1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
20 use crate::sign::{ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, OutputSpender, SignerProvider};
21 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
22 use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
23 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, COINBASE_MATURITY, ChannelPhase};
24 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
25 use crate::ln::channel::{DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS, ChannelError};
26 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
27 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
28 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
29 use crate::routing::router::{Path, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, get_route, RouteParameters};
30 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
32 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
33 use crate::util::test_channel_signer::TestChannelSigner;
34 use crate::util::test_utils::{self, WatchtowerPersister};
35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
37 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
38 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
40 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, ScriptBuf};
43 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
44 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
45 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
46 use bitcoin::{Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
47 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
50 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
53 use crate::prelude::*;
54 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
55 use core::iter::repeat;
56 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
57 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
59 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
60 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
62 use super::channel::UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS;
65 fn test_channel_resumption_fail_post_funding() {
66 // If we fail to exchange funding with a peer prior to it disconnecting we'll resume the
67 // channel open on reconnect, however if we do exchange funding we do not currently support
68 // replaying it and here test that the channel closes.
69 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
70 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
71 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
72 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
74 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
75 let open_chan = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
76 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan);
77 let accept_chan = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
78 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan);
80 let (temp_chan_id, tx, funding_output) =
81 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
82 let new_chan_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_output);
83 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
85 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
86 check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(new_chan_id, true, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer)]);
88 // After ddf75afd16 we'd panic on reconnection if we exchanged funding info, so test that
90 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
91 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
93 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(), Vec::new());
97 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
98 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
99 use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
100 let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
101 cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
102 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
103 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
104 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
105 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
107 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
109 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
110 let channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
111 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
113 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
114 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
116 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
117 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
119 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
120 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
121 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
122 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
123 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
124 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
125 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
126 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
128 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
129 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager", expected_regex, 1);
131 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
133 } else { assert!(false); }
136 use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
138 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
139 insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
140 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
142 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
144 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
146 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
148 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
150 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
152 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
154 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
158 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
159 // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
161 use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
162 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
163 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
164 *node_cfgs[1].override_init_features.borrow_mut() = Some(channelmanager::provided_init_features(&test_default_channel_config()).clear_wumbo());
165 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
166 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
168 match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None, None) {
169 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
170 assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
176 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
177 // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
178 // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
179 // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
180 // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
181 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
182 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
183 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
184 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
185 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
187 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
188 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
189 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
190 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
191 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
192 push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
194 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None, None).unwrap();
195 let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
196 if !send_from_initiator {
197 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
198 open_channel_message.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
200 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
202 // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
203 let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
204 if send_from_initiator {
205 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
206 accept_channel_message.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
208 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
210 let sender_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] };
211 let counterparty_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
212 let mut sender_node_per_peer_lock;
213 let mut sender_node_peer_state_lock;
215 let channel_phase = get_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
216 match channel_phase {
217 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
218 let chan_context = channel_phase.context_mut();
219 chan_context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
220 chan_context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
226 let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
227 let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
228 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
230 // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
231 // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
232 if send_from_initiator {
233 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
234 // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
235 // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
236 // well as an additional HTLC.
237 - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, &channel_type_features));
239 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
244 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
245 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
246 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
250 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
251 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
252 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
253 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
254 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
255 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
258 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
262 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
263 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
264 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
265 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
266 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
267 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
268 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
269 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
270 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
271 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
273 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
275 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
277 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
279 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
282 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
283 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
285 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
286 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
287 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
288 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
289 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
291 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
294 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
296 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
297 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
298 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
299 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
300 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
302 let payment_event = {
303 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
304 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
305 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
307 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
308 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
310 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
311 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
312 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
313 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
314 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
315 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
317 // deliver(1), generate (3):
318 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
319 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
320 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
321 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
323 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
324 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
325 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
326 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
327 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
328 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
329 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
330 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
332 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
333 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
334 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
335 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
336 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
337 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
338 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
339 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
341 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
342 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
343 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
344 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
346 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
347 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
348 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
350 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
351 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
353 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
354 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
356 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
357 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
360 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
361 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
365 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
366 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
367 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
368 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
369 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
370 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
371 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
372 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
375 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
377 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
379 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
382 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
383 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
385 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
386 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
387 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
388 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
391 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
394 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
396 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
397 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
398 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
399 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
400 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
402 let payment_event = {
403 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
404 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
405 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
407 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
408 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
410 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
411 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
412 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
413 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
414 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
415 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
417 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
418 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
420 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
424 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
425 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
426 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
427 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
428 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
429 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
432 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
433 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
434 // update_fee (never committed) ->
436 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
437 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
438 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
439 // <- (1) RAA delivered
440 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
441 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
442 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
443 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
445 // B should send no response here
446 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
447 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
450 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
453 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
454 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
455 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
457 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
458 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
460 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
461 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
462 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
463 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
464 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
466 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
469 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
470 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
471 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
472 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
475 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
478 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
479 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
481 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
482 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
483 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
485 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
486 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
487 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
488 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
491 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
493 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
495 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
497 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
498 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
499 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
500 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
501 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
502 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
503 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
504 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
505 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
506 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
507 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
509 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
510 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
511 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
512 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
513 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
515 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
516 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
517 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
520 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
521 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
522 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
524 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
525 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
526 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
528 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
529 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
530 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
531 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
533 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
534 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
535 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
538 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
539 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
540 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
541 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
544 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
545 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
546 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
547 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
549 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
550 let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
551 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
552 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
555 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
556 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
557 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
559 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
560 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
561 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
563 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
564 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
566 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
568 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
569 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
570 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
571 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
573 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
574 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
576 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
577 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
578 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
579 added_monitors.clear();
581 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
583 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
585 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
586 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
588 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
589 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
590 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
591 added_monitors.clear();
594 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
595 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
596 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
598 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
599 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
601 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
602 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
603 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
604 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
605 expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
609 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
610 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
611 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
612 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
613 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
614 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
615 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
616 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
617 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
618 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
619 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
620 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
621 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
622 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
623 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
624 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
625 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
626 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
627 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
631 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
632 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
633 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
634 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
635 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
636 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
639 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
642 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
643 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
645 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
646 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
647 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
648 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
649 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
651 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
653 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
655 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
656 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
657 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
659 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
660 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
661 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
663 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
664 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
665 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
666 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
668 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
669 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
670 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
674 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
675 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
676 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
677 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
678 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
679 let channel_value = 5000;
681 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000);
682 let channel_id = chan.2;
683 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
684 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
685 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
687 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
689 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
690 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
691 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
693 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
694 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features)) as u32;
696 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
697 *feerate_lock = feerate;
699 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
700 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
701 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
703 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
705 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
707 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
709 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
711 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
712 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
713 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000;
714 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
715 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
716 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
720 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
721 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
724 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
725 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
726 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
728 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
730 // Get the TestChannelSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
731 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
732 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
733 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
734 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
735 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
736 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
737 ).flatten().unwrap();
738 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
739 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
740 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
741 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
743 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
744 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
745 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
746 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
747 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
748 ).flatten().unwrap();
749 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
750 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
751 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
752 chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
753 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
756 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
757 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
758 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
761 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
762 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
763 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
764 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
765 ).flatten().unwrap();
766 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
767 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
768 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
769 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
771 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000,
772 local_funding, remote_funding,
773 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
774 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
776 &local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
778 local_chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
781 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
784 htlc_signatures: res.1,
786 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
789 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
791 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
794 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
796 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
797 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
798 //Should produce and error.
799 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
800 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee", 3);
801 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
802 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
803 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") },
804 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], channel_value);
808 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
809 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
810 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
811 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
812 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
813 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
816 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
819 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
822 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
823 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
825 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
826 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
827 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
828 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
829 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
831 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
833 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
834 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
835 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
836 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
838 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
840 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
841 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
842 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
844 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
845 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
846 added_monitors.clear();
848 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
849 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
850 // node[1] has nothing to do
852 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
853 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
854 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
856 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
857 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
858 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
859 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
860 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
861 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
862 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
864 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
865 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
866 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
867 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
868 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
869 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
871 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
872 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
873 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
874 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
876 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
877 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
878 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
880 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
881 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
882 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
883 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
885 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
886 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
887 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
889 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
891 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
892 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
894 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => { },
895 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
898 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
900 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
901 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
902 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
903 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
904 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
908 fn test_update_fee() {
909 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
910 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
911 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
912 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
913 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
914 let channel_id = chan.2;
917 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
918 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
919 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
920 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
921 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
922 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
923 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
924 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
925 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
926 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
927 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
930 // Create and deliver (1)...
933 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
934 feerate = *feerate_lock;
935 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
937 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
938 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
940 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
941 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
942 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
943 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
944 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
946 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
948 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
950 // Generate (2) and (3):
951 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
952 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
953 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
956 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
957 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
958 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
960 // Create and deliver (4)...
962 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
963 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
965 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
966 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
967 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
968 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
969 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
970 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
971 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
973 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
976 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
977 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
978 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
980 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
981 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
983 // Handle (3), creating (6):
984 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
985 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
986 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
987 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
990 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
991 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
992 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
994 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
995 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
996 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
997 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
998 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
999 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1000 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1001 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
1002 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1005 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
1006 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1007 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1008 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1010 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
1011 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1012 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1014 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
1015 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
1016 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
1017 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1018 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1022 fn fake_network_test() {
1023 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
1024 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
1025 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
1026 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
1027 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
1028 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1030 // Create some initial channels
1031 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1032 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1033 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1035 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
1036 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1037 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1038 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1039 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1041 // Send some more payments
1042 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1043 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
1044 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
1046 // Test failure packets
1047 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
1048 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
1050 // Add a new channel that skips 3
1051 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1053 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1054 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1055 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1056 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1057 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1058 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1059 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1061 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1062 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1063 hops.push(RouteHop {
1064 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1065 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1066 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1067 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1069 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1070 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1072 hops.push(RouteHop {
1073 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1074 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1075 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1076 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1078 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1079 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1081 hops.push(RouteHop {
1082 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1083 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1084 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1085 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1087 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1088 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1090 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1091 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1092 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1],
1093 Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], route_params: None },
1094 &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1096 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1097 hops.push(RouteHop {
1098 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1099 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1100 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1101 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1103 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1104 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1106 hops.push(RouteHop {
1107 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1108 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1109 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1110 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1112 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1113 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1115 hops.push(RouteHop {
1116 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1117 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1118 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1119 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1121 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1122 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1124 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1125 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1126 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1],
1127 Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], route_params: None },
1128 &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1130 // Claim the rebalances...
1131 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1132 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1134 // Close down the channels...
1135 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1136 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1137 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1138 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1139 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1140 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1141 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1142 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1143 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1144 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1145 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1146 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1150 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1151 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1152 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1153 // commitment dance rounds.
1154 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1155 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1156 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1157 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1158 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1159 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1161 // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
1162 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1164 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1166 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1167 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
1168 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1169 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1171 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1173 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1174 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1175 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1176 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1178 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1179 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1182 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
1183 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)
1184 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1185 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1188 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1189 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1191 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
1192 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1193 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1196 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1197 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1198 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1199 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1201 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1202 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1203 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1204 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1205 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1206 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1207 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1209 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1210 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1211 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1213 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1215 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1216 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1217 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1218 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1220 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1221 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1222 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1223 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1225 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1226 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1227 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1229 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1230 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1232 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1233 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1234 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1235 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1236 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1238 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1239 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1240 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1241 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1242 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1244 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1245 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1247 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1249 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1250 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1251 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1253 &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1254 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1256 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1260 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1261 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1264 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1268 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1269 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1270 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1271 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1272 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1273 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1274 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1276 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1277 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
1278 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1279 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1280 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
1281 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
1283 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1285 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1286 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1288 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1289 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1291 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1292 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1293 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1297 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1298 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1299 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1300 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1301 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1302 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1303 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1304 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1306 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1309 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1311 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1313 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1314 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
1315 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1317 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1318 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1319 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1320 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1322 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1323 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1325 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1326 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1327 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1328 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1329 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1330 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1331 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1334 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1336 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1337 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1338 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1339 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1341 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1342 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 3);
1344 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1345 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
1346 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
1347 let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1348 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1349 (&claim_txn[1], &claim_txn[2])
1351 (&claim_txn[2], &claim_txn[1])
1354 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1355 assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1357 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1358 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1359 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1361 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1362 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1363 check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1364 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1366 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1367 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1370 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1371 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { ref msg } } => {
1372 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1373 assert_eq!(msg.as_ref().unwrap().data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1375 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1376 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1377 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1378 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1379 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1380 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1382 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1388 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1389 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1390 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1391 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1392 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1393 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1395 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1396 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1398 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1399 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2), 1 + 1, &get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2));
1400 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1401 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1402 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
1403 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1404 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1405 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1407 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
1408 if let &APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. } = &fails[0] {}
1409 else { panic!("Unexpected error variant"); }
1411 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1413 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1415 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1419 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1420 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1421 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1422 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1423 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1424 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1426 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
1427 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460000);
1428 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
1429 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1430 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1431 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1433 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
1435 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1436 let recipient_onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret);
1437 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1438 3460001, &recipient_onion_fields, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1439 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1440 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1443 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1444 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1445 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1446 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1447 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1448 blinding_point: None,
1451 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1453 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1454 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1455 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1457 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1459 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1461 // Get the TestChannelSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1462 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1463 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1464 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1465 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1466 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
1467 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
1468 ).flatten().unwrap();
1469 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1470 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1471 chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1473 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
1474 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1475 chan_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1476 chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1477 chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1479 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1480 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1481 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1482 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
1483 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
1484 ).flatten().unwrap();
1485 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1486 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
1487 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1488 chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1489 chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1492 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1493 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1494 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
1496 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1497 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1498 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1500 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1502 amount_msat: 3460001,
1503 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1505 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1508 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1511 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1512 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1513 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
1514 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
1515 ).flatten().unwrap();
1516 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1517 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1521 local_funding, remote_funding,
1522 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1524 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1525 &local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1527 local_chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1530 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1533 htlc_signatures: res.1,
1535 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
1538 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1539 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1540 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1542 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1543 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1545 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1546 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point,
1548 next_local_nonce: None,
1550 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1552 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1553 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1554 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1556 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1557 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1558 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1560 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1562 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel",
1563 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", raa_msg.channel_id), 1);
1565 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1569 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1570 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1571 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1572 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1573 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1575 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1576 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1577 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1578 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1579 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1580 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1582 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1583 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1585 push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1587 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1589 // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
1590 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1591 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1592 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1593 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1596 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1597 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1598 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1599 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1600 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1604 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1605 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1606 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1607 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1608 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1609 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1610 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1611 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1613 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1614 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1615 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1616 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1617 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1618 push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1619 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1621 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1622 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1623 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1626 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
1627 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1000);
1628 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 700_000;
1629 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1630 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1631 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1632 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
1633 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1634 let recipient_onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret);
1635 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1636 700_000, &recipient_onion_fields, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1637 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1638 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1640 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1641 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1642 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1643 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1644 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1645 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1646 blinding_point: None,
1649 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1650 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1651 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value", 3);
1652 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1653 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1654 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1655 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1656 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() },
1657 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1661 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1662 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1663 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1664 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1665 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1667 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1668 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1669 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1670 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1671 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1673 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1674 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1675 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1676 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1677 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1678 push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1679 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt);
1681 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1682 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1683 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1684 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1685 // commitment transaction fee.
1686 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1688 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1689 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1690 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1693 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1694 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1695 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt);
1696 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
1697 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1698 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1699 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1703 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1704 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1705 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1706 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1707 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1708 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1709 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1710 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1711 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1712 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1714 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1716 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1717 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1718 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None, None).unwrap_err(),
1719 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1721 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1722 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1723 push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1724 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None, None).unwrap();
1725 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1726 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1727 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
1729 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1730 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1731 match msg_events[0] {
1732 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1733 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1735 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1740 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1741 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1742 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1743 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1744 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1745 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1746 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1747 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000);
1749 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1750 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1751 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1752 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1753 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1754 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1756 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1757 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1758 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1759 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1760 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1761 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1763 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1764 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1765 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1766 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1770 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1771 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1772 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1773 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1774 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1775 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1776 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
1779 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1780 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1781 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1782 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1784 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1785 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1786 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1787 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1789 // Add a pending HTLC.
1790 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1791 let payment_event_1 = {
1792 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1793 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1794 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1796 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1797 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1798 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1800 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1802 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1803 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, &channel_type_features);
1804 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1805 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1806 let mut route_2 = route_1.clone();
1807 route_2.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = amt_msat_2;
1809 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1810 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1811 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1812 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
1813 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1814 let recipient_onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty();
1815 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
1816 &route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &recipient_onion_fields, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1817 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
1818 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1821 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1822 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1823 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1824 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1825 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1826 blinding_point: None,
1829 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1830 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1831 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value", 3);
1832 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1833 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1834 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1835 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1836 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() },
1837 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1841 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1842 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1843 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1844 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1845 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1846 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1847 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1848 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1849 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1850 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1851 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1853 let reserve = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1854 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1855 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1857 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1858 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1861 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
1862 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1866 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1867 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1868 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1869 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1870 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1871 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1872 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1873 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1874 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1875 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001);
1876 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001);
1878 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1879 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1881 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1882 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1884 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1886 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1887 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1888 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1889 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1894 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1895 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1896 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1897 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1899 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1901 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1903 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1904 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1905 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0);
1906 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1907 assert!(route.paths[0].hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1909 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1910 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1911 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1912 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1915 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1916 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1918 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1919 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1920 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1921 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1922 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1923 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1924 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1928 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1929 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1930 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0).unwrap();
1931 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1932 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1934 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1935 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1936 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1937 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1938 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1941 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1942 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1943 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1944 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1945 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1948 // adding pending output.
1949 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1950 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1951 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1952 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1953 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1954 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1955 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1956 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1957 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1959 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1960 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1961 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1963 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1964 let payment_event_1 = {
1965 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1966 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1967 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1969 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1970 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1971 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1973 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1975 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1976 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1978 let mut route = route_1.clone();
1979 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = recv_value_2 + 1;
1980 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
1981 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1982 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1983 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1984 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1987 // split the rest to test holding cell
1988 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1989 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1990 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1991 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1993 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1994 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1997 // now see if they go through on both sides
1998 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1999 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
2000 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21,
2001 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
2002 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
2003 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2004 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
2006 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
2008 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
2009 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
2010 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
2011 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
2012 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
2013 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
2014 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2017 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
2018 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
2019 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22,
2020 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
2021 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
2022 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2023 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2025 // flush the pending htlc
2026 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
2027 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2028 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2030 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
2031 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
2032 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2033 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2035 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
2036 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2037 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
2038 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2040 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
2041 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2042 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2044 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2046 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
2047 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
2048 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
2050 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2051 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
2053 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
2054 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
2055 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
2056 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
2057 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
2058 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2060 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
2061 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
2062 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
2063 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
2065 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
2066 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2068 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2069 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2071 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2072 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
2073 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
2074 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2075 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2077 PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2078 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2079 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
2081 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment")
2084 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2087 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2088 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
2089 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
2090 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2091 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2093 PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2094 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2095 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
2097 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment")
2100 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2103 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
2104 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2105 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2107 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, &channel_type_features);
2108 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2109 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2111 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
2112 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2113 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2114 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2115 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2117 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
2118 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2122 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2123 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2124 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2125 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2126 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2127 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2128 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2129 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2131 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2132 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2133 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2134 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2135 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2136 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2137 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
2138 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2140 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2141 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2142 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2143 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2144 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2145 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2146 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2147 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2148 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2149 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2151 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2152 // Route the first two HTLCs.
2153 let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2154 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2155 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2157 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2158 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2160 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_3,
2161 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2163 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2164 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2165 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2168 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2169 // initial fulfill/CS.
2170 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2171 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2172 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2173 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2175 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2176 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2177 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2178 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2179 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2180 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2182 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2183 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2184 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2185 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2186 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_1, None, false, false);
2188 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2189 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2190 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2191 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2192 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2194 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2195 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2196 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2198 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2200 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2202 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2203 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2204 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2206 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2207 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2208 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2209 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2210 // on-chain as necessary).
2211 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2212 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2213 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2214 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2215 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, false, false);
2217 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2218 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2219 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2221 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2222 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2224 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2225 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2226 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2227 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2228 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2229 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2231 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2232 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2233 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2235 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_4,
2236 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2237 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2238 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2239 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2240 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2243 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2244 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2245 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2246 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2248 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2250 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2251 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2252 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2254 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2255 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2257 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2258 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2259 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2260 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2262 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2263 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2264 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2266 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2269 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2270 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2272 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2273 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2277 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2278 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2279 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2280 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2281 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2282 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2283 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2285 // Create some initial channels
2286 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2287 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2288 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2289 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
2291 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2292 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2293 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2294 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2295 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2296 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2298 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2299 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2300 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2301 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2302 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2304 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2305 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2307 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2308 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2310 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2311 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2312 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2313 if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
2314 let _ = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2317 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2318 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2319 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2321 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2322 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2323 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2324 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2326 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2327 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2329 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2330 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2331 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2332 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2335 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2336 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2337 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2338 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2339 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2340 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2342 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2343 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2344 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2345 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2346 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2348 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2349 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2351 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2352 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2353 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2355 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2356 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2358 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2359 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2360 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2361 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2363 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2369 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2370 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2371 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2372 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2373 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2374 let node2_commitment_txid;
2376 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2377 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2378 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2379 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2381 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2382 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2383 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2384 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2385 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2387 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2388 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2389 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2390 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2391 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2393 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2394 // confusing us in the following tests.
2395 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2397 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2398 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2399 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2402 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2403 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2404 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2405 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2406 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[1] {
2407 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2410 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2413 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id } => {
2414 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2416 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2418 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2420 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2422 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2423 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2424 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2430 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2432 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2433 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2435 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2436 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2437 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2438 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[1] {
2439 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2442 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2445 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id } => {
2446 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2448 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2450 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2451 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2452 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2454 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2455 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2456 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2458 nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2459 nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2460 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2461 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2463 assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2464 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
2465 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2469 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_timeout() {
2470 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Timeout tx, against both sides
2471 let mut alice_config = test_default_channel_config();
2472 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2473 alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2474 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2475 let mut bob_config = test_default_channel_config();
2476 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2477 bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2478 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2479 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2480 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2481 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2482 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2483 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2484 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2485 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2486 // Create some new channels:
2487 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2489 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2490 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2491 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2492 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2493 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2494 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2495 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2496 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2497 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2498 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2499 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2500 // Revoke the old state
2501 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2504 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2506 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2507 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2508 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2509 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2510 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2512 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2513 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2514 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2516 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2517 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2518 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2519 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2520 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2521 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2522 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2523 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2524 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2526 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2527 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2528 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2532 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_success() {
2533 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2534 let mut alice_config = test_default_channel_config();
2535 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2536 alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2537 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2538 let mut bob_config = test_default_channel_config();
2539 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2540 bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2541 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2542 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2543 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2544 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2545 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2546 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2547 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2548 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2549 // Create some new channels:
2550 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2552 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2553 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2554 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2555 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2556 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2557 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2558 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2559 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2560 // Revoke the old state
2561 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2563 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2565 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2566 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2567 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2569 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2570 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2572 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2573 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2575 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2576 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2577 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2578 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2579 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2580 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2581 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2583 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2584 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2585 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2589 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2590 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2591 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2592 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2593 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2594 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2595 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2596 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2597 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2598 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2599 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2600 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2601 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2602 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2603 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2605 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2606 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2607 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2608 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2609 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2610 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output
2612 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2614 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2615 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2616 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2617 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2618 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2622 fn test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates() {
2623 do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(true);
2624 do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(false);
2627 fn do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(broadcast_initial_commitment: bool) {
2628 // Simple test to make sure that the justice tx formed in WatchtowerPersister
2629 // is properly formed and can be broadcasted/confirmed successfully in the event
2630 // that a revoked commitment transaction is broadcasted
2631 // (Similar to `revoked_output_claim` test but we get the justice tx + broadcast manually)
2632 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2633 let destination_script0 = chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.get_destination_script([0; 32]).unwrap();
2634 let destination_script1 = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_destination_script([0; 32]).unwrap();
2635 let persisters = vec![WatchtowerPersister::new(destination_script0),
2636 WatchtowerPersister::new(destination_script1)];
2637 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs_with_persisters(2, &chanmon_cfgs, persisters.iter().collect());
2638 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2639 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2640 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2641 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
2643 if !broadcast_initial_commitment {
2644 // Send a payment to move the channel forward
2645 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5_000_000);
2648 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output.
2649 // We'll keep this commitment transaction to broadcast once it's revoked.
2650 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel_id);
2651 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2652 let revoked_commitment_tx = &revoked_local_txn[0];
2654 // Send another payment, now revoking the previous commitment tx
2655 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5_000_000);
2657 let justice_tx = persisters[1].justice_tx(funding_txo, &revoked_commitment_tx.txid()).unwrap();
2658 check_spends!(justice_tx, revoked_commitment_tx);
2660 mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[revoked_commitment_tx, &justice_tx]);
2661 mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[revoked_commitment_tx, &justice_tx]);
2663 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2664 check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2665 &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100_000);
2666 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 0);
2668 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2669 check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2670 &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100_000);
2672 // Check that the justice tx has sent the revoked output value to nodes[1]
2673 let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel_id);
2674 let total_claimable_balance = monitor.get_claimable_balances().iter().fold(0, |sum, balance| {
2676 channelmonitor::Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { amount_satoshis, .. } => sum + amount_satoshis,
2677 _ => panic!("Unexpected balance type"),
2680 // On the first commitment, node[1]'s balance was below dust so it didn't have an output
2681 let node1_channel_balance = if broadcast_initial_commitment { 0 } else { revoked_commitment_tx.output[0].value };
2682 let expected_claimable_balance = node1_channel_balance + justice_tx.output[0].value;
2683 assert_eq!(total_claimable_balance, expected_claimable_balance);
2688 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2689 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2690 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2691 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2692 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2693 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2694 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2696 // Create some new channel:
2697 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2699 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2700 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2701 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2702 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2703 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2705 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2706 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2707 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2708 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2709 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2710 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2711 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2712 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2713 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2715 //Revoke the old state
2716 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2719 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2720 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2721 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2722 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2723 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2724 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2725 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2726 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2728 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2729 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2731 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2732 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2734 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2735 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2736 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2737 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2738 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2739 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2740 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2741 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2743 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2744 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2745 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2746 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2747 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2749 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2750 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2751 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2755 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2756 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2757 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2758 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2759 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2760 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2761 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2763 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2765 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2766 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2767 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2768 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2769 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2770 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2772 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2773 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2775 //Revoke the old state
2776 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2779 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2780 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2781 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2782 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2783 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2784 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2785 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions(events[0..2].to_vec(), &[HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
2786 match events.last().unwrap() {
2787 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2788 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2791 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2792 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2794 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2796 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2797 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2798 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2799 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2800 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2801 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2802 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2804 // Filter out any non justice transactions.
2805 node_txn.retain(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2806 assert!(node_txn.len() > 3);
2808 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2809 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2810 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2812 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2813 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2814 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2816 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2817 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2818 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2819 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2820 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2821 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2822 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2823 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2825 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2826 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2827 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2828 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2829 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2830 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2831 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2833 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2834 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2835 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2839 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2840 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2841 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2842 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2843 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2844 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2845 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2846 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2847 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2849 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2850 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2851 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2852 // PaymentSent event).
2854 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2855 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2856 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2857 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2859 // Create some initial channels
2860 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2861 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2863 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2864 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2865 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2866 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2867 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2869 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2870 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2871 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2873 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2874 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2876 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2877 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2878 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2879 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2880 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2881 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2882 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2883 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2884 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2885 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2886 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2887 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2888 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2889 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2890 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2892 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2893 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2894 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2895 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2896 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2897 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2898 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2899 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2900 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2901 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2902 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2903 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2904 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2905 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2907 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2908 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]));
2909 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2911 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2912 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2913 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2914 added_monitors.clear();
2916 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2917 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2918 match forwarded_events[0] {
2919 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2920 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2922 let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2923 match forwarded_events[1] {
2924 Event::PaymentForwarded { total_fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx,
2925 next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, ..
2927 assert_eq!(total_fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2928 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2929 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2930 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2931 assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2935 match forwarded_events[2] {
2936 Event::PaymentForwarded { total_fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx,
2937 next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, ..
2939 assert_eq!(total_fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2940 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2941 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2942 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2943 assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2947 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2949 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2950 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2951 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2952 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2953 added_monitors.clear();
2955 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2957 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2958 let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2960 match nodes_2_event {
2961 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2962 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2965 match nodes_0_event {
2966 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2967 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2968 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2969 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2970 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2971 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2973 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2976 // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
2978 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2979 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2982 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2983 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => { {
2984 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2985 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2986 // Node[1]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2987 // Node[0]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2988 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx);
2989 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2990 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2991 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2993 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2994 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2995 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2996 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2998 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2999 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3000 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
3001 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
3006 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
3007 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0]);
3009 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
3010 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
3011 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
3012 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
3013 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
3014 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3015 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3016 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3017 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
3018 assert!(node_txn.len() == 1 || node_txn.len() == 3); // HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn
3019 let commitment_spend =
3020 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
3023 // Certain `ConnectStyle`s will cause RBF bumps of the previous HTLC transaction to be broadcast.
3024 // FullBlockViaListen
3025 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
3026 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
3027 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
3028 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
3031 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
3032 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
3033 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
3038 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
3039 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
3040 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3041 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3042 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
3043 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
3044 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
3045 // we already checked the same situation with A.
3047 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
3048 connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()]));
3049 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3050 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3051 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3052 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3053 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
3054 let mut first_claimed = false;
3055 for event in events {
3057 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3058 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
3059 assert!(!first_claimed);
3060 first_claimed = true;
3062 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
3063 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
3066 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3067 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
3068 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3071 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
3074 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
3075 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
3076 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
3077 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
3078 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
3079 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
3081 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
3083 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3084 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3085 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3086 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3087 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
3088 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
3089 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
3091 // Create some intial channels
3092 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3093 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3095 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
3096 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
3097 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
3099 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
3101 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
3102 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3103 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
3104 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
3105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
3106 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
3107 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3109 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3110 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3112 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3113 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3114 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3115 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3116 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3117 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3119 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3121 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
3122 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3123 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3124 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3125 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
3126 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
3128 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
3129 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
3130 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
3131 check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false
3132 , [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3133 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
3135 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
3136 if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
3137 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
3139 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 3); // Two extra fee bumps for timeout transaction
3141 txn.iter().for_each(|tx| check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx[0]));
3142 assert_eq!(txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3146 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
3147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3148 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3150 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3152 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3153 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3154 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3155 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3157 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3158 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3159 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3160 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3161 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3162 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3164 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3167 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
3168 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3169 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
3171 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
3172 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3174 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3175 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3176 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3177 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // 1 timeout tx
3178 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3179 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
3180 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3184 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3185 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3186 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3187 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3191 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3192 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3193 // and fail backward accordingly.
3195 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3196 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3197 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3198 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3200 // Create some initial channels
3201 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3202 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3204 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3205 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3206 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3207 // Revoke the old state
3208 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3210 let (_, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3212 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3213 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3214 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3215 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3216 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3218 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3219 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3220 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3221 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3223 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3224 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3225 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3226 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3227 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3228 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3230 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3231 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3232 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3234 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3238 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3239 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3240 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3241 // commitment transaction anymore.
3242 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3243 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3244 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3245 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3246 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3247 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3249 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3250 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3251 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3252 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3253 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3254 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3255 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3256 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3257 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3259 // Create some initial channels
3260 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3261 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3263 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3264 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3265 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3266 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3267 // Revoke the old state
3268 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3270 let value = if use_dust {
3271 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3272 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3273 nodes[2].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
3274 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3277 let (_, first_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3278 let (_, second_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3279 let (_, third_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3281 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3282 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3283 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3284 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3285 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3286 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3287 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3288 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3289 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3290 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3291 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3292 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3294 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3295 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3296 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3297 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3298 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3299 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3300 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3301 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3302 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3303 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3304 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3306 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3307 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3308 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3309 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3311 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3312 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3313 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3314 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3315 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3316 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3317 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3318 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3319 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3320 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3321 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3322 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3323 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3324 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3325 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3326 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3327 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3328 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3330 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3331 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3332 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3333 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, fourth_payment_hash,
3334 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3335 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3336 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3337 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3340 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3341 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3342 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3344 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3345 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3347 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3348 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3351 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3352 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3354 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3355 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3358 let mut failed_htlcs = new_hash_set();
3359 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3361 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3362 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3363 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3365 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3366 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
3367 assert!(events.iter().any(|ev| matches!(
3369 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. }
3371 assert!(events.iter().any(|ev| matches!(
3373 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } if *payment_hash == fourth_payment_hash
3375 assert!(events.iter().any(|ev| matches!(
3377 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } if *payment_hash == fourth_payment_hash
3380 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3381 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3383 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3384 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3387 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3388 match nodes_2_event {
3389 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3390 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3391 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3392 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3393 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3394 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3396 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3400 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3401 match nodes_2_event {
3402 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data }) }, node_id: _ } => {
3403 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3404 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3406 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3409 let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3410 match nodes_0_event {
3411 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3412 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3413 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3414 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3415 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3416 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3418 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3419 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3420 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3422 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3424 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3425 assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
3427 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref failure, .. } => {
3428 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3429 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3430 // that we should update our routing table for.
3431 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3432 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure { } else { panic!("Unexpected path failure") }
3435 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3438 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3439 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, first_payment_hash);
3441 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3444 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3445 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3447 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3450 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3451 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
3453 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3456 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3457 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3459 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3462 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3463 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, third_payment_hash);
3465 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3468 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3471 // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
3473 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3474 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3477 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3478 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3479 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3483 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3484 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3485 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3486 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3487 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3491 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3492 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3493 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3494 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3495 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3499 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3500 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3501 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3502 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3503 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3504 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
3506 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3508 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3509 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
3510 PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3511 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3513 let payment_event = {
3514 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3515 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3516 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3518 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3519 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3522 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3523 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3525 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, failed_payment_hash,
3526 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3527 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3529 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3532 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3534 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3536 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3537 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3538 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3539 let recipient_onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret);
3540 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
3541 &route.paths[0], 50_000, &recipient_onion_fields, current_height, &None).unwrap();
3542 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3543 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
3545 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3546 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3552 onion_routing_packet,
3553 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
3554 blinding_point: None,
3556 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3558 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3559 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3560 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3562 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3563 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3565 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3568 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3569 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3571 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3574 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3575 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3577 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3579 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3580 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3584 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3585 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3586 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3587 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3588 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3589 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3590 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3591 if *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
3592 // We rely on the ability to connect a block redundantly, which isn't allowed via
3593 // `chain::Listen`, so we never run the test if we randomly get assigned that
3597 let funding_tx = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).3;
3599 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3600 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3601 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3602 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3603 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3604 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3606 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
3607 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
3608 check_spends!(node_txn[0], funding_tx);
3609 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
3611 let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_txn[0].clone()]);
3612 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3613 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3614 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3615 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3617 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3618 // registering new transactions
3619 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3623 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3624 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3625 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3626 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3627 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3628 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3629 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3630 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3632 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3634 let mut payment_event = {
3635 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
3636 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3637 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3639 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3640 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3641 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3644 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3645 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3647 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3649 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3650 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3651 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3652 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3654 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3655 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3656 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3657 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3658 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3660 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3661 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3662 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3664 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3665 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3666 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3667 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3668 let commitment_tx = {
3669 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3670 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3671 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3672 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3673 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3677 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx);
3679 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3680 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3681 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3682 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3684 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3686 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3687 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3689 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx);
3690 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
3691 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), if nodes[2].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 2 } else { 1 });
3692 let htlc_tx = node_txn.pop().unwrap();
3693 assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input.len(), 1);
3694 assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].previous_output.txid, commitment_tx.txid());
3695 assert_eq!(htlc_tx.lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3696 assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3698 check_spends!(htlc_tx, commitment_tx);
3702 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3703 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3704 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3705 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3706 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3708 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3709 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3710 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3711 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3712 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3714 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3716 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3717 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3718 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3719 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3720 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3721 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
3723 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3724 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3726 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3727 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
3728 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3729 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3733 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3734 // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3735 // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted, and doesn't reconnect back within time.
3736 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3737 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3738 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3739 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3741 // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3742 // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3743 let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
3744 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3745 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
3746 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3747 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
3749 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3750 assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3752 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3754 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3755 assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3757 // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3758 // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3761 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3764 // The peers disconnect before the funding is broadcasted.
3765 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3766 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3768 // The time for peers to reconnect expires.
3769 for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS {
3770 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
3773 // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` and a
3774 // `DiscardFunding` event when the peers are disconnected and do not reconnect before the
3775 // funding transaction is broadcasted.
3776 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, true
3777 , [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
3778 check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, false
3779 , [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
3783 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3784 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3785 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3786 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3787 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3788 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3789 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3790 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3792 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3793 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3794 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3795 reconnect_args.send_channel_ready = (true, true);
3796 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3798 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3799 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3800 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3801 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3803 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3804 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3805 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3807 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3808 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3809 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3810 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3812 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3813 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3815 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3816 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3818 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3819 reconnect_args.pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 = 1;
3820 reconnect_args.pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
3821 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3823 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3824 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
3826 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3827 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3828 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3830 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3833 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3834 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3837 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3838 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3839 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3841 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3844 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3845 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3847 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3850 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
3852 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3853 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3856 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3857 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3858 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3859 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3860 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3861 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3863 let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3864 let channel_id = if messages_delivered == 0 {
3865 let (channel_ready, chan_id, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
3866 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3867 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3868 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3869 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3872 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2
3875 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3877 let payment_event = {
3878 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
3879 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3880 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3882 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3883 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3884 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3886 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3888 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3889 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3891 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3892 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3893 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3894 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3895 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3897 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3898 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3899 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3900 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3902 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3903 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3904 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3905 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3906 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3908 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3909 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3910 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3911 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3918 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3919 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3920 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3921 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3922 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3923 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3925 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3926 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3927 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3929 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3930 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3932 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3933 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3934 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3935 reconnect_args.send_channel_ready = (true, true);
3936 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_adds.1 = 1;
3937 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3938 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3939 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3940 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3941 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.0 = true;
3942 reconnect_args.pending_raa.0 = true;
3943 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3944 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3945 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3946 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3947 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.0 = true;
3948 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3949 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3950 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3951 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3952 reconnect_args.pending_raa.1 = true;
3953 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3954 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3955 // Everything was delivered...
3956 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3959 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3960 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3961 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3963 Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3964 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3967 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3968 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3971 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3973 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3974 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3978 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3979 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3980 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3982 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3984 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3985 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3987 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
3988 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3989 assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3990 assert_eq!(receiver_node_id.unwrap(), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3991 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(channel_id));
3993 PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3994 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3995 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3997 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment")
4000 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4003 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4004 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4005 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
4007 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4008 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4009 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
4010 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
4011 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4012 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4013 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4014 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4015 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4016 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
4017 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
4019 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4022 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
4023 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
4025 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4026 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
4028 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4029 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
4030 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
4032 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4035 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
4036 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
4037 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4038 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4040 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
4041 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4042 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4043 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4045 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
4046 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
4047 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4048 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4049 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4051 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
4052 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4053 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4054 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4061 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4062 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4063 if messages_delivered < 2 {
4064 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4065 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
4066 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4067 if messages_delivered < 1 {
4068 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
4070 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4072 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
4073 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
4074 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4075 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.1 = true;
4076 reconnect_args.pending_raa.1 = true;
4077 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4078 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
4079 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
4080 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4081 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.1 = true;
4082 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4083 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
4084 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
4085 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4086 reconnect_args.pending_raa.0 = true;
4087 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4088 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
4089 // Everything was delivered...
4090 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
4093 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
4094 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4096 if messages_delivered <= 5 {
4097 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4098 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4100 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
4102 if messages_delivered > 2 {
4103 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4106 // Channel should still work fine...
4107 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4108 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
4109 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4113 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
4114 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
4115 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
4116 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
4117 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
4121 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
4122 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
4123 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
4124 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
4125 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
4129 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
4130 // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
4131 // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
4132 // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
4133 // channel_ready immediately instead.
4134 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4135 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4136 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4137 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4138 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
4140 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
4142 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4143 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4144 let block_txn = [funding_tx];
4145 let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
4146 let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
4147 nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
4149 // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4150 let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4151 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4155 fn test_channel_monitor_skipping_block_when_channel_manager_is_leading() {
4156 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4157 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4158 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4159 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4161 // Let channel_manager get ahead of chain_monitor by 1 block.
4162 // This is to emulate race-condition where newly added channel_monitor skips processing 1 block,
4163 // in case where client calls block_connect on channel_manager first and then on chain_monitor.
4164 let height_1 = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4165 let mut block_1 = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), height_1, Vec::new());
4167 nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().push((block_1.clone(), height_1));
4168 nodes[0].node.block_connected(&block_1, height_1);
4170 // Create channel, and it gets added to chain_monitor in funding_created.
4171 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
4173 // Now, newly added channel_monitor in chain_monitor hasn't processed block_1,
4174 // but it's best_block is block_1, since that was populated by channel_manager, and channel_manager
4175 // was running ahead of chain_monitor at the time of funding_created.
4176 // Later on, subsequent blocks are connected to both channel_manager and chain_monitor.
4177 // Hence, this channel's channel_monitor skipped block_1, directly tries to process subsequent blocks.
4178 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &funding_tx, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
4179 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4181 // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4182 let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4183 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4187 fn test_channel_monitor_skipping_block_when_channel_manager_is_lagging() {
4188 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4189 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4190 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4191 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4193 // Let chain_monitor get ahead of channel_manager by 1 block.
4194 // This is to emulate race-condition where newly added channel_monitor skips processing 1 block,
4195 // in case where client calls block_connect on chain_monitor first and then on channel_manager.
4196 let height_1 = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4197 let mut block_1 = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), height_1, Vec::new());
4199 nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().push((block_1.clone(), height_1));
4200 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block_1, height_1);
4202 // Create channel, and it gets added to chain_monitor in funding_created.
4203 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
4205 // channel_manager can't really skip block_1, it should get it eventually.
4206 nodes[0].node.block_connected(&block_1, height_1);
4208 // Now, newly added channel_monitor in chain_monitor hasn't processed block_1, it's best_block is
4209 // the block before block_1, since that was populated by channel_manager, and channel_manager was
4210 // running behind at the time of funding_created.
4211 // Later on, subsequent blocks are connected to both channel_manager and chain_monitor.
4212 // Hence, this channel's channel_monitor skipped block_1, directly tries to process subsequent blocks.
4213 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &funding_tx, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
4214 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4216 // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4217 let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4218 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4222 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4223 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4224 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4225 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4226 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4227 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4228 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4229 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4231 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
4233 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4234 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4235 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
4236 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
4237 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4239 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4240 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4242 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4243 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4246 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4247 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
4248 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4250 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4251 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4253 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4254 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4255 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4256 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4257 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4258 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4259 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4261 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4262 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4263 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4265 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4266 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4267 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4269 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4272 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4273 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4274 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4275 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4277 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4280 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4281 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4283 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
4284 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
4286 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4287 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4288 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
4289 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
4291 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4292 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4294 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4295 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4296 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4297 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4299 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4300 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4302 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4303 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4305 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4307 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4308 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4309 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4310 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4311 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4312 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4313 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4314 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4315 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4316 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4318 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4319 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4320 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4321 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4322 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4323 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4324 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4325 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4327 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4328 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4329 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4330 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4331 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4332 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4333 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4334 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4336 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4337 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4338 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4339 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4341 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4342 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4343 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4344 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4346 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4347 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4348 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4350 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4352 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4353 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4355 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4356 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4358 PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4359 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4360 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4362 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment")
4365 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4368 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4369 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4370 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4372 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4373 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4376 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4377 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4378 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4379 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4380 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4381 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4382 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4384 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4386 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4387 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4388 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4389 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4390 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4391 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4392 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
4393 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4394 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
4395 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id,
4396 &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4397 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4398 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4399 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4400 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4401 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentClaimable event(s).
4402 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4405 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4408 let mut block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
4409 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4410 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4411 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4412 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4413 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4414 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4415 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4418 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4420 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4421 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4422 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4423 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4424 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4425 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4427 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4428 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4429 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4430 let mut expected_failure_data = (100_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4431 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&(block_count - 1).to_be_bytes());
4432 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4436 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4437 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4438 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4441 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4442 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4443 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4444 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4445 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4446 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4447 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4448 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4450 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4451 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4452 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4453 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4455 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4456 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4457 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, first_payment_hash,
4458 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4459 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4460 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4462 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4463 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4464 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4465 sending_node.node.send_payment_with_route(&route, second_payment_hash,
4466 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4469 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4470 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4471 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4472 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4474 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4476 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4477 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4478 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4479 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4482 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4483 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4484 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4485 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4486 match fail_commit[0] {
4487 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4488 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4489 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4491 _ => unreachable!(),
4493 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4495 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4500 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4501 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4502 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4505 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4506 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4508 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4509 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4510 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4511 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4512 for event in events.drain(..) {
4514 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs, channel_id: _ } => {
4515 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4516 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4517 all_outputs.push(outp);
4520 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4523 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4524 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx) {
4534 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4535 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4536 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4537 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4538 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4539 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4541 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4542 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4543 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4544 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4545 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4546 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4547 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4548 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4549 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4551 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4552 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4554 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4555 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4556 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4557 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4558 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4562 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4563 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4564 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4565 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4566 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4567 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4568 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4570 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4571 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4572 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4573 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4574 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4576 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4577 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4578 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4579 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4581 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4582 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4583 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4584 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4585 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4587 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4588 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4589 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4593 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4594 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4595 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4597 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4598 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4599 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4600 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4602 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
4603 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4604 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4605 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4606 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4608 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4609 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4610 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4611 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4612 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4614 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4615 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4616 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4618 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4619 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4620 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4621 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4622 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4626 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4627 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4628 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4629 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4630 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4632 // Create some initial channels
4633 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4635 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4637 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4638 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4639 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4641 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4642 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4643 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4644 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4645 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4646 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4647 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4649 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4650 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4653 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4654 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4657 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4658 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4659 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4660 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4661 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4663 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4664 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4665 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4667 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4668 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4669 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4673 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4674 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4675 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4676 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4677 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4679 // Create some initial channels
4680 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4682 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4683 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4685 let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4687 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4688 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4689 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4691 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4692 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4693 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4694 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4696 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4697 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4699 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4701 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4702 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4703 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4704 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4705 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4707 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4708 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4709 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4710 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4712 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4713 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4714 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4715 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4716 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4720 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4721 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4722 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4723 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4724 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4726 // Create some initial channels
4727 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4729 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4730 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4731 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4732 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4734 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4736 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4737 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4738 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4739 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4741 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4742 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4743 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4744 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4746 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4747 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4749 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4750 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4751 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4755 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4756 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4757 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4758 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4759 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4760 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4762 // Create some initial channels
4763 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4765 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4766 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4767 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4768 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4770 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4772 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4773 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4774 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4775 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4776 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4777 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4779 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4780 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4781 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4782 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4783 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4784 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // HTLC-Timeout
4786 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4787 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4788 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4789 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4790 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4792 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4793 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs
4794 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4795 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4796 // transactions next...
4797 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4798 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4800 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4801 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4802 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4803 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4805 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4806 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4809 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4810 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4812 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4813 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4814 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4815 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4816 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4820 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4821 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4822 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4823 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4824 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4825 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4827 // Create some initial channels
4828 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4830 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4831 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4832 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4833 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4835 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4836 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4838 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4840 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4841 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4842 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4843 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4844 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4845 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4847 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4848 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4849 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4850 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4852 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4853 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4854 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4856 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4857 connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4858 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4859 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4860 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4862 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4863 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success
4865 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4866 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4867 // transactions next...
4868 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4869 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4870 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4871 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4873 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4874 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4877 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4878 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4880 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4881 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4883 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4884 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4886 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4887 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4888 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4889 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4890 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4891 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4892 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4893 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4897 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4898 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4899 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4900 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4901 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4903 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4906 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4907 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4908 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4909 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4911 // Create some initial channels
4912 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4913 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4915 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4916 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4917 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4918 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4919 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4921 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4922 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4923 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4925 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
4926 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4927 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4928 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4929 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4930 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4931 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4932 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4933 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4934 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4935 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4937 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4938 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4939 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4940 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4942 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4943 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 1);
4944 check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4945 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4946 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4947 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // Success tx
4949 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4950 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), c_txn[0].clone()]));
4951 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4952 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4953 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4955 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4956 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4959 Event::PaymentForwarded { total_fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx,
4960 next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, ..
4962 assert_eq!(total_fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4963 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
4964 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4965 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
4966 assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
4968 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4970 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4971 let mut msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4972 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4973 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4974 let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4976 match nodes_2_event {
4977 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4978 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4981 match nodes_0_event {
4982 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4983 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4984 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4985 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4986 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4987 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4989 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4992 // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
4993 match msg_events[0] {
4994 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4995 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4998 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4999 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5000 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5001 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5002 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5003 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx
5004 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5005 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5006 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5007 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5008 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), nodes[1].best_block_info().1); // Success tx
5010 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5011 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5015 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5016 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5017 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5018 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5019 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5020 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5021 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5022 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5023 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5024 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5025 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5026 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5027 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5028 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5030 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5031 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5032 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5034 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5035 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5036 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5037 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5038 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5040 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
5042 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
5043 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5044 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5045 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5046 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40)
5047 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
5048 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 800_000);
5049 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 800_000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5051 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5052 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5053 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5055 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5056 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5057 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5058 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5059 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5061 let htlc_timeout_tx;
5062 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5063 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5064 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3
5065 assert!(node_txn.len() == 2 || node_txn.len() == 3);
5067 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5068 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5069 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
5071 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
5072 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5073 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5074 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
5075 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5077 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5078 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5079 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
5080 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5082 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5083 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5084 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
5085 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5088 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5089 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5090 // Assign htlc_timeout_tx to the forwarded HTLC (with value ~800 sats). The received HTLC
5091 // (with value 900 sats) will be claimed in the below `claim_funds` call.
5092 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
5093 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5094 htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[2].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[2].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
5096 htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[0].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[1].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
5100 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5101 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
5103 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5104 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5105 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5106 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5108 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5109 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5112 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5113 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5115 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5116 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5117 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5118 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5119 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5120 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5121 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5122 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5123 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5124 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5126 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5127 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5128 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
5129 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5130 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5131 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5132 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5133 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5134 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5135 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5137 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5138 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5140 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5142 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5144 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5145 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[1]);
5146 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196), true, true);
5147 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5148 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5149 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5150 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5151 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5152 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5153 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5155 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5156 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5157 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, None, true, true);
5161 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5162 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5163 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5164 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5165 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5167 // Create some initial channels
5168 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5170 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
5171 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5172 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5173 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5174 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5176 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5177 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5178 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
5179 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5181 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5182 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5183 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5184 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5186 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5187 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5190 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5191 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5194 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5195 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5196 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5197 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5198 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5202 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5203 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5205 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5206 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5207 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5208 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5209 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5210 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5213 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5214 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5215 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5216 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5217 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5218 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5219 // use the same payment hashes.
5220 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5225 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5226 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5227 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5228 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5229 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5230 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5231 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5232 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5233 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5234 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5236 let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5237 let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5238 let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5239 let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5240 let chan_3_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
5242 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5243 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5244 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5245 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5247 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
5248 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5250 let (_, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5252 let (_, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5253 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5255 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5257 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5259 let (_, payment_hash_3, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5261 let (_, payment_hash_4, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5262 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5264 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5266 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5269 let (_, payment_hash_5, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5271 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5272 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5275 let (_, payment_hash_6, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5277 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5278 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5280 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5281 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5282 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5283 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
5284 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5286 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5287 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5288 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5289 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5290 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5291 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5292 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5294 let failed_destinations = vec![
5295 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
5296 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
5297 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
5298 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
5300 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
5301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5303 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5304 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5305 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5306 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5307 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5308 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5310 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5311 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5312 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5313 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5315 let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5316 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5317 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5319 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5320 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5322 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5323 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5324 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5325 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5327 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5329 // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5330 let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5331 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5332 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5333 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5334 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5335 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5336 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5338 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5339 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5340 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5341 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5342 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5343 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5344 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5345 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5346 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5347 if deliver_last_raa {
5348 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5350 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5353 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5354 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5355 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5356 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5358 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5359 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5360 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5362 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5363 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5364 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5366 if announce_latest {
5367 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5369 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5371 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5372 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5373 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5374 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5376 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5377 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5380 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5381 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5384 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5385 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5386 if deliver_last_raa {
5387 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[1..2], true);
5389 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5390 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5392 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5393 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5395 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5398 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5400 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5402 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5403 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5404 let mut a_done = false;
5405 for msg in cs_msgs {
5407 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5408 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5409 // should be failed-backwards here.
5410 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5411 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5412 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5413 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5415 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5420 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5421 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5422 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5424 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5425 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5428 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5429 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5430 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5431 if announce_latest {
5432 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5433 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5434 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5437 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5439 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5443 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5444 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 10 } else { 6 });
5445 let mut as_faileds = new_hash_set();
5446 let mut as_updates = 0;
5447 for event in as_events.iter() {
5448 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5449 assert!(as_faileds.insert(*payment_hash));
5450 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5451 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5453 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5455 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5458 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5459 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5461 assert!(as_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5462 assert!(as_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5463 if announce_latest {
5464 assert!(as_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5465 assert!(as_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5467 assert!(as_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5469 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5470 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 8 } else { 6 });
5471 let mut bs_faileds = new_hash_set();
5472 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5473 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5474 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5475 assert!(bs_faileds.insert(*payment_hash));
5476 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5477 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5479 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5481 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5484 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5485 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5487 assert!(bs_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5488 assert!(bs_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5489 if announce_latest {
5490 assert!(bs_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5492 assert!(bs_faileds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5494 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5495 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5496 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5497 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5498 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5499 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5503 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5504 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5508 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5509 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5513 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5514 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5515 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5516 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5520 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5521 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5522 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5523 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5524 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5526 // Create some initial channels
5527 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5529 let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5530 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5531 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5532 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5534 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5535 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5536 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5537 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5538 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5539 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5541 let htlc_timeout = {
5542 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5543 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5544 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5545 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5546 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5550 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5551 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5552 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5554 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5555 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5556 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5557 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5558 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5559 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5560 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5561 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5562 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5563 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5564 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5568 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5569 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with a key
5570 // manager rotation to test that `channel_keys_id` returned in
5571 // [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] let us re-derive the channel key set to
5572 // then derive a `delayed_payment_key`.
5574 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5576 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5577 let seed = [42; 32];
5578 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5579 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5580 let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger));
5581 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
5582 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &scorer);
5583 let message_router = test_utils::TestMessageRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), &keys_manager);
5584 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, router, message_router, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, override_init_features: alloc::rc::Rc::new(core::cell::RefCell::new(None)) };
5585 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5586 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5587 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5589 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5590 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5592 // Create some initial channels
5593 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5595 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5596 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5597 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5599 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5600 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5601 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5602 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5603 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5605 let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5606 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5607 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5608 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5609 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5611 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5612 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5613 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5614 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5615 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5616 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5617 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5618 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5621 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5622 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5623 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5624 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5625 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5626 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5628 let htlc_timeout = {
5629 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5630 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5631 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5632 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5633 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5637 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5638 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5639 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5641 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5642 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5643 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5644 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5645 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5646 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5647 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5648 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5649 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5650 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5651 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5652 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5656 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5657 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5658 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5659 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5660 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5662 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5664 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5665 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5667 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5668 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5669 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5671 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5672 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5673 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5675 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5676 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5677 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5679 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5680 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5681 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5684 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5685 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5686 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5687 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5688 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5689 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5691 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5693 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5694 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5695 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5696 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5697 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5699 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5700 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5701 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
5703 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5704 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5705 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5706 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5707 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5709 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5710 let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5711 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5712 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5713 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5715 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5716 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5717 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5718 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5721 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5722 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5723 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5724 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5725 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5726 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5728 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5729 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
5730 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5731 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5733 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5735 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5736 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5737 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5739 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5740 let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5742 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5743 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5744 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5746 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5747 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5748 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5749 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5752 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5753 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5754 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5755 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5756 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5757 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5759 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5760 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5761 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5762 // actually revoked.
5763 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5764 let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5765 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5766 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
5767 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5769 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5770 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5771 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5772 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5773 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5774 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5775 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5776 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5777 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5778 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5780 if check_revoke_no_close {
5781 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5782 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5785 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5786 let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5787 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5788 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5789 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5791 if !check_revoke_no_close {
5792 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5793 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5794 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5795 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5797 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5801 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5802 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5803 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5804 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5805 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5806 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5807 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5809 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5810 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5811 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5813 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5814 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5815 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5817 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5818 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5822 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5823 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5824 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5825 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5826 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5831 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5832 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5833 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5834 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5835 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5836 // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5837 for node in nodes.iter() {
5838 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5841 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5842 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5843 let push_msat=10001;
5844 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
5845 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5846 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5847 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5849 // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5850 // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5851 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
5855 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5856 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5857 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5858 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5859 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5861 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5862 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5863 let push_msat=10001;
5864 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
5866 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5867 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5868 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5869 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5870 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
5872 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5873 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5874 let push_msat=10001;
5875 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5876 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5877 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis);
5879 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5880 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5881 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.channel_flags<=1);
5883 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5884 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5885 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5887 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5888 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
5889 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.chain_hash, chain_hash);
5891 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5892 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5893 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5894 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5895 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5896 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5900 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5901 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5902 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5903 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5904 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5906 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5907 let push_msat=10001;
5908 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
5909 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5910 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5911 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5913 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5914 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5915 let err_msg = match events[0] {
5916 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5919 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5921 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5924 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5925 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5926 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5927 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5929 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5930 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5931 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5932 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5933 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5934 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5936 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5937 // pending_update_fee.
5939 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5940 *feerate_lock += 20;
5942 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5943 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5945 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5946 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5947 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5948 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5949 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5951 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5954 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5956 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5957 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5958 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5959 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5961 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5962 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
5963 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5965 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5966 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
5967 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5968 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5969 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5971 // Flush the pending fee update.
5972 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5973 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5974 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5975 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5976 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5978 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5979 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5980 // us to surface its failure to the user.
5981 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5982 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5983 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", chan.2), 1);
5985 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5986 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5987 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5989 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5990 assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5991 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5992 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5993 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
5995 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5998 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5999 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6001 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6005 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6006 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6007 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6009 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6010 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6011 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6012 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6013 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6014 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6016 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6017 // pending_update_fee.
6019 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6020 *feerate_lock += 200;
6022 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6023 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6025 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6026 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6027 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6028 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6029 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6031 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6034 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6036 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6037 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6038 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6039 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6041 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6043 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features) - amt_1;
6044 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6045 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6047 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6048 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, payment_hash_1,
6049 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
6050 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6051 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6052 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6053 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
6054 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
6055 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6056 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6058 // Flush the pending fee update.
6059 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6060 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6061 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6062 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6063 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6064 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6066 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6067 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6068 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6069 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6070 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6071 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", chan.2), 1);
6073 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6074 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6075 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6077 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
6078 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6079 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6080 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
6081 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
6083 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6086 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6087 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6089 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6092 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6093 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6094 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6095 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6096 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6098 let raa = match send_raa_event {
6099 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6100 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6102 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6103 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6104 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6105 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6106 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6107 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6109 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6110 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6112 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6113 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6114 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6116 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => {},
6117 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6119 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6120 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6121 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
6123 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6124 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6125 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6126 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6129 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6130 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6131 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6134 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6135 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6136 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6137 // Avoid having to include routing fees in calculations
6138 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6139 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 0;
6140 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
6141 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6142 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6143 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6144 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
6146 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6147 // pending_update_fee.
6149 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6150 *feerate_lock += 20;
6152 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6153 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6155 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6156 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6157 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6158 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6159 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6161 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6164 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6166 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
6167 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6168 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
6169 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
6171 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6172 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
6173 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6174 let payment_event = {
6175 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6176 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6177 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6179 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6180 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6182 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6184 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6185 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6186 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6187 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6189 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_1_2.2);
6190 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6192 // Flush the pending fee update.
6193 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6194 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6195 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6196 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6197 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6198 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6200 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6201 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6202 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6204 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6205 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6208 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6211 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6212 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6213 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6215 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6216 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6217 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
6218 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[1] {
6219 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6220 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6223 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6224 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6225 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6227 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6228 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6229 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6230 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6231 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6232 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6233 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6234 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6235 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6236 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6238 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6241 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6242 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6243 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6245 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6246 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6247 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6248 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6249 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6250 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6251 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6252 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6253 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6254 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6255 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6257 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6258 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6259 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6263 fn test_payment_route_reaching_same_channel_twice() {
6264 //A route should not go through the same channel twice
6265 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6266 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6267 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6268 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6269 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6270 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6272 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6273 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
6274 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000);
6276 // Extend the path by itself, essentially simulating route going through same channel twice
6277 let cloned_hops = route.paths[0].hops.clone();
6278 route.paths[0].hops.extend_from_slice(&cloned_hops);
6280 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6281 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6282 ), false, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6283 assert_eq!(err, &"Path went through the same channel twice"));
6286 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6287 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6288 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6291 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6292 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6293 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6294 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6295 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6296 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6297 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6299 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6300 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 100;
6302 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6303 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6304 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6305 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6309 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6310 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6311 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6312 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6313 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6314 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6315 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6317 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6318 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 0;
6319 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6320 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)),
6321 true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6322 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6324 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6325 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC", 1);
6329 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6330 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6331 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6332 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6333 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6334 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6335 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6337 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6338 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6339 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6340 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6341 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6342 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6344 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6345 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC", 3);
6346 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6347 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6348 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() },
6349 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6353 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6354 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6355 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6356 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6357 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6358 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6359 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6360 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6362 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6363 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
6364 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000);
6365 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6366 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6367 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6368 ), true, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6369 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6373 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6374 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6375 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6376 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6377 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6378 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6379 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6380 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6381 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6382 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6383 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6385 // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
6386 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6387 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6388 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6389 let payment_event = {
6390 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6391 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6392 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6394 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6395 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6396 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6397 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6401 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6403 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6404 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6405 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6407 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6408 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6410 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6411 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6412 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6414 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6418 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6419 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6420 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6421 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6422 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6423 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6424 let channel_value = 100000;
6425 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0);
6426 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6428 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6430 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6431 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6433 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6434 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6435 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6436 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6437 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6439 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6442 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6444 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6445 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6446 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6447 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6448 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6449 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6450 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6451 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6453 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6454 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6455 let channel = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6456 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.context().get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6459 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6460 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6461 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6462 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6463 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6464 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6465 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6466 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6467 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6468 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6469 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6470 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6474 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6475 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6476 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6477 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6478 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6479 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6480 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6482 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6483 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6484 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6485 let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6486 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6487 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
6489 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6490 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6491 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6492 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6493 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6494 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6496 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6497 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6498 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6499 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6500 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6502 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6503 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6504 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6505 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6506 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6510 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6511 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6512 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6513 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6514 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6515 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6516 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6517 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6519 let send_amt = 3999999;
6520 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
6521 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
6522 route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = send_amt;
6523 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6524 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
6525 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6526 let recipient_onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret);
6527 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
6528 &route.paths[0], send_amt, &recipient_onion_fields, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6529 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6531 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6535 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6536 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6537 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6538 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6539 blinding_point: None,
6543 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6544 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6546 msg.htlc_id = (50) as u64;
6547 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6549 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6550 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6551 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6552 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6553 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6557 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6558 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6559 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6560 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6561 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6562 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6563 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6565 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6566 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6567 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6568 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6569 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6570 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6571 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6573 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6574 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6575 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6576 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6577 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
6581 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6582 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6583 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6584 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6585 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6586 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6588 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6589 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6590 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6591 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6592 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6593 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6594 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6595 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6597 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6598 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6599 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6600 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6601 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6605 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6606 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6607 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6608 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6609 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6610 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6611 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6612 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6614 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6615 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6616 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6617 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6618 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6619 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6620 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6622 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6623 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6624 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6625 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
6626 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
6628 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6629 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6630 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
6631 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
6633 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6634 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6635 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6636 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6637 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6638 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6641 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6642 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6643 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6644 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6645 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6647 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6649 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6650 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6651 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6652 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6653 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6657 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6658 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6660 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6661 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6662 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6663 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6664 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6665 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6666 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6667 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6669 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6670 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6671 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6673 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6676 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6679 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6681 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6682 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6683 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6684 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6685 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6689 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6690 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6692 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6693 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6694 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6695 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6696 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6698 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6699 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6700 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6701 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6702 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6703 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6705 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6708 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6711 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6713 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6714 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6715 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6716 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6717 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6721 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6722 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6724 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6725 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6726 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6727 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6728 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6730 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6731 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6732 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6733 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6734 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6735 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6736 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6739 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6740 failure_code: 0x8000,
6743 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6745 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6746 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6747 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6748 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6749 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6753 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6754 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6756 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6757 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6758 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6759 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6760 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6762 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6764 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6765 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6766 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6768 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6769 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6770 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6772 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6773 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6774 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6775 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6776 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6777 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6778 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6780 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6784 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6786 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6788 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6789 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6790 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6791 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6792 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6796 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6797 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6799 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6800 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6801 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6802 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6803 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6805 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6807 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6808 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6809 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6811 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6812 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6813 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6815 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6816 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6817 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6818 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6819 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6820 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6821 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6823 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6827 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6829 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6831 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6832 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6833 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6834 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6835 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6839 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6840 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6842 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6843 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6844 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6845 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6846 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6848 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6849 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6850 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6851 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6853 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6854 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6856 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6857 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6858 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6860 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6862 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6864 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6865 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6866 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6867 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6868 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6869 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6870 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6872 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6875 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6876 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6878 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6879 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6880 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6881 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6882 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
6886 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6887 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6888 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6890 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6891 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6892 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6893 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6894 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6895 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000);
6897 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6900 let mut payment_event = {
6901 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6902 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6903 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6904 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6905 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6906 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6908 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6909 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6910 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6911 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6912 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6913 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6914 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6915 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6916 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6919 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6920 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6921 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6922 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6924 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6925 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6926 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6928 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6929 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6930 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6931 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6932 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6933 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6934 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6936 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6940 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6942 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6943 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6944 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6945 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6946 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6948 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6950 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6951 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6952 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6953 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6954 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6955 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6957 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6960 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6964 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
6965 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6966 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6967 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6968 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6969 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6970 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6972 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
6975 let mut payment_event = {
6976 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6977 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6978 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6979 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
6982 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6983 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6984 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6985 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6986 payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
6987 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6990 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
6991 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6992 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6993 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6995 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6996 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6998 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6999 let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
7000 // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
7001 update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
7003 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
7004 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
7006 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7009 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
7010 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
7011 node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
7012 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7013 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7014 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7017 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
7018 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7019 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
7021 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7024 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7025 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 2);
7027 // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
7028 // the node originating the error to its next hop.
7030 Event::PaymentPathFailed { error_code, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }) }, ..
7032 assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
7033 assert!(is_permanent);
7034 assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
7036 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7039 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7040 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
7042 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7045 // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
7048 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7049 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7050 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7051 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7053 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7054 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7055 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7056 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7057 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7058 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7060 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7061 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7063 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7064 let (_, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7065 let (_, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7066 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7068 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7069 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7071 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7072 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
7073 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7074 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7075 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7077 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7078 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7079 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7080 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7082 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7083 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7085 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7087 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7088 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7090 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7093 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7094 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7096 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7099 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7100 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7101 if announce_latest {
7102 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7104 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7107 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7108 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7109 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7111 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7112 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7113 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7114 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7115 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
7116 let mut first_failed = false;
7117 for event in events {
7119 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7120 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7121 assert!(!first_failed);
7122 first_failed = true;
7124 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7127 Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {}
7128 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7134 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7135 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7136 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7139 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7140 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7141 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7142 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7143 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7144 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7145 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7147 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7148 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7149 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7150 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7151 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7153 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7154 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7156 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7157 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7159 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7160 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7162 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7164 let (payment_preimage_3, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7165 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7168 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7170 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7171 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7172 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7173 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7174 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7176 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7177 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7178 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7179 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7180 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
7181 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7182 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7183 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7184 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7185 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7186 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7188 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7189 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7190 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7191 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7192 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7193 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7195 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7196 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
7197 .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
7198 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7199 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
7200 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
7201 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7204 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7206 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), 11);
7208 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
7209 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7210 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7211 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7212 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7217 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7218 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7219 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7220 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7224 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7225 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7227 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7228 low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7229 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7230 high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7231 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7232 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7233 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7234 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7235 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7237 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in OutboundV1Channel::new()
7238 if let Err(error) = OutboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7239 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7240 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42, None)
7243 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7244 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7246 } else { assert!(false) }
7248 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
7249 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
7250 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7251 open_channel.common_fields.to_self_delay = 200;
7252 if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7253 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7254 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7257 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7258 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7260 } else { assert!(false); }
7262 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7263 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
7264 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7265 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7266 accept_channel.common_fields.to_self_delay = 200;
7267 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
7269 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7271 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7272 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7273 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7277 } else { panic!(); }
7278 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7280 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
7281 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
7282 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7283 open_channel.common_fields.to_self_delay = 200;
7284 if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7285 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7286 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7289 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7290 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7292 } else { assert!(false); }
7296 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7297 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7298 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7299 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7301 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7302 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7303 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7304 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7306 // Create some initial channels
7307 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7309 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7310 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7311 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
7312 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7313 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000);
7314 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(),
7315 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7316 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7317 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
7318 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
7319 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7320 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7322 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7323 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7324 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7325 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7326 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7328 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7329 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7330 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7331 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7333 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7334 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7335 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7337 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7338 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7339 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7340 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7341 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7342 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7343 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7344 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7345 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7346 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7348 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7350 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7352 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7353 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7355 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7356 let mut expected_failure_data = (10_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7357 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH.to_be_bytes());
7358 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7362 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7363 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7364 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7366 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7367 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7368 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7369 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7371 // Connect a dummy node for proper future events broadcasting
7372 connect_dummy_node(&nodes[0]);
7374 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7375 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0);
7376 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7379 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7380 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7382 for _ in 0..DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS + 1 {
7383 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7385 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7386 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7387 let mut chans_disabled = new_hash_map();
7388 for e in msg_events {
7390 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7391 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7392 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7393 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7394 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7397 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7401 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
7402 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
7404 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7405 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7406 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
7407 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
7409 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7410 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7412 // Reestablish chan_1
7413 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7414 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7415 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7416 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7417 // Reestablish chan_2
7418 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7419 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7420 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7421 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7422 // Reestablish chan_3
7423 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7424 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7425 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7426 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7428 for _ in 0..ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
7429 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7431 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7432 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7433 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7434 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7435 for e in msg_events {
7437 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7438 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7439 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7440 // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7442 Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7443 None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7446 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7449 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7450 assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7454 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7455 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7456 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7458 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7459 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7460 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7461 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7463 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7465 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7466 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 30)
7467 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7468 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000);
7469 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7471 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7472 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7473 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7474 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7475 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7476 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7478 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7479 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7480 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7481 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7485 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7486 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7488 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7489 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7490 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(header_114, 42, vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()]));
7491 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7493 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7497 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7498 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor)
7499 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7500 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7501 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7502 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7503 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7504 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7508 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7509 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7510 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7511 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7513 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7514 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7515 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7516 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7517 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7518 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7519 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7520 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7521 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7522 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7523 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7524 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7525 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7529 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7531 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7532 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7534 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7536 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7537 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7538 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7539 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7540 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7541 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7542 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7543 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7544 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7545 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7546 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7547 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7548 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7552 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7554 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7555 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7559 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7560 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7561 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7563 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7564 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7565 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7566 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7567 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7569 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7570 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7571 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7572 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7573 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7574 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 3_000_000);
7575 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7576 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7577 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7578 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 50)
7579 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7580 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 3_000_000);
7581 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7582 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7583 let failed_payment_hash = send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000).1;
7585 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7586 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7587 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7589 // Revoke local commitment tx
7590 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7592 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7593 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]));
7594 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7595 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7596 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7597 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 50); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7599 let revoked_htlc_txn = {
7600 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
7601 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
7603 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7604 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7605 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7607 assert_eq!(txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7608 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7609 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 1);
7610 check_spends!(txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7615 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7616 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7617 let block_11 = create_dummy_block(hash_128, 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]);
7618 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_11);
7619 let block_129 = create_dummy_block(block_11.block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()]);
7620 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_129);
7621 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7622 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_conditions(events[0..2].to_vec(), &[HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: failed_payment_hash }]);
7623 match events.last().unwrap() {
7624 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7625 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7631 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7632 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7633 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7635 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7636 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7637 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7638 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7640 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7641 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7642 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7643 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7644 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7645 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7647 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7648 // available, which we check here:
7649 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7650 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7651 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7653 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7654 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7656 // node_txn[3] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7657 // output, checked above).
7658 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 2);
7659 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].output.len(), 1);
7660 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7662 first = node_txn[3].txid();
7663 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7664 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[3].output[0].value;
7665 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight().to_wu();
7666 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7670 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7671 let block_130 = create_dummy_block(block_129.block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn);
7672 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_130);
7673 let block_131 = create_dummy_block(block_130.block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
7674 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_131);
7676 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7677 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7678 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7679 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7681 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7682 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7684 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7685 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7686 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7687 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7688 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7689 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7690 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7691 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7695 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7696 connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(header_144, 42, node_txn));
7697 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7699 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7700 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7701 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7702 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7703 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7704 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7705 // up bumped justice generation.
7706 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7709 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7710 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7714 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7715 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7716 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7719 // Provide preimage for one
7720 // Check aggregation
7722 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7723 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7724 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7725 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7727 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7728 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7729 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7731 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7732 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7733 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7734 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7735 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7737 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7738 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7739 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7740 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7741 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7742 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7744 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7748 let feerate_timeout;
7749 let feerate_preimage;
7751 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7752 // 3 transactions including:
7753 // preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
7754 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7755 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7756 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7757 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7758 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7759 check_spends!(node_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
7760 check_spends!(node_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
7762 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7763 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7764 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7765 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7767 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7768 (node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[1].clone())
7770 (node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone())
7773 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
7774 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7775 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
7777 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
7778 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7779 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
7780 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight().to_wu();
7784 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7785 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7787 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7788 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7790 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7791 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7792 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7793 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7794 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7795 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7797 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7798 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7799 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight().to_wu();
7800 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7801 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7803 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7804 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7805 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7806 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7807 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7812 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7813 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7817 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7818 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7819 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7820 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7821 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7822 // TestChannelSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7823 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7824 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7826 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7827 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7828 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7829 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7830 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
7832 let per_commitment_secret;
7833 let next_per_commitment_point;
7835 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7836 let mut guard = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7837 let keys = guard.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).map(
7838 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7839 ).flatten().unwrap().get_signer();
7841 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7843 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7844 keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7845 per_commitment_secret = keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7847 // Must revoke without gaps
7848 keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7849 keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7851 keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7852 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7853 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7856 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7857 &msgs::RevokeAndACK {
7859 per_commitment_secret,
7860 next_per_commitment_point,
7862 next_local_nonce: None,
7864 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7865 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7866 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() }
7867 , [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7871 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7872 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7873 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7875 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7876 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7877 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7878 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7880 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7881 // Lock HTLC in both directions
7882 let (payment_preimage_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
7883 let (_, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
7885 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7886 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7887 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7889 // Revoke local commitment tx
7890 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
7892 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7893 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7894 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7895 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7897 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7898 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7899 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7900 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7902 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7903 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3
7904 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7905 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7906 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7907 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7911 connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn));
7912 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7914 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7915 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7916 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7921 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7922 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7923 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7924 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7925 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7926 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7927 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7929 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000);
7931 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7932 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7933 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7934 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7935 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7937 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7938 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7939 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7940 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7942 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7943 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7944 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7945 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7946 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7948 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7949 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7950 assert_eq!(msg.as_ref().unwrap().data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7952 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7957 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7958 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7959 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7960 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7961 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7963 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7964 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7965 override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7967 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, None, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7969 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7970 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7971 assert_eq!(res.common_fields.channel_flags, 0);
7972 assert_eq!(res.common_fields.to_self_delay, 200);
7976 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7977 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7978 zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7979 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7980 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7981 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7982 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7984 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, None, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7985 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7986 assert_eq!(res.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7988 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7989 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7990 assert_eq!(res.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7994 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
7995 // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
7996 // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
7997 // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
7998 // 90% of the `channel_value`.
7999 // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
8001 let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
8002 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8003 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
8004 let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
8005 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8006 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
8007 let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
8008 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8009 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
8010 let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
8011 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
8012 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
8014 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8015 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8016 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
8017 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8019 let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
8020 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8021 let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
8022 let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
8023 let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
8025 let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
8026 let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
8028 // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8029 // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8030 assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
8031 // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8032 // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8033 assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
8035 // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8036 // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
8038 assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
8039 // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8040 // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
8042 assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
8046 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
8047 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8048 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8049 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8050 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8051 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8052 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8054 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8055 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8057 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
8059 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8060 // accepting the inbound channel request.
8061 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8063 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8065 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8066 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
8068 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8071 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8072 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8074 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8075 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8076 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8078 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8081 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8083 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8084 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8086 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8088 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
8089 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
8091 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8096 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
8097 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8098 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8099 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8100 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8101 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8102 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8104 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8105 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8107 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
8109 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8110 // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8111 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8113 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8115 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8116 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8118 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8121 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8122 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8124 match close_msg_ev[0] {
8125 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8126 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8128 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8131 // There should be no more events to process, as the channel was never opened.
8132 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8136 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8137 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8138 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8139 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8140 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8141 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8142 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8144 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8145 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8147 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
8149 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8150 // accepting the inbound channel request.
8151 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8153 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8155 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8156 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
8157 let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8159 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8160 assert_eq!(err, "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.");
8162 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8163 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected Error {:?}", e),
8166 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8169 // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8170 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8171 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8173 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8174 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8175 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8177 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8182 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8183 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8184 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8185 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8186 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8188 let unknown_channel_id = ChannelId::new_zero();
8189 let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8191 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8192 assert_eq!(err, "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.");
8194 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8195 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected Error: {:?}", e),
8200 fn test_onion_value_mpp_set_calculation() {
8201 // Test that we use the onion value `amt_to_forward` when
8202 // calculating whether we've reached the `total_msat` of an MPP
8203 // by having a routing node forward more than `amt_to_forward`
8204 // and checking that the receiving node doesn't generate
8205 // a PaymentClaimable event too early
8207 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8208 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8209 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8210 let mut nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8212 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8213 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8214 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8215 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8217 let total_msat = 100_000;
8218 let expected_paths: &[&[&Node]] = &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]];
8219 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], total_msat);
8220 let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8222 let mut path_1 = sample_path.clone();
8223 path_1.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8224 path_1.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8225 path_1.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
8226 path_1.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8227 path_1.hops[1].fee_msat = 100_000;
8228 route.paths.push(path_1);
8230 let mut path_2 = sample_path.clone();
8231 path_2.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8232 path_2.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8233 path_2.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
8234 path_2.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8235 path_2.hops[1].fee_msat = 1_000;
8236 route.paths.push(path_2);
8239 let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8240 let onion_session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8241 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8242 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8243 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8244 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], expected_paths.len());
8246 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8247 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8250 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[0][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8251 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8252 let mut prev_node = &nodes[0];
8254 for (idx, &node) in expected_paths[0].iter().enumerate() {
8255 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
8257 if idx == 0 { // routing node
8258 let session_priv = [3; 32];
8259 let height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
8260 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv).unwrap();
8261 let mut onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
8262 let recipient_onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret);
8263 let (mut onion_payloads, _, _) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 100_000,
8264 &recipient_onion_fields, height + 1, &None).unwrap();
8265 // Edit amt_to_forward to simulate the sender having set
8266 // the final amount and the routing node taking less fee
8267 if let msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive {
8268 ref mut sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat, ..
8269 } = onion_payloads[1] {
8270 *sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat = 99_000;
8272 let new_onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
8273 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet = new_onion_packet;
8276 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8277 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
8278 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8279 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(node);
8282 let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8283 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8284 check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
8285 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
8286 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
8288 let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8289 assert!(events_2.is_empty());
8296 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[1][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8297 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], expected_paths[1], 101_000, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, true, None);
8299 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8302 fn do_test_overshoot_mpp(msat_amounts: &[u64], total_msat: u64) {
8304 let routing_node_count = msat_amounts.len();
8305 let node_count = routing_node_count + 2;
8307 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8308 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8309 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8310 let nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8315 // Create channels for each amount
8316 let mut expected_paths = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8317 let mut src_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8318 let mut dst_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8319 for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8320 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8321 let src_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, src_idx, routing_node).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8322 src_chan_ids.push(src_chan_id);
8323 let dst_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, routing_node, dst_idx).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8324 dst_chan_ids.push(dst_chan_id);
8325 let path = vec![&nodes[routing_node], &nodes[dst_idx]];
8326 expected_paths.push(path);
8328 let expected_paths: Vec<&[&Node]> = expected_paths.iter().map(|route| route.as_slice()).collect();
8330 // Create a route for each amount
8331 let example_amount = 100000;
8332 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[src_idx], nodes[dst_idx], example_amount);
8333 let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8334 for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8335 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8336 let mut path = sample_path.clone();
8337 path.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[routing_node].node.get_our_node_id();
8338 path.hops[0].short_channel_id = src_chan_ids[i];
8339 path.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[dst_idx].node.get_our_node_id();
8340 path.hops[1].short_channel_id = dst_chan_ids[i];
8341 path.hops[1].fee_msat = msat_amounts[i];
8342 route.paths.push(path);
8345 // Send payment with manually set total_msat
8346 let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[src_idx].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8347 let onion_session_privs = nodes[src_idx].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8348 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8349 nodes[src_idx].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8350 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8351 check_added_monitors!(nodes[src_idx], expected_paths.len());
8353 let mut events = nodes[src_idx].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8354 assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8355 let mut amount_received = 0;
8356 for (path_idx, expected_path) in expected_paths.iter().enumerate() {
8357 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_path[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8359 let current_path_amount = msat_amounts[path_idx];
8360 amount_received += current_path_amount;
8361 let became_claimable_now = amount_received >= total_msat && amount_received - current_path_amount < total_msat;
8362 pass_along_path(&nodes[src_idx], expected_path, amount_received, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, became_claimable_now, None);
8365 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[src_idx], &expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8369 fn test_overshoot_mpp() {
8370 do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 101_000], 200_000);
8371 do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 10_000, 100_000], 200_000);
8375 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8376 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8377 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8378 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8379 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8380 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8382 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8383 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8384 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8385 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8387 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8388 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8389 route.paths.push(path);
8390 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8391 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8392 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8393 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8394 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8395 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8396 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8397 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8401 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8402 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8403 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8404 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8405 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8406 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8408 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8411 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
8412 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8413 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8414 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8415 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8416 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8417 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8418 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8419 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8421 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8422 // values from previous calls.
8423 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8424 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8425 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8427 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref purpose, .. } => {
8429 PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8430 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8432 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment")
8435 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8440 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8441 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8442 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8443 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8444 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8445 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8447 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8449 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8450 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8451 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, None).unwrap();
8452 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8454 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8455 // resulting events.
8456 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8457 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8458 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8459 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8460 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8461 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8462 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8464 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8465 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8466 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8467 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8470 // We should fail the payment back
8471 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8472 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8473 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8474 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8475 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8477 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8482 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8483 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8484 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8486 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8487 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
8488 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8489 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8490 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8492 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8493 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8494 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8495 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8496 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8498 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8499 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8500 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8501 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8502 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8506 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8507 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8508 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8509 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8512 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8513 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8514 // commitment at same time.
8516 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8517 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8518 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8519 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8521 // Create some initial channel
8522 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8523 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8525 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8526 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8528 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8529 let (preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8531 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8532 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8533 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8534 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8537 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8538 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
8539 &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8540 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8543 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8544 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
8547 let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8548 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8549 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8550 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 200));
8551 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8553 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8554 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8555 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8556 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8558 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8559 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8560 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8562 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8563 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8564 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut channel) = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2) {
8565 if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8566 assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
8567 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8568 } else { assert!(false); }
8573 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8574 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8575 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8576 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8580 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8581 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8582 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8583 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8584 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8586 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8587 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8588 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8589 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8591 // Create some initial channel
8592 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8593 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8595 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8596 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8598 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8599 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8601 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8602 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8603 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8604 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8605 let alice_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(
8606 Arc::new(Mutex::new(nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().clone())),
8608 let watchtower_alice = {
8610 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8611 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
8612 &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8613 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8616 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &alice_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8617 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
8620 let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8621 // Make Alice aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating transaction lock time
8622 // requirements here.
8623 const HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST: u32 = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8624 alice_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST) as usize, (block.clone(), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST));
8625 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8627 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8629 let mut txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8630 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8631 check_spends!(txn[0], chan_1.3);
8632 check_spends!(txn[1], txn[0]);
8635 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8636 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8637 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8638 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8639 let bob_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(Arc::clone(&alice_broadcaster.blocks));
8640 let watchtower_bob = {
8642 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8643 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
8644 &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8645 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8648 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &bob_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8649 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
8652 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST - 1);
8654 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8655 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8656 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8657 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8658 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8660 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8661 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8662 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8664 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8665 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8666 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut channel) = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2) {
8667 if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8668 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8669 assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
8670 assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8671 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8672 } else { assert!(false); }
8677 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8678 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8680 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8681 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8683 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8686 let mut txn = bob_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8687 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8688 bob_state_y = txn.remove(0);
8691 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8692 let height = HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST + 1;
8693 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
8694 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
8695 check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HTLCsTimedOut, false,
8696 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8697 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, vec![bob_state_y.clone()]), height);
8698 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
8700 let htlc_txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8701 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
8702 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8707 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8708 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8709 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8712 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8713 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8715 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8716 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8717 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8718 // before receiving funding_signed.
8719 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8720 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8721 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8722 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8724 // Create an initial channel
8725 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
8726 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8727 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8728 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8729 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
8731 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8732 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8734 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8735 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8737 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8738 let channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index });
8739 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8740 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8741 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("Hi".to_string()) }, true,
8742 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8746 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8747 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8748 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8749 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8750 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8751 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8752 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8754 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8755 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8756 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8757 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8759 // Create some initial channels
8760 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8762 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8763 let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8764 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8765 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8766 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8767 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8769 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8770 let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![local_txn[0].clone()]);
8771 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
8772 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8773 // this test before #653 fix.
8774 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &block, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8775 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8776 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8777 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8778 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
8780 let htlc_timeout = {
8781 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8782 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8783 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8784 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8785 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
8789 connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![htlc_timeout.clone()]));
8790 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8791 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
8794 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8795 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8796 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8797 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8799 // Steps of the test:
8800 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8801 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8802 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8803 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8804 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8805 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8806 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8807 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8808 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8809 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8810 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8811 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8813 // Create some initial channels
8814 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8815 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001);
8817 // Steps (1) and (2):
8818 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8819 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8821 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8822 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8823 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8824 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8825 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8826 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8827 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8829 // Steps (3) and (4):
8830 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8831 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8832 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8833 let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8836 if !broadcast_alice {
8837 force_closing_node = 1;
8838 counterparty_node = 0;
8840 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8841 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8842 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8843 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8844 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8845 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8846 true => alice_txn.clone(),
8847 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8849 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8850 if broadcast_alice {
8851 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8852 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8853 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8858 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8859 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8860 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8861 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8862 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8864 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8865 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8866 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8867 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8868 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8869 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8871 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8872 let went_onchain = go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1;
8873 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if went_onchain { None } else { Some(1000) }, went_onchain, false);
8874 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8875 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8876 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8877 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8879 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8880 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8882 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8885 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8886 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8887 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8888 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8890 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8891 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8892 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8893 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8894 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8897 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8899 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8900 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8901 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8904 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8907 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8908 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8909 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8910 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8912 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8913 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8914 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8915 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8916 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8919 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8921 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8922 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8924 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8925 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8926 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8927 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8928 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8929 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8930 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8931 if broadcast_alice {
8932 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8933 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8934 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8936 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8937 if broadcast_alice {
8938 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8939 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8941 if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() {
8942 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8943 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].txid(), bob_txn[1].txid());
8945 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8947 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8952 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8953 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8955 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8956 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8957 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8959 // If Alice force-closed, Bob only broadcasts a HTLC-output-claiming transaction. Otherwise,
8960 // Bob force-closed and broadcasts the commitment transaction along with a
8961 // HTLC-output-claiming transaction.
8962 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8963 if broadcast_alice {
8964 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8965 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8966 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8968 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().updates_best_block_first() { 3 } else { 2 });
8969 let htlc_tx = bob_txn.pop().unwrap();
8970 check_spends!(htlc_tx, txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8971 assert_eq!(htlc_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8977 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8978 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8979 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8980 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8981 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8985 fn test_duplicate_temporary_channel_id_from_different_peers() {
8986 // Tests that we can accept two different `OpenChannel` requests with the same
8987 // `temporary_channel_id`, as long as they are from different peers.
8988 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8989 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8990 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8991 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8993 // Create an first channel channel
8994 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
8995 let mut open_chan_msg_chan_1_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8997 // Create an second channel
8998 nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None, None).unwrap();
8999 let mut open_chan_msg_chan_2_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9001 // Modify the `OpenChannel` from `nodes[2]` to `nodes[0]` to ensure that it uses the same
9002 // `temporary_channel_id` as the `OpenChannel` from nodes[1] to nodes[0].
9003 open_chan_msg_chan_2_0.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
9005 // Assert that `nodes[0]` can accept both `OpenChannel` requests, even though they use the same
9006 // `temporary_channel_id` as they are from different peers.
9007 nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_1_0);
9009 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9010 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9012 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
9013 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9014 assert_eq!(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
9016 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9020 nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_2_0);
9022 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9023 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9025 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
9026 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9027 assert_eq!(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
9029 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9035 fn test_peer_funding_sidechannel() {
9036 // Test that if a peer somehow learns which txid we'll use for our channel funding before we
9037 // receive `funding_transaction_generated` the peer cannot cause us to crash. We'd previously
9038 // assumed that LDK would receive `funding_transaction_generated` prior to our peer learning
9039 // the txid and panicked if the peer tried to open a redundant channel to us with the same
9040 // funding outpoint.
9042 // While this assumption is generally safe, some users may have out-of-band protocols where
9043 // they notify their LSP about a funding outpoint first, or this may be violated in the future
9044 // with collaborative transaction construction protocols, i.e. dual-funding.
9045 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9046 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9047 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9048 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9050 let temp_chan_id_ab = exchange_open_accept_chan(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
9051 let temp_chan_id_ca = exchange_open_accept_chan(&nodes[2], &nodes[0], 1_000_000, 0);
9053 let (_, tx, funding_output) =
9054 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9056 let cs_funding_events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9057 assert_eq!(cs_funding_events.len(), 1);
9058 match cs_funding_events[0] {
9059 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => {}
9060 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", cs_funding_events),
9063 nodes[2].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temp_chan_id_ca, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), funding_output.index).unwrap();
9064 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9065 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9066 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9067 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9068 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9070 let res = nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_chan_id_ab, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone());
9071 let err_msg = format!("{:?}", res.unwrap_err());
9072 assert!(err_msg.contains("An existing channel using outpoint "));
9073 assert!(err_msg.contains(" is open with peer"));
9074 // Even though the last funding_transaction_generated errored, it still generated a
9075 // SendFundingCreated. However, when the peer responds with a funding_signed it will send the
9076 // appropriate error message.
9077 let as_funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9078 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_created);
9079 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9080 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9081 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: format!("An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}", funding_output, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), };
9082 check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_output), true, reason)]);
9084 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9085 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9086 get_err_msg(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9090 fn test_duplicate_conflicting_funding_from_second_peer() {
9091 // Test that if a user tries to fund a channel with a funding outpoint they'd previously used
9092 // we don't try to remove the previous ChannelMonitor. This is largely a test to ensure we
9093 // don't regress in the fuzzer, as such funding getting passed our outpoint-matches checks
9094 // implies the user (and our counterparty) has reused cryptographic keys across channels, which
9095 // we require the user not do.
9096 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9097 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9098 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9099 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9101 let temp_chan_id = exchange_open_accept_chan(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
9103 let (_, tx, funding_output) =
9104 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9106 // Now that we have a funding outpoint, create a dummy `ChannelMonitor` and insert it into
9107 // nodes[0]'s ChainMonitor so that the initial `ChannelMonitor` write fails.
9108 let dummy_chan_id = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[2], &nodes[3]).3;
9109 let dummy_monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[2], dummy_chan_id).clone();
9110 nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(funding_output, dummy_monitor).unwrap();
9112 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9114 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9115 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9116 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9118 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9120 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9121 // At this point, the channel should be closed, after having generated one monitor write (the
9122 // watch_channel call which failed), but zero monitor updates.
9123 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9124 get_err_msg(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9125 let err_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned() };
9126 check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(funding_signed_msg.channel_id, true, err_reason)]);
9130 fn test_duplicate_funding_err_in_funding() {
9131 // Test that if we have a live channel with one peer, then another peer comes along and tries
9132 // to create a second channel with the same txid we'll fail and not overwrite the
9133 // outpoint_to_peer map in `ChannelManager`.
9135 // This was previously broken.
9136 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9137 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9138 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9139 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9141 let (_, _, _, real_channel_id, funding_tx) = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9142 let real_chan_funding_txo = chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9143 assert_eq!(ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(real_chan_funding_txo), real_channel_id);
9145 nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9146 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9147 let node_c_temp_chan_id = open_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
9148 open_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = real_channel_id;
9149 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9150 let mut accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9151 accept_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = node_c_temp_chan_id;
9152 nodes[2].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
9154 // Now that we have a second channel with the same funding txo, send a bogus funding message
9155 // and let nodes[1] remove the inbound channel.
9156 let (_, funding_tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[2], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9158 nodes[2].node.funding_transaction_generated(&node_c_temp_chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), funding_tx).unwrap();
9160 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9161 funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id = real_channel_id;
9162 // Make the signature invalid by changing the funding output
9163 funding_created_msg.funding_output_index += 10;
9164 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9165 get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9166 let err = "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned();
9167 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err };
9168 let expected_closing = ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(real_channel_id, false, reason);
9169 check_closed_events(&nodes[1], &[expected_closing]);
9172 *nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().get(&real_chan_funding_txo).unwrap(),
9173 nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
9178 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
9179 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
9180 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
9182 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
9183 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
9184 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
9185 // updating logic for the existing channel.
9186 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9187 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9188 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9189 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9191 // Create an initial channel
9192 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9193 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9194 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9195 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9197 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
9198 // that it is rejected.
9199 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9201 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9202 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9204 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9205 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
9206 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
9207 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
9208 // move forward with it.
9209 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
9210 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9212 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9216 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9217 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9219 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9220 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9222 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9223 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9225 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9226 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9227 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9228 added_monitors.clear();
9230 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9232 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9234 let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
9235 let channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_outpoint);
9237 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
9240 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
9241 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
9242 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
9243 open_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
9244 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9246 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9247 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9249 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9250 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9251 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9252 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
9253 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9255 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9259 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9260 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9261 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9262 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9263 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9264 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9266 let funding_created = {
9267 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9268 let mut a_peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9269 // Once we call `get_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
9270 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
9271 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
9272 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
9273 match a_peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id).unwrap() {
9274 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan) => {
9275 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9276 chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap()
9278 _ => panic!("Unexpected ChannelPhase variant"),
9281 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9282 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9283 // At this point we'll look up if the channel_id is present and immediately fail the channel
9284 // without trying to persist the `ChannelMonitor`.
9285 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9287 check_closed_events(&nodes[1], &[
9288 ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(funding_created.temporary_channel_id, false, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
9289 err: "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned()
9293 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9295 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9296 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9298 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9299 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9300 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9301 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9302 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9304 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9308 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9309 // everything is functional.
9310 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9312 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9313 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9314 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9315 added_monitors.clear();
9317 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9319 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9320 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9321 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9322 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9324 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9325 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9326 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9328 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9332 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9333 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9335 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9336 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9337 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9338 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9339 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9340 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9341 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9343 // Create some initial channels
9344 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9345 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9346 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001);
9348 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9349 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9350 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9352 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9353 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9354 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9356 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9357 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9358 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9359 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9360 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) },
9361 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9362 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9363 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9364 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9365 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9367 // A null channel ID should close all channels
9368 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9369 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(), data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9370 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9371 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) },
9372 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 100000);
9373 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9374 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9376 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9377 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9379 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9382 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9383 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9385 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9387 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9388 // peer_disconnected.
9389 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9390 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9392 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9393 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9394 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9398 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9399 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9401 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9402 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9403 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9404 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9406 // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
9407 // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
9408 // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
9409 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9410 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9411 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9412 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9414 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9415 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9416 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9418 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9420 // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9421 // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9422 // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9424 let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9425 let wit_program_script: ScriptBuf = wit_program.into();
9426 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9427 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9428 output.script_pubkey = ScriptBuf::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9431 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9432 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9433 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9434 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9436 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9437 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9438 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9440 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9441 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9443 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9444 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9445 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9447 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9448 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9449 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() },
9450 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9451 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9452 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9453 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9454 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9455 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9456 if let msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg } = action {
9457 assert_eq!(msg.as_ref().unwrap().data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9458 } else { panic!(); }
9459 } else { panic!(); }
9460 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9462 // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9463 // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9464 // as its not 32 bytes long.
9465 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9466 version: 2i32, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
9467 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9468 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9472 script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
9473 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
9474 witness: Witness::from_slice(&channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9476 output: vec![TxOut {
9478 script_pubkey: ScriptBuf::new(),
9481 check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9482 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9486 fn test_coinbase_funding_tx() {
9487 // Miners are able to fund channels directly from coinbase transactions, however
9488 // by consensus rules, outputs of a coinbase transaction are encumbered by a 100
9489 // block maturity timelock. To ensure that a (non-0conf) channel like this is enforceable
9490 // on-chain, the minimum depth is updated to 100 blocks for coinbase funding transactions.
9492 // Note that 0conf channels with coinbase funding transactions are unaffected and are
9493 // immediately operational after opening.
9494 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9495 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9496 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9497 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9499 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9500 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9502 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9503 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9505 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9507 // Create the coinbase funding transaction.
9508 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_coinbase_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9510 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9511 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9512 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9514 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9515 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9516 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9518 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9520 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9521 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9523 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9524 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9526 // Starting at height 0, we "confirm" the coinbase at height 1.
9527 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 1);
9528 // We connect 98 more blocks to have 99 confirmations for the coinbase transaction.
9529 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], COINBASE_MATURITY - 2);
9530 // Check that we have no pending message events (we have not queued a `channel_ready` yet).
9531 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9532 // Now connect one more block which results in 100 confirmations of the coinbase transaction.
9533 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
9534 // There should now be a `channel_ready` which can be handled.
9535 let _ = &nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(&nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9537 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9538 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], COINBASE_MATURITY - 2);
9539 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9540 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
9541 expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9542 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9545 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9546 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9547 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9548 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9549 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9550 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9551 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9552 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9553 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9554 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9555 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9556 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9557 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9558 // until we learned about an additional block.
9560 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9561 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9562 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9563 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9564 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9565 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9566 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9568 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9569 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9570 let (_, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9571 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9572 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9574 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9575 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9576 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9577 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9578 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9579 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9581 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9582 if !test_height_before_timelock {
9583 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9585 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9586 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9587 if test_height_before_timelock {
9588 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9589 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9590 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9591 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9593 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9594 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9595 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9596 let htlc_tx = if spending_txn[0].txid() == node_txn[0].txid() {
9601 check_spends!(htlc_tx, node_txn[0]);
9602 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9604 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9605 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9607 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9608 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9609 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9610 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9611 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, htlc_tx)], conf_height + 1);
9612 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
9613 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9615 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9616 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9617 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9618 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9619 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9620 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9621 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9622 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9623 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9628 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9629 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9630 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9633 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9634 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9635 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9636 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9637 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9639 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9641 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9642 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
9643 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000).unwrap();
9645 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9648 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9649 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9650 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9651 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9652 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9653 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9654 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9655 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9657 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9658 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9661 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
9662 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9663 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
9664 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9665 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9666 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9667 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9668 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9669 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9670 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9671 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9672 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9673 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9676 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9677 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9679 if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9680 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9681 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9683 let expected_destinations = vec![
9684 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9685 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9687 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], expected_destinations);
9688 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9690 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9691 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9692 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9694 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9695 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9696 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9698 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9699 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 4);
9700 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9701 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9702 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
9703 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
9705 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9706 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9707 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9709 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9710 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9711 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9712 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9714 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
9716 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9721 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9722 // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9723 // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentClaimable` event.
9724 // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9725 // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9726 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9730 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9731 // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9732 // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9733 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9737 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9738 // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9739 // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9740 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9741 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9742 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9743 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9745 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9746 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9747 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9748 let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9750 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9751 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
9752 let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000).unwrap();
9753 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9754 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9755 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9756 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9757 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9760 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9762 let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9763 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9765 let session_privs = {
9766 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
9767 // ultimately have, just not right away.
9768 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
9769 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9770 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9771 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9773 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9774 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9775 &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9776 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9779 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9780 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9781 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9783 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9785 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9786 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9787 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9790 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9791 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9792 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9794 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9795 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9797 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9798 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9800 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9801 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9802 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9804 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9805 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9806 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9808 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9809 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9810 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9812 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9813 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9814 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9815 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9817 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9819 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9820 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9821 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9823 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9824 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9826 let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9827 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9828 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9830 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9832 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9833 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9834 &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9835 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9837 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9838 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9839 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9841 do_claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9842 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, Some(None), true, true);
9846 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9847 // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentClaimable event, the HTLCs
9848 // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9849 // PaymentClaimable event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9851 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9852 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9853 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9854 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9856 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9857 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9858 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9859 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9861 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9862 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9863 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9864 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9865 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9866 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9869 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9870 // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentClaimable event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9871 // amount of time to respond to.
9873 // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9874 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9875 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9877 let failed_destinations = vec![
9878 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9879 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9881 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
9883 pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash, PaymentFailureReason::RecipientRejected);
9885 // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9886 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9887 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9888 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9890 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9891 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9892 let node_1_msgs = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
9893 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), node_1_msgs, false, None);
9895 // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9896 // that PaymentClaimable event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9897 nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9898 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9899 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9902 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9903 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9904 enum ExposureEvent {
9905 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9907 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9909 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9910 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9913 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool, multiplier_dust_limit: bool, apply_excess_fee: bool) {
9914 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9917 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9918 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9919 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9920 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9921 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9922 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9923 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9924 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9926 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9927 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9929 // We hard-code the feerate values here but they're re-calculated furter down and asserted.
9930 // If the values ever change below these constants should simply be updated.
9931 const AT_FEE_OUTBOUND_HTLCS: u64 = 20;
9932 let nondust_htlc_count_in_limit =
9933 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9934 AT_FEE_OUTBOUND_HTLCS
9936 let initial_feerate = if apply_excess_fee { 253 * 2 } else { 253 };
9937 let expected_dust_buffer_feerate = initial_feerate + 2530;
9938 let mut commitment_tx_cost = commit_tx_fee_msat(initial_feerate - 253, nondust_htlc_count_in_limit, &ChannelTypeFeatures::empty());
9939 commitment_tx_cost +=
9941 htlc_success_tx_weight(&ChannelTypeFeatures::empty())
9943 htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&ChannelTypeFeatures::empty())
9944 } * (initial_feerate as u64 - 253) / 1000 * nondust_htlc_count_in_limit;
9946 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9947 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate;
9949 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = if multiplier_dust_limit {
9950 // Default test fee estimator rate is 253 sat/kw, so we set the multiplier to 5_000_000 / 253
9951 // to get roughly the same initial value as the default setting when this test was
9952 // originally written.
9953 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier((5_000_000 + commitment_tx_cost) / 253)
9954 } else { MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(5_000_000 + commitment_tx_cost) };
9955 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9956 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9957 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9959 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9960 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9961 open_channel.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9962 open_channel.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9964 open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9966 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9967 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9968 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9970 let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9972 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9975 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
9976 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
9977 match get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id) {
9978 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
9979 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9981 _ => panic!("Unexpected ChannelPhase variant"),
9985 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9986 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9987 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9988 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9990 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9991 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9992 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9994 let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9995 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9996 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9999 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10000 *feerate_lock = 253;
10003 // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
10004 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
10005 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
10007 let (dust_buffer_feerate, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat) = {
10008 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10009 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10010 let chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
10011 (chan.context().get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64,
10012 chan.context().get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(253))
10014 assert_eq!(dust_buffer_feerate, expected_dust_buffer_feerate as u64);
10015 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
10016 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10018 // Substract 3 sats for multiplier and 2 sats for fixed limit to make sure we are 50% below the dust limit.
10019 // This is to make sure we fully use the dust limit. If we don't, we could end up with `dust_ibd_htlc_on_holder_tx` being 1
10020 // while `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat` is not equal to `dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat`.
10021 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis - if multiplier_dust_limit { 3 } else { 2 }) * 1000;
10022 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10024 // This test was written with a fixed dust value here, which we retain, but assert that it is,
10025 // indeed, dust on both transactions.
10026 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 4;
10027 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = 1_250_000;
10028 let calcd_dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis - if multiplier_dust_limit { 3 } else { 2 }) * 1000;
10029 assert!(dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat < dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10030 assert!(dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat < calcd_dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10033 if dust_outbound_balance {
10034 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10035 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10036 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
10037 for _ in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10038 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10039 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10040 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10043 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10044 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
10045 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
10046 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
10047 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
10051 if dust_outbound_balance {
10052 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10053 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10054 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
10055 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10056 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10057 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10060 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
10061 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
10062 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
10063 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
10068 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
10069 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat =
10070 if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 1 };
10071 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10073 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10074 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
10075 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
10077 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10078 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
10079 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
10081 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
10082 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 4 });
10083 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10084 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10085 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10086 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10087 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10088 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
10089 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10090 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
10092 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
10093 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
10094 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
10095 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10097 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
10098 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel",
10099 format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
10100 dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + commitment_tx_cost + 4,
10101 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
10103 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
10104 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = 2_500_000;
10105 // For the multiplier dust exposure limit, since it scales with feerate,
10106 // we need to add a lot of HTLCs that will become dust at the new feerate
10107 // to cross the threshold.
10108 for _ in 0..AT_FEE_OUTBOUND_HTLCS {
10109 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash(&nodes[1], Some(1_000), None);
10110 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10111 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10114 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10115 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
10117 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10118 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10119 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel", "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure", 1);
10122 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10123 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
10124 added_monitors.clear();
10127 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(multiplier_dust_limit: bool, apply_excess_fee: bool) {
10128 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee);
10129 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee);
10130 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee);
10131 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee);
10132 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee);
10133 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee);
10134 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee);
10135 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee);
10136 if !multiplier_dust_limit && !apply_excess_fee {
10137 // Because non-dust HTLC transaction fees are included in the dust exposure, trying to
10138 // increase the fee to hit a higher dust exposure with a
10139 // `MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier` is no longer super practical, so we skip these
10140 // in the `multiplier_dust_limit` case.
10141 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee);
10142 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee);
10143 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee);
10144 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit, apply_excess_fee);
10149 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
10150 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(false, false);
10151 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(false, true);
10152 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(true, false);
10153 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(true, true);
10157 fn test_nondust_htlc_fees_are_dust() {
10158 // Test that the transaction fees paid in nondust HTLCs count towards our dust limit
10159 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10160 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10162 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
10163 // Set the dust limit to the default value
10164 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure =
10165 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(10_000);
10166 // Make sure the HTLC limits don't get in the way
10167 config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs = 400;
10168 config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs = 400;
10169 config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 1;
10171 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), Some(config), Some(config)]);
10172 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10174 // Create a channel from 1 -> 0 but immediately push all of the funds towards 0
10175 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0).2;
10176 while nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat > 0 {
10177 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat);
10180 // First get the channel one HTLC_VALUE HTLC away from the dust limit by sending dust HTLCs
10181 // repeatedly until we run out of space.
10182 const HTLC_VALUE: u64 = 1_000_000; // Doesn't matter, tune until the test passes
10183 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], HTLC_VALUE).0;
10185 while nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 {
10186 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], HTLC_VALUE);
10188 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, 0,
10189 "We don't want to run out of ability to send because of some non-dust limit");
10190 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].pending_outbound_htlcs.len() < 10,
10191 "We should be able to fill our dust limit without too many HTLCs");
10193 let dust_limit = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat;
10194 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
10195 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, 0,
10196 "Make sure we are able to send once we clear one HTLC");
10198 // At this point we have somewhere between dust_limit and dust_limit * 2 left in our dust
10199 // exposure limit, and we want to max that out using non-dust HTLCs.
10200 let commitment_tx_per_htlc_cost =
10201 htlc_success_tx_weight(&ChannelTypeFeatures::empty()) * 253;
10202 let max_htlcs_remaining = dust_limit * 2 / commitment_tx_per_htlc_cost;
10203 assert!(max_htlcs_remaining < 30,
10204 "We should be able to fill our dust limit without too many HTLCs");
10205 for i in 0..max_htlcs_remaining + 1 {
10206 assert_ne!(i, max_htlcs_remaining);
10207 if nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat < dust_limit {
10208 // We found our limit, and it was less than max_htlcs_remaining!
10209 // At this point we can only send dust HTLCs as any non-dust HTLCs will overuse our
10210 // remaining dust exposure.
10213 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], dust_limit * 2);
10216 // At this point non-dust HTLCs are no longer accepted from node 0 -> 1, we also check that
10217 // such HTLCs can't be routed over the same channel either.
10218 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0);
10219 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
10220 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[2], nodes[1], dust_limit * 2);
10221 let onion = RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret);
10222 nodes[2].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash, onion, PaymentId([0; 32])).unwrap();
10223 check_added_monitors(&nodes[2], 1);
10224 let send = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[2]);
10226 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &send.msgs[0]);
10227 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], send.commitment_msg, false, true);
10229 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
10230 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10231 let node_id_1 = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10232 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(
10233 nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(),
10234 &[HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(node_id_1), channel_id: chan_id_1 }]
10237 let fail = get_htlc_update_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
10238 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10239 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], fail.commitment_signed, false);
10240 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[2], payment_hash, false, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
10245 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
10246 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10247 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10248 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10249 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10251 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10252 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10253 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10254 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10255 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10257 let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
10259 let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
10260 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10261 let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::ScriptBuf::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_slice(&[&[1]]) };
10262 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10263 let mut tx = match events[0] {
10264 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
10265 // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 1.
10266 Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: LockTime::from_height(best_height + 2).unwrap(), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
10267 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10270 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10272 // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
10273 match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
10274 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10275 assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
10279 let err = "Error in transaction funding: Misuse error: Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned();
10280 check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[ExpectedCloseEvent::from_id_reason(temp_channel_id, false, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err })]);
10281 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).data, "Failed to fund channel");
10285 fn test_non_final_funding_tx_within_headroom() {
10286 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10287 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10288 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10289 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10291 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10292 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10293 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10294 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10295 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10297 let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
10299 let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
10300 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10301 let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::ScriptBuf::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_slice(&[[1]]) };
10302 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10303 let mut tx = match events[0] {
10304 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
10305 // Timelock the transaction within a +1 headroom from the best block.
10306 Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: LockTime::from_consensus(best_height + 1), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
10307 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10310 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10313 // Transaction should be accepted if it's in a +1 headroom from best block.
10314 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
10315 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10319 fn accept_busted_but_better_fee() {
10320 // If a peer sends us a fee update that is too low, but higher than our previous channel
10321 // feerate, we should accept it. In the future we may want to consider closing the channel
10322 // later, but for now we only accept the update.
10323 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10324 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10325 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10326 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10328 create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10330 // Set nodes[1] to expect 5,000 sat/kW.
10332 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10333 *feerate_lock = 5000;
10336 // If nodes[0] increases their feerate, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept it.
10338 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10339 *feerate_lock = 1000;
10341 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10342 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10344 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10345 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10347 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
10348 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10349 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
10351 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10354 // If nodes[0] increases their feerate further, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept
10357 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10358 *feerate_lock = 2000;
10360 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10361 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10363 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10364 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10366 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
10367 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10368 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
10370 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10373 // However, if nodes[0] decreases their feerate, nodes[1] should reject it and close the
10376 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10377 *feerate_lock = 1000;
10379 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10380 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10382 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10383 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10385 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
10386 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10387 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
10388 err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000".to_owned() },
10389 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10390 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
10391 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10393 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10397 fn do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(valid_delta: bool, use_user_hash: bool) {
10398 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10399 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10400 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10401 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10402 let min_final_cltv_expiry_delta = 120;
10403 let final_cltv_expiry_delta = if valid_delta { min_final_cltv_expiry_delta + 2 } else {
10404 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta - 2 };
10405 let recv_value = 100_000;
10407 create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10409 let payment_parameters = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32);
10410 let (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = if use_user_hash {
10411 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1],
10412 Some(recv_value), Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta));
10413 (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret)
10415 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(recv_value), 7200, Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)).unwrap();
10416 (payment_hash, nodes[1].node.get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret).unwrap(), payment_secret)
10418 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_parameters, recv_value).unwrap();
10419 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10420 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10421 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10422 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10423 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10424 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
10425 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10426 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10427 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10430 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, recv_value, if use_user_hash {
10431 None } else { Some(payment_preimage) }, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10433 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
10435 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10437 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10439 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10440 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10441 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10443 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10448 fn test_payment_with_custom_min_cltv_expiry_delta() {
10449 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, false);
10450 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, true);
10451 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, false);
10452 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, true);
10456 fn test_disconnects_peer_awaiting_response_ticks() {
10457 // Tests that nodes which are awaiting on a response critical for channel responsiveness
10458 // disconnect their counterparty after `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10459 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10460 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10461 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10462 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10464 // Asserts a disconnect event is queued to the user.
10465 let check_disconnect_event = |node: &Node, should_disconnect: bool| {
10466 let disconnect_event = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
10467 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action, .. } = event {
10468 if let msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning { .. } = action {
10477 assert_eq!(disconnect_event.is_some(), should_disconnect);
10480 // Fires timer ticks ensuring we only attempt to disconnect peers after reaching
10481 // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10482 let check_disconnect = |node: &Node| {
10483 // No disconnect without any timer ticks.
10484 check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10486 // No disconnect with 1 timer tick less than required.
10487 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS - 1 {
10488 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10489 check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10492 // Disconnect after reaching the required ticks.
10493 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10494 check_disconnect_event(node, true);
10496 // Disconnect again on the next tick if the peer hasn't been disconnected yet.
10497 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10498 check_disconnect_event(node, true);
10501 create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10503 // We'll start by performing a fee update with Alice (nodes[0]) on the channel.
10504 *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
10505 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10506 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
10507 let alice_fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10508 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), alice_fee_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10509 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_fee_update.commitment_signed);
10510 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);
10512 // This will prompt Bob (nodes[1]) to respond with his `CommitmentSigned` and `RevokeAndACK`.
10513 let (bob_revoke_and_ack, bob_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10514 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revoke_and_ack);
10515 check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
10516 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_commitment_signed);
10517 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10519 // Alice then needs to send her final `RevokeAndACK` to complete the commitment dance. We
10520 // pretend Bob hasn't received the message and check whether he'll disconnect Alice after
10521 // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10522 let alice_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10523 check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
10525 // Now, we'll reconnect them to test awaiting a `ChannelReestablish` message.
10527 // Note that since the commitment dance didn't complete above, Alice is expected to resend her
10528 // final `RevokeAndACK` to Bob to complete it.
10529 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10530 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10531 let bob_init = msgs::Init {
10532 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10534 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_init, true).unwrap();
10535 let alice_init = msgs::Init {
10536 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10538 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_init, true).unwrap();
10540 // Upon reconnection, Alice sends her `ChannelReestablish` to Bob. Alice, however, hasn't
10541 // received Bob's yet, so she should disconnect him after reaching
10542 // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10543 let alice_channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
10544 nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()
10546 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_channel_reestablish);
10547 check_disconnect(&nodes[0]);
10549 // Bob now sends his `ChannelReestablish` to Alice to resume the channel and consider it "live".
10550 let bob_channel_reestablish = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
10551 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = event {
10552 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10558 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_channel_reestablish);
10560 // Sanity check that Alice won't disconnect Bob since she's no longer waiting for any messages.
10561 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
10562 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10563 check_disconnect_event(&nodes[0], false);
10566 // However, Bob is still waiting on Alice's `RevokeAndACK`, so he should disconnect her after
10567 // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10568 check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
10570 // Finally, have Bob process the last message.
10571 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_revoke_and_ack);
10572 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10574 // At this point, neither node should attempt to disconnect each other, since they aren't
10575 // waiting on any messages.
10576 for node in &nodes {
10577 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
10578 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10579 check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10585 fn test_remove_expired_outbound_unfunded_channels() {
10586 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10587 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10588 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10589 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10591 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10592 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10593 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10594 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10595 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10597 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10598 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10600 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => (),
10601 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10604 // Asserts the outbound channel has been removed from a nodes[0]'s peer state map.
10605 let check_outbound_channel_existence = |should_exist: bool| {
10606 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10607 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10608 assert_eq!(chan_lock.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temp_channel_id), should_exist);
10611 // Channel should exist without any timer ticks.
10612 check_outbound_channel_existence(true);
10614 // Channel should exist with 1 timer tick less than required.
10615 for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS - 1 {
10616 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10617 check_outbound_channel_existence(true)
10620 // Remove channel after reaching the required ticks.
10621 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10622 check_outbound_channel_existence(false);
10624 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10625 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10626 match msg_events[0] {
10627 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
10628 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake");
10630 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10632 check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10636 fn test_remove_expired_inbound_unfunded_channels() {
10637 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10638 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10639 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10640 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10642 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10643 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10644 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10645 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10646 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10648 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10649 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10651 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => (),
10652 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10655 // Asserts the inbound channel has been removed from a nodes[1]'s peer state map.
10656 let check_inbound_channel_existence = |should_exist: bool| {
10657 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10658 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10659 assert_eq!(chan_lock.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temp_channel_id), should_exist);
10662 // Channel should exist without any timer ticks.
10663 check_inbound_channel_existence(true);
10665 // Channel should exist with 1 timer tick less than required.
10666 for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS - 1 {
10667 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10668 check_inbound_channel_existence(true)
10671 // Remove channel after reaching the required ticks.
10672 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10673 check_inbound_channel_existence(false);
10675 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10676 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10677 match msg_events[0] {
10678 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
10679 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake");
10681 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10683 check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10687 fn test_channel_close_when_not_timely_accepted() {
10688 // Create network of two nodes
10689 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10690 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10691 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10692 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10694 // Simulate peer-disconnects mid-handshake
10695 // The channel is initiated from the node 0 side,
10696 // but the nodes disconnect before node 1 could send accept channel
10697 let create_chan_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10698 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10699 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id, create_chan_id);
10701 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10702 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10704 // Make sure that we have not removed the OutboundV1Channel from node[0] immediately.
10705 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
10707 // Since channel was inbound from node[1] perspective, it should have been dropped immediately.
10708 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
10710 // In the meantime, some time passes.
10711 for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS {
10712 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10715 // Since we disconnected from peer and did not connect back within time,
10716 // we should have forced-closed the channel by now.
10717 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10718 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
10721 // Since accept channel message was never received
10722 // The channel should be forced close by now from node 0 side
10723 // and the peer removed from per_peer_state
10724 let node_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10725 assert_eq!(node_0_per_peer_state.len(), 0);
10730 fn test_rebroadcast_open_channel_when_reconnect_mid_handshake() {
10731 // Create network of two nodes
10732 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10733 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10734 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10735 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10737 // Simulate peer-disconnects mid-handshake
10738 // The channel is initiated from the node 0 side,
10739 // but the nodes disconnect before node 1 could send accept channel
10740 let create_chan_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10741 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10742 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id, create_chan_id);
10744 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10745 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10747 // Make sure that we have not removed the OutboundV1Channel from node[0] immediately.
10748 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
10750 // Since channel was inbound from node[1] perspective, it should have been immediately dropped.
10751 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
10753 // The peers now reconnect
10754 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10755 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10757 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10758 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10759 }, false).unwrap();
10761 // Make sure the SendOpenChannel message is added to node_0 pending message events
10762 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10763 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10764 match &msg_events[0] {
10765 MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { msg, .. } => assert_eq!(msg, &open_channel_msg),
10766 _ => panic!("Unexpected message."),
10770 fn do_test_multi_post_event_actions(do_reload: bool) {
10771 // Tests handling multiple post-Event actions at once.
10772 // There is specific code in ChannelManager to handle channels where multiple post-Event
10773 // `ChannelMonitorUpdates` are pending at once. This test exercises that code.
10775 // Specifically, we test calling `get_and_clear_pending_events` while there are two
10776 // PaymentSents from different channels and one channel has two pending `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s
10777 // - one from an RAA and one from an inbound commitment_signed.
10778 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10779 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10780 let (persister, chain_monitor);
10781 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10782 let nodes_0_deserialized;
10783 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10785 let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
10786 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).2;
10788 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
10789 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
10791 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
10792 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
10794 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
10795 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10796 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 1_000_000);
10798 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
10799 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
10800 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 1_000_000);
10802 for dest in &[1, 2] {
10803 let htlc_fulfill_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[*dest], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10804 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[*dest].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fulfill_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10805 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[*dest], htlc_fulfill_updates.commitment_signed, false);
10806 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 0);
10809 let (route, payment_hash_3, _, payment_secret_3) =
10810 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
10811 let payment_id = PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0);
10812 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_3,
10813 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_3), payment_id).unwrap();
10814 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10816 let send_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
10817 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]);
10818 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg);
10819 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10822 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
10823 let chan_0_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).encode();
10824 let chan_1_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_2).encode();
10825 reload_node!(nodes[0], test_default_channel_config(), &nodes_0_serialized, &[&chan_0_monitor_serialized, &chan_1_monitor_serialized], persister, chain_monitor, nodes_0_deserialized);
10827 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10828 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10830 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
10831 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[2]));
10834 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10835 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
10836 if let Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } = events[0] {
10837 assert!(payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage || payment_preimage == payment_preimage_2);
10838 } else { panic!(); }
10839 if let Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } = events[1] {
10840 assert!(payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage || payment_preimage == payment_preimage_2);
10841 } else { panic!(); }
10842 if let Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } = events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
10843 if let Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } = events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
10845 // After the events are processed, the ChannelMonitorUpdates will be released and, upon their
10846 // completion, we'll respond to nodes[1] with an RAA + CS.
10847 get_revoke_commit_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10848 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 3);
10852 fn test_multi_post_event_actions() {
10853 do_test_multi_post_event_actions(true);
10854 do_test_multi_post_event_actions(false);
10858 fn test_batch_channel_open() {
10859 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10860 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10861 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10862 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10864 // Initiate channel opening and create the batch channel funding transaction.
10865 let (tx, funding_created_msgs) = create_batch_channel_funding(&nodes[0], &[
10866 (&nodes[1], 100_000, 0, 42, None),
10867 (&nodes[2], 200_000, 0, 43, None),
10870 // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 1.
10871 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[0]);
10872 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10873 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10875 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10876 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10877 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10879 // The transaction should not have been broadcast before all channels are ready.
10880 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10882 // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 2.
10883 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[1]);
10884 check_added_monitors(&nodes[2], 1);
10885 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[2], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10887 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10888 chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
10889 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10890 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10892 // The transaction should not have been broadcast before persisting all monitors has been
10894 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
10895 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
10897 // Complete the persistence of the monitor.
10898 nodes[0].chain_monitor.complete_sole_pending_chan_update(
10899 &ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 })
10901 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10903 // The transaction should only have been broadcast now.
10904 let broadcasted_txs = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
10905 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs.len(), 1);
10906 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0], tx);
10908 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10909 assert!(events.iter().any(|e| matches!(
10911 crate::events::Event::ChannelPending {
10912 ref counterparty_node_id,
10914 } if counterparty_node_id == &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
10916 assert!(events.iter().any(|e| matches!(
10918 crate::events::Event::ChannelPending {
10919 ref counterparty_node_id,
10921 } if counterparty_node_id == &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
10926 fn test_close_in_funding_batch() {
10927 // This test ensures that if one of the channels
10928 // in the batch closes, the complete batch will close.
10929 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10930 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10931 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10932 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10934 // Initiate channel opening and create the batch channel funding transaction.
10935 let (tx, funding_created_msgs) = create_batch_channel_funding(&nodes[0], &[
10936 (&nodes[1], 100_000, 0, 42, None),
10937 (&nodes[2], 200_000, 0, 43, None),
10940 // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 1.
10941 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[0]);
10942 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10943 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10945 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10946 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10947 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10949 // The transaction should not have been broadcast before all channels are ready.
10950 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
10952 // Force-close the channel for which we've completed the initial monitor.
10953 let funding_txo_1 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10954 let funding_txo_2 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 };
10955 let channel_id_1 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_1);
10956 let channel_id_2 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_2);
10958 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id_1, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10960 // The monitor should become closed.
10961 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10963 let mut monitor_updates = nodes[0].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
10964 let monitor_updates_1 = monitor_updates.get(&channel_id_1).unwrap();
10965 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1.len(), 1);
10966 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1[0].update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
10969 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10970 match msg_events[0] {
10971 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => (),
10972 _ => panic!("Unexpected message."),
10975 // We broadcast the commitment transaction as part of the force-close.
10977 let broadcasted_txs = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
10978 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs.len(), 1);
10979 assert!(broadcasted_txs[0].txid() != tx.txid());
10980 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input.len(), 1);
10981 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
10984 // All channels in the batch should close immediately.
10985 check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[
10986 ExpectedCloseEvent {
10987 channel_id: Some(channel_id_1),
10988 discard_funding: true,
10989 channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_1),
10990 user_channel_id: Some(42),
10991 ..Default::default()
10993 ExpectedCloseEvent {
10994 channel_id: Some(channel_id_2),
10995 discard_funding: true,
10996 channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_2),
10997 user_channel_id: Some(43),
10998 ..Default::default()
11002 // Ensure the channels don't exist anymore.
11003 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
11007 fn test_batch_funding_close_after_funding_signed() {
11008 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11009 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11010 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
11011 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11013 // Initiate channel opening and create the batch channel funding transaction.
11014 let (tx, funding_created_msgs) = create_batch_channel_funding(&nodes[0], &[
11015 (&nodes[1], 100_000, 0, 42, None),
11016 (&nodes[2], 200_000, 0, 43, None),
11019 // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 1.
11020 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[0]);
11021 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
11022 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11024 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11025 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
11026 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
11028 // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 2.
11029 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[1]);
11030 check_added_monitors(&nodes[2], 1);
11031 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[2], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11033 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11034 chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
11035 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
11036 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
11038 // The transaction should not have been broadcast before all channels are ready.
11039 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
11041 // Force-close the channel for which we've completed the initial monitor.
11042 let funding_txo_1 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
11043 let funding_txo_2 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 };
11044 let channel_id_1 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_1);
11045 let channel_id_2 = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo_2);
11046 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id_1, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11047 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 2);
11049 let mut monitor_updates = nodes[0].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
11050 let monitor_updates_1 = monitor_updates.get(&channel_id_1).unwrap();
11051 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1.len(), 1);
11052 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1[0].update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
11053 let monitor_updates_2 = monitor_updates.get(&channel_id_2).unwrap();
11054 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_2.len(), 1);
11055 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_2[0].update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
11057 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11058 match msg_events[0] {
11059 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => (),
11060 _ => panic!("Unexpected message."),
11063 // We broadcast the commitment transaction as part of the force-close.
11065 let broadcasted_txs = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
11066 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs.len(), 1);
11067 assert!(broadcasted_txs[0].txid() != tx.txid());
11068 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input.len(), 1);
11069 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
11072 // All channels in the batch should close immediately.
11073 check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[
11074 ExpectedCloseEvent {
11075 channel_id: Some(channel_id_1),
11076 discard_funding: true,
11077 channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_1),
11078 user_channel_id: Some(42),
11079 ..Default::default()
11081 ExpectedCloseEvent {
11082 channel_id: Some(channel_id_2),
11083 discard_funding: true,
11084 channel_funding_txo: Some(funding_txo_2),
11085 user_channel_id: Some(43),
11086 ..Default::default()
11090 // Ensure the channels don't exist anymore.
11091 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
11094 fn do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(confirm_remote_commitment: bool) {
11095 // Tests that a node will forget the channel (when it only requires 1 confirmation) if the
11096 // funding and commitment transaction confirm in the same block.
11097 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11098 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11099 let mut min_depth_1_block_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11100 min_depth_1_block_cfg.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
11101 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(min_depth_1_block_cfg), Some(min_depth_1_block_cfg)]);
11102 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11104 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
11105 let chan_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 });
11107 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
11108 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
11110 let (closing_node, other_node) = if confirm_remote_commitment {
11111 (&nodes[1], &nodes[0])
11113 (&nodes[0], &nodes[1])
11116 closing_node.node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &other_node.node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11117 let mut msg_events = closing_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11118 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
11119 match msg_events.pop().unwrap() {
11120 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, .. } => {},
11121 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11123 check_added_monitors(closing_node, 1);
11124 check_closed_event(closing_node, 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[other_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
11126 let commitment_tx = {
11127 let mut txn = closing_node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
11128 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
11129 let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
11130 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
11134 mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&funding_tx, &commitment_tx]);
11135 mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&funding_tx, &commitment_tx]);
11137 check_closed_broadcast(other_node, 1, true);
11138 check_added_monitors(other_node, 1);
11139 check_closed_event(other_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false, &[closing_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
11141 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
11142 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
11146 fn test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block() {
11147 do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(false);
11148 do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(true);
11152 fn test_accept_inbound_channel_errors_queued() {
11153 // For manually accepted inbound channels, tests that a close error is correctly handled
11154 // and the channel fails for the initiator.
11155 let mut config0 = test_default_channel_config();
11156 let mut config1 = config0.clone();
11157 config1.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 1000;
11158 config1.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11159 config0.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 2000;
11161 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11162 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11163 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config0), Some(config1)]);
11164 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11166 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11167 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11169 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11170 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11172 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11173 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23) {
11174 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }) => (),
11178 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11180 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11181 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);