1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
20 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, KeysInterface};
21 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
22 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
23 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS};
24 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
25 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
26 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
27 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
28 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
29 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
31 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
32 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
33 use crate::util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
34 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
37 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
39 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
43 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
44 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
45 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxMerkleNode, TxOut, Witness};
46 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
54 use crate::prelude::*;
55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
56 use core::default::Default;
57 use core::iter::repeat;
58 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
59 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
61 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
62 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
65 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
66 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
67 use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
68 let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
69 cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
70 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
71 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
72 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
73 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
75 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
77 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
78 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
79 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
81 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
82 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
84 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
85 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
87 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
88 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
89 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
90 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
91 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
92 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
93 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
94 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
96 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
97 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
99 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
101 } else { assert!(false); }
104 use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
106 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
107 insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
108 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
110 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
112 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
114 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
116 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
118 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
120 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
122 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
126 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
127 // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
129 use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
130 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
131 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
132 node_cfgs[1].features = channelmanager::provided_init_features().clear_wumbo();
133 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
134 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
136 match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
137 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
138 assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
144 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
145 // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
146 // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
147 // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
148 // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
149 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
150 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
151 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
152 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
153 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
155 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
156 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
157 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
158 let opt_anchors = false;
159 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
160 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
162 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
163 let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
164 if !send_from_initiator {
165 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
166 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
168 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_message);
170 // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
171 let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
172 if send_from_initiator {
173 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
174 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
176 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel_message);
179 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
180 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
181 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
184 let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
185 let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
186 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
188 // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
189 // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
190 if send_from_initiator {
191 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
192 // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
193 // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
194 // well as an additional HTLC.
195 - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
197 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
202 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
203 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
204 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
208 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
209 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
210 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
211 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
212 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
213 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
216 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
220 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
221 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
222 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
223 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
224 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
225 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
226 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
227 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
228 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
229 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
231 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
233 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
235 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
237 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
240 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
241 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
243 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
244 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
245 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
246 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
247 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
249 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
252 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
254 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
255 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
256 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
257 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
259 let payment_event = {
260 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
261 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
262 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
264 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
265 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
267 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
268 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
269 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
270 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
271 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
274 // deliver(1), generate (3):
275 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
276 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
277 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
278 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
280 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
281 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
282 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
283 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
284 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
285 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
286 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
287 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
289 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
290 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
291 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
292 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
293 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
294 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
295 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
296 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
298 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
299 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
300 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
303 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
304 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
307 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
308 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
310 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
311 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
313 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
314 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
317 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
322 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
323 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
324 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
325 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
326 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
327 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
328 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
329 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
332 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
334 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
336 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
339 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
340 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
342 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
343 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
344 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
345 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
348 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
351 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
353 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
354 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
355 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
358 let payment_event = {
359 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
360 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
361 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
363 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
364 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
366 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
367 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
368 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
369 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
370 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
371 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
373 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
374 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
376 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
380 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
381 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
382 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
383 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
384 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
385 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
388 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
389 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
390 // update_fee (never committed) ->
392 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
393 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
394 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
395 // <- (1) RAA delivered
396 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
397 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
398 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
399 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
401 // B should send no response here
402 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
403 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
406 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
409 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
410 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
411 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
413 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
414 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
416 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
417 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
418 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
419 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
420 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
422 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
425 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
426 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
427 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
428 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
429 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
431 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
434 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
435 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
437 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
438 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
439 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
441 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
442 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
443 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
444 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
447 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
449 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
451 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
453 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
454 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
455 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
457 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
458 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
459 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
460 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
461 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
462 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
463 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
465 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
466 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
467 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
469 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
471 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
472 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
476 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
477 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
478 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
480 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
481 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
484 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
485 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
486 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
487 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
489 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
490 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
494 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
495 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
496 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
497 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
500 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
501 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
502 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
503 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
505 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
507 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
510 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
511 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
514 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
515 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
516 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
518 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
519 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
520 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
522 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
523 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
525 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
527 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
528 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
529 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
530 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
532 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
533 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
535 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
536 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
537 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
538 added_monitors.clear();
540 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
542 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
543 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
545 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
546 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
547 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
548 added_monitors.clear();
551 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
552 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
554 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
555 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
557 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
558 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
559 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
560 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
564 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
565 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
566 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
567 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
568 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
569 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
570 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
571 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
572 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
573 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
574 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
575 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
576 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
577 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
578 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
579 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
580 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
581 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
582 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
586 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
587 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
588 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
589 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
590 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
591 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
594 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
597 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
598 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
600 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
601 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
602 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
603 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
604 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
606 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
608 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
610 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
611 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
612 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
614 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
615 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
616 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
618 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
619 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
620 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
621 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
623 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
624 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
625 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
629 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
630 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
631 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
632 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
633 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
634 let channel_value = 5000;
636 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
637 let channel_id = chan.2;
638 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
639 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
640 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
642 let opt_anchors = false;
644 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
645 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
646 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
648 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
649 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
651 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
652 *feerate_lock = feerate;
654 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
655 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
656 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
658 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
660 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
662 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
664 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
666 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
667 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
668 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
669 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
670 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
671 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
675 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
676 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
679 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
680 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
681 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
683 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
685 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
686 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
687 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
688 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
689 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
690 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
691 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
692 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
693 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
695 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
696 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
697 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
698 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
699 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
700 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
701 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
702 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
705 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
706 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
707 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
710 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
711 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
712 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
713 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
714 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
715 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
717 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
718 opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
719 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
720 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
722 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
724 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
727 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
730 htlc_signatures: res.1
733 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
735 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
738 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
740 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
741 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
742 //Should produce and error.
743 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
744 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
745 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
746 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
747 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
751 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
752 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
753 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
754 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
755 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
756 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
759 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
762 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
765 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
766 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
768 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
769 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
770 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
771 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
772 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
774 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
776 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
777 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
778 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
779 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
781 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
783 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
784 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
786 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
787 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
788 added_monitors.clear();
790 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
791 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
792 // node[1] has nothing to do
794 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
795 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
796 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
798 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
799 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
800 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
801 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
802 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
803 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
804 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
806 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
807 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
808 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
809 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
810 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
811 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
813 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
814 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
815 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
816 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
818 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
819 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
820 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
822 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
823 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
824 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
825 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
827 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
828 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
829 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
831 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
833 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
834 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
836 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
837 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
840 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
842 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
843 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
844 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
845 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
846 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
850 fn test_update_fee() {
851 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
852 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
853 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
854 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
855 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
856 let channel_id = chan.2;
859 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
860 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
861 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
862 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
863 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
864 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
865 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
866 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
867 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
868 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
869 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
872 // Create and deliver (1)...
875 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
876 feerate = *feerate_lock;
877 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
879 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
880 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
882 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
883 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
884 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
885 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
886 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
888 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
890 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
892 // Generate (2) and (3):
893 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
894 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
895 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
898 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
899 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
900 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
902 // Create and deliver (4)...
904 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
905 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
907 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
908 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
909 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
910 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
911 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
912 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
913 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
915 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
918 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
919 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
920 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
922 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
923 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
925 // Handle (3), creating (6):
926 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
928 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
929 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
932 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
933 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
934 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
936 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
937 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
938 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
939 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
940 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
941 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
942 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
943 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
944 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
947 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
948 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
949 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
950 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
952 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
953 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
954 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
956 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
957 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
958 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
959 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
960 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
964 fn fake_network_test() {
965 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
966 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
967 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
968 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
969 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
970 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
972 // Create some initial channels
973 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
974 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
975 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
977 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
978 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
979 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
980 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
981 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
983 // Send some more payments
984 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
985 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
986 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
988 // Test failure packets
989 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
990 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
992 // Add a new channel that skips 3
993 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
995 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
996 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
997 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
998 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
999 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1000 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1001 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1003 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1004 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1005 hops.push(RouteHop {
1006 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1007 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1008 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1009 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1011 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1013 hops.push(RouteHop {
1014 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1015 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1016 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1017 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1019 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1021 hops.push(RouteHop {
1022 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1023 node_features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
1024 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1025 channel_features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
1027 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1029 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1030 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1031 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1033 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1034 hops.push(RouteHop {
1035 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1036 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1037 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1038 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1040 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1042 hops.push(RouteHop {
1043 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1044 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1045 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1046 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1048 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1050 hops.push(RouteHop {
1051 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1052 node_features: channelmanager::provided_node_features(),
1053 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1054 channel_features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
1056 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1058 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1059 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1060 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1062 // Claim the rebalances...
1063 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1064 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1066 // Close down the channels...
1067 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1068 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1069 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1070 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1071 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1072 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1073 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1074 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1075 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1076 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1077 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1078 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1082 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1083 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1084 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1085 // commitment dance rounds.
1086 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1087 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1088 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1089 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1090 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1091 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1093 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1094 for _ in 0..crate::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1095 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1096 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1097 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1099 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1101 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1102 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1103 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1104 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1106 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1107 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1109 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1111 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1112 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1113 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1114 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1117 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1118 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1120 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1124 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1125 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1126 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1127 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1129 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1130 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1131 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1132 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1133 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1134 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1135 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1137 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1138 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1139 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1141 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1143 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1144 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1145 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1146 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1148 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1149 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1151 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1153 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1154 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1155 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1157 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1158 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1160 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1162 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1163 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1164 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1166 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1167 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1168 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1170 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1172 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1173 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1175 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1177 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1178 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1179 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1181 &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1182 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1184 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1188 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1189 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1192 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1196 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1197 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1198 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1199 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1200 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1201 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1202 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1204 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1205 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1206 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1207 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1208 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1209 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1211 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1213 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1214 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1216 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1217 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1219 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1220 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1221 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1225 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1226 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1227 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1228 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1229 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1230 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1231 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1232 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1234 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1237 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1239 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1241 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1242 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1243 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1245 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1246 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1247 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1248 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1250 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1251 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1253 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1254 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1255 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1256 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1257 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1258 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1259 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1262 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1264 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1265 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1266 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1267 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1269 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1270 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 5);
1272 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1273 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3); // Alternative commitment tx
1274 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]); // HTLC spend in alternative commitment tx
1276 check_spends!(claim_txn[3], remote_txn[0]);
1277 check_spends!(claim_txn[4], remote_txn[0]);
1278 let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1279 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1280 (&claim_txn[3], &claim_txn[4])
1282 (&claim_txn[4], &claim_txn[3])
1285 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1286 assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1288 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1289 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1290 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1292 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1293 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1294 check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1295 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1297 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1298 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1301 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1302 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1303 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1304 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1306 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1307 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1308 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1309 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1310 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1311 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1313 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1319 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1320 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1321 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1322 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1323 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1324 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1326 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1327 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1329 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1330 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2));
1331 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1332 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1333 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1335 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1337 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1338 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1339 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1342 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1344 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1345 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1347 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1351 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1352 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1353 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1354 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1355 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1356 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1358 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1359 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1360 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1361 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1363 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1365 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1366 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1367 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1368 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1371 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1372 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1373 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1374 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1377 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1379 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1380 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1381 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1383 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1385 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1387 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1388 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1389 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1390 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1391 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1392 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1393 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1394 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1396 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1397 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1398 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1399 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1400 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1402 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1403 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1404 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1405 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1406 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1407 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1408 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1409 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1412 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1413 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1414 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1416 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1417 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1418 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1420 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1422 amount_msat: 3460001,
1423 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1425 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1428 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1431 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1432 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1433 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1434 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1438 local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1439 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1441 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1442 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1444 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1447 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1450 htlc_signatures: res.1
1453 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1454 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1455 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1457 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1458 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1460 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1461 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1463 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1465 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1466 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1467 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1469 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1470 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1471 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1473 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1475 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1476 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1478 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1482 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1483 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1484 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1485 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1486 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1488 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1489 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1490 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1491 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1492 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1493 let opt_anchors = false;
1495 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1496 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1498 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1500 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1502 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1503 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1504 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1507 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1508 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1509 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1510 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1511 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1512 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1516 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1517 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1518 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1519 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1520 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1521 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1522 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1523 let opt_anchors = false;
1525 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1526 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1527 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1528 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1529 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1530 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1531 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1533 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1534 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1535 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1538 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1539 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1540 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1541 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1542 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1543 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1544 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1545 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1546 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1548 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1549 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1550 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1551 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1552 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1555 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1556 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1557 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1558 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1559 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1560 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1561 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1562 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1566 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1567 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1568 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1569 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1570 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1572 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1573 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1574 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1575 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1576 let opt_anchors = false;
1578 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1579 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1580 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1581 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1582 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1583 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1584 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1586 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1587 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1588 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1589 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1590 // commitment transaction fee.
1591 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1593 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1594 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1595 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1598 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1599 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1600 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1601 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1605 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1606 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1607 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1608 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1609 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1610 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1611 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1612 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1613 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1614 let opt_anchors = false;
1616 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1618 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1619 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1620 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1621 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1623 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1624 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1625 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1626 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1627 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1628 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1629 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg);
1631 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1632 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1633 match msg_events[0] {
1634 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1635 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1637 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1642 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1643 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1644 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1645 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1646 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1647 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1648 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1649 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1651 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1652 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1653 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1654 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1655 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1656 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1658 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1659 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1660 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1661 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1662 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1663 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1665 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1666 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1667 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1668 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1672 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1673 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1674 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1675 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1676 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1677 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1678 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1681 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1682 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1683 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1684 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1686 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1687 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1688 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1689 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1691 // Add a pending HTLC.
1692 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1693 let payment_event_1 = {
1694 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1695 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1697 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1698 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1699 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1701 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1703 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1704 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1705 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1706 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1707 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1709 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1710 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1711 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1712 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1713 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1714 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1715 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1716 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1719 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1720 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1721 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1722 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1725 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1726 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1727 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1728 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1729 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1730 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1731 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1732 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1736 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1737 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1738 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1739 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1740 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1741 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1742 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1743 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1744 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1745 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1746 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1748 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1749 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1750 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1752 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1753 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1756 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1757 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1761 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1762 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1763 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1764 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1765 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1766 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1767 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1768 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1769 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1770 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1771 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
1773 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1774 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1776 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1777 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1779 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1781 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1782 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1783 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1784 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1789 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1790 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1791 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1792 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1794 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1796 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1798 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1799 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1800 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1801 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1802 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1804 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1805 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1806 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1807 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1810 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1811 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1813 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1814 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1815 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1816 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1817 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1818 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1819 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1823 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
1824 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1825 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
1826 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1827 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1829 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1830 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1831 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1832 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1833 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1836 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1837 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1838 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1839 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1840 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1843 // adding pending output.
1844 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1845 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1846 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1847 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1848 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1849 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1850 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1851 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1852 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1854 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1855 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1856 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1858 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1859 let payment_event_1 = {
1860 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1861 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1863 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1864 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1865 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1867 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1869 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1870 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1872 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1873 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1874 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1875 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1878 // split the rest to test holding cell
1879 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1880 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1881 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1882 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1884 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1885 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1888 // now see if they go through on both sides
1889 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1890 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1891 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
1892 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1893 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1894 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1896 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1898 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1899 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1900 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1901 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1902 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1905 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1906 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1907 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
1908 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1909 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1910 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1912 // flush the pending htlc
1913 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1914 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1917 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1918 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1919 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1920 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1922 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1923 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1924 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1925 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1927 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1928 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1929 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1931 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1933 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1934 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1935 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1937 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1938 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1940 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1941 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1942 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1943 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1944 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1945 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1947 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1948 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1949 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1950 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1952 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1953 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1955 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1956 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1958 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
1959 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1960 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
1962 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1963 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1964 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1966 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1969 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1972 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
1973 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1974 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
1976 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1977 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1978 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1980 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1983 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1986 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1987 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1988 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1990 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
1991 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1992 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1994 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
1995 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1996 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1997 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
1998 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2000 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2001 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2005 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2006 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2007 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2008 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2009 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2010 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2011 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2012 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2014 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2015 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2016 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2017 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2018 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2019 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2020 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
2021 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2023 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2024 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2025 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2026 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2027 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2028 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2029 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2030 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2031 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2032 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2034 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2035 // Route the first two HTLCs.
2036 let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2037 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2038 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2040 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2041 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2043 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2044 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2045 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2046 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2047 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2050 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2051 // initial fulfill/CS.
2052 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2053 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2054 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2055 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2057 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2058 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2059 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2060 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2061 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2062 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2064 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2065 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2066 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2067 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2068 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2070 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2071 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2072 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2073 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2074 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2076 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2077 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2078 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2080 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2081 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2082 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2084 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2085 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2086 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2088 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2089 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2090 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2091 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2092 // on-chain as necessary).
2093 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2094 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2095 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2096 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2097 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2099 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2100 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2101 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2103 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2104 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2106 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2107 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2108 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2109 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2110 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2111 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2113 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2114 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2115 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2117 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2118 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2119 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2120 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2121 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2124 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2125 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2126 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2127 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2129 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2131 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2132 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2133 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2135 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2136 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2138 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2139 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2140 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2141 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2143 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2144 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2145 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2147 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2148 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2150 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2151 expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2153 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2154 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2158 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2159 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2160 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2161 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2162 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2163 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2164 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2166 // Create some initial channels
2167 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2168 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2169 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2170 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2172 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2173 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2174 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2175 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2176 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2177 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2179 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2180 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2181 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2182 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2183 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2185 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2186 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2187 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2188 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2190 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2191 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2192 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2193 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2194 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2196 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2197 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2198 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2199 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2200 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2202 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2203 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2205 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2206 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2207 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2208 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2209 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2211 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2212 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2213 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2214 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2215 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2216 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2218 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2219 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2220 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2221 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2222 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2224 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2225 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2227 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2228 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2229 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2231 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2232 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2234 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2235 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2236 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2237 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2239 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2245 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2246 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2247 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2248 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2249 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2250 let node2_commitment_txid;
2252 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2253 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2254 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2255 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2257 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2258 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2259 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2260 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2261 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2263 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2264 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2265 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2266 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2267 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2269 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2270 // confusing us in the following tests.
2271 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2273 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2274 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2275 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2278 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2279 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2280 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2281 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2282 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2283 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2286 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2289 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2290 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2292 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2294 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2296 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2298 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2299 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2300 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2306 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2308 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2309 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2311 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2312 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2313 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2314 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2315 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2318 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2321 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2322 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2324 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2326 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2327 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2329 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2330 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2331 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2333 nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2334 nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2335 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2336 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2338 assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2339 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
2340 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2341 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2345 fn test_justice_tx() {
2346 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2347 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2348 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2349 alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2350 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2351 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2352 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2353 bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2354 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2355 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2356 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2357 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2358 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2359 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2360 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2361 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2362 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen;
2363 // Create some new channels:
2364 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2366 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2367 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2368 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2369 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2370 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2371 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2372 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2373 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2374 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2375 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2376 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2377 // Revoke the old state
2378 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2381 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2383 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2384 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2385 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2387 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2388 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2389 node_txn.truncate(1);
2391 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2392 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2393 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2395 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2396 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2397 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2398 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2399 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2400 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2401 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2402 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2403 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2405 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2407 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2408 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2410 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2411 // Create some new channels:
2412 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2414 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2418 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2419 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2420 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2421 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2422 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2423 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2424 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2425 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2426 // Revoke the old state
2427 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2429 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2431 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2432 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2433 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2435 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2436 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2438 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2439 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2441 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2442 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2443 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2444 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2445 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2446 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2447 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2449 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2450 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2451 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2455 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2456 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2457 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2458 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2459 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2460 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2461 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2462 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2463 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2464 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2465 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2466 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2467 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2468 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2469 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2471 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2472 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2474 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2475 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2476 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2478 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2479 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2481 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2482 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2483 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2484 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2485 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2489 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2490 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2491 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2492 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2493 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2494 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2495 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2497 // Create some new channel:
2498 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2500 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2501 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2502 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2503 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2504 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2506 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2507 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2508 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2509 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2510 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2511 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2512 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2513 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2514 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2516 //Revoke the old state
2517 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2520 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2521 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2522 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2523 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2524 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2525 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2526 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2527 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2529 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2530 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2532 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2533 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2535 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2536 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2537 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2538 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2539 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2540 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2541 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2542 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2544 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2545 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2546 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2548 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2549 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2550 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2551 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2552 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2554 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2555 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2556 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2560 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2561 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2562 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2563 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2564 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2565 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2566 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2568 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2570 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2571 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2572 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2573 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2574 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2575 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2577 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2578 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2580 //Revoke the old state
2581 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2584 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2585 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2586 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2587 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2588 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2589 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2590 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2591 match events.last().unwrap() {
2592 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2593 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2596 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2597 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2599 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2600 assert!(node_txn.len() == 9 || node_txn.len() == 10);
2602 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2603 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2604 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2605 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2606 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2607 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2608 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2610 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2611 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2612 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2613 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2615 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2616 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2617 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2619 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2620 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2621 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2622 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2623 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2624 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2625 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2626 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2628 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2629 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2630 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2631 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[3]);
2632 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[4]);
2633 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2634 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2636 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2637 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2638 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2642 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2643 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2644 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2645 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2646 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2647 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2648 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2649 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2650 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2652 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2653 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2654 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2655 // PaymentSent event).
2657 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2658 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2659 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2660 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2662 // Create some initial channels
2663 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2664 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2666 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2667 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2668 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2669 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2670 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2672 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2673 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2674 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2676 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2677 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2679 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2680 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2681 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2682 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2683 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2684 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2685 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2686 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2687 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2688 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2689 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2690 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2691 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2692 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2693 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2695 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2696 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2697 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2698 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2699 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2700 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2701 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2702 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2703 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2704 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2705 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2706 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2707 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2708 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2709 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2710 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2711 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2713 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2714 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2715 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2716 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2718 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2719 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2720 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2721 added_monitors.clear();
2723 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2724 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2725 match forwarded_events[0] {
2726 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2727 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2729 let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2730 match forwarded_events[1] {
2731 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2732 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2733 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2734 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2735 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2739 match forwarded_events[2] {
2740 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2741 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2742 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2743 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2744 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2748 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2750 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2751 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2752 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2753 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2754 added_monitors.clear();
2756 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2758 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2759 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2762 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2763 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2767 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2768 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2769 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2770 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2771 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2772 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2774 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2776 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2777 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2778 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2779 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2780 // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2781 // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2782 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2783 check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2784 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2785 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time.0, 0);
2787 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2788 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2789 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2790 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2792 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2793 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2794 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2795 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2797 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2798 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2802 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2803 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2804 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2805 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2807 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2808 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2809 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2810 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2811 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2812 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2813 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2814 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2815 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2816 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2817 let commitment_spend =
2818 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2819 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2820 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2821 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2824 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2825 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2826 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2830 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2831 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2832 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2833 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2834 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, 0);
2835 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2836 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2837 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2838 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2839 check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2840 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2841 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2843 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2844 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2845 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2846 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2847 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2848 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2849 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2850 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2851 let mut first_claimed = false;
2852 for event in events {
2854 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2855 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2856 assert!(!first_claimed);
2857 first_claimed = true;
2859 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2860 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2863 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2864 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2865 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2868 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2871 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2872 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2873 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2874 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2875 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2876 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2878 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2880 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2881 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2882 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2883 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2884 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2885 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2886 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2888 // Create some intial channels
2889 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2890 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
2892 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2893 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2894 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2896 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2898 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2899 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2900 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2901 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2902 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2903 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
2904 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2906 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2907 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2909 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2910 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2911 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2912 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2913 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2914 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2916 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2918 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2919 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2920 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2921 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2922 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2923 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2924 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2925 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2927 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2928 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2929 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2930 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2931 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2934 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2935 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2936 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2937 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2939 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2940 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2942 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2943 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2944 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2945 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2947 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2951 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2952 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2953 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2955 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2956 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2957 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2958 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2961 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2963 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2964 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2965 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2966 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2967 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2968 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2969 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2971 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2975 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
2976 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2977 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2978 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2980 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2981 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2982 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2983 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2984 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2985 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2987 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2990 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2991 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2992 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2994 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2995 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2997 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2998 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2999 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3000 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
3001 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3002 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
3003 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
3004 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
3005 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3009 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3010 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3011 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3012 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3016 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3017 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3018 // and fail backward accordingly.
3020 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3021 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3022 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3023 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3025 // Create some initial channels
3026 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3027 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3029 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3030 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3031 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3032 // Revoke the old state
3033 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3035 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3037 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3038 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3039 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3040 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3041 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3043 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3044 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3045 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3046 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3048 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3049 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3050 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3051 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3052 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3053 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3055 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3056 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3057 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3059 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3063 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3064 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3065 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3066 // commitment transaction anymore.
3067 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3068 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3069 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3070 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3071 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3072 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3074 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3075 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3076 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3077 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3078 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3079 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3080 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3081 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3082 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3084 // Create some initial channels
3085 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3086 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3088 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3089 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3090 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3091 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3092 // Revoke the old state
3093 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3095 let value = if use_dust {
3096 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3097 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3098 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3101 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3102 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3103 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3105 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3106 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3107 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3108 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3109 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3110 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3111 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3112 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3113 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3114 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3115 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3116 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3118 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3119 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3120 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3121 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3122 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3123 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3124 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3125 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3126 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3127 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3128 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3129 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3130 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3131 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3132 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3133 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3135 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3136 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3137 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3138 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3139 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3140 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3141 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3142 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3143 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3144 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3145 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3146 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3147 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3148 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3149 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3150 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3151 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3152 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3154 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3155 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3156 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3157 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3158 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3159 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3163 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3164 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3165 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3166 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3167 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3168 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3170 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3171 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3174 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3175 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3177 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3178 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3181 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3182 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3184 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3185 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3186 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3187 assert!(ANTI_REORG_DELAY > PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS); // We assume payments will also expire
3189 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3190 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 + (nodes.len() - 1) } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
3192 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3193 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3196 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3197 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3199 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3201 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3203 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3204 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3206 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3209 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3210 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3213 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3214 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3216 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3217 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3218 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3219 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3220 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3222 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3223 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3224 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3225 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3227 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3231 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3232 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3233 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3234 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3235 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3236 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3238 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3241 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3242 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3243 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3244 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3245 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3246 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3247 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3249 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3250 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3251 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3253 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3255 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3256 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3258 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3259 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3260 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3261 // that we should update our routing table for.
3262 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3263 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3266 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3269 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3270 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3271 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3273 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3276 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref network_update, .. } => {
3277 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3278 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3280 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3283 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3286 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3287 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3288 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3292 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3293 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3294 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3295 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3296 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3300 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3301 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3302 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3303 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3304 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3308 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3309 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3310 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3311 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3312 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3313 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3315 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3317 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3318 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3319 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3321 let payment_event = {
3322 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3323 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3324 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3326 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3327 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3330 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3331 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3333 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3334 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3336 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3339 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3341 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3343 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3344 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3345 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3346 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3347 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3348 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3350 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3351 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3357 onion_routing_packet,
3359 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3361 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3362 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3363 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3365 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3366 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3368 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3371 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3372 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3374 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3376 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3377 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3381 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3382 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3383 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3384 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3385 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3386 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3387 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3388 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3390 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3391 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3392 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3393 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3394 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3395 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3397 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3398 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3399 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3401 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3402 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3403 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3404 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3405 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3407 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3408 // registering new transactions
3409 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3410 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3414 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3415 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3416 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3417 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3418 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3419 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3420 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3421 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3423 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3425 let mut payment_event = {
3426 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3427 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3429 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3430 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3431 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3434 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3435 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3437 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3439 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3440 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3441 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3442 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3444 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3445 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3446 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3447 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3448 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3450 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3451 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3452 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3454 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3455 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3457 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3459 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3460 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3461 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3462 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3463 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3467 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3469 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3470 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3472 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3474 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3476 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3477 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3479 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3480 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3481 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3482 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3483 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3484 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3485 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3487 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3491 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3492 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3493 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3494 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3495 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3497 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3498 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3499 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3500 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3501 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3503 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3505 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3506 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3507 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3508 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3509 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3510 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3512 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3513 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3515 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3516 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3520 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3521 // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3522 // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3523 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3524 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3525 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3526 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3528 // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3529 // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3530 let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3531 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3532 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
3533 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3534 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
3536 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3537 assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3539 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3541 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3542 assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3544 // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3545 // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3548 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3551 // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3552 // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3553 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3554 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3556 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3557 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3561 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3562 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3563 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3564 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3565 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3566 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3567 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3568 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3570 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3571 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3572 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3574 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3575 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3576 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3577 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3579 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3580 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3581 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3583 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3584 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3585 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3586 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3588 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3589 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3591 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3592 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3594 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3596 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3597 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3599 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3600 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3601 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3603 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3606 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3607 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3608 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3610 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3613 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3614 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3618 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3619 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3622 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3623 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3624 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3625 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3626 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3627 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3629 let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3630 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3631 let (channel_ready, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3632 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3633 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3634 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3635 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3637 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3640 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3642 let payment_event = {
3643 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3644 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3646 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3647 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3648 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3650 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3652 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3653 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3655 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3656 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3657 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3658 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3659 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3661 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3662 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3663 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3664 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3666 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3667 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3668 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3669 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3670 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3672 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3673 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3674 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3675 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3682 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3683 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3684 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3685 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3686 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3687 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3689 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3690 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3691 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3693 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3694 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3696 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3697 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3698 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3699 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3700 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3701 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3702 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3703 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3704 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3705 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3706 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3707 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3708 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3709 // Everything was delivered...
3710 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3713 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3714 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3716 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3717 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3720 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3721 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3722 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3724 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3726 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3727 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3729 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat } => {
3730 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3731 assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3733 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3734 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3735 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3737 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3740 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3743 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3744 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3745 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3747 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3748 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3749 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3750 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3751 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3752 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3753 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3754 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3755 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3756 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3757 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3759 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3762 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3763 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3765 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3766 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3768 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3769 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3770 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3772 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3775 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3776 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3777 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3778 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3780 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3781 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3782 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3783 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3785 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3786 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3787 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3788 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3789 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3791 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3792 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3793 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3794 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3801 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3802 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3803 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3804 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3805 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3806 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3808 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3810 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3811 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3812 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3813 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3814 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3815 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3816 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3817 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3818 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3819 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3820 // Everything was delivered...
3821 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3824 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3825 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3828 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3829 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3830 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3832 if messages_delivered > 2 {
3833 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3836 // Channel should still work fine...
3837 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3838 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3839 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3843 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3844 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3845 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3846 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3847 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3851 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3852 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3853 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3854 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3855 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3859 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3860 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3861 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3862 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3863 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3864 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3865 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3866 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3867 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3868 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
3870 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3871 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3873 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3874 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3875 assert!(events_1.is_empty());
3877 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3879 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3880 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3882 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3883 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3884 assert!(events_2.is_empty());
3886 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
3887 let as_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]).pop().unwrap();
3888 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
3889 let bs_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]).pop().unwrap();
3891 // nodes[0] hasn't yet received a channel_ready, so it only sends that on reconnect.
3892 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
3893 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3894 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3895 let as_channel_ready = match events_3[0] {
3896 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3897 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3900 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_3[0]),
3903 // nodes[1] received nodes[0]'s channel_ready on the first reconnect above, so it should send
3904 // announcement_signatures as well as channel_update.
3905 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
3906 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3907 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 3);
3909 let bs_channel_ready = match events_4[0] {
3910 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3911 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3912 chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3915 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[0]),
3917 let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_4[1] {
3918 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3919 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3922 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[1]),
3925 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3926 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3928 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[2]),
3931 // Re-deliver nodes[0]'s channel_ready, which nodes[1] can safely ignore. It currently
3932 // generates a duplicative private channel_update
3933 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3934 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3935 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3937 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3938 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3940 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_5[0]),
3943 // When we deliver nodes[1]'s channel_ready, however, nodes[0] will generate its
3944 // announcement_signatures.
3945 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_channel_ready);
3946 let events_6 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3947 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
3948 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
3949 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3950 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3953 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_6[0]),
3956 // When we deliver nodes[1]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[0], nodes[0] should immediately
3957 // broadcast the channel announcement globally, as well as re-send its (now-public)
3959 nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3960 let events_7 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3961 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3962 let (chan_announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
3963 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3964 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3966 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_7[0]),
3969 // Finally, deliver nodes[0]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[1] and make sure it creates the
3970 // same channel_announcement.
3971 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3972 let events_8 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3973 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3974 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
3975 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3976 assert_eq!(*msg, chan_announcement);
3979 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_8[0]),
3982 // Provide the channel announcement and public updates to the network graph
3983 nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap();
3984 nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3985 nodes[0].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3987 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3988 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3989 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3991 // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3992 // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3993 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3995 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3996 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3997 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3999 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4000 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4001 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4002 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4003 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4004 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4005 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4006 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4008 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4009 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4010 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4011 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4012 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4013 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4015 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
4016 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4017 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4018 logger: nodes[0].logger,
4022 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4023 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4025 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor),
4026 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4027 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4028 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4030 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4034 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
4035 // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
4036 // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
4037 // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
4038 // channel_ready immediately instead.
4039 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4040 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4041 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4042 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4043 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
4045 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4047 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4048 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4049 let block_txn = [funding_tx];
4050 let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
4051 let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
4052 nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
4054 // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4055 let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4056 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4060 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4061 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4062 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4063 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4064 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4065 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4066 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4067 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4069 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
4071 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4072 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4073 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
4074 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4076 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4077 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4079 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4080 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4083 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4084 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
4085 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4087 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4088 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4090 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4091 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4092 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4093 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4094 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4095 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4096 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4098 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4099 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4100 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4102 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4103 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4104 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4106 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4109 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4110 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4111 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4112 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4114 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4117 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4118 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4120 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4121 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4122 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4123 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4124 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4125 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4127 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4128 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4129 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4130 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4132 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4133 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4135 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4136 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4138 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4140 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4141 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4142 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4143 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4144 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4145 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4146 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4147 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4148 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4149 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4151 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4152 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4153 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4154 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4155 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4156 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4157 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4158 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4160 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4161 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4162 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4163 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4164 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4165 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4166 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4167 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4169 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4170 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4171 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4172 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4174 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4175 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4176 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4177 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4179 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4180 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4181 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4183 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4185 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4186 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4188 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4189 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4191 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4192 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4193 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4195 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4198 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4201 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4202 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4203 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4205 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4206 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4209 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4210 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4211 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4212 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4213 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4214 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4215 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4217 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4219 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4220 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4221 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4222 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4223 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4224 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4225 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4226 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4227 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4228 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4229 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4230 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4231 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4232 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4235 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4238 let mut block = Block {
4239 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4242 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4243 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4244 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4245 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4246 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4247 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4248 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4251 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4253 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4254 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4255 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4256 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4257 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4258 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4260 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4261 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4262 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4263 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4264 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4265 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4269 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4270 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4271 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4274 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4275 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4276 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4277 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4278 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4279 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4280 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4281 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4283 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4284 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4285 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4286 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4288 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4289 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4291 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4293 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4294 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4296 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4297 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4298 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4299 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4302 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4303 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4304 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4305 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4307 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4309 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4310 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4311 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4312 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4315 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4316 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4317 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4318 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4319 match fail_commit[0] {
4320 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4321 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4322 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4324 _ => unreachable!(),
4326 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4328 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4329 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4330 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
4331 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4332 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4333 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
4334 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4335 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4340 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4341 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4342 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4346 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4347 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4348 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4349 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4350 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4351 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4352 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4353 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4354 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4355 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4357 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4359 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4361 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4362 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4363 get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4364 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4366 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4367 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4368 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4369 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4370 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4371 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4372 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4373 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4374 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4375 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4377 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4378 let config = UserConfig::default();
4379 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4380 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4381 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4382 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4383 default_config: config,
4385 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4386 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4387 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4392 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4393 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4395 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor),
4396 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4397 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4398 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4399 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4401 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4402 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4403 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4404 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4406 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4407 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4408 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4409 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4411 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4412 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
4413 for node in nodes.iter() {
4414 assert!(node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4415 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4416 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4419 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4423 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4424 // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4425 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4426 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4427 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4428 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4429 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4430 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4431 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4432 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4433 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4435 // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4436 let channel_value = 100000;
4437 let push_msat = 10001;
4438 let a_flags = channelmanager::provided_init_features();
4439 let b_flags = channelmanager::provided_init_features();
4440 let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4441 let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4442 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4443 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4444 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4446 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, 42);
4448 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
4449 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4451 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4453 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4454 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4455 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4456 added_monitors.clear();
4459 let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4460 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4462 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4463 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4464 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4465 added_monitors.clear();
4467 // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4472 // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4473 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4474 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4475 get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4477 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4478 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4479 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4480 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4481 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4482 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4483 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4484 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4485 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4486 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4488 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4489 let config = UserConfig::default();
4490 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4491 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4492 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4493 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4494 default_config: config,
4496 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4497 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4498 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4503 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4504 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4506 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4508 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor),
4509 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4510 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4512 // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4513 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4514 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4515 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4516 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4518 // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4519 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4520 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4522 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4523 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4524 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4525 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4527 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4528 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4529 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4530 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4532 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4533 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
4534 for node in nodes.iter() {
4535 assert!(node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4536 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4537 node.gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4540 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4544 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4545 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4546 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4547 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4548 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4549 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4550 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4551 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4552 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4553 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4554 let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
4556 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4557 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4559 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4561 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4562 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4563 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4565 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4566 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4567 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4568 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4569 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4570 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4571 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4572 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4573 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4574 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4576 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4577 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4578 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4579 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4580 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4581 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4583 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4584 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4585 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4590 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4591 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4593 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor),
4594 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4595 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4596 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4598 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4600 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4601 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4605 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4606 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4607 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4608 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4609 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4610 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4611 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4612 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4613 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4614 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4615 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4616 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
4617 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
4618 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4620 let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4621 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4622 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4623 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4624 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4627 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4629 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4630 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4632 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4633 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4634 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4635 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4637 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4639 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4640 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4641 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4642 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4643 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4646 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4647 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4648 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4649 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4650 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4651 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4654 let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4655 for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4656 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4657 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4658 assert!(read.is_empty());
4659 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4662 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4663 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4664 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4665 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4666 assert!(read.is_empty());
4667 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4670 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4671 if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4672 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4673 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4675 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4676 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4677 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4679 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4681 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4684 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4685 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4686 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4687 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4689 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4690 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4691 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4693 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4695 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4696 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4698 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4699 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4700 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4701 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4702 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4705 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4706 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor),
4707 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
4708 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4710 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4711 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4713 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4714 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4715 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4716 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4717 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4719 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4720 let reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[0]).pop().unwrap();
4721 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
4722 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4723 let mut found_err = false;
4724 for msg_event in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
4725 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_event {
4727 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4728 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4729 assert!(!found_err);
4732 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4739 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4740 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4742 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4743 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4744 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4745 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4746 for event in events.drain(..) {
4748 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4749 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4750 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4751 all_outputs.push(outp);
4754 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4757 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4758 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4768 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4769 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4770 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4771 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4772 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4773 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4775 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4776 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4777 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4778 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4779 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4780 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4781 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4782 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4783 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4785 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4786 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4788 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4789 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4790 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4791 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4792 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4796 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4797 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4798 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4799 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4800 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4801 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4802 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4804 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4805 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4806 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4807 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4808 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4810 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4811 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4812 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4813 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4815 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4816 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4817 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4818 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4819 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4821 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4822 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4823 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4827 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4828 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4829 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4831 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4832 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4833 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4834 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4836 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4837 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4838 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4839 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4840 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4842 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4843 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4844 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4845 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4846 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4848 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4849 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4850 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4852 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4853 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4854 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4855 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4856 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4860 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4861 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4862 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4863 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4864 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4866 // Create some initial channels
4867 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4869 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4871 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4872 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4873 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4875 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4876 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4877 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4878 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4879 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4880 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4881 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4883 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4884 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4887 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4888 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4891 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4892 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4893 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4894 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4895 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4896 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4897 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4899 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4900 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4901 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4903 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4904 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4905 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4909 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4910 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4911 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4912 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4913 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4915 // Create some initial channels
4916 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4918 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4919 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4921 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4923 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4924 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4925 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4927 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4928 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4929 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4930 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4932 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4933 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4935 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4937 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4938 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4939 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4940 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4941 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4942 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4944 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4945 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4946 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4947 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4949 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4950 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4951 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4952 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4953 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4957 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4958 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4959 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4960 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4961 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4963 // Create some initial channels
4964 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
4966 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4967 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4968 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4969 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4971 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4973 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4974 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4975 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4976 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4978 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4979 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4980 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4981 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4983 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4984 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4986 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4987 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4988 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4992 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4993 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4994 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4995 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4996 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4997 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4999 // Create some initial channels
5000 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5002 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5003 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5004 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5005 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5007 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5009 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
5010 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5011 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5012 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5013 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5014 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5016 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
5017 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5018 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5019 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5020 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5021 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5022 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
5024 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5025 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5026 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
5027 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5028 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5029 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5031 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5032 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5033 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5034 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5035 // transactions next...
5036 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
5037 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5039 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
5040 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5041 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
5042 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5044 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
5045 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5048 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5049 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5051 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
5052 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5054 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5055 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5056 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5057 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5058 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
5062 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
5063 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5064 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
5065 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5066 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5067 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5069 // Create some initial channels
5070 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5072 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5073 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5074 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5075 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5077 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
5078 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
5080 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5082 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
5083 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5084 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5085 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5086 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5087 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5089 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5090 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5091 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5092 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5094 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
5095 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
5096 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
5098 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5099 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5100 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
5101 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5102 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5103 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5105 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5106 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5108 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5109 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5110 // transactions next...
5111 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
5112 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5113 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
5114 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5116 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
5117 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5120 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5121 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5123 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5125 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
5126 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5128 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
5129 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
5131 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5132 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5133 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5134 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5135 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
5136 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5137 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
5138 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
5142 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
5143 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
5144 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
5145 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
5146 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
5148 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
5151 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5152 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5153 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5154 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5156 // Create some initial channels
5157 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5158 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5160 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5161 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5162 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5163 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5164 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5166 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5167 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5168 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5170 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
5171 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5172 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5173 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5174 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
5175 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5176 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5177 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5178 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5179 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5180 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5182 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5183 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5184 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5185 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5187 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5188 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5189 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5190 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5191 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5192 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5193 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5194 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5195 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5196 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
5198 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5199 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5200 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5201 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5202 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5203 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5205 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5206 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5209 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
5210 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5211 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
5212 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5213 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
5215 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5218 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5219 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5220 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5221 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5224 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5225 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5226 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5227 match msg_events[0] {
5228 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5229 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5231 match msg_events[1] {
5232 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5233 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5235 match msg_events[2] {
5236 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5237 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5238 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5239 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5240 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5241 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5243 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5245 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5246 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5247 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5248 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5249 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5250 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5251 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5252 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5253 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5254 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5255 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5256 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5257 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
5259 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5260 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5264 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5265 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5266 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5267 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5268 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5269 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5270 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5271 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5272 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5273 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5274 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5275 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5276 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5277 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5279 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5280 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5281 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5283 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5284 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5285 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5286 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5287 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5289 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
5291 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5292 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5293 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5294 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5295 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
5296 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
5297 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5298 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5300 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5301 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5302 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5304 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5305 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5307 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5308 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5310 let htlc_timeout_tx;
5311 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5312 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5313 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5314 assert!(node_txn.len() == 4 || node_txn.len() == 3);
5315 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5317 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5318 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5320 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
5321 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5322 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5323 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5325 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5326 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5328 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5329 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5332 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5333 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5334 if node_txn.len() > 3 {
5335 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5337 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5340 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5341 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
5343 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5344 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5345 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5346 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5348 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5349 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5352 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5353 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5355 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5356 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5357 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5358 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5359 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5360 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5361 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5362 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5363 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5364 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5365 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5366 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5367 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5369 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5370 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5371 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
5372 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5373 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5374 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5375 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5376 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5377 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5378 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5380 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5381 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5383 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5385 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5387 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5388 // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5389 // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5390 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5391 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196*2), true, true);
5392 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5393 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5394 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5395 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5396 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5397 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5398 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5400 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5401 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5403 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5405 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5406 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5407 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5409 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5414 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5415 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5416 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5417 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5418 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5420 // Create some initial channels
5421 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5423 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
5424 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5425 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5426 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5427 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5429 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5430 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5431 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
5432 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5434 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5435 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5436 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5437 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5439 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5440 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5443 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5444 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5447 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5448 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5449 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5450 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5451 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5452 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5453 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5457 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5458 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5460 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5461 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5462 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5463 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5464 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5465 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5468 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5469 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5470 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5471 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5472 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5473 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5474 // use the same payment hashes.
5475 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5480 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5481 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5482 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5483 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5484 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5485 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5486 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5487 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5488 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5489 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5491 let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5492 let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5493 let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5494 let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5495 let chan_3_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5497 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5498 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5499 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5500 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5502 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5504 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5506 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5507 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5509 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5511 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5513 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5515 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5516 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5518 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5520 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5523 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5525 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5526 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5529 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5531 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5532 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5534 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5535 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5536 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5537 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
5538 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5540 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5541 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5542 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5543 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5544 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5545 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5546 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5548 let failed_destinations = vec![
5549 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
5550 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
5551 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
5552 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
5554 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
5555 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5557 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5558 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5559 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5560 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5561 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5562 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5564 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5565 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5566 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5567 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5569 let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5570 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5571 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5573 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5574 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5576 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5577 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5578 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5579 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5581 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5583 // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5584 let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5585 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5586 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5587 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5588 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5589 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5590 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5592 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5593 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5594 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5595 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5596 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5597 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5598 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5599 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5600 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5601 if deliver_last_raa {
5602 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5604 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5607 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5608 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5609 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5610 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5612 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5613 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5614 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5616 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5617 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5618 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5620 if announce_latest {
5621 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5623 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5625 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5626 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5627 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5628 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5630 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5631 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5634 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5635 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5638 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5639 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5640 if deliver_last_raa {
5641 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5643 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5644 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5646 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5647 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5649 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5652 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5654 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5656 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5657 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5658 let mut a_done = false;
5659 for msg in cs_msgs {
5661 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5662 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5663 // should be failed-backwards here.
5664 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5665 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5666 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5667 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5669 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5674 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5675 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5676 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5678 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5679 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5682 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5683 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5684 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5685 if announce_latest {
5686 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5687 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5688 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5691 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5693 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5697 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5698 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5699 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5700 let mut as_updates = 0;
5701 for event in as_events.iter() {
5702 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5703 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5704 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5705 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5707 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5709 if network_update.is_some() {
5712 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5714 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5715 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5716 if announce_latest {
5717 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5718 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5720 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5722 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5723 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5724 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5725 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5726 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5727 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5728 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5729 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5730 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5732 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5734 if network_update.is_some() {
5737 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5739 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5740 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5741 if announce_latest {
5742 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5744 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5746 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5747 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5748 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5749 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5750 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5751 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5755 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5756 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5760 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5761 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5765 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5766 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5767 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5768 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5772 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5773 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5774 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5775 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5776 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5778 // Create some initial channels
5779 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5781 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5782 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5783 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5784 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5786 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5787 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5788 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5789 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5790 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5791 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5793 let htlc_timeout = {
5794 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5795 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5796 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5797 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5798 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5799 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5803 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5804 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5805 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5807 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5808 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5809 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5810 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5811 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5812 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5813 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5814 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5815 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5816 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5817 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5821 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5822 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5823 // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5824 // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5826 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5828 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5829 let seed = [42; 32];
5830 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5831 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5832 let network_graph = NetworkGraph::new(chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source.genesis_hash, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger);
5833 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: channelmanager::provided_init_features() };
5834 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5835 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5836 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5838 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5839 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5841 // Create some initial channels
5842 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5844 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5845 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5846 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5848 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5849 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5850 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5851 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5852 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5854 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5855 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5856 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5857 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5858 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5860 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5861 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5862 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5863 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5864 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5865 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5866 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5867 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5870 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5871 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5872 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5873 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5874 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5875 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5877 let htlc_timeout = {
5878 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5879 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5880 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5881 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5885 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5886 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5887 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5889 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5890 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5891 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5892 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5893 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5894 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5895 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5896 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5897 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5898 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5899 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5900 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5904 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5905 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5906 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5907 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5908 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5910 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5912 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5913 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5915 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5916 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5917 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5919 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5920 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5921 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5923 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5924 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5925 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5927 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5928 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5929 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5932 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5933 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5934 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5935 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5936 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5937 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5939 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5941 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5942 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5943 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5944 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5945 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5947 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5948 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5949 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5951 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5952 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5953 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5954 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5955 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5957 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5958 let mut block = Block {
5959 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5962 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5963 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5964 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5966 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5967 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5968 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5969 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5972 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5973 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5974 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5975 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5976 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5977 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
5979 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5980 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5981 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5983 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5985 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5986 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5987 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5989 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5990 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5992 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5993 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5994 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5996 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5997 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5998 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5999 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6002 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
6003 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6004 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6005 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6006 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6007 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6009 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
6010 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
6011 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
6012 // actually revoked.
6013 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
6014 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
6015 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
6016 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
6017 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6019 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6020 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6021 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
6022 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6023 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6024 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
6025 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6026 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
6027 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6028 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6030 if check_revoke_no_close {
6031 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
6032 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6035 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
6036 let mut block = Block {
6037 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6040 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
6041 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
6042 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
6044 if !check_revoke_no_close {
6045 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
6046 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6047 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6048 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6050 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6051 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6052 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
6053 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6054 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
6055 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
6056 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6057 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
6061 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
6062 // There are only a few cases to test here:
6063 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
6064 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
6065 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
6066 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
6067 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
6069 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
6070 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
6071 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
6073 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
6074 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
6075 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
6077 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
6078 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
6082 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
6083 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
6084 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
6085 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
6086 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
6091 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
6092 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6093 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6094 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6095 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6096 // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
6097 for node in nodes.iter() {
6098 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
6101 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
6102 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6103 let push_msat=10001;
6104 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6105 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6106 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6107 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6109 // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
6110 // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
6111 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6115 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
6116 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6117 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6118 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6119 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6121 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
6122 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
6123 let push_msat=10001;
6124 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6126 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
6127 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6128 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
6129 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
6130 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6132 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
6133 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6134 let push_msat=10001;
6135 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
6136 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6137 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
6139 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
6140 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
6141 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
6143 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
6144 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
6145 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6147 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
6148 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
6149 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
6151 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
6152 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
6153 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6154 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6155 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
6156 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6160 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
6161 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6162 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6163 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6164 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6166 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
6167 let push_msat=10001;
6168 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6169 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6170 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
6171 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
6173 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6174 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6175 let err_msg = match events[0] {
6176 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
6179 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6181 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
6184 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
6185 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
6186 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
6187 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
6189 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
6190 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6191 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6192 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6193 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6194 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6196 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6197 // pending_update_fee.
6199 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6200 *feerate_lock += 20;
6202 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6203 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6205 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6206 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6207 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6208 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6209 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6211 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6214 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6216 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6217 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6218 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6219 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6221 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6222 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6223 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6225 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6226 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6227 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6228 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6230 // Flush the pending fee update.
6231 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6232 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6233 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6234 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6235 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6237 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6238 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6239 // us to surface its failure to the user.
6240 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6241 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6242 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6243 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6244 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6245 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6247 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6248 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6249 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6251 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
6252 assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6253 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6254 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
6255 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6256 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6257 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
6259 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6263 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6264 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6265 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6267 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6268 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6269 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6270 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6271 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6272 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6274 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6275 // pending_update_fee.
6277 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6278 *feerate_lock += 200;
6280 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6281 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6283 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6284 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6285 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6286 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6287 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6289 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6292 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6294 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6295 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6296 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6297 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6299 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6301 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
6302 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6303 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6305 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6306 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
6307 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6308 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6309 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6310 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
6311 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6312 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6314 // Flush the pending fee update.
6315 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6316 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6317 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6318 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6319 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6320 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6322 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6323 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6324 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6325 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6326 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6327 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6328 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6329 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6330 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6332 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6333 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6334 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6336 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
6337 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6338 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6339 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
6340 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6341 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6342 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
6344 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6347 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6348 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6349 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6350 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6351 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6353 let raa = match send_raa_event {
6354 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6355 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6357 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6358 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6359 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6360 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6361 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6362 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6364 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6365 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6367 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6368 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6369 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6371 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6372 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6374 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6375 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6376 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
6378 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6379 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6380 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6381 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6384 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6385 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6386 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6389 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6390 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6391 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6392 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6393 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6394 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6395 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6396 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6397 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6398 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6399 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6401 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6402 // pending_update_fee.
6404 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6405 *feerate_lock += 20;
6407 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6408 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6410 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6411 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6412 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6413 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6414 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6416 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6419 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6421 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6422 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6423 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6424 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6426 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6428 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6429 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6430 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6431 let payment_event = {
6432 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6433 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6435 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6436 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6438 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6440 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6441 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6442 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6443 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6445 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6446 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6448 // Flush the pending fee update.
6449 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6450 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6451 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6452 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6453 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6454 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6456 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6457 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6458 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6460 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6461 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6464 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6467 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6469 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6471 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6472 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6473 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
6474 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6475 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6476 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6479 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6480 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6481 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6483 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6484 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6485 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6486 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6487 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6488 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6489 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6490 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6491 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6492 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6494 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6497 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6498 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6499 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6501 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6502 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6503 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6504 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6505 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6506 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6507 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6508 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6509 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6510 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6511 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6513 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6514 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6515 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6518 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6519 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6520 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6523 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6524 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6525 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6526 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6527 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6528 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6529 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6531 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6532 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6534 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6535 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6536 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6537 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6541 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6542 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6543 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6544 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6545 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6546 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6547 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6549 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6550 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6551 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6552 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6554 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6555 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6559 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6560 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6561 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6562 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6563 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6564 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6565 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6567 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6568 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6569 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6570 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6571 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6573 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6574 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6575 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6576 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6577 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6581 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6582 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6583 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6584 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6585 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6586 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6587 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6588 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6590 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
6591 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
6592 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6593 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6594 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6595 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6599 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6600 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6601 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6602 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6603 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6604 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6605 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6606 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6607 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6608 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6610 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6611 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6612 let payment_event = {
6613 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6614 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6616 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6617 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6618 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6619 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6623 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6625 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6626 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6627 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6629 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6630 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6632 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6633 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6634 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6636 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6637 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6641 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6642 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6643 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6644 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6645 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6646 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6647 let channel_value = 100000;
6648 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6649 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6651 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6653 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6654 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6656 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6657 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6658 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6660 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6661 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6663 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6666 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6668 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6669 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6670 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6671 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6672 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6673 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6674 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6675 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6677 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6678 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6679 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6682 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6683 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6684 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6685 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6686 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6687 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6688 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6689 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6690 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6691 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6692 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6696 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6697 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6698 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6699 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6700 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6701 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6702 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6704 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6705 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6706 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6707 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6708 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6709 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6711 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6712 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6713 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6714 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6715 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6717 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6718 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6719 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6720 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6721 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6723 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6724 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6725 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6726 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6727 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6731 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6732 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6733 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6734 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6735 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6736 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6737 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6738 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6740 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6741 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6742 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6743 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6744 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6745 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6747 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6751 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6752 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6753 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6756 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6757 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6758 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6760 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6761 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6763 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6764 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6765 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6766 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6767 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6771 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6772 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6773 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6774 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6775 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6776 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6777 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6779 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6780 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6781 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6782 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6783 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6784 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6786 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6787 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6788 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6789 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6790 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6794 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6795 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6796 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6797 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6798 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6799 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6801 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6802 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6803 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6804 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6805 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6806 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6807 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6809 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6810 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6811 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6812 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6813 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6817 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6818 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6819 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6820 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6821 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6822 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6823 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6824 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6826 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6827 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6828 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6829 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6830 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6831 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6833 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6834 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6835 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6836 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6837 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6838 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6839 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
6840 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6841 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6842 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6843 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6844 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6845 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6848 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6849 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6850 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6851 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6852 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6854 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6856 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6857 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6858 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6859 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6860 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6864 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6865 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6867 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6868 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6869 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6870 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6871 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6872 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6873 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6875 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6876 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6877 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6879 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6882 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6885 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6887 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6888 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6889 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6890 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6891 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6895 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6896 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6898 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6899 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6900 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6901 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6902 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6904 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6905 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6906 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6907 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6908 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6910 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6913 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6916 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6918 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6919 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6920 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6921 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6922 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6926 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6927 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6929 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6930 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6931 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6932 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6933 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6935 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6936 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6937 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6938 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6939 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6940 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6943 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6944 failure_code: 0x8000,
6947 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6949 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6950 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6951 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6952 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6953 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6957 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6958 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6960 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6961 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6962 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6963 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6964 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
6966 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6968 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6969 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6970 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6972 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6973 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6974 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6976 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6977 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6978 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6979 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6980 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6981 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6982 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6984 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6988 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6990 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6992 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6993 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6994 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6995 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6996 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7000 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
7001 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
7003 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7004 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7005 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7006 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7007 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7009 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
7011 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
7012 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7013 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
7015 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7016 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7017 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
7019 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7020 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7021 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
7022 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7023 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7024 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7025 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
7027 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7031 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
7033 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
7035 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7036 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7037 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
7038 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7039 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7043 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
7044 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
7046 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7047 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7048 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7049 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7050 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7052 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
7053 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7054 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7056 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7057 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7059 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7060 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7061 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
7063 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7065 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
7067 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7068 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7069 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7070 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7071 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7072 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7073 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
7075 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7078 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
7079 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
7081 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7082 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7083 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
7084 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7085 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7089 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
7090 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
7091 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
7093 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7094 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7095 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7096 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7097 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7098 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7100 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
7103 let mut payment_event = {
7104 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7106 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7107 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7108 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
7110 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7112 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7113 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7114 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7115 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7116 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7117 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
7118 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
7121 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7122 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7123 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
7124 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7126 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7127 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7128 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
7130 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7131 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7132 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7133 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7134 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7135 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7136 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7138 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7142 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
7144 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7145 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
7146 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
7147 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7148 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7150 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
7152 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7153 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7154 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7155 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7156 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7157 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7159 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7166 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
7167 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7168 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7169 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7170 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7171 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7172 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7174 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
7177 let mut payment_event = {
7178 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7179 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7180 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
7183 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7184 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7185 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7186 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7187 payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
7188 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
7191 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
7192 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7193 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
7194 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7196 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7197 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7199 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
7200 let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
7201 // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
7202 update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
7204 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
7205 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
7207 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7210 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
7211 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
7212 node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
7213 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7214 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7215 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7218 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
7219 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7220 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
7222 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7225 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7226 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
7228 // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
7229 // the node originating the error to its next hop.
7231 Event::PaymentPathFailed { network_update:
7232 Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }), error_code, ..
7234 assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
7235 assert!(is_permanent);
7236 assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
7238 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7241 // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
7244 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7245 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7246 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7247 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7249 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7250 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7251 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7252 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7253 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7254 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7256 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7258 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7259 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7260 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7261 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7263 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7264 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7266 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7267 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
7268 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7269 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7270 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7272 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7273 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7274 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7275 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7277 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7278 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7280 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7282 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7283 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7285 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7288 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7289 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7291 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7294 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7295 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7296 if announce_latest {
7297 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7299 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7302 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7303 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7304 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7306 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7307 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7308 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7309 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7310 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7311 let mut first_failed = false;
7312 for event in events {
7314 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7315 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7316 assert!(!first_failed);
7317 first_failed = true;
7319 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7322 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7328 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7329 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7330 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7333 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7334 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7335 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7336 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7337 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7338 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7339 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7341 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7342 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7343 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7344 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7345 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7347 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7349 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7350 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7352 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7353 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7355 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7357 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7358 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7361 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7363 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7364 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7365 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7366 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7367 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7369 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7370 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7371 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7372 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7373 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7374 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7375 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7376 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7377 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7378 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7379 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7381 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7382 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7383 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7384 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7385 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7386 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7388 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7389 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
7390 .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
7391 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7392 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
7393 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
7394 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7397 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7399 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 0);
7401 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
7402 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7403 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7404 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7405 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7410 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7411 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7412 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7413 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7417 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7418 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7420 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7421 low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7422 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7423 high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7424 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7425 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7426 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7427 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7428 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7430 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7431 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7432 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7433 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
7436 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7437 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7439 } else { assert!(false) }
7441 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7442 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7443 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7444 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7445 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7446 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7447 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7450 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7451 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7453 } else { assert!(false); }
7455 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7456 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7457 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7458 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7459 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7460 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
7462 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7464 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7465 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7466 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7470 } else { panic!(); }
7471 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7473 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7474 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7475 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7476 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7477 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7478 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7479 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7482 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7483 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7485 } else { assert!(false); }
7488 fn do_test_data_loss_protect(reconnect_panicing: bool) {
7489 // When we get a data_loss_protect proving we're behind, we immediately panic as the
7490 // chain::Watch API requirements have been violated (e.g. the user restored from a backup). The
7491 // panic message informs the user they should force-close without broadcasting, which is tested
7492 // if `reconnect_panicing` is not set.
7498 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7499 // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7500 // during signing due to revoked tx
7501 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7502 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7505 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7506 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7507 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7509 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7511 // Cache node A state before any channel update
7512 let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7513 let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7514 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7516 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7517 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7519 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7520 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7522 // Restore node A from previous state
7523 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7524 let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7525 chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7526 tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster { txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())) };
7527 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7528 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7529 monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7531 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7532 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7533 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7534 keys_manager: keys_manager,
7535 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7536 chain_monitor: &monitor,
7538 tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7539 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7543 nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7544 assert_eq!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor),
7545 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
7546 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7547 nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7549 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7551 if reconnect_panicing {
7552 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7553 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7555 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7557 // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7558 // Check that we sent the warning message when we detected that A has fallen behind,
7559 // and give the possibility for A to recover from the warning.
7560 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7561 let warn_msg = "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned();
7562 assert!(check_warn_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), chan.2).contains(&warn_msg));
7565 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7566 // The node B should not broadcast the transaction to force close the channel!
7567 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
7570 let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7571 // Check A panics upon seeing proof it has fallen behind.
7572 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7573 return; // By this point we should have panic'ed!
7576 nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7577 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7578 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7580 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7581 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7584 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7585 if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7586 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7588 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7589 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel force-closed");
7591 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7594 panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", msg)
7598 // after the warning message sent by B, we should not able to
7599 // use the channel, or reconnect with success to the channel.
7600 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7601 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7602 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7603 let retry_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7605 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &retry_reestablish[0]);
7606 let mut err_msgs_0 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7607 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7608 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7610 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7611 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Failed to find corresponding channel");
7612 err_msgs_0.push(msg.clone());
7614 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7617 panic!("Unexpected event!");
7620 assert_eq!(err_msgs_0.len(), 1);
7621 nodes[1].node.handle_error(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &err_msgs_0[0]);
7622 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7623 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7624 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned() });
7625 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
7630 fn test_data_loss_protect_showing_stale_state_panics() {
7631 do_test_data_loss_protect(true);
7635 fn test_force_close_without_broadcast() {
7636 do_test_data_loss_protect(false);
7640 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7641 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7642 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7643 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7645 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7646 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7647 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7648 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7650 // Create some initial channels
7651 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7653 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7654 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7655 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7656 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7657 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7658 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7659 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7660 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7662 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7663 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7664 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7665 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7666 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7668 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7669 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7670 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7671 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7673 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7674 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7675 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7677 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7678 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7679 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7680 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7681 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7682 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7683 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7684 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7685 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7686 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7688 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7690 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7692 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7693 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7695 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7696 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7697 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7698 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7702 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7703 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7704 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7706 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7707 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7708 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7709 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7711 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7712 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7713 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7716 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7717 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7719 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7720 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7721 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7722 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7723 let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7724 for e in msg_events {
7726 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7727 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7728 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7729 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7730 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7733 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7737 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7738 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7739 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7740 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
7741 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7742 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7744 // Reestablish chan_1
7745 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7746 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7747 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7748 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7749 // Reestablish chan_2
7750 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7751 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7752 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7753 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7754 // Reestablish chan_3
7755 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7756 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7757 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7758 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7760 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7761 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7762 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7763 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7764 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7765 for e in msg_events {
7767 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7768 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7769 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7770 // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7772 Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7773 None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7776 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7779 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7780 assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7784 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7785 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7786 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7788 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7789 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7790 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7791 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7793 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7795 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7796 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7797 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7798 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7799 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7801 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7802 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7803 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7804 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7805 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7806 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7808 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7809 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7810 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7811 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7815 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7816 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7818 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7819 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7820 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7821 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7822 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7824 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7828 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7829 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7830 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7831 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7832 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7833 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7834 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7835 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7839 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7840 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7841 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7842 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7844 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7845 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7846 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7847 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7848 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7849 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7850 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7851 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7852 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7853 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7854 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7855 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7856 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7860 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7862 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7863 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7865 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7867 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7868 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7869 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7870 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7871 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7872 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7873 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7874 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7875 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7876 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7877 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7878 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7879 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7883 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7885 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7886 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7890 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7891 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7892 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7894 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7895 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7896 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7897 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7898 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7900 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7901 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7902 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7903 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7904 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7905 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7906 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7907 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7908 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
7909 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7910 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7911 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7913 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7914 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7915 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7917 // Revoke local commitment tx
7918 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7920 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7921 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7922 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7923 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7924 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7925 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7926 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7928 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
7929 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7930 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7932 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7933 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7934 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7936 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7937 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7938 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7939 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7941 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7942 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7943 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7944 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7945 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7946 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7947 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7948 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7949 match events.last().unwrap() {
7950 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7951 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7957 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7958 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7959 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7961 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7962 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7963 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7964 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7966 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7967 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7968 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7969 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7970 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7971 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7973 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7974 // available, which we check here:
7975 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7976 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7977 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7979 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7980 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7982 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7983 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7984 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7985 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7987 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7988 // output, checked above).
7989 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7990 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7991 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7993 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7994 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7995 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7996 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].weight() as u64;
7997 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
8001 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
8002 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8003 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8004 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8005 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
8007 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8008 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
8010 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8011 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8012 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
8013 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
8014 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
8016 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
8017 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
8023 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
8024 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
8025 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8026 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
8028 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8029 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8031 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
8032 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
8033 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
8034 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
8035 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8036 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8037 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
8038 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
8042 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
8043 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8044 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
8045 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
8047 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8048 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
8049 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
8050 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
8051 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
8052 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
8053 // up bumped justice generation.
8054 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
8057 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8058 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8062 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
8063 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
8064 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
8067 // Provide preimage for one
8068 // Check aggregation
8070 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8071 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8072 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8073 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8075 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8076 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
8077 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
8079 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
8080 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
8081 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
8082 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8083 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8085 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
8086 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8087 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8088 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
8089 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8090 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
8092 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
8096 let feerate_timeout;
8097 let feerate_preimage;
8099 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8100 // 5 transactions including:
8101 // local commitment + HTLC-Success
8102 // preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
8103 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
8104 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8105 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
8106 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
8107 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8108 check_spends!(node_txn[3], remote_txn[0]);
8109 check_spends!(node_txn[4], remote_txn[0]);
8111 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3); // local commitment
8112 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]); // local HTLC-Success
8114 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
8115 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8116 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8117 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8119 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
8120 (node_txn[3].clone(), node_txn[4].clone())
8122 (node_txn[4].clone(), node_txn[3].clone())
8125 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
8126 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
8127 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
8129 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
8130 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
8131 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
8132 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight() as u64;
8136 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
8137 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
8139 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
8140 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
8142 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8143 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8144 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8145 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
8146 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8147 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
8149 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
8150 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
8151 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
8152 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
8153 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
8155 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8156 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8157 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8158 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
8159 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
8164 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8165 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8169 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
8170 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
8171 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
8172 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
8173 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
8174 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
8175 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
8176 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
8178 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8179 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8180 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8181 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8182 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
8184 let per_commitment_secret;
8185 let next_per_commitment_point;
8187 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8188 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
8190 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
8192 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
8193 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8194 per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
8196 // Must revoke without gaps
8197 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8198 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
8200 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8201 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
8202 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
8205 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
8206 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
8207 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
8208 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8209 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
8213 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
8214 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
8215 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
8217 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8218 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8219 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8220 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8222 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8223 // Lock HTLC in both directions
8224 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
8225 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
8227 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
8228 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8229 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8231 // Revoke local commitment tx
8232 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
8234 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
8235 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
8236 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
8237 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8239 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
8240 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8241 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8242 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8244 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8245 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
8246 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8247 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8248 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8249 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8253 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8254 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8255 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8257 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8258 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8259 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8264 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
8265 // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
8266 // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
8267 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8268 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8269 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8270 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8271 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8273 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000);
8274 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8275 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_010_000);
8276 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8277 let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8279 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8280 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
8281 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
8282 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8283 let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8285 // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
8286 // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
8287 // can get our balance.
8289 // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
8290 // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
8291 // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
8292 let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
8293 route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
8294 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8295 let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8296 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
8298 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
8302 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8303 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8304 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8305 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8306 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8307 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8308 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8310 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8312 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8313 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8314 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8315 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8316 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8318 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8319 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8320 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8321 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8323 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8324 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8325 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8326 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8327 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8329 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8330 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8331 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8333 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8338 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8339 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8340 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8341 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8342 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8344 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8345 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8346 override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8348 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8350 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8351 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8352 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8353 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8357 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8358 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8359 zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8360 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8361 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8362 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8363 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8365 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8366 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8367 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8369 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
8370 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8371 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8375 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
8376 // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
8377 // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
8378 // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
8379 // 90% of the `channel_value`.
8380 // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
8382 let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
8383 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8384 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
8385 let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
8386 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8387 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
8388 let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
8389 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8390 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
8391 let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
8392 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8393 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
8395 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8396 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8397 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
8398 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8400 let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
8401 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8402 let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
8403 let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
8404 let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
8406 let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8407 let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8409 // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8410 // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8411 assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
8412 // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8413 // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8414 assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
8416 // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8417 // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
8419 assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
8420 // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8421 // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
8423 assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
8427 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
8428 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8429 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8430 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8431 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8432 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8433 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8435 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8436 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8438 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
8440 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8441 // accepting the inbound channel request.
8442 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8444 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8446 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8447 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
8449 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8452 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8453 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8455 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8456 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8457 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8459 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8462 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8464 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8465 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8467 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8469 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
8470 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
8472 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8477 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
8478 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8479 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8480 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8481 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8482 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8483 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8485 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8486 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8488 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
8490 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8491 // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8492 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8494 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8496 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8497 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8499 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8502 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8503 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8505 match close_msg_ev[0] {
8506 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8507 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8509 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8511 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8515 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
8516 // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
8517 // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
8518 // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
8519 // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
8520 // and the channel should be closed.
8521 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8522 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8523 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8524 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8525 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8526 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8528 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8529 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8530 let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
8532 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
8534 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
8535 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8537 // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
8538 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8540 // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
8541 // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
8542 // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
8543 // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
8544 // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
8545 let accept_chan_msg = {
8547 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], lock, temp_channel_id);
8548 channel.get_accept_channel_message()
8550 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_chan_msg);
8552 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8554 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8555 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8557 // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
8558 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8560 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8561 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8563 let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
8564 match close_msg_ev[0] {
8565 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
8566 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
8567 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8568 assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
8570 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8573 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8577 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8578 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8579 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8580 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8581 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8582 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8583 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8585 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8586 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8588 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &res);
8590 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8591 // accepting the inbound channel request.
8592 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8594 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8596 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8597 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
8598 let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8600 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8601 assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
8603 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8604 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8607 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8610 // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8611 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8612 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8614 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8615 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8616 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8618 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8623 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8624 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8625 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8626 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8627 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8629 let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
8630 let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8632 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8633 assert_eq!(err, "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist");
8635 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8636 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8641 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8642 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8643 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8644 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8645 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8646 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8648 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8649 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8650 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8651 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8653 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8654 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8655 route.paths.push(path);
8656 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8657 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8658 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8659 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8660 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8661 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8662 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8663 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8667 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8668 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8669 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8670 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8671 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8672 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8674 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8677 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
8678 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8679 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8680 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8681 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8682 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8683 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8684 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8686 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8687 // values from previous calls.
8688 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8689 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8690 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8692 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8694 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8695 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8697 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8700 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8705 #[allow(deprecated)]
8706 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8707 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8708 // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8709 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8710 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8711 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8712 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8714 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8716 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8718 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8719 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8720 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8721 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8722 } else { panic!(); }
8724 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8726 header: BlockHeader {
8728 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8729 merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(),
8730 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8734 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8735 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8736 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8737 } else { panic!(); }
8739 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8740 // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8741 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8742 block.header.time += 1;
8743 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8744 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8745 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8748 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8749 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8750 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8751 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8752 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8753 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8754 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8756 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8757 // values from previous calls.
8758 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8759 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8760 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8762 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8763 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8764 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8765 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8767 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8772 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8773 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8774 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8775 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8776 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8777 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8779 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8781 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8782 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8783 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8784 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8786 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8787 // resulting events.
8788 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8789 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8790 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8791 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8792 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8793 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8794 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8796 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8797 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8798 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8799 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8800 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8802 // We should fail the payment back
8803 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8804 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8805 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8806 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8807 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8809 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8814 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8815 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8816 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8818 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8819 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8820 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8821 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8823 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8824 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8825 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8826 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8828 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8829 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8830 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8831 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8835 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8836 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8837 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8838 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8841 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8842 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8843 // commitment at same time.
8845 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8846 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8847 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8848 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8850 // Create some initial channel
8851 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8852 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8854 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8855 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8857 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8858 let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8860 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8861 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8862 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8863 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8865 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8866 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8867 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8868 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8869 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8870 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8871 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8872 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8875 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8876 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8877 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8878 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8879 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 0));
8880 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8882 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8883 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8884 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8885 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8887 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8888 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8889 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8890 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8891 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8892 assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8893 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8894 } else { assert!(false); }
8895 } else { assert!(false); };
8896 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8897 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8898 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8899 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8903 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8904 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8905 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8906 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8907 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8909 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8910 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8911 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8912 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8914 // Create some initial channel
8915 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8916 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8918 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8919 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8921 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8922 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8924 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8925 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8926 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8927 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8928 let watchtower_alice = {
8929 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8930 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8931 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8932 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8933 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8934 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8935 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8936 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8939 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8940 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8941 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8942 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8943 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (block.clone(), 0));
8944 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8946 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8948 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8949 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8953 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8954 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8955 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8956 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8957 let watchtower_bob = {
8958 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8959 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8960 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8961 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8962 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8963 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8964 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8965 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8968 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8969 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8971 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8972 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8974 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8976 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8978 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8979 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8980 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8981 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8982 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8983 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8984 assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8985 assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8986 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8987 } else { assert!(false); }
8988 } else { assert!(false); };
8989 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8990 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8992 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8993 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8994 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8996 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8999 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9000 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
9001 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
9005 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
9006 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9007 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
9009 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9010 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
9011 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
9016 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
9017 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
9018 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
9021 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
9022 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
9024 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
9025 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
9026 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
9027 // before receiving funding_signed.
9028 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9029 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9030 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9031 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9033 // Create an initial channel
9034 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9035 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9036 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
9037 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9038 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_chan_msg);
9040 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9041 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9043 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9044 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9046 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9047 let channel_id = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
9048 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
9049 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9050 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
9054 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
9055 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
9056 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
9057 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
9058 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
9059 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
9060 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
9062 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9063 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9064 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9065 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9067 // Create some initial channels
9068 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9070 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
9071 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
9072 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
9073 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
9074 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
9075 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
9077 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
9078 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9079 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
9080 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
9081 // this test before #653 fix.
9082 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
9083 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
9084 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9085 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9086 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
9088 let htlc_timeout = {
9089 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9090 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
9091 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9092 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
9096 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
9097 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
9098 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
9099 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
9102 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
9103 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
9104 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
9105 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
9107 // Steps of the test:
9108 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
9109 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
9110 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
9111 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
9112 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
9113 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
9114 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
9115 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
9116 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9117 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9118 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9119 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9121 // Create some initial channels
9122 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9123 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9125 // Steps (1) and (2):
9126 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
9127 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
9129 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
9130 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
9131 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9132 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
9133 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
9134 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
9135 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
9137 // Steps (3) and (4):
9138 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
9139 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
9140 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
9141 let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
9144 if !broadcast_alice {
9145 force_closing_node = 1;
9146 counterparty_node = 0;
9148 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9149 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
9150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
9151 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9152 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9153 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
9154 true => alice_txn.clone(),
9155 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
9157 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9158 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9159 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9160 if broadcast_alice {
9161 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9163 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9165 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
9166 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9170 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
9171 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
9172 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9173 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9174 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
9176 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9177 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9178 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9179 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9180 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
9181 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9183 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9184 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
9185 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
9186 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
9187 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9188 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9190 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
9191 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9193 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9196 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
9197 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
9198 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
9199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9201 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9202 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9203 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
9204 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9205 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9208 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9210 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
9211 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
9212 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9215 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9218 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
9219 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9220 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
9221 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9223 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9224 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9225 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
9226 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9227 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9230 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9232 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
9233 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9235 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
9236 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
9237 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
9238 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
9239 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9240 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9241 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9242 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
9243 if broadcast_alice {
9244 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9245 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9246 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9248 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9249 if broadcast_alice {
9250 // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
9251 // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
9252 // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
9253 // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
9255 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
9256 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
9258 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9259 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9264 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
9265 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
9267 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9268 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9269 // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
9270 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9272 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
9273 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
9274 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
9276 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
9277 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
9278 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
9279 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
9280 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9281 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9282 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9284 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9285 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9291 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
9292 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
9293 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
9294 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
9295 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
9299 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
9300 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
9301 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
9303 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
9304 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
9305 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
9306 // updating logic for the existing channel.
9307 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9308 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9309 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9310 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9312 // Create an initial channel
9313 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9314 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9315 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
9316 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9318 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
9319 // that it is rejected.
9320 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
9322 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9323 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9325 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9326 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
9327 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
9328 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
9329 // move forward with it.
9330 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9331 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9333 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9337 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9338 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9340 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9341 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9343 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9344 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9346 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9347 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9348 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9349 added_monitors.clear();
9351 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9353 let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
9354 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
9356 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
9359 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
9360 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
9361 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
9362 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
9363 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_msg);
9365 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9366 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9368 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9369 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9370 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9371 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9372 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9374 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9378 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9379 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9380 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9381 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9382 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9383 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9385 let funding_created = {
9386 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9387 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
9388 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
9389 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
9390 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
9391 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
9392 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9393 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
9395 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9396 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9397 // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
9398 // still needs to be cleared here.
9399 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9401 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9403 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9404 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9406 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9407 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9408 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9409 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9410 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9412 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9416 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9417 // everything is functional.
9418 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9420 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9421 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9422 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9423 added_monitors.clear();
9426 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9427 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9428 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9429 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9431 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9432 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9433 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9434 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9438 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9439 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9441 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9442 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9443 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9444 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9445 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9446 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9447 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9449 // Create some initial channels
9450 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9451 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9452 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9454 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9455 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9456 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9458 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9459 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9460 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9462 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9463 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9464 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9465 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9466 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9467 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9468 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9469 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9470 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9472 // A null channel ID should close all channels
9473 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9474 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9475 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9476 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9477 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9478 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9480 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9481 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9483 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9486 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9487 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9489 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9491 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9492 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
9493 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
9494 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
9495 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9496 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9498 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
9499 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9500 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9504 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9505 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9507 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9508 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9509 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9510 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9512 // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
9513 // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
9514 // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
9515 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9516 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9517 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9518 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9520 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9521 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9522 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9524 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9526 // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9527 // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9528 // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9530 let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9531 let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.into();
9532 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9533 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9534 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9537 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9538 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9539 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9541 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9542 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9544 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9545 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9547 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9548 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9549 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9551 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9552 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9553 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9554 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9555 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9556 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9557 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9558 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9559 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9560 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9561 } else { panic!(); }
9562 } else { panic!(); }
9563 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9565 // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9566 // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9567 // as its not 32 bytes long.
9568 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9569 version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9570 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9571 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9575 script_sig: Script::new(),
9576 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
9577 witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9579 output: vec![TxOut {
9581 script_pubkey: Script::new(),
9584 check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9585 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9588 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9589 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9590 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9591 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9592 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9593 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9594 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9595 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9596 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9597 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9598 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9599 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9600 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9601 // until we learned about an additional block.
9603 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9604 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9605 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9606 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9607 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9608 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9609 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9611 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9612 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9613 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9614 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9615 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9617 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9618 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9619 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9620 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9621 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9622 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9624 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9625 if !test_height_before_timelock {
9626 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9628 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9629 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9630 if test_height_before_timelock {
9631 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9632 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9633 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9634 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9636 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9637 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9638 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9639 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9640 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9641 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9643 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9644 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9646 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9647 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9648 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9649 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9650 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9651 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
9652 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9654 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9655 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9656 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9657 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9658 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9659 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9660 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9661 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9662 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9667 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9668 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9669 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9673 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9674 // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9675 // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9677 // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9679 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9680 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9681 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9682 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9683 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9684 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9685 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9686 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
9687 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
9689 // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9690 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9691 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9692 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9694 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9695 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9696 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9697 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9698 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9700 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9702 // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9703 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9704 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
9705 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9707 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9708 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9709 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9710 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9711 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9713 // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9715 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9717 // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9718 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9719 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9721 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9722 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9723 let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9724 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9725 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9727 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9728 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9729 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9730 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9732 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9733 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9734 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9735 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9736 let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9737 let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9738 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9739 assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9741 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9742 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9743 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9744 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9745 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9746 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9747 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9749 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9750 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9751 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9752 logger: nodes[1].logger,
9756 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9757 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9759 assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor),
9760 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
9761 assert_eq!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor),
9762 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
9763 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9764 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9766 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9767 // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their channel_ready here since they haven't updated
9768 // the commitment state.
9769 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9771 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9773 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9774 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9775 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9777 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9778 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9779 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9780 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9781 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9782 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9783 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9785 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9786 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9789 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9790 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9791 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9792 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9793 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9795 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9797 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
9798 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
9799 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9801 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9804 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9805 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9806 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9807 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9808 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9809 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9810 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9812 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9813 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9816 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
9817 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
9818 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9819 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9820 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9821 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9822 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9823 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9824 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9825 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9826 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9827 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9830 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9831 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9833 if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9834 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9835 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9837 let expected_destinations = vec![
9838 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9839 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9841 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], expected_destinations);
9842 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9844 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9845 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9846 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9848 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9849 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9850 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9852 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9853 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
9854 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9855 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9857 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9858 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9859 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9861 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9862 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9863 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9864 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9866 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9868 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9873 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9874 // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9875 // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentReceived` event.
9876 // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9877 // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9878 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9882 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9883 // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9884 // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9885 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9889 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9890 // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9891 // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9892 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9893 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9894 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9895 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9897 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9898 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9899 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9900 let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9902 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
9903 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
9904 let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9905 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9906 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9907 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9908 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9909 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9911 let payment_params_opt = Some(payment_params);
9913 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9915 let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9916 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9918 let session_privs = {
9919 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
9920 // ultimately have, just not right away.
9921 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
9922 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9923 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9926 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9929 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9930 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9931 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9933 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9936 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9937 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9939 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9940 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9941 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9943 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9944 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9946 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9947 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9949 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9950 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9951 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9953 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9955 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9957 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9958 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9959 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9961 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9962 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9963 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9964 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9966 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9968 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9969 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9970 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9972 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9973 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9975 let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9976 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9977 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9979 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9981 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9982 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9984 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9985 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9986 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9988 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9992 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9993 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9994 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9995 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9996 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9998 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
9999 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
10000 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10001 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10002 let route_params = RouteParameters {
10003 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
10004 final_value_msat: 10000,
10005 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
10007 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
10008 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10009 let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
10011 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10012 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10013 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10014 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10015 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10016 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10017 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10018 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
10019 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
10023 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
10024 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10025 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10026 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10027 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10029 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10030 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10031 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
10032 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
10034 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10035 let route_params = RouteParameters {
10036 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
10037 final_value_msat: 10000,
10038 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
10040 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
10041 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10042 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
10043 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10044 let route = find_route(
10045 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10046 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
10049 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10050 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10051 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10052 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10053 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10054 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10055 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10056 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
10057 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
10061 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
10062 // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentReceived event, the HTLCs
10063 // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
10064 // PaymentReceived event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
10066 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10067 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10068 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10069 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10071 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10072 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10073 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10074 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10076 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
10077 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
10078 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
10079 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
10080 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
10081 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
10084 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
10085 // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentReceived event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
10086 // amount of time to respond to.
10088 // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
10089 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
10090 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
10092 let failed_destinations = vec![
10093 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
10094 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
10096 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
10098 pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash);
10100 // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
10101 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10102 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
10104 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10105 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10106 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10108 // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
10109 // that PaymentReceived event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
10110 nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
10112 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10115 fn do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(persist_both_monitors: bool) {
10116 // Test what happens if a node receives an MPP payment, claims it, but crashes before
10117 // persisting the ChannelManager. If `persist_both_monitors` is false, also crash after only
10118 // updating one of the two channels' ChannelMonitors. As a result, on startup, we'll (a) still
10119 // have the PaymentReceived event, (b) have one (or two) channel(s) that goes on chain with the
10120 // HTLC preimage in them, and (c) optionally have one channel that is live off-chain but does
10121 // not have the preimage tied to the still-pending HTLC.
10123 // To get to the correct state, on startup we should propagate the preimage to the
10124 // still-off-chain channel, claiming the HTLC as soon as the peer connects, with the monitor
10125 // receiving the preimage without a state update.
10127 // Further, we should generate a `PaymentClaimed` event to inform the user that the payment was
10128 // definitely claimed.
10129 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10130 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10131 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10133 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
10134 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
10135 let nodes_3_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
10137 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10139 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10140 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
10141 let chan_id_persisted = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
10142 let chan_id_not_persisted = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).2;
10144 // Create an MPP route for 15k sats, more than the default htlc-max of 10%
10145 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
10146 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
10147 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
10148 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
10149 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
10150 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
10153 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10154 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
10156 // Send the payment through to nodes[3] *without* clearing the PaymentReceived event
10157 let mut send_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10158 assert_eq!(send_events.len(), 2);
10159 do_pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), send_events[0].clone(), true, false, None);
10160 do_pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), send_events[1].clone(), true, false, None);
10162 // Now that we have an MPP payment pending, get the latest encoded copies of nodes[3]'s
10163 // monitors and ChannelManager, for use later, if we don't want to persist both monitors.
10164 let mut original_monitor = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10165 if !persist_both_monitors {
10166 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10167 if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_not_persisted {
10168 assert!(original_monitor.0.is_empty());
10169 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut original_monitor).unwrap();
10174 let mut original_manager = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10175 nodes[3].node.write(&mut original_manager).unwrap();
10177 expect_payment_received!(nodes[3], payment_hash, payment_secret, 15_000_000);
10179 nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10180 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 2);
10181 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[3], payment_hash, 15_000_000);
10183 // Now fetch one of the two updated ChannelMonitors from nodes[3], and restart pretending we
10184 // crashed in between the two persistence calls - using one old ChannelMonitor and one new one,
10185 // with the old ChannelManager.
10186 let mut updated_monitor = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
10187 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10188 if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_persisted {
10189 assert!(updated_monitor.0.is_empty());
10190 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut updated_monitor).unwrap();
10193 // If `persist_both_monitors` is set, get the second monitor here as well
10194 if persist_both_monitors {
10195 for outpoint in nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.list_monitors() {
10196 if outpoint.to_channel_id() == chan_id_not_persisted {
10197 assert!(original_monitor.0.is_empty());
10198 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap().write(&mut original_monitor).unwrap();
10203 // Now restart nodes[3].
10204 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
10205 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[3].keys_manager;
10206 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[3].chain_source), nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[3].logger, node_cfgs[3].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
10207 nodes[3].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
10208 let mut monitors = Vec::new();
10209 for mut monitor_data in [original_monitor, updated_monitor].iter() {
10210 let (_, mut deserialized_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut &monitor_data.0[..], keys_manager).unwrap();
10211 monitors.push(deserialized_monitor);
10214 let config = UserConfig::default();
10215 nodes_3_deserialized = {
10216 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
10217 for monitor in monitors.iter_mut() {
10218 channel_monitors.insert(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
10220 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut &original_manager.0[..], ChannelManagerReadArgs {
10221 default_config: config,
10223 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[3].fee_estimator,
10224 chain_monitor: nodes[3].chain_monitor,
10225 tx_broadcaster: nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
10226 logger: nodes[3].logger,
10230 nodes[3].node = &nodes_3_deserialized;
10232 for monitor in monitors {
10233 // On startup the preimage should have been copied into the non-persisted monitor:
10234 assert!(monitor.get_stored_preimages().contains_key(&payment_hash));
10235 assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.clone(), monitor),
10236 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
10238 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 2);
10240 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
10241 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
10243 // During deserialization, we should have closed one channel and broadcast its latest
10244 // commitment transaction. We should also still have the original PaymentReceived event we
10245 // never finished processing.
10246 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10247 assert_eq!(events.len(), if persist_both_monitors { 4 } else { 3 });
10248 if let Event::PaymentReceived { amount_msat: 15_000_000, .. } = events[0] { } else { panic!(); }
10249 if let Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, .. } = events[1] { } else { panic!(); }
10250 if persist_both_monitors {
10251 if let Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager, .. } = events[2] { } else { panic!(); }
10254 // On restart, we should also get a duplicate PaymentClaimed event as we persisted the
10255 // ChannelManager prior to handling the original one.
10256 if let Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: our_payment_hash, amount_msat: 15_000_000, .. } =
10257 events[if persist_both_monitors { 3 } else { 2 }]
10259 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
10260 } else { panic!(); }
10262 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), if persist_both_monitors { 0 } else { 1 });
10263 if !persist_both_monitors {
10264 // If one of the two channels is still live, reveal the payment preimage over it.
10266 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
10267 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2]);
10268 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
10269 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[3]);
10271 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
10272 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
10273 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10275 nodes[3].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
10277 // Once we call `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` the holding cell is cleared and the HTLC
10278 // claim should fly.
10279 let ds_msgs = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10280 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
10281 assert_eq!(ds_msgs.len(), 2);
10282 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } = ds_msgs[1] {} else { panic!(); }
10284 let cs_updates = match ds_msgs[0] {
10285 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
10286 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10287 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
10288 let cs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10289 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[2], nodes[0], nodes[3], Some(1000), false, false);
10290 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10296 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10297 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], cs_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10298 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
10303 fn test_partial_claim_before_restart() {
10304 do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(false);
10305 do_test_partial_claim_before_restart(true);
10308 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
10309 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
10310 enum ExposureEvent {
10311 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
10313 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
10315 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
10316 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
10319 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
10320 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
10323 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
10324 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
10325 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
10326 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
10327 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
10328 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
10329 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
10330 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
10332 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10333 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
10334 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
10335 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10336 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
10337 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10339 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10340 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10341 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
10342 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
10344 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10346 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
10347 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10348 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
10350 let opt_anchors = false;
10352 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
10355 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
10356 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10360 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10361 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10362 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10364 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10365 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10367 let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10368 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10369 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
10371 let dust_buffer_feerate = {
10372 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
10373 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
10374 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
10376 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
10377 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10379 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
10380 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10382 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
10383 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
10386 if dust_outbound_balance {
10387 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10388 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10389 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
10390 for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10391 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10392 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
10395 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10396 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10397 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
10398 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10399 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10403 if dust_outbound_balance {
10404 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10405 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10406 for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
10407 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10408 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
10411 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10412 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10413 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
10414 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10419 let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
10420 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
10421 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
10422 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10423 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10425 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10426 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10427 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
10429 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
10431 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
10432 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
10433 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10434 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10435 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10436 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10437 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
10438 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10439 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10441 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
10442 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10443 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10444 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10446 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
10447 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10449 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
10450 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
10451 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
10453 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10454 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
10456 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10457 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10458 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
10461 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10462 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
10463 added_monitors.clear();
10467 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
10468 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10469 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
10470 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10471 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10472 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10473 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10474 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10475 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10476 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
10477 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10478 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10479 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
10483 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
10484 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10485 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10486 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10487 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10489 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10490 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10491 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_message);
10492 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10493 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel_message);
10495 let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
10497 let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
10498 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10499 let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
10500 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10501 let mut tx = match events[0] {
10502 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
10503 // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 2.
10504 Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 3), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
10505 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10508 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10510 // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
10511 match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
10512 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10513 assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
10518 // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +2 headroom from best block.
10519 tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(tx.lock_time.0 - 1);
10520 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
10521 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());