1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use chain::channelmonitor;
17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
19 use chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
21 use ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS };
23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
25 use ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
26 use routing::network_graph::RoutingFees;
27 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
28 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
30 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
31 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
32 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
33 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
34 use util::errors::APIError;
35 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
36 use util::config::UserConfig;
38 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
39 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
43 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
45 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
46 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
52 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
53 use core::default::Default;
54 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
56 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
57 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
60 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
61 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
62 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
63 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
64 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
65 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
67 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
69 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
70 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
71 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
73 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
74 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
76 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
77 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
79 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
80 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
81 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
82 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
83 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
84 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
85 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
86 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
88 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
89 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
91 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
93 } else { assert!(false); }
96 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
97 use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
99 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
100 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
102 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
104 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than funding value \d+", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
106 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
108 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
110 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
112 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
114 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
117 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
118 // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
119 // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
120 // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
121 // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
122 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
123 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
124 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
125 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
127 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
128 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
129 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
130 let opt_anchors = false;
131 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
132 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
134 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
135 let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
136 if !send_from_initiator {
137 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
138 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
140 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
142 // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
143 let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
144 if send_from_initiator {
145 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
146 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
148 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
151 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
152 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
153 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
156 let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
157 let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
158 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
160 // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
161 // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
162 if send_from_initiator {
163 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
164 // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
165 // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
166 // well as an additional HTLC.
167 - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
169 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
174 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
175 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
176 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
180 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
181 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
182 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
183 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
184 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
185 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
188 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
192 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
193 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
194 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
195 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
196 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
197 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
198 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
199 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
200 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
201 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
203 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
205 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
207 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
209 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
212 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
213 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
215 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
216 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
217 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
218 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
219 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
221 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
224 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
226 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
227 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
228 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
229 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
231 let payment_event = {
232 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
233 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
234 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
236 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
237 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
239 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
240 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
241 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
242 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
243 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
244 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
246 // deliver(1), generate (3):
247 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
248 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
249 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
250 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
252 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
253 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
254 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
255 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
256 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
257 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
258 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
259 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
261 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
262 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
263 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
264 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
265 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
266 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
267 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
268 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
270 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
271 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
272 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
273 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
275 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
276 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
277 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
279 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
280 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
282 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
283 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
285 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
286 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
289 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
290 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
294 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
295 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
296 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
297 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
298 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
299 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
300 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
301 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
304 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
306 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
308 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
311 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
312 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
314 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
315 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
316 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
317 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
320 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
323 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
325 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
326 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
327 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
328 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
330 let payment_event = {
331 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
332 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
333 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
335 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
336 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
338 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
339 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
340 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
341 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
342 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
345 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
346 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
348 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
352 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
353 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
354 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
355 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
356 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
357 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
360 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
361 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
362 // update_fee (never committed) ->
364 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
365 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
366 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
367 // <- (1) RAA delivered
368 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
369 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
370 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
371 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
373 // B should send no response here
374 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
375 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
378 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
381 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
382 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
383 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
385 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
386 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
388 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
389 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
390 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
391 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
392 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
394 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
397 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
398 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
399 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
400 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
401 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
403 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
406 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
407 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
409 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
410 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
411 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
413 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
414 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
415 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
416 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
419 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
421 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
423 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
425 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
426 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
427 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
428 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
429 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
430 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
431 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
432 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
433 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
434 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
435 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
437 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
438 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
439 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
440 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
441 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
443 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
444 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
445 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
448 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
449 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
450 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
452 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
453 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
454 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
456 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
457 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
458 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
459 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
461 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
462 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
463 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
466 fn do_test_1_conf_open(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
467 // Previously, if the minium_depth config was set to 1, we'd never send a funding_locked. This
468 // tests that we properly send one in that case.
469 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
470 alice_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
471 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
472 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
473 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
474 bob_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
475 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
476 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
477 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
478 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
479 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
480 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
481 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
483 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
484 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
485 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
487 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
488 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
489 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
492 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
493 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
494 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
498 fn test_1_conf_open() {
499 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst);
500 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst);
501 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
504 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
505 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
506 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
507 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
510 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
511 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
512 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
513 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
515 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
517 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
520 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
521 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
524 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
525 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
526 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
528 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
529 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
530 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
532 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
533 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
535 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
537 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
538 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
539 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
540 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
542 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
543 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
545 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
546 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
547 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
548 added_monitors.clear();
550 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
552 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
553 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
555 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
556 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
557 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
558 added_monitors.clear();
561 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
562 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
564 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
565 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
567 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
568 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
569 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
570 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
574 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
575 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
576 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
577 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
578 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
579 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
580 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
581 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
582 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
583 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
584 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
585 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
586 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
587 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
588 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
589 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
590 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
591 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
592 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
596 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
597 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
598 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
599 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
600 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
601 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
604 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
607 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
608 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
610 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
611 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
612 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
613 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
614 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
616 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
618 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
620 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
621 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
622 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
624 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
625 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
626 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
628 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
629 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
630 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
631 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
633 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
634 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
635 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
639 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
640 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
641 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
642 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
643 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
644 let channel_value = 5000;
646 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
647 let channel_id = chan.2;
648 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
649 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value);
651 let opt_anchors = false;
653 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
654 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
655 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
657 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
658 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
660 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
661 *feerate_lock = feerate;
663 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
664 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
665 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
667 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
669 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
671 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
673 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
675 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
676 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
677 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
678 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
679 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
680 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
684 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
685 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
688 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
689 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
690 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
692 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
694 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
695 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
696 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
697 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
698 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
699 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
700 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
701 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
702 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
704 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
705 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
706 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
707 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
708 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
709 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
710 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
711 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
714 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
715 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
716 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
719 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
720 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
721 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
722 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
723 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
724 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
726 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
727 opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
728 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
729 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
731 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
733 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
736 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
739 htlc_signatures: res.1
742 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
744 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
747 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
749 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
750 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
751 //Should produce and error.
752 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
753 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
754 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
755 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
756 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
760 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
761 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
762 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
763 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
764 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
765 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
768 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
771 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
774 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
775 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
777 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
778 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
779 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
780 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
781 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
783 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
785 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
786 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
787 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
788 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
790 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
792 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
793 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
795 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
796 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
797 added_monitors.clear();
799 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
800 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
801 // node[1] has nothing to do
803 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
804 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
805 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
807 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
808 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
809 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
810 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
811 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
812 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
813 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
815 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
816 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
817 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
818 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
819 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
820 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
822 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
823 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
824 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
825 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
827 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
828 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
829 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
831 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
832 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
833 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
834 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
836 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
837 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
838 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
840 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
842 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
843 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
845 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
846 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
849 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
851 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
852 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
853 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
854 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
855 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
859 fn test_update_fee() {
860 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
861 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
862 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
863 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
864 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
865 let channel_id = chan.2;
868 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
869 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
870 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
871 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
872 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
873 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
874 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
875 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
876 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
877 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
878 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
881 // Create and deliver (1)...
884 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
885 feerate = *feerate_lock;
886 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
888 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
889 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
891 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
892 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
893 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
894 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
895 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
897 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
899 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
901 // Generate (2) and (3):
902 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
903 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
904 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
907 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
908 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
909 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
911 // Create and deliver (4)...
913 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
914 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
916 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
917 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
918 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
919 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
920 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
921 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
922 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
924 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
927 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
928 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
929 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
931 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
932 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
934 // Handle (3), creating (6):
935 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
937 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
938 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
941 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
942 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
943 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
945 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
946 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
947 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
948 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
949 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
950 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
951 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
952 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
953 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
956 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
957 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
958 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
959 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
961 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
962 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
963 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
965 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
966 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
967 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
968 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
969 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
973 fn fake_network_test() {
974 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
975 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
976 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
977 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
978 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
979 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
981 // Create some initial channels
982 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
983 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
984 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
986 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
987 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
988 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
989 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
990 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
992 // Send some more payments
993 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
994 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
995 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
997 // Test failure packets
998 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
999 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
1001 // Add a new channel that skips 3
1002 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1004 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1005 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1006 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1007 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1008 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1009 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1010 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1012 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1013 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1014 hops.push(RouteHop {
1015 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1016 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1017 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1018 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1020 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1022 hops.push(RouteHop {
1023 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1024 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1025 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1026 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1028 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1030 hops.push(RouteHop {
1031 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1032 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1033 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1034 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1036 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1038 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1039 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1040 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1042 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1043 hops.push(RouteHop {
1044 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1045 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1046 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1047 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1049 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1051 hops.push(RouteHop {
1052 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1053 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1054 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1055 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1057 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1059 hops.push(RouteHop {
1060 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1061 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1062 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1063 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1065 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1067 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1068 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1069 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1071 // Claim the rebalances...
1072 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1073 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1075 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1076 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1078 // Send some payments across both channels
1079 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1080 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1081 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1084 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1085 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1086 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1087 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1089 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1091 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1092 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1093 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1095 // Close down the channels...
1096 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1097 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1098 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1099 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1100 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1101 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1102 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1103 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1104 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1105 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1106 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1107 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1108 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1109 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1110 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1114 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1115 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1116 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1117 // commitment dance rounds.
1118 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1119 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1120 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1121 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1122 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1123 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1125 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1126 for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1127 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1128 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1129 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1131 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1133 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1134 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1135 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1136 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1138 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1139 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1141 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1143 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1144 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1145 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1146 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1149 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1150 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1152 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1153 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1156 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1157 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1158 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1159 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1161 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1162 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1163 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1164 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1165 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1166 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1167 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1169 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1170 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1171 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1173 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1175 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1176 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1177 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1178 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1180 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1181 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1182 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1183 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1185 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1186 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1187 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1189 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1190 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1192 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1193 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1194 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1195 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1196 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1198 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1200 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1201 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1202 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1204 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1205 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1207 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1209 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1210 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1211 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1213 &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1214 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1216 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1220 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1221 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1224 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1228 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1229 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1230 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1231 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1232 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1233 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1234 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1236 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1237 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1238 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1239 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1240 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1241 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1243 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1245 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1246 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1248 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1249 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1251 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1252 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1253 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1257 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1258 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1259 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1260 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1261 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1262 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1263 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1264 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1266 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1269 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1271 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1273 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1274 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1275 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1277 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1278 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1281 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1282 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1284 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1285 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1286 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1287 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1288 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1289 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1290 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1293 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1295 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1296 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1297 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1298 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1300 // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1301 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1302 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1303 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1304 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1305 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1306 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1307 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1309 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1310 assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1311 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1313 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1314 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1315 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1316 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1317 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1318 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1319 check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1320 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1322 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1323 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1326 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1327 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1328 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1329 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1331 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1332 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1333 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1334 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1335 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1336 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1338 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1344 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1345 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1346 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1347 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1348 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1349 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1351 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1352 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1354 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1355 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2));
1356 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1357 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1358 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1360 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1362 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1363 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1364 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1367 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1369 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1370 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1372 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1376 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1377 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1378 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1379 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1380 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1381 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1383 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1384 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1385 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1386 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1388 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1390 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1391 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1392 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1393 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1396 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1397 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1398 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1399 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1402 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1404 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1405 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1406 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1408 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1410 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1412 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1413 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1414 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1415 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1416 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1417 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1418 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1419 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1421 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1422 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1423 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1424 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1425 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1427 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1428 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1429 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1430 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1431 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1432 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1433 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1434 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1437 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1438 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1439 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1441 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1442 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1443 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1445 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1447 amount_msat: 3460001,
1448 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1450 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1453 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1456 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1457 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1458 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1459 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1463 local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1464 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1466 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1467 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1469 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1472 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1475 htlc_signatures: res.1
1478 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1479 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1480 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1482 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1483 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1485 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1486 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1488 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1490 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1491 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1492 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1494 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1495 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1496 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1498 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1500 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1501 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1503 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1507 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1508 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1509 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1510 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1511 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1513 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1514 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1515 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1516 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1518 let opt_anchors = false;
1520 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1521 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1522 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1524 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1526 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1527 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1528 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1531 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1532 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1533 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1534 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1535 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1536 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1540 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1541 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1542 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1543 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1544 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1545 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1547 let opt_anchors = false;
1549 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1550 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1551 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1552 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1553 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1554 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1555 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1557 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1558 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1559 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1562 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1563 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1564 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1565 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1566 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1567 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1568 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1569 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1570 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1572 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1573 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1574 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1575 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1576 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1579 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1580 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1581 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1582 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1583 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1584 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1585 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1586 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1590 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1591 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1592 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1593 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1594 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1596 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1597 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1598 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1600 let opt_anchors = false;
1602 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1603 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1604 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1605 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1606 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1607 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1608 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1610 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1611 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1612 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1613 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1614 // commitment transaction fee.
1615 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1617 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1618 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1619 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1622 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1623 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1624 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1625 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1629 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1630 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1631 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1632 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1633 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1634 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1635 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1636 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1638 let opt_anchors = false;
1640 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1642 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1643 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1644 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1645 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1647 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1648 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1649 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1650 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1651 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1652 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1653 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg);
1655 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1656 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1657 match msg_events[0] {
1658 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1659 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1661 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1666 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1667 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1668 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1669 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1670 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1671 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1672 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1673 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1675 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1676 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1677 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1678 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1679 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1680 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1682 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1683 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1684 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1685 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1686 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1687 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1689 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1690 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1691 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1692 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1696 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1697 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1698 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1699 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1700 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1701 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1702 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1705 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1706 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1707 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1708 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1710 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1711 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1712 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1713 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1715 // Add a pending HTLC.
1716 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1717 let payment_event_1 = {
1718 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1719 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1721 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1722 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1723 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1725 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1727 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1728 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1729 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1730 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1731 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1733 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1734 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1735 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1736 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1737 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1738 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1739 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1740 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1743 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1744 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1745 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1746 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1749 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1750 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1751 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1752 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1753 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1754 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1755 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1756 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1760 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1761 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1762 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1763 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1764 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1765 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1766 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1767 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1768 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1769 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1771 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1772 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1773 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1775 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1776 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1779 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1780 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1784 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1785 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1786 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1787 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1788 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1789 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1790 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1791 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1792 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1793 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1794 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1796 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1797 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1799 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1800 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1802 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1804 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1805 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1806 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1807 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1812 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1813 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1814 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1815 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1817 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1819 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1821 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1822 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1823 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1824 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1825 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1826 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1827 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1830 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1831 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1833 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1834 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1835 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1836 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1837 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1838 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1839 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1842 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1844 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1845 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1846 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1847 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1848 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1851 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1852 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1853 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1854 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1855 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1858 // adding pending output.
1859 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1860 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1861 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1862 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1863 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1864 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1865 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1866 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1867 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1869 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1870 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1871 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1873 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1874 let payment_event_1 = {
1875 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1876 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1878 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1879 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1880 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1882 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1884 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1885 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1887 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1888 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1889 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1890 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1893 // split the rest to test holding cell
1894 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1895 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1896 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1897 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1899 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1900 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1903 // now see if they go through on both sides
1904 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1905 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1906 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1907 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1908 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1909 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1911 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1913 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1914 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1915 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1916 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1917 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1920 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1921 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1922 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1923 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1924 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1925 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1927 // flush the pending htlc
1928 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1929 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1930 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1932 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1933 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1934 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1935 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1937 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1938 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1939 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1942 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1943 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1944 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1946 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1948 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1949 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1950 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1952 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1953 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1955 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1956 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1957 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1958 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1959 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1960 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1962 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1963 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1964 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1965 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1967 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1968 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1970 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1971 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1973 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1974 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1975 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
1977 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1978 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1979 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1981 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1984 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1987 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1988 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1989 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
1991 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1992 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1993 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1995 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1998 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2001 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
2002 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2003 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2005 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
2006 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2007 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2009 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
2010 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2011 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2012 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2013 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2015 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2016 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2020 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2021 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2022 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2023 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2024 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2025 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2026 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2027 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2029 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2030 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2031 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2032 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2033 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2034 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2035 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
2036 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2038 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2039 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2040 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2041 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2042 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2043 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2044 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2045 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2046 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2047 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2049 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2050 // Route the first two HTLCs.
2051 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
2052 let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
2054 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2055 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2057 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
2058 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2059 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2060 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2061 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2064 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2065 // initial fulfill/CS.
2066 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
2067 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2068 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2070 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2071 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2072 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
2073 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2074 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2076 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2077 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2078 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2079 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2080 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2082 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2083 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2084 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2085 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2086 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2088 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2089 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2090 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2092 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2093 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2094 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2096 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2097 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2098 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2100 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2101 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2102 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2103 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2104 // on-chain as necessary).
2105 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2106 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2107 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2108 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2109 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2111 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2112 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2113 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2115 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2116 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2118 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2119 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2120 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2122 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2123 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2125 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2126 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2127 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2129 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2131 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2132 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2133 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2136 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2137 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2139 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2141 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2143 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2144 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2145 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2147 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2148 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2150 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2152 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2153 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2155 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2157 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2159 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2162 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2163 expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2165 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2166 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2170 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2171 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2172 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2173 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2174 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2175 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2176 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2178 // Create some initial channels
2179 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2180 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2181 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2182 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2184 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2185 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2186 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2187 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2188 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2189 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2191 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2192 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2193 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2194 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2195 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2197 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2198 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2200 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2202 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2203 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2204 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2205 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2206 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2208 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2209 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2210 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2211 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2212 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2214 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2215 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2217 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2218 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2219 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2220 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2221 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2223 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2224 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2225 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2226 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2227 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2228 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2230 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2231 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2232 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2233 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2234 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2236 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2237 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2239 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2240 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2242 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2243 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2245 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2246 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2247 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2248 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2250 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2256 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2257 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2258 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2259 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2260 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
2261 let node2_commitment_txid;
2263 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2264 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2265 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2266 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2268 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2269 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2270 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2272 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2274 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2275 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2276 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2277 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2278 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2280 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2281 // confusing us in the following tests.
2282 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2284 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2285 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2286 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2289 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2290 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2291 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2292 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2293 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2294 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2297 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2300 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2301 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2303 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2307 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2309 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2310 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2311 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2317 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2319 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2320 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2322 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2323 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2324 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2325 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2326 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2329 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2332 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2333 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2335 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2337 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2338 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2340 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2341 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2342 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2344 nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2345 nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2346 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2347 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2349 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2350 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2351 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2355 fn test_justice_tx() {
2356 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2357 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2358 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2359 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2360 alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2361 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2362 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2363 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2364 bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2365 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2366 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2367 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2368 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2369 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2370 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2371 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2372 // Create some new channels:
2373 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2375 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2376 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2377 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2378 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2379 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2380 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2381 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2382 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2383 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2384 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2385 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2386 // Revoke the old state
2387 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2390 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2392 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2393 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2394 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2396 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2397 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2398 node_txn.truncate(1);
2400 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2401 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2402 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2404 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2405 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2406 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2407 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2408 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2409 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2410 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2411 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2412 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2414 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2416 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2417 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2419 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2420 // Create some new channels:
2421 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2423 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2427 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2428 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2429 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2430 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2431 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2432 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2433 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2434 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2435 // Revoke the old state
2436 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2438 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2440 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2441 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2442 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2444 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2445 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2447 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2448 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2450 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2451 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2452 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2453 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2454 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2455 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2456 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2458 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2459 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2460 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2464 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2465 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2466 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2467 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2468 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2469 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2470 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2471 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2472 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2473 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2474 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2475 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2476 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2477 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2478 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2480 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2481 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2483 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2484 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2485 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2487 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2488 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2490 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2491 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2492 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2493 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2494 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2498 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2499 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2500 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2501 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2502 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2503 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2504 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2506 // Create some new channel:
2507 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2509 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2510 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2511 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2512 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2513 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2515 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2516 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2517 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2518 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2519 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2520 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2521 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2522 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2523 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2525 //Revoke the old state
2526 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2529 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2530 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2531 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2532 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2533 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2534 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2535 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2536 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2538 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2539 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2541 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2542 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2544 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2545 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2546 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2547 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2548 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2549 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2550 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2551 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2553 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2554 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2555 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2557 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2558 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2559 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2563 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2564 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2565 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2566 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2567 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2568 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2569 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2571 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2573 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2574 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2575 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2576 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2577 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2578 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2580 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2581 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2583 //Revoke the old state
2584 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2587 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2588 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2589 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2590 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2591 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2592 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2593 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2595 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2596 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2599 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2600 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2602 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2603 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2604 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2605 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2606 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2607 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2609 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2610 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2611 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2612 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2613 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2614 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2615 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2617 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2618 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2619 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2620 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2622 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2623 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2624 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2626 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2627 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2628 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2629 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2630 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2631 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2632 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2633 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2635 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2636 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2637 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2641 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2642 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2643 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2644 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2645 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2646 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2647 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2648 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2649 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2651 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2652 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2653 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2654 // PaymentSent event).
2656 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2657 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2658 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2659 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2661 // Create some initial channels
2662 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2663 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2665 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2666 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2667 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2668 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2669 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2671 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2672 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2673 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2675 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2676 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2678 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2679 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2680 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2681 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2682 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2683 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2684 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2685 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2686 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2687 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2688 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2689 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2690 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2692 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2693 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2694 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2695 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2696 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2697 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2698 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2699 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2700 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2701 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2702 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2703 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2704 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2705 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2706 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2707 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2708 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2710 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2711 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2712 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2713 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2715 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2716 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2717 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2718 added_monitors.clear();
2720 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2721 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2722 match forwarded_events[0] {
2723 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2724 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2726 if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[1] {
2727 } else { panic!(); }
2728 if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[2] {
2729 } else { panic!(); }
2730 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2732 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2733 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2734 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2735 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2736 added_monitors.clear();
2738 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2740 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2741 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2744 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2745 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2749 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2750 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2751 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2752 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2753 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2754 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2756 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2758 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2759 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2760 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2761 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2762 // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2763 // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2764 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2765 check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2766 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2767 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2769 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2770 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2771 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2772 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2774 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2775 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2776 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2777 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2779 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2780 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2784 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2785 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2786 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2787 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2789 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2790 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2791 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2792 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2793 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2794 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2795 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2796 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2797 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2798 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2799 let commitment_spend =
2800 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2801 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2802 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2803 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2806 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2807 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2808 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2812 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2813 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2814 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2815 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2816 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2817 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2818 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2819 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2820 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2821 check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2822 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2823 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2825 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2826 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2827 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2828 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2829 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2830 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2831 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2832 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2833 let mut first_claimed = false;
2834 for event in events {
2836 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2837 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2838 assert!(!first_claimed);
2839 first_claimed = true;
2841 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2842 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2845 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2846 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2847 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2850 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2853 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2854 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2855 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2856 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2857 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2858 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2860 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2862 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2863 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2864 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2865 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2866 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2867 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2868 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2870 // Create some intial channels
2871 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2872 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2874 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2875 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2876 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2878 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2880 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2881 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2882 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2883 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2884 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2885 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2886 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2888 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2889 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2891 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2892 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2893 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2894 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2895 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2896 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2898 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2900 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2901 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2902 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2903 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2904 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2905 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2906 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2907 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2909 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2910 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2911 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2912 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2913 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2916 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2917 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2918 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2919 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2921 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2922 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2924 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2925 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2926 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2927 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2929 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2933 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2934 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2935 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2937 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2938 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2939 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2940 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2943 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2945 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2946 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2947 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2948 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2949 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2950 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2951 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2953 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2957 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2958 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2959 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2960 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2962 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2963 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2964 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2965 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2966 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2967 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2969 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2972 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2973 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2974 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2976 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2977 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2979 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2980 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2981 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2982 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2983 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2984 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2985 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2986 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2987 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2991 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2992 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2993 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2994 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2998 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
2999 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3000 // and fail backward accordingly.
3002 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3003 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3004 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3005 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3007 // Create some initial channels
3008 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3009 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3011 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3012 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3013 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3014 // Revoke the old state
3015 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3017 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3019 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3020 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3021 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3022 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3023 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3025 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3026 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3027 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3028 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3030 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3031 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3032 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3033 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3034 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3035 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3037 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3038 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3039 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3041 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3045 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3046 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3047 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3048 // commitment transaction anymore.
3049 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3050 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3051 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3052 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3053 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3054 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3056 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3057 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3058 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3059 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3060 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3061 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3062 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3063 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3064 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3066 // Create some initial channels
3067 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3068 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3070 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3071 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3072 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3073 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3074 // Revoke the old state
3075 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3077 let value = if use_dust {
3078 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3079 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3080 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3083 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3084 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3085 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3087 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
3088 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3089 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3090 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3091 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3092 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3093 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3094 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3095 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3096 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3097 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3098 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3100 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
3101 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3102 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3103 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3104 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3105 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3106 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3107 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3108 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3109 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3110 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3112 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3113 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3114 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3115 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3117 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
3118 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3119 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3120 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3121 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3122 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3123 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3124 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3125 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3126 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3127 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3128 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3129 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3131 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3132 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3133 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3134 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3136 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3137 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3138 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3139 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3140 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3141 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3142 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3145 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3146 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3147 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3148 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3149 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3150 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3152 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3153 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3155 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3156 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3159 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3160 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3162 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3163 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3164 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3165 assert!(ANTI_REORG_DELAY > PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS); // We assume payments will also expire
3167 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3168 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 4 });
3170 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3171 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3174 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3175 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3177 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3179 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3181 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3182 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3184 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3187 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3188 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3191 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3192 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3194 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3195 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3196 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3197 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3198 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3200 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3201 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3202 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3203 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3205 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3209 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3210 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3211 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3212 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3213 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3214 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3216 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3219 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3220 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3221 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3222 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3223 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3224 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3225 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3227 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3228 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3229 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3231 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3233 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3234 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3236 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3237 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3238 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3239 // that we should update our routing table for.
3240 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3241 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3244 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3247 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3248 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3249 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3251 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3254 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3255 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3256 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3258 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3261 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3264 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3265 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3266 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3270 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3271 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3272 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3273 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3274 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3278 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3279 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3280 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3281 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3282 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3286 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3287 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3288 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3289 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3290 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3291 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3293 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3295 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3296 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3297 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3299 let payment_event = {
3300 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3301 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3302 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3304 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3305 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3308 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3309 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3311 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3312 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3314 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3317 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3319 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3321 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3322 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3323 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3324 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3325 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3326 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3328 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3329 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3335 onion_routing_packet,
3337 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3339 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3340 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3341 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3343 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3344 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3346 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3349 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3350 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3352 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3354 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3355 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3359 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3360 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3361 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3362 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3363 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3364 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3365 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3366 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3368 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3369 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
3370 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3371 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3372 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3373 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3375 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3376 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3377 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3379 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3380 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3381 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3382 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3383 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3385 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3386 // registering new transactions
3387 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3388 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3392 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3393 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3394 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3395 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3396 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3397 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3398 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3399 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3401 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3403 let mut payment_event = {
3404 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3405 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3407 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3408 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3409 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3412 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3413 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3415 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3417 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3418 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3419 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3420 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3422 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3423 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3424 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3425 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3426 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3428 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3429 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3430 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3432 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
3433 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3434 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3435 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3437 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3438 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3439 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3440 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3441 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3445 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3447 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3448 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3449 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3450 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3452 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3454 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3455 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3457 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3458 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3459 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3460 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3461 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3462 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3463 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3465 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3469 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3470 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3471 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3472 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3473 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3475 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3476 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3477 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3478 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3479 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3481 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3483 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3484 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3485 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3486 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3487 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3489 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3490 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3492 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3493 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3497 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3498 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3499 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3500 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3501 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3502 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3503 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3504 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3506 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3507 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3508 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3510 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3511 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3512 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3513 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3515 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3516 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3517 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3519 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3520 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3521 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3522 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3524 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3525 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3527 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3528 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3530 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3532 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3533 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3535 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3536 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3537 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3539 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3542 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3543 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3544 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3546 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3549 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3550 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3554 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3555 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3558 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3559 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3560 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3561 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3562 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3563 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3565 let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3566 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3567 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3568 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3569 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3570 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3571 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3573 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3576 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3578 let payment_event = {
3579 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3580 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3582 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3583 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3584 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3586 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3588 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3589 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3591 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3592 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3593 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3594 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3595 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3597 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3598 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3599 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3600 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3602 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3603 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3604 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3605 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3606 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3608 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3609 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3610 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3611 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3618 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3619 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3620 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3621 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3622 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3623 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3625 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3626 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3627 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3629 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3630 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3632 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3633 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3634 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3635 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3636 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3637 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3638 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3639 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3640 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3641 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3642 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3643 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3644 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3645 // Everything was delivered...
3646 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3649 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3650 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3652 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3653 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3656 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3657 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3658 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3660 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3662 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3663 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3665 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3666 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3667 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3669 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3670 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3671 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3673 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3676 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3679 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3680 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3682 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3683 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3684 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3685 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3686 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3687 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3688 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3689 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3690 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3691 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3692 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3694 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3697 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3698 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3700 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3701 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3703 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3704 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3705 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3707 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3710 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3711 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3712 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3713 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3715 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3716 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3717 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3718 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3720 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3721 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3722 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3723 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3724 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3726 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3727 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3728 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3729 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3736 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3737 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3738 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3739 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3740 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3741 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3743 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3745 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3746 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3747 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3748 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3749 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3750 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3751 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3752 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3753 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3754 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3755 // Everything was delivered...
3756 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3759 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3760 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3763 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3764 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3765 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3767 if messages_delivered > 2 {
3768 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3771 // Channel should still work fine...
3772 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3773 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3774 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3778 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3779 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3780 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3781 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3782 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3786 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3787 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3788 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3789 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3790 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3794 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3795 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3796 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3797 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3798 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3799 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3800 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3801 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3802 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3803 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3805 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3806 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3808 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3809 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3810 assert!(events_1.is_empty());
3812 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3814 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3815 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3817 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3818 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3819 assert!(events_2.is_empty());
3821 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3822 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3823 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3824 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3826 // nodes[0] hasn't yet received a funding_locked, so it only sends that on reconnect.
3827 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
3828 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3829 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3830 let as_funding_locked = match events_3[0] {
3831 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3832 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3835 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_3[0]),
3838 // nodes[1] received nodes[0]'s funding_locked on the first reconnect above, so it should send
3839 // announcement_signatures as well as channel_update.
3840 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
3841 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3842 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 3);
3844 let bs_funding_locked = match events_4[0] {
3845 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3846 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3847 chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3850 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[0]),
3852 let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_4[1] {
3853 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3854 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3857 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[1]),
3860 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3861 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3863 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[2]),
3866 // Re-deliver nodes[0]'s funding_locked, which nodes[1] can safely ignore. It currently
3867 // generates a duplicative announcement_signatures
3868 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
3869 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3870 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3872 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3873 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3874 assert_eq!(*msg, bs_announcement_sigs);
3876 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_5[0]),
3879 // When we deliver nodes[1]'s funding_locked, however, nodes[0] will generate its
3880 // announcement_signatures.
3881 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_locked);
3882 let events_6 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3883 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
3884 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
3885 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3886 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3889 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_6[0]),
3892 // When we deliver nodes[1]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[0], nodes[0] should immediately
3893 // broadcast the channel announcement globally, as well as re-send its (now-public)
3895 nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3896 let events_7 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3897 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3898 let (chan_announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
3899 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3900 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3902 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_7[0]),
3905 // Finally, deliver nodes[0]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[1] and make sure it creates the
3906 // same channel_announcement.
3907 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3908 let events_8 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3909 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3910 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
3911 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3912 assert_eq!(*msg, chan_announcement);
3915 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_8[0]),
3918 // Provide the channel announcement and public updates to the network graph
3919 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap();
3920 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3921 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3923 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3924 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3925 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3927 // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3928 // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3929 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3931 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3932 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3933 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3935 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3936 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3937 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3938 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3939 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3940 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3941 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3942 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3944 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3945 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3946 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3947 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3948 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3949 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3951 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3952 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3953 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3954 logger: nodes[0].logger,
3958 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
3959 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
3961 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
3962 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
3963 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3965 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3967 // The channel announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
3968 nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
3969 let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3970 let mut found_announcement = false;
3971 for event in msgs.iter() {
3973 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
3974 if *msg == chan_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
3976 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
3977 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3980 assert!(found_announcement);
3984 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3985 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3986 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3987 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3988 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3989 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3990 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3991 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3993 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
3995 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3996 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3997 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
3998 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4000 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4001 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4003 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4004 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4007 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
4008 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4010 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4011 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4013 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4014 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4015 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4016 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4017 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4018 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4019 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4021 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4022 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4023 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4025 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4026 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4027 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4029 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4032 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4033 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4034 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4035 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4037 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4040 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4041 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4043 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4044 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4045 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4046 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4047 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4048 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4050 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4051 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4052 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4053 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4055 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4056 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4058 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4059 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4061 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4063 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4064 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4065 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4066 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4067 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4068 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4069 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4070 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4071 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4072 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4074 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4075 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4076 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4077 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4078 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4079 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4080 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4081 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4083 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4084 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4085 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4086 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4087 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4088 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4089 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4090 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4092 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4093 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4094 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4095 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4097 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4098 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4099 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4100 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4102 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4103 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4104 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4106 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4108 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4109 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4111 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4112 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4114 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4115 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4116 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4118 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4121 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4124 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4125 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4126 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4128 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4129 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4132 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4133 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4134 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4135 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4136 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4137 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4138 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4140 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4142 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4143 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4144 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4145 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4146 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4147 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4148 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4149 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4150 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4151 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4152 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4153 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4154 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4157 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4160 let mut block = Block {
4161 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4164 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4165 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4166 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4167 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4168 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4169 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4170 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4173 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4175 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4176 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4177 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4178 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4179 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4180 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4182 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4183 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4184 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4185 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4186 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4187 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4191 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4192 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4193 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4196 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4197 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4198 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4199 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4200 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4201 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4202 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4203 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4205 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4206 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4207 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4208 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4210 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4211 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4213 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4215 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4216 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4218 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4219 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4220 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4221 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4224 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4225 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4226 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4227 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4229 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4231 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4232 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4233 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4234 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4237 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4238 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4239 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4240 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4241 match fail_commit[0] {
4242 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4243 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4244 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4246 _ => unreachable!(),
4248 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4250 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4251 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4252 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
4253 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4254 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4255 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
4256 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4257 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4262 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4263 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4264 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4268 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4269 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4270 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4271 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4272 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4273 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4274 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4275 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4276 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4277 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4279 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4281 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4283 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4284 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4285 get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4286 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4288 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4289 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4290 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4291 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4292 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4293 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4294 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4295 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4296 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4297 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4299 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4300 let config = UserConfig::default();
4301 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4302 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4303 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4304 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4305 default_config: config,
4307 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4308 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4309 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4314 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4315 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4317 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4318 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4319 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4320 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4322 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4323 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4324 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4325 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4327 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4328 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4329 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4330 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4332 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4333 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4334 for node in nodes.iter() {
4335 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4336 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4337 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4340 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4344 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4345 // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4346 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4347 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4348 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4349 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4350 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4351 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4352 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4353 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4354 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4356 // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4357 let channel_value = 100000;
4358 let push_msat = 10001;
4359 let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4360 let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4361 let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4362 let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4363 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4364 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4365 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4367 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
4369 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4370 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4372 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4374 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4375 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4376 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4377 added_monitors.clear();
4380 let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4381 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4383 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4384 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4385 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4386 added_monitors.clear();
4388 // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4393 // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4394 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4395 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4396 get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4398 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4399 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4400 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4401 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4402 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4403 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4404 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4405 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4406 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4407 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4409 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4410 let config = UserConfig::default();
4411 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4412 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4413 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4414 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4415 default_config: config,
4417 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4418 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4419 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4424 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4425 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4427 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4429 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4430 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4432 // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4433 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4434 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4435 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4436 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4438 // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4439 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4440 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4442 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4443 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4444 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4445 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4447 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4448 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4449 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4450 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4452 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4453 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4454 for node in nodes.iter() {
4455 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4456 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4457 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4460 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4464 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4465 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4466 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4467 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4468 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4469 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4470 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4471 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4472 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4473 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4474 let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4476 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4477 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4479 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4481 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4482 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4483 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4485 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4486 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4487 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4488 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4489 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4490 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4491 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4492 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4493 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4494 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4496 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4497 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4498 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4499 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4500 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4501 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4503 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4504 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4505 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4510 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4511 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4513 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4514 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4515 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4517 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4519 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4520 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4524 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4525 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4526 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4527 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4528 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4529 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4530 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4531 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4532 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4533 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4534 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4535 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4536 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4537 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4539 let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4540 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4541 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4542 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4543 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4546 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4548 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4549 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4551 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4552 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4553 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4554 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4556 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4558 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4559 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4560 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4561 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4562 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4565 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4566 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4567 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4568 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4569 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4570 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4573 let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4574 for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4575 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4576 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4577 assert!(read.is_empty());
4578 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4581 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4582 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4583 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4584 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4585 assert!(read.is_empty());
4586 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4589 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4590 if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4591 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4592 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4594 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4595 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4596 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4598 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4600 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4603 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4604 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4605 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4606 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4608 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4609 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4610 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4612 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4614 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4615 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4617 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4618 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4619 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4620 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4621 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4624 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4625 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4626 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4628 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4629 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4631 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4632 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4633 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4634 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4635 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4637 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4638 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4639 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4640 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4641 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4642 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4643 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4645 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4646 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4648 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4653 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4654 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4656 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4657 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4658 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4659 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4660 for event in events.drain(..) {
4662 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4663 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4664 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4665 all_outputs.push(outp);
4668 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4671 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4672 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4682 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4683 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4684 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4685 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4686 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4687 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4689 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4690 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4691 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4692 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4693 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4694 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4695 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4696 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4697 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4699 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4700 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4702 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4703 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4704 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4705 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4706 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4710 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4711 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4712 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4713 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4714 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4715 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4716 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4718 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4719 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4720 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4721 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4722 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4724 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4725 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4726 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4727 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4729 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4730 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4731 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4732 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4733 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4735 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4736 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4737 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4741 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4742 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4743 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4745 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4746 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4747 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4748 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4750 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4751 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4752 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4753 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4754 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4756 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4757 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4758 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4759 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4760 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4762 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4763 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4764 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4766 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4767 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4768 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4769 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4770 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4774 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4775 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4776 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4777 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4778 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4780 // Create some initial channels
4781 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4783 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4785 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4786 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4787 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4789 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4790 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4791 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4792 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4793 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4794 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4796 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4797 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4800 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4801 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4804 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4805 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4806 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4807 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4808 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4809 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4810 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4812 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4813 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4814 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4816 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4817 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4818 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4822 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4823 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4824 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4825 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4826 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4828 // Create some initial channels
4829 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4831 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4832 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4834 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4836 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4837 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4838 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4840 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4841 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4842 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4843 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4845 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4846 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4848 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4850 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4851 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4852 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4853 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4854 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4855 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4857 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4858 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4859 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4860 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4862 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4863 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4864 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4865 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4866 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4870 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4871 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4872 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4873 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4874 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4876 // Create some initial channels
4877 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4879 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4880 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4881 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4882 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4884 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4886 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4887 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4888 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4889 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4891 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4892 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4893 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4894 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4896 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4897 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4899 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4900 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4901 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4905 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4906 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4907 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4908 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4909 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4910 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4912 // Create some initial channels
4913 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4915 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4916 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4917 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4918 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4920 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4922 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4923 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4924 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4925 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4926 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4927 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4929 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4930 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4931 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4932 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4933 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4934 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4935 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4937 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4938 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4939 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4940 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4941 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4942 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4944 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4945 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4946 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4947 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4948 // transactions next...
4949 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4950 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4952 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4953 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4954 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4955 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4957 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4958 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4961 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4962 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4964 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4965 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4967 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4968 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4969 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4970 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4971 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4975 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4976 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4977 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4978 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4979 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4980 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4982 // Create some initial channels
4983 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4985 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4986 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4987 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4988 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4990 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4991 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4993 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4995 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4996 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4997 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4998 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4999 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5000 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5002 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5003 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5004 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5005 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5007 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
5008 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
5009 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
5011 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5012 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5013 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
5014 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5015 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5016 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5018 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5019 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5021 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5022 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5023 // transactions next...
5024 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
5025 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5026 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
5027 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5029 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
5030 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5033 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5034 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5036 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5038 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
5039 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5041 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
5042 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
5044 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5045 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5046 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5047 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5048 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
5049 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5050 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
5051 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
5055 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
5056 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
5057 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
5058 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
5059 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
5061 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
5064 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5065 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5066 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5067 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5069 // Create some initial channels
5070 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5071 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5073 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5074 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5075 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5076 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5077 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5079 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5080 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5081 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5083 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
5084 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5085 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5086 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5087 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5088 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5089 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5090 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5091 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5092 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5094 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5095 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5096 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5097 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5099 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5100 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5101 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5102 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5103 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5104 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5105 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5106 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5107 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5108 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5110 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5111 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5112 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5113 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5114 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5115 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5117 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5118 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5121 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
5122 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5123 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5125 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5128 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5129 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5130 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5131 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5134 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5135 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5136 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5137 match msg_events[0] {
5138 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5139 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5141 match msg_events[1] {
5142 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5143 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5145 match msg_events[2] {
5146 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5147 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5148 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5149 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5150 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5151 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5153 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5155 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5156 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5157 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5158 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5159 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5160 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5161 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5162 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5163 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5164 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5165 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5166 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5167 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5169 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5170 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5174 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5175 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5176 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5177 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5178 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5179 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5180 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5181 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5182 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5183 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5184 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5185 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5186 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5187 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5189 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5190 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5191 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5193 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5194 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5195 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5196 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5197 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5199 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
5201 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5202 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5203 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5204 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5205 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], vec![], 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5206 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5208 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5209 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5210 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5212 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5213 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5214 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5215 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5216 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5218 let htlc_timeout_tx;
5219 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5220 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5221 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5222 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5223 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5225 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5226 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5227 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5228 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5229 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5230 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5231 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5233 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5234 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5235 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5236 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5239 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5240 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5241 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5242 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5243 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5245 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5246 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5249 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5250 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5252 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5253 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5254 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5255 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5256 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5257 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5258 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5259 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5260 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5261 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5262 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5263 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5264 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5266 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5267 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5268 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5269 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5270 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5271 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5272 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5273 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5274 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5275 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5277 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5278 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5280 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5282 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5284 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5285 // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5286 // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5287 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5288 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], Some(196*2), true);
5289 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5290 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5291 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5292 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5293 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5294 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5295 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5297 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5298 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5300 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5302 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5303 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5304 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5306 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5311 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5312 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5313 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5314 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5315 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5317 // Create some initial channels
5318 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5320 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5321 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5322 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5323 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5324 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5326 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5327 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5328 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5329 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5330 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5331 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5332 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5334 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5335 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5338 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5339 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5342 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5343 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5344 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5345 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5346 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5347 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5348 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5352 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5353 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5355 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5356 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5357 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5358 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5359 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5360 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5363 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5364 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5365 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5366 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5367 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5368 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5369 // use the same payment hashes.
5370 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5375 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5376 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5377 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5378 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5379 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5380 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5381 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5382 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5383 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5384 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5386 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5387 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5388 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5389 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5390 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5392 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5393 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5394 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5395 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5397 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5399 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5401 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5402 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5404 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5406 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5408 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5410 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5411 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5413 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5415 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5418 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5420 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5421 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5424 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5426 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5427 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5429 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5430 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5431 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5432 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5433 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5435 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5436 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5437 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5438 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5439 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5440 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5441 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5442 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5443 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5445 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5446 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5447 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5448 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5449 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5450 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5452 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5453 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5454 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5455 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5456 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5457 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5459 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5460 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5461 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5462 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5464 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5466 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5467 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5468 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5469 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5470 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5471 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5472 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5473 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5474 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5475 if deliver_last_raa {
5476 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5478 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5481 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5482 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5483 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5484 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5486 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5487 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5488 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5490 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5491 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5492 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5494 if announce_latest {
5495 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5497 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5499 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5500 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5501 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5504 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5508 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5509 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5512 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5513 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5514 if deliver_last_raa {
5515 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5517 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5519 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5521 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5522 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5523 let mut a_done = false;
5524 for msg in cs_msgs {
5526 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5527 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5528 // should be failed-backwards here.
5529 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5530 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5531 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5532 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5534 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5539 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5540 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5541 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5543 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5544 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5547 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5548 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5549 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5550 if announce_latest {
5551 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5552 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5553 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5556 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5558 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5562 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5563 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5564 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5565 let mut as_updates = 0;
5566 for event in as_events.iter() {
5567 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5568 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5569 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5570 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5572 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5574 if network_update.is_some() {
5577 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5579 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5580 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5581 if announce_latest {
5582 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5583 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5585 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5587 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5588 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5589 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5590 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5591 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5592 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5593 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5594 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5595 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5597 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5599 if network_update.is_some() {
5602 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5604 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5605 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5606 if announce_latest {
5607 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5609 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5611 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5612 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5613 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5614 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5615 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5616 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5620 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5621 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5625 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5626 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5630 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5631 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5632 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5633 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5637 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5638 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5639 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5640 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5641 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5643 // Create some initial channels
5644 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5646 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5647 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5648 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5649 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5651 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5652 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5653 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5654 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5655 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5656 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5658 let htlc_timeout = {
5659 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5660 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5661 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5662 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5663 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5664 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5668 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5669 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5670 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5672 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5673 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5674 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5675 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5676 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5677 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5678 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5679 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5680 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5681 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5682 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5686 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5687 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5688 // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5689 // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5691 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5693 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5694 let seed = [42; 32];
5695 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5696 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5697 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph: &chanmon_cfgs[0].network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5698 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5699 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5700 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5702 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5703 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5705 // Create some initial channels
5706 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5708 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5709 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5710 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5712 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5713 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5714 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5715 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5716 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5718 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5719 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5720 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5721 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5722 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5724 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5725 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5726 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5727 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5728 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5729 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5730 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5731 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5734 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5735 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5736 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5737 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5738 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5739 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5741 let htlc_timeout = {
5742 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5743 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5744 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5745 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5749 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5750 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5751 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5753 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5754 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5755 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5756 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5757 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5758 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5759 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5760 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5761 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5762 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5763 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5764 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5768 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5769 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5770 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5771 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5772 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5774 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5776 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5777 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5779 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5780 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5781 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5783 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5784 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5785 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5787 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5788 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5789 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5791 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5792 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5793 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5796 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5797 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5798 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5799 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5800 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5801 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5803 let (payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5805 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5806 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5807 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5808 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5810 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5811 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5812 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5814 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5815 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5816 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5817 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5818 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5820 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5821 let mut block = Block {
5822 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5825 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5826 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5827 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5829 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5830 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5831 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5832 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5835 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5836 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5837 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5838 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5839 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5840 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5842 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5843 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5844 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5846 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5848 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5849 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5850 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5852 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5853 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5855 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5856 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5857 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5859 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5860 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5861 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5862 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5865 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5866 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5867 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5868 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5869 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5870 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5872 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5873 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5874 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5875 // actually revoked.
5876 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5877 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5878 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5879 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5880 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5882 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5883 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5884 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5885 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5886 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5887 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5888 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5889 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5890 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5891 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5893 if check_revoke_no_close {
5894 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5895 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5898 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5899 let mut block = Block {
5900 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5903 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5904 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5905 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5907 if !check_revoke_no_close {
5908 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5909 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5910 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5911 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5913 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5914 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5915 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
5916 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5917 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5918 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
5919 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5920 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5924 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5925 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5926 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5927 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5928 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5929 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5930 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5932 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5933 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5934 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5936 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5937 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5938 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5940 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5941 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5945 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5946 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5947 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5948 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5949 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5954 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5955 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5956 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5957 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5958 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5959 //Force duplicate channel ids
5960 for node in nodes.iter() {
5961 *node.keys_manager.override_channel_id_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5964 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5965 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5966 let push_msat=10001;
5967 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5968 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5969 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5971 //Create a second channel with a channel_id collision
5972 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5976 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5977 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5978 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5979 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5980 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5982 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5983 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5984 let push_msat=10001;
5985 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5987 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5988 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5989 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5990 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5991 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5993 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5994 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5995 let push_msat=10001;
5996 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5997 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5998 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
6000 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
6001 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
6002 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
6004 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
6005 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
6006 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6008 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
6009 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
6010 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
6012 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
6013 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
6014 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6015 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6016 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
6017 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6021 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
6022 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6023 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6024 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6025 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6027 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
6028 let push_msat=10001;
6029 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6030 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6031 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
6032 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
6034 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6035 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6036 let err_msg = match events[0] {
6037 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
6040 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6042 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
6045 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
6046 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
6047 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
6048 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
6050 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
6051 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6052 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6053 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6054 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6055 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6057 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6058 // pending_update_fee.
6060 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6061 *feerate_lock += 20;
6063 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6064 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6066 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6067 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6068 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6069 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6070 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6072 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6075 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6077 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6078 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6079 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6080 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6082 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6083 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6084 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6086 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6087 let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6088 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6089 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6091 // Flush the pending fee update.
6092 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6093 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6094 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6095 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6096 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6098 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6099 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6100 // us to surface its failure to the user.
6101 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6102 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6103 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6104 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6105 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6106 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6108 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6109 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6110 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6112 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6113 assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6114 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6115 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6116 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6117 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6118 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6119 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6120 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6122 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6126 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6127 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6128 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6130 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6131 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6132 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6133 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6134 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6135 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6137 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6138 // pending_update_fee.
6140 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6141 *feerate_lock += 200;
6143 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6144 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6146 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6147 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6148 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6149 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6150 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6152 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6155 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6157 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6158 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6159 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6160 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6162 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6164 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
6165 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6166 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6168 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6169 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6170 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6171 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6172 let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6173 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6174 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6176 // Flush the pending fee update.
6177 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6178 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6179 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6180 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6181 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6182 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6184 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6185 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6186 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6187 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6188 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6189 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6190 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6191 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6192 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6194 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6195 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6196 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6198 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6199 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6200 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6201 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6202 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6203 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6204 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6205 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6206 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6208 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6211 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6212 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6213 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6214 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6215 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6217 let raa = match send_raa_event {
6218 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6219 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6221 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6222 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6223 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6224 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6225 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6226 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6228 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6229 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6231 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6232 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6233 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6235 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6236 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6238 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6239 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6240 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6241 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6242 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6243 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6246 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6247 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6248 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6251 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6252 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6253 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6254 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6255 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6256 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6257 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6258 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6259 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6260 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6261 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6263 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6264 // pending_update_fee.
6266 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6267 *feerate_lock += 20;
6269 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6270 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6272 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6273 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6274 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6275 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6276 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6278 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6281 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6283 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6284 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6285 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6286 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6288 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6290 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6291 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6292 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6293 let payment_event = {
6294 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6295 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6297 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6298 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6300 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6302 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6303 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6304 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6305 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6307 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6308 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6310 // Flush the pending fee update.
6311 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6312 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6313 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6314 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6315 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6316 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6318 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6319 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6320 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6322 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6323 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6326 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6329 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6330 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6331 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6333 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6334 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6335 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6336 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6337 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6338 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6341 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6342 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6345 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6346 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6347 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6348 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6349 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6350 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6351 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6352 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6353 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6354 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6356 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6359 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6360 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6361 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6363 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6364 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6365 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6366 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6367 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6368 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6369 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6370 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6371 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6372 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6373 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6375 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6376 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6377 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6380 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6381 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6382 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6385 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6386 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6387 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6388 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6389 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6390 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6391 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6393 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6394 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6396 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6397 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6398 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6399 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6403 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6404 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6405 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6406 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6407 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6408 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6409 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6411 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6412 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6413 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6414 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6416 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6417 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6421 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6422 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6423 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6424 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6425 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6426 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6427 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6429 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6430 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6431 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6432 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6433 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6435 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6436 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6437 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6438 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6439 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6443 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6444 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6445 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6446 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6447 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6448 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6449 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6450 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6452 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], vec![], 100000000, 500000001);
6453 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6454 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6458 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6459 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6460 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6461 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6462 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6463 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6464 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6465 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6466 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6467 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6469 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6470 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6471 let payment_event = {
6472 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6475 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6476 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6477 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6478 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6482 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6484 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6485 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6486 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6488 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6489 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6491 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6492 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6493 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6495 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6496 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6500 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6501 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6502 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6503 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6504 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6505 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6506 let channel_value = 100000;
6507 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6508 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6510 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6512 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6513 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6515 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6516 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6517 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6519 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6520 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6522 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6525 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6527 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6528 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6529 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6530 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6531 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6532 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6533 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6534 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6536 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6537 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6538 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6541 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6542 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6543 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6544 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6545 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6546 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6547 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6548 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6549 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6550 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6551 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6555 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6556 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6557 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6558 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6559 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6560 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6561 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6563 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6564 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6565 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6566 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6567 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6568 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6570 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6571 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6572 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6573 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6574 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6576 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6577 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6578 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6579 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6580 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6582 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6583 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6584 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6585 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6586 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6590 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6591 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6592 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6593 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6594 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6595 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6596 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6597 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6599 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6600 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6601 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6602 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6603 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6604 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6606 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6610 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6611 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6612 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6615 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6616 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6617 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6619 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6620 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6622 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6623 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6624 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6625 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6626 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6630 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6631 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6632 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6633 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6634 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6635 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6636 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6638 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6639 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6640 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6641 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6642 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6643 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6645 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6646 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6647 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6648 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6649 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6653 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6654 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6655 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6656 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6657 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6658 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6660 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6661 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6662 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6663 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6664 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6665 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6666 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6668 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6669 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6670 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6671 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6672 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6676 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6677 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6678 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6679 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6680 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6681 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6682 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6683 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6685 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6686 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6687 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6688 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6689 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6690 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6692 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6693 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6694 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6695 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6696 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6697 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6698 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6699 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6700 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6701 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6702 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6703 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6704 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6707 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6708 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6709 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6710 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6711 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6713 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6715 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6716 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6717 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6718 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6719 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6723 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6724 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6726 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6727 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6728 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6729 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6730 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6731 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6732 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6734 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6735 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6736 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6738 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6741 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6744 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6746 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6747 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6748 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6749 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6750 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6754 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6755 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6757 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6758 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6759 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6760 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6761 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6763 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6764 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6765 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6766 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6767 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6769 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6772 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6775 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6777 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6778 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6779 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6780 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6781 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6785 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6786 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6788 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6789 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6790 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6791 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6792 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6794 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6795 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6796 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6797 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6798 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6799 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6802 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6803 failure_code: 0x8000,
6806 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6808 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6809 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6810 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6811 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6812 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6816 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6817 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6819 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6820 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6821 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6822 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6823 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6825 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6827 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6828 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6830 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6831 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6832 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6834 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6835 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6836 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6837 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6838 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6839 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6840 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6842 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6846 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6848 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6850 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6851 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6852 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6853 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6854 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6858 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6859 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6861 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6862 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6863 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6864 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6865 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6867 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6869 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6870 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6872 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6873 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6874 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6876 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6877 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6878 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6879 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6880 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6881 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6882 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6884 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6888 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6890 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6892 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6893 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6894 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6895 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6896 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6900 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6901 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6903 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6904 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6905 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6906 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6907 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6909 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6910 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6911 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6913 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6914 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6916 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6917 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6918 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6920 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6922 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6924 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6925 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6926 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6927 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6928 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6929 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6930 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6932 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6935 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6936 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6938 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6939 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6940 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6941 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6942 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6946 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6947 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6948 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6950 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6951 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6952 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6953 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6954 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6955 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6957 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6960 let mut payment_event = {
6961 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6962 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6963 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6964 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6965 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6967 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6968 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6969 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6970 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6971 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6972 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6973 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6974 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6975 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6978 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6979 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6980 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6981 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6983 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6984 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6985 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6987 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6988 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6989 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6990 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6991 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6992 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6993 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6995 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6999 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
7001 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7002 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
7003 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7004 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7005 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7007 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
7009 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7010 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7011 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7012 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7013 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7014 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7016 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7019 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7022 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7023 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7024 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7025 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7027 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7028 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7029 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7030 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7031 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7032 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7034 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7036 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7037 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7038 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7039 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7041 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7042 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7044 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7045 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
7046 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7047 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7048 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7050 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7051 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7052 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7053 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7055 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7056 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7058 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7060 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7061 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7063 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7066 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7067 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7069 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7072 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7073 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7074 if announce_latest {
7075 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7077 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7080 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7081 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7082 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7084 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7085 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7086 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7087 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7088 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7089 let mut first_failed = false;
7090 for event in events {
7092 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7093 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7094 assert!(!first_failed);
7095 first_failed = true;
7097 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7100 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7106 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7107 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7108 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7111 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7112 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7113 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7114 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7115 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7116 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7117 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7119 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7120 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7121 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7122 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7123 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7125 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7127 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7128 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7130 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7131 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7133 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7135 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7136 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7139 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7141 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7142 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7143 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7144 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7145 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7147 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7148 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7149 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7150 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7151 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7152 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7153 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7154 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7155 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7156 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7157 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7159 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7160 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7161 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7163 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7164 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7165 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7166 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7168 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7169 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7170 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
7171 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7172 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7173 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7174 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7176 // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
7178 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7179 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7182 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7183 if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7184 else { first = false; }
7186 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7189 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7190 if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7191 else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7193 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7200 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7201 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7202 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7203 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7207 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7208 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7210 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7211 low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7212 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7213 high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7214 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7215 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7216 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7217 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7218 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7220 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7221 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0) {
7223 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7224 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7226 } else { assert!(false) }
7228 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7229 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7230 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7231 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7232 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger) {
7234 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7235 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7237 } else { assert!(false); }
7239 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7240 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7241 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7242 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7243 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7244 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7246 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7248 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7249 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7250 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7254 } else { panic!(); }
7255 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7257 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7258 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7259 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7260 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7261 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger) {
7263 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7264 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7266 } else { assert!(false); }
7270 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7271 // We want to be sure that :
7272 // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7273 // (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7274 // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7275 // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7276 // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7282 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7283 // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7284 // during signing due to revoked tx
7285 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7286 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7289 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7290 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7291 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7293 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7295 // Cache node A state before any channel update
7296 let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7297 let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7298 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7300 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7301 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7303 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7304 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7306 // Restore node A from previous state
7307 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7308 let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7309 chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7310 tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7311 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7312 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7313 monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7315 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7316 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7317 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7318 keys_manager: keys_manager,
7319 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7320 chain_monitor: &monitor,
7322 tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7323 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7327 nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7328 assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7329 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7330 nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7332 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7334 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7335 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7337 let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7339 // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7340 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7341 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7344 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7345 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7348 let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7349 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7350 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7351 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7352 reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7353 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7354 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7356 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7357 assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7359 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7362 panic!("Unexpected event")
7366 // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7367 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7368 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_string() });
7369 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction");
7370 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7372 // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7373 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7374 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7375 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
7376 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
7377 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
7378 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7379 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting".to_string() });
7380 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
7381 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7382 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
7386 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7387 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7388 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7389 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7391 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7392 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7393 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7394 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7396 // Create some initial channels
7397 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7399 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7400 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7401 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7402 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7403 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7404 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7405 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7407 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7408 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7409 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7410 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7411 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7413 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7414 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7415 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7416 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7418 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7419 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7420 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7422 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7423 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7424 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7425 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7426 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7427 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7428 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7429 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7430 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7431 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7433 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7435 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7437 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7438 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7440 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7441 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7442 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7443 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7447 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7448 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7449 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7451 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7452 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7453 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7454 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7456 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7457 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7458 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7461 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7462 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7464 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7465 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7466 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7467 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7468 let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7469 for e in msg_events {
7471 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7472 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7473 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7474 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7475 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7478 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7482 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7483 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7484 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7485 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7486 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7487 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7489 // Reestablish chan_1
7490 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7491 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7492 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7493 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7494 // Reestablish chan_2
7495 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7496 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7497 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7498 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7499 // Reestablish chan_3
7500 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7501 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7502 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7503 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7505 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7506 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7507 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7508 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7509 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7510 for e in msg_events {
7512 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7513 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7514 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7515 // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7517 Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7518 None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7521 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7524 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7525 assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7529 fn test_priv_forwarding_rejection() {
7530 // If we have a private channel with outbound liquidity, and
7531 // UserConfig::accept_forwards_to_priv_channels is set to false, we should reject any attempts
7532 // to forward through that channel.
7533 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7534 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7535 let mut no_announce_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
7536 no_announce_cfg.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
7537 no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = false;
7538 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(no_announce_cfg), None]);
7539 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
7540 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
7541 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
7542 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7544 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7546 // Note that the create_*_chan functions in utils requires announcement_signatures, which we do
7547 // not send for private channels.
7548 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7549 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7550 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
7551 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7552 nodes[1].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7554 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[1], 1_000_000, 42);
7555 nodes[1].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7556 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()));
7557 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
7559 let cs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7560 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_funding_signed);
7561 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7563 let conf_height = core::cmp::max(nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1, nodes[2].best_block_info().1 + 1);
7564 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, conf_height);
7565 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7566 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[2], &tx, conf_height);
7567 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7568 let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7569 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7570 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7571 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
7572 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7574 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7575 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
7576 assert!(!nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7578 // We should always be able to forward through nodes[1] as long as its out through a public
7580 send_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], 10_000);
7582 // ... however, if we send to nodes[2], we will have to pass the private channel from nodes[1]
7583 // to nodes[2], which should be rejected:
7584 let route_hint = RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
7585 src_node_id: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
7586 short_channel_id: nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(),
7587 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 1000, proportional_millionths: 0 },
7588 cltv_expiry_delta: MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
7589 htlc_minimum_msat: None,
7590 htlc_maximum_msat: None,
7592 let last_hops = vec![route_hint];
7593 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], last_hops, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
7595 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7596 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7597 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
7598 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7599 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7601 let htlc_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7602 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7603 assert_eq!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7604 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7605 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fee.is_none());
7607 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7608 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7609 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(), true);
7611 // Now disconnect nodes[1] from its peers and restart with accept_forwards_to_priv_channels set
7612 // to true. Sadly there is currently no way to change it at runtime.
7614 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7615 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7617 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
7618 let mut monitor_a_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7619 let mut monitor_b_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7620 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut monitor_a_serialized).unwrap();
7621 get_monitor!(nodes[1], cs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut monitor_b_serialized).unwrap();
7623 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7624 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
7625 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7626 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
7628 let mut monitor_a_read = &monitor_a_serialized.0[..];
7629 let mut monitor_b_read = &monitor_b_serialized.0[..];
7630 let (_, mut monitor_a) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_a_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7631 let (_, mut monitor_b) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_b_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7632 assert!(monitor_a_read.is_empty());
7633 assert!(monitor_b_read.is_empty());
7635 no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = true;
7637 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
7638 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
7639 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7640 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_a);
7641 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_b);
7642 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7643 default_config: no_announce_cfg,
7645 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
7646 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
7647 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7648 logger: nodes[1].logger,
7652 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
7653 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
7655 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_a).is_ok());
7656 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_b).is_ok());
7657 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7658 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
7660 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7661 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7662 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7663 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7664 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
7665 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7666 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7667 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7669 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7670 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7671 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7672 let cs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7673 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7674 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_reestablish);
7675 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7676 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7678 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7679 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7680 pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], 10_000, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret);
7681 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], our_payment_preimage);
7685 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7686 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7687 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7689 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7690 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7691 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7692 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7694 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7696 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7697 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], vec![], 3000000, 30);
7698 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7700 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7701 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7702 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7703 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7704 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7705 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7707 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7708 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7709 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7710 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7714 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7715 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7717 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7718 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7719 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7720 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7721 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7723 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7727 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7728 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7729 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7730 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7731 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7732 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7733 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7734 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7738 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7739 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7740 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7741 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7743 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7744 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7745 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7746 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7747 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7748 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7749 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7750 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7751 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7752 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7753 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7754 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7755 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7759 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7761 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7762 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7764 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7766 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7767 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7768 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7769 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7770 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7771 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7772 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7773 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7774 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7775 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7776 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7777 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7778 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7782 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7784 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7785 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7789 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7790 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7791 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7793 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7794 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7795 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7796 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7797 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7799 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7800 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7801 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7802 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7803 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7804 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7805 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7806 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7807 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, nodes[1].network_graph, None,
7808 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7809 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7811 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7812 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7813 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7815 // Revoke local commitment tx
7816 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7818 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7819 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7820 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7821 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7822 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7823 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7824 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7826 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7827 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7828 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7830 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7831 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7832 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7834 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7835 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7836 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7837 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7839 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7840 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7841 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7842 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7843 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7844 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7845 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7846 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7848 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7849 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7855 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7856 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7857 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7859 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7860 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7861 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7862 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7864 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7865 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7866 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7867 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7868 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7869 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7871 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7872 // available, which we check here:
7873 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7874 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7875 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7877 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7878 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7880 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7881 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7882 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7883 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7885 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7886 // output, checked above).
7887 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7888 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7889 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7891 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7892 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7893 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7894 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
7895 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7899 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7900 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7901 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7902 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7903 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7905 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7906 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7908 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7909 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7910 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7911 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7912 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7914 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7915 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7921 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7922 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7923 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7924 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7926 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7927 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7929 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7930 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7931 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7932 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7933 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7934 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7935 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7936 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7940 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7941 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7942 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7943 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7945 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7946 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7947 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7948 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7949 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7950 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7951 // up bumped justice generation.
7952 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7955 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7956 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7960 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7961 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7962 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7965 // Provide preimage for one
7966 // Check aggregation
7968 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7969 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7970 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7971 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7973 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7974 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7975 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7977 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7978 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7979 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7980 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7981 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7983 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7984 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7985 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7986 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7987 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7989 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7993 let feerate_timeout;
7994 let feerate_preimage;
7996 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7997 // 9 transactions including:
7998 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
7999 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
8000 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
8002 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
8003 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8004 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
8005 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8006 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
8007 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
8008 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
8010 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
8011 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
8012 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
8013 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
8015 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
8016 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8017 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
8018 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].get_weight() as u64;
8020 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
8021 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8022 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8023 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
8027 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
8028 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
8030 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
8031 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
8033 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8034 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8035 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8036 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
8037 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
8038 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
8040 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
8041 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
8042 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.get_weight() as u64;
8043 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
8044 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
8046 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8047 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8048 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
8049 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
8050 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
8055 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8056 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8060 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
8061 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
8062 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
8063 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
8064 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
8065 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
8066 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
8067 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
8069 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8070 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8071 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8072 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8073 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
8075 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8076 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
8078 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
8080 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
8081 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8082 let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
8084 // Must revoke without gaps
8085 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8086 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
8088 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8089 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
8090 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
8092 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
8093 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
8094 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
8095 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8096 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
8100 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
8101 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
8102 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
8104 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8105 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8106 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8107 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8109 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8110 // Lock HTLC in both directions
8111 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8112 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8114 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
8115 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8116 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8118 // Revoke local commitment tx
8119 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8121 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
8122 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
8123 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
8124 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8126 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
8127 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8128 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8129 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8131 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8132 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
8133 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8134 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8135 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8136 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8140 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8141 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8142 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8144 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8145 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8146 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8151 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8152 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8153 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8154 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8155 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8156 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8157 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8159 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8161 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8162 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8163 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8164 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8165 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8167 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8168 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8170 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8172 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8173 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8174 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8175 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8176 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8178 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8179 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8180 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8182 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8187 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8188 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8189 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8190 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8191 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8193 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8194 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8195 override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8197 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8199 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8200 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8201 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8202 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8206 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8207 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8208 zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8209 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8210 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8211 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8212 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8214 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8215 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8216 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8218 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8219 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8220 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8224 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8225 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8226 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8227 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8228 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8229 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8231 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8232 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8233 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8234 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8236 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8237 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8238 route.paths.push(path);
8239 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8240 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8241 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8242 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8243 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8244 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8245 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8246 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8250 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8251 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8252 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8253 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8254 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8255 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8257 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8260 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
8261 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8262 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8263 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8264 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8265 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8266 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8267 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8269 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8270 // values from previous calls.
8271 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8272 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8273 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8275 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8277 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8278 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8280 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8283 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8288 #[allow(deprecated)]
8289 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8290 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8291 // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8292 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8293 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8294 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8295 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8297 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8299 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8301 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8302 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8303 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8304 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8305 } else { panic!(); }
8307 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8309 header: BlockHeader {
8311 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8312 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8313 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8317 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8318 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8319 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8320 } else { panic!(); }
8322 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8323 // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8324 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8325 block.header.time += 1;
8326 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8327 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8328 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8331 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8332 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8334 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8335 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8336 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8337 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8339 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8340 // values from previous calls.
8341 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8342 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8343 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8345 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8346 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8347 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8348 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8350 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8355 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8356 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8357 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8358 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8359 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8360 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8362 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8364 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8365 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8366 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8367 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8369 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8370 // resulting events.
8371 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8373 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8374 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8375 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8376 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8377 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8379 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8380 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8381 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8382 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8383 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8385 // We should fail the payment back
8386 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8387 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8388 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8389 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8390 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8392 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8397 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8398 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8399 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8401 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8402 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8403 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8404 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8406 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8407 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8408 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8409 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8411 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8412 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8413 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8414 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8418 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8419 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8420 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8421 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8423 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8424 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8425 // commitment at same time.
8427 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8428 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8429 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8430 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8432 // Create some initial channel
8433 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8434 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8436 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8437 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8439 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8440 let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8442 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8443 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8444 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8445 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8447 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8448 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8449 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8450 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8451 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8452 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8453 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8454 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8457 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8458 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8459 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8460 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8461 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8463 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8464 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8465 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8466 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8467 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8468 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8469 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8470 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8471 if let Err(_) = watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8472 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8473 } else { assert!(false); }
8474 } else { assert!(false); };
8475 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8476 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8477 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8478 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8482 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8483 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8484 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8485 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8486 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8488 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8489 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8490 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8491 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8493 // Create some initial channel
8494 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8495 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8497 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8498 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8500 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8501 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8503 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8504 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8505 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8506 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8507 let watchtower_alice = {
8508 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8509 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8510 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8511 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8512 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8513 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8514 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8515 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8518 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8519 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8520 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8521 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8522 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8524 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8526 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8527 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8531 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8532 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8533 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8534 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8535 let watchtower_bob = {
8536 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8537 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8538 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8539 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8540 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8541 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8542 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8543 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8546 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8547 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8549 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8550 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8552 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8554 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8556 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8557 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8558 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8559 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8560 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8561 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8562 if let Err(_) = watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8563 if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8564 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8565 } else { assert!(false); }
8566 } else { assert!(false); };
8567 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8568 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8570 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8571 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8572 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8574 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8577 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8578 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8579 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8583 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8584 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8585 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8587 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8588 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8589 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8590 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8591 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8592 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8597 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8598 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8599 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8602 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8603 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8605 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8606 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8607 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8608 // before receiving funding_signed.
8609 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8610 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8611 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8612 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8614 // Create an initial channel
8615 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8616 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8617 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8618 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8619 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8621 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8622 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8624 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8625 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8627 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8628 let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8629 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8630 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8631 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8635 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8636 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8637 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8638 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8639 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8640 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8641 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8643 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8644 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8645 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8646 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8648 // Create some initial channels
8649 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8651 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8652 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8653 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8654 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8655 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8656 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8658 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8659 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8660 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8661 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8662 // this test before #653 fix.
8663 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8664 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8665 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8666 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8667 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8669 let htlc_timeout = {
8670 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8671 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8672 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8673 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8677 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8678 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8679 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8680 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8683 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8684 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8685 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8686 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8688 // Steps of the test:
8689 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8690 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8691 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8692 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8693 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8694 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8695 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8696 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8697 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8698 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8699 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8700 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8702 // Create some initial channels
8703 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8704 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8706 // Steps (1) and (2):
8707 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8708 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8710 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8711 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8712 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8713 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8714 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8715 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8716 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8718 // Steps (3) and (4):
8719 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8720 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8721 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8722 if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
8723 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
8724 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8725 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8726 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8727 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8728 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8729 true => alice_txn.clone(),
8730 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8732 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8733 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8734 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8735 if broadcast_alice {
8736 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8737 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8738 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8740 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8741 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8745 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8746 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8747 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8748 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8749 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8750 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8751 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8752 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8753 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8754 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8756 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8757 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false);
8758 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8759 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8760 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8761 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8763 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8764 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8766 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8769 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8770 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8771 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8772 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8774 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8775 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8776 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8777 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8778 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8781 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8783 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8784 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8785 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8788 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8791 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8792 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8793 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8794 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8796 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8797 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8798 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8799 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8800 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8803 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8805 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8806 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8808 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8809 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8810 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8811 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8812 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8813 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8814 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8815 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8816 if broadcast_alice {
8817 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8818 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8819 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8821 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8822 if broadcast_alice {
8823 // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8824 // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8825 // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8826 // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8828 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8829 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8831 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8832 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8837 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8838 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8840 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8841 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8842 // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8843 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8845 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8846 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8847 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8849 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8850 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8851 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8852 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8853 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8854 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8855 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8857 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8858 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8864 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8865 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8866 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8867 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8868 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8872 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8873 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8874 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8876 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8877 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8878 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8879 // updating logic for the existing channel.
8880 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8881 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8882 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8883 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8885 // Create an initial channel
8886 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8887 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8888 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8889 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8891 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8892 // that it is rejected.
8893 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8895 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8896 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8898 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8899 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8900 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8901 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8902 // move forward with it.
8903 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8904 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8906 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8910 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8911 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8913 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8914 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8916 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8917 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8919 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8920 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8921 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8922 added_monitors.clear();
8924 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8926 let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8927 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8929 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8932 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8933 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8934 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8935 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8936 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8938 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8939 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8941 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8942 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8943 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8944 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8945 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8947 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8951 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8952 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8953 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8954 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8955 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8956 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8958 let funding_created = {
8959 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8960 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8961 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8962 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8964 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8965 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8966 // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8967 // still needs to be cleared here.
8968 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8970 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8972 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8973 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8975 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8976 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8977 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8978 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8979 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8981 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8985 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8986 // everything is functional.
8987 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8989 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8990 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8991 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8992 added_monitors.clear();
8995 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8996 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8997 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8998 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
9000 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9001 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9002 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9003 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9007 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9008 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9010 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9011 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9012 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9013 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9014 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9015 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9016 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9018 // Create some initial channels
9019 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9020 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9021 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9023 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9024 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9025 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9027 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9028 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9029 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9031 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9032 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9033 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9034 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9035 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9036 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9037 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9038 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9039 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9041 // A null channel ID should close all channels
9042 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9043 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9044 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9045 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9046 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9047 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9049 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9050 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9052 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9055 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9056 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9058 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9060 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9061 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
9062 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
9063 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
9064 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9065 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9067 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
9068 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9069 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9073 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9074 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9076 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9077 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9078 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9079 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9080 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9081 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9082 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9083 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9085 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9086 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9087 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9089 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42);
9090 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9091 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9092 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
9095 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9096 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9097 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9099 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9100 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9102 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9103 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9105 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9106 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9107 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9109 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9110 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9111 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9112 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9113 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9114 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9115 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9116 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9117 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9118 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9119 } else { panic!(); }
9120 } else { panic!(); }
9121 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9124 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9125 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9126 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9127 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9128 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9129 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9130 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9131 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9132 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9133 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9134 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9135 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9136 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9137 // until we learned about an additional block.
9139 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9140 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9141 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9142 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9143 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9144 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9145 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9147 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9148 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9149 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9150 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9151 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9153 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
9154 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9155 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9156 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9157 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9158 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9160 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9161 if !test_height_before_timelock {
9162 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9164 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9165 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9166 if test_height_before_timelock {
9167 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9168 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9169 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9170 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9172 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9173 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9174 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9175 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9176 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9177 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9179 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9180 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9182 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9183 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9184 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9185 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9186 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9187 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9190 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9191 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9192 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9193 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9194 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9195 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9196 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9197 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9198 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9203 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9204 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9205 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9209 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9210 // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9211 // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9213 // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9215 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9216 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9217 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9218 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9219 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9220 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9221 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9222 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9223 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9225 // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9226 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9227 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9228 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9230 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9231 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9232 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9233 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9234 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9236 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9238 // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9239 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9240 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9241 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9243 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9244 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9245 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9246 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9247 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9249 // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9251 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9253 // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9254 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9255 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9257 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9258 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9259 let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9260 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9261 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9263 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9264 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9265 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9266 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9268 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9269 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9270 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9271 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9272 let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9273 let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9274 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9275 assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9277 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9278 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9279 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9280 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9281 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9282 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9283 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9285 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9286 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9287 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9288 logger: nodes[1].logger,
9292 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9293 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9295 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9296 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9297 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9298 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9300 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9301 // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9302 // the commitment state.
9303 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9305 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9307 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9308 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9309 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9311 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9312 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9313 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9314 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9315 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9316 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9317 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9319 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9320 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9324 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9325 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9326 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9327 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9328 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9330 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9331 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9332 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9333 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9334 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9335 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9336 final_value_msat: 10000,
9337 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9339 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9340 let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
9342 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9343 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9344 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9345 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9346 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9347 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9348 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9349 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9350 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9354 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9355 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9356 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9357 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9358 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9360 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9361 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9362 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9363 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9365 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9366 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9367 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9368 final_value_msat: 10000,
9369 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9371 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9372 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9373 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9374 let route = find_route(
9375 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9376 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
9379 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9380 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9381 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9382 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9383 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9384 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9385 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9386 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9387 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9390 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9391 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9392 enum ExposureEvent {
9393 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9395 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9397 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9398 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9401 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9402 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9405 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9406 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9407 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9408 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9409 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9410 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9411 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9412 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9414 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9415 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9416 config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9417 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9418 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9419 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9421 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9422 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9423 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9424 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9426 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9428 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
9429 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9430 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
9432 let opt_anchors = false;
9434 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 1_000_000, 42);
9437 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9438 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9442 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9443 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9444 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9446 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9447 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9449 let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9450 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9451 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9453 let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9454 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9455 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9456 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9458 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9459 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9461 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9462 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9464 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9465 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9468 if dust_outbound_balance {
9469 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9470 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9471 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9472 for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9473 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9474 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9477 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9478 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9479 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9480 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9481 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9485 if dust_outbound_balance {
9486 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9487 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9488 for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9489 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9490 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9493 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9494 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9495 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9496 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9501 let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9502 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9503 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9504 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9505 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9507 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9508 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9509 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9511 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9513 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9514 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9515 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9516 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9517 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9518 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9519 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9520 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9521 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9523 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9524 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9525 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9526 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9528 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9529 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9531 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9532 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9533 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9535 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9536 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9538 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9539 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9540 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9543 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9544 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9545 added_monitors.clear();
9549 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9550 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9551 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9552 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9553 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9554 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9555 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9556 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9557 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9558 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9559 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9560 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9561 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);