1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use chain::channelmonitor;
17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
19 use chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
21 use ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS };
23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
25 use ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
26 use routing::network_graph::RoutingFees;
27 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
28 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
30 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
31 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
32 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
33 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
34 use util::errors::APIError;
35 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
36 use util::config::UserConfig;
38 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
39 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
43 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
45 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
46 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
52 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
53 use core::default::Default;
54 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
56 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
57 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
60 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
61 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
62 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
63 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
64 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
65 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
67 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
69 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
70 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
71 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
73 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
74 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
76 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
77 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
79 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
80 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
81 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
82 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
83 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
84 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
85 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
86 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
88 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
89 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
91 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
93 } else { assert!(false); }
96 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
97 use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
99 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
100 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
102 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
104 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than funding value \d+", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
106 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
108 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
110 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
112 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
114 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
117 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
118 // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
119 // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
120 // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
121 // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
122 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
123 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
124 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
125 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
127 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
128 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
129 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
130 let opt_anchors = false;
131 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
132 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
134 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
135 let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
136 if !send_from_initiator {
137 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
138 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
140 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
142 // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
143 let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
144 if send_from_initiator {
145 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
146 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
148 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
151 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
152 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
153 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
156 let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
157 let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
158 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
160 // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
161 // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
162 if send_from_initiator {
163 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
164 // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
165 // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
166 // well as an additional HTLC.
167 - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
169 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
174 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
175 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
176 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
180 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
181 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
182 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
183 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
184 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
185 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
188 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
192 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
193 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
194 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
195 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
196 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
197 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
198 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
199 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
200 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
201 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
203 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
205 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
207 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
209 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
212 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
213 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
215 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
216 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
217 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
218 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
219 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
221 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
224 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
226 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
227 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
228 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
229 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
231 let payment_event = {
232 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
233 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
234 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
236 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
237 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
239 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
240 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
241 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
242 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
243 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
244 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
246 // deliver(1), generate (3):
247 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
248 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
249 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
250 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
252 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
253 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
254 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
255 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
256 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
257 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
258 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
259 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
261 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
262 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
263 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
264 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
265 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
266 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
267 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
268 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
270 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
271 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
272 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
273 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
275 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
276 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
277 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
279 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
280 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
282 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
283 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
285 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
286 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
289 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
290 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
294 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
295 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
296 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
297 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
298 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
299 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
300 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
301 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
304 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
306 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
308 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
311 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
312 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
314 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
315 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
316 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
317 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
320 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
323 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
325 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
326 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
327 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
328 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
330 let payment_event = {
331 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
332 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
333 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
335 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
336 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
338 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
339 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
340 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
341 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
342 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
345 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
346 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
348 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
352 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
353 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
354 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
355 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
356 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
357 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
360 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
361 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
362 // update_fee (never committed) ->
364 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
365 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
366 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
367 // <- (1) RAA delivered
368 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
369 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
370 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
371 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
373 // B should send no response here
374 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
375 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
378 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
381 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
382 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
383 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
385 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
386 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
388 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
389 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
390 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
391 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
392 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
394 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
397 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
398 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
399 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
400 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
401 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
403 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
406 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
407 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
409 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
410 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
411 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
413 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
414 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
415 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
416 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
419 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
421 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
423 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
425 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
426 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
427 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
428 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
429 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
430 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
431 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
432 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
433 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
434 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
435 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
437 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
438 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
439 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
440 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
441 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
443 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
444 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
445 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
448 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
449 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
450 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
452 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
453 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
454 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
456 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
457 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
458 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
459 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
461 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
462 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
463 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
466 fn do_test_1_conf_open(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
467 // Previously, if the minium_depth config was set to 1, we'd never send a funding_locked. This
468 // tests that we properly send one in that case.
469 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
470 alice_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
471 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
472 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
473 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
474 bob_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
475 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
476 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
477 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
478 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
479 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
480 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
481 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
483 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
484 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
485 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
486 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
488 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
489 let as_msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
490 assert_eq!(as_msg_events.len(), 2);
491 let as_funding_locked = if let MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } = as_msg_events[0] {
492 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
494 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); };
495 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } = as_msg_events[1] {
496 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
497 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
499 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
500 let bs_msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
501 assert_eq!(bs_msg_events.len(), 1);
502 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } = bs_msg_events[0] {
503 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
504 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
506 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
508 // After 6 confirmations, as required by the spec, we'll send announcement_signatures and
509 // broadcast the channel_announcement (but not before exactly 6 confirmations).
510 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
511 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
512 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
513 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
514 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
516 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 5);
517 let bs_announce_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
518 assert_eq!(bs_announce_events.len(), 2);
519 let bs_announcement_sigs = if let MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } = bs_announce_events[0] {
520 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
522 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); };
523 let (bs_announcement, bs_update) = if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } = bs_announce_events[1] {
524 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
525 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); };
527 nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
528 let as_announce_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
529 assert_eq!(as_announce_events.len(), 1);
530 let (announcement, as_update) = if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } = as_announce_events[0] {
531 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
532 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); };
533 assert_eq!(announcement, bs_announcement);
536 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
537 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
538 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
542 fn test_1_conf_open() {
543 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst);
544 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst);
545 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
548 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
549 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
550 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
551 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
554 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
555 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
556 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
557 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
559 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
561 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
564 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
565 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
568 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
569 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
570 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
572 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
573 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
574 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
576 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
577 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
579 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
581 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
582 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
583 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
584 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
586 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
587 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
589 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
590 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
591 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
592 added_monitors.clear();
594 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
596 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
597 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
599 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
600 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
601 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
602 added_monitors.clear();
605 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
606 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
608 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
609 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
611 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
612 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
613 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
614 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
618 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
619 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
620 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
621 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
622 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
623 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
624 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
625 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
626 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
627 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
628 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
629 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
630 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
631 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
632 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
633 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
634 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
635 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
636 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
640 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
641 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
642 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
643 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
644 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
645 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
648 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
651 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
652 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
654 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
655 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
656 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
657 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
658 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
660 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
662 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
664 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
665 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
666 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
668 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
669 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
670 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
672 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
673 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
674 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
675 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
677 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
678 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
679 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
683 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
684 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
685 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
686 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
687 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
688 let channel_value = 5000;
690 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
691 let channel_id = chan.2;
692 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
693 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value);
695 let opt_anchors = false;
697 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
698 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
699 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
701 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
702 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
704 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
705 *feerate_lock = feerate;
707 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
708 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
709 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
711 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
713 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
715 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
717 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
719 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
720 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
721 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
722 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
723 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
724 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
728 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
729 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
732 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
733 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
734 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
736 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
738 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
739 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
740 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
741 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
742 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
743 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
744 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
745 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
746 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
748 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
749 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
750 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
751 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
752 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
753 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
754 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
755 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
758 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
759 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
760 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
763 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
764 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
765 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
766 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
767 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
768 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
770 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
771 opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
772 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
773 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
775 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
777 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
780 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
783 htlc_signatures: res.1
786 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
788 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
791 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
793 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
794 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
795 //Should produce and error.
796 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
797 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
798 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
799 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
800 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
804 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
805 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
806 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
807 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
808 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
809 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
812 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
815 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
818 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
819 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
821 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
822 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
823 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
824 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
825 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
827 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
829 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
830 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
831 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
832 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
834 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
836 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
837 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
839 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
840 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
841 added_monitors.clear();
843 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
844 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
845 // node[1] has nothing to do
847 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
848 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
849 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
851 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
852 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
853 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
854 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
855 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
856 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
857 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
859 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
860 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
861 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
862 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
863 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
864 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
866 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
867 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
868 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
869 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
871 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
872 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
873 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
875 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
876 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
877 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
878 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
880 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
881 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
882 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
884 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
886 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
887 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
889 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
890 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
893 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
895 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
896 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
897 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
898 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
899 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
903 fn test_update_fee() {
904 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
905 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
906 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
907 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
908 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
909 let channel_id = chan.2;
912 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
913 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
914 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
915 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
916 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
917 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
918 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
919 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
920 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
921 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
922 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
925 // Create and deliver (1)...
928 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
929 feerate = *feerate_lock;
930 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
932 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
933 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
935 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
936 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
937 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
938 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
939 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
941 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
943 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
945 // Generate (2) and (3):
946 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
947 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
948 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
951 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
952 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
953 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
955 // Create and deliver (4)...
957 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
958 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
960 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
961 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
962 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
963 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
964 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
965 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
966 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
968 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
971 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
972 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
973 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
975 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
976 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
978 // Handle (3), creating (6):
979 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
980 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
981 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
982 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
985 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
986 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
987 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
989 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
990 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
991 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
992 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
993 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
994 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
995 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
996 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
997 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1000 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
1001 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1002 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1003 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1005 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
1006 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1007 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1009 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
1010 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
1011 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
1012 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1013 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1017 fn fake_network_test() {
1018 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
1019 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
1020 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
1021 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
1022 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
1023 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1025 // Create some initial channels
1026 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1027 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1028 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1030 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
1031 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1032 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1033 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1034 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1036 // Send some more payments
1037 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1038 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
1039 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
1041 // Test failure packets
1042 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
1043 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
1045 // Add a new channel that skips 3
1046 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1048 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1049 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1050 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1051 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1052 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1053 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1054 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1056 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1057 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1058 hops.push(RouteHop {
1059 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1060 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1061 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1062 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1064 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1066 hops.push(RouteHop {
1067 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1068 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1069 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1070 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1072 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1074 hops.push(RouteHop {
1075 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1076 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1077 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1078 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1080 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1082 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1083 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1084 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1086 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1087 hops.push(RouteHop {
1088 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1089 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1090 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1091 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1093 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1095 hops.push(RouteHop {
1096 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1097 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1098 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1099 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1101 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1103 hops.push(RouteHop {
1104 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1105 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1106 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1107 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1109 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1111 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1112 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1113 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1115 // Claim the rebalances...
1116 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1117 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1119 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1120 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1122 // Send some payments across both channels
1123 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1124 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1125 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1128 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1129 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1130 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1131 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1133 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1135 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1136 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1137 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1139 // Close down the channels...
1140 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1141 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1142 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1143 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1144 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1145 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1146 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1147 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1148 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1149 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1150 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1151 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1152 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1153 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1154 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1158 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1159 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1160 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1161 // commitment dance rounds.
1162 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1163 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1164 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1165 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1166 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1167 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1169 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1170 for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1171 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1172 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1173 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1175 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1177 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1178 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1179 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1180 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1182 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1183 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1185 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1187 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1188 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1189 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1190 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1193 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1194 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1196 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1197 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1200 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1201 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1202 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1203 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1205 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1206 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1207 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1208 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1209 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1210 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1211 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1213 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1214 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1215 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1217 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1219 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1220 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1221 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1222 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1224 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1225 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1226 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1227 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1229 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1230 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1231 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1233 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1234 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1236 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1237 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1238 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1239 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1240 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1242 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1243 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1244 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1245 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1246 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1248 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1249 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1251 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1253 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1254 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1255 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1257 &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1258 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1260 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1264 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1265 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1268 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1272 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1273 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1274 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1275 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1276 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1277 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1278 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1280 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1281 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1282 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1283 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1284 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1285 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1287 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1289 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1290 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1292 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1293 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1295 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1296 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1297 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1301 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1302 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1303 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1304 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1305 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1306 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1307 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1308 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1310 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1313 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1315 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1317 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1318 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1319 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1321 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1322 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1323 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1325 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1326 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1328 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1329 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1330 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1331 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1332 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1333 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1334 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1337 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1339 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1340 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1341 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1342 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1344 // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1345 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1346 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1347 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1348 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1349 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1350 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1351 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1353 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1354 assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1355 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1357 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1358 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1359 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1360 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1361 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1362 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1363 check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1364 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1366 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1367 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1370 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1371 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1372 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1373 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1375 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1376 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1377 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1378 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1379 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1380 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1382 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1388 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1389 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1390 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1391 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1392 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1393 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1395 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1396 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1398 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1399 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2));
1400 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1401 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1402 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1404 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1406 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1407 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1408 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1411 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1413 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1414 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1416 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1420 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1421 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1422 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1423 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1424 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1425 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1427 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1428 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1429 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1430 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1432 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1434 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1435 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1436 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1437 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1440 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1441 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1442 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1443 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1446 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1448 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1449 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1450 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1452 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1454 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1456 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1457 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1458 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1459 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1460 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1461 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1462 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1463 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1465 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1466 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1467 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1468 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1469 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1471 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1472 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1473 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1474 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1475 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1476 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1477 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1478 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1481 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1482 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1483 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1485 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1486 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1487 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1489 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1491 amount_msat: 3460001,
1492 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1494 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1497 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1500 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1501 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1502 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1503 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1507 local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1508 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1510 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1511 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1513 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1516 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1519 htlc_signatures: res.1
1522 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1523 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1524 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1526 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1527 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1529 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1530 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1532 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1534 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1535 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1536 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1538 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1539 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1540 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1542 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1544 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1545 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1547 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1551 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1552 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1553 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1554 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1555 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1557 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1558 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1559 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1560 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1562 let opt_anchors = false;
1564 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1565 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1566 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1568 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1570 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1571 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1572 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1575 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1576 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1577 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1578 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1579 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1580 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1584 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1585 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1586 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1587 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1588 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1589 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1591 let opt_anchors = false;
1593 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1594 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1595 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1596 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1597 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1598 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1599 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1601 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1602 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1603 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1606 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1607 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1608 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1609 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1610 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1611 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1612 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1613 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1614 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1616 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1617 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1618 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1619 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1620 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1623 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1624 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1625 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1626 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1627 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1628 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1629 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1630 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1634 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1635 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1636 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1637 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1638 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1640 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1641 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1642 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1644 let opt_anchors = false;
1646 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1647 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1648 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1649 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1650 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1651 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1652 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1654 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1655 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1656 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1657 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1658 // commitment transaction fee.
1659 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1661 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1662 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1663 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1666 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1667 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1668 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1669 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1673 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1674 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1675 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1676 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1677 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1678 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1679 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1680 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1682 let opt_anchors = false;
1684 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1686 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1687 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1688 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1689 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1691 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1692 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1693 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1694 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1695 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1696 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1697 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg);
1699 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1700 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1701 match msg_events[0] {
1702 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1703 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1705 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1710 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1711 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1712 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1713 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1714 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1715 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1716 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1717 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1719 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1720 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1721 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1722 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1723 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1724 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1726 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1727 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1728 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1729 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1730 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1731 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1733 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1734 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1735 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1736 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1740 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1741 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1742 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1743 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1744 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1745 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1746 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1749 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1750 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1751 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1752 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1754 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1755 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1756 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1757 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1759 // Add a pending HTLC.
1760 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1761 let payment_event_1 = {
1762 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1763 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1765 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1766 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1767 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1769 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1771 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1772 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1773 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1774 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1775 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1777 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1778 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1779 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1780 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1781 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1782 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1783 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1784 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1787 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1788 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1789 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1790 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1793 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1794 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1795 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1796 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1797 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1798 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1799 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1800 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1804 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1805 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1806 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1807 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1808 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1809 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1810 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1811 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1812 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1813 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1815 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1816 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1817 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1819 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1820 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1823 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1824 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1828 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1829 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1830 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1831 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1832 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1833 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1834 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1835 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1836 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1837 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1838 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1840 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1841 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1843 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1844 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1846 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1848 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1849 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1850 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1851 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1856 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1857 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1858 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1859 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1861 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1863 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1865 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1866 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1867 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1868 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1869 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1870 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1871 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1874 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1875 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1877 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1878 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1879 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1880 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1881 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1882 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1883 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1886 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1888 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1889 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1890 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1891 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1892 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1895 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1896 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1897 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1898 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1899 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1902 // adding pending output.
1903 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1904 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1905 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1906 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1907 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1908 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1909 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1910 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1911 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1913 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1914 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1915 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1917 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1918 let payment_event_1 = {
1919 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1920 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1922 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1923 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1924 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1926 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1928 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1929 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1931 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1932 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1933 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1934 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1937 // split the rest to test holding cell
1938 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1939 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1940 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1941 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1943 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1944 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1947 // now see if they go through on both sides
1948 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1949 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1950 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1951 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1952 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1953 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1955 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1957 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1958 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1959 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1960 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1961 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1964 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1965 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1966 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1967 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1968 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1969 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1971 // flush the pending htlc
1972 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1973 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1974 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1976 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1977 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1978 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1979 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1981 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1982 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1983 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1984 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1986 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1987 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1988 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1990 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1992 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1993 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1994 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1996 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1997 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1999 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
2000 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
2001 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
2002 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
2003 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
2004 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2006 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
2007 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
2008 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
2009 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
2011 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
2012 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2014 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2015 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2017 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
2018 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
2019 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
2021 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2022 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2023 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
2025 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2028 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2031 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
2032 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
2033 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
2035 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2036 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2037 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
2039 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2042 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2045 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
2046 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2047 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2049 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
2050 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2051 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2053 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
2054 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2055 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2056 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2057 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2059 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2060 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2064 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2065 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2066 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2067 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2068 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2069 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2070 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2071 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2073 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2074 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2075 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2076 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2077 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2078 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2079 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
2080 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2082 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2083 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2084 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2085 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2086 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2087 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2088 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2089 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2090 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2091 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2093 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2094 // Route the first two HTLCs.
2095 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
2096 let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
2098 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2099 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2101 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
2102 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2103 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2104 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2105 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2108 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2109 // initial fulfill/CS.
2110 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
2111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2112 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2114 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2115 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2116 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
2117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2118 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2120 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2121 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2122 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2123 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2124 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2126 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2127 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2128 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2129 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2130 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2132 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2133 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2134 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2136 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2137 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2138 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2140 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2141 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2142 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2144 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2145 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2146 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2147 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2148 // on-chain as necessary).
2149 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2150 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2152 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2153 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2155 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2157 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2159 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2160 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2162 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2163 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2164 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2165 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2166 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2167 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2169 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2170 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2171 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2173 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2174 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2175 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2176 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2177 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2180 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2181 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2182 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2183 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2185 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2187 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2189 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2191 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2192 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2194 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2195 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2196 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2197 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2199 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2200 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2201 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2203 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2206 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2207 expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2209 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2210 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2214 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2215 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2216 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2217 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2218 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2219 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2220 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2222 // Create some initial channels
2223 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2224 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2225 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2226 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2228 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2229 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2230 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2231 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2232 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2233 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2235 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2236 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2237 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2238 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2239 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2241 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2242 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2243 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2244 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2246 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2247 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2248 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2249 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2250 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2252 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2253 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2254 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2255 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2256 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2258 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2259 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2261 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2262 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2263 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2264 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2265 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2267 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2268 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2269 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2270 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2272 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2274 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2275 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2276 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2277 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2278 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2280 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2281 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2283 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2284 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2286 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2287 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2289 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2290 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2291 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2292 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2294 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2300 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2301 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2302 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2303 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2304 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
2305 let node2_commitment_txid;
2307 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2308 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2309 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2310 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2312 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2313 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2314 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2315 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2316 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2318 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2319 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2320 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2321 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2322 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2324 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2325 // confusing us in the following tests.
2326 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2328 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2329 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2330 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2333 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2334 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2335 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2336 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2337 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2338 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2341 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2344 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2345 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2347 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2349 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2351 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2353 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2354 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2355 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2361 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2363 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2364 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2366 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2367 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2368 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2369 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2370 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2373 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2376 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2377 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2379 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2381 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2382 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2384 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2385 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2386 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2388 nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2389 nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2390 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2391 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2393 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2394 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2395 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2399 fn test_justice_tx() {
2400 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2401 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2402 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2403 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2404 alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2405 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2406 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2407 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2408 bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2409 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2410 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2411 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2412 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2413 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2414 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2415 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2416 // Create some new channels:
2417 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2419 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2420 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2421 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2422 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2423 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2424 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2425 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2426 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2427 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2428 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2429 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2430 // Revoke the old state
2431 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2434 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2436 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2437 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2438 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2440 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2441 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2442 node_txn.truncate(1);
2444 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2445 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2446 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2448 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2449 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2450 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2451 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2452 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2453 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2454 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2455 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2456 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2458 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2460 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2461 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2463 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2464 // Create some new channels:
2465 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2467 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2471 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2472 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2473 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2474 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2475 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2476 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2477 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2478 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2479 // Revoke the old state
2480 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2482 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2484 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2485 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2486 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2488 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2489 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2492 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2494 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2495 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2496 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2497 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2498 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2499 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2500 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2502 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2503 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2504 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2508 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2509 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2510 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2511 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2512 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2513 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2514 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2515 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2516 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2517 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2518 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2519 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2520 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2521 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2522 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2524 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2525 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2526 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2527 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2528 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2529 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2531 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2532 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2534 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2535 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2536 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2537 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2538 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2542 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2543 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2544 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2545 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2546 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2547 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2548 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2550 // Create some new channel:
2551 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2553 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2554 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2555 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2556 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2557 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2559 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2560 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2561 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2562 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2563 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2564 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2565 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2566 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2567 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2569 //Revoke the old state
2570 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2573 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2574 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2575 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2576 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2577 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2578 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2579 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2580 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2582 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2583 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2585 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2586 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2588 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2589 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2590 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2591 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2592 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2593 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2594 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2595 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2597 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2598 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2599 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2601 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2602 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2603 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2607 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2608 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2609 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2610 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2611 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2612 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2613 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2615 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2617 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2618 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2619 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2620 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2621 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2622 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2624 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2625 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2627 //Revoke the old state
2628 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2631 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2632 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2633 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2634 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2635 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2636 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2637 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2639 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2640 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2643 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2644 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2646 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2647 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2648 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2649 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2650 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2651 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2653 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2654 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2655 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2656 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2657 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2658 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2659 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2661 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2662 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2663 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2664 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2666 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2667 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2668 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2670 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2671 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2672 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2673 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2674 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2675 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2676 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2677 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2679 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2680 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2681 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2685 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2686 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2687 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2688 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2689 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2690 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2691 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2692 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2693 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2695 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2696 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2697 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2698 // PaymentSent event).
2700 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2701 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2702 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2703 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2705 // Create some initial channels
2706 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2707 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2709 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2710 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2711 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2712 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2713 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2715 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2716 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2717 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2719 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2720 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2722 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2723 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2724 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2725 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2726 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2727 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2728 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2729 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2730 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2731 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2732 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2733 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2734 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2736 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2737 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2738 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2739 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2740 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2741 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2742 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2743 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2744 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2745 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2746 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2747 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2748 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2749 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2750 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2751 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2752 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2754 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2755 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2756 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2757 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2759 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2760 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2761 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2762 added_monitors.clear();
2764 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2765 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2766 match forwarded_events[0] {
2767 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2768 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2770 if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[1] {
2771 } else { panic!(); }
2772 if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[2] {
2773 } else { panic!(); }
2774 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2776 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2777 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2778 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2779 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2780 added_monitors.clear();
2782 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2784 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2785 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2788 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2789 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2793 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2794 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2795 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2796 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2797 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2798 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2800 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2802 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2803 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2804 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2805 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2806 // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2807 // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2808 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2809 check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2810 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2811 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2813 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2814 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2815 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2816 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2818 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2819 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2820 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2821 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2823 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2824 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2828 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2829 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2830 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2831 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2833 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2834 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2835 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2836 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2837 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2838 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2839 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2840 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2841 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2842 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2843 let commitment_spend =
2844 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2845 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2846 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2847 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2850 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2851 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2852 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2856 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2857 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2858 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2859 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2860 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2861 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2862 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2863 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2864 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2865 check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2866 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2867 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2869 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2870 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2871 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2872 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2873 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2874 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2875 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2876 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2877 let mut first_claimed = false;
2878 for event in events {
2880 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2881 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2882 assert!(!first_claimed);
2883 first_claimed = true;
2885 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2886 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2889 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2890 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2891 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2894 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2897 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2898 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2899 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2900 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2901 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2902 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2904 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2906 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2907 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2908 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2909 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2910 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2911 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2912 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2914 // Create some intial channels
2915 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2916 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2918 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2919 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2920 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2922 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2924 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2925 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2926 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2927 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2928 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2929 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2930 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2932 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2933 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2935 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2936 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2937 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2938 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2939 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2940 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2942 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2944 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2945 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2946 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2947 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2948 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2949 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2950 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2951 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2953 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2954 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2955 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2956 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2957 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2960 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2961 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2962 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2963 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2965 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2966 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2968 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2969 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2970 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2971 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2973 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2977 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2978 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2979 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2981 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2982 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2983 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2984 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2987 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2989 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2990 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2991 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2992 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2993 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2994 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2995 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2997 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
3001 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3002 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3003 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3004 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3006 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3007 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3008 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3009 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3010 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3011 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3013 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3016 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
3017 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3018 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
3020 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
3021 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3023 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3024 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3025 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3026 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
3027 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3028 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
3029 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
3030 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
3031 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3035 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3036 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3037 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3038 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3042 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3043 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3044 // and fail backward accordingly.
3046 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3047 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3048 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3049 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3051 // Create some initial channels
3052 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3053 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3055 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3056 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3057 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3058 // Revoke the old state
3059 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3061 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3063 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3064 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3065 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3066 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3067 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3069 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3070 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3071 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3072 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3074 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3075 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3076 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3077 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3078 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3079 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3081 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3082 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3083 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3085 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3089 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3090 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3091 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3092 // commitment transaction anymore.
3093 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3094 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3095 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3096 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3097 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3098 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3100 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3101 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3102 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3103 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3104 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3105 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3106 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3107 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3108 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3110 // Create some initial channels
3111 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3112 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3114 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3115 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3116 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3117 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3118 // Revoke the old state
3119 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3121 let value = if use_dust {
3122 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3123 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3124 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3127 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3128 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3129 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3131 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
3132 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3133 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3134 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3135 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3136 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3137 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3138 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3139 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3140 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3141 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3142 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3144 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
3145 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3146 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3147 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3148 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3149 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3150 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3151 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3152 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3153 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3154 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3155 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3156 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3157 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3158 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3159 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3161 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
3162 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3163 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3164 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3165 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3166 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3167 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3168 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3169 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3170 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3171 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3172 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3173 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3174 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3175 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3176 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3177 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3178 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3180 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3181 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3182 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3183 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3184 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3185 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3186 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3189 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3190 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3191 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3192 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3193 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3194 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3196 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3197 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3199 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3200 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3203 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3204 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3206 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3207 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3208 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3209 assert!(ANTI_REORG_DELAY > PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS); // We assume payments will also expire
3211 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3212 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 4 });
3214 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3215 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3218 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3219 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3221 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3223 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3225 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3226 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3228 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3231 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3232 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3235 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3236 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3238 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3239 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3240 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3241 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3242 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3244 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3245 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3246 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3247 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3249 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3253 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3254 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3255 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3256 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3257 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3258 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3260 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3263 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3264 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3265 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3266 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3267 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3268 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3269 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3271 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3272 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3273 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3275 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3277 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3278 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3280 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3281 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3282 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3283 // that we should update our routing table for.
3284 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3285 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3288 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3291 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3292 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3293 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3295 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3298 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3299 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3300 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3302 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3305 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3308 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3309 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3310 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3314 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3315 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3316 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3317 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3318 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3322 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3323 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3324 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3325 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3326 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3330 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3331 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3332 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3333 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3334 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3335 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3337 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3339 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3340 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3341 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3343 let payment_event = {
3344 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3345 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3346 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3348 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3349 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3352 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3353 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3355 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3358 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3361 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3363 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3365 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3366 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3367 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3368 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3369 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3370 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3372 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3373 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3379 onion_routing_packet,
3381 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3383 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3384 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3385 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3387 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3388 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3390 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3393 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3394 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3396 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3398 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3399 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3403 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3404 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3405 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3406 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3407 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3408 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3409 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3410 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3412 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3413 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
3414 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3415 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3416 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3417 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3419 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3420 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3421 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3423 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3424 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3425 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3426 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3427 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3429 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3430 // registering new transactions
3431 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3432 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3436 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3437 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3438 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3439 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3440 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3441 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3442 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3443 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3445 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3447 let mut payment_event = {
3448 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3449 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3451 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3452 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3453 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3456 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3457 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3459 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3461 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3462 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3463 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3464 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3466 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3467 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3468 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3469 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3470 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3472 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3473 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3474 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3476 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
3477 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3478 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3479 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3481 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3482 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3483 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3484 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3485 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3489 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3491 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3492 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3493 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3494 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3496 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3498 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3499 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3501 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3502 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3503 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3504 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3505 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3506 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3507 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3509 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3513 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3514 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3515 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3516 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3517 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3519 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3520 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3521 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3522 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3523 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3525 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3527 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3528 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3529 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3530 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3531 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3533 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3534 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3536 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3537 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3541 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3542 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3543 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3544 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3545 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3546 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3547 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3548 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3550 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3551 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3552 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3554 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3555 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3556 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3557 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3559 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3560 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3561 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3563 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3564 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3565 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3566 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3568 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3569 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3571 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3572 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3574 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3576 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3577 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3579 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3580 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3581 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3583 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3586 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3587 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3588 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3590 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3593 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3594 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3598 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3599 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3602 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3603 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3604 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3605 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3606 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3607 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3609 let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3610 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3611 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3612 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3613 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3614 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3615 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3617 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3620 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3622 let payment_event = {
3623 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3624 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3626 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3627 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3628 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3630 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3632 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3633 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3635 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3636 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3637 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3638 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3639 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3641 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3642 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3643 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3644 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3646 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3647 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3648 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3649 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3650 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3652 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3653 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3654 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3655 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3662 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3663 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3664 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3665 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3666 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3667 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3669 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3670 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3671 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3673 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3674 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3676 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3677 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3678 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3679 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3680 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3681 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3682 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3683 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3684 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3685 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3686 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3687 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3688 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3689 // Everything was delivered...
3690 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3693 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3694 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3696 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3697 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3700 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3701 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3702 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3704 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3706 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3707 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3709 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3710 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3711 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3713 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3714 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3715 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3717 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3720 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3723 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3724 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3726 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3727 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3728 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3729 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3730 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3731 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3732 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3733 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3734 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3735 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3736 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3738 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3741 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3742 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3744 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3745 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3747 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3748 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3749 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3751 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3754 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3755 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3756 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3757 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3759 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3760 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3761 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3762 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3764 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3765 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3766 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3767 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3768 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3770 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3771 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3772 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3773 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3780 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3781 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3782 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3783 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3784 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3785 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3787 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3789 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3790 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3791 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3792 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3793 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3794 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3795 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3796 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3797 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3798 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3799 // Everything was delivered...
3800 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3803 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3804 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3807 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3808 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3809 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3811 if messages_delivered > 2 {
3812 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3815 // Channel should still work fine...
3816 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3817 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3818 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3822 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3823 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3824 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3825 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3826 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3830 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3831 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3832 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3833 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3834 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3838 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3839 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3840 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3841 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3842 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3843 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3844 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3845 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3846 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3847 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3849 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3850 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3852 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3853 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3854 assert!(events_1.is_empty());
3856 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3858 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3859 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3861 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3862 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3863 assert!(events_2.is_empty());
3865 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3866 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3867 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3868 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3870 // nodes[0] hasn't yet received a funding_locked, so it only sends that on reconnect.
3871 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
3872 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3873 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3874 let as_funding_locked = match events_3[0] {
3875 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3876 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3879 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_3[0]),
3882 // nodes[1] received nodes[0]'s funding_locked on the first reconnect above, so it should send
3883 // announcement_signatures as well as channel_update.
3884 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
3885 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3886 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 3);
3888 let bs_funding_locked = match events_4[0] {
3889 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3890 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3891 chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3894 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[0]),
3896 let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_4[1] {
3897 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3898 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3901 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[1]),
3904 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3905 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3907 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[2]),
3910 // Re-deliver nodes[0]'s funding_locked, which nodes[1] can safely ignore. It currently
3911 // generates a duplicative private channel_update
3912 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
3913 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3914 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3916 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3917 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3919 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_5[0]),
3922 // When we deliver nodes[1]'s funding_locked, however, nodes[0] will generate its
3923 // announcement_signatures.
3924 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_locked);
3925 let events_6 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3926 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
3927 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
3928 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3929 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3932 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_6[0]),
3935 // When we deliver nodes[1]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[0], nodes[0] should immediately
3936 // broadcast the channel announcement globally, as well as re-send its (now-public)
3938 nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3939 let events_7 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3940 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3941 let (chan_announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
3942 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3943 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3945 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_7[0]),
3948 // Finally, deliver nodes[0]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[1] and make sure it creates the
3949 // same channel_announcement.
3950 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3951 let events_8 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3952 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3953 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
3954 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3955 assert_eq!(*msg, chan_announcement);
3958 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_8[0]),
3961 // Provide the channel announcement and public updates to the network graph
3962 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap();
3963 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3964 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3966 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3967 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3968 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3970 // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3971 // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3972 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3974 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3975 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3976 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3978 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3979 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3980 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3981 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3982 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3983 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3984 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3985 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3987 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3988 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3989 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3990 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3991 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3992 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3994 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3995 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3996 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3997 logger: nodes[0].logger,
4001 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4002 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4004 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4005 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4006 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4008 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4010 // The channel announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
4011 nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
4012 let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4013 let mut found_announcement = false;
4014 for event in msgs.iter() {
4016 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
4017 if *msg == chan_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
4019 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
4020 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4023 assert!(found_announcement);
4027 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4028 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4029 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4030 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4031 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4032 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4033 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4034 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4036 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4038 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4039 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4040 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
4041 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4043 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4044 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4046 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4047 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4050 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
4051 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4053 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4054 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4056 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4057 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4058 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4059 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4060 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4061 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4062 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4064 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4065 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4066 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4068 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4069 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4070 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4072 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4075 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4076 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4077 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4078 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4080 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4083 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4084 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4086 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4087 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4088 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4089 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4090 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4091 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4093 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4094 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4095 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4096 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4098 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4099 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4101 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4102 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4104 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4106 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4107 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4108 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4109 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4110 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4111 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4112 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4113 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4114 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4115 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4117 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4118 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4119 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4120 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4121 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4122 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4123 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4124 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4126 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4127 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4128 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4129 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4130 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4131 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4132 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4133 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4135 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4136 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4137 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4140 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4141 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4142 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4145 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4146 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4149 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4151 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4152 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4154 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4155 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4157 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4158 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4159 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4161 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4164 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4167 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4168 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4171 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4172 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4175 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4176 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4177 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4178 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4179 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4180 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4181 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4183 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4185 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4186 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4187 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4188 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4189 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4190 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4191 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4192 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4193 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4194 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4195 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4196 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4197 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4200 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4203 let mut block = Block {
4204 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4207 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4208 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4209 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4210 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4211 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4212 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4213 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4216 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4218 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4219 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4220 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4221 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4222 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4223 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4225 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4226 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4227 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4228 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4229 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4230 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4234 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4235 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4236 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4239 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4240 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4241 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4242 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4243 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4244 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4245 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4246 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4248 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4249 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4250 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4251 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4253 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4254 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4256 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4258 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4259 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4261 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4262 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4263 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4264 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4266 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4267 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4268 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4269 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4270 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4274 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4275 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4276 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4277 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4280 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4281 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4282 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4283 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4284 match fail_commit[0] {
4285 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4286 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4287 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4289 _ => unreachable!(),
4291 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4293 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4294 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4295 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
4296 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4297 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4298 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
4299 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4300 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4305 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4306 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4307 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4311 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4312 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4313 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4314 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4315 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4316 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4317 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4318 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4319 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4320 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4322 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4324 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4326 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4327 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4328 get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4329 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4331 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4332 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4333 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4334 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4335 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4336 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4337 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4338 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4339 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4340 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4342 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4343 let config = UserConfig::default();
4344 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4345 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4346 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4347 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4348 default_config: config,
4350 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4351 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4352 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4357 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4358 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4360 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4361 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4362 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4363 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4365 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4366 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4367 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4368 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4370 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4371 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4372 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4373 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4375 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4376 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4377 for node in nodes.iter() {
4378 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4379 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4380 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4383 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4387 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4388 // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4389 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4390 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4391 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4392 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4393 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4394 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4395 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4396 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4397 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4399 // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4400 let channel_value = 100000;
4401 let push_msat = 10001;
4402 let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4403 let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4404 let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4405 let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4406 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4407 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4408 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4410 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
4412 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4413 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4415 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4417 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4418 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4419 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4420 added_monitors.clear();
4423 let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4424 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4426 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4427 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4428 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4429 added_monitors.clear();
4431 // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4436 // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4437 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4438 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4439 get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4441 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4442 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4443 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4444 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4445 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4446 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4447 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4448 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4449 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4450 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4452 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4453 let config = UserConfig::default();
4454 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4455 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4456 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4457 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4458 default_config: config,
4460 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4461 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4462 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4467 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4468 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4470 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4472 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4473 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4475 // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4476 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4477 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4478 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4479 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4481 // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4482 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4483 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4485 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4486 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4487 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4488 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4490 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4491 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4492 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4493 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4495 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4496 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4497 for node in nodes.iter() {
4498 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4499 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4500 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4503 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4507 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4508 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4509 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4510 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4511 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4512 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4513 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4514 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4515 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4516 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4517 let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4519 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4520 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4522 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4524 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4525 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4526 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4528 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4529 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4530 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4531 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4532 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4533 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4534 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4535 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4536 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4537 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4539 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4540 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4541 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4542 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4543 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4544 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4546 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4547 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4548 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4553 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4554 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4556 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4557 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4558 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4560 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4562 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4563 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4567 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4568 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4569 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4570 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4571 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4572 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4573 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4574 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4575 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4576 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4577 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4578 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4579 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4580 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4582 let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4583 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4584 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4585 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4586 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4589 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4591 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4592 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4594 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4595 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4596 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4597 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4599 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4601 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4602 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4603 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4604 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4605 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4608 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4609 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4610 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4611 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4612 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4613 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4616 let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4617 for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4618 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4619 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4620 assert!(read.is_empty());
4621 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4624 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4625 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4626 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4627 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4628 assert!(read.is_empty());
4629 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4632 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4633 if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4634 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4635 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4637 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4638 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4639 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4641 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4643 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4646 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4647 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4648 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4649 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4651 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4652 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4653 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4655 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4657 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4658 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4660 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4661 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4662 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4663 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4664 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4667 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4668 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4669 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4671 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4672 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4674 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4675 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4676 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4677 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4678 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4680 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4681 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4682 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4683 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4684 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4685 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4686 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4688 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4689 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4691 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4696 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4697 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4699 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4700 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4701 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4702 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4703 for event in events.drain(..) {
4705 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4706 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4707 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4708 all_outputs.push(outp);
4711 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4714 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4715 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4725 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4726 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4727 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4728 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4729 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4730 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4732 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4733 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4734 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4735 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4736 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4737 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4738 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4739 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4740 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4742 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4743 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4745 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4746 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4747 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4748 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4749 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4753 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4754 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4755 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4756 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4757 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4758 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4759 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4761 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4762 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4763 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4764 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4765 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4767 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4768 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4769 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4770 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4772 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4773 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4774 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4775 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4776 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4778 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4779 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4780 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4784 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4785 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4786 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4788 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4789 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4790 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4791 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4793 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4794 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4795 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4796 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4797 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4799 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4800 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4801 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4803 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4805 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4806 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4807 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4809 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4810 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4811 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4812 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4813 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4817 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4818 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4819 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4820 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4821 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4823 // Create some initial channels
4824 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4826 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4828 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4829 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4830 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4832 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4833 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4834 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4835 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4836 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4837 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4839 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4840 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4843 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4844 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4847 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4848 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4849 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4850 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4851 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4852 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4853 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4855 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4856 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4857 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4859 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4860 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4861 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4865 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4866 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4867 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4868 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4869 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4871 // Create some initial channels
4872 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4874 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4875 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4877 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4879 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4880 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4881 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4883 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4884 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4885 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4886 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4888 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4889 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4891 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4893 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4894 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4895 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4896 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4897 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4898 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4900 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4901 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4902 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4903 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4905 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4906 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4907 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4908 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4909 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4913 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4914 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4915 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4916 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4917 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4919 // Create some initial channels
4920 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4922 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4923 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4924 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4925 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4927 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4929 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4930 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4931 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4932 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4934 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4935 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4936 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4937 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4939 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4940 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4942 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4943 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4944 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4948 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4949 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4950 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4951 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4952 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4953 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4955 // Create some initial channels
4956 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4958 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4959 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4960 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4961 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4963 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4965 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4966 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4967 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4968 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4969 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4970 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4972 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4973 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4974 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4975 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4976 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4977 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4978 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4980 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4981 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4982 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4983 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4984 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4985 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4987 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4988 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4989 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4990 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4991 // transactions next...
4992 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4993 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4995 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4996 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4997 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4998 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5000 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
5001 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5004 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5005 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5007 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
5008 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5010 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5011 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5012 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5013 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5014 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
5018 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
5019 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5020 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
5021 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5022 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5023 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5025 // Create some initial channels
5026 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5028 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5029 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5030 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5031 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5033 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
5034 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
5036 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5038 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
5039 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5040 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5041 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5042 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5043 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5045 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5046 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5047 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5048 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5050 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
5051 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
5052 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
5054 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5055 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5056 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
5057 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5058 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5059 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5061 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5062 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5064 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5065 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5066 // transactions next...
5067 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
5068 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5069 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
5070 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5072 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
5073 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5076 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5077 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5079 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5081 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
5082 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5084 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
5085 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
5087 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5088 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5089 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5090 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5091 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
5092 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5093 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
5094 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
5098 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
5099 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
5100 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
5101 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
5102 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
5104 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
5107 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5108 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5109 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5110 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5112 // Create some initial channels
5113 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5114 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5116 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5117 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5118 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5119 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5120 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5122 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5123 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5124 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5126 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
5127 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5128 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5129 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5131 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5132 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5133 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5134 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5135 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5137 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5138 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5139 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5140 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5142 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5143 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5144 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5145 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5146 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5147 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5148 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5149 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5150 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5151 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5153 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5154 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5155 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5157 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5158 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5160 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5161 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5164 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
5165 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5166 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5168 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5171 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5172 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5173 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5174 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5177 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5178 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5179 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5180 match msg_events[0] {
5181 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5182 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5184 match msg_events[1] {
5185 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5186 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5188 match msg_events[2] {
5189 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5190 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5191 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5192 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5193 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5194 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5196 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5198 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5199 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5200 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5201 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5202 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5203 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5204 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5205 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5206 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5207 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5208 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5209 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5210 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5212 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5213 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5217 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5218 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5219 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5220 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5221 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5222 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5223 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5224 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5225 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5226 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5227 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5228 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5229 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5230 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5232 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5233 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5234 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5236 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5237 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5238 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5239 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5240 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5242 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
5244 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5245 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5246 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5247 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5248 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], vec![], 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5249 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5251 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5252 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5253 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5255 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5256 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5257 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5258 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5259 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5261 let htlc_timeout_tx;
5262 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5263 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5264 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5265 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5266 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5268 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5269 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5270 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5271 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5272 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5273 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5274 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5276 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5277 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5278 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5279 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5282 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5283 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5284 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5285 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5286 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5288 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5289 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5292 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5293 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5295 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5296 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5297 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5298 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5299 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5300 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5301 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5302 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5303 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5304 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5305 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5306 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5307 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5309 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5310 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5311 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5312 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5313 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5314 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5315 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5316 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5317 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5320 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5321 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5323 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5325 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5327 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5328 // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5329 // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5330 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5331 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], Some(196*2), true);
5332 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5333 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5334 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5335 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5336 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5337 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5338 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5340 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5341 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5343 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5345 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5346 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5347 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5349 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5354 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5355 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5356 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5357 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5358 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5360 // Create some initial channels
5361 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5363 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5364 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5365 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5366 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5367 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5369 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5370 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5371 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5372 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5373 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5374 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5375 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5377 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5378 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5381 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5382 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5385 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5386 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5387 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5388 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5389 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5390 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5391 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5395 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5396 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5398 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5399 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5400 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5401 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5402 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5403 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5406 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5407 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5408 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5409 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5410 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5411 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5412 // use the same payment hashes.
5413 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5418 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5419 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5420 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5421 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5422 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5423 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5424 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5425 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5426 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5427 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5429 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5430 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5431 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5432 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5433 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5435 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5436 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5437 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5438 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5440 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5442 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5444 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5445 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5447 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5449 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5451 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5453 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5454 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5456 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5458 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5461 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5463 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5464 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5467 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5469 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5470 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5472 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5473 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5474 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5475 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5476 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5478 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5479 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5480 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5481 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5482 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5483 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5484 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5485 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5486 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5488 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5489 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5490 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5491 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5492 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5493 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5495 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5496 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5497 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5498 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5499 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5500 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5502 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5503 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5504 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5505 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5507 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5509 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5510 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5511 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5512 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5513 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5514 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5515 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5516 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5517 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5518 if deliver_last_raa {
5519 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5521 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5524 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5525 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5526 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5527 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5529 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5530 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5531 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5533 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5534 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5535 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5537 if announce_latest {
5538 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5540 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5542 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5543 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5544 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5547 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5551 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5552 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5555 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5556 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5557 if deliver_last_raa {
5558 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5560 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5562 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5564 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5565 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5566 let mut a_done = false;
5567 for msg in cs_msgs {
5569 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5570 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5571 // should be failed-backwards here.
5572 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5573 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5574 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5575 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5577 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5582 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5583 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5584 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5586 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5587 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5590 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5591 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5592 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5593 if announce_latest {
5594 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5595 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5596 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5599 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5601 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5605 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5606 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5607 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5608 let mut as_updates = 0;
5609 for event in as_events.iter() {
5610 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5611 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5612 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5613 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5615 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5617 if network_update.is_some() {
5620 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5622 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5623 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5624 if announce_latest {
5625 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5626 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5628 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5630 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5631 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5632 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5633 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5634 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5635 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5636 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5637 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5638 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5640 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5642 if network_update.is_some() {
5645 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5647 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5648 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5649 if announce_latest {
5650 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5652 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5654 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5655 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5656 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5657 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5658 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5659 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5663 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5664 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5668 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5669 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5673 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5674 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5675 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5676 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5680 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5681 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5682 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5683 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5684 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5686 // Create some initial channels
5687 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5689 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5690 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5691 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5692 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5694 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5695 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5696 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5697 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5698 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5699 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5701 let htlc_timeout = {
5702 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5703 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5704 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5705 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5706 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5707 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5711 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5712 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5713 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5715 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5716 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5717 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5718 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5719 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5720 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5721 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5722 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5723 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5724 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5725 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5729 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5730 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5731 // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5732 // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5734 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5736 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5737 let seed = [42; 32];
5738 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5739 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5740 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph: &chanmon_cfgs[0].network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5741 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5742 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5743 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5745 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5746 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5748 // Create some initial channels
5749 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5751 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5752 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5753 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5755 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5756 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5757 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5758 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5759 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5761 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5762 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5763 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5764 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5765 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5767 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5768 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5769 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5770 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5771 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5772 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5773 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5774 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5777 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5778 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5779 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5780 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5781 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5782 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5784 let htlc_timeout = {
5785 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5786 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5787 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5788 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5792 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5793 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5794 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5796 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5797 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5798 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5799 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5800 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5801 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5802 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5803 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5804 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5805 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5806 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5807 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5811 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5812 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5813 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5814 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5815 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5817 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5819 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5820 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5822 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5823 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5824 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5826 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5827 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5828 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5830 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5831 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5832 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5834 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5835 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5836 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5839 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5840 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5841 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5842 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5843 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5844 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5846 let (payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5848 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5849 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5850 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5851 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5853 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5854 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5855 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5857 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5858 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5859 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5860 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5861 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5863 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5864 let mut block = Block {
5865 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5868 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5869 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5870 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5872 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5873 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5874 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5875 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5878 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5879 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5880 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5881 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5882 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5883 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5885 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5886 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5887 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5889 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5891 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5892 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5893 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5895 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5896 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5898 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5899 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5900 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5902 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5903 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5904 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5905 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5908 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5909 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5910 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5911 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5912 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5913 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5915 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5916 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5917 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5918 // actually revoked.
5919 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5920 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5921 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5922 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5923 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5925 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5926 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5927 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5928 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5929 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5930 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5931 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5932 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5933 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5934 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5936 if check_revoke_no_close {
5937 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5938 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5941 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5942 let mut block = Block {
5943 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5946 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5947 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5948 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5950 if !check_revoke_no_close {
5951 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5952 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5953 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5954 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5956 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5957 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5958 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
5959 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5960 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5961 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
5962 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5963 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5967 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5968 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5969 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5970 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5971 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5972 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5973 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5975 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5976 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5977 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5979 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5980 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5981 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5983 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5984 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5988 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5989 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5990 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5991 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5992 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5997 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5998 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5999 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6000 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6001 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6002 //Force duplicate channel ids
6003 for node in nodes.iter() {
6004 *node.keys_manager.override_channel_id_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
6007 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
6008 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6009 let push_msat=10001;
6010 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6011 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6012 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6014 //Create a second channel with a channel_id collision
6015 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6019 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
6020 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6021 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6022 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6023 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6025 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
6026 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
6027 let push_msat=10001;
6028 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6030 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
6031 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6032 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
6033 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
6034 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6036 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
6037 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6038 let push_msat=10001;
6039 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
6040 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6041 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
6043 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
6044 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
6045 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
6047 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
6048 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
6049 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6051 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
6052 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
6053 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
6055 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
6056 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
6057 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6058 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6059 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
6060 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6064 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
6065 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6066 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6067 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6068 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6070 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
6071 let push_msat=10001;
6072 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6073 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6074 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
6075 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
6077 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6078 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6079 let err_msg = match events[0] {
6080 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
6083 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6085 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
6088 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
6089 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
6090 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
6091 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
6093 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
6094 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6095 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6096 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6097 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6098 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6100 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6101 // pending_update_fee.
6103 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6104 *feerate_lock += 20;
6106 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6107 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6109 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6110 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6111 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6112 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6113 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6115 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6118 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6120 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6121 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6122 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6123 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6125 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6126 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6127 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6129 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6130 let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6131 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6132 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6134 // Flush the pending fee update.
6135 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6136 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6137 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6138 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6139 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6141 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6142 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6143 // us to surface its failure to the user.
6144 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6145 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6146 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6147 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6148 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6149 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6151 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6152 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6153 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6155 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6156 assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6157 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6158 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6159 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6160 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6161 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6162 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6163 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6165 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6169 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6170 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6171 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6173 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6174 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6175 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6176 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6177 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6178 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6180 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6181 // pending_update_fee.
6183 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6184 *feerate_lock += 200;
6186 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6187 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6189 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6190 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6191 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6192 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6193 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6195 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6198 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6200 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6201 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6202 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6203 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6205 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6207 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
6208 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6209 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6211 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6212 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6213 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6214 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6215 let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6216 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6217 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6219 // Flush the pending fee update.
6220 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6221 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6222 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6223 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6224 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6225 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6227 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6228 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6229 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6230 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6231 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6232 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6233 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6234 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6235 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6237 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6238 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6239 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6241 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6242 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6243 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6244 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6245 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6246 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6247 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6248 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6249 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6251 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6254 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6255 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6256 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6257 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6258 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6260 let raa = match send_raa_event {
6261 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6262 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6264 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6265 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6266 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6267 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6268 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6269 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6271 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6272 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6274 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6275 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6276 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6278 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6279 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6281 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6282 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6283 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6284 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6285 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6286 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6289 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6290 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6291 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6294 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6295 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6296 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6297 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6298 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6299 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6300 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6301 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6302 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6303 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6304 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6306 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6307 // pending_update_fee.
6309 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6310 *feerate_lock += 20;
6312 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6313 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6315 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6316 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6317 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6318 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6319 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6321 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6324 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6326 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6327 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6328 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6329 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6331 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6333 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6334 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6335 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6336 let payment_event = {
6337 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6338 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6340 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6341 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6343 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6345 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6346 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6347 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6348 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6350 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6351 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6353 // Flush the pending fee update.
6354 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6355 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6357 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6358 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6359 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6361 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6362 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6363 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6365 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6366 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6369 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6372 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6373 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6374 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6376 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6377 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6378 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6379 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6380 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6381 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6384 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6385 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6386 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6388 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6389 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6390 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6391 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6392 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6393 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6394 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6395 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6396 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6397 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6399 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6402 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6403 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6404 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6406 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6407 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6408 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6409 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6410 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6411 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6412 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6413 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6414 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6415 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6416 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6418 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6419 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6420 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6423 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6424 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6425 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6428 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6429 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6430 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6431 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6432 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6433 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6434 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6436 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6437 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6439 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6440 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6441 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6442 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6446 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6447 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6448 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6449 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6450 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6451 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6452 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6454 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6455 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6456 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6457 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6459 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6460 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6464 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6465 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6466 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6467 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6468 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6469 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6470 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6472 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6473 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6474 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6475 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6476 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6478 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6479 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6480 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6481 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6482 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6486 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6487 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6488 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6489 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6490 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6491 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6492 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6493 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6495 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], vec![], 100000000, 500000001);
6496 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6497 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6501 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6502 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6503 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6504 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6505 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6506 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6507 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6508 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6509 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6510 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6512 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6513 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6514 let payment_event = {
6515 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6516 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6518 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6519 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6520 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6521 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6525 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6527 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6528 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6529 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6531 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6532 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6534 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6535 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6536 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6538 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6539 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6543 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6544 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6545 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6546 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6547 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6548 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6549 let channel_value = 100000;
6550 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6551 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6553 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6555 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6556 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6558 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6559 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6560 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6562 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6563 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6565 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6568 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6570 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6571 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6572 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6573 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6574 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6575 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6576 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6577 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6579 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6580 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6581 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6584 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6585 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6586 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6587 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6588 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6589 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6590 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6591 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6592 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6593 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6594 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6598 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6599 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6600 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6601 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6602 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6603 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6604 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6606 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6607 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6608 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6609 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6610 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6611 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6613 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6614 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6615 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6616 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6617 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6619 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6620 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6621 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6622 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6623 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6625 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6626 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6627 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6628 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6629 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6633 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6634 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6635 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6636 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6637 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6638 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6639 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6640 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6642 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6643 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6644 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6645 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6646 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6647 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6649 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6653 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6654 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6655 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6658 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6659 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6660 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6662 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6663 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6665 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6666 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6667 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6668 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6669 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6673 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6674 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6675 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6676 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6677 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6678 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6679 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6681 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6682 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6683 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6684 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6685 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6686 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6688 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6689 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6690 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6691 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6692 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6696 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6697 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6698 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6699 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6700 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6701 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6703 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6704 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6705 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6706 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6707 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6708 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6709 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6711 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6712 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6713 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6714 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6715 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6719 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6720 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6721 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6722 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6723 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6724 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6725 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6726 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6728 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6729 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6730 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6731 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6732 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6733 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6735 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6736 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6737 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6738 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6739 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6740 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6741 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6742 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6743 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6744 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6745 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6746 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6747 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6750 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6751 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6752 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6753 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6754 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6756 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6758 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6759 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6760 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6761 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6762 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6766 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6767 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6769 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6770 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6771 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6772 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6773 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6774 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6775 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6777 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6778 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6779 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6781 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6784 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6787 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6789 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6790 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6791 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6792 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6793 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6797 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6798 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6800 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6801 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6802 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6803 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6804 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6806 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6807 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6808 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6809 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6810 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6812 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6815 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6818 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6820 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6821 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6822 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6823 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6824 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6828 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6829 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6831 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6832 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6833 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6834 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6835 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6837 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6838 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6839 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6840 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6841 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6842 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6845 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6846 failure_code: 0x8000,
6849 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6851 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6852 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6853 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6854 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6855 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6859 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6860 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6862 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6863 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6864 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6865 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6866 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6868 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6870 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6871 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6873 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6874 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6875 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6877 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6878 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6879 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6880 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6881 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6882 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6883 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6885 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6889 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6891 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6893 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6894 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6895 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6896 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6897 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6901 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6902 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6904 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6905 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6906 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6907 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6908 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6910 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6912 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6913 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6915 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6916 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6917 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6919 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6920 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6921 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6922 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6923 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6924 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6925 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6927 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6931 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6933 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6935 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6936 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6937 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6938 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6939 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6943 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6944 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6946 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6947 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6948 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6949 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6950 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6952 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6953 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6956 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6957 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6959 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6960 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6961 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6963 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6965 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6967 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6968 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6969 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6970 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6971 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6972 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6973 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6975 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6978 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6979 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6981 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6982 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6983 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6984 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6985 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6989 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6990 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6991 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6993 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6994 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6995 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6996 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6997 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6998 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7000 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
7003 let mut payment_event = {
7004 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7005 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7006 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7007 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7008 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
7010 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7011 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7012 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7013 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7014 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7015 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7016 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7017 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
7018 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
7021 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7022 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7023 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
7024 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7026 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7027 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7028 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
7030 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7031 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7032 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7033 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7034 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7035 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7036 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7038 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7042 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
7044 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7045 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
7046 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7047 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7048 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7050 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
7052 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7053 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7054 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7055 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7056 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7057 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7059 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7062 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7065 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7066 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7067 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7068 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7070 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7071 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7072 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7073 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7074 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7075 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7077 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7079 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7080 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7081 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7082 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7084 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7085 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7087 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7088 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
7089 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7090 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7091 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7093 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7094 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7095 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7096 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7098 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7099 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7101 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7103 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7104 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7106 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7109 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7110 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7112 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7115 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7116 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7117 if announce_latest {
7118 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7120 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7123 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7124 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7125 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7127 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7128 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7129 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7130 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7131 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7132 let mut first_failed = false;
7133 for event in events {
7135 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7136 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7137 assert!(!first_failed);
7138 first_failed = true;
7140 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7143 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7149 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7150 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7151 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7154 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7155 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7156 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7157 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7158 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7159 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7160 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7162 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7163 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7164 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7165 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7166 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7168 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7170 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7171 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7173 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7174 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7176 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7178 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7179 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7182 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7184 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7185 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7186 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7187 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7188 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7190 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7191 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7192 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7193 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7194 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7195 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7196 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7197 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7198 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7199 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7200 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7202 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7203 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7204 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7205 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7206 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7207 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7208 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7209 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7211 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7212 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7213 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
7214 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7215 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7216 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7217 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7219 // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
7221 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7222 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7225 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7226 if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7227 else { first = false; }
7229 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7232 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7233 if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7234 else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7236 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7243 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7244 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7245 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7246 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7250 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7251 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7253 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7254 low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7255 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7256 high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7257 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7258 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7259 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7260 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7261 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7263 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7264 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0) {
7266 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7267 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7269 } else { assert!(false) }
7271 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7272 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7273 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7274 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7275 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger) {
7277 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7278 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7280 } else { assert!(false); }
7282 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7283 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7284 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7285 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7286 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7287 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7289 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7291 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7292 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7293 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7297 } else { panic!(); }
7298 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7300 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7301 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7302 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7303 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7304 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger) {
7306 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7307 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7309 } else { assert!(false); }
7313 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7314 // We want to be sure that :
7315 // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7316 // (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7317 // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7318 // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7319 // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7325 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7326 // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7327 // during signing due to revoked tx
7328 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7329 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7332 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7333 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7334 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7336 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7338 // Cache node A state before any channel update
7339 let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7340 let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7341 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7343 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7344 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7346 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7347 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7349 // Restore node A from previous state
7350 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7351 let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7352 chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7353 tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7354 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7355 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7356 monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7358 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7359 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7360 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7361 keys_manager: keys_manager,
7362 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7363 chain_monitor: &monitor,
7365 tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7366 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7370 nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7371 assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7372 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7373 nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7375 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7377 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7378 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7380 let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7382 // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7383 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7384 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7387 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7388 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7391 let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7392 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7393 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7394 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7395 reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7396 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7397 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7399 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7400 assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7402 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7405 panic!("Unexpected event")
7409 // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7410 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7411 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_string() });
7412 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction");
7413 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7415 // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7416 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7417 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7418 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
7419 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
7420 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
7421 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7422 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting".to_string() });
7423 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
7424 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7425 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
7429 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7430 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7431 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7432 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7434 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7435 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7436 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7437 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7439 // Create some initial channels
7440 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7442 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7443 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7444 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7445 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7446 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7447 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7448 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7450 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7451 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7452 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7453 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7454 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7456 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7457 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7458 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7459 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7461 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7462 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7463 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7465 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7466 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7467 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7468 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7469 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7470 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7471 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7472 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7473 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7474 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7476 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7478 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7480 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7481 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7483 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7484 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7485 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7486 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7490 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7491 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7492 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7494 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7495 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7496 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7497 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7499 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7500 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7501 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7504 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7505 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7507 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7508 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7509 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7510 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7511 let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7512 for e in msg_events {
7514 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7515 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7516 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7517 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7518 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7521 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7525 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7526 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7527 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7528 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7529 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7530 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7532 // Reestablish chan_1
7533 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7534 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7535 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7536 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7537 // Reestablish chan_2
7538 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7539 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7540 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7541 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7542 // Reestablish chan_3
7543 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7544 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7545 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7546 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7548 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7549 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7550 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7551 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7552 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7553 for e in msg_events {
7555 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7556 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7557 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7558 // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7560 Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7561 None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7564 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7567 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7568 assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7572 fn test_priv_forwarding_rejection() {
7573 // If we have a private channel with outbound liquidity, and
7574 // UserConfig::accept_forwards_to_priv_channels is set to false, we should reject any attempts
7575 // to forward through that channel.
7576 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7577 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7578 let mut no_announce_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
7579 no_announce_cfg.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
7580 no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = false;
7581 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(no_announce_cfg), None]);
7582 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
7583 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
7584 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
7585 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7587 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7589 // Note that the create_*_chan functions in utils requires announcement_signatures, which we do
7590 // not send for private channels.
7591 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7592 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7593 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
7594 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7595 nodes[1].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7597 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[1], 1_000_000, 42);
7598 nodes[1].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7599 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()));
7600 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
7602 let cs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7603 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_funding_signed);
7604 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7606 let conf_height = core::cmp::max(nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1, nodes[2].best_block_info().1 + 1);
7607 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, conf_height);
7608 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7609 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[2], &tx, conf_height);
7610 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7611 let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7612 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7613 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7614 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
7615 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7617 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7618 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
7619 assert!(!nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7621 // We should always be able to forward through nodes[1] as long as its out through a public
7623 send_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], 10_000);
7625 // ... however, if we send to nodes[2], we will have to pass the private channel from nodes[1]
7626 // to nodes[2], which should be rejected:
7627 let route_hint = RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
7628 src_node_id: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
7629 short_channel_id: nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(),
7630 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 1000, proportional_millionths: 0 },
7631 cltv_expiry_delta: MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
7632 htlc_minimum_msat: None,
7633 htlc_maximum_msat: None,
7635 let last_hops = vec![route_hint];
7636 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], last_hops, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
7638 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7639 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7640 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
7641 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7642 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7644 let htlc_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7645 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7646 assert_eq!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7647 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7648 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fee.is_none());
7650 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7651 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7652 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(), true);
7654 // Now disconnect nodes[1] from its peers and restart with accept_forwards_to_priv_channels set
7655 // to true. Sadly there is currently no way to change it at runtime.
7657 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7658 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7660 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
7661 let mut monitor_a_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7662 let mut monitor_b_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7663 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut monitor_a_serialized).unwrap();
7664 get_monitor!(nodes[1], cs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut monitor_b_serialized).unwrap();
7666 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7667 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
7668 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7669 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
7671 let mut monitor_a_read = &monitor_a_serialized.0[..];
7672 let mut monitor_b_read = &monitor_b_serialized.0[..];
7673 let (_, mut monitor_a) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_a_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7674 let (_, mut monitor_b) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_b_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7675 assert!(monitor_a_read.is_empty());
7676 assert!(monitor_b_read.is_empty());
7678 no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = true;
7680 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
7681 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
7682 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7683 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_a);
7684 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_b);
7685 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7686 default_config: no_announce_cfg,
7688 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
7689 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
7690 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7691 logger: nodes[1].logger,
7695 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
7696 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
7698 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_a).is_ok());
7699 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_b).is_ok());
7700 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7701 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
7703 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7704 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7705 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7706 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7707 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
7708 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7709 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7710 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7712 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7713 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7714 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7715 let cs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7716 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7717 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_reestablish);
7718 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7719 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7721 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7722 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7723 pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], 10_000, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret);
7724 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], our_payment_preimage);
7728 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7729 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7730 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7732 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7733 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7734 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7735 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7737 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7739 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7740 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], vec![], 3000000, 30);
7741 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7743 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7744 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7745 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7746 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7747 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7748 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7750 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7751 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7752 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7753 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7757 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7758 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7760 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7761 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7762 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7763 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7764 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7766 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7770 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7771 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7772 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7773 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7774 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7775 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7776 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7777 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7781 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7782 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7783 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7784 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7786 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7787 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7788 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7789 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7790 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7791 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7792 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7793 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7794 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7795 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7796 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7797 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7798 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7802 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7804 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7805 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7807 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7809 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7810 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7811 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7812 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7813 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7814 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7815 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7816 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7817 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7818 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7819 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7820 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7821 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7825 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7827 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7828 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7832 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7833 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7834 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7836 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7837 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7838 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7839 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7840 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7842 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7843 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7844 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7845 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7846 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7847 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7848 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7849 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7850 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, nodes[1].network_graph, None,
7851 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7852 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7854 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7855 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7856 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7858 // Revoke local commitment tx
7859 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7861 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7862 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7863 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7864 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7865 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7866 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7867 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7869 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7870 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7871 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7873 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7874 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7875 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7877 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7878 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7879 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7880 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7882 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7883 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7884 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7885 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7886 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7887 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7888 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7889 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7891 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7892 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7898 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7899 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7900 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7902 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7903 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7904 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7905 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7907 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7908 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7909 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7910 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7911 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7912 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7914 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7915 // available, which we check here:
7916 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7917 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7918 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7920 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7921 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7923 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7924 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7925 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7926 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7928 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7929 // output, checked above).
7930 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7931 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7932 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7934 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7935 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7936 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7937 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
7938 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7942 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7943 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7944 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7945 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7946 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7948 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7949 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7951 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7952 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7953 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7954 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7955 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7957 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7958 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7964 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7965 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7966 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7967 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7969 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7970 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7972 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7973 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7974 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7975 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7976 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7977 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7978 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7979 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7983 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7984 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7985 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7986 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7988 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7989 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7990 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7991 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7992 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7993 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7994 // up bumped justice generation.
7995 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7998 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7999 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8003 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
8004 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
8005 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
8008 // Provide preimage for one
8009 // Check aggregation
8011 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8012 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8013 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8014 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8016 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8017 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
8018 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
8020 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
8021 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
8022 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
8023 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8024 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8026 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
8027 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8028 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
8029 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8030 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
8032 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
8036 let feerate_timeout;
8037 let feerate_preimage;
8039 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8040 // 9 transactions including:
8041 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
8042 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
8043 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
8045 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
8046 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8047 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
8048 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8049 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
8050 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
8051 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
8053 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
8054 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
8055 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
8056 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
8058 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
8059 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8060 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
8061 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].get_weight() as u64;
8063 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
8064 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8065 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8066 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
8070 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
8071 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
8073 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
8074 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
8076 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8077 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8078 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8079 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
8080 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8081 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
8083 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
8084 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
8085 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.get_weight() as u64;
8086 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
8087 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
8089 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8090 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8091 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
8092 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
8093 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
8098 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8099 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8103 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
8104 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
8105 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
8106 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
8107 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
8108 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
8109 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
8110 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
8112 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8113 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8114 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8115 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8116 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
8118 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8119 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
8121 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
8123 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
8124 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8125 let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
8127 // Must revoke without gaps
8128 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8129 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
8131 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8132 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
8133 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
8135 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
8136 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
8137 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
8138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8139 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
8143 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
8144 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
8145 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
8147 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8148 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8149 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8150 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8152 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8153 // Lock HTLC in both directions
8154 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8155 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8157 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
8158 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8159 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8161 // Revoke local commitment tx
8162 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8164 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
8165 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
8166 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
8167 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8169 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
8170 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8171 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8172 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8174 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8175 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
8176 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8177 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8178 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8179 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8183 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8184 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8185 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8187 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8188 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8189 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8194 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
8195 // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
8196 // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
8197 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8198 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8199 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8200 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8201 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8203 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000).0;
8204 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8205 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8206 let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8208 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8209 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
8210 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
8211 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8212 let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8214 // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
8215 // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
8216 // can get our balance.
8218 // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
8219 // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
8220 // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
8221 let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
8222 route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
8223 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8224 let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8225 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
8227 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
8231 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8232 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8233 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8234 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8235 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8236 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8237 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8239 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8241 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8242 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8243 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8244 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8245 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8247 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8248 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8249 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8250 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8252 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8253 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8254 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8255 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8256 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8258 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8259 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8260 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8262 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8267 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8268 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8269 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8270 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8271 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8273 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8274 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8275 override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8277 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8279 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8280 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8281 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8282 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8286 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8287 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8288 zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8289 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8290 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8291 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8292 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8294 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8295 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8296 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8298 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8299 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8300 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8304 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8305 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8306 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8307 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8308 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8309 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8311 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8312 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8313 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8314 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8316 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8317 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8318 route.paths.push(path);
8319 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8320 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8321 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8322 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8323 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8324 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8325 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8326 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8330 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8331 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8332 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8333 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8334 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8335 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8337 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8340 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
8341 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8342 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8344 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8345 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8346 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8347 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8349 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8350 // values from previous calls.
8351 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8352 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8353 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8355 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8357 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8358 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8360 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8363 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8368 #[allow(deprecated)]
8369 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8370 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8371 // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8372 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8373 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8374 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8375 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8377 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8379 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8381 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8382 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8383 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8384 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8385 } else { panic!(); }
8387 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8389 header: BlockHeader {
8391 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8392 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8393 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8397 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8398 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8399 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8400 } else { panic!(); }
8402 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8403 // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8404 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8405 block.header.time += 1;
8406 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8407 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8408 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8411 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8412 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8413 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8414 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8415 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8416 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8417 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8419 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8420 // values from previous calls.
8421 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8422 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8423 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8425 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8426 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8427 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8428 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8430 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8435 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8436 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8437 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8438 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8439 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8440 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8442 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8444 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8445 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8446 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8447 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8449 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8450 // resulting events.
8451 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8453 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8454 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8455 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8456 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8457 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8459 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8460 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8461 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8462 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8463 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8465 // We should fail the payment back
8466 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8467 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8468 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8469 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8470 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8472 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8477 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8478 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8479 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8481 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8482 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8483 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8484 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8486 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8487 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8488 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8489 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8491 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8492 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8493 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8494 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8498 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8499 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8500 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8501 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8503 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8504 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8505 // commitment at same time.
8507 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8508 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8509 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8510 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8512 // Create some initial channel
8513 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8514 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8516 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8517 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8519 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8520 let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8522 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8523 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8524 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8525 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8527 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8528 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8529 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8530 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8531 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8532 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8533 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8534 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8537 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8538 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8539 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8540 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8541 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8543 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8544 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8545 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8546 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8547 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8548 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8549 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8550 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8551 if let Err(_) = watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8552 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8553 } else { assert!(false); }
8554 } else { assert!(false); };
8555 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8556 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8557 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8558 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8562 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8563 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8564 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8565 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8566 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8568 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8569 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8570 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8571 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8573 // Create some initial channel
8574 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8575 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8577 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8578 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8580 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8581 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8583 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8584 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8585 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8586 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8587 let watchtower_alice = {
8588 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8589 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8590 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8591 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8592 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8593 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8594 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8595 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8598 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8599 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8600 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8601 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8602 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8604 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8606 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8607 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8611 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8612 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8613 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8614 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8615 let watchtower_bob = {
8616 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8617 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8618 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8619 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8620 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8621 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8622 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8623 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8626 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8627 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8629 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8630 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8632 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8634 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8636 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8637 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8638 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8639 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8640 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8641 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8642 if let Err(_) = watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8643 if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8644 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8645 } else { assert!(false); }
8646 } else { assert!(false); };
8647 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8648 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8650 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8651 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8652 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8654 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8657 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8658 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8659 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8663 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8664 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8665 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8667 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8668 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8669 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8670 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8671 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8672 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8677 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8678 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8679 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8682 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8683 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8685 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8686 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8687 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8688 // before receiving funding_signed.
8689 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8690 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8691 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8692 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8694 // Create an initial channel
8695 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8696 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8697 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8698 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8699 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8701 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8702 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8704 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8705 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8707 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8708 let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8709 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8710 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8711 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8715 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8716 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8717 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8718 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8719 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8720 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8721 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8723 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8724 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8725 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8726 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8728 // Create some initial channels
8729 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8731 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8732 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8733 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8734 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8735 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8736 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8738 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8739 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8740 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8741 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8742 // this test before #653 fix.
8743 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8744 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8745 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8746 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8747 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8749 let htlc_timeout = {
8750 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8751 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8752 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8753 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8757 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8758 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8759 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8760 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8763 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8764 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8765 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8766 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8768 // Steps of the test:
8769 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8770 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8771 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8772 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8773 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8774 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8775 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8776 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8777 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8778 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8779 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8780 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8782 // Create some initial channels
8783 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8784 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8786 // Steps (1) and (2):
8787 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8788 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8790 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8791 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8792 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8793 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8794 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8795 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8796 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8798 // Steps (3) and (4):
8799 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8800 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8801 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8802 if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
8803 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
8804 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8805 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8806 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8807 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8808 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8809 true => alice_txn.clone(),
8810 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8812 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8813 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8814 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8815 if broadcast_alice {
8816 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8817 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8818 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8820 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8821 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8825 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8826 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8827 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8828 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8829 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8830 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8831 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8832 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8833 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8834 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8836 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8837 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false);
8838 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8839 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8840 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8841 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8843 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8844 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8846 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8849 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8850 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8851 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8852 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8854 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8855 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8856 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8857 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8858 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8861 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8863 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8864 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8865 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8868 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8871 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8872 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8873 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8874 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8876 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8877 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8878 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8879 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8880 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8883 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8885 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8886 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8888 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8889 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8890 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8891 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8892 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8893 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8894 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8895 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8896 if broadcast_alice {
8897 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8898 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8899 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8901 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8902 if broadcast_alice {
8903 // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8904 // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8905 // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8906 // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8908 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8909 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8911 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8912 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8917 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8918 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8920 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8921 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8922 // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8923 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8925 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8926 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8927 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8929 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8930 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8931 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8932 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8933 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8934 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8935 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8937 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8938 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8944 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8945 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8946 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8947 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8948 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8952 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8953 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8954 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8956 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8957 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8958 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8959 // updating logic for the existing channel.
8960 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8961 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8962 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8963 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8965 // Create an initial channel
8966 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8967 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8968 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8969 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8971 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8972 // that it is rejected.
8973 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8975 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8976 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8978 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8979 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8980 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8981 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8982 // move forward with it.
8983 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8984 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8986 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8990 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8991 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8993 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8994 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8996 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8997 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8999 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9000 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9001 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9002 added_monitors.clear();
9004 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9006 let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
9007 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
9009 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
9012 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
9013 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
9014 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
9015 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
9016 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9018 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9019 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9021 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9022 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9023 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9024 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9025 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9027 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9031 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9032 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9033 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9034 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9035 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9036 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9038 let funding_created = {
9039 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9040 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
9041 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9042 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
9044 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9045 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9046 // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
9047 // still needs to be cleared here.
9048 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9050 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9052 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9053 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9055 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9056 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9057 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9058 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9059 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9061 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9065 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9066 // everything is functional.
9067 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9069 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9070 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9071 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9072 added_monitors.clear();
9075 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9076 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9077 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9078 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
9080 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9081 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9082 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9083 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9087 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9088 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9090 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9091 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9092 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9093 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9094 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9095 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9096 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9098 // Create some initial channels
9099 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9100 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9101 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9103 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9104 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9105 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9107 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9108 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9109 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9111 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9112 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9113 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9114 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9115 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9116 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9117 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9118 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9119 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9121 // A null channel ID should close all channels
9122 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9123 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9124 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9125 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9126 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9127 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9129 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9130 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9132 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9135 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9136 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9138 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9140 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9141 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
9142 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
9143 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
9144 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9145 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9147 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
9148 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9149 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9153 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9154 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9156 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9157 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9158 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9159 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9160 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9161 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9162 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9163 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9165 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9166 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9167 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9169 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42);
9170 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9171 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9172 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
9175 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9176 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9177 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9179 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9180 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9182 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9183 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9185 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9186 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9187 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9189 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9190 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9191 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9192 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9193 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9194 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9195 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9196 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9197 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9198 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9199 } else { panic!(); }
9200 } else { panic!(); }
9201 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9204 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9205 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9206 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9207 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9208 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9209 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9210 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9211 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9212 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9213 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9214 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9215 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9216 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9217 // until we learned about an additional block.
9219 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9220 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9221 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9222 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9223 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9224 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9225 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9227 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9228 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9229 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9230 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9231 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9233 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
9234 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9235 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9236 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9237 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9238 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9240 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9241 if !test_height_before_timelock {
9242 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9244 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9245 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9246 if test_height_before_timelock {
9247 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9248 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9249 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9250 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9252 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9253 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9254 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9255 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9256 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9257 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9259 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9260 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9262 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9263 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9264 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9265 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9266 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9267 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9268 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9270 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9271 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9272 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9273 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9274 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9275 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9276 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9277 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9278 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9283 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9284 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9285 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9289 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9290 // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9291 // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9293 // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9295 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9296 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9297 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9298 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9299 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9300 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9301 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9302 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9303 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9305 // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9306 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9307 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9308 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9310 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9311 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9312 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9313 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9314 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9316 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9318 // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9319 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9320 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9321 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9323 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9324 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9325 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9326 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9327 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9329 // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9331 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9333 // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9334 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9335 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9337 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9338 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9339 let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9340 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9341 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9343 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9344 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9345 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9346 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9348 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9349 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9350 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9351 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9352 let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9353 let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9354 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9355 assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9357 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9358 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9359 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9360 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9361 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9362 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9363 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9365 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9366 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9367 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9368 logger: nodes[1].logger,
9372 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9373 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9375 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9376 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9377 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9378 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9380 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9381 // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9382 // the commitment state.
9383 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9385 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9387 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9388 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9389 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9391 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9392 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9393 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9394 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9395 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9396 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9397 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9399 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9400 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9404 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9405 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9406 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9407 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9408 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9410 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9411 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9412 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9413 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9414 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9415 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9416 final_value_msat: 10000,
9417 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9419 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9420 let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
9422 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9423 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9424 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9425 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9426 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9427 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9428 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9429 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9430 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9434 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9435 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9436 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9437 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9438 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9440 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9441 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9442 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9443 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9445 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9446 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9447 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9448 final_value_msat: 10000,
9449 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9451 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9452 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9453 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9454 let route = find_route(
9455 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9456 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
9459 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9460 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9461 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9462 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9463 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9464 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9465 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9466 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9467 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9470 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9471 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9472 enum ExposureEvent {
9473 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9475 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9477 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9478 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9481 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9482 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9485 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9486 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9487 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9488 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9489 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9490 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9491 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9492 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9494 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9495 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9496 config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9497 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9498 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9499 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9501 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9502 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9503 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9504 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9506 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9508 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
9509 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9510 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
9512 let opt_anchors = false;
9514 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 1_000_000, 42);
9517 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9518 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9522 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9523 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9524 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9526 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9527 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9529 let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9530 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9531 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9533 let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9534 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9535 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9536 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9538 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9539 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9541 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9542 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9544 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9545 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9548 if dust_outbound_balance {
9549 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9550 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9551 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9552 for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9553 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9554 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9557 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9558 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9559 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9560 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9561 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9565 if dust_outbound_balance {
9566 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9567 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9568 for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9569 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9570 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9573 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9574 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9575 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9576 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9581 let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9582 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9583 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9584 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9585 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9587 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9588 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9589 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9591 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9593 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9594 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9595 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9596 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9597 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9598 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9599 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9600 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9601 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9603 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9604 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9605 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9606 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9608 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9609 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9611 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9612 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9613 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9615 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9616 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9618 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9619 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9620 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9623 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9624 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9625 added_monitors.clear();
9629 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9630 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9631 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9632 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9633 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9634 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9635 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9636 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9637 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9638 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9639 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9640 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9641 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);