986                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8987         } else {
8988                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
8989                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8990                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
8991                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
8992                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
8993                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
8994                 // timelock is up).
8995                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
8996                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
8997
8998                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
8999                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9000                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9001                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9002                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9003                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9004                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9005
9006                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9007                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9008                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9009                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9010                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9011                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9012                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9013                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9014                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9015         }
9016 }
9017
9018 #[test]
9019 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9020         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9021         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9022 }
9023
9024 #[test]
9025 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9026         // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9027         // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9028         // HTLCs.
9029         // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9030
9031         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9032         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9033         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9034         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9035         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9036         let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9037         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9038         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9039         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9040
9041         // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9042         let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9043         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9044         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9045
9046         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9047         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9048         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9049         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9050         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9051
9052         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9053
9054         // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9055         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9056         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9057         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9058
9059         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9060         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9061         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9062         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9063         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9064
9065         // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9066         // generated
9067         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9068
9069         // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9070         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9071         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9072
9073         let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9074         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9075         let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9076         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9077         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9078
9079         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9080         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9081         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9082         nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9083
9084         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9085         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9086                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9087         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9088         let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9089         let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9090                 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9091         assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9092
9093         let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9094         let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9095                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9096                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9097                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9098                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9099                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9100                         keys_manager,
9101                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9102                         chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9103                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9104                         logger: nodes[1].logger,
9105                         channel_monitors,
9106                 }).unwrap()
9107         };
9108         nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9109         assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9110
9111         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9112         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9113         nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9114         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9115
9116         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9117         // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9118         // the commitment state.
9119         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9120
9121         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9122
9123         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9124         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9125         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9126
9127         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9128         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9129         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9130         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9131         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9132         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9133         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9134
9135         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9136         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9137 }
9138
9139 #[test]
9140 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9141         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9142         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9143         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9144         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9145
9146         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9147         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9148         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9149         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9150         let params = RouteParameters {
9151                 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9152                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9153                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9154         };
9155         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9156         let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &params, network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
9157
9158         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9159         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9160         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9161         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9162         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9163         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9164         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9165         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9166         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9167 }
9168
9169 #[test]
9170 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9171         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9172         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9173         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9174         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9175
9176         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9177         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9178         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9179         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9180
9181         let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9182         let params = RouteParameters {
9183                 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9184                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9185                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9186         };
9187         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9188         let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9189         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9190         let route = find_route(
9191                 &payer_pubkey, &params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9192                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
9193         ).unwrap();
9194
9195         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9196         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9197         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9198         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9199         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9200         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9201         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9202         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9203         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9204 }
9205
9206 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9207 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9208 enum ExposureEvent {
9209         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9210         AtHTLCForward,
9211         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9212         AtHTLCReception,
9213         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9214         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9215 }
9216
9217 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9218         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9219         // policy.
9220         //
9221         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9222         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9223         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9224         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9225         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9226         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9227         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9228         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9229
9230         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9231         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9232         config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9233         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9234         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9235         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9236
9237         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9238         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9239         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9240         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9241         if on_holder_tx {
9242                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9243         }
9244         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
9245         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9246         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
9247
9248         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 1_000_000, 42);
9249
9250         if on_holder_tx {
9251                 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9252                         chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9253                 }
9254         }
9255
9256         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9257         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9258         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9259
9260         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9261         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9262
9263         let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9264         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9265         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9266
9267         let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9268                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9269                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9270                 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9271         };
9272         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9273         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9274
9275         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9276         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9277
9278         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9279         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9280
9281         if on_holder_tx {
9282                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9283                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9284                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9285                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9286                         for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9287                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9288                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9289                         }
9290                 } else {
9291                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9292                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9293                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9294                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9295                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9296                         }
9297                 }
9298         } else {
9299                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9300                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9301                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9302                         for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9303                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9304                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9305                         }
9306                 } else {
9307                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9308                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9309                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9310                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9311                         }
9312                 }
9313         }
9314
9315         let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9316         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9317                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9318                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9319                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9320                 if on_holder_tx {
9321                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9322                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9323                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9324                 } else {
9325                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9326                 }
9327         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9328                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9329                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9330                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9331                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9332                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9333                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9334                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9335                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9336                 if on_holder_tx {
9337                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9338                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9339                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9340                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9341                 } else {
9342                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9343                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9344                 }
9345         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9346                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9347                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9348                 {
9349                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9350                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9351                 }
9352                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9353                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9354                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9355         }
9356
9357         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9358         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9359         added_monitors.clear();
9360 }
9361
9362 #[test]
9363 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9364         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9365         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9366         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9367         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9368         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9369         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9370         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9371         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9372         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9373         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9374         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9375         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9376 }