_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use chain;
  15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use chain::channelmonitor;
  17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  19 use chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
  20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  21 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
  22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS };
  23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
  24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  25 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  26 use routing::network_graph::RoutingFees;
  27 use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
  28 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  29 use ln::msgs;
  30 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  31 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
  32 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
  33 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
  34 use util::errors::APIError;
  35 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  36 use util::config::UserConfig;
  37
  38 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  39 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
  40 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  43 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  44
  45 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  46 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  47
  48 use regex;
  49
  50 use io;
  51 use prelude::*;
  52 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  53 use core::default::Default;
  54 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
  55
  56 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  57 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  58
  59 #[test]
  60 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  61         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  62         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  63         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  64         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
  65         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  66
  67         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  68         // funding satoshis
  69         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  70         let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
  71         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  72
  73         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  74         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
  75
  76         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  77         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  78
  79         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  80         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  81         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  82                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  83                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  84                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  85                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  86                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  87                         match action {
  88                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
  89                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
  90                                 },
  91                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
  92                         }
  93                 } else { assert!(false); }
  94         };
  95
  96         use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
  97         use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
  98
  99         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 100         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
 101
 102         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 103
 104         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than funding value \d+", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 105
 106         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 107
 108         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 109
 110         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 111
 112         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 113
 114         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 115 }
 116
 117 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
 118         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
 119         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
 120         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
 121         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
 122         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 123         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 124         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 125         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 126
 127         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 128         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
 129         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
 130         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
 131         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
 132
 133         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
 134         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 135         if !send_from_initiator {
 136                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 137                 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 138         }
 139         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
 140
 141         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
 142         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 143         if send_from_initiator {
 144                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 145                 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 146         }
 147         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
 148         {
 149                 let mut lock;
 150                 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
 151                 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 152                 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 153         }
 154
 155         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
 156         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
 157         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
 158
 159         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
 160         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
 161         if send_from_initiator {
 162                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
 163                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
 164                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
 165                         // well as an additional HTLC.
 166                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2));
 167         } else {
 168                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
 169         }
 170 }
 171
 172 #[test]
 173 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
 174         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
 175         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
 176 }
 177
 178 #[test]
 179 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 180         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 181         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 182         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 183         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 184         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 185
 186         // balancing
 187         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 188
 189         // A                                        B
 190         // update_fee                            ->
 191         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 192         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 193         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 194         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 195         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 196         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 197         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 198         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 199         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 200         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 201         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 202         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 203         //                                       <- RAA
 204         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 205
 206         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 207         {
 208                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 209                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 210         }
 211         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 212         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 213
 214         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 215         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 216         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 217                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 218                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 219                 },
 220                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 221         };
 222
 223         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 224
 225         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 226         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 227         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 228         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 229
 230         let payment_event = {
 231                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 232                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 233                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 234         };
 235         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 236         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 237
 238         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 239         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 240         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 241         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 242         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 243         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 244
 245         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 246         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 247         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 248         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 249         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 250
 251         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 252         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 253         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 254         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 255         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 256         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 257         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 258         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 259
 260         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 261         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 262         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 263         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 264         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 265         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 266         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 267         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 268
 269         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 270         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 271         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 272         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 273
 274         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 275         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 276         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 277
 278         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 279         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 280
 281         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 282         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 283         match events_2[0] {
 284                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 285                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 286         }
 287
 288         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 289         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 290 }
 291
 292 #[test]
 293 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 294         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 295         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 296         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 297         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 298         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 299         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 300         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 301
 302         // balancing
 303         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 304
 305         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 306         {
 307                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 308                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 309         }
 310         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 311         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 312
 313         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 314         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 315         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 316                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 317                         update_fee.as_ref()
 318                 },
 319                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 320         };
 321
 322         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 323
 324         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 325         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 326         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 327         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 328
 329         let payment_event = {
 330                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 331                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 332                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 333         };
 334         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 335         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 336
 337         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 338         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 339         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 340         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 341         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 342         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 343
 344         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 345         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 346
 347         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 348 }
 349
 350 #[test]
 351 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 352         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 353         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 354         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 355         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 356         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 357
 358         // A                                        B
 359         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 360         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 361         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 362         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 363         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 364         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 365         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 366         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 367         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 368         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 369         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 370         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 371         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 372         //                                          B should send no response here
 373         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 374         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 375         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 376
 377         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 378         let initial_feerate;
 379         {
 380                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 381                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 382                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 383         }
 384         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 385         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 386
 387         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 388         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 389         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 390                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 391                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 392                 },
 393                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 394         };
 395
 396         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 397         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 398         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 399         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 400         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 401
 402         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 403         // transaction:
 404         {
 405                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 406                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 407         }
 408         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 409         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 410         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 411
 412         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 413         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 414                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 415                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 416         };
 417
 418         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 419
 420         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 421         // Deliver (3)
 422         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 423
 424         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 425         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 426         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 427         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 428         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 429         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 430         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 431         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 432         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 433         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 434         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 435
 436         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 437         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 438         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 439         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 440         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 441
 442         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 443         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 444         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 445
 446         // Delever (4)
 447         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 448         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 449         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 450
 451         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 452         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 453         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 454
 455         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 456         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 457         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 458         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 459
 460         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 461         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 462         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 463 }
 464
 465 fn do_test_1_conf_open(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
 466         // Previously, if the minium_depth config was set to 1, we'd never send a funding_locked. This
 467         // tests that we properly send one in that case.
 468         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
 469         alice_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
 470         alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
 471         alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
 472         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
 473         bob_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
 474         bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
 475         bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
 476         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 477         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 478         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
 479         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 480         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
 481
 482         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 483         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
 484         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
 485
 486         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
 487         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 488         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
 489
 490         for node in nodes {
 491                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
 492                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
 493                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
 494         }
 495 }
 496 #[test]
 497 fn test_1_conf_open() {
 498         do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst);
 499         do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst);
 500         do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
 501 }
 502
 503 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 504         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 505         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 506         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 507         // Node objects.
 508
 509         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 510         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 511         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 512         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 513
 514         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 515                 let block = Block {
 516                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
 517                         txdata: vec![],
 518                 };
 519                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 520                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 521         }
 522
 523         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 524         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
 525         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 526
 527         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 528         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
 529         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 530
 531         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 532         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
 533
 534         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
 535
 536         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 537         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
 538         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 539         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 540
 541         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 542         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 543         {
 544                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 545                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 546                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 547                 added_monitors.clear();
 548         }
 549         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 550
 551         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 552         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 553         {
 554                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 555                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 556                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 557                 added_monitors.clear();
 558         }
 559
 560         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 561         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 562
 563         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 564         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 565
 566         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 567         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 568         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 569         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 570 }
 571
 572 #[test]
 573 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 574         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 575         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 576         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 577         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 578         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 579         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 580         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 581         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 582         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 583         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 584         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 585         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 586         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 587         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 588         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 589         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 590         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 591         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 592 }
 593
 594 #[test]
 595 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 596         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 597         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 598         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 599         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 600         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 601
 602         {
 603                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 604                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 605         }
 606         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 607         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 608
 609         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 610         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 611         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 612                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 613                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 614                 },
 615                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 616         };
 617         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 618
 619         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 620         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 621         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 622
 623         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 624         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 625         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 626
 627         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 628         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 629         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 630         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 631
 632         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 633         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 634         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 635 }
 636
 637 #[test]
 638 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 639         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 640         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 641         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 642         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 643         let channel_value = 5000;
 644         let push_sats = 700;
 645         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 646         let channel_id = chan.2;
 647         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 648         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value);
 649
 650         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 651         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 652         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 653         // remote limit.
 654         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 655         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT) as u32;
 656         {
 657                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 658                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 659         }
 660         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 661         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 662         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 663
 664         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 665
 666         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 667
 668         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 669         {
 670                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 671
 672                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 673                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 674                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0) / 1000;
 675                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 676                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 677                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 678         }
 679
 680         {
 681                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 682                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 683                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 684         }
 685         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 686         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 687         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 688
 689         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 690
 691         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 692         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 693         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 694                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 695                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 696                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 697                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 698                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 699                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 700         };
 701         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 702                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 703                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 704                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 705                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 706                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 707                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 708                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 709         };
 710
 711         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 712         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 713                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
 714
 715         let res = {
 716                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 717                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 718                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 719                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 720                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 721                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 722                         push_sats,
 723                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0) / 1000,
 724                         false, local_funding, remote_funding,
 725                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 726                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 727                         &mut htlcs,
 728                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 729                 );
 730                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 731         };
 732
 733         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 734                 channel_id: chan.2,
 735                 signature: res.0,
 736                 htlc_signatures: res.1
 737         };
 738
 739         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 740                 channel_id: chan.2,
 741                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 742         };
 743
 744         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 745
 746         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 747         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 748         //Should produce and error.
 749         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 750         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
 751         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 752         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 753         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
 754 }
 755
 756 #[test]
 757 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 758         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 759         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 760         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 761         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 762         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 763
 764         // balancing
 765         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 766
 767         {
 768                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 769                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 770         }
 771         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 772         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 773
 774         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 775         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 776         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 777                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 778                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 779                 },
 780                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 781         };
 782         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 783         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 784         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 785         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 786
 787         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 788
 789         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 790         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 791         {
 792                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 793                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 794                 added_monitors.clear();
 795         }
 796         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 797         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 798         // node[1] has nothing to do
 799
 800         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 801         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 802         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 803
 804         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 805         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 806         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 807         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 808         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 809         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 810         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 811
 812         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 813         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 814         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 815         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 816         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 817         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 818
 819         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 820         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 821         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 822         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 823
 824         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 825         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 826         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 827
 828         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 829         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 830         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 831         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 832
 833         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 834         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 835         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 836
 837         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 838
 839         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 840         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 841         match events[0] {
 842                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
 843                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 844         };
 845
 846         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 847
 848         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 849         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 850         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 851         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 852         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 853 }
 854
 855 #[test]
 856 fn test_update_fee() {
 857         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 858         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 859         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 860         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 861         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 862         let channel_id = chan.2;
 863
 864         // A                                        B
 865         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 866         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 867         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 868         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 869         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 870         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 871         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 872         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 873         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 874         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 875         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 876         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 877
 878         // Create and deliver (1)...
 879         let feerate;
 880         {
 881                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 882                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 883                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 884         }
 885         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 886         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 887
 888         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 889         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 890         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 891                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 892                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 893                 },
 894                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 895         };
 896         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 897
 898         // Generate (2) and (3):
 899         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 900         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 901         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 902
 903         // Deliver (2):
 904         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 905         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 906         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 907
 908         // Create and deliver (4)...
 909         {
 910                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 911                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 912         }
 913         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 914         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 915         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 916         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 917         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 918                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 919                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 920                 },
 921                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 922         };
 923
 924         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 925         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 926         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 927         // ... creating (5)
 928         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 929         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 930
 931         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 932         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 933         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 934         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 935         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 936
 937         // Deliver (5):
 938         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 939         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 940         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 941
 942         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 943         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 944         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 945         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 946         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 947         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 948         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 949         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 950         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 951
 952         // Deliver (7)
 953         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 954         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 955         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 956         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 957
 958         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 959         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 960         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 961
 962         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 963         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 964         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 965         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 966         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 967 }
 968
 969 #[test]
 970 fn fake_network_test() {
 971         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 972         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 973         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 974         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 975         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 976         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 977
 978         // Create some initial channels
 979         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 980         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 981         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 982
 983         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
 984         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 985         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 986         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 987         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 988
 989         // Send some more payments
 990         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 991         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
 992         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
 993
 994         // Test failure packets
 995         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
 996         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
 997
 998         // Add a new channel that skips 3
 999         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1000
1001         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1002         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1003         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1004         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1005         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1006         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1007         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1008
1009         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1010         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1011         hops.push(RouteHop {
1012                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1013                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1014                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1015                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1016                 fee_msat: 0,
1017                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1018         });
1019         hops.push(RouteHop {
1020                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1021                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1022                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1023                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1024                 fee_msat: 0,
1025                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1026         });
1027         hops.push(RouteHop {
1028                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1029                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1030                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1031                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1032                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1033                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1034         });
1035         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1036         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1037         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1038
1039         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1040         hops.push(RouteHop {
1041                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1042                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1043                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1044                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1045                 fee_msat: 0,
1046                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1047         });
1048         hops.push(RouteHop {
1049                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1050                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1051                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1052                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1053                 fee_msat: 0,
1054                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1055         });
1056         hops.push(RouteHop {
1057                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1058                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1059                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1060                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1061                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1062                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1063         });
1064         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1065         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1066         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1067
1068         // Claim the rebalances...
1069         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1070         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1071
1072         // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1073         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1074
1075         // Send some payments across both channels
1076         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1077         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1078         let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1079
1080
1081         route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1082         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1083         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1084         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1085
1086         //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1087
1088         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1089         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1090         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1091
1092         // Close down the channels...
1093         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1094         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1095         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1096         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1097         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1098         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1099         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1100         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1101         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1102         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1103         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1104         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1105         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1106         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1107         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1108 }
1109
1110 #[test]
1111 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1112         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1113         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1114         // commitment dance rounds.
1115         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1116         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1117         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1118         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1119         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1120         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1121
1122         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1123         for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1124                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1125                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1126                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1127         }
1128         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1129
1130         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1131         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1132         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1133         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1134
1135         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1136         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1137         // another HTLC.
1138         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1139         {
1140                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1141                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1142                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1143                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1144         }
1145
1146         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1147         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1148         {
1149                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1150                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1151         }
1152
1153         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1154         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1155         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1156         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1157
1158         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1159         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1160         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1161         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1162         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1163         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1164         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1165
1166         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1167         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1168         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1169
1170         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1171
1172         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1173         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1174         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1175         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1176
1177         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1178         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1179         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1180         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1181
1182         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1183         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1184         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1185
1186         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1187                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1188         }
1189         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1190         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1191         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1192         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1193         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1194
1195         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1196         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1197         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1198         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1199         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1200
1201         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1202         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1203
1204         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1205
1206         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1207         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1208         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1209                 match event {
1210                         &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1211                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1212                         },
1213                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1214                 };
1215         }
1216
1217         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1218                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1219         }
1220
1221         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1222 }
1223
1224 #[test]
1225 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1226         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1227         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1228         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1229         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1230         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1231         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1232
1233         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1234         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1235         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1236         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1237         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1238         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1239
1240         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1241
1242         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1243         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1244
1245         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1246         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1247
1248         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1249         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1250         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1251 }
1252
1253 #[test]
1254 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1255         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1256         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1257         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1258         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1259         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1260         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1261         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1262
1263         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1264
1265         // balancing
1266         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1267
1268         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1269
1270         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1271         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1272         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1273
1274         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1275         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1276         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1277
1278         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1279         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1280
1281         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1282         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1283         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1284                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1285                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1286                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1287                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1288                 }
1289         }
1290         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1291
1292         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1293         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1294         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1295         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1296
1297         // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1298         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1299         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1300         assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1301         assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1302         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1303         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1304         check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1305
1306         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1307         assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1308         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1309
1310         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1311         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1312         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1313         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1314         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1315         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1316         check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1317         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1318
1319         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1320         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1321         for e in events {
1322                 match e {
1323                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1324                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1325                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1326                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1327                         },
1328                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1329                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1330                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1331                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1332                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1333                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1334                         },
1335                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1336                 }
1337         }
1338 }
1339
1340 #[test]
1341 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1342         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1343         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1344         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1345         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1346         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1347
1348         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1349         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1350
1351         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1352         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1);
1353         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1354         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1355         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1356         match err {
1357                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1358                         match &fails[0] {
1359                                 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1360                                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1361                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1362                         }
1363                 },
1364                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1365         }
1366         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1367         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1368
1369         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1370 }
1371
1372 #[test]
1373 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1374         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1375         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1376         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1377         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1378         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1379
1380         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1381         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1382         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1383         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1384
1385         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1386
1387         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1388         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1389         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1390         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1391                 channel_id: chan.2,
1392                 htlc_id: 0,
1393                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1394                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1395                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1396                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1397         };
1398
1399         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1400
1401         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1402         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1403         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1404
1405         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1406
1407         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1408
1409         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1410         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1411         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1412                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1413                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1414                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1415                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1416                 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1417
1418                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1419                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1420                  chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1421                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1422                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1423         };
1424         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1425                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1426                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1427                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1428                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1429                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1430                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1431                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1432         };
1433
1434         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1435         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1436                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1437
1438         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1439         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1440         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1441
1442         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1443                 offered: false,
1444                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1445                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1446                 payment_hash,
1447                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1448         };
1449
1450         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1451
1452         let res = {
1453                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1454                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1455                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1456                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1457                         commitment_number,
1458                         95000,
1459                         local_chan_balance,
1460                         false, local_funding, remote_funding,
1461                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1462                         feerate_per_kw,
1463                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1464                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1465                 );
1466                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1467         };
1468
1469         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1470                 channel_id: chan.2,
1471                 signature: res.0,
1472                 htlc_signatures: res.1
1473         };
1474
1475         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1476         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1477         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1478
1479         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1480         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1481                 channel_id: chan.2,
1482                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1483                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1484         };
1485         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1486
1487         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1488         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1489         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1490         match events[0] {
1491                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1492                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1493                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1494                 },
1495                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1496         };
1497         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1498                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1499
1500         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1501 }
1502
1503 #[test]
1504 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1505         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1506         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1507         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1508         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1509         // this situation.
1510         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1511         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1512         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1513         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1514
1515         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1516         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1517         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1518
1519         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1520
1521         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1522         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1523                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1524         }
1525
1526         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1527         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1528         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1529                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1530         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1531         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1532 }
1533
1534 #[test]
1535 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1536         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1537         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1538         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1539         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1540         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1541
1542         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1543         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1544         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1545         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1546         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1547         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1548         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1549
1550         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1551         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1552                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1553         }
1554
1555         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1556         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1557         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1558         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1559         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1560         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1561         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1562         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1563         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1564                 channel_id: chan.2,
1565                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1566                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1567                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1568                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1569                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1570         };
1571
1572         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1573         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1574         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1575         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1576         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1577         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1578         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1579         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1580 }
1581
1582 #[test]
1583 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1584         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1585         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1586         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1587         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1588
1589         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1590         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1591         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1592
1593         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1594         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1595         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1596         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1597         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1598         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1599         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1600
1601         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1602                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1603         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1604         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1605         // commitment transaction fee.
1606         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1607
1608         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1609         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1610                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1611         }
1612
1613         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1614         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1615         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1616                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1617 }
1618
1619 #[test]
1620 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1621         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1622         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1623         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1624         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1625         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1626         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1627         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1628
1629         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1630         // HTLC.
1631         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1632         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1633         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1634                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1635
1636         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1637         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1638         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1639         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1640         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1641         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1642         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg);
1643
1644         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1645         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1646         match msg_events[0] {
1647                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1648                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1649                 },
1650                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1651         }
1652 }
1653
1654 #[test]
1655 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1656         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1657         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1658         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1659         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1660         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1661         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1662         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1663
1664         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1665         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1666         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1667         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1668         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1669         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1670
1671         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1672         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1673         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1674         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1675         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1676         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1677
1678         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1679         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1680         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1681         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1682 }
1683
1684 #[test]
1685 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1686         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1687         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1688         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1689         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1690         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1691         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1692
1693         let feemsat = 239;
1694         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1695         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1696         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1697
1698         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1699         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1700         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1701         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1702
1703         // Add a pending HTLC.
1704         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1705         let payment_event_1 = {
1706                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1707                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1708
1709                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1710                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1711                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1712         };
1713         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1714
1715         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1716         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2);
1717         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1718         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1719         let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1720
1721         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1722         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1723         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1724         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1725         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1726         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1727         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1728         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1729                 channel_id: chan.2,
1730                 htlc_id: 1,
1731                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1732                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1733                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1734                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1735         };
1736
1737         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1738         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1739         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1740         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1741         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1742         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1743         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1744         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1745 }
1746
1747 #[test]
1748 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1749         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1750         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1751         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1752         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1753         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1754         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1755         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1756         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1757         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1758
1759         let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1760         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1761         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1762
1763         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1764         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1765 }
1766
1767 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64) -> u64 {
1768         (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1769 }
1770
1771 #[test]
1772 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1773         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1774         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1775         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1776         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1777         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1778         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1779         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1780         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1781         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1782         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1783
1784         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1785         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1786
1787         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1788         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1789
1790         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1791                 ($node: expr) => {{
1792                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1793                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1794                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1795                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1796                         payment_event
1797                 }}
1798         }
1799
1800         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1801         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1802         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1803
1804         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1805
1806         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1807         {
1808                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1809                 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1810                 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1811                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1812                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1813                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1814                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1815         }
1816
1817         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1818         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1819         loop {
1820                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1821                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1822                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1823                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1824                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1825                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1826                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1827                         break;
1828                 }
1829                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1830
1831                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1832                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1833                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1834                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1835                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1836                 );
1837
1838                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1839                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1840                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1841                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1842                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1843         }
1844
1845         // adding pending output.
1846         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1847         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1848         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1849         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1850         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1851         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1852         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1853         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1854         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1855         // policy.
1856         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1857         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1858         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1859
1860         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1861         let payment_event_1 = {
1862                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1863                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1864
1865                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1866                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1867                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1868         };
1869         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1870
1871         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1872         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1873         {
1874                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1875                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1876                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1877                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1878         }
1879
1880         // split the rest to test holding cell
1881         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1882         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1883         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1884         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1885         {
1886                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1887                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1888         }
1889
1890         // now see if they go through on both sides
1891         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1892         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1893         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1894         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1895         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1896         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1897
1898         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1899         {
1900                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1901                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1902                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1903                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1904                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1905         }
1906
1907         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1908         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1909         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1910         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1911         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1912         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1913
1914         // flush the pending htlc
1915         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1916         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1917         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1918
1919         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1920         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1921         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1922         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1923
1924         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1925         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1926         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1927         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1928
1929         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1930         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1931         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1932
1933         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1934
1935         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1936         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1937         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1938
1939         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1940         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1941
1942         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1943         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1944         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1945         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1946         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1947         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1948
1949         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1950         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1951         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1952         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1953
1954         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1955         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1956
1957         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1958         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1959         match events[0] {
1960                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1961                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1962                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
1963                         match &purpose {
1964                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1965                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1966                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1967                                 },
1968                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1969                         }
1970                 },
1971                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1972         }
1973         match events[1] {
1974                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1975                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1976                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
1977                         match &purpose {
1978                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1979                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1980                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1981                                 },
1982                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1983                         }
1984                 },
1985                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1986         }
1987
1988         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1989         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1990         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1991
1992         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1);
1993         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1994         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1995
1996         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
1997         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1998         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1999         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2000         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2001
2002         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2003         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2004 }
2005
2006 #[test]
2007 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2008         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2009         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2010         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2011         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2012         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2013         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2014         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2015         // To test this we:
2016         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2017         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2018         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2019         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2020         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2021         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2022         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
2023         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2024         //    claim,
2025         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2026         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2027         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2028         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2029         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2030         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2031         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2032         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2033         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2034         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2035
2036         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2037         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2038         let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
2039         let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
2040
2041         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2042         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2043         let send_1 = {
2044                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
2045                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2046                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2047                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2048                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2049         };
2050
2051         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2052         // initial fulfill/CS.
2053         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
2054         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2055         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2056
2057         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2058         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2059         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
2060         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2061         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2062
2063         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2064         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2065         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2066         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2067         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2068
2069         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2070         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2071         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2072         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2073         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2074
2075         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2076         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2077         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2078
2079         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2080         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2081         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2082
2083         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2084         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2085         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2086
2087         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2088         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2089         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2090         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2091         // on-chain as necessary).
2092         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2093         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2094         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2095         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2096         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2097
2098         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2099         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2100         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2101
2102         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2103         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2104
2105         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2106         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2107         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2108         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2109         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2110         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2111
2112         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2113         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2114         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2115         let send_2 = {
2116                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2117                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2118                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2119                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2120                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2121         };
2122
2123         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2124         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2125         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2126         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2127
2128         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2129
2130         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2131         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2132         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2133
2134         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2135         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2136
2137         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2138         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2139         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2140         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2141
2142         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2143         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2144         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2145
2146         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2147         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2148
2149         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2150         expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2151
2152         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2153         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2154 }
2155
2156 #[test]
2157 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2158         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2159         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2160         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2161         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2162         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2163         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2164
2165         // Create some initial channels
2166         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2167         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2168         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2169         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2170
2171         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2172         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2173         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2174         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2175         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2176         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2177
2178         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2179         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2180         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2181         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2182         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2183
2184         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2185         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2186         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2187         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2188         {
2189                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2190                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2191                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2192                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2193                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2194         }
2195         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2196         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2197         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2198         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2199         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2200
2201         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2202         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2203
2204         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2205         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2206         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2207         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2208         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2209         {
2210                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2211                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2212                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2213                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2214                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2215                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2216         }
2217         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2218         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2219         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2220         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2221         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2222
2223         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2224                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2225                         {
2226                                 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2227                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2228
2229                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2230                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2231                                 match events[0] {
2232                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2233                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2234                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2235                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2236                                         },
2237                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2238                                 };
2239                         }
2240                 }
2241         }
2242
2243         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2244         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2245         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2246         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2247         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
2248         let node2_commitment_txid;
2249         {
2250                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2251                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2252                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2253                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2254
2255                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2256                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2257                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2258                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2259                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2260         }
2261         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2262         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2263         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2264         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2265         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2266
2267         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2268         // confusing us in the following tests.
2269         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2270
2271         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2272         let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2273         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2274         // buffer space).
2275
2276         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2277                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2278                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2279                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2280                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2281                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2282                                 msg.clone()
2283                         },
2284                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2285                 };
2286                 match events[1] {
2287                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2288                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2289                         },
2290                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2291                 }
2292                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2293
2294                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2295                 {
2296                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2297                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2298                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2299                                         false
2300                                 } else { true }
2301                         });
2302                 }
2303
2304                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2305
2306                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2307                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2308
2309                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2310                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2311                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2312                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2313                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2314                                 msg.clone()
2315                         },
2316                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2317                 };
2318                 match events[1] {
2319                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2320                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2321                         },
2322                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2323                 }
2324                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2325                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2326
2327                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2328                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2329                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2330         };
2331         nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2332         nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2333         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2334         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2335
2336         nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2337         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2338         check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2339 }
2340
2341 #[test]
2342 fn test_justice_tx() {
2343         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2344         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2345         alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2346         alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2347         alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2348         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2349         bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2350         bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2351         bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2352         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2353         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2354         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2355         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2356         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2357         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2358         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2359         // Create some new channels:
2360         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2361
2362         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2363         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2364         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2365         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2366         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2367         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2368         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2369         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2370         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2371         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2372         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2373         // Revoke the old state
2374         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2375
2376         {
2377                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2378                 {
2379                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2380                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2381                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2382
2383                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2384                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2385                         node_txn.truncate(1);
2386                 }
2387                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2388                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2389                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2390
2391                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2392                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2393                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2394                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2395                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2396                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2397                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2398                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2399                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2400         }
2401         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2402
2403         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2404         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2405
2406         // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2407         // Create some new channels:
2408         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2409         {
2410                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2411                 node_txn.clear();
2412         }
2413
2414         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2415         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2416         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2417         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2418         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2419         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2420         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2421         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2422         // Revoke the old state
2423         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2424         {
2425                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2426                 {
2427                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2428                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2429                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2430
2431                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2432                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2433                 }
2434                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2435                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2436
2437                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2438                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2439                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2440                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2441                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2442                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2443                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2444         }
2445         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2446         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2447         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2448 }
2449
2450 #[test]
2451 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2452         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2453         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2454         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2455         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2456         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2457         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2458         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2459         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2460         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2461         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2462         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2463         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2464         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2465         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2466
2467         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2468         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2469         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2470         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2471         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2472         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2473
2474         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2475         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2476
2477         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2478         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2479         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2480         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2481         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2482 }
2483
2484 #[test]
2485 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2486         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2487         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2488         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2489         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2490         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2491         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2492
2493         // Create some new channel:
2494         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2495
2496         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2497         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2498         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2499         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2500         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2501
2502         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2503         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2504         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2505         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2506         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2507         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2508         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2509         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2510         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2511
2512         //Revoke the old state
2513         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2514
2515         {
2516                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2517                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2518                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2519                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2520                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2521                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2522                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2523                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2524
2525                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2526                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2527
2528                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2529                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2530
2531                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2532                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2533                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2534                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2535                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2536                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2537                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2538                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2539
2540                 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2541                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2542                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2543         }
2544         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2545         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2546         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2547 }
2548
2549 #[test]
2550 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2551         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2552         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2553         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2554         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2555         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2556         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2557
2558         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2559
2560         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2561         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2562         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2563         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2564         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2565         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2566
2567         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2568         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2569
2570         //Revoke the old state
2571         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2572
2573         {
2574                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2575                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2576                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2577                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2578                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2579                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2580                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2581                 match events[1] {
2582                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2583                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2584                 }
2585
2586                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2587                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2588
2589                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2590                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2591                 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2592                 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2593                 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2594                 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2595
2596                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2597                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2598                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2599                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2600                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2601                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2602                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2603
2604                 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2605                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2606                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2607                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2608
2609                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2610                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2611                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2612
2613                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2614                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2615                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2616                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2617                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2618                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2619                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2620                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2621         }
2622         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2623         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2624         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2625 }
2626
2627 #[test]
2628 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2629         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2630         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2631         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2632         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2633         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2634         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2635         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2636         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2637         // towards B.
2638         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2639         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2640         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2641         // PaymentSent event).
2642
2643         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2644         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2645         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2646         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2647
2648         // Create some initial channels
2649         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2650         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2651
2652         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2653         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2654         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2655         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2656         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2657
2658         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2659         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2660         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2661
2662         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2663         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2664
2665         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2666         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2667         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2668         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2669         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2670         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2671         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2672         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2673         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2674         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2675         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2676         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2677         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2678
2679         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2680         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2681         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2682         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2683         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2684         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2685         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2686         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2687         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2688         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2689         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2690         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2691         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2692         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2693         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2694         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2695         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2696
2697         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2698         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2699         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2700         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2701         {
2702                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2703                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2704                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2705                 added_monitors.clear();
2706         }
2707         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2708         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2709         match forwarded_events[0] {
2710                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2711                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2712         }
2713         if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[1] {
2714                 } else { panic!(); }
2715         if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[2] {
2716                 } else { panic!(); }
2717         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2718         {
2719                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2720                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2721                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2722                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2723                 added_monitors.clear();
2724         }
2725         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2726         match events[0] {
2727                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2728                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2729         }
2730         match events[1] {
2731                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2732                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2733         }
2734
2735         match events[2] {
2736                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2737                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2738                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2739                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2740                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2741                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2742                 },
2743                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2744         };
2745         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2746                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2747                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2748                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2749                         // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2750                         // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2751                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2752                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2753                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2754                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2755                         if $htlc_offered {
2756                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2757                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2758                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2759                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2760                         } else {
2761                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2762                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2763                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2764                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2765                         }
2766                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2767                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2768                         node_txn.clear();
2769                 } }
2770         }
2771         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2772         // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2773         // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2774         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2775
2776         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2777         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2778         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2779         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2780         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2781         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2782         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2783         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2784         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2785         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2786         let commitment_spend =
2787                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2788                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2789                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2790                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2791                         &node_txn[0]
2792                 } else {
2793                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2794                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2795                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2796                         &node_txn[2]
2797                 };
2798
2799         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2800         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2801         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2802         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2803         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2804         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2805         check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2806         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2807         check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2808         check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2809         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2810         // we already checked the same situation with A.
2811
2812         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2813         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2814         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2815         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2816         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2817         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2818         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2819         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2820         let mut first_claimed = false;
2821         for event in events {
2822                 match event {
2823                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2824                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2825                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
2826                                         first_claimed = true;
2827                                 } else {
2828                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2829                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2830                                 }
2831                         },
2832                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2833                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2834                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2835                 }
2836         }
2837         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2838 }
2839
2840 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2841         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2842         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2843         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2844         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2845         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
2846         //            \                                  \
2847         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
2848
2849         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2850         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2851         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2852         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2853         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2854         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2855         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2856
2857         // Create some intial channels
2858         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2859         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2860
2861         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2862         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2863         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2864
2865         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2866
2867         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2868         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2869         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2870         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2871         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2872         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2873         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2874
2875         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2876         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2877         match events[0] {
2878                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2879                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2880                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2881                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2882                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2883                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2884                 },
2885                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2886         };
2887         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2888         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2889         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2890         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2891         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2892         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2893         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2894         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2895
2896         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2897         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2898         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2899         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2900         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2901         let timeout_tx;
2902         {
2903                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2904                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2905                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2906                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2907
2908                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2909                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2910
2911                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2912                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2913                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2914                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2915
2916                 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2917                 node_txn.clear();
2918         }
2919
2920         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2921         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2922         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2923         {
2924                 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2925                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2926                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2927                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2928         }
2929
2930         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2931         {
2932                 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2933                 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2934                 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2935                 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2936                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2937                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2938                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2939                 } else {
2940                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2941                 }
2942         }
2943
2944         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2945         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2946         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2947         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2948         match events[0] {
2949                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2950                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2951                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2952                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2953                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2954                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2955                 },
2956                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2957         };
2958
2959         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2960         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2961         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2962
2963         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2964         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2965
2966         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2967         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2968         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2969         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2970         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2971         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2972         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2973         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2974         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2975 }
2976
2977 #[test]
2978 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2979         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2980         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2981         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2982 }
2983
2984 #[test]
2985 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
2986         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
2987         // and fail backward accordingly.
2988
2989         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2990         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2991         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2992         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2993
2994         // Create some initial channels
2995         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2996         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2997
2998         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2999         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3000         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3001         // Revoke the old state
3002         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3003
3004         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3005
3006         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3007         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3008         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3009         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3010         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3011
3012         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3013         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3014         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3015         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3016         match events[0] {
3017                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3018                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3019                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3020                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3021                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3022                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3023
3024                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3025                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3026                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3027                 },
3028                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3029         }
3030 }
3031
3032 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3033         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3034         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3035         // commitment transaction anymore.
3036         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3037         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3038         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3039         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3040         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3041         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3042         // transactions:
3043         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3044         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3045         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3046         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3047         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3048         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3049         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3050         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3051         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3052
3053         // Create some initial channels
3054         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3055         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3056
3057         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3058         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3059         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3060         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3061         // Revoke the old state
3062         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3063
3064         let value = if use_dust {
3065                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3066                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3067                 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3068         } else { 3000000 };
3069
3070         let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3071         let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3072         let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3073
3074         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
3075         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3076         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3077         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3078         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3079         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3080         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3081         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3082         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3083         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3084         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3085         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3086
3087         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
3088         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3089         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3090         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3091         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3092         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3093         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3094         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3095         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3096         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3097         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3098         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3099         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3100         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3101         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3102         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3103
3104         assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
3105         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3106         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3107         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3108         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3109         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3110         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3111         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3112         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3113         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3114         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3115         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3116         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3117         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3118         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3119         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3120         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3121         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3122
3123         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3124         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3125         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3126         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3127         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3128         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3129         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3130
3131         if deliver_bs_raa {
3132                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3133                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3134                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3135                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3136                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3137                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3138                 match events[0] {
3139                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3140                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3141                 };
3142                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3143                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3144         }
3145
3146         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3147         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3148
3149         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3150         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3151         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3152         assert!(ANTI_REORG_DELAY > PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS); // We assume payments will also expire
3153
3154         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3155         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 4 });
3156         match events[0] {
3157                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3158                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3159         }
3160         match events[1] {
3161                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3162                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3163                 },
3164                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3165         }
3166         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3167                 match events[2] {
3168                         Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3169                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3170                         },
3171                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3172                 }
3173                 match events[3] {
3174                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3175                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3176                 };
3177         }
3178         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3179         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3180
3181         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3182         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3183         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3184                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3185                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3186         }
3187         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3188                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3189                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3190                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3191                 },
3192                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3193         }
3194         if deliver_bs_raa {
3195                 match events[0] {
3196                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3197                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3198                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3199                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3200                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3201                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3202                         },
3203                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3204                 }
3205         }
3206         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3207                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3208                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3209                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3210                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3211                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3212                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3213
3214                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3215                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3216                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3217
3218                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3219
3220                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3221                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3222                         match events[0] {
3223                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3224                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3225                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3226                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3227                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3228                                                 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3229                                         }
3230                                 },
3231                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3232                         }
3233                         match events[1] {
3234                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3235                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3236                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3237                                 },
3238                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3239                         }
3240                         match events[2] {
3241                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3242                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3243                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3244                                 },
3245                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3246                         }
3247                 },
3248                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3249         }
3250
3251         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3252         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3253         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3254 }
3255
3256 #[test]
3257 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3258         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3259         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3260         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3261         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3262 }
3263
3264 #[test]
3265 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3266         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3267         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3268         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3269         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3270 }
3271
3272 #[test]
3273 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3274         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3275         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3276         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3277         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3278         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3279
3280         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3281         {
3282                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3283                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3284                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3285
3286                 let payment_event = {
3287                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3288                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3289                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3290                 };
3291                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3292                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3293         }
3294
3295         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3296         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3297         {
3298                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3299                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3300
3301                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3302         }
3303
3304         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3305         {
3306                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3307
3308                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3309                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3310                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3311                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3312                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3313                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3314
3315                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3316                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3317                         channel_id: chan.2,
3318                         htlc_id: 0,
3319                         amount_msat: 0,
3320                         payment_hash,
3321                         cltv_expiry,
3322                         onion_routing_packet,
3323                 };
3324                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3325         }
3326         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3327         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3328         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3329         match events[0] {
3330                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3331                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3332                 },
3333                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3334         }
3335         match events[1] {
3336                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3337                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3338                 },
3339                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3340         }
3341         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3342         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3343 }
3344
3345 #[test]
3346 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3347         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3348         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3349         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3350         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3351         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3352         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3353         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3354
3355         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3356         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
3357         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3358         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3359         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3360         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3361
3362         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3363         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3364         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3365
3366         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3367         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3368         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3369         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3370         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3371
3372         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3373         // registering new transactions
3374         header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3375         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3376 }
3377
3378 #[test]
3379 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3380         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3381         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3382         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3383         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3384         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3385         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3386         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3387
3388         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3389
3390         let mut payment_event = {
3391                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3392                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3393
3394                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3395                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3396                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3397         };
3398
3399         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3400         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3401
3402         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3403
3404         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3405         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3406         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3407         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3408
3409         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3410         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3411         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3412         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3413         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3414
3415         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3416         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3417         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3418
3419         nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
3420         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3421         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3422         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3423         let tx = {
3424                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3425                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3426                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3427                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3428                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3429                 node_txn.remove(0)
3430         };
3431
3432         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3433
3434         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3435         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3436         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3437         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3438
3439         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3440         {
3441                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3442                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3443         }
3444         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3445         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3446         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3447         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3448         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3449         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3450         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3451
3452         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3453 }
3454
3455 #[test]
3456 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3457         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3458         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3459         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3460         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3461
3462         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3463         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3464         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3465         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3466         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3467
3468         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3469
3470         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3471         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3472         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3473         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3474         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3475
3476         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3477         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3478
3479         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3480         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3481 }
3482
3483 #[test]
3484 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3485         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3486         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3487         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3488         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3489         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3490         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3491         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3492
3493         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3494         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3495         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3496
3497         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3498         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3499         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3500         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3501
3502         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3503         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3504         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3505
3506         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3507         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3508         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3509         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3510
3511         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3512         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3513
3514         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3515         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3516
3517         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3518         {
3519                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3520                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3521                 match events[0] {
3522                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3523                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3524                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3525                         },
3526                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3527                 }
3528                 match events[1] {
3529                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3530                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3531                                 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3532                         },
3533                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3534                 }
3535                 match events[2] {
3536                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3537                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3538                 }
3539         }
3540
3541         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3542         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3543 }
3544
3545 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3546         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3547         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3548         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3549         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3550         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3551
3552         let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3553         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3554                 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3555                 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3556                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3557                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3558                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3559         } else {
3560                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3561         }
3562
3563         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3564
3565         let payment_event = {
3566                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3567                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3568
3569                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3570                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3571                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3572         };
3573         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3574
3575         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3576                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3577         } else {
3578                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3579                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3580                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3581                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3582                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3583
3584                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3585                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3586                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3587                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3588
3589                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3590                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3591                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3592                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3593                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3594
3595                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3596                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3597                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3598                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3599                                         }
3600                                 }
3601                         }
3602                 }
3603         }
3604
3605         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3606         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3607         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3608                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3609                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3610                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3611                         //
3612                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3613                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3614                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3615                         //
3616                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3617                         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3618                 }
3619                 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3620                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3621                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3622         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3623                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3624                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3625         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3626                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3627                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3628         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3629                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3630                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3631         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3632                 // Everything was delivered...
3633                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3634         }
3635
3636         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3637         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3638         match events_1[0] {
3639                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3640                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3641         };
3642
3643         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3644         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3645         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3646
3647         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3648
3649         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3650         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3651         match events_2[0] {
3652                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3653                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3654                         assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3655                         match &purpose {
3656                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3657                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3658                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3659                                 },
3660                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3661                         }
3662                 },
3663                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3664         }
3665
3666         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3667         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3668
3669         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3670         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3671         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3672                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3673                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3674                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3675                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3676                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3677                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3678                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3679                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3680                 },
3681                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3682         };
3683
3684         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3685                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3686
3687                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3688                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3689                 match events_4[0] {
3690                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3691                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3692                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3693                         },
3694                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3695                 }
3696
3697                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3698                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3699                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3700                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3701
3702                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3703                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3704                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3705                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3706
3707                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3708                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3709                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3710                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3711                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3712
3713                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3714                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3715                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3716                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3717                                         }
3718                                 }
3719                         }
3720                 }
3721         }
3722
3723         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3724         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3725         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3726                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3727                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3728                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3729                 } else {
3730                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3731                 }
3732         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3733                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3734                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3735         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3736                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3737                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3738         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3739                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3740                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3741         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3742                 // Everything was delivered...
3743                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3744         }
3745
3746         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3747                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3748         }
3749
3750         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3751         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3752         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3753
3754         if messages_delivered > 2 {
3755                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3756         }
3757
3758         // Channel should still work fine...
3759         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3760         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3761         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3762 }
3763
3764 #[test]
3765 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3766         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3767         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3768         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3769         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3770 }
3771
3772 #[test]
3773 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3774         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3775         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3776         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3777         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3778 }
3779
3780 #[test]
3781 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3782         // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3783         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3784         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3785         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3786         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3787         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3788         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3789         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3790         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3791
3792         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3793         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3794
3795         confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3796         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3797         assert!(events_1.is_empty());
3798
3799         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3800
3801         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3802         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3803
3804         confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3805         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3806         assert!(events_2.is_empty());
3807
3808         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3809         let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3810         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3811         let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3812
3813         // nodes[0] hasn't yet received a funding_locked, so it only sends that on reconnect.
3814         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
3815         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3816         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3817         let as_funding_locked = match events_3[0] {
3818                 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3819                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3820                         msg.clone()
3821                 },
3822                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_3[0]),
3823         };
3824
3825         // nodes[1] received nodes[0]'s funding_locked on the first reconnect above, so it should send
3826         // announcement_signatures as well as channel_update.
3827         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
3828         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3829         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 3);
3830         let chan_id;
3831         let bs_funding_locked = match events_4[0] {
3832                 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3833                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3834                         chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3835                         msg.clone()
3836                 },
3837                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[0]),
3838         };
3839         let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_4[1] {
3840                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3841                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3842                         msg.clone()
3843                 },
3844                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[1]),
3845         };
3846         match events_4[2] {
3847                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3848                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3849                 },
3850                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[2]),
3851         }
3852
3853         // Re-deliver nodes[0]'s funding_locked, which nodes[1] can safely ignore. It currently
3854         // generates a duplicative announcement_signatures
3855         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
3856         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3857         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3858         match events_5[0] {
3859                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3860                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3861                         assert_eq!(*msg, bs_announcement_sigs);
3862                 },
3863                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_5[0]),
3864         };
3865
3866         // When we deliver nodes[1]'s funding_locked, however, nodes[0] will generate its
3867         // announcement_signatures.
3868         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_locked);
3869         let events_6 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3870         assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
3871         let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
3872                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3873                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3874                         msg.clone()
3875                 },
3876                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_6[0]),
3877         };
3878
3879         // When we deliver nodes[1]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[0], nodes[0] should immediately
3880         // broadcast the channel announcement globally, as well as re-send its (now-public)
3881         // channel_update.
3882         nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3883         let events_7 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3884         assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3885         let (chan_announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
3886                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3887                         (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3888                 },
3889                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_7[0]),
3890         };
3891
3892         // Finally, deliver nodes[0]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[1] and make sure it creates the
3893         // same channel_announcement.
3894         nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3895         let events_8 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3896         assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3897         let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
3898                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3899                         assert_eq!(*msg, chan_announcement);
3900                         update_msg.clone()
3901                 },
3902                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_8[0]),
3903         };
3904
3905         // Provide the channel announcement and public updates to the network graph
3906         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap();
3907         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3908         nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3909
3910         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3911         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3912         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3913
3914         // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3915         // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3916         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3917
3918         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3919         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3920         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3921
3922         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3923         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3924         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3925         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3926         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3927         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3928                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3929         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3930
3931         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3932         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3933                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3934                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3935                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3936                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3937                         keys_manager,
3938                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3939                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3940                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3941                         logger: nodes[0].logger,
3942                         channel_monitors,
3943                 }).unwrap()
3944         };
3945         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
3946         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
3947
3948         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
3949         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
3950         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3951
3952         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3953
3954         // The channel announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
3955         nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
3956         let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3957         let mut found_announcement = false;
3958         for event in msgs.iter() {
3959                 match event {
3960                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
3961                                 if *msg == chan_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
3962                         },
3963                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
3964                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3965                 }
3966         }
3967         assert!(found_announcement);
3968 }
3969
3970 #[test]
3971 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3972         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3973         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3974         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3975         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3976         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3977         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3978         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3979
3980         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
3981
3982         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3983         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3984         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
3985         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3986
3987         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3988         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3989         match events_1[0] {
3990                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3991                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3992         }
3993
3994         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
3995         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3996
3997         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3998         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3999         match events_2[0] {
4000                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4001                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4002                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4003                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4004                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4005                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4006                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4007
4008                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4009                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4010                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4011                         match events_3[0] {
4012                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4013                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4014                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4015                                 },
4016                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4017                         }
4018
4019                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4020                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4021                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4022                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4023                 },
4024                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4025         }
4026
4027         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4028         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4029
4030         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4031         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4032         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4033         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4034         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4035         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4036
4037         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4038         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4039         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4040         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4041
4042         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4043         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4044
4045         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4046         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4047
4048         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4049
4050         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4051         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4052         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4053         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4054         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4055         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4056         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4057         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4058         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4059         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4060
4061         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4062         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4063         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4064         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4065         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4066         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4067         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4068         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4069
4070         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4071         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4072         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4073         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4074         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4075         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4076         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4077         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4078
4079         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4080         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4081         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4082         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4083
4084         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4085         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4086         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4087         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4088
4089         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4090         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4091         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4092
4093         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4094
4095         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4096         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4097         match events_5[0] {
4098                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4099                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4100                         match &purpose {
4101                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4102                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4103                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4104                                 },
4105                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4106                         }
4107                 },
4108                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4109         }
4110
4111         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4112         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4113         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4114
4115         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4116         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4117 }
4118
4119 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4120         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4121         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4122         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4123         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4124         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4125         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4126
4127         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4128
4129         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4130                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4131                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4132                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4133                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4134                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4135                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4136                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4137                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4138                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4139                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4140                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4141                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4142                 our_payment_hash
4143         } else {
4144                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4145         };
4146
4147         let mut block = Block {
4148                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4149                 txdata: vec![],
4150         };
4151         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4152         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4153         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4154         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4155                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4156                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4157                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4158         }
4159
4160         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4161
4162         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4163         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4164         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4165         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4166         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4167         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4168
4169         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4170         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4171         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4172         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4173         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4174         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4175 }
4176
4177 #[test]
4178 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4179         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4180         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4181 }
4182
4183 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4184         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4185         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4186         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4187         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4188         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4189         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4190         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4191
4192         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4193         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4194         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4195         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4196
4197         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4198         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4199         {
4200                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4201         }
4202         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4203         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4204
4205         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4206         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4207         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4208         sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4209         if forwarded_htlc {
4210                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4211                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4212                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4213                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4214                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4215         }
4216         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4217
4218         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4219         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4220         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4221         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4222
4223         if forwarded_htlc {
4224                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4225                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4226                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4227                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4228                 match fail_commit[0] {
4229                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4230                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4231                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4232                         },
4233                         _ => unreachable!(),
4234                 }
4235                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4236         } else {
4237                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4238                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4239                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
4240                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4241                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4242                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
4243                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4244                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4245         }
4246 }
4247
4248 #[test]
4249 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4250         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4251         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4252 }
4253
4254 #[test]
4255 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4256         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4257         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4258         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4259         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4260         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4261         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4262         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4263         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4264         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4265
4266         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4267
4268         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4269
4270         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4271         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4272         get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4273                 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4274
4275         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4276         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4277         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4278         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4279         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4280         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4281         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4282         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4283                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4284         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4285
4286         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4287         let config = UserConfig::default();
4288         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4289                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4290                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4291                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4292                         default_config: config,
4293                         keys_manager,
4294                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4295                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4296                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4297                         logger: &logger,
4298                         channel_monitors,
4299                 }).unwrap()
4300         };
4301         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4302         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4303
4304         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4305         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4306         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4307         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4308
4309         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4310         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4311         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4312         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4313
4314         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4315         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4316         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4317         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4318
4319         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4320         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4321         for node in nodes.iter() {
4322                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4323                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4324                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4325         }
4326
4327         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4328 }
4329
4330 #[test]
4331 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4332         // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4333         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4334         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4335         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4336         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4337         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4338         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4339         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4340         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4341         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4342
4343         // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4344         let channel_value = 100000;
4345         let push_msat = 10001;
4346         let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4347         let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4348         let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4349         let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4350         node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4351         node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4352         node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4353
4354         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
4355
4356         node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4357         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4358
4359         node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4360         {
4361                 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4362                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4363                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4364                 added_monitors.clear();
4365         }
4366
4367         let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4368         node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4369         {
4370                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4371                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4372                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4373                 added_monitors.clear();
4374         }
4375         // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4376
4377         nodes.push(node_a);
4378         nodes.push(node_b);
4379
4380         // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4381         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4382         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4383         get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4384
4385         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4386         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4387         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4388         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4389         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4390         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4391         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4392         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4393                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4394         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4395
4396         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4397         let config = UserConfig::default();
4398         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4399                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4400                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4401                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4402                         default_config: config,
4403                         keys_manager,
4404                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4405                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4406                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4407                         logger: &logger,
4408                         channel_monitors,
4409                 }).unwrap()
4410         };
4411         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4412         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4413
4414         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4415
4416         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4417         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4418
4419         // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4420         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4421         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4422         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4423         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4424
4425         // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4426         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4427         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4428
4429         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4430         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4431         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4432         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4433
4434         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4435         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4436         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4437         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4438
4439         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4440         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4441         for node in nodes.iter() {
4442                 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4443                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4444                 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4445         }
4446
4447         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4448 }
4449
4450 #[test]
4451 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4452         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4453         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4454         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4455         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4456         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4457         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4458         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4459         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4460         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4461         let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4462
4463         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4464         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4465
4466         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4467
4468         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4469         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4470         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4471
4472         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4473         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4474         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4475         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4476         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4477         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4478         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4479         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4480                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4481         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4482
4483         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4484         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4485                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4486                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4487                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4488                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4489                         keys_manager,
4490                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4491                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4492                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4493                         logger: &logger,
4494                         channel_monitors,
4495                 }).unwrap()
4496         };
4497         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4498         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4499
4500         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4501         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4502         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4503
4504         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4505
4506         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4507         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4508 }
4509
4510 #[test]
4511 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4512         // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4513         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4514         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4515         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4516         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4517         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4518         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4519         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4520         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4521         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4522         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4523         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4524         let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4525
4526         let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4527         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4528                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4529                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4530                 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4531         }
4532
4533         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4534
4535         // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4536         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4537
4538         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4539         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4540         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4541         nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4542
4543         // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4544         // nodes[3])
4545         let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4546         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4547                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4548                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4549                 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4550         }
4551
4552         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4553         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4554         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4555         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4556         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4557         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4558
4559
4560         let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4561         for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4562                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4563                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4564                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4565                 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4566         }
4567
4568         let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4569         for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4570                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4571                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4572                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4573                 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4574         }
4575
4576         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4577         if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4578                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4579                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4580                 keys_manager,
4581                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4582                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4583                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4584                 logger: &logger,
4585                 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4586         }) { } else {
4587                 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4588         };
4589
4590         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4591         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4592                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4593                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4594                 keys_manager,
4595                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4596                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4597                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4598                 logger: &logger,
4599                 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4600         }).unwrap();
4601         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4602         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4603
4604         { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4605                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4606                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4607                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4608                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4609         }
4610
4611         for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4612                 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4613                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4614         }
4615         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4616         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4617
4618         // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4619         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4620         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4621         //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4622         claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4623
4624         nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4625         let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4626         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4627         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4628         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4629         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4630         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4631                 match action {
4632                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4633                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4634                         },
4635                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4636                 }
4637         }
4638 }
4639
4640 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4641         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4642                 {
4643                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4644                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4645                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4646                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4647                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4648                                 match event {
4649                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4650                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4651                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4652                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4653                                                 }
4654                                         },
4655                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4656                                 };
4657                         }
4658                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4659                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4660                                         txn.push(tx);
4661                                 }
4662                         }
4663                         txn
4664                 }
4665         }
4666 }
4667
4668 #[test]
4669 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4670         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4671         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4672         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4673         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4674         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4675
4676         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4677         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4678         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4679         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4680         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4681         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4682         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4683         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4684         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4685
4686         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4687         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4688
4689         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4690         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4691         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4692         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4693         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4694 }
4695
4696 #[test]
4697 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4698         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4699         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4700         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4701         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4702         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4703         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4704
4705         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4706         nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4707         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4708         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4709         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4710
4711         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4712         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4713         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4714         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4715
4716         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4717         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4718         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4719         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4720         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4721
4722         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4723         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4724         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4725 }
4726
4727 #[test]
4728 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4729         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4730         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4731
4732         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4733         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4734         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4735         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4736
4737         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4738         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4739         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4740         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4741         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4742
4743         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4744         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4745         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4746         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4747         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4748
4749         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4750         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4751         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4752
4753         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4754         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4755         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4756         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4757         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4758 }
4759
4760 #[test]
4761 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4762         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4763         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4764         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4765         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4766
4767         // Create some initial channels
4768         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4769
4770         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4771
4772         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4773         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4774         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4775
4776         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4777         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4778         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4779         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4780         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4781         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4782         match events[0] {
4783                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4784                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4785         }
4786         match events[1] {
4787                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4788                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4789         }
4790
4791         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4792         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4793         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4794         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4795         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4796         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4797         check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4798
4799         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4800         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4801         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4802
4803         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4804         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4805         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4806 }
4807
4808 #[test]
4809 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4810         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4811         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4812         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4813         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4814
4815         // Create some initial channels
4816         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4817
4818         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4819         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4820
4821         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4822
4823         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4824         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4825         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4826
4827         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4828         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4829         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4830         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4831         match events[0] {
4832                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4833                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4834         }
4835         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4836
4837         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4838         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4839         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4840         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4841         check_spends!(node_txn[1],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4842         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4843
4844         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4845         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4846         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4847         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4848
4849         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4850         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4851         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4852         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4853         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4854 }
4855
4856 #[test]
4857 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4858         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4859         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4860         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4861         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4862
4863         // Create some initial channels
4864         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4865
4866         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4867         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4868         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4869         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4870
4871         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4872
4873         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4874         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4875         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4876         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4877
4878         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4879         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4880         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4881         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4882
4883         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4884         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4885
4886         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4887         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4888         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4889 }
4890
4891 #[test]
4892 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4893         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4894         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4895         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4896         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4897         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4898
4899         // Create some initial channels
4900         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4901
4902         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4903         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4904         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4905         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4906
4907         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4908
4909         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4910         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4911         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4912         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4913         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4914         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4915
4916         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4917         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4918         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4919         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4920         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4921         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4922         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4923
4924         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4925         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4926         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4927         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4928         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4929         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4930
4931         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4932         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4933         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4934         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4935         // transactions next...
4936         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4937         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4938
4939         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4940         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4941         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4942                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4943         } else {
4944                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4945                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4946         }
4947
4948         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4949         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4950
4951         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4952         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4953
4954         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4955         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4956         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4957         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4958         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4959 }
4960
4961 #[test]
4962 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4963         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4964         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4965         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4966         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4967         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4968
4969         // Create some initial channels
4970         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4971
4972         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4973         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4974         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4975         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4976
4977         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4978         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4979
4980         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4981
4982         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4983         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4984         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4985         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4986         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4987         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4988
4989         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4990         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4991         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4992         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4993
4994         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4995         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4996         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4997
4998         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4999         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5000         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
5001         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5002         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5003         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5004
5005         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5006         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5007
5008         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5009         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5010         // transactions next...
5011         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
5012         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5013         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
5014                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5015         } else {
5016                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
5017                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5018         }
5019
5020         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5021         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5022
5023         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5024
5025         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
5026         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5027
5028         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
5029         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
5030
5031         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5032         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5033         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5034         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5035         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
5036         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5037         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
5038         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
5039 }
5040
5041 #[test]
5042 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
5043         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
5044         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
5045         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
5046         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
5047         // channel.
5048         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
5049         // gets broadcast.
5050
5051         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5052         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5053         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5054         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5055
5056         // Create some initial channels
5057         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5058         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5059
5060         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5061         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5062         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5063         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5064         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5065
5066         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5067         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5068         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5069
5070         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
5071         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5072         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5073         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5074         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5075         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5076         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5077         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5078         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5079         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5080
5081         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5082         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5083         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5084         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5085
5086         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5087         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5088         assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5089         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5090         check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5091         check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5092         assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5093         assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5094         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5095         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5096
5097         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5098         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5099         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5100         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5101         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5102         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5103         match events[0] {
5104                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5105                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5106         }
5107         match events[1] {
5108                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
5109                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5110                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5111                 },
5112                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5113         }
5114         {
5115                 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5116                 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5117                 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5118                 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5119                 b_txn.clear();
5120         }
5121         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5122         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5123         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5124         match msg_events[0] {
5125                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5126                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5127         }
5128         match msg_events[1] {
5129                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5130                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5131         }
5132         match msg_events[2] {
5133                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5134                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5135                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5136                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5137                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5138                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5139                 },
5140                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5141         };
5142         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5143         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5144         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5145         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5146         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5147         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5148         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5149         check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5150         check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5151         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5152         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5153         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5154         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5155
5156         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5157         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5158 }
5159
5160 #[test]
5161 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5162         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5163         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5164         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5165         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5166         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5167         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5168         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5169         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5170         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5171         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5172         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5173                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5174         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5175
5176         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5177         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5178         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5179
5180         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5181         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5182         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5183         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5184         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5185
5186         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
5187
5188         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5189         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5190         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5191         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5192         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], vec![], 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5193         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5194
5195         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5196         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5197         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5198
5199         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5200         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5201         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5202         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5203         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5204
5205         let htlc_timeout_tx;
5206         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5207                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5208                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5209                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5210                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5211
5212                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5213                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5214                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5215                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5216                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5217                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5218                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5219
5220                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5221                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5222                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5223                 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5224         }
5225
5226         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5227         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5228         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5229         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5230         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5231         match events[0] {
5232                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5233                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5234         }
5235         match events[1] {
5236                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5237                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5238         }
5239         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5240         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5241         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5242         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5243         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5244         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5245         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5246         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5247         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5248         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5249         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5250         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5251         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5252
5253         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5254         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5255         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5256         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5257         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5258         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5259         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5260         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5261         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5262         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5263
5264         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5265         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5266         {
5267                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5268         }
5269         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5270
5271         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5272         // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5273         // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5274         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5275         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], Some(196*2), true);
5276         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5277         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5278         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5279         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5280         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5281         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5282         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5283
5284         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5285         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5286
5287         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5288         match events[0] {
5289                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5290                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5291                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5292                 }
5293                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5294         }
5295 }
5296
5297 #[test]
5298 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5299         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5300         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5301         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5302         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5303
5304         // Create some initial channels
5305         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5306
5307         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5308         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5309         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5310         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5311         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5312
5313         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5314         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5315         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5316         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5317         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5318         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5319         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5320         match events[0] {
5321                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5322                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5323         }
5324         match events[1] {
5325                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5326                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5327         }
5328         let node_tx = {
5329                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5330                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5331                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5332                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5333                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5334                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5335                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5336                 node_txn[0].clone()
5337         };
5338
5339         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5340         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5341
5342         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5343         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5344         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5345         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5346         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5347         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5348 }
5349
5350 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5351         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5352         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5353         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5354         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5355         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5356         // use the same payment hashes.
5357         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5358         //
5359         // A \         / E
5360         //    - C - D -
5361         // B /         \ F
5362         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5363         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5364         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5365         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5366         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5367         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5368         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5369         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5370                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5371         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5372
5373         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5374         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5375         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5376         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5377         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5378
5379         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5380         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5381         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5382         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5383
5384         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5385         // 0th HTLC:
5386         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5387         // 1st HTLC:
5388         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5389         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5390         // 2nd HTLC:
5391         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5392         // 3rd HTLC:
5393         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5394         // 4th HTLC:
5395         let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5396         // 5th HTLC:
5397         let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5398         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5399         // 6th HTLC:
5400         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5401         // 7th HTLC:
5402         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5403
5404         // 8th HTLC:
5405         let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5406         // 9th HTLC:
5407         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5408         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5409
5410         // 10th HTLC:
5411         let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5412         // 11th HTLC:
5413         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5414         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5415
5416         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5417         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5418         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5419         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5420         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5421
5422         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5423         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5424         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5425         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5426         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5427         assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5428         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5429         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5430         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5431
5432         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5433         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5434         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5435         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5436         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5437         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5438
5439         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5440         assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5441         assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5442         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5443         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5444         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5445
5446         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5447         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5448         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5449         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5450
5451         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5452
5453         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5454         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5455         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5456         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5457         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5458         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5459         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5460         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5461         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5462         if deliver_last_raa {
5463                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5464         } else {
5465                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5466         }
5467
5468         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5469         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5470         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5471         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5472         //
5473         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5474         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5475         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5476         //
5477         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5478         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5479         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5480
5481         if announce_latest {
5482                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5483         } else {
5484                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5485         }
5486         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5487         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5488                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5489                 events[1].clone()
5490         } else {
5491                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5492                 events[0].clone()
5493         };
5494         match close_event {
5495                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5496                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5497         }
5498
5499         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5500         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5501         if deliver_last_raa {
5502                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5503         } else {
5504                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5505         }
5506         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5507
5508         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5509         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5510         let mut a_done = false;
5511         for msg in cs_msgs {
5512                 match msg {
5513                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5514                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5515                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5516                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5517                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5518                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5519                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5520                                         }
5521                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5522                                         assert!(!a_done);
5523                                         a_done = true;
5524                                         &nodes[0]
5525                                 } else {
5526                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5527                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5528                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5529                                         }
5530                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5531                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5532                                         &nodes[1]
5533                                 };
5534                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5535                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5536                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5537                                 if announce_latest {
5538                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5539                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5540                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5541                                         }
5542                                 }
5543                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5544                         },
5545                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5546                 }
5547         }
5548
5549         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5550         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5551         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5552         let mut as_updates = 0;
5553         for event in as_events.iter() {
5554                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5555                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5556                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5557                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5558                         } else {
5559                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5560                         }
5561                         if network_update.is_some() {
5562                                 as_updates += 1;
5563                         }
5564                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5565         }
5566         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5567         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5568         if announce_latest {
5569                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5570                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5571         }
5572         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5573
5574         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5575         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5576         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5577         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5578         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5579                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5580                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5581                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5582                                 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5583                         } else {
5584                                 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5585                         }
5586                         if network_update.is_some() {
5587                                 bs_updates += 1;
5588                         }
5589                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5590         }
5591         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5592         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5593         if announce_latest {
5594                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5595         }
5596         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5597
5598         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5599         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5600         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5601         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5602         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5603         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5604 }
5605
5606 #[test]
5607 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5608         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5609 }
5610
5611 #[test]
5612 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5613         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5614 }
5615
5616 #[test]
5617 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5618         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5619         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5620         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5621 }
5622
5623 #[test]
5624 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5625         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5626         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5627         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5628         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5629
5630         // Create some initial channels
5631         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5632
5633         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5634         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5635         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5636         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5637
5638         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5639         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5640         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5641         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5642         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5643         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5644
5645         let htlc_timeout = {
5646                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5647                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5648                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5649                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5650                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5651                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5652                 node_txn[1].clone()
5653         };
5654
5655         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5656         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5657         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5658
5659         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5660         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5661         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5662         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5663         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5664         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5665         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5666         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5667         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5668         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5669                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5670 }
5671
5672 #[test]
5673 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5674         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5675         // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5676         // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5677
5678         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5679
5680         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5681         let seed = [42; 32];
5682         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5683         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5684         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph: &chanmon_cfgs[0].network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5685         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5686         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5687         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5688
5689         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5690         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5691
5692         // Create some initial channels
5693         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5694         // for node 0
5695         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5696         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5697         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5698
5699         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5700         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5701         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5702         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5703         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5704
5705         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5706         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5707         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5708         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5709         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5710
5711         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5712         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5713         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5714         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5715             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5716             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5717             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5718                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5719         }
5720
5721         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5722         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5723         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5724         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5725         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5726         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5727
5728         let htlc_timeout = {
5729                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5730                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5731                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5732                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5733                 node_txn[1].clone()
5734         };
5735
5736         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5737         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5738         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5739
5740         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5741         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5742         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5743         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5744         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5745         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5746         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5747         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5748         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5749         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5750         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5751                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5752 }
5753
5754 #[test]
5755 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5756         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5757         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5758         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5759         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5760
5761         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5762
5763         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5764         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5765
5766         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5767         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5768         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5769
5770         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5771         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5772         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5773
5774         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5775         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5776         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5777
5778         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5779         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5780         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5781 }
5782
5783 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5784         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5785         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5786         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5787         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5788         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5789
5790         let (payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5791
5792         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5793         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5794         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5795         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5796
5797         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5798         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5799         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5800
5801         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5802         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5803         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5804         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5805         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5806
5807         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5808         let mut block = Block {
5809                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5810                 txdata: vec![],
5811         };
5812         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5813                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5814                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5815         }
5816         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5817         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5818         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5819         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5820 }
5821
5822 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5823         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5824         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5825         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5826         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5827         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5828
5829         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5830         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5831         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5832
5833         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5834
5835         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5836         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5837         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5838
5839         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5840         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5841
5842         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5843                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5844                 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5845         }
5846         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5847         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5848         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5849         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5850 }
5851
5852 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5853         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5854         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5855         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5856         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5857         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5858
5859         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5860         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5861         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5862         // actually revoked.
5863         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5864         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5865         assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5866         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5867         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5868
5869         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5870         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5871         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5872         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5873         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5874         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5875         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5876         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5877         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5878         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5879
5880         if check_revoke_no_close {
5881                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5882                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5883         }
5884
5885         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5886         let mut block = Block {
5887                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5888                 txdata: vec![],
5889         };
5890         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5891                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5892                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5893         }
5894         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5895                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5896                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5897                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5898                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5899         } else {
5900                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5901                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5902                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
5903                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5904                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5905                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
5906                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5907                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5908         }
5909 }
5910
5911 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5912 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5913 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5914 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5915 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5916 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5917 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5918 // non-dust HTLCs.
5919 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5920 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5921 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5922 #[test]
5923 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5924         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5925         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5926
5927         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5928         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5929 }
5930
5931 #[test]
5932 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5933         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5934         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5935         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5936         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5937 }
5938
5939 #[test]
5940 #[should_panic]
5941 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5942         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5943         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5944         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5945         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5946         //Force duplicate channel ids
5947         for node in nodes.iter() {
5948                 *node.keys_manager.override_channel_id_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5949         }
5950
5951         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5952         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5953         let push_msat=10001;
5954         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5955         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5956         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5957
5958         //Create a second channel with a channel_id collision
5959         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5960 }
5961
5962 #[test]
5963 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5964         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5965         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5966         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5967         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5968
5969         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5970         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5971         let push_msat=10001;
5972         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5973
5974         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5975         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5976         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5977         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5978         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5979
5980         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5981         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5982         let push_msat=10001;
5983         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5984         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5985         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5986
5987         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5988         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5989         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5990
5991         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5992         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5993         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5994
5995         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5996         let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5997         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5998
5999         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
6000         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
6001         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6002         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6003         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
6004         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6005 }
6006
6007 #[test]
6008 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
6009         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6010         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6011         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6012         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6013
6014         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
6015         let push_msat=10001;
6016         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6017         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6018         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
6019         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
6020
6021         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6022         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6023         let err_msg = match events[0] {
6024                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
6025                         msg.clone()
6026                 },
6027                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6028         };
6029         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
6030 }
6031
6032 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
6033 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
6034 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
6035 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
6036 #[test]
6037 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
6038         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6039         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6040         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6041         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6042         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6043
6044         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6045         // pending_update_fee.
6046         {
6047                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6048                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6049         }
6050         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6051         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6052
6053         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6054         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6055         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6056                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6057                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6058                 },
6059                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6060         };
6061
6062         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6063
6064         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6065         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6066         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6067
6068         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6069         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
6070         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6071
6072         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6073         let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6074         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6075         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6076
6077         // Flush the pending fee update.
6078         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6079         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6080         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6081         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6082         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6083
6084         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6085         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6086         // us to surface its failure to the user.
6087         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6088         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6089         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6090         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6091                 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6092         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6093
6094         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6095         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6096         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6097         match &events[0] {
6098                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6099                         assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6100                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6101                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6102                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6103                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6104                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6105                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6106                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6107                 },
6108                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6109         }
6110 }
6111
6112 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6113 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6114 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6115 #[test]
6116 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6117         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6118         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6119         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6120         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6121         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6122
6123         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6124         // pending_update_fee.
6125         {
6126                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6127                 *feerate_lock += 200;
6128         }
6129         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6130         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6131
6132         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6133         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6134         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6135                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6136                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6137                 },
6138                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6139         };
6140
6141         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6142
6143         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6144         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6145         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6146
6147         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6148         let amt_1 = 20000;
6149         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1) - amt_1;
6150         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6151         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6152
6153         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6154         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6155         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6156         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6157         let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6158         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6159         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6160
6161         // Flush the pending fee update.
6162         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6163         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6164         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6165         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6166         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6167         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6168
6169         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6170         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6171         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6172         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6173         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6174         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6175         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6176                 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6177         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6178
6179         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6180         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6181         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6182         match &events[0] {
6183                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6184                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6185                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6186                         assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6187                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6188                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6189                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6190                         assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6191                         assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6192                 },
6193                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6194         }
6195
6196         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6197         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6198                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6199                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6200                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6201         };
6202         let raa = match send_raa_event {
6203                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6204                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6205         };
6206         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6207         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6208         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6209         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6210         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6211         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6212         match events[0] {
6213                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6214                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6215         }
6216         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6217         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6218         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6219         match events[0] {
6220                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6221                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6222         }
6223         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6224         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6225         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6226         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6227         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6228         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6229 }
6230
6231 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6232 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6233 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6234 // once it's freed.
6235 #[test]
6236 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6237         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6238         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6239         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6240         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6241         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6242         config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6243         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6244         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6245         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6246         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6247
6248         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6249         // pending_update_fee.
6250         {
6251                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6252                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6253         }
6254         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6255         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6256
6257         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6258         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6259         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6260                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6261                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6262                 },
6263                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6264         };
6265
6266         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6267
6268         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6269         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6270         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6271
6272         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6273         let feemsat = 239;
6274         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6275         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6276         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6277         let payment_event = {
6278                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6279                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6280
6281                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6282                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6283
6284                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6285         };
6286         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6287         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6288         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6289         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6290
6291         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6292         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6293
6294         // Flush the pending fee update.
6295         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6296         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6297         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6298         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6299         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6300         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6301
6302         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6303         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6304         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6305
6306         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6307                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6308                         msg.clone()
6309                 },
6310                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6311         };
6312
6313         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6314         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6315         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6316
6317         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6318         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6319         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6320         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6321                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6322                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6323         }
6324
6325         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6326         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6327         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6328
6329         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6330         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6331         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6332         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6333                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6334                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6335                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6336                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6337                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6338                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6339                 },
6340                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6341         };
6342
6343         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6344         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6345         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6346
6347         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6348         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6349         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6350         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6351         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6352         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6353         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6354         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6355         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6356                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6357                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6358         };
6359         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6360         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6361         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6362 }
6363
6364 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6365 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6366 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6367
6368 #[test]
6369 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6370         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6371         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6372         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6373         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6374         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6375         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6376
6377         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6378         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6379
6380         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6381                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6382         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6383         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6384 }
6385
6386 #[test]
6387 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6388         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6389         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6390         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6391         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6392         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6393         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6394
6395         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6396         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6397         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6398                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6399
6400         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6401         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6402 }
6403
6404 #[test]
6405 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6406         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6407         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6408         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6409         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6410         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6411         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6412
6413         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6414         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6415         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6416         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6417         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6418
6419         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6420         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6421         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6422         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6423         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6424 }
6425
6426 #[test]
6427 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6428         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6429         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6430         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6431         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6432         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6433         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6434         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6435
6436         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], vec![], 100000000, 500000001);
6437         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6438                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6439 }
6440
6441 #[test]
6442 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6443         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6444         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6445         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6446         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6447         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6448         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6449         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6450         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6451         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6452
6453         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6454                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6455                 let payment_event = {
6456                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6457                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6458
6459                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6460                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6461                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6462                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6463                         } else {
6464                                 assert!(false);
6465                         }
6466                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6467                 };
6468                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6469                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6470                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6471
6472                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6473                 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6474         }
6475         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6476         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6477                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6478
6479         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6480         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6481 }
6482
6483 #[test]
6484 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6485         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6486         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6487         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6488         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6489         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6490         let channel_value = 100000;
6491         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6492         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6493
6494         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6495
6496         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6497         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6498         // limits us to.
6499         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6500         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6501                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6502
6503         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6504         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6505
6506         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6507 }
6508
6509 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6510 #[test]
6511 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6512         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6513         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6514         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6515         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6516         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6517         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6518         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6519         {
6520                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6521                 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6522                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6523         }
6524
6525         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6526         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6527         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6528         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6529         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6530         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6531         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6532         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6533         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6534         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6535         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6536 }
6537
6538 #[test]
6539 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6540         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6541         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6542         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6543         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6544         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6545         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6546
6547         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6548         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6549         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6550         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6551         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
6552
6553         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6554         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6555         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6556         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6557         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6558
6559         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6560         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6561         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6562         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6563         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6564
6565         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6566         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6567         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6568         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6569         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6570 }
6571
6572 #[test]
6573 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6574         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6575         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6576         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6577         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6578         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6579         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6580         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6581
6582         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6583         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6584         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6585         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6586         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6587         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6588
6589         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6590                 channel_id: chan.2,
6591                 htlc_id: 0,
6592                 amount_msat: 1000,
6593                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6594                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6595                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6596         };
6597
6598         for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6599                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6600                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6601         }
6602         msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6603         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6604
6605         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6606         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6607         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6608         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6609         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6610 }
6611
6612 #[test]
6613 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6614         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6615         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6616         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6617         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6618         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6619         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6620
6621         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6622         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6623         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6624         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6625         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6626         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6627
6628         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6629         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6630         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6631         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6632         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6633 }
6634
6635 #[test]
6636 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6637         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6638         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6639         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6640         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6641         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6642
6643         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6644         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6645         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6646         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6647         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6648         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6649         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6650
6651         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6652         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6653         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6654         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6655         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6656 }
6657
6658 #[test]
6659 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6660         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6661         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6662         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6663         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6664         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6665         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6666         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6667
6668         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6669         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6670         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6671         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6672         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6673         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6674
6675         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6676         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6677         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6678         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6679         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6680         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6681         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6682         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6683         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6684         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6685         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6686         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6687         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6688
6689         //Resend HTLC
6690         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6691         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6692         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6693         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6694         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6695
6696         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6697
6698         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6699         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6700         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6701         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6702         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6703 }
6704
6705 #[test]
6706 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6707         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6708
6709         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6710         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6711         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6712         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6713         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6714         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6715         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6716
6717         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6718         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6719         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6720
6721         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6722                 channel_id: chan.2,
6723                 htlc_id: 0,
6724                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6725         };
6726
6727         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6728
6729         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6730         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6731         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6732         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6733         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6734 }
6735
6736 #[test]
6737 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6738         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6739
6740         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6741         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6742         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6743         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6744         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6745
6746         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6747         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6748         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6749         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6750         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6751
6752         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6753                 channel_id: chan.2,
6754                 htlc_id: 0,
6755                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6756         };
6757
6758         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6759
6760         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6761         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6762         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6763         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6764         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6765 }
6766
6767 #[test]
6768 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6769         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6770
6771         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6772         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6773         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6774         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6775         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6776
6777         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6778         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6779         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6780         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6781         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6782         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6783                 channel_id: chan.2,
6784                 htlc_id: 0,
6785                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6786                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6787         };
6788
6789         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6790
6791         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6792         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6793         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6794         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6795         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6796 }
6797
6798 #[test]
6799 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6800         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6801
6802         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6803         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6804         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6805         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6806         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6807
6808         let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6809
6810         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6811         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6812
6813         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6814         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6815         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6816                 match events[0] {
6817                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6818                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6819                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6820                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6821                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6822                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6823                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6824                         },
6825                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6826                 }
6827         };
6828
6829         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6830
6831         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6832
6833         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6834         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6835         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6836         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6837         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6838 }
6839
6840 #[test]
6841 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6842         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6843
6844         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6845         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6846         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6847         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6848         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6849
6850         let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6851
6852         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6853         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6854
6855         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6856         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6857         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6858                 match events[0] {
6859                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6860                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6861                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6862                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6863                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6864                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6865                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6866                         },
6867                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6868                 }
6869         };
6870
6871         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6872
6873         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6874
6875         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6876         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6877         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6878         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6879         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6880 }
6881
6882 #[test]
6883 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6884         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6885
6886         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6887         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6888         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6889         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6890         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6891
6892         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6893         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6894         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6895
6896         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6897         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6898
6899         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6900         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6901         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6902
6903         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6904
6905         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6906                 match events[0] {
6907                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6908                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6909                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6910                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6911                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6912                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6913                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6914                         },
6915                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6916                 }
6917         };
6918         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6919         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6920
6921         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6922         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6923         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6924         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6925         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6926 }
6927
6928 #[test]
6929 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6930         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6931         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6932
6933         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6934         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6935         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6936         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6937         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6938         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6939
6940         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6941
6942         //First hop
6943         let mut payment_event = {
6944                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6945                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6946                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6947                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6948                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6949         };
6950         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6951         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6952         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6953         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6954         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6955         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6956         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6957         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6958         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6959
6960         //Second Hop
6961         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6962         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6963         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6964         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6965
6966         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6967         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6968         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6969                 match events_3[0] {
6970                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6971                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6972                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6973                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6974                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6975                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6976                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6977                         },
6978                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6979                 }
6980         };
6981
6982         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6983
6984         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6985         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6986         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6987         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6988         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6989
6990         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6991         match events_4[0] {
6992                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6993                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6994                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6995                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6996                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6997                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6998                 },
6999                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7000         };
7001
7002         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7003 }
7004
7005 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7006         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7007         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7008         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7009
7010         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7011         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7012         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7013         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7014         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7015         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7016
7017         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7018
7019         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7020         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7021         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7022         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7023
7024         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7025         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7026
7027         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7028         assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
7029         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7030         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7031         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7032
7033         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7034         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7035         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7036         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7037
7038         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7039         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7040
7041         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7042         match events[0] {
7043                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7044                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7045                 },
7046                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7047         }
7048         match events[1] {
7049                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7050                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7051                 },
7052                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7053         }
7054
7055         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7056         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7057         if announce_latest {
7058                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7059         } else {
7060                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7061         }
7062
7063         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7064         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7065         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7066
7067         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7068         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7069         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7070         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7071         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7072         let mut first_failed = false;
7073         for event in events {
7074                 match event {
7075                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7076                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7077                                         assert!(!first_failed);
7078                                         first_failed = true;
7079                                 } else {
7080                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7081                                 }
7082                         }
7083                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7084                 }
7085         }
7086 }
7087
7088 #[test]
7089 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7090         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7091         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7092 }
7093
7094 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7095         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7096         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7097         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7098         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7099         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7100         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7101
7102         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7103         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7104         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7105         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7106         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7107
7108         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7109
7110         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7111         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7112
7113         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7114         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7115
7116         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7117         if revoked {
7118                 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7119                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7120         }
7121
7122         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7123         if local {
7124                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7125                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7126                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7127                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7128                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7129
7130                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7131                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7132                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7133                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7134                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7135                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7136                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7137                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7138                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7139                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7140                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7141         } else {
7142                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7143                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7144                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7145                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7146                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7147                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7148                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7149                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7150                 if !revoked {
7151                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7152                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7153                         // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
7154                         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7155                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7156                         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7157                         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7158                 } else {
7159                         // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
7160                         // commitment tx
7161                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7162                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7163                         let first;
7164                         match events[0] {
7165                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7166                                         if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7167                                         else { first = false; }
7168                                 },
7169                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7170                         }
7171                         match events[1] {
7172                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7173                                         if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7174                                         else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7175                                 },
7176                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7177                         }
7178                 }
7179         }
7180 }
7181
7182 #[test]
7183 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7184         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7185         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7186         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7187 }
7188
7189 #[test]
7190 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7191         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7192
7193         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7194         low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7195         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7196         high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7197         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7198         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7199         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7200         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7201         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7202
7203         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7204         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0) {
7205                 match error {
7206                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7207                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7208                 }
7209         } else { assert!(false) }
7210
7211         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7212         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7213         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7214         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7215         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger) {
7216                 match error {
7217                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
7218                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7219                 }
7220         } else { assert!(false); }
7221
7222         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7223         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7224         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7225         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7226         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7227         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7228         let reason_msg;
7229         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7230                 match action {
7231                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7232                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7233                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7234                         },
7235                         _ => { panic!(); }
7236                 }
7237         } else { panic!(); }
7238         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7239
7240         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7241         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7242         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7243         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7244         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger) {
7245                 match error {
7246                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7247                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7248                 }
7249         } else { assert!(false); }
7250 }
7251
7252 #[test]
7253 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7254         // We want to be sure that :
7255         // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7256         //   (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7257         // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7258         // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7259         // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7260         let persister;
7261         let logger;
7262         let fee_estimator;
7263         let tx_broadcaster;
7264         let chain_source;
7265         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7266         // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7267         // during signing due to revoked tx
7268         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7269         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7270         let monitor;
7271         let node_state_0;
7272         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7273         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7274         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7275
7276         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7277
7278         // Cache node A state before any channel update
7279         let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7280         let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7281         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7282
7283         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7284         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7285
7286         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7287         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7288
7289         // Restore node A from previous state
7290         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7291         let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7292         chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7293         tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7294         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7295         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7296         monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7297         node_state_0 = {
7298                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7299                 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7300                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7301                         keys_manager: keys_manager,
7302                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7303                         chain_monitor: &monitor,
7304                         logger: &logger,
7305                         tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7306                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7307                         channel_monitors,
7308                 }).unwrap().1
7309         };
7310         nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7311         assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7312         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7313         nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7314
7315         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7316
7317         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7318         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7319
7320         let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7321
7322         // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7323         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7324         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7325
7326         {
7327                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7328                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7329         }
7330
7331         let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7332         for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7333                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7334                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7335                         reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7336                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7337                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7338                         match action {
7339                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7340                                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7341                                 },
7342                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7343                         }
7344                 } else {
7345                         panic!("Unexpected event")
7346                 }
7347         }
7348
7349         // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7350         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7351         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_string() });
7352         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction");
7353         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7354
7355         // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7356         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7357         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7358         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
7359         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
7360         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
7361         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7362         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting".to_string() });
7363         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
7364         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7365         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
7366 }
7367
7368 #[test]
7369 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7370         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7371         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7372         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7373
7374         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7375         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7376         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7377         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7378
7379         // Create some initial channels
7380         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7381
7382         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7383         let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7384         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[0].network_graph, None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7385         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7386         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7387         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7388         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7389
7390         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7391         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7392         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7393         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7394         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7395
7396         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7397         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7398         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7399         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7400
7401         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7402         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7403         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7404
7405         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7406         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7407         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7408                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7409                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7410                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7411                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7412                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7413                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7414                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7415                 },
7416                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7417         };
7418         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7419
7420         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7421         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7422
7423         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7424         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7425         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7426         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7427 }
7428
7429 #[test]
7430 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7431         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7432         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7433
7434         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7435         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7436         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7437         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7438
7439         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7440         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7441         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7442
7443         // Disconnect peers
7444         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7445         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7446
7447         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7448         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7449         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7450         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7451         let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7452         for e in msg_events {
7453                 match e {
7454                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7455                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7456                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7457                                 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7458                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7459                                 }
7460                         },
7461                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7462                 }
7463         }
7464         // Reconnect peers
7465         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7466         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7467         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7468         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7469         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7470         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7471
7472         // Reestablish chan_1
7473         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7474         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7475         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7476         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7477         // Reestablish chan_2
7478         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7479         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7480         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7481         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7482         // Reestablish chan_3
7483         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7484         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7485         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7486         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7487
7488         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7489         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7490         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7491         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7492         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7493         for e in msg_events {
7494                 match e {
7495                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7496                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7497                                 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7498                                         // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7499                                         // the old one.
7500                                         Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7501                                         None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7502                                 }
7503                         },
7504                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7505                 }
7506         }
7507         // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7508         assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7509 }
7510
7511 #[test]
7512 fn test_priv_forwarding_rejection() {
7513         // If we have a private channel with outbound liquidity, and
7514         // UserConfig::accept_forwards_to_priv_channels is set to false, we should reject any attempts
7515         // to forward through that channel.
7516         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7517         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7518         let mut no_announce_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
7519         no_announce_cfg.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
7520         no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = false;
7521         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(no_announce_cfg), None]);
7522         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
7523         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
7524         let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
7525         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7526
7527         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7528
7529         // Note that the create_*_chan functions in utils requires announcement_signatures, which we do
7530         // not send for private channels.
7531         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7532         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7533         nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
7534         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7535         nodes[1].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7536
7537         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[1], 1_000_000, 42);
7538         nodes[1].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7539         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()));
7540         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
7541
7542         let cs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7543         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_funding_signed);
7544         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7545
7546         let conf_height = core::cmp::max(nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1, nodes[2].best_block_info().1 + 1);
7547         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, conf_height);
7548         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7549         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[2], &tx, conf_height);
7550         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7551         let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7552         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7553         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7554         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
7555         get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7556
7557         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7558         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
7559         assert!(!nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7560
7561         // We should always be able to forward through nodes[1] as long as its out through a public
7562         // channel:
7563         send_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], 10_000);
7564
7565         // ... however, if we send to nodes[2], we will have to pass the private channel from nodes[1]
7566         // to nodes[2], which should be rejected:
7567         let route_hint = RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
7568                 src_node_id: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
7569                 short_channel_id: nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(),
7570                 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 1000, proportional_millionths: 0 },
7571                 cltv_expiry_delta: MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
7572                 htlc_minimum_msat: None,
7573                 htlc_maximum_msat: None,
7574         }]);
7575         let last_hops = vec![route_hint];
7576         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], last_hops, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
7577
7578         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7579         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7580         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
7581         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7582         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7583
7584         let htlc_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7585         assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7586         assert_eq!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7587         assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7588         assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fee.is_none());
7589
7590         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7591         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7592         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(), true);
7593
7594         // Now disconnect nodes[1] from its peers and restart with accept_forwards_to_priv_channels set
7595         // to true. Sadly there is currently no way to change it at runtime.
7596
7597         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7598         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7599
7600         let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
7601         let mut monitor_a_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7602         let mut monitor_b_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7603         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut monitor_a_serialized).unwrap();
7604         get_monitor!(nodes[1], cs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut monitor_b_serialized).unwrap();
7605
7606         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7607         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
7608         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7609         nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
7610
7611         let mut monitor_a_read = &monitor_a_serialized.0[..];
7612         let mut monitor_b_read = &monitor_b_serialized.0[..];
7613         let (_, mut monitor_a) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_a_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7614         let (_, mut monitor_b) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_b_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7615         assert!(monitor_a_read.is_empty());
7616         assert!(monitor_b_read.is_empty());
7617
7618         no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = true;
7619
7620         let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
7621         let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
7622                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7623                 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_a);
7624                 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_b);
7625                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7626                         default_config: no_announce_cfg,
7627                         keys_manager,
7628                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
7629                         chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
7630                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7631                         logger: nodes[1].logger,
7632                         channel_monitors,
7633                 }).unwrap()
7634         };
7635         assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
7636         nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
7637
7638         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_a).is_ok());
7639         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_b).is_ok());
7640         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7641         nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
7642
7643         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7644         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7645         let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7646         let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7647         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
7648         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7649         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7650         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7651
7652         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7653         nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7654         let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7655         let cs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7656         nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7657         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_reestablish);
7658         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7659         get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7660
7661         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7662         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7663         pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], 10_000, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret);
7664         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], our_payment_preimage);
7665 }
7666
7667 #[test]
7668 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7669         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7670         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7671
7672         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7673         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7674         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7675         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7676
7677         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7678
7679         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7680         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], vec![], 3000000, 30);
7681         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7682
7683         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7684         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7685         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7686         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7687         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7688         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7689
7690         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7691         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7692                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7693                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7694                 }
7695         }
7696
7697         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7698         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7699
7700         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7701         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7702         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7703         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7704         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7705
7706         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7707         let penalty_1;
7708         let feerate_1;
7709         {
7710                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7711                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7712                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7713                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7714                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7715                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7716                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7717                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7718                 node_txn.clear();
7719         };
7720
7721         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7722         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7723         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7724         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7725         {
7726                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7727                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7728                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7729                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7730                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7731                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7732                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7733                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7734                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7735                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7736                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7737                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7738                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7739                         node_txn.clear();
7740                 }
7741         }
7742         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7743
7744         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7745         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7746         let penalty_3;
7747         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7748         {
7749                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7750                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7751                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7752                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7753                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7754                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7755                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7756                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7757                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7758                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7759                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7760                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7761                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7762                         node_txn.clear();
7763                 }
7764         }
7765         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7766
7767         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7768         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7769 }
7770
7771 #[test]
7772 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7773         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7774         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7775
7776         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7777         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7778         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7779         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7780         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7781
7782         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7783         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7784         let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7785         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7786         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7787                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7788         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7789         let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7790         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[1].network_graph, None,
7791                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7792         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7793
7794         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7795         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7796         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7797
7798         // Revoke local commitment tx
7799         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7800
7801         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7802         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7803         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7804         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7805         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7806         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7807         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7808
7809         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7810         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7811         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7812
7813         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7814         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7815         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7816
7817         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7818         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7819         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7820         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7821
7822         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7823         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7824         let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7825         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7826         let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7827         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7828         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7829         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7830         match events[1] {
7831                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7832                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7833         }
7834         let first;
7835         let feerate_1;
7836         let penalty_txn;
7837         {
7838                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7839                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7840                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7841
7842                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7843                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7844                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7845                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7846                 // future).
7847                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7848                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7849                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7850                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7851                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7852                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7853
7854                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7855                 // available, which we check here:
7856                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7857                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7858                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7859
7860                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7861                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7862
7863                 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7864                 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7865                 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7866                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7867
7868                 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7869                 // output, checked above).
7870                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7871                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7872                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7873
7874                 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7875                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7876                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7877                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
7878                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7879                 node_txn.clear();
7880         }
7881
7882         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7883         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7884         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7885         let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7886         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7887         {
7888                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7889                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7890
7891                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7892                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7893                 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7894                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output  {
7895                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7896                 } else {
7897                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7898                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7899                 }
7900
7901                 node_txn.clear();
7902         };
7903
7904         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7905         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7906         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7907         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7908         let node_txn = {
7909                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7910                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7911
7912                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7913                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7914                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7915                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7916                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7917                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7918                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7919                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7920                 node_txn.clear();
7921                 txn
7922         };
7923         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7924         let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7925         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7926         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7927         {
7928                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7929                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7930                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7931                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7932                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7933                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7934                 // up bumped justice generation.
7935                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7936                 node_txn.clear();
7937         }
7938         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7939         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7940 }
7941
7942 #[test]
7943 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7944         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7945         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7946
7947         // Create 2 HTLCs
7948         // Provide preimage for one
7949         // Check aggregation
7950
7951         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7952         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7953         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7954         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7955
7956         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7957         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7958         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7959
7960         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7961         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7962         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7963         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7964         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7965
7966         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7967         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7968         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7969         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7970         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7971
7972         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7973         let timeout;
7974         let preimage;
7975         let preimage_bump;
7976         let feerate_timeout;
7977         let feerate_preimage;
7978         {
7979                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7980                 // 9 transactions including:
7981                 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
7982                 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
7983                 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
7984                 // 1 * HTLC-Timeout
7985                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
7986                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7987                 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
7988                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7989                 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
7990                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
7991                 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
7992
7993                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
7994                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
7995                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
7996                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
7997
7998                 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
7999                 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8000                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
8001                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].get_weight() as u64;
8002
8003                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
8004                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8005                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8006                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
8007
8008                 node_txn.clear();
8009         };
8010         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
8011         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
8012
8013         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
8014         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
8015         {
8016                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8017                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8018                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8019                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
8020                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8021                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
8022
8023                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
8024                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
8025                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.get_weight() as u64;
8026                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
8027                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
8028
8029                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8030                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8031                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
8032                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
8033                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
8034
8035                 node_txn.clear();
8036         }
8037
8038         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8039         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8040 }
8041
8042 #[test]
8043 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
8044         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
8045         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
8046         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
8047         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
8048         // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
8049         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
8050         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
8051         // implement that).
8052         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8053         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8054         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8055         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8056         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
8057
8058         let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8059         let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
8060
8061         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
8062
8063         // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
8064         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8065         let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
8066
8067         // Must revoke without gaps
8068         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8069         keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
8070
8071         keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8072         let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
8073                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
8074
8075         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
8076                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
8077         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
8078         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8079         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
8080 }
8081
8082 #[test]
8083 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
8084         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
8085         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
8086
8087         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8088         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8089         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8090         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8091
8092         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8093         // Lock HTLC in both directions
8094         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8095         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8096
8097         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
8098         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8099         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8100
8101         // Revoke local commitment tx
8102         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8103
8104         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
8105         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
8106         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
8107         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8108
8109         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
8110         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8111         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8112         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8113         let penalty_txn = {
8114                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8115                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
8116                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8117                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8118                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8119                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8120                 node_txn.clear();
8121                 penalty_txn
8122         };
8123         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8124         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8125         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8126         {
8127                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8128                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8129                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8130         }
8131 }
8132
8133 #[test]
8134 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8135         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8136         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8137         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8138         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8139         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8140         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8141
8142         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8143
8144         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8145         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8146         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8147         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8148         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8149
8150         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8151         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8152         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8153         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8154
8155         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8156         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8157         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8158         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8159         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8160         match close_ev[0] {
8161                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8162                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8163                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8164                 },
8165                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8166         }
8167 }
8168
8169 #[test]
8170 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8171         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8172         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8173         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8174         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8175
8176         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8177         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8178         override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8179
8180         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8181
8182         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8183         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8184         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8185         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8186 }
8187
8188 #[test]
8189 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8190         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8191         zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8192         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8193         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8194         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8195         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8196
8197         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8198         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8199         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8200
8201         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8202         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8203         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8204 }
8205
8206 #[test]
8207 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8208         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8209         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8210         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8211         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8212         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8213
8214         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8215         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8216         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8217         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8218
8219         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8220         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8221         route.paths.push(path);
8222         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8223         route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8224         route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8225         route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8226         route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8227         route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8228         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8229         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8230 }
8231
8232 #[test]
8233 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8234         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8235         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8236         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8237         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8238         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8239
8240         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8241
8242         {
8243                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
8244                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8245                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8246                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8247                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8248                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8249                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8250                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8251         }
8252         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8253         // values from previous calls.
8254         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8255         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8256         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8257         match events[0] {
8258                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8259                         match &purpose {
8260                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8261                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8262                                 },
8263                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8264                         }
8265                 },
8266                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8267         }
8268 }
8269
8270 #[test]
8271 #[allow(deprecated)]
8272 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8273         // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8274         // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8275         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8276         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8277         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8278         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8279
8280         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8281
8282         let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8283
8284         // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8285         // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8286         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8287                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8288         } else { panic!(); }
8289         let mut block = {
8290                 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8291                 Block {
8292                         header: BlockHeader {
8293                                 version: 0x2000000,
8294                                 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8295                                 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8296                                 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8297                         txdata: vec![],
8298                 }
8299         };
8300         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8301         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8302                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8303         } else { panic!(); }
8304
8305         // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8306         // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8307         block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8308         block.header.time += 1;
8309         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8310         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8311         assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8312
8313         {
8314                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8315                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8316                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8317                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8318                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8319                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8320                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8321         }
8322         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8323         // values from previous calls.
8324         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8325         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8326         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8327         match events[0] {
8328                 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8329                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8330                         assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8331                         // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8332                 },
8333                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8334         }
8335 }
8336
8337 #[test]
8338 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8339         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8340         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8341         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8342         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8343         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8344
8345         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8346
8347         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8348         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8349         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8350         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8351
8352         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8353         // resulting events.
8354         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8355                 () => {
8356                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8357                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8358                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8359                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8360                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8361
8362                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8363                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8364                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8365                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8366                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8367
8368                         // We should fail the payment back
8369                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8370                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8371                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8372                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8373                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8374                                 },
8375                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8376                         }
8377                 }
8378         }
8379
8380         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8381         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8382         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8383
8384         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8385         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8386         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8387         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8388
8389         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8390         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8391         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8392         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8393
8394         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8395         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8396         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8397         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8398 }
8399
8400 #[test]
8401 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8402         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8403         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8404         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8405         //
8406         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8407         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8408         // commitment at same time.
8409
8410         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8411         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8412         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8413         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8414
8415         // Create some initial channel
8416         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8417         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8418
8419         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8420         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8421
8422         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8423         let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8424
8425         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8426         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8427         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8428         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8429         let watchtower = {
8430                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8431                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8432                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8433                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8434                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8435                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8436                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8437                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8438                 watchtower
8439         };
8440         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8441         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8442         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8443         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8444         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8445
8446         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8447         assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8448         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8449         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8450         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8451         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8452         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8453                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8454                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8455                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8456                 } else { assert!(false); }
8457         } else { assert!(false); };
8458         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8459         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8460         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8461         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8462 }
8463
8464 #[test]
8465 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8466         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8467         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8468         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8469         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8470
8471         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8472         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8473         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8474         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8475
8476         // Create some initial channel
8477         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8478         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8479
8480         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8481         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8482
8483         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8484         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8485
8486         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8487         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8488         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8489         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8490         let watchtower_alice = {
8491                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8492                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8493                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8494                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8495                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8496                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8497                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8498                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8499                 watchtower
8500         };
8501         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8502         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8503         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8504         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8505         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8506
8507         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8508         {
8509                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8510                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8511                 txn.clear();
8512         }
8513
8514         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8515         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8516         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8517         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8518         let watchtower_bob = {
8519                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8520                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8521                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8522                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8523                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8524                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8525                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8526                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8527                 watchtower
8528         };
8529         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8530         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8531
8532         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8533         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8534         {
8535                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8536         }
8537         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8538
8539         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8540         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8541         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8542         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8543                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8544                         // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8545                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8546                         if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8547                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8548                 } else { assert!(false); }
8549         } else { assert!(false); };
8550         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8551         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8552
8553         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8554         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8555         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8556
8557         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8558         let bob_state_y;
8559         {
8560                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8561                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8562                 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8563                 txn.clear();
8564         };
8565
8566         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8567         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8568         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8569         {
8570                 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8571                 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8572                 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8573                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8574                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8575                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8576         }
8577 }
8578
8579 #[test]
8580 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8581         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8582         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8583         // message).
8584         //
8585         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8586         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8587         //
8588         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8589         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8590         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8591         // before receiving funding_signed.
8592         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8593         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8594         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8595         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8596
8597         // Create an initial channel
8598         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8599         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8600         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8601         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8602         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8603
8604         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8605         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8606
8607         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8608         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8609
8610         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8611         let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8612         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8613         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8614         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8615 }
8616
8617 #[test]
8618 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8619         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8620         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8621         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8622         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8623         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8624         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8625
8626         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8627         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8628         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8629         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8630
8631         // Create some initial channels
8632         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8633
8634         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8635         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8636         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8637         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8638         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8639         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8640
8641         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8642         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8643         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8644         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8645         // this test before #653 fix.
8646         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8647         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8648         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8649         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8650         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8651
8652         let htlc_timeout = {
8653                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8654                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8655                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8656                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8657                 node_txn[1].clone()
8658         };
8659
8660         let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8661         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8662         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8663         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8664 }
8665
8666 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8667         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8668         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8669         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8670         //
8671         // Steps of the test:
8672         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8673         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8674         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8675         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8676         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8677         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8678         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8679         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8680         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8681         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8682         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8683         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8684
8685         // Create some initial channels
8686         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8687         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8688
8689         // Steps (1) and (2):
8690         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8691         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8692
8693         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8694         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8695         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8696         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8697         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8698         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8699         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8700
8701         // Steps (3) and (4):
8702         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8703         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8704         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8705         if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
8706         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
8707         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8708         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8709         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8710         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8711                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8712                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
8713                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8714                 };
8715                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8716                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8717                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8718                 if broadcast_alice {
8719                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8720                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8721                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8722                 }
8723                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8724                 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8725         }
8726
8727         // Step (5):
8728         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8729         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8730         assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8731         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8732         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8733         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8734         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8735         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8736         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8737         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8738
8739         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8740         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false);
8741         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8742         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8743                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8744                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8745                 match events[0] {
8746                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8747                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8748                         },
8749                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8750                 };
8751         }
8752         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8753         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8754         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8755         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8756
8757         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8758         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8759         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8760                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8761                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8762                         (*msg).clone()
8763                 },
8764                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8765         };
8766         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8767                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8768                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8769                         (*updates).clone()
8770                 },
8771                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8772         };
8773
8774         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8775         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8776         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8777         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8778
8779         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8780         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8781         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8782                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8783                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8784                         (*msg).clone()
8785                 },
8786                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8787         };
8788         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8789         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8790
8791         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8792         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8793         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8794         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8795         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8796                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8797                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8798                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8799                 if broadcast_alice {
8800                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8801                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8802                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8803                 }
8804                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8805                 if broadcast_alice {
8806                         // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8807                         // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8808                         // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8809                         // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8810                         // broadcasted.
8811                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8812                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8813                 } else {
8814                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8815                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8816                 }
8817         }
8818
8819         // Step (6):
8820         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8821         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8822         {
8823                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8824                 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8825                         // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8826                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8827                 }
8828                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8829                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8830                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8831                 };
8832                 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8833                 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8834                 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8835                 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8836                 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8837                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8838                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8839                 } else {
8840                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8841                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8842                 }
8843         }
8844 }
8845
8846 #[test]
8847 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8848         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8849         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8850         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8851         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8852 }
8853
8854 #[test]
8855 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8856         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8857         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8858         //
8859         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8860         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8861         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8862         // updating logic for the existing channel.
8863         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8864         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8865         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8866         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8867
8868         // Create an initial channel
8869         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8870         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8871         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8872         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8873
8874         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8875         // that it is rejected.
8876         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8877         {
8878                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8879                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8880                 match events[0] {
8881                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8882                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8883                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8884                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8885                                 // move forward with it.
8886                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8887                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8888                         },
8889                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8890                 }
8891         }
8892
8893         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8894         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8895
8896         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8897         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8898
8899         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8900         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8901         {
8902                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8903                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8904                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8905                 added_monitors.clear();
8906         }
8907         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8908
8909         let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8910         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8911
8912         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8913         // temporary one).
8914
8915         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8916         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8917         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8918         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8919         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8920         {
8921                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8922                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8923                 match events[0] {
8924                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8925                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8926                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8927                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8928                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8929                         },
8930                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8931                 }
8932         }
8933
8934         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8935         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8936         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8937         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8938         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8939         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8940
8941         let funding_created = {
8942                 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8943                 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8944                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8945                 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8946         };
8947         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8948         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8949         // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8950         // still needs to be cleared here.
8951         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8952
8953         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8954         {
8955                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8956                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8957                 match events[0] {
8958                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8959                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8960                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8961                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8962                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8963                         },
8964                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8965                 }
8966         }
8967
8968         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8969         // everything is functional.
8970         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8971         {
8972                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8973                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8974                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8975                 added_monitors.clear();
8976         }
8977
8978         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8979         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8980         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8981         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
8982
8983         let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8984         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
8985         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8986         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8987 }
8988
8989 #[test]
8990 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8991         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8992         //
8993         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8994         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8995         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8996         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8997         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8998         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8999         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9000
9001         // Create some initial channels
9002         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9003         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9004         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9005
9006         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9007         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9008         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9009
9010         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9011         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9012         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9013
9014         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9015         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9016         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9017         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9018         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9019         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9020         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9021         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9022         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9023
9024         // A null channel ID should close all channels
9025         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9026         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9027         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9028         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9029         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9030         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9031         match events[0] {
9032                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9033                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9034                 },
9035                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9036         }
9037         match events[1] {
9038                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9039                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9040                 },
9041                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9042         }
9043         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9044         // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
9045         // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
9046         // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
9047         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9048         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9049
9050         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
9051         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9052         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9053 }
9054
9055 #[test]
9056 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9057         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9058         //
9059         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9060         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9061         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9062         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9063         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9064         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9065         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9066         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9067
9068         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9069         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9070         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9071
9072         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42);
9073         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9074                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9075                 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
9076         }
9077
9078         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9079         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9080         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9081
9082         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9083         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9084
9085         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9086         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9087
9088         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9089         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9090         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9091
9092         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9093         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9094         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9095         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9096         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9097         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9098         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9099                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9100                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9101                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9102                 } else { panic!(); }
9103         } else { panic!(); }
9104         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9105 }
9106
9107 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9108         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9109         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9110         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9111         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9112         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9113         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9114         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9115         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9116         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9117         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9118         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9119         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9120         // until we learned about an additional block.
9121         //
9122         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9123         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9124         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9125         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9126         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9127         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9128         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9129
9130         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9131         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9132         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9133         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9134         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9135
9136         nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
9137         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9138         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9139         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9140         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9141         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9142
9143         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9144         if !test_height_before_timelock {
9145                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9146         }
9147         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9148                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9149         if test_height_before_timelock {
9150                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9151                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9152                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9153                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9154         } else {
9155                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9156                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9157                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9158                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9159                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9160                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9161                 // timelock is up).
9162                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9163                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9164
9165                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9166                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9167                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9168                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9169                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9170                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9171                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9172
9173                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9174                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9175                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9176                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9177                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9178                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9179                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9180                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9181                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9182         }
9183 }
9184
9185 #[test]
9186 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9187         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9188         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9189 }
9190
9191 #[test]
9192 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9193         // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9194         // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9195         // HTLCs.
9196         // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9197
9198         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9199         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9200         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9201         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9202         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9203         let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9204         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9205         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9206         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9207
9208         // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9209         let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9210         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9211         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9212
9213         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9214         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9215         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9216         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9217         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9218
9219         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9220
9221         // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9222         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9223         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9224         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9225
9226         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9227         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9228         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9229         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9230         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9231
9232         // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9233         // generated
9234         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9235
9236         // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9237         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9238         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9239
9240         let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9241         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9242         let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9243         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9244         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9245
9246         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9247         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9248         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9249         nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9250
9251         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9252         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9253                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9254         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9255         let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9256         let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9257                 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9258         assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9259
9260         let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9261         let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9262                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9263                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9264                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9265                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9266                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9267                         keys_manager,
9268                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9269                         chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9270                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9271                         logger: nodes[1].logger,
9272                         channel_monitors,
9273                 }).unwrap()
9274         };
9275         nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9276         assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9277
9278         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9279         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9280         nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9281         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9282
9283         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9284         // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9285         // the commitment state.
9286         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9287
9288         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9289
9290         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9291         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9292         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9293
9294         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9295         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9296         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9297         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9298         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9299         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9300         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9301
9302         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9303         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9304 }
9305
9306 #[test]
9307 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9308         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9309         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9310         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9311         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9312
9313         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9314         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9315         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9316         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9317         let params = RouteParameters {
9318                 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9319                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9320                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9321         };
9322         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9323         let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &params, network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
9324
9325         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9326         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9327         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9328         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9329         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9330         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9331         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9332         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9333         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9334 }
9335
9336 #[test]
9337 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9338         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9339         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9340         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9341         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9342
9343         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9344         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9345         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9346         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9347
9348         let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9349         let params = RouteParameters {
9350                 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9351                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9352                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9353         };
9354         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9355         let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9356         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9357         let route = find_route(
9358                 &payer_pubkey, &params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9359                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
9360         ).unwrap();
9361
9362         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9363         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9364         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9365         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9366         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9367         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9368         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9369         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9370         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9371 }
9372
9373 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9374 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9375 enum ExposureEvent {
9376         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9377         AtHTLCForward,
9378         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9379         AtHTLCReception,
9380         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9381         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9382 }
9383
9384 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9385         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9386         // policy.
9387         //
9388         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9389         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9390         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9391         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9392         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9393         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9394         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9395         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9396
9397         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9398         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9399         config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9400         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9401         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9402         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9403
9404         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9405         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9406         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9407         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9408         if on_holder_tx {
9409                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9410         }
9411         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
9412         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9413         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
9414
9415         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 1_000_000, 42);
9416
9417         if on_holder_tx {
9418                 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9419                         chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9420                 }
9421         }
9422
9423         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9424         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9425         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9426
9427         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9428         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9429
9430         let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9431         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9432         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9433
9434         let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9435                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9436                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9437                 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9438         };
9439         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9440         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9441
9442         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9443         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9444
9445         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9446         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9447
9448         if on_holder_tx {
9449                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9450                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9451                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9452                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9453                         for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9454                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9455                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9456                         }
9457                 } else {
9458                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9459                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9460                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9461                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9462                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9463                         }
9464                 }
9465         } else {
9466                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9467                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9468                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9469                         for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9470                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9471                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9472                         }
9473                 } else {
9474                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9475                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9476                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9477                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9478                         }
9479                 }
9480         }
9481
9482         let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9483         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9484                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9485                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9486                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9487                 if on_holder_tx {
9488                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9489                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9490                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9491                 } else {
9492                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9493                 }
9494         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9495                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9496                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9497                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9498                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9499                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9500                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9501                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9502                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9503                 if on_holder_tx {
9504                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9505                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9506                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9507                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9508                 } else {
9509                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9510                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9511                 }
9512         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9513                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9514                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9515                 {
9516                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9517                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9518                 }
9519                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9520                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9521                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9522         }
9523
9524         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9525         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9526         added_monitors.clear();
9527 }
9528
9529 #[test]
9530 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9531         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9532         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9533         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9534         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9535         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9536         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9537         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9538         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9539         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9540         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9541         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9542         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9543 }