_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use chain;
  15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
  17 use chain::channelmonitor;
  18 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  19 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  20 use chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, KeysInterface};
  21 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  22 use ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
  23 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS };
  24 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
  25 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  26 use ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  27 use routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
  28 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
  29 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  30 use ln::msgs;
  31 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  32 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
  33 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
  34 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
  35 use util::errors::APIError;
  36 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  37 use util::config::UserConfig;
  38
  39 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  40 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  43 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
  44 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  45 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxMerkleNode, TxOut, Witness};
  46 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
  47
  48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  50
  51 use regex;
  52
  53 use io;
  54 use prelude::*;
  55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  56 use core::default::Default;
  57 use core::iter::repeat;
  58 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  59 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
  60
  61 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  62 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  63
  64 #[test]
  65 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  66         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  67         use ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
  68         let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
  69         cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
  70         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  71         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  72         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
  73         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  74
  75         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  76         // funding satoshis
  77         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  78         let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
  79         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  80
  81         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  82         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
  83
  84         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  85         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  86
  87         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  88         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  89         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  90                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  91                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  92                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  93                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  94                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  95                         match action {
  96                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
  97                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
  98                                 },
  99                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
 100                         }
 101                 } else { assert!(false); }
 102         };
 103
 104         use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
 105
 106         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 107         insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
 108         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
 109
 110         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 111
 112         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 113
 114         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 115
 116         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 117
 118         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 119
 120         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 121
 122         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 123 }
 124
 125 #[test]
 126 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
 127         // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
 128         // them.
 129         use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
 130         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 131         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 132         node_cfgs[1].features = InitFeatures::known().clear_wumbo();
 133         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 134         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 135
 136         match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
 137                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
 138                         assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
 139                 },
 140                 _ => panic!()
 141         }
 142 }
 143
 144 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
 145         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
 146         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
 147         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
 148         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
 149         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 150         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 151         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 152         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 153         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 154
 155         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 156         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
 157         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
 158         let opt_anchors = false;
 159         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
 160         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
 161
 162         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
 163         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 164         if !send_from_initiator {
 165                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 166                 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 167         }
 168         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
 169
 170         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
 171         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 172         if send_from_initiator {
 173                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 174                 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 175         }
 176         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
 177         {
 178                 let mut lock;
 179                 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
 180                 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 181                 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 182         }
 183
 184         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
 185         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
 186         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
 187
 188         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
 189         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
 190         if send_from_initiator {
 191                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
 192                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
 193                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
 194                         // well as an additional HTLC.
 195                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
 196         } else {
 197                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
 198         }
 199 }
 200
 201 #[test]
 202 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
 203         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
 204         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
 205 }
 206
 207 #[test]
 208 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 209         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 210         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 211         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 212         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 213         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 214
 215         // balancing
 216         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 217
 218         // A                                        B
 219         // update_fee                            ->
 220         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 221         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 222         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 223         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 224         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 225         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 226         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 227         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 228         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 229         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 230         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 231         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 232         //                                       <- RAA
 233         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 234
 235         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 236         {
 237                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 238                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 239         }
 240         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 241         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 242
 243         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 244         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 245         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 246                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 247                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 248                 },
 249                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 250         };
 251
 252         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 253
 254         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 255         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 256         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 257         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 258
 259         let payment_event = {
 260                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 261                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 262                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 263         };
 264         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 265         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 266
 267         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 268         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 269         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 270         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 271         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 272         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 273
 274         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 275         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 276         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 277         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 278         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 279
 280         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 281         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 282         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 283         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 284         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 285         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 286         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 287         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 288
 289         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 290         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 291         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 292         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 293         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 294         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 295         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 296         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 297
 298         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 299         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 300         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 301         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 302
 303         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 304         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 305         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 306
 307         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 308         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 309
 310         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 311         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 312         match events_2[0] {
 313                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 314                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 315         }
 316
 317         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 318         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 319 }
 320
 321 #[test]
 322 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 323         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 324         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 325         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 326         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 327         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 328         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 329         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 330
 331         // balancing
 332         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 333
 334         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 335         {
 336                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 337                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 338         }
 339         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 340         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 341
 342         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 343         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 344         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 345                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 346                         update_fee.as_ref()
 347                 },
 348                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 349         };
 350
 351         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 352
 353         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 354         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 355         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 356         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 357
 358         let payment_event = {
 359                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 360                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 361                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 362         };
 363         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 364         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 365
 366         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 367         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 368         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 369         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 370         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 371         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 372
 373         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 374         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 375
 376         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 377 }
 378
 379 #[test]
 380 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 381         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 382         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 383         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 384         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 385         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 386
 387         // A                                        B
 388         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 389         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 390         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 391         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 392         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 393         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 394         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 395         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 396         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 397         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 398         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 399         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 400         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 401         //                                          B should send no response here
 402         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 403         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 404         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 405
 406         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 407         let initial_feerate;
 408         {
 409                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 410                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 411                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 412         }
 413         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 414         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 415
 416         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 417         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 418         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 419                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 420                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 421                 },
 422                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 423         };
 424
 425         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 426         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 427         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 428         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 429         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 430
 431         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 432         // transaction:
 433         {
 434                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 435                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 436         }
 437         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 438         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 439         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 440
 441         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 442         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 443                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 444                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 445         };
 446
 447         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 448
 449         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 450         // Deliver (3)
 451         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 452
 453         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 454         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 455         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 456         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 457         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 458         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 459         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 460         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 461         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 462         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 463         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 464
 465         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 466         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 467         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 468         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 469         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 470
 471         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 472         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 473         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 474
 475         // Delever (4)
 476         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 477         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 478         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 479
 480         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 481         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 482         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 483
 484         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 485         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 486         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 487         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 488
 489         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 490         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 491         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 492 }
 493
 494 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 495         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 496         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 497         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 498         // Node objects.
 499
 500         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 501         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 502         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 503         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 504
 505         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 506                 let block = Block {
 507                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
 508                         txdata: vec![],
 509                 };
 510                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 511                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 512         }
 513
 514         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 515         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
 516         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 517
 518         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 519         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
 520         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 521
 522         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 523         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
 524
 525         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
 526
 527         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 528         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
 529         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 530         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 531
 532         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 533         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 534         {
 535                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 536                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 537                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 538                 added_monitors.clear();
 539         }
 540         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 541
 542         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 543         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 544         {
 545                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 546                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 547                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 548                 added_monitors.clear();
 549         }
 550
 551         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 552         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 553
 554         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 555         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 556
 557         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 558         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 559         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 560         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 561 }
 562
 563 #[test]
 564 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 565         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 566         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 567         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 568         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 569         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 570         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 571         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 572         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 573         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 574         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 575         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 576         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 577         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 578         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 579         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 580         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 581         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 582         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 583 }
 584
 585 #[test]
 586 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 587         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 588         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 589         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 590         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 591         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 592
 593         {
 594                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 595                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 596         }
 597         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 598         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 599
 600         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 601         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 602         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 603                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 604                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 605                 },
 606                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 607         };
 608         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 609
 610         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 611         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 612         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 613
 614         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 615         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 616         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 617
 618         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 619         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 620         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 621         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 622
 623         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 624         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 625         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 626 }
 627
 628 #[test]
 629 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 630         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 631         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 632         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 633         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 634         let channel_value = 5000;
 635         let push_sats = 700;
 636         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 637         let channel_id = chan.2;
 638         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 639         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 640         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
 641
 642         let opt_anchors = false;
 643
 644         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 645         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 646         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 647         // remote limit.
 648         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 649         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
 650         {
 651                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 652                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 653         }
 654         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 655         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 656         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 657
 658         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 659
 660         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 661
 662         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 663         {
 664                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 665
 666                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 667                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 668                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
 669                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 670                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 671                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 672         }
 673
 674         {
 675                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 676                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 677                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 678         }
 679         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 680         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 681         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 682
 683         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 684
 685         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 686         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 687         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 688                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 689                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 690                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 691                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 692                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 693                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 694         };
 695         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 696                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 697                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 698                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 699                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
 700                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 701                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 702                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 703         };
 704
 705         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 706         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 707                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
 708
 709         let res = {
 710                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
 711                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
 712                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 713                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 714                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 715                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 716                         push_sats,
 717                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
 718                         opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
 719                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 720                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 721                         &mut htlcs,
 722                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 723                 );
 724                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 725         };
 726
 727         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 728                 channel_id: chan.2,
 729                 signature: res.0,
 730                 htlc_signatures: res.1
 731         };
 732
 733         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 734                 channel_id: chan.2,
 735                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 736         };
 737
 738         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 739
 740         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 741         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 742         //Should produce and error.
 743         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 744         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
 745         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 746         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 747         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
 748 }
 749
 750 #[test]
 751 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 752         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 753         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 754         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 755         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 756         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 757
 758         // balancing
 759         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 760
 761         {
 762                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 763                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 764         }
 765         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 766         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 767
 768         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 769         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 770         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 771                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 772                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 773                 },
 774                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 775         };
 776         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 777         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 778         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 779         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 780
 781         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 782
 783         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 784         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
 785         {
 786                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 787                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 788                 added_monitors.clear();
 789         }
 790         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 791         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 792         // node[1] has nothing to do
 793
 794         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 795         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 796         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 797
 798         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 799         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 800         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 801         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 802         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 803         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 804         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 805
 806         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 807         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 808         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 809         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 810         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 811         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 812
 813         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 814         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 815         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 816         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 817
 818         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 819         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 820         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 821
 822         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 823         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 824         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 825         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 826
 827         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 828         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 829         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 830
 831         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 832
 833         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 834         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 835         match events[0] {
 836                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
 837                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 838         };
 839
 840         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 841
 842         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 843         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 844         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 845         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 846         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 847 }
 848
 849 #[test]
 850 fn test_update_fee() {
 851         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 852         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 853         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 854         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 855         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 856         let channel_id = chan.2;
 857
 858         // A                                        B
 859         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 860         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 861         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 862         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 863         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 864         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 865         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 866         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 867         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 868         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 869         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 870         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 871
 872         // Create and deliver (1)...
 873         let feerate;
 874         {
 875                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 876                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 877                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 878         }
 879         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 880         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 881
 882         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 883         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 884         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 885                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 886                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 887                 },
 888                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 889         };
 890         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 891
 892         // Generate (2) and (3):
 893         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 894         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 895         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 896
 897         // Deliver (2):
 898         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 899         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 900         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 901
 902         // Create and deliver (4)...
 903         {
 904                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 905                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 906         }
 907         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 908         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 909         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 910         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 911         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 912                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 913                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 914                 },
 915                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 916         };
 917
 918         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 919         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 920         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 921         // ... creating (5)
 922         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 923         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 924
 925         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 926         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 927         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 928         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 929         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 930
 931         // Deliver (5):
 932         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 933         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 934         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 935
 936         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 937         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 938         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 939         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 940         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 941         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 942         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 943         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 944         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 945
 946         // Deliver (7)
 947         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 948         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 949         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 950         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 951
 952         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 953         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 954         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 955
 956         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 957         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 958         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 959         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 960         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
 961 }
 962
 963 #[test]
 964 fn fake_network_test() {
 965         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 966         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 967         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 968         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 969         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 970         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 971
 972         // Create some initial channels
 973         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 974         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 975         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 976
 977         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
 978         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 979         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 980         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 981         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 982
 983         // Send some more payments
 984         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 985         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
 986         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
 987
 988         // Test failure packets
 989         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
 990         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
 991
 992         // Add a new channel that skips 3
 993         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
 994
 995         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 996         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
 997         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 998         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
 999         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1000         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1001         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1002
1003         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1004         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1005         hops.push(RouteHop {
1006                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1007                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1008                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1009                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1010                 fee_msat: 0,
1011                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1012         });
1013         hops.push(RouteHop {
1014                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1015                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1016                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1017                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1018                 fee_msat: 0,
1019                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1020         });
1021         hops.push(RouteHop {
1022                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1023                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1024                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1025                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1026                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1027                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1028         });
1029         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1030         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1031         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1032
1033         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1034         hops.push(RouteHop {
1035                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1036                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1037                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1038                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1039                 fee_msat: 0,
1040                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1041         });
1042         hops.push(RouteHop {
1043                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1044                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1045                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1046                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1047                 fee_msat: 0,
1048                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1049         });
1050         hops.push(RouteHop {
1051                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1052                 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1053                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1054                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1055                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1056                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1057         });
1058         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1059         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1060         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1061
1062         // Claim the rebalances...
1063         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1064         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1065
1066         // Close down the channels...
1067         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1068         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1069         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1070         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1071         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1072         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1073         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1074         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1075         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1076         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1077         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1078         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1079 }
1080
1081 #[test]
1082 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1083         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1084         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1085         // commitment dance rounds.
1086         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1087         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1088         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1089         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1090         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1091         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1092
1093         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1094         for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1095                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1096                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1097                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1098         }
1099         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1100
1101         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1102         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1103         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1104         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1105
1106         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1107         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1108         // another HTLC.
1109         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1110         {
1111                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1112                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1113                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1114                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1115         }
1116
1117         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1118         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1119         {
1120                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1121                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1122         }
1123
1124         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1125         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1126         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1127         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1128
1129         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1130         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1131         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1132         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1133         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1134         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1135         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1136
1137         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1138         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1139         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1140
1141         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1142
1143         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1144         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1145         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1146         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1147
1148         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1149         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1150         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1151         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1152
1153         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1154         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1155         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1156
1157         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1158                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1159         }
1160         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1161         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1162         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1163         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1164         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1165
1166         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1167         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1168         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1169         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1170         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1171
1172         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1173         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1174
1175         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1176
1177         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1178         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1179         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1180                 match event {
1181                         &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1182                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1183                         },
1184                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1185                 };
1186         }
1187
1188         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1189                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1190         }
1191
1192         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1193 }
1194
1195 #[test]
1196 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1197         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1198         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1199         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1200         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1201         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1202         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1203
1204         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1205         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1206         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1207         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1208         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1209         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1210
1211         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1212
1213         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1214         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1215
1216         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1217         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1218
1219         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1220         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1221         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1222 }
1223
1224 #[test]
1225 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1226         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1227         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1228         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1229         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1230         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1231         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1232         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1233
1234         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1235
1236         // balancing
1237         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1238
1239         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1240
1241         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1242         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1243         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1244
1245         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1246         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1247         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1248         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1249
1250         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1251         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1252
1253         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1254         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1255         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1256                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1257                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1258                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1259                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1260                 }
1261         }
1262         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1263
1264         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1265         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1266         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1267         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1268
1269         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1270         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1271
1272         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1273
1274         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Alternative commitment tx
1275         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC spend in alternative commitment tx
1276
1277         let bump_tx = if claim_txn[1] == claim_txn[4] {
1278                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1279                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1280
1281                 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC timeout on alternative commitment tx
1282
1283                 check_spends!(claim_txn[3], remote_txn[0]); // HTLC timeout on broadcasted commitment tx
1284                 &claim_txn[3]
1285         } else {
1286                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[3]);
1287                 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[4]);
1288
1289                 check_spends!(claim_txn[5], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC timeout on alternative commitment tx
1290
1291                 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], remote_txn[0]); // HTLC timeout on broadcasted commitment tx
1292
1293                 &claim_txn[7]
1294         };
1295
1296         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1297         assert_eq!(bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1298         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, bump_tx.input[0].previous_output);
1299
1300         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1301         assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1302         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1303
1304         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1305         assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1306         check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1307         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1308
1309         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1310         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1311         for e in events {
1312                 match e {
1313                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1314                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1315                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1316                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1317                         },
1318                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1319                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1320                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1321                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1322                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1323                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1324                         },
1325                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1326                 }
1327         }
1328 }
1329
1330 #[test]
1331 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1332         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1333         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1334         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1335         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1336         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1337
1338         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1339         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1340
1341         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1342         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2));
1343         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1344         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1345         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1346         match err {
1347                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1348                         match &fails[0] {
1349                                 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1350                                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1351                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1352                         }
1353                 },
1354                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1355         }
1356         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1357         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1358
1359         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1360 }
1361
1362 #[test]
1363 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1364         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1365         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1366         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1367         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1368         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1369
1370         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1371         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1372         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1373         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1374
1375         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1376
1377         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1378         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1379         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1380         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1381                 channel_id: chan.2,
1382                 htlc_id: 0,
1383                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1384                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1385                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1386                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1387         };
1388
1389         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1390
1391         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1392         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1393         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1394
1395         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1396
1397         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1398
1399         // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1400         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1401         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1402                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1403                 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1404                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1405                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1406                 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1407
1408                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1409                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1410                  chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1411                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1412                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1413         };
1414         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1415                 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1416                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1417                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1418                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1419                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1420                  chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1421                  chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1422         };
1423
1424         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1425         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1426                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1427
1428         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1429         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1430         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1431
1432         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1433                 offered: false,
1434                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1435                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1436                 payment_hash,
1437                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1438         };
1439
1440         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1441
1442         let res = {
1443                 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1444                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1445                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1446                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1447                         commitment_number,
1448                         95000,
1449                         local_chan_balance,
1450                         local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1451                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1452                         feerate_per_kw,
1453                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1454                         &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1455                 );
1456                 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1457         };
1458
1459         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1460                 channel_id: chan.2,
1461                 signature: res.0,
1462                 htlc_signatures: res.1
1463         };
1464
1465         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1466         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1467         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1468
1469         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1470         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1471                 channel_id: chan.2,
1472                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1473                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1474         };
1475         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1476
1477         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1478         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1479         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1480         match events[0] {
1481                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1482                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1483                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1484                 },
1485                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1486         };
1487         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1488                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1489
1490         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1491 }
1492
1493 #[test]
1494 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1495         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1496         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1497         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1498         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1499         // this situation.
1500         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1501         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1502         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1503         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1504         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1505         let opt_anchors = false;
1506
1507         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1508         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1509
1510         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1511
1512         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1513
1514         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1515         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1516                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1517         }
1518
1519         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1520         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1521         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1522                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1523         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1524         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1525 }
1526
1527 #[test]
1528 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1529         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1530         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1531         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1532         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1533         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1534         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1535         let opt_anchors = false;
1536
1537         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1538         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1539         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1540         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1541         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1542         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1543         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1544
1545         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1546         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1547                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1548         }
1549
1550         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1551         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1552         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1553         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1554         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1555         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1556         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1557         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1558         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1559                 channel_id: chan.2,
1560                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1561                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1562                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1563                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1564                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1565         };
1566
1567         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1568         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1569         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1570         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1571         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1572         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1573         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1574         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1575 }
1576
1577 #[test]
1578 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1579         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1580         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1581         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1582         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1583
1584         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1585         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1586         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1587         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1588         let opt_anchors = false;
1589
1590         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1591         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1592         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1593         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1594         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1595         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1596         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1597
1598         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1599                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1600         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1601         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1602         // commitment transaction fee.
1603         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1604
1605         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1606         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1607                 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1608         }
1609
1610         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1611         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1612         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1613                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1614 }
1615
1616 #[test]
1617 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1618         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1619         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1620         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1621         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1622         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1623         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1624         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1625         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1626         let opt_anchors = false;
1627
1628         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1629         // HTLC.
1630         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1631         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1632         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1633                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1634
1635         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1636         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1637         push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1638         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1639         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1640         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1641         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg);
1642
1643         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1644         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1645         match msg_events[0] {
1646                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1647                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1648                 },
1649                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1650         }
1651 }
1652
1653 #[test]
1654 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1655         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1656         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1657         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1658         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1659         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1660         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1661         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1662
1663         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1664         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1665         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1666         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1667         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1668         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1669
1670         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1671         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1672         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1673         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1674         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1675         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1676
1677         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1678         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1679         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1680         let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1681 }
1682
1683 #[test]
1684 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1685         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1686         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1687         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1688         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1689         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1690         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1691
1692         let feemsat = 239;
1693         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1694         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1695         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1696         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1697
1698         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1699         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1700         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1701         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1702
1703         // Add a pending HTLC.
1704         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1705         let payment_event_1 = {
1706                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1707                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1708
1709                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1710                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1711                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1712         };
1713         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1714
1715         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1716         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1717         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1718         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1719         let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1720
1721         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1722         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1723         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1724         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1725         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1726         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1727         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1728         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1729                 channel_id: chan.2,
1730                 htlc_id: 1,
1731                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1732                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1733                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1734                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1735         };
1736
1737         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1738         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1739         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1740         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1741         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1742         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1743         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1744         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1745 }
1746
1747 #[test]
1748 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1749         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1750         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1751         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1752         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1753         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1754         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1755         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1756         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1757         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1758         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1759
1760         let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1761         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1762         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1763
1764         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1765         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1766 }
1767
1768 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1769         (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1770 }
1771
1772 #[test]
1773 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1774         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1775         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1776         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1777         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1778         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1779         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1780         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1781         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1782         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1783         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1784
1785         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1786         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1787
1788         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1789         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1790
1791         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1792                 ($node: expr) => {{
1793                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1794                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1795                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1796                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1797                         payment_event
1798                 }}
1799         }
1800
1801         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1802         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1803         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1804         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1805
1806         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1807
1808         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1809         {
1810                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1811                         .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1812                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1813                 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1814                 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1815
1816                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1817                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1818                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1819                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1820         }
1821
1822         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1823         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1824         loop {
1825                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1826                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1827                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1828                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1829                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1830                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1831                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1832                         break;
1833                 }
1834
1835                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1836                         .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1837                 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
1838                 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1839                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1840
1841                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1842                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1843                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1844                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1845                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1846                 );
1847
1848                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1849                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1850                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1851                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1852                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1853         }
1854
1855         // adding pending output.
1856         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1857         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1858         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1859         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1860         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1861         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1862         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1863         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1864         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1865         // policy.
1866         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1867         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1868         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1869
1870         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1871         let payment_event_1 = {
1872                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1873                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1874
1875                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1876                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1877                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1878         };
1879         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1880
1881         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1882         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1883         {
1884                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1885                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1886                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1887                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1888         }
1889
1890         // split the rest to test holding cell
1891         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1892         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1893         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1894         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1895         {
1896                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1897                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1898         }
1899
1900         // now see if they go through on both sides
1901         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1902         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1903         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1904         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1905         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1906         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1907
1908         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1909         {
1910                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1911                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1912                         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1913                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1914                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1915         }
1916
1917         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1918         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1919         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1920         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1921         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1922         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1923
1924         // flush the pending htlc
1925         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1926         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1927         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1928
1929         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1930         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1931         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1932         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1933
1934         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1935         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1936         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1937         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1938
1939         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1940         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1941         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1942
1943         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1944
1945         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1946         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1947         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1948
1949         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1950         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1951
1952         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1953         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1954         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1955         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1956         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1957         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1958
1959         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1960         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1961         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1962         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1963
1964         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1965         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1966
1967         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1968         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1969         match events[0] {
1970                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
1971                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1972                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
1973                         match &purpose {
1974                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1975                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1976                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1977                                 },
1978                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1979                         }
1980                 },
1981                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1982         }
1983         match events[1] {
1984                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
1985                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1986                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
1987                         match &purpose {
1988                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1989                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1990                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1991                                 },
1992                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1993                         }
1994                 },
1995                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1996         }
1997
1998         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1999         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2000         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2001
2002         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
2003         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2004         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2005
2006         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
2007         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2008         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2009         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2010         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2011
2012         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2013         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2014 }
2015
2016 #[test]
2017 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2018         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2019         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2020         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2021         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2022         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2023         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2024         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2025         // To test this we:
2026         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2027         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2028         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2029         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2030         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2031         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2032         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
2033         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2034         //    claim,
2035         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2036         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2037         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2038         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2039         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2040         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2041         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2042         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2043         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2044         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2045
2046         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2047         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2048         let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2049         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2050         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2051
2052         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2053         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2054         let send_1 = {
2055                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
2056                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2057                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2058                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2059                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2060         };
2061
2062         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2063         // initial fulfill/CS.
2064         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2065         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2066         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2067         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2068
2069         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2070         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2071         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2072         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2073         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2074         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2075
2076         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2077         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2078         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2079         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2080         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2081
2082         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2083         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2084         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2085         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2086         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2087
2088         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2089         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2090         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2091
2092         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2093         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2094         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2095
2096         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2097         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2098         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2099
2100         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2101         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2102         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2103         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2104         // on-chain as necessary).
2105         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2106         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2107         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2108         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2109         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2110
2111         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2112         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2113         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2114
2115         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2116         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2117
2118         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2119         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2120         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2121         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2122         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2123         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2124
2125         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2126         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2127         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2128         let send_2 = {
2129                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2130                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2131                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2132                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2133                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2134         };
2135
2136         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2137         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2138         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2139         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2140
2141         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2142
2143         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2144         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2145         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2146
2147         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2148         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2149
2150         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2151         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2152         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2153         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2154
2155         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2156         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2157         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2158
2159         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2160         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2161
2162         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2163         expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2164
2165         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2166         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2167 }
2168
2169 #[test]
2170 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2171         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2172         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2173         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2174         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2175         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2176         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2177
2178         // Create some initial channels
2179         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2180         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2181         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2182         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2183
2184         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2185         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2186         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2187         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2188         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2189         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2190
2191         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2192         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2193         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2194         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2195         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2196
2197         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2198         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2199         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2200         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2201         {
2202                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2203                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2204                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2205                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2206                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2207         }
2208         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2209         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2210         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2211         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2212         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2213
2214         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2215         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2216
2217         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2218         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2219         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2220         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2221         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2222         {
2223                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2224                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2225                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2226                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2227                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2228                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2229         }
2230         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2231         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2232         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2233         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2234         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2235
2236         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2237                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2238                         {
2239                                 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2240                                 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2241                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2242
2243                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2244                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2245                                 match events[0] {
2246                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2247                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2248                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2249                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2250                                         },
2251                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2252                                 };
2253                         }
2254                 }
2255         }
2256
2257         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2258         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2259         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2260         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2261         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2262         let node2_commitment_txid;
2263         {
2264                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2265                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2266                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2267                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2268
2269                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2270                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2271                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2272                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2273                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2274         }
2275         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2276         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2277         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2278         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2279         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2280
2281         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2282         // confusing us in the following tests.
2283         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2284
2285         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2286         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2287         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2288         // buffer space).
2289
2290         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2291                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2292                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2293                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2294                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2295                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2296                                 msg.clone()
2297                         },
2298                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2299                 };
2300                 match events[1] {
2301                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2302                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2303                         },
2304                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2305                 }
2306                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2307
2308                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2309                 {
2310                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2311                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2312                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2313                                         false
2314                                 } else { true }
2315                         });
2316                 }
2317
2318                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2319
2320                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2321                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2322
2323                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2324                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2325                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2326                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2327                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2328                                 msg.clone()
2329                         },
2330                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2331                 };
2332                 match events[1] {
2333                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2334                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2335                         },
2336                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2337                 }
2338                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2339                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2340
2341                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2342                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2343                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2344         };
2345         nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2346         nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2347         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2348         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2349
2350         nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2351         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2352         check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2353 }
2354
2355 #[test]
2356 fn test_justice_tx() {
2357         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2358         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2359         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2360         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2361         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2362         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2363         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2364         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2365         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2366         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2367         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2368         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2369         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2370         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2371         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2372         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2373         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen;
2374         // Create some new channels:
2375         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2376
2377         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2378         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2379         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2380         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2381         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2382         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2383         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2384         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2385         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2386         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2387         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2388         // Revoke the old state
2389         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2390
2391         {
2392                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2393                 {
2394                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2395                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2396                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2397
2398                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2399                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2400                         node_txn.truncate(1);
2401                 }
2402                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2403                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2404                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2405
2406                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2407                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2408                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2409                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2410                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2411                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2412                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2413                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2414                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2415         }
2416         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2417
2418         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2419         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2420
2421         // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2422         // Create some new channels:
2423         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2424         {
2425                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2426                 node_txn.clear();
2427         }
2428
2429         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2430         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2431         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2432         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2433         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2434         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2435         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2436         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2437         // Revoke the old state
2438         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2439         {
2440                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2441                 {
2442                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2443                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2444                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2445
2446                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2447                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2448                 }
2449                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2450                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2451
2452                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2453                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2454                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2455                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2456                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2457                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2458                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2459         }
2460         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2461         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2462         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2463 }
2464
2465 #[test]
2466 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2467         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2468         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2469         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2470         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2471         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2472         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2473         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2474         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2475         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2476         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2477         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2478         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2479         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2480         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2481
2482         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2483         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2484         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2485         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2486         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2487         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2488
2489         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2490         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2491
2492         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2493         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2494         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2495         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2496         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2497 }
2498
2499 #[test]
2500 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2501         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2502         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2503         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2504         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2505         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2506         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2507
2508         // Create some new channel:
2509         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2510
2511         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2512         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2513         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2514         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2515         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2516
2517         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2518         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2519         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2520         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2521         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2522         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2523         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2524         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2525         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2526
2527         //Revoke the old state
2528         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2529
2530         {
2531                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2532                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2533                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2534                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2535                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2536                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2537                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2538                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2539
2540                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2541                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2542
2543                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2544                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2545
2546                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2547                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2548                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2549                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2550                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2551                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2552                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2553                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2554
2555                 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2556                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2557                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2558
2559                 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2560                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2561                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2562                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2563                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2564         }
2565         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2566         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2567         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2568 }
2569
2570 #[test]
2571 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2572         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2573         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2574         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2575         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2576         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2577         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2578
2579         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2580
2581         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2582         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2583         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2584         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2585         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2586         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2587
2588         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2589         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2590
2591         //Revoke the old state
2592         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2593
2594         {
2595                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2596                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2597                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2598                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2599                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2600                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2601                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2602                 match events.last().unwrap() {
2603                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2604                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2605                 }
2606
2607                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2608                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2609
2610                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2611                 assert!(node_txn.len() == 9 || node_txn.len() == 10);
2612
2613                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2614                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2615                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2616                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2617                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2618                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2619                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2620
2621                 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2622                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2623                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2624                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2625
2626                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2627                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2628                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2629
2630                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2631                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2632                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2633                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2634                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2635                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2636                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2637                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2638
2639                 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2640                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2641                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2642                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[3]);
2643                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[4]);
2644                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2645                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2646         }
2647         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2648         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2649         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2650 }
2651
2652 #[test]
2653 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2654         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2655         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2656         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2657         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2658         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2659         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2660         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2661         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2662         // towards B.
2663         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2664         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2665         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2666         // PaymentSent event).
2667
2668         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2669         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2670         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2671         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2672
2673         // Create some initial channels
2674         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2675         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2676
2677         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2678         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2679         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2680         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2681         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2682
2683         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2684         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2685         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2686
2687         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2688         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2689
2690         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2691         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2692         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2693         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2694         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2695         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2696         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2697         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2698         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2699         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2700         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2701         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2702         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2703         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2704         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2705
2706         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2707         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2708         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2709         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2710         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2711         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2712         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2713         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2714         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2715         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2716         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2717         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2718         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2719         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2720         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2721         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2722         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2723
2724         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2725         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2726         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2727         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2728         {
2729                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2730                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2731                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2732                 added_monitors.clear();
2733         }
2734         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2735         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2736         match forwarded_events[0] {
2737                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2738                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2739         }
2740         let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2741         match forwarded_events[1] {
2742                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2743                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2744                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2745                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2746                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2747                 },
2748                 _ => panic!()
2749         }
2750         match forwarded_events[2] {
2751                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2752                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2753                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2754                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2755                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2756                 },
2757                 _ => panic!()
2758         }
2759         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2760         {
2761                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2762                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2763                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2764                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2765                 added_monitors.clear();
2766         }
2767         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2768         match events[0] {
2769                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2770                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2771         }
2772         match events[1] {
2773                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2774                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2775         }
2776
2777         match events[2] {
2778                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2779                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2780                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2781                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2782                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2783                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2784                 },
2785                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2786         };
2787         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2788                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2789                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2790                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2791                         // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2792                         // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2793                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2794                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2795                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2796                         assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time.0, 0);
2797                         if $htlc_offered {
2798                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2799                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2800                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2801                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2802                         } else {
2803                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2804                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2805                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2806                                 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2807                         }
2808                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2809                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2810                         node_txn.clear();
2811                 } }
2812         }
2813         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2814         // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2815         // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2816         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2817
2818         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2819         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2820         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2821         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2822         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2823         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2824         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2825         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2826         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2827         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2828         let commitment_spend =
2829                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2830                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2831                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2832                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2833                         &node_txn[0]
2834                 } else {
2835                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2836                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2837                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2838                         &node_txn[2]
2839                 };
2840
2841         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2842         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2843         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2844         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2845         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, 0);
2846         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2847         check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2848         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2849         check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2850         check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2851         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2852         // we already checked the same situation with A.
2853
2854         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2855         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2856         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2857         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2858         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2859         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2860         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2861         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2862         let mut first_claimed = false;
2863         for event in events {
2864                 match event {
2865                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2866                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2867                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
2868                                         first_claimed = true;
2869                                 } else {
2870                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2871                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2872                                 }
2873                         },
2874                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2875                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2876                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2877                 }
2878         }
2879         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2880 }
2881
2882 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2883         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2884         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2885         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2886         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2887         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
2888         //            \                                  \
2889         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
2890
2891         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2892         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2893         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2894         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2895         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2896         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2897         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2898
2899         // Create some intial channels
2900         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2901         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2902
2903         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2904         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2905         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2906
2907         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2908
2909         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2910         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2911         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2912         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2913         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2914         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
2915         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2916
2917         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2918         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2919         match events[0] {
2920                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2921                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2922                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2923                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2924                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2925                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2926                 },
2927                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2928         };
2929         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2930         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2931         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2932         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2933         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2934         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2935         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2936         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2937
2938         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2939         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2940         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2941         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2942         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2943         let timeout_tx;
2944         {
2945                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2946                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2947                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2948                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2949
2950                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2951                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2952
2953                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2954                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2955                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2956                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2957
2958                 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2959                 node_txn.clear();
2960         }
2961
2962         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2963         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2964         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2965         {
2966                 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2967                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2968                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2969                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2970         }
2971
2972         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2973         {
2974                 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2975                 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2976                 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2977                 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2978                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2979                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2980                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2981                 } else {
2982                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2983                 }
2984         }
2985
2986         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
2987         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2988         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2989         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2990         match events[0] {
2991                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2992                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2993                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2994                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2995                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2996                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2997                 },
2998                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2999         };
3000
3001         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
3002         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3003         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
3004
3005         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
3006         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3007
3008         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3009         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3010         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3011         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
3012         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3013         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
3014         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
3015         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
3016         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3017 }
3018
3019 #[test]
3020 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3021         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3022         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3023         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3024 }
3025
3026 #[test]
3027 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3028         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3029         // and fail backward accordingly.
3030
3031         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3032         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3033         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3034         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3035
3036         // Create some initial channels
3037         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3038         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3039
3040         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3041         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3042         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3043         // Revoke the old state
3044         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3045
3046         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3047
3048         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3049         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3050         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3051         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3052         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3053
3054         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3055         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3056         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3057         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3058         match events[0] {
3059                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3060                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3061                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3062                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3063                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3064                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3065
3066                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3067                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3068                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3069                 },
3070                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3071         }
3072 }
3073
3074 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3075         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3076         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3077         // commitment transaction anymore.
3078         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3079         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3080         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3081         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3082         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3083         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3084         // transactions:
3085         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3086         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3087         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3088         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3089         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3090         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3091         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3092         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3093         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3094
3095         // Create some initial channels
3096         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3097         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3098
3099         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3100         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3101         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3102         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3103         // Revoke the old state
3104         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3105
3106         let value = if use_dust {
3107                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3108                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3109                 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3110         } else { 3000000 };
3111
3112         let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3113         let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3114         let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3115
3116         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3117         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3118         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3119         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3120         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3121         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3122         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3123         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3124         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3125         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3126         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3127         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3128
3129         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3130         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3131         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3132         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3133         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3134         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3135         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3136         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3137         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3138         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3139         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3140         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3141         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3142         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3143         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3144         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3145
3146         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3147         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3148         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3149         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3150         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3151         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3152         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3153         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3154         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3155         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3156         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3157         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3158         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3159         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3160         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3161         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3162         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3163         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3164
3165         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3166         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3167         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3168         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3169         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3170         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3171         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3172
3173         if deliver_bs_raa {
3174                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3175                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3176                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3177                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3178                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3179                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3180                 match events[0] {
3181                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3182                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3183                 };
3184                 match events[1] {
3185                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3186                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3187                 }
3188                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3189                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3190         }
3191
3192         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3193         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3194
3195         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3196         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3197         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3198         assert!(ANTI_REORG_DELAY > PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS); // We assume payments will also expire
3199
3200         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3201         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 + (nodes.len() - 1) } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
3202         match events[0] {
3203                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3204                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3205         }
3206         match events[1] {
3207                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3208                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3209                 },
3210                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3211         }
3212         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3213                 match events[2] {
3214                         Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3215                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3216                         },
3217                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3218                 }
3219                 match events[3] {
3220                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3221                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3222                 };
3223         }
3224         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3225         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3226
3227         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3228         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3229         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3230                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3231                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3232         }
3233         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3234                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3235                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3236                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3237                 },
3238                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3239         }
3240         if deliver_bs_raa {
3241                 match events[0] {
3242                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3243                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3244                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3245                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3246                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3247                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3248                         },
3249                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3250                 }
3251         }
3252         match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3253                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3254                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3255                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3256                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3257                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3258                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3259
3260                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3261                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3262                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3263
3264                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3265
3266                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3267                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3268                         match events[0] {
3269                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3270                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3271                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3272                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3273                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3274                                                 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3275                                         }
3276                                 },
3277                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3278                         }
3279                         match events[1] {
3280                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3281                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3282                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3283                                 },
3284                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3285                         }
3286                         match events[2] {
3287                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3288                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3289                                         assert!(network_update.is_some());
3290                                 },
3291                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3292                         }
3293                 },
3294                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3295         }
3296
3297         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3298         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3299         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3300 }
3301
3302 #[test]
3303 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3304         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3305         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3306         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3307         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3308 }
3309
3310 #[test]
3311 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3312         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3313         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3314         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3315         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3316 }
3317
3318 #[test]
3319 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3320         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3321         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3322         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3323         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3324         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3325
3326         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3327         {
3328                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3329                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3330                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3331
3332                 let payment_event = {
3333                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3334                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3335                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3336                 };
3337                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3338                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3339         }
3340
3341         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3342         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3343         {
3344                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3345                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3346
3347                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3348         }
3349
3350         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3351         {
3352                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3353
3354                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3355                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3356                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3357                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3358                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3359                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3360
3361                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3362                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3363                         channel_id: chan.2,
3364                         htlc_id: 0,
3365                         amount_msat: 0,
3366                         payment_hash,
3367                         cltv_expiry,
3368                         onion_routing_packet,
3369                 };
3370                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3371         }
3372         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3373         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3374         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3375         match events[0] {
3376                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3377                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3378                 },
3379                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3380         }
3381         match events[1] {
3382                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3383                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3384                 },
3385                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3386         }
3387         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3388         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3389 }
3390
3391 #[test]
3392 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3393         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3394         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3395         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3396         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3397         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3398         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3399         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3400
3401         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3402         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3403         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3404         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3405         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3406         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3407
3408         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3409         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3410         assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3411
3412         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3413         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3414         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3415         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3416         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3417
3418         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3419         // registering new transactions
3420         header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3421         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3422 }
3423
3424 #[test]
3425 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3426         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3427         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3428         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3429         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3430         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3431         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3432         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3433
3434         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3435
3436         let mut payment_event = {
3437                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3438                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3439
3440                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3441                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3442                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3443         };
3444
3445         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3446         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3447
3448         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3449
3450         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3451         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3452         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3453         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3454
3455         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3456         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3457         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3458         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3459         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3460
3461         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3462         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3463         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3464
3465         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3466         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3467         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3468         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3469         let tx = {
3470                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3471                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3472                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3473                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3474                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3475                 node_txn.remove(0)
3476         };
3477
3478         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3479
3480         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3481         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3482         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3483         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3484
3485         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3486         {
3487                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3488                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3489         }
3490         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3491         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3492         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3493         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3494         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3495         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3496         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3497
3498         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3499 }
3500
3501 #[test]
3502 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3503         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3504         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3505         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3506         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3507
3508         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3509         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3510         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3511         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3512         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3513
3514         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3515
3516         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3517         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3518         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3519         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3520         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3521         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3522
3523         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3524         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3525
3526         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3527         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3528 }
3529
3530 #[test]
3531 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3532         // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3533         // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3534         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3535         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3536         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3537         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3538
3539         // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3540         // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3541         let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3542         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3543         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
3544         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3545         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
3546
3547         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3548         assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3549
3550         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3551
3552         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3553         assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3554
3555         // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3556         // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3557         // broadcasted.
3558         {
3559                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3560         }
3561
3562         // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3563         // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3564         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3565         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3566
3567         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3568         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3569 }
3570
3571 #[test]
3572 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3573         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3574         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3575         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3576         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3577         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3578         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3579         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3580
3581         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3582         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3583         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3584
3585         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3586         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3587         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3588         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3589
3590         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3591         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3592         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3593
3594         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3595         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3596         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3597         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3598
3599         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3600         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3601
3602         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3603         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3604
3605         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3606         {
3607                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3608                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3609                 match events[0] {
3610                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3611                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3612                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3613                         },
3614                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3615                 }
3616                 match events[1] {
3617                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3618                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3619                                 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3620                         },
3621                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3622                 }
3623                 match events[2] {
3624                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3625                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3626                 }
3627         }
3628
3629         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3630         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3631 }
3632
3633 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3634         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3635         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3636         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3637         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3638         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3639
3640         let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3641         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3642                 let (channel_ready, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3643                 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3644                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3645                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3646                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3647         } else {
3648                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3649         }
3650
3651         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3652
3653         let payment_event = {
3654                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3655                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3656
3657                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3658                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3659                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3660         };
3661         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3662
3663         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3664                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3665         } else {
3666                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3667                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3668                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3669                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3670                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3671
3672                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3673                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3674                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3675                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3676
3677                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3678                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3679                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3680                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3681                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3682
3683                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3684                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3685                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3686                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3687                                         }
3688                                 }
3689                         }
3690                 }
3691         }
3692
3693         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3694         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3695         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3696                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3697                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3698                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3699                         //
3700                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3701                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3702                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3703                         //
3704                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3705                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3706                 }
3707                 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3708                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3709                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3710         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3711                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3712                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3713         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3714                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3715                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3716         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3717                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3718                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3719         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3720                 // Everything was delivered...
3721                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3722         }
3723
3724         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3725         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3726         match events_1[0] {
3727                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3728                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3729         };
3730
3731         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3732         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3733         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3734
3735         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3736
3737         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3738         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3739         match events_2[0] {
3740                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
3741                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3742                         assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3743                         match &purpose {
3744                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3745                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3746                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3747                                 },
3748                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3749                         }
3750                 },
3751                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3752         }
3753
3754         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3755         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3756         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3757
3758         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3759         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3760         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3761                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3762                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3763                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3764                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3765                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3766                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3767                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3768                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3769                 },
3770                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3771         };
3772
3773         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3774                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3775
3776                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3777                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3778                 match events_4[0] {
3779                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3780                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3781                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3782                         },
3783                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3784                 }
3785
3786                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3787                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3788                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3789                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3790
3791                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3792                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3793                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3794                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3795
3796                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3797                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3798                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3799                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3800                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3801
3802                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3803                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3804                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3805                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3806                                         }
3807                                 }
3808                         }
3809                 }
3810         }
3811
3812         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3813         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3814         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3815                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3816                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3817                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3818                 } else {
3819                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3820                 }
3821         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3822                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3823                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3824         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3825                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3826                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3827         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3828                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3829                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3830         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3831                 // Everything was delivered...
3832                 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3833         }
3834
3835         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3836                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3837         }
3838
3839         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3840         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3841         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3842
3843         if messages_delivered > 2 {
3844                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3845         }
3846
3847         // Channel should still work fine...
3848         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3849         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3850         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3851 }
3852
3853 #[test]
3854 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3855         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3856         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3857         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3858         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3859 }
3860
3861 #[test]
3862 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3863         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3864         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3865         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3866         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3867 }
3868
3869 #[test]
3870 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3871         // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3872         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3873         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3874         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3875         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3876         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3877         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3878         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3879         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3880
3881         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3882         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3883
3884         confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3885         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3886         assert!(events_1.is_empty());
3887
3888         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3889
3890         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3891         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3892
3893         confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3894         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3895         assert!(events_2.is_empty());
3896
3897         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
3898         let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3899         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
3900         let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3901
3902         // nodes[0] hasn't yet received a channel_ready, so it only sends that on reconnect.
3903         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
3904         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3905         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3906         let as_channel_ready = match events_3[0] {
3907                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3908                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3909                         msg.clone()
3910                 },
3911                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_3[0]),
3912         };
3913
3914         // nodes[1] received nodes[0]'s channel_ready on the first reconnect above, so it should send
3915         // announcement_signatures as well as channel_update.
3916         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
3917         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3918         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 3);
3919         let chan_id;
3920         let bs_channel_ready = match events_4[0] {
3921                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3922                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3923                         chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3924                         msg.clone()
3925                 },
3926                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[0]),
3927         };
3928         let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_4[1] {
3929                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3930                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3931                         msg.clone()
3932                 },
3933                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[1]),
3934         };
3935         match events_4[2] {
3936                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3937                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3938                 },
3939                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[2]),
3940         }
3941
3942         // Re-deliver nodes[0]'s channel_ready, which nodes[1] can safely ignore. It currently
3943         // generates a duplicative private channel_update
3944         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3945         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3946         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3947         match events_5[0] {
3948                 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3949                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3950                 },
3951                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_5[0]),
3952         };
3953
3954         // When we deliver nodes[1]'s channel_ready, however, nodes[0] will generate its
3955         // announcement_signatures.
3956         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_channel_ready);
3957         let events_6 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3958         assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
3959         let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
3960                 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3961                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3962                         msg.clone()
3963                 },
3964                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_6[0]),
3965         };
3966
3967         // When we deliver nodes[1]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[0], nodes[0] should immediately
3968         // broadcast the channel announcement globally, as well as re-send its (now-public)
3969         // channel_update.
3970         nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3971         let events_7 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3972         assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3973         let (chan_announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
3974                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3975                         (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3976                 },
3977                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_7[0]),
3978         };
3979
3980         // Finally, deliver nodes[0]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[1] and make sure it creates the
3981         // same channel_announcement.
3982         nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3983         let events_8 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3984         assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3985         let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
3986                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3987                         assert_eq!(*msg, chan_announcement);
3988                         update_msg.clone()
3989                 },
3990                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_8[0]),
3991         };
3992
3993         // Provide the channel announcement and public updates to the network graph
3994         nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap();
3995         nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3996         nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3997
3998         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3999         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
4000         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
4001
4002         // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
4003         // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
4004         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4005
4006         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4007         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4008         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4009
4010         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4011         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4012         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4013         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4014         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4015         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4016                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4017         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4018
4019         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4020         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4021                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4022                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4023                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4024                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4025                         keys_manager,
4026                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
4027                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4028                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4029                         logger: nodes[0].logger,
4030                         channel_monitors,
4031                 }).unwrap()
4032         };
4033         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4034         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4035
4036         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4037         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4038         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4039
4040         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4041
4042         // The channel announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
4043         nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
4044         let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4045         let mut found_announcement = false;
4046         for event in msgs.iter() {
4047                 match event {
4048                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
4049                                 if *msg == chan_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
4050                         },
4051                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
4052                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4053                 }
4054         }
4055         assert!(found_announcement);
4056 }
4057
4058 #[test]
4059 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
4060         // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
4061         // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
4062         // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
4063         // channel_ready immediately instead.
4064         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4065         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4066         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4067         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4068         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
4069
4070         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4071
4072         let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4073         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4074         let block_txn = [funding_tx];
4075         let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
4076         let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
4077         nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
4078
4079         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4080         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4081         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4082 }
4083
4084 #[test]
4085 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4086         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4087         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4088         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4089         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4090         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4091         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4092         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4093
4094         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
4095
4096         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4097         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4098         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
4099         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4100
4101         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4102         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4103         match events_1[0] {
4104                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4105                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4106         }
4107
4108         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4109         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
4110         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4111
4112         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4113         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4114         match events_2[0] {
4115                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4116                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4117                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4118                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4119                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4120                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4121                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4122
4123                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4124                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4125                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4126                         match events_3[0] {
4127                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4128                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4129                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4130                                 },
4131                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4132                         }
4133
4134                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4135                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4136                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4137                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4138                 },
4139                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4140         }
4141
4142         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4143         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4144
4145         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4146         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4147         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4148         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4149         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4150         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4151
4152         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4153         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4154         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4155         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4156
4157         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4158         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4159
4160         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4161         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4162
4163         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4164
4165         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4166         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4167         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4168         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4169         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4170         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4171         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4172         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4173         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4174         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4175
4176         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4177         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4178         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4179         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4180         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4181         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4182         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4183         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4184
4185         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4186         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4187         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4188         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4189         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4190         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4191         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4192         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4193
4194         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4195         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4196         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4197         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4198
4199         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4200         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4201         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4202         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4203
4204         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4205         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4206         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4207
4208         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4209
4210         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4211         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4212         match events_5[0] {
4213                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4214                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4215                         match &purpose {
4216                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4217                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4218                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4219                                 },
4220                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4221                         }
4222                 },
4223                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4224         }
4225
4226         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4227         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4228         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4229
4230         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4231         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4232 }
4233
4234 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4235         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4236         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4237         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4238         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4239         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4240         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4241
4242         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4243
4244         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4245                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4246                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4247                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4248                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4249                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4250                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4251                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4252                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4253                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4254                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4255                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4256                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4257                 our_payment_hash
4258         } else {
4259                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4260         };
4261
4262         let mut block = Block {
4263                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4264                 txdata: vec![],
4265         };
4266         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4267         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4268         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4269         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4270                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4271                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4272                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4273         }
4274
4275         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4276
4277         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4278         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4279         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4280         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4281         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4282         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4283
4284         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4285         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4286         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4287         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4288         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4289         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4290 }
4291
4292 #[test]
4293 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4294         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4295         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4296 }
4297
4298 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4299         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4300         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4301         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4302         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4303         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4304         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4305         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4306
4307         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4308         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4309         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4310         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4311
4312         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4313         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4314         {
4315                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4316         }
4317         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4318         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4319
4320         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4321         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4322         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4323         sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4324         if forwarded_htlc {
4325                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4326                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4327                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4328                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4329                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4330         }
4331         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4332
4333         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4334         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4335         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4336         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4337
4338         if forwarded_htlc {
4339                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4340                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4341                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4342                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4343                 match fail_commit[0] {
4344                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4345                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4346                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4347                         },
4348                         _ => unreachable!(),
4349                 }
4350                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4351         } else {
4352                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4353                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4354                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
4355                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4356                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4357                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
4358                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4359                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4360         }
4361 }
4362
4363 #[test]
4364 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4365         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4366         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4367 }
4368
4369 #[test]
4370 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4371         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4372         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4373         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4374         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4375         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4376         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4377         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4378         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4379         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4380
4381         let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4382
4383         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4384
4385         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4386         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4387         get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4388                 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4389
4390         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4391         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4392         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4393         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4394         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4395         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4396         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4397         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4398                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4399         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4400
4401         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4402         let config = UserConfig::default();
4403         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4404                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4405                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4406                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4407                         default_config: config,
4408                         keys_manager,
4409                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4410                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4411                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4412                         logger: &logger,
4413                         channel_monitors,
4414                 }).unwrap()
4415         };
4416         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4417         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4418
4419         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4420         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4421         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4422         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4423
4424         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4425         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4426         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4427         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4428
4429         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4430         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4431         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4432         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4433
4434         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4435         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
4436         for node in nodes.iter() {
4437                 assert!(node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4438                 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4439                 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4440         }
4441
4442         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4443 }
4444
4445 #[test]
4446 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4447         // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4448         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4449         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4450         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4451         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4452         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4453         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4454         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4455         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4456         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4457
4458         // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4459         let channel_value = 100000;
4460         let push_msat = 10001;
4461         let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4462         let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4463         let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4464         let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4465         node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4466         node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4467         node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4468
4469         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, 42);
4470
4471         node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
4472         check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4473
4474         node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4475         {
4476                 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4477                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4478                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4479                 added_monitors.clear();
4480         }
4481
4482         let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4483         node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4484         {
4485                 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4486                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4487                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4488                 added_monitors.clear();
4489         }
4490         // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4491
4492         nodes.push(node_a);
4493         nodes.push(node_b);
4494
4495         // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4496         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4497         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4498         get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4499
4500         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4501         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4502         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4503         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4504         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4505         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4506         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4507         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4508                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4509         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4510
4511         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4512         let config = UserConfig::default();
4513         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4514                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4515                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4516                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4517                         default_config: config,
4518                         keys_manager,
4519                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4520                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4521                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4522                         logger: &logger,
4523                         channel_monitors,
4524                 }).unwrap()
4525         };
4526         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4527         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4528
4529         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4530
4531         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4532         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4533
4534         // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4535         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4536         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4537         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4538         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4539
4540         // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4541         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4542         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4543
4544         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4545         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4546         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4547         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4548
4549         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4550         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4551         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4552         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4553
4554         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4555         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
4556         for node in nodes.iter() {
4557                 assert!(node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4558                 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4559                 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4560         }
4561
4562         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4563 }
4564
4565 #[test]
4566 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4567         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4568         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4569         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4570         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4571         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4572         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4573         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4574         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4575         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4576         let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4577
4578         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4579         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4580
4581         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4582
4583         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4584         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4585         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4586
4587         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4588         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4589         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4590         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4591         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4592         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4593         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4594         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4595                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4596         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4597
4598         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4599         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4600                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4601                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4602                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4603                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4604                         keys_manager,
4605                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4606                         chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4607                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4608                         logger: &logger,
4609                         channel_monitors,
4610                 }).unwrap()
4611         };
4612         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4613         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4614
4615         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4616         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4617         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4618
4619         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4620
4621         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4622         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4623 }
4624
4625 #[test]
4626 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4627         // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4628         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4629         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4630         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4631         let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4632         let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4633         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4634         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4635         let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4636         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4637         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4638         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4639         let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4640
4641         let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4642         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4643                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4644                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4645                 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4646         }
4647
4648         let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4649
4650         // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4651         let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4652
4653         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4654         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4655         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4656         nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4657
4658         // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4659         // nodes[3])
4660         let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4661         for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4662                 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4663                 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4664                 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4665         }
4666
4667         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4668         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4669         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4670         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4671         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4672         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4673
4674
4675         let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4676         for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4677                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4678                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4679                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4680                 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4681         }
4682
4683         let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4684         for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4685                 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4686                 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4687                 assert!(read.is_empty());
4688                 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4689         }
4690
4691         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4692         if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4693                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4694                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4695                 keys_manager,
4696                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4697                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4698                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4699                 logger: &logger,
4700                 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4701         }) { } else {
4702                 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4703         };
4704
4705         let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4706         let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4707                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4708                 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4709                 keys_manager,
4710                 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4711                 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4712                 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4713                 logger: &logger,
4714                 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4715         }).unwrap();
4716         nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4717         assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4718
4719         { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4720                 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4721                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4722                 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4723                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4724         }
4725
4726         for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4727                 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4728                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4729         }
4730         nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4731         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4732
4733         // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4734         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4735         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4736         //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4737         claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4738
4739         nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4740         let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4741         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4742         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4743         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4744         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4745         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4746                 match action {
4747                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4748                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4749                         },
4750                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4751                 }
4752         }
4753 }
4754
4755 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4756         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4757                 {
4758                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4759                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4760                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4761                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4762                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4763                                 match event {
4764                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4765                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4766                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4767                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4768                                                 }
4769                                         },
4770                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4771                                 };
4772                         }
4773                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4774                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4775                                         txn.push(tx);
4776                                 }
4777                         }
4778                         txn
4779                 }
4780         }
4781 }
4782
4783 #[test]
4784 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4785         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4786         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4787         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4788         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4789         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4790
4791         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4792         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4793         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4794         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4795         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4796         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4797         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4798         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4799         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4800
4801         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4802         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4803
4804         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4805         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4806         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4807         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4808         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4809 }
4810
4811 #[test]
4812 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4813         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4814         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4815         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4816         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4817         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4818         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4819
4820         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4821         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4822         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4823         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4824         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4825
4826         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4827         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4828         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4829         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4830
4831         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4832         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4833         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4834         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4835         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4836
4837         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4838         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4839         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4840 }
4841
4842 #[test]
4843 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4844         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4845         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4846
4847         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4848         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4849         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4850         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4851
4852         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4853         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4854         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4855         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4856         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4857
4858         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4859         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4860         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4861         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4862         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4863
4864         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4865         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4866         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4867
4868         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4869         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4870         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4871         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4872         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4873 }
4874
4875 #[test]
4876 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4877         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4878         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4879         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4880         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4881
4882         // Create some initial channels
4883         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4884
4885         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4886
4887         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4888         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4889         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4890
4891         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4892         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4893         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4894         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4895         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4896         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4897         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4898         match events[0] {
4899                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4900                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4901         }
4902         match events[1] {
4903                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4904                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4905         }
4906
4907         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4908         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4909         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4910         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4911         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4912         check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4913         check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4914
4915         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4916         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4917         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4918
4919         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4920         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4921         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4922 }
4923
4924 #[test]
4925 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4926         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4927         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4928         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4929         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4930
4931         // Create some initial channels
4932         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4933
4934         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4935         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4936
4937         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4938
4939         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4940         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4941         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4942
4943         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4944         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4945         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4946         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4947         match events[0] {
4948                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4949                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4950         }
4951         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4952
4953         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4954         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4955         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4956         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4957         check_spends!(node_txn[1],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4958         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4959
4960         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4961         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4962         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4963         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4964
4965         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4966         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4967         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4968         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4969         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4970 }
4971
4972 #[test]
4973 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4974         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4975         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4976         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4977         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4978
4979         // Create some initial channels
4980         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4981
4982         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4983         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4984         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4985         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4986
4987         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4988
4989         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4990         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4991         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4992         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4993
4994         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4995         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4996         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4997         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4998
4999         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
5000         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5001
5002         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5003         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5004         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
5005 }
5006
5007 #[test]
5008 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5009         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5010         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
5011         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5012         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5013         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5014
5015         // Create some initial channels
5016         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5017
5018         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5019         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5020         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5021         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5022
5023         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5024
5025         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
5026         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5027         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5028         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5029         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5030         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5031
5032         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
5033         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5034         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5035         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5036         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5037         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5038         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
5039
5040         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5041         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5042         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
5043         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5044         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5045         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5046
5047         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5048         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5049         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5050         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5051         // transactions next...
5052         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
5053         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5054
5055         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
5056         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5057         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
5058                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5059         } else {
5060                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
5061                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5062         }
5063
5064         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5065         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5066
5067         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
5068         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5069
5070         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5071         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5072         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5073         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5074         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
5075 }
5076
5077 #[test]
5078 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
5079         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5080         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
5081         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5082         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5083         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5084
5085         // Create some initial channels
5086         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5087
5088         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5089         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5090         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5091         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5092
5093         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
5094         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
5095
5096         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5097
5098         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
5099         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5100         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5101         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5102         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5103         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5104
5105         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5106         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5107         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5108         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5109
5110         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
5111         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
5112         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
5113
5114         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5115         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5116         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
5117         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5118         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5119         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5120
5121         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5122         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5123
5124         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5125         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5126         // transactions next...
5127         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
5128         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5129         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
5130                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5131         } else {
5132                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
5133                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5134         }
5135
5136         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5137         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5138
5139         check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5140
5141         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
5142         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5143
5144         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
5145         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
5146
5147         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5148         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5149         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5150         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5151         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
5152         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5153         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
5154         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
5155 }
5156
5157 #[test]
5158 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
5159         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
5160         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
5161         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
5162         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
5163         // channel.
5164         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
5165         // gets broadcast.
5166
5167         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5168         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5169         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5170         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5171
5172         // Create some initial channels
5173         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5174         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5175
5176         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5177         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5178         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5179         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5180         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5181
5182         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5183         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5184         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5185
5186         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
5187         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5188         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5189         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5190         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
5191         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5192         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5193         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5194         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5195         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5196         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5197
5198         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5199         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5200         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5201         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5202
5203         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5204         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5205         assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5206         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5207         check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5208         check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5209         assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5210         assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5211         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5212         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
5213
5214         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5215         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5216         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5217         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5218         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5219         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5220         match events[0] {
5221                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5222                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5223         }
5224         match events[1] {
5225                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
5226                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5227                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
5228                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5229                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
5230                 },
5231                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5232         }
5233         {
5234                 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5235                 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5236                 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5237                 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5238                 b_txn.clear();
5239         }
5240         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5241         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5242         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5243         match msg_events[0] {
5244                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5245                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5246         }
5247         match msg_events[1] {
5248                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5249                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5250         }
5251         match msg_events[2] {
5252                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5253                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5254                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5255                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5256                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5257                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5258                 },
5259                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5260         };
5261         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5262         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5263         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5264         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5265         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5266         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5267         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5268         check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5269         check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5270         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5271         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5272         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5273         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
5274
5275         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5276         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5277 }
5278
5279 #[test]
5280 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5281         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5282         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5283         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5284         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5285         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5286         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5287         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5288         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5289         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5290         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5291         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5292                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5293         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5294
5295         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5296         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5297         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5298
5299         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5300         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5301         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5302         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5303         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5304
5305         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
5306
5307         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5308         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5309         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5310         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5311         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
5312                 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
5313         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5314         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5315
5316         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5317         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5318         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5319
5320         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5321         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5322         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5323         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5324         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5325
5326         let htlc_timeout_tx;
5327         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5328                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5329                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5330                 assert!(node_txn.len() == 4 || node_txn.len() == 3);
5331                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5332
5333                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5334                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5335
5336                 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
5337                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5338                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5339                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5340
5341                         check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5342                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5343                 } else {
5344                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5345                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5346                 }
5347
5348                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5349                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5350                 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
5351                         assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5352                 }
5353                 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5354         }
5355
5356         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5357         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
5358
5359         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5360         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5361         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5362         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5363         match events[0] {
5364                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5365                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5366         }
5367         match events[1] {
5368                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5369                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5370         }
5371         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5372         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5373         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5374         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5375         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5376         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5377         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5378         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5379         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5380         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5381         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5382         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5383         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5384
5385         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5386         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5387         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
5388         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5389         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5390         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5391         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5392         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5393         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5394         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5395
5396         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5397         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5398         {
5399                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5400         }
5401         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5402
5403         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5404         // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5405         // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5406         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5407         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196*2), true, true);
5408         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5409         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5410         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5411         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5412         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5413         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5414         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5415
5416         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5417         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5418
5419         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5420         match events[0] {
5421                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5422                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5423                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5424                 }
5425                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5426         }
5427 }
5428
5429 #[test]
5430 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5431         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5432         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5433         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5434         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5435
5436         // Create some initial channels
5437         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5438
5439         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
5440         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5441         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5442         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5443         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5444
5445         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5446         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5447         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
5448         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5449
5450         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5451         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5452         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5453         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5454         match events[0] {
5455                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5456                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5457         }
5458         match events[1] {
5459                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5460                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5461         }
5462         let node_tx = {
5463                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5464                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5465                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5466                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5467                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5468                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5469                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5470                 node_txn[0].clone()
5471         };
5472
5473         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5474         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5475
5476         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5477         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5478         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5479         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5480         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5481         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5482 }
5483
5484 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5485         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5486         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5487         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5488         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5489         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5490         // use the same payment hashes.
5491         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5492         //
5493         // A \         / E
5494         //    - C - D -
5495         // B /         \ F
5496         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5497         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5498         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5499         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5500         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5501         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5502         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5503         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5504                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5505         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5506
5507         let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5508         let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5509         let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5510         let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5511         let chan_3_5  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5512
5513         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5514         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5515         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5516         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5517
5518         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5519         // 0th HTLC:
5520         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5521         // 1st HTLC:
5522         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5523         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5524         // 2nd HTLC:
5525         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5526         // 3rd HTLC:
5527         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5528         // 4th HTLC:
5529         let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5530         // 5th HTLC:
5531         let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5532         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5533         // 6th HTLC:
5534         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5535         // 7th HTLC:
5536         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5537
5538         // 8th HTLC:
5539         let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5540         // 9th HTLC:
5541         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5542         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5543
5544         // 10th HTLC:
5545         let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5546         // 11th HTLC:
5547         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5548         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5549
5550         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5551         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5552         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5553         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
5554         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5555
5556         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5557         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5558         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5559         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5560         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5561         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5562         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5563
5564         let failed_destinations = vec![
5565                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
5566                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
5567                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
5568                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
5569         ];
5570         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
5571         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5572
5573         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5574         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5575         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5576         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5577         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5578         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5579
5580         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5581         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5582         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5583         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5584
5585         let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5586                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5587                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5588         ];
5589         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5590         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5591
5592         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5593         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5594         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5595         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5596
5597         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5598
5599         // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5600         let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5601                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5602                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5603                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5604                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5605                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5606                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5607         ];
5608         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5609         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5610         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5611         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5612         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5613         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5614         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5615         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5616         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5617         if deliver_last_raa {
5618                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5619         } else {
5620                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5621         }
5622
5623         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5624         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5625         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5626         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5627         //
5628         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5629         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5630         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5631         //
5632         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5633         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5634         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5635
5636         if announce_latest {
5637                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5638         } else {
5639                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5640         }
5641         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5642         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5643                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5644                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5645         } else {
5646                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5647                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5648         };
5649         match close_event {
5650                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5651                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5652         }
5653
5654         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5655         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5656         if deliver_last_raa {
5657                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5658
5659                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5660                 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5661         } else {
5662                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5663                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5664                 } else {
5665                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5666                 };
5667
5668                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5669         }
5670         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5671
5672         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5673         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5674         let mut a_done = false;
5675         for msg in cs_msgs {
5676                 match msg {
5677                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5678                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5679                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5680                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5681                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5682                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5683                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5684                                         }
5685                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5686                                         assert!(!a_done);
5687                                         a_done = true;
5688                                         &nodes[0]
5689                                 } else {
5690                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5691                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5692                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5693                                         }
5694                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5695                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5696                                         &nodes[1]
5697                                 };
5698                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5699                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5700                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5701                                 if announce_latest {
5702                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5703                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5704                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5705                                         }
5706                                 }
5707                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5708                         },
5709                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5710                 }
5711         }
5712
5713         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5714         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5715         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5716         let mut as_updates = 0;
5717         for event in as_events.iter() {
5718                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5719                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5720                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5721                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5722                         } else {
5723                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5724                         }
5725                         if network_update.is_some() {
5726                                 as_updates += 1;
5727                         }
5728                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5729         }
5730         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5731         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5732         if announce_latest {
5733                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5734                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5735         }
5736         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5737
5738         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5739         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5740         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5741         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5742         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5743                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5744                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5745                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5746                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5747                         } else {
5748                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5749                         }
5750                         if network_update.is_some() {
5751                                 bs_updates += 1;
5752                         }
5753                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5754         }
5755         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5756         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5757         if announce_latest {
5758                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5759         }
5760         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5761
5762         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5763         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5764         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5765         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5766         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5767         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5768 }
5769
5770 #[test]
5771 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5772         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5773 }
5774
5775 #[test]
5776 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5777         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5778 }
5779
5780 #[test]
5781 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5782         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5783         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5784         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5785 }
5786
5787 #[test]
5788 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5789         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5790         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5791         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5792         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5793
5794         // Create some initial channels
5795         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5796
5797         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5798         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5799         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5800         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5801
5802         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5803         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5804         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5805         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5806         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5807         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5808
5809         let htlc_timeout = {
5810                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5811                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5812                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5813                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5814                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5815                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5816                 node_txn[1].clone()
5817         };
5818
5819         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5820         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5821         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5822
5823         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5824         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5825         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5826         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5827         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5828         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5829         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5830         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5831         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5832         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5833                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5834 }
5835
5836 #[test]
5837 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5838         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5839         // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5840         // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5841
5842         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5843
5844         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5845         let seed = [42; 32];
5846         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5847         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5848         let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source.genesis_hash, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger);
5849         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5850         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5851         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5852         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5853
5854         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5855         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5856
5857         // Create some initial channels
5858         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5859         // for node 0
5860         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5861         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5862         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5863
5864         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5865         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5866         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5867         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5868         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5869
5870         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5871         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5872         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5873         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5874         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5875
5876         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5877         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5878         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5879         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5880             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5881             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5882             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5883                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5884         }
5885
5886         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5887         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5888         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5889         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5890         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5891         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5892
5893         let htlc_timeout = {
5894                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5895                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5896                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5897                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5898                 node_txn[1].clone()
5899         };
5900
5901         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5902         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5903         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5904
5905         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5906         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5907         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5908         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5909         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5910         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5911         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5912         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5913         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5914         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5915         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5916                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5917 }
5918
5919 #[test]
5920 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5921         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5922         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5923         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5924         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5925
5926         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5927
5928         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5929         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5930
5931         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5932         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5933         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5934
5935         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5936         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5937         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5938
5939         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5940         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5941         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5942
5943         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5944         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5945         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5946 }
5947
5948 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5949         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5950         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5951         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5952         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5953         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5954
5955         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5956
5957         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5958         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5959         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5960         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5961         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5962
5963         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5964         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5965         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5966
5967         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5968         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5969         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5970         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5971         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5972
5973         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5974         let mut block = Block {
5975                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5976                 txdata: vec![],
5977         };
5978         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5979                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5980                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5981         }
5982         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5983         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5984         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5985         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5986 }
5987
5988 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5989         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5990         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5991         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5992         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5993         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5994
5995         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5996         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5997         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5998
5999         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6000
6001         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
6002         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
6003         // to "time out" the HTLC.
6004
6005         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
6006         let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
6007
6008         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
6009                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
6010                 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
6011         }
6012         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
6013         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6014         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6015         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6016 }
6017
6018 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
6019         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6020         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6021         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6022         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6023         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6024
6025         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
6026         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
6027         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
6028         // actually revoked.
6029         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
6030         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
6031         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
6032         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
6033         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6034
6035         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6036         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6037         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
6038         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6039         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6040         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
6041         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6042         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
6043         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6044         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6045
6046         if check_revoke_no_close {
6047                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
6048                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6049         }
6050
6051         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
6052         let mut block = Block {
6053                 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6054                 txdata: vec![],
6055         };
6056         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
6057                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
6058                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
6059         }
6060         if !check_revoke_no_close {
6061                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
6062                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6063                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6064                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6065         } else {
6066                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6067                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6068                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
6069                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6070                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
6071                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
6072                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6073                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
6074         }
6075 }
6076
6077 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
6078 // There are only a few cases to test here:
6079 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
6080 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
6081 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
6082 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
6083 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
6084 // non-dust HTLCs.
6085 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
6086 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
6087 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
6088 #[test]
6089 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
6090         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
6091         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
6092
6093         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
6094         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
6095 }
6096
6097 #[test]
6098 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
6099         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
6100         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
6101         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
6102         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
6103 }
6104
6105 #[test]
6106 #[should_panic]
6107 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
6108         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6109         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6110         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6111         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6112         // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
6113         for node in nodes.iter() {
6114                 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
6115         }
6116
6117         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
6118         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6119         let push_msat=10001;
6120         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6121         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6122         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6123         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6124
6125         // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
6126         // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
6127         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6128 }
6129
6130 #[test]
6131 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
6132         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6133         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6134         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6135         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6136
6137         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
6138         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
6139         let push_msat=10001;
6140         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6141
6142         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
6143         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6144         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
6145         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
6146         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6147
6148         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
6149         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6150         let push_msat=10001;
6151         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
6152         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6153         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
6154
6155         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
6156         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
6157         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
6158
6159         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
6160         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
6161         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6162
6163         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
6164         let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
6165         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
6166
6167         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
6168         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
6169         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6170         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6171         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
6172         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6173 }
6174
6175 #[test]
6176 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
6177         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6178         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6179         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6180         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6181
6182         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
6183         let push_msat=10001;
6184         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6185         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6186         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
6187         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
6188
6189         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6190         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6191         let err_msg = match events[0] {
6192                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
6193                         msg.clone()
6194                 },
6195                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6196         };
6197         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
6198 }
6199
6200 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
6201 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
6202 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
6203 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
6204 #[test]
6205 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
6206         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6207         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6208         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6209         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6210         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6211
6212         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6213         // pending_update_fee.
6214         {
6215                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6216                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6217         }
6218         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6219         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6220
6221         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6222         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6223         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6224                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6225                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6226                 },
6227                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6228         };
6229
6230         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6231
6232         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6233         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6234         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6235         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6236
6237         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6238         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6239         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6240
6241         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6242         let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6243         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6244         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6245
6246         // Flush the pending fee update.
6247         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6248         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6249         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6250         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6251         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6252
6253         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6254         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6255         // us to surface its failure to the user.
6256         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6257         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6258         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6259         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6260                 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6261         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6262
6263         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6264         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6265         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6266         match &events[0] {
6267                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
6268                         assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6269                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6270                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
6271                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6272                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6273                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
6274                 },
6275                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6276         }
6277 }
6278
6279 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6280 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6281 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6282 #[test]
6283 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6284         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6285         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6286         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6287         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6288         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6289
6290         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6291         // pending_update_fee.
6292         {
6293                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6294                 *feerate_lock += 200;
6295         }
6296         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6297         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6298
6299         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6300         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6301         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6302                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6303                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6304                 },
6305                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6306         };
6307
6308         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6309
6310         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6311         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6312         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6313         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6314
6315         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6316         let amt_1 = 20000;
6317         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
6318         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6319         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6320
6321         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6322         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6323         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6324         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6325         let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6326         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6327         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6328
6329         // Flush the pending fee update.
6330         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6331         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6332         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6333         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6334         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6335         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6336
6337         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6338         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6339         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6340         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6341         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6342         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6343         let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6344                 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6345         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6346
6347         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6348         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6349         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6350         match &events[0] {
6351                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
6352                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6353                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6354                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
6355                         assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6356                         assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6357                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
6358                 },
6359                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6360         }
6361
6362         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6363         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6364                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6365                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6366                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6367         };
6368         let raa = match send_raa_event {
6369                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6370                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6371         };
6372         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6373         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6374         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6375         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6376         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6377         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6378         match events[0] {
6379                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6380                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6381         }
6382         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6383         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6384         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6385         match events[0] {
6386                 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6387                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6388         }
6389         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6390         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6391         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
6392
6393         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6394         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6395         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6396         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6397 }
6398
6399 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6400 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6401 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6402 // once it's freed.
6403 #[test]
6404 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6405         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6406         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6407         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6408         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6409         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6410         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6411         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6412         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6413         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6414         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6415
6416         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6417         // pending_update_fee.
6418         {
6419                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6420                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6421         }
6422         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6423         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6424
6425         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6426         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6427         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6428                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6429                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6430                 },
6431                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6432         };
6433
6434         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6435
6436         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6437         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6438         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6439         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6440
6441         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6442         let feemsat = 239;
6443         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6444         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6445         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6446         let payment_event = {
6447                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6448                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6449
6450                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6451                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6452
6453                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6454         };
6455         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6456         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6457         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6458         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6459
6460         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6461         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6462
6463         // Flush the pending fee update.
6464         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6465         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6466         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6467         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6468         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6469         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6470
6471         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6472         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6473         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6474
6475         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6476                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6477                         msg.clone()
6478                 },
6479                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6480         };
6481
6482         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6483         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6484         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6485
6486         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6487         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6488         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
6489         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6490                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6491                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6492         }
6493
6494         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6495         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6496         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6497
6498         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6499         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6500         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6501         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6502                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6503                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6504                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6505                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6506                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6507                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6508                 },
6509                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6510         };
6511
6512         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6513         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6514         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6515
6516         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6517         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6518         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6519         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6520         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6521         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6522         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6523         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6524         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6525                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6526                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6527         };
6528         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6529         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6530         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6531 }
6532
6533 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6534 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6535 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6536
6537 #[test]
6538 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6539         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6540         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6541         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6542         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6543         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6544         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6545
6546         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6547         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6548
6549         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6550                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6551         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6552         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6553 }
6554
6555 #[test]
6556 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6557         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6558         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6559         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6560         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6561         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6562         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6563
6564         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6565         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6566         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6567                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6568
6569         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6570         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6571 }
6572
6573 #[test]
6574 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6575         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6576         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6577         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6578         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6579         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6580         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6581
6582         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6583         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6584         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6585         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6586         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6587
6588         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6589         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6590         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6591         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6592         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6593 }
6594
6595 #[test]
6596 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6597         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6598         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6599         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6600         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6601         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6602         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6603         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6604
6605         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
6606                 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
6607         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6608         route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6609         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6610                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6611 }
6612
6613 #[test]
6614 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6615         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6616         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6617         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6618         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6619         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6620         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6621         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6622         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6623         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6624
6625         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6626                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6627                 let payment_event = {
6628                         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6629                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6630
6631                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6632                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6633                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6634                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6635                         } else {
6636                                 assert!(false);
6637                         }
6638                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6639                 };
6640                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6641                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6642                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6643
6644                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6645                 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6646         }
6647         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6648         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6649                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6650
6651         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6652         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6653 }
6654
6655 #[test]
6656 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6657         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6658         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6659         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6660         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6661         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6662         let channel_value = 100000;
6663         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6664         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6665
6666         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6667
6668         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6669         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6670         // limits us to.
6671         route.paths[0][0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6672         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6673                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6674
6675         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6676         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6677
6678         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6679 }
6680
6681 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6682 #[test]
6683 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6684         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6685         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6686         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6687         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6688         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6689         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6690         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6691         {
6692                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6693                 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6694                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6695         }
6696
6697         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6698         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6699         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6700         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6701         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6702         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6703         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6704         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6705         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6706         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6707         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6708 }
6709
6710 #[test]
6711 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6712         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6713         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6714         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6715         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6716         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6717         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6718
6719         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6720         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6721         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6722         let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6723         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6724         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6725
6726         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6727         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6728         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6729         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6730         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6731
6732         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6733         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6734         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6735         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6736         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6737
6738         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6739         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6740         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6741         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6742         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6743 }
6744
6745 #[test]
6746 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6747         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6748         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6749         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6750         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6751         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6752         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6753         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6754
6755         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6756         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6757         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6758         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6759         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6760         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6761
6762         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6763                 channel_id: chan.2,
6764                 htlc_id: 0,
6765                 amount_msat: 1000,
6766                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6767                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6768                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6769         };
6770
6771         for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6772                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6773                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6774         }
6775         msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6776         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6777
6778         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6779         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6780         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6781         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6782         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6783 }
6784
6785 #[test]
6786 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6787         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6788         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6789         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6790         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6791         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6792         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6793
6794         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6795         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6796         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6797         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6798         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6799         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6800
6801         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6802         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6803         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6804         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6805         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6806 }
6807
6808 #[test]
6809 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6810         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6811         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6812         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6813         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6814         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6815
6816         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6817         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6818         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6819         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6820         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6821         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6822         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6823
6824         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6825         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6826         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6827         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6828         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6829 }
6830
6831 #[test]
6832 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6833         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6834         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6835         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6836         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6837         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6838         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6839         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6840
6841         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6842         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6843         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6844         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6845         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6846         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6847
6848         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6849         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6850         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6851         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
6852         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6853         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6854         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
6855         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6856         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6857         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6858         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6859         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6860         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6861
6862         //Resend HTLC
6863         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6864         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6865         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6866         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6867         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6868
6869         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6870
6871         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6872         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6873         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6874         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6875         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6876 }
6877
6878 #[test]
6879 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6880         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6881
6882         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6883         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6884         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6885         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6886         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6887         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6888         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6889
6890         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6891         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6892         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6893
6894         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6895                 channel_id: chan.2,
6896                 htlc_id: 0,
6897                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6898         };
6899
6900         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6901
6902         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6903         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6904         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6905         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6906         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6907 }
6908
6909 #[test]
6910 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6911         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6912
6913         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6914         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6915         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6916         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6917         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6918
6919         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6920         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6921         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6922         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6923         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6924
6925         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6926                 channel_id: chan.2,
6927                 htlc_id: 0,
6928                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6929         };
6930
6931         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6932
6933         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6934         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6935         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6936         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6937         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6938 }
6939
6940 #[test]
6941 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6942         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6943
6944         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6945         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6946         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6947         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6948         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6949
6950         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6951         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6952         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6953         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6954         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6955         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6956                 channel_id: chan.2,
6957                 htlc_id: 0,
6958                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6959                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6960         };
6961
6962         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6963
6964         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6965         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6966         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6967         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6968         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6969 }
6970
6971 #[test]
6972 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6973         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6974
6975         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6976         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6977         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6978         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6979         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6980
6981         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6982
6983         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6984         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6985         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6986
6987         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6988         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6989         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6990                 match events[0] {
6991                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6992                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6993                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6994                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6995                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6996                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6997                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6998                         },
6999                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7000                 }
7001         };
7002
7003         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
7004
7005         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
7006
7007         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7008         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7009         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
7010         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7011         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7012 }
7013
7014 #[test]
7015 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
7016         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
7017
7018         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7019         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7020         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7021         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7022         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7023
7024         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
7025
7026         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
7027         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7028         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
7029
7030         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7031         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7032         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
7033                 match events[0] {
7034                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7035                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7036                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7037                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7038                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7039                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7040                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
7041                         },
7042                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7043                 }
7044         };
7045
7046         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
7047
7048         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
7049
7050         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7051         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7052         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
7053         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7054         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7055 }
7056
7057 #[test]
7058 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
7059         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
7060
7061         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7062         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7063         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7064         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7065         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7066
7067         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
7068         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7069         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7070
7071         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7072         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7073
7074         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7075         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7076         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
7077
7078         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7079
7080         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
7081                 match events[0] {
7082                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7083                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7084                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7085                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7086                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7087                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7088                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
7089                         },
7090                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7091                 }
7092         };
7093         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
7094         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
7095
7096         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7097         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7098         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
7099         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7100         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7101 }
7102
7103 #[test]
7104 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
7105         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
7106         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
7107
7108         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7109         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7110         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7111         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7112         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7113         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7114
7115         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
7116
7117         //First hop
7118         let mut payment_event = {
7119                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7120                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7121                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7122                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7123                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
7124         };
7125         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7126         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7127         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7128         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7129         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7130         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7131         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7132         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
7133         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
7134
7135         //Second Hop
7136         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7137         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7138         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
7139         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7140
7141         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7142         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7143         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
7144                 match events_3[0] {
7145                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7146                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7147                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7148                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7149                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7150                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7151                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7152                         },
7153                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7154                 }
7155         };
7156
7157         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
7158
7159         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7160         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
7161         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
7162         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7163         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7164
7165         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
7166         match events_4[0] {
7167                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7168                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7169                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7170                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7171                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7172                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7173                 },
7174                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7175         };
7176
7177         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7178 }
7179
7180 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7181         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7182         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7183         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7184
7185         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7186         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7187         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7188         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7189         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7190         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7191
7192         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7193
7194         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7195         let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7196         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7197         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7198
7199         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7200         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7201
7202         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7203         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
7204         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7205         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7206         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7207
7208         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7209         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7210         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7211         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7212
7213         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7214         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7215
7216         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7217         match events[0] {
7218                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7219                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7220                 },
7221                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7222         }
7223         match events[1] {
7224                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7225                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7226                 },
7227                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7228         }
7229
7230         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7231         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7232         if announce_latest {
7233                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7234         } else {
7235                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7236         }
7237
7238         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7239         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7240         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7241
7242         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7243         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7244         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7245         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7246         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7247         let mut first_failed = false;
7248         for event in events {
7249                 match event {
7250                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7251                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7252                                         assert!(!first_failed);
7253                                         first_failed = true;
7254                                 } else {
7255                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7256                                 }
7257                         }
7258                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7259                 }
7260         }
7261 }
7262
7263 #[test]
7264 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7265         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7266         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7267 }
7268
7269 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7270         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7271         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7272         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7273         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7274         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7275         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7276
7277         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7278         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7279         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7280         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7281         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7282
7283         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7284
7285         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7286         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7287
7288         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7289         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7290
7291         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7292         if revoked {
7293                 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7294                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7295         }
7296
7297         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7298         if local {
7299                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7300                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7301                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7302                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7303                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7304
7305                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7306                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7307                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7308                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7309                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7310                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7311                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7312                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7313                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7314                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7315                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7316         } else {
7317                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7318                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7319                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7320                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7321                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7322                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7323
7324                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7325                 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
7326                         .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
7327                 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7328                 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
7329                 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
7330                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7331
7332                 if !revoked {
7333                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7334                 } else {
7335                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 0);
7336                 }
7337                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
7338                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7339                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7340                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7341                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7342         }
7343 }
7344
7345 #[test]
7346 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7347         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7348         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7349         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7350 }
7351
7352 #[test]
7353 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7354         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7355
7356         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7357         low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7358         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7359         high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7360         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7361         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7362         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7363         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7364         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7365
7366         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7367         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7368                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7369                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
7370         {
7371                 match error {
7372                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7373                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7374                 }
7375         } else { assert!(false) }
7376
7377         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7378         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7379         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7380         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7381         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7382                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0,
7383                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7384         {
7385                 match error {
7386                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
7387                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7388                 }
7389         } else { assert!(false); }
7390
7391         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7392         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7393         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7394         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7395         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7396         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7397         let reason_msg;
7398         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7399                 match action {
7400                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7401                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7402                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7403                         },
7404                         _ => { panic!(); }
7405                 }
7406         } else { panic!(); }
7407         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7408
7409         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7410         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7411         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7412         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7413         if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7414                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0,
7415                 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7416         {
7417                 match error {
7418                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7419                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7420                 }
7421         } else { assert!(false); }
7422 }
7423
7424 fn do_test_data_loss_protect(reconnect_panicing: bool) {
7425         // When we get a data_loss_protect proving we're behind, we immediately panic as the
7426         // chain::Watch API requirements have been violated (e.g. the user restored from a backup). The
7427         // panic message informs the user they should force-close without broadcasting, which is tested
7428         // if `reconnect_panicing` is not set.
7429         let persister;
7430         let logger;
7431         let fee_estimator;
7432         let tx_broadcaster;
7433         let chain_source;
7434         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7435         // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7436         // during signing due to revoked tx
7437         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7438         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7439         let monitor;
7440         let node_state_0;
7441         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7442         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7443         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7444
7445         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7446
7447         // Cache node A state before any channel update
7448         let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7449         let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7450         get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7451
7452         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7453         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7454
7455         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7456         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7457
7458         // Restore node A from previous state
7459         logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7460         let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7461         chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7462         tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster { txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())) };
7463         fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7464         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7465         monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7466         node_state_0 = {
7467                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7468                 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7469                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7470                         keys_manager: keys_manager,
7471                         fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7472                         chain_monitor: &monitor,
7473                         logger: &logger,
7474                         tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7475                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7476                         channel_monitors,
7477                 }).unwrap().1
7478         };
7479         nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7480         assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7481         nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7482         nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7483
7484         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7485
7486         if reconnect_panicing {
7487                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7488                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7489
7490                 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7491
7492                 // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7493                 // Check that we sent the warning message when we detected that A has fallen behind,
7494                 // and give the possibility for A to recover from the warning.
7495                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7496                 let warn_msg = "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned();
7497                 assert!(check_warn_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), chan.2).contains(&warn_msg));
7498
7499                 {
7500                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7501                         // The node B should not broadcast the transaction to force close the channel!
7502                         assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
7503                 }
7504
7505                 let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7506                 // Check A panics upon seeing proof it has fallen behind.
7507                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7508                 return; // By this point we should have panic'ed!
7509         }
7510
7511         nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7512         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7513         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7514         {
7515                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7516                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7517         }
7518
7519         for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7520                 if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7521                 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7522                         match action {
7523                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7524                                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel force-closed");
7525                                 },
7526                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7527                         }
7528                 } else {
7529                         panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", msg)
7530                 }
7531         }
7532
7533         // after the warning message sent by B, we should not able to
7534         // use the channel, or reconnect with success to the channel.
7535         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7536         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7537         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7538         let retry_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7539
7540         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &retry_reestablish[0]);
7541         let mut err_msgs_0 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7542         for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7543                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7544                         match action {
7545                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7546                                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Failed to find corresponding channel");
7547                                         err_msgs_0.push(msg.clone());
7548                                 },
7549                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7550                         }
7551                 } else {
7552                         panic!("Unexpected event!");
7553                 }
7554         }
7555         assert_eq!(err_msgs_0.len(), 1);
7556         nodes[1].node.handle_error(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &err_msgs_0[0]);
7557         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7558         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7559         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned() });
7560         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
7561 }
7562
7563 #[test]
7564 #[should_panic]
7565 fn test_data_loss_protect_showing_stale_state_panics() {
7566         do_test_data_loss_protect(true);
7567 }
7568
7569 #[test]
7570 fn test_force_close_without_broadcast() {
7571         do_test_data_loss_protect(false);
7572 }
7573
7574 #[test]
7575 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7576         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7577         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7578         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7579
7580         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7581         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7582         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7583         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7584
7585         // Create some initial channels
7586         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7587
7588         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7589         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7590         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7591         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7592         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7593         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7594         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7595         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7596
7597         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7598         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7599         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7600         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7601         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7602
7603         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7604         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7605         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7606         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7607
7608         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7609         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7610         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7611
7612         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7613         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7614         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7615                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7616                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7617                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7618                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7619                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7620                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7621                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7622                 },
7623                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7624         };
7625         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7626
7627         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7628         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7629
7630         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7631         let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7632         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7633         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7634 }
7635
7636 #[test]
7637 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7638         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7639         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7640
7641         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7642         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7643         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7644         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7645
7646         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7647         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7648         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7649
7650         // Disconnect peers
7651         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7652         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7653
7654         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7655         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7656         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7657         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7658         let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7659         for e in msg_events {
7660                 match e {
7661                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7662                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7663                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7664                                 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7665                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7666                                 }
7667                         },
7668                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7669                 }
7670         }
7671         // Reconnect peers
7672         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7673         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7674         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7675         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7676         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7677         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7678
7679         // Reestablish chan_1
7680         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7681         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7682         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7683         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7684         // Reestablish chan_2
7685         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7686         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7687         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7688         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7689         // Reestablish chan_3
7690         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7691         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7692         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7693         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7694
7695         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7696         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7697         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7698         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7699         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7700         for e in msg_events {
7701                 match e {
7702                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7703                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7704                                 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7705                                         // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7706                                         // the old one.
7707                                         Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7708                                         None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7709                                 }
7710                         },
7711                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7712                 }
7713         }
7714         // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7715         assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7716 }
7717
7718 #[test]
7719 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7720         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7721         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7722
7723         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7724         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7725         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7726         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7727
7728         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7729
7730         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7731         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7732                 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7733         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7734         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7735
7736         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7737         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7738         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7739         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7740         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7741         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7742
7743         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7744         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7745                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7746                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7747                 }
7748         }
7749
7750         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7751         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7752
7753         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7754         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7755         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7756         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7757         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7758
7759         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7760         let penalty_1;
7761         let feerate_1;
7762         {
7763                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7764                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7765                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7766                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7767                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7768                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7769                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7770                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7771                 node_txn.clear();
7772         };
7773
7774         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7775         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7776         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7777         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7778         {
7779                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7780                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7781                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7782                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7783                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7784                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7785                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7786                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7787                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7788                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7789                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7790                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7791                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7792                         node_txn.clear();
7793                 }
7794         }
7795         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7796
7797         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7798         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7799         let penalty_3;
7800         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7801         {
7802                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7803                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7804                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7805                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7806                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7807                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7808                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7809                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7810                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7811                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7812                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7813                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7814                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7815                         node_txn.clear();
7816                 }
7817         }
7818         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7819
7820         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7821         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7822 }
7823
7824 #[test]
7825 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7826         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7827         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7828
7829         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7830         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7831         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7832         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7833         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7834
7835         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7836         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7837         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7838         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7839         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7840         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7841                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7842         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7843         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7844         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7845                 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7846         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7847
7848         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7849         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7850         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7851
7852         // Revoke local commitment tx
7853         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7854
7855         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7856         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7857         connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7858         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7859         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7860         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7861         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7862
7863         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
7864         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7865         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7866
7867         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7868         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7869         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7870
7871         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7872         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7873         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7874         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7875
7876         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7877         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7878         let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7879         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7880         let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7881         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7882         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7883         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7884         match events.last().unwrap() {
7885                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7886                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7887         }
7888         let first;
7889         let feerate_1;
7890         let penalty_txn;
7891         {
7892                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7893                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7894                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7895
7896                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7897                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7898                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7899                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7900                 // future).
7901                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7902                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7903                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7904                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7905                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7906                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7907
7908                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7909                 // available, which we check here:
7910                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7911                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7912                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7913
7914                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7915                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7916
7917                 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7918                 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7919                 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7920                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7921
7922                 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7923                 // output, checked above).
7924                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7925                 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7926                 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7927
7928                 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7929                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7930                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7931                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].weight() as u64;
7932                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7933                 node_txn.clear();
7934         }
7935
7936         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7937         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7938         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7939         let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7940         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7941         {
7942                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7943                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7944
7945                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7946                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7947                 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7948                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output  {
7949                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7950                 } else {
7951                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7952                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7953                 }
7954
7955                 node_txn.clear();
7956         };
7957
7958         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7959         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7960         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7961         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7962         let node_txn = {
7963                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7964                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7965
7966                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7967                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7968                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7969                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7970                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7971                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7972                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7973                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7974                 node_txn.clear();
7975                 txn
7976         };
7977         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7978         let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7979         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7980         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7981         {
7982                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7983                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7984                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7985                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7986                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7987                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7988                 // up bumped justice generation.
7989                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7990                 node_txn.clear();
7991         }
7992         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7993         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7994 }
7995
7996 #[test]
7997 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7998         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7999         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
8000
8001         // Create 2 HTLCs
8002         // Provide preimage for one
8003         // Check aggregation
8004
8005         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8006         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8007         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8008         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8009
8010         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8011         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
8012         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
8013
8014         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
8015         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
8016         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
8017         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8018         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8019
8020         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
8021         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8022         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8023         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
8024         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8025         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
8026
8027         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
8028         let timeout;
8029         let preimage;
8030         let preimage_bump;
8031         let feerate_timeout;
8032         let feerate_preimage;
8033         {
8034                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8035                 // 9 transactions including:
8036                 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
8037                 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
8038                 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
8039                 // 1 * HTLC-Timeout
8040                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
8041                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8042                 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
8043                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8044                 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
8045
8046                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
8047                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
8048
8049                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output {
8050                         preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
8051                         check_spends!(node_txn[3], remote_txn[0]);
8052
8053                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
8054                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
8055                 } else {
8056                         preimage_bump = node_txn[7].clone();
8057                         check_spends!(node_txn[7], remote_txn[0]);
8058                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[7].input[0].previous_output);
8059
8060                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[3]);
8061                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[4]);
8062                 }
8063
8064                 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
8065                 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8066                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
8067                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].weight() as u64;
8068
8069                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
8070                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8071                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8072                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8073
8074                 node_txn.clear();
8075         };
8076         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
8077         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
8078
8079         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
8080         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
8081         {
8082                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8083                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8084                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8085                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
8086                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8087                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
8088
8089                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
8090                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
8091                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
8092                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
8093                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
8094
8095                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8096                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8097                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8098                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
8099                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
8100
8101                 node_txn.clear();
8102         }
8103
8104         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8105         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8106 }
8107
8108 #[test]
8109 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
8110         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
8111         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
8112         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
8113         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
8114         // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
8115         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
8116         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
8117         // implement that).
8118         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8119         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8120         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8121         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8122         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
8123
8124         let per_commitment_secret;
8125         let next_per_commitment_point;
8126         {
8127                 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8128                 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
8129
8130                 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
8131
8132                 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
8133                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8134                 per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
8135
8136                 // Must revoke without gaps
8137                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8138                 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
8139
8140                 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8141                 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
8142                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
8143         }
8144
8145         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
8146                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
8147         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
8148         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8149         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
8150 }
8151
8152 #[test]
8153 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
8154         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
8155         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
8156
8157         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8158         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8159         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8160         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8161
8162         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8163         // Lock HTLC in both directions
8164         let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
8165         let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
8166
8167         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
8168         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8169         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8170
8171         // Revoke local commitment tx
8172         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
8173
8174         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
8175         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
8176         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
8177         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8178
8179         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
8180         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8181         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8182         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8183         let penalty_txn = {
8184                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8185                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
8186                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8187                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8188                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8189                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8190                 node_txn.clear();
8191                 penalty_txn
8192         };
8193         let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8194         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8195         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8196         {
8197                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8198                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8199                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8200         }
8201 }
8202
8203 #[test]
8204 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
8205         // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
8206         // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
8207         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8208         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8209         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8210         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8211         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8212
8213         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000);
8214         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8215         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_010_000);
8216         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8217         let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8218
8219         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8220         expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
8221         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
8222         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8223         let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8224
8225         // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
8226         // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
8227         // can get our balance.
8228
8229         // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
8230         // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
8231         // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
8232         let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
8233         route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
8234         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8235         let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8236         nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
8237
8238         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
8239 }
8240
8241 #[test]
8242 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8243         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8244         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8245         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8246         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8247         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8248         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8249
8250         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8251
8252         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8253         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8254         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8255         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8256         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8257
8258         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8259         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8260         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8261         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8262
8263         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8264         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8265         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8266         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8267         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8268         match close_ev[0] {
8269                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8270                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8271                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8272                 },
8273                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8274         }
8275 }
8276
8277 #[test]
8278 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8279         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8280         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8281         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8282         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8283
8284         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8285         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8286         override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8287
8288         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8289
8290         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8291         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8292         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8293         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8294 }
8295
8296 #[test]
8297 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8298         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8299         zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8300         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8301         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8302         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8303         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8304
8305         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8306         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8307         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8308
8309         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8310         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8311         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8312 }
8313
8314 #[test]
8315 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
8316         // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
8317         // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
8318         // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
8319         // 90% of the `channel_value`.
8320         // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
8321
8322         let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
8323         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8324         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
8325         let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
8326         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8327         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
8328         let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
8329         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8330         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
8331         let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
8332         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8333         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
8334
8335         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8336         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8337         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
8338         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8339
8340         let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
8341         let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8342         let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
8343         let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
8344         let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
8345
8346         let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8347         let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8348
8349         // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8350         // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8351         assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
8352         // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8353         // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8354         assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
8355
8356         // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8357         // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
8358         // `channel_value`.
8359         assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
8360         // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8361         // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
8362         // `channel_value`.
8363         assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
8364 }
8365
8366 #[test]
8367 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
8368         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8369         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8370         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8371         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8372         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8373         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8374
8375         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8376         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8377
8378         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8379
8380         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8381         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8382         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8383
8384         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8385         match events[0] {
8386                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8387                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
8388                 }
8389                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8390         }
8391
8392         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8393         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8394
8395         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8396                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8397                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8398                 }
8399                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8400         }
8401
8402         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8403
8404         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8405         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8406
8407         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8408         match events[0] {
8409                 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
8410                         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
8411                 }
8412                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8413         }
8414 }
8415
8416 #[test]
8417 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
8418         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8419         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8420         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8421         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8422         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8423         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8424
8425         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8426         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8427
8428         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8429
8430         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8431         // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8432         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8433
8434         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8435         match events[0] {
8436                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8437                         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8438                 }
8439                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8440         }
8441
8442         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8443         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8444
8445         match close_msg_ev[0] {
8446                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8447                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8448                 }
8449                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8450         }
8451         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8452 }
8453
8454 #[test]
8455 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
8456         // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
8457         // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
8458         // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
8459         // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
8460         // and the channel should be closed.
8461         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8462         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8463         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8464         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8465         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8466         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8467
8468         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8469         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8470         let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
8471
8472         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8473
8474         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
8475         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8476
8477         // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
8478         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8479
8480         // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
8481         // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
8482         // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
8483         // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
8484         // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
8485         let accept_chan_msg = {
8486                 let mut lock;
8487                 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], lock, temp_channel_id);
8488                 channel.get_accept_channel_message()
8489         };
8490         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8491
8492         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8493
8494         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8495         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8496
8497         // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
8498         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8499
8500         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8501         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8502
8503         let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
8504         match close_msg_ev[0] {
8505                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
8506                         assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
8507                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8508                         assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
8509                 }
8510                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8511         }
8512
8513         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8514 }
8515
8516 #[test]
8517 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8518         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8519         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8520         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8521         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8522         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8523         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8524
8525         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8526         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8527
8528         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8529
8530         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8531         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8532         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8533
8534         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8535         match events[0] {
8536                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8537                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
8538                         let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8539                         match api_res {
8540                                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8541                                         assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
8542                                 },
8543                                 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8544                                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8545                         }
8546                 }
8547                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8548         }
8549
8550         // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8551         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8552         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8553
8554         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8555                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8556                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8557                 }
8558                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8559         }
8560 }
8561
8562 #[test]
8563 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8564         let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8565         let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8566         let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8567         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8568
8569         let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
8570         let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8571         match api_res {
8572                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8573                         assert_eq!(err, "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist");
8574                 },
8575                 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8576                 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8577         }
8578 }
8579
8580 #[test]
8581 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8582         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8583         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8584         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8585         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8586         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8587
8588         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8589         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8590         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8591         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8592
8593         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8594         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8595         route.paths.push(path);
8596         route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8597         route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8598         route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8599         route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8600         route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8601         route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8602         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8603         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8604 }
8605
8606 #[test]
8607 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8608         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8609         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8610         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8611         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8612         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8613
8614         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8615
8616         {
8617                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
8618                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8619                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8620                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8621                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8622                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8623                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8624                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8625         }
8626         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8627         // values from previous calls.
8628         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8629         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8630         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8631         match events[0] {
8632                 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8633                         match &purpose {
8634                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8635                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8636                                 },
8637                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8638                         }
8639                 },
8640                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8641         }
8642 }
8643
8644 #[test]
8645 #[allow(deprecated)]
8646 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8647         // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8648         // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8649         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8650         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8651         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8652         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8653
8654         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8655
8656         let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8657
8658         // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8659         // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8660         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8661                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8662         } else { panic!(); }
8663         let mut block = {
8664                 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8665                 Block {
8666                         header: BlockHeader {
8667                                 version: 0x2000000,
8668                                 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8669                                 merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(),
8670                                 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8671                         txdata: vec![],
8672                 }
8673         };
8674         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8675         if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8676                 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8677         } else { panic!(); }
8678
8679         // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8680         // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8681         block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8682         block.header.time += 1;
8683         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8684         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8685         assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8686
8687         {
8688                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8689                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8690                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8691                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8692                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8693                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8694                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8695         }
8696         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8697         // values from previous calls.
8698         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8699         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8700         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8701         match events[0] {
8702                 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8703                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8704                         assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8705                         // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8706                 },
8707                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8708         }
8709 }
8710
8711 #[test]
8712 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8713         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8714         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8715         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8716         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8717         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8718
8719         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8720
8721         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8722         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8723         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8724         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8725
8726         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8727         // resulting events.
8728         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8729                 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8730                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8731                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8732                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8733                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8734                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8735
8736                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8737                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8738                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8739                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8740                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8741
8742                         // We should fail the payment back
8743                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8744                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8745                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8746                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8747                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8748                                 },
8749                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8750                         }
8751                 }
8752         }
8753
8754         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8755         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8756         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8757
8758         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8759         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8760         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8761         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8762
8763         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8764         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8765         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8766         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8767
8768         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8769         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8770         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8771         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8772 }
8773
8774 #[test]
8775 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8776         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8777         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8778         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8779         //
8780         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8781         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8782         // commitment at same time.
8783
8784         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8785         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8786         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8787         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8788
8789         // Create some initial channel
8790         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8791         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8792
8793         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8794         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8795
8796         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8797         let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8798
8799         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8800         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8801         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8802         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8803         let watchtower = {
8804                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8805                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8806                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8807                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8808                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8809                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8810                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8811                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8812                 watchtower
8813         };
8814         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8815         let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8816         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8817         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8818         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 0));
8819         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8820
8821         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8822         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8823         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8824         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8825
8826         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8827         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8828         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8829         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8830                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8831                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8832                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8833                 } else { assert!(false); }
8834         } else { assert!(false); };
8835         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8836         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8837         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8838         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8839 }
8840
8841 #[test]
8842 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8843         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8844         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8845         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8846         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8847
8848         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8849         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8850         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8851         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8852
8853         // Create some initial channel
8854         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8855         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8856
8857         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8858         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8859
8860         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8861         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8862
8863         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8864         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8865         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8866         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8867         let watchtower_alice = {
8868                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8869                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8870                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8871                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8872                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8873                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8874                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8875                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8876                 watchtower
8877         };
8878         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8879         let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8880         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8881         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8882         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (block.clone(), 0));
8883         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8884
8885         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8886         {
8887                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8888                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8889                 txn.clear();
8890         }
8891
8892         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8893         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8894         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8895         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8896         let watchtower_bob = {
8897                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8898                 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8899                 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8900                 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8901                                 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8902                 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8903                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8904                 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8905                 watchtower
8906         };
8907         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8908         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8909
8910         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8911         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8912         {
8913                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8914         }
8915         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8916
8917         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8918         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8919         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8920         if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8921                 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8922                         // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8923                         if let Err(_) =  watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8924                         if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8925                         if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8926                 } else { assert!(false); }
8927         } else { assert!(false); };
8928         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8929         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8930
8931         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8932         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8933         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8934
8935         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8936         let bob_state_y;
8937         {
8938                 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8939                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8940                 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8941                 txn.clear();
8942         };
8943
8944         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8945         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8946         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8947         {
8948                 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8949                 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8950                 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8951                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8952                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8953                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8954         }
8955 }
8956
8957 #[test]
8958 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8959         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8960         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8961         // message).
8962         //
8963         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8964         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8965         //
8966         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8967         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8968         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8969         // before receiving funding_signed.
8970         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8971         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8972         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8973         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8974
8975         // Create an initial channel
8976         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8977         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8978         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8979         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8980         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8981
8982         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8983         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8984
8985         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8986         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8987
8988         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8989         let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8990         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8991         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8992         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8993 }
8994
8995 #[test]
8996 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8997         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8998         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8999         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
9000         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
9001         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
9002         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
9003
9004         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9005         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9006         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9007         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9008
9009         // Create some initial channels
9010         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9011
9012         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
9013         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
9014         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
9015         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9016         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
9017         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
9018
9019         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
9020         let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9021         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
9022         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
9023         // this test before #653 fix.
9024         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
9025         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9026         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9027         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9028         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
9029
9030         let htlc_timeout = {
9031                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9032                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
9033                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9034                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
9035                 node_txn[1].clone()
9036         };
9037
9038         let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9039         connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
9040         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
9041         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
9042 }
9043
9044 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
9045         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
9046         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
9047         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
9048         //
9049         // Steps of the test:
9050         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
9051         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
9052         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
9053         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
9054         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
9055         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
9056         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
9057         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
9058         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9059         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9060         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9061         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9062
9063         // Create some initial channels
9064         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9065         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9066
9067         // Steps (1) and (2):
9068         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
9069         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
9070
9071         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
9072         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
9073         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9074         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
9075         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
9076         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9077         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
9078
9079         // Steps (3) and (4):
9080         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
9081         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
9082         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
9083         let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
9084
9085         // Bob force-closes
9086         if !broadcast_alice {
9087                 force_closing_node = 1;
9088                 counterparty_node = 0;
9089         }
9090         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9091         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
9092         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
9093         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9094         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9095                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
9096                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
9097                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
9098                 };
9099                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9100                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9101                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9102                 if broadcast_alice {
9103                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9104                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9105                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9106                 }
9107                 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
9108                 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9109         }
9110
9111         // Step (5):
9112         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
9113         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
9114         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9115         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9116         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
9117
9118         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9119         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9120         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9121         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9122         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
9123         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9124
9125         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9126         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
9127         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
9128         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
9129                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9130                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9131                 match events[0] {
9132                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
9133                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9134                         },
9135                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9136                 };
9137         }
9138         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
9139         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
9140         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
9141         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9142
9143         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9144         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9145         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
9146                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9147                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9148                         (*msg).clone()
9149                 },
9150                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9151         };
9152         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
9153                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
9154                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9155                         (*updates).clone()
9156                 },
9157                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9158         };
9159
9160         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
9161         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9162         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
9163         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9164
9165         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9166         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9167         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
9168                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9169                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9170                         (*msg).clone()
9171                 },
9172                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9173         };
9174         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
9175         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9176
9177         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
9178         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
9179         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
9180         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
9181         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9182                 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9183                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9184                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
9185                 if broadcast_alice {
9186                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9187                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9188                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9189                 }
9190                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9191                 if broadcast_alice {
9192                         // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
9193                         // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
9194                         // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
9195                         // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
9196                         // broadcasted.
9197                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
9198                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
9199                 } else {
9200                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9201                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9202                 }
9203         }
9204
9205         // Step (6):
9206         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
9207         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
9208         {
9209                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9210                 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9211                         // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
9212                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9213                 }
9214                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
9215                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
9216                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
9217                 };
9218                 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
9219                 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
9220                 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
9221                 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
9222                 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9223                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9224                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9225                 } else {
9226                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9227                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9228                 }
9229         }
9230 }
9231
9232 #[test]
9233 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
9234         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
9235         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
9236         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
9237         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
9238 }
9239
9240 #[test]
9241 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
9242         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
9243         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
9244         //
9245         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
9246         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
9247         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
9248         // updating logic for the existing channel.
9249         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9250         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9251         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9252         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9253
9254         // Create an initial channel
9255         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9256         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9257         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9258         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9259
9260         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
9261         // that it is rejected.
9262         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9263         {
9264                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9265                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9266                 match events[0] {
9267                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9268                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
9269                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
9270                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
9271                                 // move forward with it.
9272                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9273                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9274                         },
9275                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9276                 }
9277         }
9278
9279         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9280         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9281
9282         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9283         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9284
9285         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9286         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9287         {
9288                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9289                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9290                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9291                 added_monitors.clear();
9292         }
9293         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9294
9295         let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
9296         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
9297
9298         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
9299         // temporary one).
9300
9301         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
9302         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
9303         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
9304         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
9305         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9306         {
9307                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9308                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9309                 match events[0] {
9310                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9311                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9312                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9313                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9314                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9315                         },
9316                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9317                 }
9318         }
9319
9320         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9321         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9322         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9323         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9324         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9325         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9326
9327         let funding_created = {
9328                 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9329                 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
9330                 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
9331                 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
9332                 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
9333                 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
9334                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9335                 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
9336         };
9337         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9338         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9339         // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
9340         // still needs to be cleared here.
9341         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9342
9343         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9344         {
9345                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9346                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9347                 match events[0] {
9348                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9349                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9350                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9351                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9352                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9353                         },
9354                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9355                 }
9356         }
9357
9358         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9359         // everything is functional.
9360         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9361         {
9362                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9363                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9364                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9365                 added_monitors.clear();
9366         }
9367
9368         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9369         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9370         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9371         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9372
9373         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9374         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9375         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9376         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9377 }
9378
9379 #[test]
9380 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9381         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9382         //
9383         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9384         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9385         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9386         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9387         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9388         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9389         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9390
9391         // Create some initial channels
9392         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9393         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9394         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9395
9396         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9397         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9398         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9399
9400         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9401         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9402         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9403
9404         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9405         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9406         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9407         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9408         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9409         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9410         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9411         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9412         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9413
9414         // A null channel ID should close all channels
9415         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9416         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9417         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9418         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9419         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9420         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9421         match events[0] {
9422                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9423                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9424                 },
9425                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9426         }
9427         match events[1] {
9428                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9429                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9430                 },
9431                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9432         }
9433         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9434         // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
9435         // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
9436         // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
9437         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9438         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9439
9440         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
9441         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9442         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9443 }
9444
9445 #[test]
9446 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9447         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9448         //
9449         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9450         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9451         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9452         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9453         //
9454         // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
9455         // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
9456         // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
9457         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9458         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9459         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9460         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9461
9462         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9463         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9464         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9465
9466         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9467
9468         // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9469         // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9470         // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9471         // its length.
9472         let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9473         assert!(chan_utils::HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(wit_program.len()).unwrap() ==
9474                 chan_utils::HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
9475
9476         let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.clone().into();
9477         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9478                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9479                 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9480         }
9481
9482         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9483         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9484         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9485
9486         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9487         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9488
9489         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9490         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9491
9492         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9493         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9494         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9495
9496         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9497         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9498         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9499         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9500         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9501         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9502         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9503                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9504                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9505                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9506                 } else { panic!(); }
9507         } else { panic!(); }
9508         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9509
9510         // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9511         // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9512         // as its not 32 bytes long.
9513         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9514                 version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9515                 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9516                         previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9517                                 txid: tx.txid(),
9518                                 vout: idx as u32,
9519                         },
9520                         script_sig: Script::new(),
9521                         sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
9522                         witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9523                 }).collect(),
9524                 output: vec![TxOut {
9525                         value: 1000,
9526                         script_pubkey: Script::new(),
9527                 }]
9528         };
9529         check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9530         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9531 }
9532
9533 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9534         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9535         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9536         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9537         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9538         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9539         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9540         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9541         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9542         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9543         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9544         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9545         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9546         // until we learned about an additional block.
9547         //
9548         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9549         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9550         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9551         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9552         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9553         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9554         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9555
9556         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9557         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9558         let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9559         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9560         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9561
9562         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9563         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9564         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9565         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9566         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9567         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9568
9569         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9570         if !test_height_before_timelock {
9571                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9572         }
9573         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9574                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9575         if test_height_before_timelock {
9576                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9577                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9578                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9579                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9580         } else {
9581                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9582                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9583                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9584                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9585                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9586                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9587                 // timelock is up).
9588                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9589                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9590
9591                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9592                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9593                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9594                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9595                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9596                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
9597                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9598
9599                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9600                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9601                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9602                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9603                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9604                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9605                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9606                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9607                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9608         }
9609 }
9610
9611 #[test]
9612 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9613         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9614         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9615 }
9616
9617 #[test]
9618 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9619         // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9620         // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9621         // HTLCs.
9622         // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9623
9624         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9625         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9626         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9627         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9628         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9629         let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9630         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9631         let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9632         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9633
9634         // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9635         let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9636         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9637         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9638
9639         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9640         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9641         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9642         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9643         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9644
9645         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9646
9647         // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9648         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9649         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9650         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9651
9652         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9653         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9654         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9655         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9656         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9657
9658         // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9659         // generated
9660         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9661
9662         // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9663         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9664         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9665
9666         let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9667         let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9668         let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9669         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9670         get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9671
9672         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9673         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9674         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9675         nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9676
9677         let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9678         let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9679                 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9680         assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9681         let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9682         let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9683                 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9684         assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9685
9686         let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9687         let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9688                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9689                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9690                 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9691                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9692                         default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9693                         keys_manager,
9694                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9695                         chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9696                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9697                         logger: nodes[1].logger,
9698                         channel_monitors,
9699                 }).unwrap()
9700         };
9701         nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9702         assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9703
9704         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9705         assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9706         nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9707         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9708
9709         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9710         // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their channel_ready here since they haven't updated
9711         // the commitment state.
9712         reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9713
9714         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9715
9716         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9717         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9718         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9719
9720         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9721         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9722         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9723         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9724         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9725         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9726         expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9727
9728         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9729         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9730 }
9731
9732 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9733         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9734         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9735         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9736         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9737
9738         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9739
9740         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
9741                 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
9742         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9743
9744         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9745
9746         {
9747                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9748                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9749                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9750                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9751                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9752                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9753                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9754         }
9755         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9756         expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9757
9758         {
9759                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9760                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9761                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9762                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9763                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9764                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9765                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9766                 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9767                 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9768                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9769                 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9770         }
9771
9772         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9773         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9774
9775         if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9776                 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9777                 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9778
9779                 let expected_destinations = vec![
9780                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9781                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9782                 ];
9783                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1],  expected_destinations);
9784                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9785
9786                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9787                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9788                 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9789
9790                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9791                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9792                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9793
9794                 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9795                 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
9796                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9797                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9798         } else {
9799                 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9800                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9801                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9802
9803                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9804                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9805                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9806                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9807
9808                 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9809
9810                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9811         }
9812 }
9813
9814 #[test]
9815 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9816         // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9817         // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentReceived` event.
9818         // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9819         // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9820         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9821 }
9822
9823 #[test]
9824 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9825         // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9826         // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9827         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9828 }
9829
9830 #[test]
9831 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9832         // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9833         // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9834         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9835         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9836         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9837         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9838
9839         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9840         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9841         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9842         let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9843
9844         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
9845                 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
9846         let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9847         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9848         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9849                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9850                 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9851                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9852         });
9853         let payment_params_opt = Some(payment_params);
9854
9855         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9856
9857         let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9858         let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9859         {
9860                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9861                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9862
9863                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9864                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9865                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9866         }
9867         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9868
9869         {
9870                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9871                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9872
9873                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9874                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9875                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9876
9877                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9878                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9879
9880                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9881                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9882
9883                 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9884                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9885                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9886
9887                 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9888                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9889                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9890
9891                 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9892                 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9893                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9894         }
9895         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9896         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9897         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9898         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9899
9900         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9901
9902         let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9903         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9904         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9905
9906         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9907         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9908
9909         let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9910         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9911         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9912
9913         expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9914
9915         nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9916         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9917
9918         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9919         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9920         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9921
9922         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9923 }
9924
9925 #[test]
9926 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9927         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9928         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9929         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9930         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9931
9932         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9933         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9934         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9935         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9936         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9937                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9938                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9939                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9940         };
9941         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9942         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9943         let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9944
9945         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9946         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9947         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9948         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9949         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9950         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9951         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9952         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9953         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9954 }
9955
9956 #[test]
9957 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9958         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9959         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9960         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9961         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9962
9963         let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9964         let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9965         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
9966         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
9967
9968         let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9969         let route_params = RouteParameters {
9970                 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9971                 final_value_msat: 10000,
9972                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9973         };
9974         let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9975         let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9976         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9977         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9978         let route = find_route(
9979                 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9980                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
9981         ).unwrap();
9982
9983         let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9984         let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9985         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9986         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9987         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9988         let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9989         let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9990         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9991         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9992 }
9993
9994 #[test]
9995 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9996         // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentReceived event, the HTLCs
9997         // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9998         // PaymentReceived event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9999         // amount.
10000         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10001         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10002         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10003         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10004
10005         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
10006         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
10007         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
10008         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
10009
10010         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
10011         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
10012         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
10013                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
10014                 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
10015                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
10016         });
10017
10018         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
10019         // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentReceived event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
10020         // amount of time to respond to.
10021
10022         // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
10023         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
10024         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
10025
10026         let failed_destinations = vec![
10027                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
10028                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
10029         ];
10030         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
10031
10032         pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash);
10033
10034         // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
10035         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10036         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
10037
10038         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10039         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10040         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10041
10042         // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
10043         // that PaymentReceived event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
10044         nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10045         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
10046         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10047 }
10048
10049 fn do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(persist_both_monitors: bool) {
10050         // Test what happens if a node receives an MPP payment, claims it, but crashes before
10051         // persisting the ChannelManager. If `persist_both_monitors` is false, also crash after only
10052         // updating one of the two channels' ChannelMonitors. As a result, on startup, we'll (a) still
10053         // have the PaymentReceived event, (b) have one (or two) channel(s) that goes on chain with the
10054         // HTLC preimage in them, and (c) optionally have one channel that is live off-chain but does
10055         // not have the preimage tied to the still-pending HTLC.
10056         //
10057         // To get to the correct state, on startup we should propagate the preimage to the
10058         // still-off-chain channel, claiming the HTLC as soon as the peer connects, with the monitor
10059         // receiving the preimage without a state update.
10060         //
10061         // Further, we should generate a `PaymentClaimed` event to inform the user that the payment was
10062         // definitely claimed.
10063         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10064         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10065         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10066
10067         let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
10068         let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
10069         let nodes_3_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
10070
10071         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10072
10073         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
10074         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
10075         let chan_id_persisted = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
10076         let chan_id_not_persisted = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
10077
10078         // Create an MPP route for 15k sats, more than the default htlc-max of 10%
10079         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
10080         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
10081         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
10082                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
10083                 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
10084                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
10085         });
10086
10087         nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10088         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
10089
10090         // Send the payment through to nodes[3] *without* clearing the PaymentReceived event
10091         let mut send_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10092         assert_eq!(send_events.len(), 2);
10093         do_pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), send_events[0].clone(), true, false, None);
10094         do_pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), send_events[1].clone(), true, false, None);
10095
10096         // Now that we have an MPP payment pending, get the latest encoded copies of nodes[3]'s
10097         // monitors and ChannelManager, for use later, if we don't want to persist both monitors.
10098         let mut original_monitor = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10099         if !persist_both_monitors {
10100                 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10101                         if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_not_persisted {
10102                                 assert!(original_monitor.0.is_empty());
10103                                 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut original_monitor).unwrap();
10104                         }
10105                 }
10106         }
10107
10108         let mut original_manager = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10109         nodes[3].node.write(&mut original_manager).unwrap();
10110
10111         expect_payment_received!(nodes[3], payment_hash, payment_secret, 15_000_000);
10112
10113         nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10114         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 2);
10115         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[3], payment_hash, 15_000_000);
10116
10117         // Now fetch one of the two updated ChannelMonitors from nodes[3], and restart pretending we
10118         // crashed in between the two persistence calls - using one old ChannelMonitor and one new one,
10119         // with the old ChannelManager.
10120         let mut updated_monitor = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10121         for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10122                 if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_persisted {
10123                         assert!(updated_monitor.0.is_empty());
10124                         nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut updated_monitor).unwrap();
10125                 }
10126         }
10127         // If `persist_both_monitors` is set, get the second monitor here as well
10128         if persist_both_monitors {
10129                 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10130                         if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_not_persisted {
10131                                 assert!(original_monitor.0.is_empty());
10132                                 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut original_monitor).unwrap();
10133                         }
10134                 }
10135         }
10136
10137         // Now restart nodes[3].
10138         persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
10139         let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[3].keys_manager;
10140         new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[3].chain_source), nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[3].logger, node_cfgs[3].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
10141         nodes[3].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
10142         let mut monitors = Vec::new();
10143         for mut monitor_data in [original_monitor, updated_monitor].iter() {
10144                 let (_, mut deserialized_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut &monitor_data.0[..], keys_manager).unwrap();
10145                 monitors.push(deserialized_monitor);
10146         }
10147
10148         let config = UserConfig::default();
10149         nodes_3_deserialized = {
10150                 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
10151                 for monitor in monitors.iter_mut() {
10152                         channel_monitors.insert(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
10153                 }
10154                 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut &original_manager.0[..], ChannelManagerReadArgs {
10155                         default_config: config,
10156                         keys_manager,
10157                         fee_estimator: node_cfgs[3].fee_estimator,
10158                         chain_monitor: nodes[3].chain_monitor,
10159                         tx_broadcaster: nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
10160                         logger: nodes[3].logger,
10161                         channel_monitors,
10162                 }).unwrap().1
10163         };
10164         nodes[3].node = &nodes_3_deserialized;
10165
10166         for monitor in monitors {
10167                 // On startup the preimage should have been copied into the non-persisted monitor:
10168                 assert!(monitor.get_stored_preimages().contains_key(&payment_hash));
10169                 nodes[3].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.clone(), monitor).unwrap();
10170         }
10171         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 2);
10172
10173         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
10174         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
10175
10176         // During deserialization, we should have closed one channel and broadcast its latest
10177         // commitment transaction. We should also still have the original PaymentReceived event we
10178         // never finished processing.
10179         let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10180         assert_eq!(events.len(), if persist_both_monitors { 4 } else { 3 });
10181         if let Event::PaymentReceived { amount_msat: 15_000_000, .. } = events[0] { } else { panic!(); }
10182         if let Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, .. } = events[1] { } else { panic!(); }
10183         if persist_both_monitors {
10184                 if let Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, .. } = events[2] { } else { panic!(); }
10185         }
10186
10187         // On restart, we should also get a duplicate PaymentClaimed event as we persisted the
10188         // ChannelManager prior to handling the original one.
10189         if let Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: our_payment_hash, amount_msat: 15_000_000, .. } =
10190                 events[if persist_both_monitors { 3 } else { 2 }]
10191         {
10192                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
10193         } else { panic!(); }
10194
10195         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), if persist_both_monitors { 0 } else { 1 });
10196         if !persist_both_monitors {
10197                 // If one of the two channels is still live, reveal the payment preimage over it.
10198
10199                 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
10200                 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2]);
10201                 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
10202                 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[3]);
10203
10204                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
10205                 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
10206                 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10207
10208                 nodes[3].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
10209
10210                 // Once we call `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` the holding cell is cleared and the HTLC
10211                 // claim should fly.
10212                 let ds_msgs = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10213                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
10214                 assert_eq!(ds_msgs.len(), 2);
10215                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } = ds_msgs[1] {} else { panic!(); }
10216
10217                 let cs_updates = match ds_msgs[0] {
10218                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
10219                                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10220                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
10221                                 let cs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10222                                 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[2], nodes[0], nodes[3], Some(1000), false, false);
10223                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10224                                 cs_updates
10225                         }
10226                         _ => panic!(),
10227                 };
10228
10229                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10230                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], cs_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10231                 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
10232         }
10233 }
10234
10235 #[test]
10236 fn test_partial_claim_before_restart() {
10237         do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(false);
10238         do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(true);
10239 }
10240
10241 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
10242 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
10243 enum ExposureEvent {
10244         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
10245         AtHTLCForward,
10246         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
10247         AtHTLCReception,
10248         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
10249         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
10250 }
10251
10252 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
10253         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
10254         // policy.
10255         //
10256         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
10257         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
10258         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
10259         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
10260         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
10261         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
10262         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
10263         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
10264
10265         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10266         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
10267         config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
10268         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10269         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
10270         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10271
10272         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10273         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10274         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
10275         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
10276         if on_holder_tx {
10277                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10278         }
10279         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
10280         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10281         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
10282
10283         let opt_anchors = false;
10284
10285         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
10286
10287         if on_holder_tx {
10288                 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
10289                         chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10290                 }
10291         }
10292
10293         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10294         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10295         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10296
10297         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10298         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10299
10300         let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10301         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10302         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
10303
10304         let dust_buffer_feerate = {
10305                 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
10306                 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
10307                 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
10308         };
10309         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
10310         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10311
10312         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
10313         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10314
10315         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
10316         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
10317
10318         if on_holder_tx {
10319                 if dust_outbound_balance {
10320                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10321                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10322                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
10323                         for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10324                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10325                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
10326                         }
10327                 } else {
10328                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10329                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10330                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
10331                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10332                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10333                         }
10334                 }
10335         } else {
10336                 if dust_outbound_balance {
10337                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10338                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10339                         for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
10340                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10341                                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
10342                         }
10343                 } else {
10344                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10345                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10346                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
10347                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10348                         }
10349                 }
10350         }
10351
10352         let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
10353         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
10354                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
10355                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10356                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10357                 if on_holder_tx {
10358                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10359                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10360                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
10361                 } else {
10362                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
10363                 }
10364         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
10365                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
10366                 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
10367                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10368                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10369                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10370                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
10371                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10372                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10373                 if on_holder_tx {
10374                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
10375                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10376                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10377                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10378                 } else {
10379                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
10380                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10381                 }
10382         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
10383                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
10384                 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
10385                 {
10386                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10387                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
10388                 }
10389                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10390                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10391                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
10392         }
10393
10394         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10395         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
10396         added_monitors.clear();
10397 }
10398
10399 #[test]
10400 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
10401         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10402         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10403         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10404         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10405         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10406         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10407         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10408         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10409         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
10410         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10411         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10412         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
10413 }
10414
10415 #[test]
10416 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
10417         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10418         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10419         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10420         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10421
10422         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10423         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10424         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
10425         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10426         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
10427
10428         let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
10429
10430         let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
10431         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10432         let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
10433         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10434         let mut tx = match events[0] {
10435                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
10436                         // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 2.
10437                         Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 3), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
10438                                 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10439                         }]}
10440                 },
10441                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10442         };
10443         // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
10444         match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
10445                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10446                         assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
10447                 },
10448                 _ => panic!()
10449         }
10450
10451         // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +2 headroom from best block.
10452         tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(tx.lock_time.0 - 1);
10453         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
10454         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10455 }