1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use chain::channelmonitor;
17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
19 use chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
21 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
25 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
26 use routing::network_graph::{NetworkUpdate, RoutingFees};
27 use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
28 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
30 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
31 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
32 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
33 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
34 use util::errors::APIError;
35 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
36 use util::config::UserConfig;
38 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
39 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
43 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
45 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
46 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
52 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
53 use core::default::Default;
54 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
56 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
57 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
60 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
61 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
62 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
63 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
64 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
65 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
67 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
69 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
70 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
71 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
73 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
74 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
76 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
77 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
79 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
80 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
81 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
82 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
83 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
84 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
85 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
86 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
88 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
89 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
91 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
93 } else { assert!(false); }
96 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
97 use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
99 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
100 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
102 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
104 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than funding value \d+", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
106 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
108 insane_open_helper(r"Bogus; channel reserve \(\d+\) is less than dust limit \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis + 1; msg });
110 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
112 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
114 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
116 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
120 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
121 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
122 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
123 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
124 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
125 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
128 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
132 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
133 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
134 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
135 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
136 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
137 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
138 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
139 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
140 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
141 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
143 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
145 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
147 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
149 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
152 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
153 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
155 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
156 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
157 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
158 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
159 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
161 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
164 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
166 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
167 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
168 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
171 let payment_event = {
172 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
173 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
174 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
176 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
177 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
179 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
180 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
181 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
182 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
183 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
184 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
186 // deliver(1), generate (3):
187 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
188 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
189 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
190 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
192 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
193 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
194 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
195 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
196 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
197 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
198 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
201 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
202 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
203 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
204 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
205 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
206 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
207 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
208 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
210 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
211 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
212 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
213 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
215 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
216 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
217 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
219 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
220 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
222 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
223 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
225 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
226 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
229 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
230 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
234 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
235 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
236 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
237 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
238 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
239 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
240 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
241 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
244 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
246 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
248 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
251 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
252 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
254 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
255 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
256 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
257 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
260 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
263 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
265 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
266 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
267 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
268 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
270 let payment_event = {
271 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
272 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
273 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
275 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
276 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
278 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
279 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
280 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
281 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
282 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
283 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
285 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
286 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
288 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
292 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
293 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
294 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
295 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
296 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
297 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
300 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
301 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
302 // update_fee (never committed) ->
304 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
305 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
306 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
307 // <- (1) RAA delivered
308 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
309 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
310 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
311 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
313 // B should send no response here
314 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
315 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
318 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
321 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
322 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
323 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
325 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
326 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
328 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
329 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
330 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
331 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
332 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
334 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
337 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
338 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
339 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
340 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
341 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
343 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
346 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
347 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
349 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
350 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
351 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
353 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
354 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
355 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
356 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
359 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
361 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
363 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
365 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
366 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
367 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
368 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
369 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
370 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
371 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
372 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
373 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
374 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
375 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
377 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
378 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
379 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
380 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
381 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
383 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
384 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
388 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
389 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
390 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
392 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
393 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
394 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
396 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
397 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
398 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
399 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
401 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
402 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
403 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
406 fn do_test_1_conf_open(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
407 // Previously, if the minium_depth config was set to 1, we'd never send a funding_locked. This
408 // tests that we properly send one in that case.
409 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
410 alice_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
411 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
412 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
413 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
414 bob_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
415 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
416 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
417 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
418 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
419 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
420 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
421 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
423 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
424 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
425 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
427 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
428 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
429 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
432 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
433 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
434 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
438 fn test_1_conf_open() {
439 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst);
440 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst);
441 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
444 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
445 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
446 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
447 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
450 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
451 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
452 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
453 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
455 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
457 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
460 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
461 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
464 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
465 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
466 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
468 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
469 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
470 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
472 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
473 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
475 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
477 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
478 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
479 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
480 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
482 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
483 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
485 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
486 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
487 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
488 added_monitors.clear();
490 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
492 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
493 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
495 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
496 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
497 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
498 added_monitors.clear();
501 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
502 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
504 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
505 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
507 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
508 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
509 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
510 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
514 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
515 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
516 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
517 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
518 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
519 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
520 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
521 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
522 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
523 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
524 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
525 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
526 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
527 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
528 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
529 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
530 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
531 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
532 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
536 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
537 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
538 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
539 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
540 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
541 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
544 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
547 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
548 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
550 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
551 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
552 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
553 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
554 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
556 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
558 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
560 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
561 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
562 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
564 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
565 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
566 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
568 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
569 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
570 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
571 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
573 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
574 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
575 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
579 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
580 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
581 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
582 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
583 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
584 let channel_value = 5000;
586 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
587 let channel_id = chan.2;
588 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
589 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value);
591 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
592 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
593 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
595 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
596 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT) as u32;
598 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
599 *feerate_lock = feerate;
601 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
602 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
603 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
605 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
607 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
609 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
611 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
613 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
614 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
615 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0) / 1000;
616 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
617 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
618 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
622 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
623 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
626 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
627 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
628 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
630 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
632 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
633 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
634 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
635 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
636 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
637 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
638 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
639 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
640 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
642 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
643 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
644 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
645 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
646 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
647 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
648 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
649 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
652 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
653 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
654 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
657 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
658 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
659 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
660 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
661 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
662 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
664 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0) / 1000,
665 false, local_funding, remote_funding,
666 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
667 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
669 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
671 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
674 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
677 htlc_signatures: res.1
680 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
682 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
685 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
687 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
688 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
689 //Should produce and error.
690 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
691 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
692 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
693 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
694 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
698 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
699 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
700 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
701 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
702 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
703 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
706 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
709 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
712 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
713 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
715 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
716 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
717 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
718 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
719 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
721 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
723 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
724 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
725 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
726 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
728 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
730 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
731 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
733 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
734 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
735 added_monitors.clear();
737 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
738 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
739 // node[1] has nothing to do
741 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
742 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
743 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
745 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
746 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
747 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
748 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
749 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
750 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
751 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
753 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
754 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
755 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
756 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
757 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
758 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
760 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
761 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
762 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
763 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
765 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
766 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
767 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
769 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
770 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
771 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
772 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
774 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
775 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
776 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
778 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
780 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
781 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
783 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
784 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
787 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
789 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
790 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
791 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
792 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
793 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
797 fn test_update_fee() {
798 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
799 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
800 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
801 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
802 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
803 let channel_id = chan.2;
806 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
807 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
808 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
809 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
810 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
811 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
812 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
813 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
814 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
815 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
816 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
819 // Create and deliver (1)...
822 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
823 feerate = *feerate_lock;
824 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
826 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
827 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
829 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
830 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
831 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
832 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
833 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
835 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
837 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
839 // Generate (2) and (3):
840 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
841 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
842 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
845 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
846 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
847 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
849 // Create and deliver (4)...
851 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
852 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
854 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
855 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
856 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
857 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
858 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
859 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
860 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
862 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
865 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
866 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
867 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
869 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
870 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
872 // Handle (3), creating (6):
873 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
874 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
875 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
876 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
879 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
880 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
881 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
883 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
884 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
885 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
886 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
887 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
888 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
889 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
890 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
891 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
894 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
895 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
896 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
897 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
899 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
900 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
901 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
903 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
904 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
905 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
906 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
907 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
911 fn fake_network_test() {
912 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
913 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
914 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
915 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
916 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
917 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
919 // Create some initial channels
920 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
921 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
922 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
924 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
925 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
926 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
927 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
928 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
930 // Send some more payments
931 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
932 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
933 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
935 // Test failure packets
936 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
937 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
939 // Add a new channel that skips 3
940 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
942 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
943 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
944 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
945 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
946 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
947 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
948 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
950 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
951 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
953 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
954 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
955 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
956 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
958 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
961 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
962 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
963 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
964 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
966 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
969 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
970 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
971 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
972 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
974 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
976 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
977 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
978 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
980 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
982 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
983 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
984 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
985 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
987 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
990 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
991 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
992 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
993 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
995 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
998 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
999 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1000 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1001 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1003 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1005 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1006 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1007 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1009 // Claim the rebalances...
1010 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1011 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1013 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1014 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1016 // Send some payments across both channels
1017 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1018 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1019 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1022 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1023 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1024 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1025 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1027 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1029 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1030 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1031 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1033 // Close down the channels...
1034 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1035 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1036 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1037 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1038 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1039 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1040 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1041 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1042 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1043 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1044 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1045 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1046 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1047 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1048 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1052 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1053 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1054 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1055 // commitment dance rounds.
1056 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1057 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1058 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1059 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1060 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1061 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1063 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1064 for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1065 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1066 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1067 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1069 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1071 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1072 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1073 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1074 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1076 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1077 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1079 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1081 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1082 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1083 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1084 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1087 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1088 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1090 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1091 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1094 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1095 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1096 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1097 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1099 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1100 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1101 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1102 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1103 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1104 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1107 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1108 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1109 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1111 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1113 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1114 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1115 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1116 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1118 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1119 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1120 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1121 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1123 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1124 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1125 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1127 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1128 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1130 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1131 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1132 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1133 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1134 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1136 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1137 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1138 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1139 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1140 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1142 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1145 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1147 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1148 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1149 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1151 &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1152 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1154 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1158 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1159 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1162 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1166 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1167 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1168 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1169 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1170 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1171 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1172 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1174 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1175 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1176 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1177 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1178 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1179 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1181 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1183 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1184 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1186 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1187 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1189 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1190 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1191 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1195 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1196 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1197 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1198 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1199 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1200 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1201 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1202 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1204 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1207 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1209 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1211 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1212 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1213 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1215 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1216 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1217 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1219 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1220 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1222 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1223 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1224 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1225 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1226 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1227 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1228 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1231 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1233 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1234 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1235 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1236 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1238 // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1239 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1240 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1241 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1242 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1243 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1244 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1245 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1247 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1248 assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1249 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1251 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1252 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1253 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1254 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1255 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1256 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1257 check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1258 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1260 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1261 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1264 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1265 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1266 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1267 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1269 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1270 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1271 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1272 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1273 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1274 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1276 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1282 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1283 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1284 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1285 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1286 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1287 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1289 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1290 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1292 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1293 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1);
1294 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1295 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1296 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1298 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1300 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1301 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1302 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1305 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1307 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1308 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1310 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1314 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1315 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1316 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1317 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1318 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1319 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1321 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1322 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1323 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1324 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1326 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1328 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1329 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1330 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1331 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1334 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1335 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1336 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1337 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1340 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1342 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1343 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1344 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1346 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1348 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1350 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1351 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1352 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1353 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1354 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1355 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1356 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1357 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1359 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1360 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1361 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1362 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1363 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1365 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1366 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1367 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1368 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1369 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1370 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1371 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1372 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1375 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1376 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1377 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1379 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1380 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1381 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1383 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1385 amount_msat: 3460001,
1386 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1388 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1391 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1394 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1395 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1396 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1397 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1401 false, local_funding, remote_funding,
1402 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1404 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1405 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1407 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1410 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1413 htlc_signatures: res.1
1416 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1417 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1418 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1420 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1421 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1423 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1424 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1426 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1428 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1429 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1430 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1432 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1433 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1434 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1436 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1438 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1439 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1441 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1445 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1446 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1447 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1448 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1449 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1451 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1452 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1453 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1454 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1456 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1457 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1458 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1460 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1462 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1463 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1464 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1467 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1468 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1469 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1470 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1471 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1472 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1476 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1477 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1478 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1479 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1480 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1481 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1483 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1484 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1485 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1486 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1487 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1488 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1489 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1491 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1492 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1493 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1496 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1497 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1498 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1499 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1500 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1501 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1502 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1503 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1504 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1506 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1507 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1508 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1509 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1510 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1513 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1514 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1515 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1516 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1517 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1518 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1519 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1520 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1524 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1525 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1526 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1527 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1528 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1530 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1531 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1532 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1534 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1535 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1536 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1537 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1538 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1539 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1540 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1542 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1543 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1544 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1545 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1546 // commitment transaction fee.
1547 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1549 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1550 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1551 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1554 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1555 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1556 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1557 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1561 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1562 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1563 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1564 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1565 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1566 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1567 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1568 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1570 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1572 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1573 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1574 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1575 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1577 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1578 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1579 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1580 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1581 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1582 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1583 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg);
1585 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1586 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1587 match msg_events[0] {
1588 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1589 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1591 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1596 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1597 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1598 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1599 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1600 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1601 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1602 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1603 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1605 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1606 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1607 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1608 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1609 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1610 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1612 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1613 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1614 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1615 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1616 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1617 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1619 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1620 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1621 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1622 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1626 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1627 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1628 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1629 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1630 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1631 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1632 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1635 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1636 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1637 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1639 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1640 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1641 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1642 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1644 // Add a pending HTLC.
1645 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1646 let payment_event_1 = {
1647 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1648 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1650 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1651 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1652 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1654 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1656 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1657 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2);
1658 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1659 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1660 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1662 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1663 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1664 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1665 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1666 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1667 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1668 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1669 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1672 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1673 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1674 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1675 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1678 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1679 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1680 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1681 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1682 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1683 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1684 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1685 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1689 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1690 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1691 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1692 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1693 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1694 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1695 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1696 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1697 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1698 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1700 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1701 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1702 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1704 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1705 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1708 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64) -> u64 {
1709 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1713 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1714 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1715 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1716 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1717 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1718 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1719 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1720 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1721 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1722 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1723 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1725 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1726 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1728 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1729 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1731 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1733 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1734 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1735 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1736 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1741 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1742 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1743 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1745 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1747 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1749 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1750 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1751 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1752 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1753 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1754 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1755 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1758 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1759 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1761 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1762 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1763 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1764 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1765 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1766 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1767 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1770 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1772 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1773 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1774 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1775 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1776 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1779 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1780 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1781 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1782 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1783 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1786 // adding pending output.
1787 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1788 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1789 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1790 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1791 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1792 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1793 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1794 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1795 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1797 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1798 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1799 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1801 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1802 let payment_event_1 = {
1803 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1804 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1806 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1807 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1808 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1810 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1812 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1813 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1815 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1816 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1817 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1818 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1821 // split the rest to test holding cell
1822 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1823 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1824 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1825 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1827 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1828 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1831 // now see if they go through on both sides
1832 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1833 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1834 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1835 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1836 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1837 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1839 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1841 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1842 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1843 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1844 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1845 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1848 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1849 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1850 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1851 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1852 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1853 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1855 // flush the pending htlc
1856 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1857 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1858 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1860 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1861 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1862 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1863 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1865 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1866 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1867 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1868 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1870 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1871 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1872 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1874 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1876 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1877 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1878 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1880 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1881 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1883 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1884 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1885 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1886 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1887 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1888 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1890 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1891 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1892 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1893 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1895 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1896 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1898 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1899 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1901 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1902 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1903 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
1905 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1906 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1907 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1909 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1912 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1915 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1916 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1917 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
1919 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1920 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1921 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1923 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1926 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1929 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1930 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1931 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1933 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1);
1934 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1935 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1937 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
1938 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1939 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1940 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
1941 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
1943 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1944 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
1948 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
1949 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
1950 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
1951 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
1952 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
1953 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
1954 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
1955 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
1957 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
1958 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
1959 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
1960 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
1961 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
1962 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
1963 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
1964 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
1966 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
1967 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
1968 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
1969 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
1970 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
1971 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1972 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1973 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1974 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1975 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1977 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1978 // Route the first two HTLCs.
1979 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
1980 let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
1982 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
1983 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
1985 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
1986 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1987 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1988 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1989 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1992 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
1993 // initial fulfill/CS.
1994 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
1995 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1996 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1998 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
1999 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2000 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
2001 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2002 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2004 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2005 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2006 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2007 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2008 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2010 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2011 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2012 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2013 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2014 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2016 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2017 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2018 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2020 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2021 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2022 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2024 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2025 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2026 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2028 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2029 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2030 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2031 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2032 // on-chain as necessary).
2033 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2034 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2035 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2036 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2037 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2039 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2040 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2041 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2043 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2044 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2046 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2047 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2048 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2049 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2050 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2051 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2053 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2054 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2055 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2057 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2058 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2059 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2060 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2061 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2064 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2065 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2066 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2067 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2069 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2071 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2072 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2073 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2075 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2076 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2078 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2079 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2080 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2081 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2083 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2084 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2085 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2087 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2088 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2090 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2091 expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2093 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2094 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2098 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2099 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2100 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2101 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2102 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2103 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2104 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2106 // Create some initial channels
2107 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2108 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2109 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2110 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2112 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2113 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2114 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2115 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2116 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2117 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2119 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2120 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2121 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2122 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2123 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2125 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2126 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2127 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2128 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2130 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2131 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2132 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2133 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2134 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2136 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2137 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2138 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2139 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2140 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2142 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2143 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2145 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2146 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2147 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2148 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2149 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2151 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2152 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2153 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2154 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2155 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2156 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2158 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2159 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2160 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2161 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2162 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2164 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2165 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2167 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2168 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2170 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2171 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2173 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2174 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2175 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2176 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2178 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2184 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2185 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2186 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2187 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2188 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
2189 let node2_commitment_txid;
2191 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2192 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2193 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2194 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2196 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2197 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2198 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2200 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2202 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2203 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2204 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2205 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2206 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2208 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2209 // confusing us in the following tests.
2210 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2212 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2213 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2214 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2217 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2218 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2219 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2220 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2221 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2222 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2225 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2228 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2229 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2231 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2233 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2235 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2237 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2238 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2239 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2245 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2247 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2248 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2250 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2251 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2252 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2253 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2254 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2257 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2260 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2261 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2263 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2265 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2266 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2268 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2269 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2270 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2272 nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2273 nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2274 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2275 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2277 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2278 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2279 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2283 fn test_justice_tx() {
2284 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2285 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2286 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2287 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2288 alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2289 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2290 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2291 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2292 bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2293 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2294 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2295 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2296 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2297 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2298 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2299 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2300 // Create some new channels:
2301 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2303 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2304 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2305 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2306 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2307 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2308 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2309 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2310 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2311 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2312 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2313 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2314 // Revoke the old state
2315 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2318 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2320 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2321 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2322 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2324 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2325 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2326 node_txn.truncate(1);
2328 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2329 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2330 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2332 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2333 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2334 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2335 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2336 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2337 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2338 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2339 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2340 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2342 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2344 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2345 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2347 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2348 // Create some new channels:
2349 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2351 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2355 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2356 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2357 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2358 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2359 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2360 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2361 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2362 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2363 // Revoke the old state
2364 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2366 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2368 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2369 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2370 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2372 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2373 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2375 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2376 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2378 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2379 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2380 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2381 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2382 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2383 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2384 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2386 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2387 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2388 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2392 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2393 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2394 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2395 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2396 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2397 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2398 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2399 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2400 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2401 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2402 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2403 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2404 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2405 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2406 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2408 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2409 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2410 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2411 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2412 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2413 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2415 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2416 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2418 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2419 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2420 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2421 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2422 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2426 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2427 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2428 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2429 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2430 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2431 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2432 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2434 // Create some new channel:
2435 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2437 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2438 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2439 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2440 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2441 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2443 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2444 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2445 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2446 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2447 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2448 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2449 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2450 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2451 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2453 //Revoke the old state
2454 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2457 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2458 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2459 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2460 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2461 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2462 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2463 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2464 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2466 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2467 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2469 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2470 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2472 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2473 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2474 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2475 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2476 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2477 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2478 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2479 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2481 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2482 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2483 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2485 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2486 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2487 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2491 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2492 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2493 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2494 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2495 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2496 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2497 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2499 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2501 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2502 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2503 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2504 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2505 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2506 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2508 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2509 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2511 //Revoke the old state
2512 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2515 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2516 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2517 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2518 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2519 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2520 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2521 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2523 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2524 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2527 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2528 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2530 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2531 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2532 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2533 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2534 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2535 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2537 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2538 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2539 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2540 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2541 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2542 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2543 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2545 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2546 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2547 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2548 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2550 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2551 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2552 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2554 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2555 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2556 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2557 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2558 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2559 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2560 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2561 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2563 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2564 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2565 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2569 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2570 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2571 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2572 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2573 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2574 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2575 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2576 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2577 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2579 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2580 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2581 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2582 // PaymentSent event).
2584 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2585 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2586 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2587 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2589 // Create some initial channels
2590 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2591 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2593 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2594 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2595 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2596 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2597 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2599 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2600 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2601 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2603 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2604 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2606 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2607 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2608 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2609 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2610 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2611 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2612 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2613 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2614 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2615 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2616 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2617 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2618 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2620 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2621 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2622 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2623 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2624 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2625 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2626 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2627 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2628 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2629 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2630 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2631 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2632 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2633 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2634 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2635 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2636 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2638 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2639 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2640 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2641 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2643 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2644 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2645 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2646 added_monitors.clear();
2648 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2649 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2650 match forwarded_events[0] {
2651 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2652 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2654 if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[1] {
2655 } else { panic!(); }
2656 if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[2] {
2657 } else { panic!(); }
2658 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2660 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2661 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2662 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2663 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2664 added_monitors.clear();
2666 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2668 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2669 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2672 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2673 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2677 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2678 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2679 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2680 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2681 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2682 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2684 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2686 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2687 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2688 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2689 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2690 // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2691 // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2692 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2693 check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2694 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2695 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2697 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2698 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2699 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2700 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2702 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2703 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2704 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2705 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2707 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2708 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2712 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2713 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2714 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2715 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2717 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2718 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2719 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2720 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2721 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2722 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2723 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2724 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2725 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2726 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2727 let commitment_spend =
2728 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2729 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2730 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2731 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2734 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2735 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2736 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2740 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2741 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2742 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2743 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2744 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2745 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2746 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2747 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2748 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2749 check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2750 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2751 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2753 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2754 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2755 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2756 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2757 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2758 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2759 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2760 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2761 let mut first_claimed = false;
2762 for event in events {
2764 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2765 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2766 assert!(!first_claimed);
2767 first_claimed = true;
2769 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2770 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2773 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2774 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2775 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2778 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2781 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2782 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2783 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2784 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2785 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2786 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2788 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2790 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2791 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2792 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2793 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2794 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2795 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2796 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2798 // Create some intial channels
2799 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2800 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2802 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2803 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2804 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2806 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2808 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2809 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2810 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2811 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2812 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2813 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2814 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2816 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2817 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2819 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2820 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2821 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2822 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2823 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2824 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2826 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2828 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2829 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2830 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2831 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2832 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2833 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2834 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2835 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2837 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2838 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2839 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2840 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2841 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2844 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2845 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2846 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2847 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2849 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2850 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2852 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2853 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2854 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2855 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2857 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2861 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2862 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2863 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2865 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2866 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2867 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2868 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2871 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2873 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2874 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2875 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2876 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2877 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2878 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2879 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2881 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2885 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2886 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2887 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2888 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2890 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2891 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2892 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2893 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2894 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2895 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2897 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2900 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2901 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2902 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2904 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2905 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2907 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2908 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2909 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2910 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2911 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2912 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2913 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2914 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2915 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2919 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2920 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2921 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2922 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2926 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
2927 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
2928 // and fail backward accordingly.
2930 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2931 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2932 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2933 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2935 // Create some initial channels
2936 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2937 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2939 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2940 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
2941 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2942 // Revoke the old state
2943 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
2945 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
2947 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2948 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2949 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2950 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2951 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2953 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2955 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2956 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2958 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
2959 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2960 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
2961 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2962 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2963 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2965 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
2966 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
2967 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
2969 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2973 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
2974 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
2975 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
2976 // commitment transaction anymore.
2977 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
2978 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
2979 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
2980 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
2981 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
2982 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
2984 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
2985 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
2986 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
2987 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
2988 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
2989 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2990 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2991 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2992 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2994 // Create some initial channels
2995 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2996 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2998 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
2999 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3000 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3001 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3002 // Revoke the old state
3003 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3005 let value = if use_dust {
3006 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3007 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3008 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3011 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3012 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3013 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3015 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
3016 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3017 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3018 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3019 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3020 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3021 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3022 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3023 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3024 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3025 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3026 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3028 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
3029 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3030 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3031 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3032 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3033 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3034 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3035 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3036 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3037 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3038 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3039 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3040 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3041 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3042 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3043 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3045 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
3046 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3047 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3048 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3049 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3050 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3051 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3052 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3053 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3054 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3055 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3056 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3057 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3058 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3059 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3060 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3061 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3062 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3064 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3065 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3066 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3067 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3068 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3069 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3070 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3073 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3074 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3075 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3076 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3077 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3078 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3080 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3081 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3083 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3084 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3087 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3088 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3090 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3091 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3092 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3094 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3095 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 3 });
3097 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3098 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3101 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3102 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3104 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3106 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3108 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3109 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3112 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3113 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3115 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3116 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3117 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3118 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3119 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3121 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3122 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3123 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3124 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3126 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3130 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3131 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3132 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3133 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3134 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3135 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3137 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3140 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3141 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3142 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3143 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3144 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3145 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3146 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3148 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3149 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3150 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3152 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3154 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3155 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3157 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3158 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3159 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3160 // that we should update our routing table for.
3161 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3162 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3165 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3168 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3169 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3170 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3172 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3175 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3176 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3177 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3179 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3182 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3185 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3186 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3187 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3191 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3192 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3193 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3194 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3195 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3199 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3200 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3201 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3202 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3203 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3207 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3208 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3209 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3210 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3211 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3212 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3214 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3216 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3217 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3218 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3220 let payment_event = {
3221 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3222 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3223 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3225 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3226 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3229 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3230 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3232 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3233 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3235 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3238 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3240 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3242 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3243 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3244 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3245 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3246 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3247 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3249 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3250 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3256 onion_routing_packet,
3258 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3260 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3261 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3262 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3264 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3265 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3267 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3270 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3271 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3273 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3275 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3276 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3280 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3281 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3282 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3283 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3284 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3285 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3286 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3287 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3289 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3290 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
3291 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3292 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3293 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3294 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3296 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3297 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3298 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3300 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3301 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3302 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3303 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3304 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3306 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3307 // registering new transactions
3308 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3309 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3313 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3314 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3315 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3316 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3317 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3318 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3319 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3320 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3322 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3324 let mut payment_event = {
3325 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3326 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3328 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3329 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3330 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3333 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3334 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3336 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3338 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3339 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3340 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3341 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3344 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3345 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3346 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3347 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3349 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3350 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3351 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3353 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
3354 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3355 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3356 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3358 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3359 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3360 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3361 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3362 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3366 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3368 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3369 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3370 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3371 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3373 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3375 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3376 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3378 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3379 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3380 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3381 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3382 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3383 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3384 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3386 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3390 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3391 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3392 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3393 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3394 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3396 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3397 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3398 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3399 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3400 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3402 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3404 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3405 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3406 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3407 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3408 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3410 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3411 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3413 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3414 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3418 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3419 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3420 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3421 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3422 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3423 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3424 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3425 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3427 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3428 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3429 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3431 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3432 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3433 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3434 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3436 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3437 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3438 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3440 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3441 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3442 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3443 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3445 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3446 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3448 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3449 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3451 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3453 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3454 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3456 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3457 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3458 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3460 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3463 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3464 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3465 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3467 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3470 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3471 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3475 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3476 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3479 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3480 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3481 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3482 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3483 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3484 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3486 let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3487 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3488 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3489 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3490 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3491 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3492 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3494 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3497 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3499 let payment_event = {
3500 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3501 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3503 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3504 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3505 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3507 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3509 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3510 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3512 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3513 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3514 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3515 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3516 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3518 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3519 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3520 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3521 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3523 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3524 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3525 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3526 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3527 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3529 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3530 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3531 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3532 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3539 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3540 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3541 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3542 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3543 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3544 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3546 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3547 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3548 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3550 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3551 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3553 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3554 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3555 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3556 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3557 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3558 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3559 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3560 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3561 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3562 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3563 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3564 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3565 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3566 // Everything was delivered...
3567 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3570 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3571 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3573 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3574 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3577 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3578 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3579 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3581 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3583 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3584 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3586 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3587 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3588 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3590 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3591 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3592 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3594 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3597 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3600 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3601 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3603 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3604 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3605 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3606 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3607 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3608 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3609 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3610 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3611 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3612 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3613 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3615 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3618 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3619 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3621 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3622 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3624 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3625 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3626 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3628 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3631 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3632 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3633 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3634 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3636 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3637 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3638 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3639 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3641 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3642 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3643 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3644 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3645 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3647 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3648 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3649 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3650 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3657 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3658 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3659 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3660 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3661 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3662 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3664 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3666 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3667 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3668 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3669 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3670 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3671 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3672 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3673 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3674 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3675 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3676 // Everything was delivered...
3677 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3680 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3681 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3684 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3685 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3686 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3688 if messages_delivered > 2 {
3689 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3692 // Channel should still work fine...
3693 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3694 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3695 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3699 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3700 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3701 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3702 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3703 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3707 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3708 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3709 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3710 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3711 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3715 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3716 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3717 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3718 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3719 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3720 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3721 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3722 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3723 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3724 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3726 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3727 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3729 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3730 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3732 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3734 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3735 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3736 chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3738 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3741 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3743 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3744 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3746 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3747 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3748 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
3749 let funding_locked = match events_2[0] {
3750 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3751 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3754 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3756 let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_2[1] {
3757 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3758 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3761 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3764 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3766 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_locked);
3767 nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3768 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3769 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2);
3770 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_3[0] {
3771 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3772 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3775 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3777 let (as_announcement, as_update) = match events_3[1] {
3778 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3779 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3781 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3784 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3785 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3786 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3787 let (_, bs_update) = match events_4[0] {
3788 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3789 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3791 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3794 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&as_announcement).unwrap();
3795 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3796 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3798 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3799 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3800 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3802 // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3803 // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3804 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3806 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3807 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3808 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3810 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3811 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3812 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3813 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3814 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3815 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3816 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3817 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3819 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3820 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3821 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3822 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3823 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3824 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3826 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3827 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3828 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3829 logger: nodes[0].logger,
3833 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
3834 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
3836 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
3837 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
3838 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3840 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3842 // as_announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
3843 nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
3844 let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3845 let mut found_announcement = false;
3846 for event in msgs.iter() {
3848 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
3849 if *msg == as_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
3851 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
3852 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3855 assert!(found_announcement);
3859 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3860 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3861 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3862 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3863 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3864 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3865 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3866 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3868 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
3870 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3871 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3872 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
3873 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3875 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3876 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3878 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3879 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3882 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
3883 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3885 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3886 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3888 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3889 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3890 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3891 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3892 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3893 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3894 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3896 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3897 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3898 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3900 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3901 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3902 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3904 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3907 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3908 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3909 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3910 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3912 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3915 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3916 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3918 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3919 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3920 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3921 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3922 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3923 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3925 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3926 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3927 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3928 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3930 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
3931 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
3933 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
3934 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
3936 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
3938 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3939 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3940 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3941 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3942 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
3943 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
3944 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
3945 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3946 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3947 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3949 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
3950 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3951 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3952 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3953 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3954 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3955 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3956 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3958 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3959 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3960 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3961 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3962 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3963 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3964 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
3965 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3967 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3968 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3969 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3970 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3972 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
3973 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3974 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3975 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3977 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3978 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3979 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3981 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3983 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3984 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3986 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
3987 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
3989 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3990 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3991 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
3993 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3996 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3999 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4000 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4001 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4003 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4004 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4007 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4008 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4009 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4010 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4011 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4012 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4013 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4015 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4017 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4018 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4019 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4020 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4021 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4022 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4023 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4024 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4025 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4026 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4027 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4028 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4029 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4032 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4035 let mut block = Block {
4036 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4039 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4040 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4041 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4042 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4043 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4044 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4045 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4048 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4050 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4051 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4052 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4053 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4054 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4055 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4057 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4058 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4059 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4060 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4061 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4062 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4066 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4067 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4068 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4071 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4072 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4073 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4074 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4075 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4076 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4077 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4078 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4080 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4081 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4082 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4083 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4085 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4086 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4088 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4090 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4091 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4093 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4094 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4095 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4096 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4098 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4099 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4100 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4101 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4102 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4104 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4106 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4107 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4108 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4109 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4112 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4113 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4114 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4115 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4116 match fail_commit[0] {
4117 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4118 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4119 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4121 _ => unreachable!(),
4123 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4125 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, true);
4130 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4131 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4132 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4136 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4137 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4138 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4139 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4140 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4141 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4142 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4143 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4144 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4145 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4147 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4149 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4151 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4152 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4153 get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4154 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4156 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4157 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4158 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4159 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4160 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4161 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4162 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4163 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4164 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4165 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4167 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4168 let config = UserConfig::default();
4169 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4170 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4171 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4172 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4173 default_config: config,
4175 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4176 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4177 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4182 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4183 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4185 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4186 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4187 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4190 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4191 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4192 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4193 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4195 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4196 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4197 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4198 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4200 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4201 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4202 for node in nodes.iter() {
4203 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4204 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4205 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4208 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4212 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4213 // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4214 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4215 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4216 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4217 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4218 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4219 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4220 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4221 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4222 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4224 // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4225 let channel_value = 100000;
4226 let push_msat = 10001;
4227 let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4228 let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4229 let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4230 let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4231 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4232 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4233 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4235 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
4237 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4238 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4240 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4242 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4243 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4244 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4245 added_monitors.clear();
4248 let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4249 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4251 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4252 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4253 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4254 added_monitors.clear();
4256 // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4261 // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4262 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4263 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4264 get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4266 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4267 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4268 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4269 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4270 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4271 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4272 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4273 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4274 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4275 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4277 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4278 let config = UserConfig::default();
4279 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4280 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4281 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4282 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4283 default_config: config,
4285 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4286 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4287 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4292 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4293 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4295 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4297 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4298 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4300 // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4301 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4302 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4303 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4304 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4306 // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4307 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4308 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4310 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4311 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4312 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4313 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4315 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4316 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4317 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4318 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4320 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4321 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4322 for node in nodes.iter() {
4323 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4324 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4325 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4328 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4332 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4333 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4334 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4335 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4336 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4337 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4338 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4339 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4340 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4341 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4342 let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4344 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4345 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4347 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4349 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4350 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4351 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4353 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4354 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4355 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4356 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4357 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4358 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4359 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4360 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4361 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4362 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4364 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4365 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4366 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4367 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4368 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4369 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4371 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4372 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4373 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4378 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4379 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4381 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4382 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4383 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4385 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4387 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4388 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4392 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4393 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4394 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4395 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4396 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4397 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4398 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4399 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4400 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4401 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4402 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4403 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4404 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4405 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4407 let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4408 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4409 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4410 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4411 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4414 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4416 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4417 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4419 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4420 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4421 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4422 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4424 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4426 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4427 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4428 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4429 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4430 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4433 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4434 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4435 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4436 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4437 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4438 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4441 let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4442 for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4443 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4444 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4445 assert!(read.is_empty());
4446 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4449 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4450 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4451 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4452 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4453 assert!(read.is_empty());
4454 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4457 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4458 if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4459 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4460 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4462 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4463 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4464 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4466 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4468 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4471 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4472 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4473 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4474 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4476 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4477 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4478 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4480 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4482 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4483 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4485 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4486 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4487 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4488 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4489 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4492 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4493 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4494 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4496 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4497 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4499 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4500 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4501 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4502 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4503 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4505 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4506 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4507 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4508 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4509 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4510 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4511 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4513 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4514 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4516 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4521 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4522 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4524 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4525 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4526 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4527 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4528 for event in events.drain(..) {
4530 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4531 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4532 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4533 all_outputs.push(outp);
4536 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4539 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4540 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4550 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4551 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4552 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4553 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4554 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4555 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4557 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4558 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4559 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4560 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4561 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4562 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4563 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4564 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4565 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4567 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4568 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4570 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4571 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4572 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4573 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4574 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4578 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4579 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4580 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4581 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4582 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4583 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4584 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4586 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4587 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4588 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4589 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4590 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4592 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4593 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4594 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4595 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4597 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4598 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4599 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4600 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4601 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4603 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4604 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4605 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4609 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4610 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4611 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4613 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4614 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4615 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4616 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4618 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4619 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4620 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4621 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4622 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4624 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4625 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4626 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4627 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4628 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4630 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4631 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4632 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4634 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4635 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4636 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4637 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4638 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4642 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4643 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4644 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4645 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4646 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4648 // Create some initial channels
4649 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4651 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4653 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4654 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4655 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4657 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4658 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4659 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4660 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4661 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4662 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4664 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4665 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4668 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4669 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4672 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4673 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4674 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4675 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4676 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4677 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4678 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4680 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4681 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4682 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4684 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4685 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4686 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4690 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4691 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4692 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4693 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4694 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4696 // Create some initial channels
4697 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4699 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4700 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4702 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4704 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4705 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4706 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4708 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4709 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4710 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4711 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4713 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4714 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4716 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4718 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4719 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4720 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4721 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4722 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4723 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4725 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4726 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4727 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4728 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4730 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4731 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4732 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4733 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4734 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4738 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4739 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4740 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4741 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4742 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4744 // Create some initial channels
4745 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4747 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4748 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4749 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4750 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4752 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4754 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4755 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4756 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4757 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4759 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4760 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4761 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4762 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4764 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4765 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4767 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4768 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4769 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4773 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4774 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4775 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4776 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4777 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4778 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4780 // Create some initial channels
4781 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4783 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4784 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4785 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4786 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4788 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4790 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4791 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4792 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4793 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4794 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4795 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4797 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4798 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4799 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4800 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4801 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4802 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4803 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4805 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4806 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4807 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4808 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4809 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4810 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4812 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4813 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4814 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4815 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4816 // transactions next...
4817 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4818 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4820 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4821 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4822 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4823 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4825 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4826 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4829 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4830 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4832 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4833 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4835 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4836 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4837 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4838 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4839 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4843 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4844 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4845 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4846 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4847 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4848 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4850 // Create some initial channels
4851 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4853 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4854 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4855 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4856 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4858 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4859 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4861 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4863 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4864 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4865 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4866 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4867 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4868 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4870 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4871 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4872 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4873 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4875 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4876 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4877 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4879 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4880 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4881 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4882 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4883 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4884 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4886 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4887 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4889 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4890 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4891 // transactions next...
4892 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4893 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4894 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4895 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4897 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4898 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4901 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4902 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4904 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4906 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4907 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4909 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4910 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4912 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4913 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4914 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4915 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4916 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4917 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4918 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4919 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4923 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4924 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4925 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4926 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4927 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4929 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4932 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4933 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4934 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4935 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4937 // Create some initial channels
4938 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4939 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4941 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4942 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4943 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4944 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4945 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4947 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4948 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4949 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4951 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
4952 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4953 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4954 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4955 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4956 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4957 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4958 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4959 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4960 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4962 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4963 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4964 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4965 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4967 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4968 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
4969 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
4970 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
4971 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
4972 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
4973 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
4974 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4975 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4976 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
4978 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4979 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
4980 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
4981 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4982 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4983 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4985 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4986 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4989 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
4990 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4991 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4993 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4996 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4997 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
4998 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4999 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5002 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5003 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5004 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5005 match msg_events[0] {
5006 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5007 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5009 match msg_events[1] {
5010 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5011 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5013 match msg_events[2] {
5014 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5015 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5016 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5017 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5018 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5019 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5021 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5023 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5024 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5025 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5026 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5027 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5028 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5029 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5030 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5031 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5032 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5033 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5034 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5035 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5037 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5038 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5042 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5043 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5044 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5045 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5046 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5047 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5048 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5049 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5050 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5051 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5052 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5053 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5054 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5055 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5057 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5058 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5059 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5061 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5062 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5063 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5064 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5065 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5067 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
5069 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5070 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5071 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5072 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5073 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], vec![], 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5074 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5076 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5077 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5078 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5080 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5081 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5082 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5083 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5084 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5086 let htlc_timeout_tx;
5087 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5088 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5089 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5090 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5091 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5093 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5094 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5095 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5096 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5097 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5098 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5099 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5101 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5102 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5103 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5104 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5107 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5108 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5109 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5110 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5111 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5113 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5114 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5117 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5118 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5120 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5121 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5122 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5123 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5124 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5125 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5126 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5127 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5128 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5129 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5130 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5131 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5132 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5134 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5135 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5136 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5137 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5138 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5139 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5140 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5141 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5142 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5145 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5146 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5148 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5150 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5152 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5153 // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5154 // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5155 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5156 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], Some(196*2), true);
5157 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5158 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5159 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5160 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5161 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5162 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5163 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5165 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5166 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5168 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5170 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5171 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5172 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5174 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5179 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5180 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5181 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5182 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5183 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5185 // Create some initial channels
5186 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5188 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5189 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5190 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5191 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5192 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5194 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5195 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5196 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5197 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5198 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5199 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5200 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5202 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5203 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5206 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5207 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5210 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5211 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5212 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5213 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5214 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5215 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5216 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5220 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5221 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5223 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5224 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5225 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5226 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5227 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5228 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5231 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5232 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5233 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5234 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5235 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5236 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5237 // use the same payment hashes.
5238 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5243 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5244 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5245 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5246 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5247 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5248 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5249 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5250 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5251 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5252 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5254 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5255 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5256 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5257 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5258 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5260 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5261 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5262 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5263 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5265 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5267 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5269 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5270 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5272 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5274 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5276 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5278 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5279 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5281 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5283 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5286 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5288 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5289 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5292 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5294 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5295 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5297 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5298 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5299 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5300 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5301 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5303 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5304 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5305 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5306 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5307 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5308 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5309 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5310 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5311 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5313 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5314 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5315 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5316 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5317 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5318 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5320 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5321 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5322 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5323 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5324 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5325 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5327 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5328 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5329 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5330 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5332 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5334 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5335 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5336 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5337 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5338 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5339 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5340 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5341 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5342 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5343 if deliver_last_raa {
5344 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5346 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5349 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5350 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5351 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5352 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5354 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5355 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5356 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5358 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5359 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5360 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5362 if announce_latest {
5363 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5365 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5367 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5368 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5369 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5372 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5376 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5377 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5380 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5381 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5382 if deliver_last_raa {
5383 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5385 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5387 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5389 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5390 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5391 let mut a_done = false;
5392 for msg in cs_msgs {
5394 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5395 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5396 // should be failed-backwards here.
5397 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5398 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5399 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5400 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5402 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5407 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5408 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5409 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5411 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5412 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5415 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5416 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5417 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5418 if announce_latest {
5419 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5420 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5421 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5424 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5426 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5430 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5431 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5432 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5433 let mut as_updates = 0;
5434 for event in as_events.iter() {
5435 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5436 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5437 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5438 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5440 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5442 if network_update.is_some() {
5445 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5447 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5448 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5449 if announce_latest {
5450 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5451 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5453 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5455 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5456 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5457 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5458 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5459 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5460 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5461 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5462 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5463 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5465 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5467 if network_update.is_some() {
5470 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5472 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5473 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5474 if announce_latest {
5475 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5477 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5479 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5480 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5481 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5482 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5483 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5484 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5488 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5489 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5493 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5494 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5498 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5499 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5500 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5501 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5505 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5506 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5507 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5508 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5509 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5511 // Create some initial channels
5512 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5514 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5515 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5516 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5517 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5519 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5520 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5521 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5522 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5523 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5524 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5526 let htlc_timeout = {
5527 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5528 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5529 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5530 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5531 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5532 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5536 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5537 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5538 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5540 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5541 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5542 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5543 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5544 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5545 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5546 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5547 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5548 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5549 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5550 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5554 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5555 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5556 // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5557 // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5559 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5561 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5562 let seed = [42; 32];
5563 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5564 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5565 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph: &chanmon_cfgs[0].network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5566 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5567 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5568 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5570 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5571 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5573 // Create some initial channels
5574 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5576 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5577 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5578 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5580 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5581 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5582 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5583 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5584 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5586 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5587 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5588 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5589 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5590 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5592 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5593 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5594 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5595 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5596 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5597 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5598 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5599 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5602 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5603 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5604 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5605 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5606 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5607 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5609 let htlc_timeout = {
5610 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5611 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5612 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5613 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5617 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5618 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5619 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5621 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5622 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5623 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5624 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5625 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5626 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5627 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5628 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5629 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5630 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5631 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5632 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5636 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5637 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5638 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5639 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5640 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5642 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5644 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5645 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5647 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5648 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5649 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5651 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5652 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5653 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5655 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5656 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5657 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5659 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5660 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5661 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5664 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5665 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5666 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5667 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5668 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5669 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5671 let (payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5673 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5674 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5675 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5676 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5678 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5679 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5680 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5682 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5683 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5684 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5685 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5686 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5688 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5689 let mut block = Block {
5690 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5693 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5694 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5695 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5697 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5698 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5699 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5700 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5703 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5704 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5705 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5706 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5707 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5708 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5710 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5711 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5712 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5714 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5716 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5717 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5718 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5720 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5721 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5723 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5724 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5725 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5727 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5728 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5729 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5730 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5733 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5734 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5735 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5736 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5737 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5738 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5740 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5741 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5742 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5743 // actually revoked.
5744 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5745 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5746 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5747 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5748 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5750 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5751 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5752 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5753 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5754 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5755 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5756 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5757 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5758 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5759 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5761 if check_revoke_no_close {
5762 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5763 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5766 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5767 let mut block = Block {
5768 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5771 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5772 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5773 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5775 if !check_revoke_no_close {
5776 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5777 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5778 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5779 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5781 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5785 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5786 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5787 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5788 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5789 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5790 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5791 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5793 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5794 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5795 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5797 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5798 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5799 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5801 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5802 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5806 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5807 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5808 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5809 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5810 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5815 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5816 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5817 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5818 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5819 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5820 //Force duplicate channel ids
5821 for node in nodes.iter() {
5822 *node.keys_manager.override_channel_id_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5825 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5826 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5827 let push_msat=10001;
5828 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5829 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5830 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5832 //Create a second channel with a channel_id collision
5833 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5837 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5838 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5839 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5840 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5841 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5843 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5844 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5845 let push_msat=10001;
5846 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5848 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5849 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5850 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5851 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5852 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5854 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5855 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5856 let push_msat=10001;
5857 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5858 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5859 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5861 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5862 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5863 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5865 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5866 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5867 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5869 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5870 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5871 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5873 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5874 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5875 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5876 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5877 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5878 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5882 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5883 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5884 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5885 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5886 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5888 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5889 let push_msat=10001;
5890 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5891 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5892 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5893 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5895 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5896 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5897 let err_msg = match events[0] {
5898 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5901 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5903 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5906 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5907 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5908 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5909 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5911 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5912 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5913 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5914 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5915 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5916 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5918 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5919 // pending_update_fee.
5921 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5922 *feerate_lock += 20;
5924 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5925 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5927 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5928 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5929 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5930 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5931 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5933 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5936 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5938 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5939 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5940 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5942 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5943 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
5944 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5946 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5947 let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
5948 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5949 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5951 // Flush the pending fee update.
5952 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5953 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5955 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5956 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5958 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5959 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5960 // us to surface its failure to the user.
5961 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
5962 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5963 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5964 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5965 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5966 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5968 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5969 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5970 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5972 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
5973 assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5974 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5975 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
5976 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
5977 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
5978 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
5979 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
5980 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
5982 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5986 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5987 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5988 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5990 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5991 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5992 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5993 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5994 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5995 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5997 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5998 // pending_update_fee.
6000 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6001 *feerate_lock += 200;
6003 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6004 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6006 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6007 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6008 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6009 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6010 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6012 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6015 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6017 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6018 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6019 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6021 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6023 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1) - amt_1;
6024 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6025 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6027 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6028 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6029 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6030 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6031 let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6032 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6033 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6035 // Flush the pending fee update.
6036 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6037 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6038 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6039 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6040 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6041 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6043 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6044 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6045 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6046 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6047 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6048 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6049 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6050 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6051 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6053 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6054 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6055 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6057 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6058 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6059 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6060 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6061 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6062 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6063 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6064 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6065 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6067 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6070 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6071 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6072 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6073 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6074 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6076 let raa = match send_raa_event {
6077 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6078 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6080 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6081 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6082 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6083 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6084 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6085 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6087 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6088 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6090 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6091 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6092 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6094 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6095 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6097 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6098 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6099 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6100 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6101 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6102 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6105 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6106 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6107 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6110 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6111 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6112 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6113 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6114 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6115 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6116 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6117 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6118 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6119 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6120 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6122 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6123 // pending_update_fee.
6125 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6126 *feerate_lock += 20;
6128 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6129 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6131 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6132 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6133 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6134 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6135 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6137 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6140 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6142 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6143 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6144 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6146 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6148 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6149 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6150 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6151 let payment_event = {
6152 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6153 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6155 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6156 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6158 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6160 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6162 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6163 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6165 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6166 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6168 // Flush the pending fee update.
6169 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6170 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6171 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6172 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6173 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6174 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6176 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6177 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6178 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6180 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6181 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6184 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6187 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6189 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6191 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6192 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6193 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6194 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6195 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6196 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6199 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6200 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6201 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6203 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6204 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6205 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6206 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6207 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6208 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6209 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6210 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6211 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6212 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6214 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6217 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6218 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6219 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6221 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6222 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6224 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6225 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6226 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6227 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6228 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6229 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6230 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6231 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6233 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6234 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6235 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6238 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6239 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6240 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6243 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6244 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6245 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6246 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6247 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6248 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6249 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6251 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6252 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6254 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6255 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6256 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6257 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6261 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6262 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6263 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6264 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6265 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6266 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6267 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6269 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6270 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6271 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6272 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6274 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6275 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6279 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6280 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6281 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6282 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6283 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6284 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6285 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6287 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6288 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6290 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6291 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6293 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6294 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6295 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6296 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6297 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6301 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6302 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6303 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6304 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6305 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6306 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6307 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6308 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6310 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], vec![], 100000000, 500000001);
6311 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6312 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6316 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6317 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6318 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6319 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6320 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6321 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6322 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6323 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6324 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6325 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6327 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6328 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6329 let payment_event = {
6330 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6331 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6333 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6334 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6335 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6336 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6340 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6342 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6344 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6346 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6347 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6349 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6350 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6351 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6353 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6354 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6358 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6359 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6360 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6361 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6362 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6363 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6364 let channel_value = 100000;
6365 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6366 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6368 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6370 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6371 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6373 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6374 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6375 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6377 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6378 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6380 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6383 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6385 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6386 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6387 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6388 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6389 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6390 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6391 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6392 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6394 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6395 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6396 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6399 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6400 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6401 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6402 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6403 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6404 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6405 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6406 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6407 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6408 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6409 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6413 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6414 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6415 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6416 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6417 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6418 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6419 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6421 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6422 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6423 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6424 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6425 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
6427 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6428 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6429 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6430 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6431 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6433 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6434 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6435 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6436 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6437 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6439 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6440 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6441 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6442 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6443 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6447 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6448 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6449 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6450 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6451 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6452 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6453 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6454 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6456 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6457 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6458 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6459 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6460 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6461 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6463 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6467 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6468 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6469 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6472 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6473 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6474 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6476 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6477 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6479 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6480 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6481 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6483 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6487 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6488 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6489 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6490 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6491 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6492 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6493 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6495 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6496 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6497 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6498 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6499 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6500 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6502 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6503 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6504 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6505 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6506 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6510 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6511 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6512 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6513 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6514 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6515 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6517 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6518 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6519 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6520 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6521 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6522 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6523 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6525 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6526 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6527 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6528 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6529 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6533 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6534 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6535 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6536 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6537 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6538 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6539 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6540 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6542 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6543 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6544 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6545 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6546 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6547 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6549 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6550 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6551 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6552 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6553 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6554 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6555 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6556 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6557 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6558 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6559 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6560 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6561 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6564 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6565 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6566 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6567 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6568 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6570 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6572 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6573 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6574 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6575 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6576 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6580 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6581 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6583 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6584 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6585 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6586 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6587 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6588 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6589 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6591 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6592 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6593 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6595 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6598 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6601 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6603 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6604 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6605 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6606 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6607 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6611 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6612 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6614 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6615 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6616 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6617 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6618 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6620 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6621 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6622 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6623 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6624 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6626 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6629 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6632 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6634 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6635 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6636 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6637 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6638 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6642 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6643 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6645 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6646 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6647 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6648 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6649 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6651 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6652 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6653 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6654 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6655 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6656 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6659 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6660 failure_code: 0x8000,
6663 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6665 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6666 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6667 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6668 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6669 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6673 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6674 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6676 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6677 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6678 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6679 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6680 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6682 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6684 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6685 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6687 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6688 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6689 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6691 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6692 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6693 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6694 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6695 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6696 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6697 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6699 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6703 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6705 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6707 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6708 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6709 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6710 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6711 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6715 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6716 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6718 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6719 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6720 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6721 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6722 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6724 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6726 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6727 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6729 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6730 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6731 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6733 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6734 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6735 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6736 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6737 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6738 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6739 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6741 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6745 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6747 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6749 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6750 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6751 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6752 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6753 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6757 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6758 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6760 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6761 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6762 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6763 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6764 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6766 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6767 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6768 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6770 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6771 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6773 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6774 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6775 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6777 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6779 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6781 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6782 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6783 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6784 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6785 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6786 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6787 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6789 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6792 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6793 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6795 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6796 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6797 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6798 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6799 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6803 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6804 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6805 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6807 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6808 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6809 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6810 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6811 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6812 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6814 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6817 let mut payment_event = {
6818 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6819 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6820 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6821 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6822 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6824 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6825 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6826 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6827 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6828 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6829 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6830 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6831 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6832 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6835 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6836 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6837 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6838 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6840 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6841 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6842 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6844 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6845 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6846 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6847 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6848 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6849 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6850 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6852 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6856 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6858 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6859 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6860 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6861 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6862 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6864 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6866 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6867 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6868 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6869 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6870 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6871 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6873 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6876 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6879 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6880 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6881 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6882 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6884 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6885 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6886 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6887 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6888 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6889 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6891 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6893 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6894 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6895 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6896 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6898 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6899 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6901 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6902 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
6903 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6904 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6905 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6907 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6908 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6909 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6910 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6912 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6913 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6915 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6917 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6918 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6920 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6923 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6924 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6926 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6929 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6930 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6931 if announce_latest {
6932 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6934 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6937 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6938 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6939 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6941 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6942 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6943 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6944 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6945 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6946 let mut first_failed = false;
6947 for event in events {
6949 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6950 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6951 assert!(!first_failed);
6952 first_failed = true;
6954 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6957 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6963 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6964 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6965 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6968 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6969 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6970 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6971 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6972 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6973 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6974 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6976 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6977 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6978 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6979 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6980 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6982 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6984 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6985 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6987 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6988 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
6990 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
6992 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6993 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
6996 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
6998 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
6999 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7000 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7001 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7002 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7004 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7005 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7006 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7007 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7008 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7009 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7010 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7011 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7012 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7013 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7014 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7016 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7017 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7018 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7019 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7020 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7021 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7022 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7023 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7025 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7026 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7027 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
7028 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7029 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7030 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7031 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7033 // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
7035 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7036 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7039 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7040 if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7041 else { first = false; }
7043 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7046 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7047 if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7048 else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7050 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7057 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7058 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7059 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7060 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7064 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7065 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7067 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7068 low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7069 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7070 high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7071 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7072 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7073 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7074 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7075 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7077 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7078 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0) {
7080 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7081 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7083 } else { assert!(false) }
7085 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7086 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7087 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7088 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7089 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0) {
7091 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7092 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7094 } else { assert!(false); }
7096 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7097 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7098 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7099 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7100 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7101 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7103 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7105 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7106 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7107 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7111 } else { panic!(); }
7112 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7114 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7115 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7116 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7117 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7118 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &high_their_to_self_config, 0) {
7120 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7121 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7123 } else { assert!(false); }
7127 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7128 // We want to be sure that :
7129 // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7130 // (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7131 // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7132 // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7133 // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7139 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7140 // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7141 // during signing due to revoked tx
7142 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7143 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7146 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7147 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7148 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7150 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7152 // Cache node A state before any channel update
7153 let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7154 let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7155 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7157 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7158 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7160 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7161 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7163 // Restore node A from previous state
7164 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7165 let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7166 chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7167 tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7168 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7169 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7170 monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7172 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7173 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7174 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7175 keys_manager: keys_manager,
7176 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7177 chain_monitor: &monitor,
7179 tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7180 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7184 nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7185 assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7186 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7187 nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7189 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7191 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7192 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7194 let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7196 // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7197 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7198 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7201 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7202 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7205 let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7206 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7207 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7208 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7209 reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7210 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7211 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7213 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7214 assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7216 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7219 panic!("Unexpected event")
7223 // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7224 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7225 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_string() });
7226 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction");
7227 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7229 // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7230 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7231 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7232 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
7233 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
7234 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
7235 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7236 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting".to_string() });
7237 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
7238 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7239 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
7243 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7244 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7245 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7246 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7248 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7249 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7250 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7251 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7253 // Create some initial channels
7254 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7256 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7257 let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7258 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[0].network_graph, None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7259 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7260 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7261 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7262 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7264 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7265 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7266 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7267 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7268 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7270 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7271 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7272 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7273 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7275 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7276 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7277 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7279 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7280 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7281 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7282 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7283 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7284 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7285 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7286 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7287 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7288 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7290 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7292 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7294 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7295 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7297 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7298 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7299 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7300 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7304 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7305 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7306 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7308 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7309 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7310 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7311 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7313 let short_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7314 let short_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7315 let short_id_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7318 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7319 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7321 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7322 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7323 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7324 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7325 let mut chans_disabled: HashSet<u64> = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7326 for e in msg_events {
7328 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7329 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7330 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7331 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7332 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7335 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7339 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7340 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7341 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7342 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7343 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7344 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7346 // Reestablish chan_1
7347 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7348 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7349 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7350 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7351 // Reestablish chan_2
7352 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7353 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7354 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7355 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7356 // Reestablish chan_3
7357 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7358 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7359 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7360 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7362 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7363 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7364 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7365 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7366 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7367 chans_disabled = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7368 for e in msg_events {
7370 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7371 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7372 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7373 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7374 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7377 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7383 fn test_priv_forwarding_rejection() {
7384 // If we have a private channel with outbound liquidity, and
7385 // UserConfig::accept_forwards_to_priv_channels is set to false, we should reject any attempts
7386 // to forward through that channel.
7387 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7388 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7389 let mut no_announce_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
7390 no_announce_cfg.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
7391 no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = false;
7392 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(no_announce_cfg), None]);
7393 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
7394 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
7395 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
7396 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7398 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7400 // Note that the create_*_chan functions in utils requires announcement_signatures, which we do
7401 // not send for private channels.
7402 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7403 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7404 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
7405 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7406 nodes[1].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7408 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[1], 1_000_000, 42);
7409 nodes[1].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7410 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()));
7411 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
7413 let cs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7414 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_funding_signed);
7415 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7417 let conf_height = core::cmp::max(nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1, nodes[2].best_block_info().1 + 1);
7418 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, conf_height);
7419 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7420 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[2], &tx, conf_height);
7421 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7422 let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7423 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7424 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7425 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
7426 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7428 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7429 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
7430 assert!(!nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7432 // We should always be able to forward through nodes[1] as long as its out through a public
7434 send_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], 10_000);
7436 // ... however, if we send to nodes[2], we will have to pass the private channel from nodes[1]
7437 // to nodes[2], which should be rejected:
7438 let route_hint = RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
7439 src_node_id: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
7440 short_channel_id: nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(),
7441 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 1000, proportional_millionths: 0 },
7442 cltv_expiry_delta: MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
7443 htlc_minimum_msat: None,
7444 htlc_maximum_msat: None,
7446 let last_hops = vec![route_hint];
7447 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], last_hops, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
7449 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7450 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7451 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
7452 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7453 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7455 let htlc_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7456 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7457 assert_eq!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7458 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7459 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fee.is_none());
7461 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7462 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7463 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(), true);
7465 // Now disconnect nodes[1] from its peers and restart with accept_forwards_to_priv_channels set
7466 // to true. Sadly there is currently no way to change it at runtime.
7468 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7469 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7471 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
7472 let mut monitor_a_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7473 let mut monitor_b_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7474 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut monitor_a_serialized).unwrap();
7475 get_monitor!(nodes[1], cs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut monitor_b_serialized).unwrap();
7477 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7478 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
7479 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7480 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
7482 let mut monitor_a_read = &monitor_a_serialized.0[..];
7483 let mut monitor_b_read = &monitor_b_serialized.0[..];
7484 let (_, mut monitor_a) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_a_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7485 let (_, mut monitor_b) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_b_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7486 assert!(monitor_a_read.is_empty());
7487 assert!(monitor_b_read.is_empty());
7489 no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = true;
7491 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
7492 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
7493 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7494 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_a);
7495 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_b);
7496 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7497 default_config: no_announce_cfg,
7499 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
7500 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
7501 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7502 logger: nodes[1].logger,
7506 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
7507 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
7509 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_a).is_ok());
7510 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_b).is_ok());
7511 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7512 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
7514 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7515 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7516 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7517 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7518 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
7519 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7520 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7521 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7523 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7524 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7525 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7526 let cs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7527 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7528 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_reestablish);
7529 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7530 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7532 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7533 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7534 pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], 10_000, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret);
7535 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], our_payment_preimage);
7539 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7540 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7541 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7543 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7544 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7545 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7546 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7548 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7550 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7551 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], vec![], 3000000, 30);
7552 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7554 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7555 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7556 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7557 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7558 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7559 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7561 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7562 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7563 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7564 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7568 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7569 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7571 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7572 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7573 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7574 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7575 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7577 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7581 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7582 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7583 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7584 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7585 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7586 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7587 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7588 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7592 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7593 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7594 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7595 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7597 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7598 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7599 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7600 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7601 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7602 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7603 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7604 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7605 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7606 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7607 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7608 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7609 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7613 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7615 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7616 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7618 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7620 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7621 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7622 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7623 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7624 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7625 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7626 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7627 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7628 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7629 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7630 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7631 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7632 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7636 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7638 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7639 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7643 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7644 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7645 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7647 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7648 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7649 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7650 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7651 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7653 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7654 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7655 let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7656 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7657 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7658 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7659 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7660 let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7661 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[1].network_graph, None,
7662 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7663 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7665 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7666 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7667 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7669 // Revoke local commitment tx
7670 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7672 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7673 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7674 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7675 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7676 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7677 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7678 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7680 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7681 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7682 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7684 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7685 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7686 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7688 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7689 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7690 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7691 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7693 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7694 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7695 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7696 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7697 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7698 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7699 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7700 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7702 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7703 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7709 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7710 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7711 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7713 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7714 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7715 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7716 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7718 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7719 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7720 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7721 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7722 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7723 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7725 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7726 // available, which we check here:
7727 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7728 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7729 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7731 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7732 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7734 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7735 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7736 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7737 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7739 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7740 // output, checked above).
7741 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7742 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7743 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7745 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7746 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7747 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7748 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
7749 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7753 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7754 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7755 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7756 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7757 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7759 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7760 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7762 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7763 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7764 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7765 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7766 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7768 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7769 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7775 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7776 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7777 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7778 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7780 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7781 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7783 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7784 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7785 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7786 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7787 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7788 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7789 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7790 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7794 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7795 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7796 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7797 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7799 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7800 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7801 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7802 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7803 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7804 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7805 // up bumped justice generation.
7806 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7809 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7810 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7814 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7815 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7816 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7819 // Provide preimage for one
7820 // Check aggregation
7822 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7823 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7824 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7825 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7827 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7828 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7829 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7831 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7832 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7833 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7834 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7835 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7837 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7838 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7839 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7840 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7841 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7843 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7847 let feerate_timeout;
7848 let feerate_preimage;
7850 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7851 // 9 transactions including:
7852 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
7853 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
7854 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
7856 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
7857 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7858 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
7859 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7860 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
7861 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
7862 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
7864 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
7865 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
7866 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
7867 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
7869 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
7870 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7871 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
7872 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].get_weight() as u64;
7874 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7875 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7876 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7877 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7881 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7882 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7884 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7885 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7887 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7888 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7889 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7890 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7891 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7892 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7894 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7895 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7896 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.get_weight() as u64;
7897 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7898 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7900 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7901 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7902 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7903 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7904 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7909 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7910 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7914 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7915 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7916 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7917 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7918 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7919 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7920 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7921 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7923 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7924 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7925 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7926 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7927 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7929 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7930 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7932 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7934 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7935 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7936 let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7938 // Must revoke without gaps
7939 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7940 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7942 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7943 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7944 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7946 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7947 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
7948 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7949 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7950 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7954 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7955 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7956 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7958 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7959 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7960 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7961 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7963 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7964 // Lock HTLC in both directions
7965 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7966 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
7968 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7969 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7970 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7972 // Revoke local commitment tx
7973 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7975 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7976 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7977 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
7978 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7980 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7981 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7982 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7983 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7985 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7986 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
7987 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7988 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7989 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7990 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7994 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7995 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7996 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7998 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7999 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8000 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8005 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8006 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8007 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8008 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8009 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8010 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8011 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8013 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8015 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8016 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8017 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8018 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8019 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8021 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8022 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8023 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8024 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8026 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8027 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8028 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8029 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8030 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8032 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8033 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8034 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8036 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8041 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8042 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8043 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8044 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8045 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8047 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8048 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8049 override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8051 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8053 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8054 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8055 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8056 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8060 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8061 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8062 zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8063 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8064 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8065 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8066 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8068 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8069 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8070 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8072 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8073 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8074 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8078 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8079 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8080 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8081 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8082 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8083 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8085 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8086 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8087 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8088 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8090 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8091 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8092 route.paths.push(path);
8093 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8094 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8095 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8096 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8097 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8098 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8099 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8100 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8104 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8105 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8106 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8107 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8108 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8109 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8111 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8114 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200);
8115 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8116 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8118 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8119 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8120 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8121 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8123 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8124 // values from previous calls.
8125 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8126 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8127 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8129 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8131 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8132 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8134 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8137 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8142 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8143 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs
8144 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8145 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8146 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8147 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8149 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8151 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2);
8153 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8154 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8155 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8156 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8157 } else { panic!(); }
8159 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8161 header: BlockHeader {
8163 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8164 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8165 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8169 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8170 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8171 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8172 } else { panic!(); }
8174 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8175 // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8176 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8177 block.header.time += 1;
8178 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8179 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8180 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8183 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8184 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8185 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8186 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8187 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8188 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8189 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8191 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8192 // values from previous calls.
8193 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8194 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8195 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8197 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8198 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8199 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8200 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8202 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8207 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8208 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8209 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8210 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8211 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8212 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8214 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8216 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8217 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8218 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2);
8219 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8221 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8222 // resulting events.
8223 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8225 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8226 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8227 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8228 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8229 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8231 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8232 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8233 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8234 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8235 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8237 // We should fail the payment back
8238 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8239 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8240 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8241 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8242 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8244 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8249 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8250 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8251 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8253 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8254 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8255 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8256 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8258 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8259 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8260 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8261 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8263 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8264 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8265 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8266 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8270 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8271 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8272 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8273 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8275 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8276 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8277 // commitment at same time.
8279 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8280 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8281 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8282 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8284 // Create some initial channel
8285 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8286 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8288 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8289 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8291 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8292 let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8294 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8295 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8296 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8297 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8299 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8300 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8301 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8302 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8303 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8304 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8305 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8306 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8309 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8310 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8311 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8312 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8313 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8315 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8316 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8317 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8318 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8319 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8320 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8321 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8322 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8323 if let Err(_) = watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8324 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8325 } else { assert!(false); }
8326 } else { assert!(false); };
8327 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8328 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8329 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8330 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8334 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8335 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8336 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8337 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8338 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8340 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8341 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8342 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8343 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8345 // Create some initial channel
8346 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8347 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8349 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8350 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8352 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8353 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8355 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8356 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8357 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8358 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8359 let watchtower_alice = {
8360 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8361 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8362 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8363 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8364 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8365 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8366 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8367 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8370 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8371 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8372 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8373 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8374 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8376 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8378 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8379 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8383 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8384 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8385 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8386 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8387 let watchtower_bob = {
8388 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8389 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8390 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8391 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8392 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8393 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8394 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8395 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8398 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8399 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8401 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8402 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8404 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8406 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8408 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8409 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8410 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8411 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8412 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8413 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8414 if let Err(_) = watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8415 if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8416 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8417 } else { assert!(false); }
8418 } else { assert!(false); };
8419 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8420 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8422 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8423 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8424 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8426 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8429 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8430 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8431 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8435 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8436 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8437 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8439 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8440 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8441 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8442 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8443 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8444 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8449 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8450 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8451 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8454 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8455 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8457 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8458 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8459 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8460 // before receiving funding_signed.
8461 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8462 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8463 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8464 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8466 // Create an initial channel
8467 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8468 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8469 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8470 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8471 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8473 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8474 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8476 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8477 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8479 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8480 let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8481 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8482 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8483 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8487 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8488 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8489 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8490 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8491 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8492 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8493 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8495 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8496 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8497 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8498 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8500 // Create some initial channels
8501 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8503 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8504 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8505 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8506 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8507 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8508 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8510 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8511 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8512 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8513 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8514 // this test before #653 fix.
8515 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8516 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8517 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8518 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8519 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8521 let htlc_timeout = {
8522 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8523 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8524 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8525 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8529 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8530 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8531 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8532 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8535 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8536 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8537 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8538 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8540 // Steps of the test:
8541 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8542 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8543 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8544 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8545 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8546 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8547 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8548 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8549 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8550 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8551 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8552 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8554 // Create some initial channels
8555 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8556 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8558 // Steps (1) and (2):
8559 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8560 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8562 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8563 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8564 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8565 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8566 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8567 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8568 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8570 // Steps (3) and (4):
8571 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8572 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8573 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8574 if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
8575 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
8576 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8577 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8578 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8579 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8580 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8581 true => alice_txn.clone(),
8582 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8584 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8585 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8586 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8587 if broadcast_alice {
8588 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8589 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8590 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8592 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8593 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8597 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8598 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8599 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8600 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8601 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8602 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8603 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8604 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8605 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8606 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8608 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8609 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false);
8610 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8611 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8612 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8613 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8615 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8616 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8618 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8621 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8622 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8623 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8624 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8626 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8627 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8628 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8629 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8630 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8633 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8635 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8636 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8637 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8640 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8643 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8644 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8645 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8646 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8648 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8649 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8650 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8651 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8652 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8655 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8657 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8658 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8660 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8661 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8662 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8663 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8664 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8665 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8666 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8667 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8668 if broadcast_alice {
8669 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8670 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8671 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8673 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8674 if broadcast_alice {
8675 // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8676 // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8677 // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8678 // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8680 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8681 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8683 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8684 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8689 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8690 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8692 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8693 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8694 // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8695 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8697 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8698 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8699 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8701 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8702 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8703 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8704 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8705 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8706 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8707 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8709 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8710 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8716 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8717 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8718 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8719 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8720 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8724 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8725 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8726 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8728 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8729 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8730 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8731 // updating logic for the existing channel.
8732 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8733 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8734 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8735 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8737 // Create an initial channel
8738 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8739 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8740 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8741 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8743 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8744 // that it is rejected.
8745 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8747 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8748 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8750 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8751 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8752 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8753 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8754 // move forward with it.
8755 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8756 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8758 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8762 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8763 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8765 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8766 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8768 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8769 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8771 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8772 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8773 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8774 added_monitors.clear();
8776 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8778 let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8779 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8781 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8784 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8785 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8786 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8787 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8788 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8790 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8791 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8793 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8794 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8795 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8796 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8797 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8799 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8803 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8804 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8805 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8806 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8807 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8808 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8810 let funding_created = {
8811 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8812 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8813 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8814 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8816 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8817 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8818 // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8819 // still needs to be cleared here.
8820 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8822 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8824 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8825 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8827 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8828 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8829 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8830 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8831 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8833 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8837 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8838 // everything is functional.
8839 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8841 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8842 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8843 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8844 added_monitors.clear();
8847 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8848 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8849 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8850 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
8852 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8853 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
8854 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8855 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8859 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8860 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8862 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8863 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8864 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8865 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8866 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8867 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8868 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8870 // Create some initial channels
8871 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8872 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8873 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8875 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8876 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8877 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8879 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8880 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8881 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8883 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8884 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8885 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8886 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8887 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8888 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8889 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8890 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8891 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8893 // A null channel ID should close all channels
8894 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8895 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8896 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8897 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8898 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8899 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8901 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8902 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8904 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8907 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8908 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8910 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8912 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
8913 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
8914 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
8915 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
8916 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8917 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8919 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
8920 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8921 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8925 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
8926 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
8928 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
8929 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
8930 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
8931 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
8932 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8933 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8934 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8935 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8937 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8938 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8939 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8941 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42);
8942 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
8943 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
8944 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
8947 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
8948 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8949 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8951 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8952 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8954 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8955 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
8957 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8958 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8959 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
8961 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
8962 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
8963 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8964 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8965 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8966 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8967 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
8968 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8969 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
8970 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
8971 } else { panic!(); }
8972 } else { panic!(); }
8973 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
8976 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
8977 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
8978 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
8979 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
8980 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
8981 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
8982 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
8983 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
8984 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
8985 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
8986 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
8987 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
8988 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
8989 // until we learned about an additional block.
8991 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
8992 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
8993 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8994 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8995 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8996 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8997 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
8999 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9000 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9001 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9002 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9003 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9005 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
9006 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9007 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9008 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9009 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9010 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9012 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9013 if !test_height_before_timelock {
9014 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9016 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9017 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9018 if test_height_before_timelock {
9019 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9020 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9021 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9022 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9024 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9025 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9026 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9027 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9028 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9029 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9031 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9032 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9034 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9035 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9036 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9037 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9038 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9039 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9040 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9042 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9043 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9044 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9045 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9046 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9047 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9048 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9049 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9050 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9055 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9056 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9057 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9061 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9062 // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9063 // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9065 // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9067 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9068 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9069 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9070 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9071 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9072 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9073 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9074 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9075 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9077 // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9078 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9079 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9080 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9082 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9083 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9084 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9085 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9086 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9088 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9090 // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9091 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9092 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9093 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9095 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9096 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9097 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9098 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9099 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9101 // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9103 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9105 // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9106 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9107 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9109 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9110 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9111 let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9112 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9113 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9115 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9116 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9117 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9118 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9120 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9121 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9122 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9123 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9124 let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9125 let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9126 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9127 assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9129 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9130 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9131 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9132 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9133 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9134 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9135 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9137 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9138 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9139 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9140 logger: nodes[1].logger,
9144 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9145 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9147 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9148 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9149 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9152 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9153 // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9154 // the commitment state.
9155 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9157 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9159 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9160 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9163 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9164 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9165 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9166 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9167 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9168 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9169 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9171 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9172 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9176 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9177 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9178 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9179 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9180 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9182 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9183 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9184 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9185 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9186 let params = RouteParameters {
9187 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9188 final_value_msat: 10000,
9189 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9191 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9192 let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
9194 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9195 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9196 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9197 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9198 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9199 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9200 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9201 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9202 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9206 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9207 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9208 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9209 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9210 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9212 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9213 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9214 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9215 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9217 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9218 let params = RouteParameters {
9219 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9220 final_value_msat: 10000,
9221 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9223 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9224 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9225 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9226 let route = find_route(
9227 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9228 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
9231 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9232 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9233 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9234 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9235 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9236 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9237 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9238 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9239 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9242 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9243 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9244 enum ExposureEvent {
9245 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9247 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9249 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9250 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9253 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9254 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9257 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9258 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9259 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9260 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9261 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9262 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9263 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9264 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9266 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9267 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9268 config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9269 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9270 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9271 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9273 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9274 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9275 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9276 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9278 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9280 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
9281 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9282 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
9284 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 1_000_000, 42);
9287 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9288 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9292 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9293 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9294 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9296 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9297 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9299 let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9300 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9301 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9303 let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9304 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9305 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9306 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9308 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9309 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9311 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9312 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9314 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9315 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9318 if dust_outbound_balance {
9319 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9320 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9321 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9322 for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9323 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9324 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9327 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9328 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9329 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9330 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9331 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9335 if dust_outbound_balance {
9336 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9337 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9338 for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9339 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9340 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9343 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9344 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9345 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9346 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9351 let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9352 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9353 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9354 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9355 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9357 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9358 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9359 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9361 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9363 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9364 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9365 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9366 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9367 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9368 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9369 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9370 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9371 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9373 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9374 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9375 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9376 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9378 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9379 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9381 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9382 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9383 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9385 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9386 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9388 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9389 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9390 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9393 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9394 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9395 added_monitors.clear();
9399 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9400 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9401 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9402 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9403 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9404 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9405 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9406 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9407 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9408 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9409 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9410 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9411 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);