_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
  11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
  12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
  13
  14 use crate::chain;
  15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
  16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
  17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
  18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
  19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
  20 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
  21 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
  22 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
  23 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, COINBASE_MATURITY, ChannelPhase};
  24 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
  25 use crate::ln::channel::{DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS, ChannelError};
  26 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
  27 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
  28 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
  29 use crate::routing::router::{Path, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, get_route, RouteParameters};
  30 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
  31 use crate::ln::msgs;
  32 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
  33 use crate::util::test_channel_signer::TestChannelSigner;
  34 use crate::util::test_utils::{self, WatchtowerPersister};
  35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
  36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
  37 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
  38 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
  39
  40 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
  41 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
  42 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, ScriptBuf};
  43 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  44 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
  45 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
  46 use bitcoin::{Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
  47 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
  48
  49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
  50 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  51
  52 use regex;
  53
  54 use crate::io;
  55 use crate::prelude::*;
  56 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
  57 use core::default::Default;
  58 use core::iter::repeat;
  59 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  60 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
  61
  62 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
  63 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
  64
  65 use super::channel::UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS;
  66
  67 #[test]
  68 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
  69         // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
  70         use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
  71         let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
  72         cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
  73         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
  74         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
  75         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
  76         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
  77
  78         // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
  79         // funding satoshis
  80         let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
  81         let channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
  82         let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
  83
  84         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
  85         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
  86
  87         // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
  88         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
  89
  90         // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
  91         // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
  92         let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
  93                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
  94                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
  95                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
  96                 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
  97                 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
  98                         match action {
  99                                 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
 100                                         nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager", expected_regex, 1);
 101                                 },
 102                                 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
 103                         }
 104                 } else { assert!(false); }
 105         };
 106
 107         use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
 108
 109         // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
 110         insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
 111         insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
 112
 113         insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
 114
 115         insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
 116
 117         insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
 118
 119         insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
 120
 121         insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
 122
 123         insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
 124
 125         insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
 126 }
 127
 128 #[test]
 129 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
 130         // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
 131         // them.
 132         use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
 133         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 134         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 135         *node_cfgs[1].override_init_features.borrow_mut() = Some(channelmanager::provided_init_features(&test_default_channel_config()).clear_wumbo());
 136         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 137         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 138
 139         match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None, None) {
 140                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
 141                         assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
 142                 },
 143                 _ => panic!()
 144         }
 145 }
 146
 147 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
 148         // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
 149         // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
 150         // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
 151         // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
 152         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 153         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 154         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 155         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 156         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 157
 158         // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
 159         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
 160         let feerate_per_kw = 253;
 161         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
 162         push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
 163         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
 164
 165         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None, None).unwrap();
 166         let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 167         if !send_from_initiator {
 168                 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 169                 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 170         }
 171         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
 172
 173         // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
 174         let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 175         if send_from_initiator {
 176                 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 177                 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 178         }
 179         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
 180         {
 181                 let sender_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] };
 182                 let counterparty_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
 183                 let mut sender_node_per_peer_lock;
 184                 let mut sender_node_peer_state_lock;
 185
 186                 let channel_phase = get_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
 187                 match channel_phase {
 188                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
 189                                 let chan_context = channel_phase.context_mut();
 190                                 chan_context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
 191                                 chan_context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
 192                         },
 193                         ChannelPhase::Funded(_) => assert!(false),
 194                 }
 195         }
 196
 197         let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
 198         let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
 199         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
 200
 201         // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
 202         // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
 203         if send_from_initiator {
 204                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
 205                         // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
 206                         // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
 207                         // well as an additional HTLC.
 208                         - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, &channel_type_features));
 209         } else {
 210                 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
 211         }
 212 }
 213
 214 #[test]
 215 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
 216         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
 217         do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
 218 }
 219
 220 #[test]
 221 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
 222         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 223         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 224         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 225         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 226         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 227
 228         // balancing
 229         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 230
 231         // A                                        B
 232         // update_fee                            ->
 233         // send (1) commitment_signed            -.
 234         //                                       <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
 235         // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
 236         // (1) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 237         //                                       .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
 238         // (2) RAA is delivered                  ->
 239         //                                       .- send (4) commitment_signed
 240         //                                       <- (3) RAA is delivered
 241         // send (5) commitment_signed            -.
 242         //                                       <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
 243         // send (6) RAA                          -.
 244         // (5) commitment_signed is delivered    ->
 245         //                                       <- RAA
 246         // (6) RAA is delivered                  ->
 247
 248         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 249         {
 250                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 251                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 252         }
 253         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 254         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 255
 256         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 257         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 258         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 259                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 260                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 261                 },
 262                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 263         };
 264
 265         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 266
 267         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 268         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 269         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 270                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 271         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 272
 273         let payment_event = {
 274                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 275                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 276                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 277         };
 278         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 279         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 280
 281         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 282         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 283         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 284         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 285         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 286         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 287
 288         // deliver(1), generate (3):
 289         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 290         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 291         // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 292         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 293
 294         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
 295         let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 296         assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 297         assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 298         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 299         assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
 300         assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
 301         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 302
 303         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
 304         let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 305         assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 306         assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 307         assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 308         assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
 309         assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
 310         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 311
 312         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
 313         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 314         // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 315         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 316
 317         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
 318         let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 319         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 320
 321         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 322         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 323
 324         let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 325         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
 326         match events_2[0] {
 327                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
 328                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 329         }
 330
 331         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
 332         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 333 }
 334
 335 #[test]
 336 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
 337         // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
 338         // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
 339         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 340         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 341         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 342         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 343         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 344
 345         // balancing
 346         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 347
 348         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 349         {
 350                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 351                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 352         }
 353         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 354         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 355
 356         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 357         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 358         let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 359                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
 360                         update_fee.as_ref()
 361                 },
 362                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 363         };
 364
 365         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 366
 367         // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
 368         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
 369         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 370                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 371         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 372
 373         let payment_event = {
 374                 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 375                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
 376                 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
 377         };
 378         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 379         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
 380
 381         // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
 382         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
 383         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
 384         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 385         // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 386         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 387
 388         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
 389         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 390
 391         // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
 392 }
 393
 394 #[test]
 395 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
 396         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 397         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 398         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 399         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 400         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 401
 402         // A                                        B
 403         // update_fee/commitment_signed          ->
 404         //                                       .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
 405         // update_fee (never committed)          ->
 406         // (3) update_fee                        ->
 407         // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
 408         // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
 409         // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
 410         //                                       <- (1) RAA delivered
 411         // (3) is generated and send (4) CS      -.
 412         // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
 413         // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
 414         //                                       <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
 415         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 416         //                                          B should send no response here
 417         // (4) commitment_signed delivered       ->
 418         //                                       <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
 419         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 420
 421         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
 422         let initial_feerate;
 423         {
 424                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 425                 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
 426                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
 427         }
 428         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 429         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 430
 431         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 432         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 433         let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
 434                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
 435                         (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
 436                 },
 437                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 438         };
 439
 440         // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
 441         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
 442         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
 443         let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 444         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 445
 446         // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
 447         // transaction:
 448         {
 449                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 450                 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
 451         }
 452         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 453         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 454         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 455
 456         // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
 457         let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
 458                 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
 459                 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
 460         };
 461
 462         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 463
 464         update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
 465         // Deliver (3)
 466         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
 467
 468         // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
 469         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
 470         let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 471         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 472         assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 473         assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 474         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 475         assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 476         // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
 477         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
 478         assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
 479
 480         // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
 481         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
 482         let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 483         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 484         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 485
 486         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
 487         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 488         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 489
 490         // Delever (4)
 491         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
 492         let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 493         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 494
 495         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
 496         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 497         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 498
 499         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
 500         let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 501         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 502         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 503
 504         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
 505         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 506         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 507 }
 508
 509 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
 510         // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
 511         // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
 512         // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
 513         // Node objects.
 514
 515         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 516         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 517         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 518         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 519
 520         if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
 521                 let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
 522                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
 523                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
 524         }
 525
 526         if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
 527         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
 528         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 529
 530         if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
 531         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
 532         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 533
 534         if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
 535         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
 536
 537         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
 538
 539         if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
 540         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
 541         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 542         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 543
 544         if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
 545         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
 546         {
 547                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 548                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 549                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 550                 added_monitors.clear();
 551         }
 552         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 553
 554         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 555
 556         if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
 557         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
 558         {
 559                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 560                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
 561                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
 562                 added_monitors.clear();
 563         }
 564
 565         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 566         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 567         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
 568
 569         if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
 570         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
 571
 572         if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
 573         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
 574         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
 575         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
 576         expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 577 }
 578
 579 #[test]
 580 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
 581         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
 582         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
 583         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
 584         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
 585         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
 586         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
 587         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
 588         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
 589         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
 590         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
 591         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
 592         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
 593         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
 594         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
 595         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
 596         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
 597         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
 598         do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
 599 }
 600
 601 #[test]
 602 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
 603         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 604         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 605         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 606         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 607         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 608
 609         {
 610                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 611                 *feerate_lock += 25;
 612         }
 613         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 614         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 615
 616         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 617         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 618         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 619                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 620                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 621                 },
 622                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 623         };
 624         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 625
 626         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 627         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 628         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 629
 630         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 631         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 632         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 633
 634         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 635         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 636         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 637         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 638
 639         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 640         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 641         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 642 }
 643
 644 #[test]
 645 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
 646         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 647         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 648         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 649         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 650         let channel_value = 5000;
 651         let push_sats = 700;
 652         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000);
 653         let channel_id = chan.2;
 654         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 655         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
 656         let bs_channel_reserve_sats = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
 657
 658         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
 659
 660         // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
 661         // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
 662         // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
 663         // remote limit.
 664         let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
 665         let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features)) as u32;
 666         {
 667                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 668                 *feerate_lock = feerate;
 669         }
 670         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 671         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 672         let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 673
 674         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
 675
 676         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
 677
 678         // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
 679         {
 680                 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
 681
 682                 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
 683                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
 684                 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000;
 685                 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
 686                 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
 687                 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
 688         }
 689
 690         {
 691                 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
 692                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 693                 *feerate_lock += 4;
 694         }
 695         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 696         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
 697         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
 698
 699         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
 700
 701         // Get the TestChannelSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
 702         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
 703         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
 704                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 705                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 706                 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
 707                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
 708                 ).flatten().unwrap();
 709                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 710                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
 711                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 712                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 713         };
 714         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
 715                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 716                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 717                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
 718                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
 719                 ).flatten().unwrap();
 720                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
 721                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
 722                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
 723                  chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
 724                  pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
 725         };
 726
 727         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
 728         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
 729                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
 730
 731         let res = {
 732                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
 733                 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
 734                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
 735                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
 736                 ).flatten().unwrap();
 737                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
 738                 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
 739                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
 740                         INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
 741                         push_sats,
 742                         channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000,
 743                         local_funding, remote_funding,
 744                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
 745                         non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 746                         &mut htlcs,
 747                         &local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
 748                 );
 749                 local_chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
 750         };
 751
 752         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
 753                 channel_id: chan.2,
 754                 signature: res.0,
 755                 htlc_signatures: res.1,
 756                 #[cfg(taproot)]
 757                 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
 758         };
 759
 760         let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
 761                 channel_id: chan.2,
 762                 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
 763         };
 764
 765         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
 766
 767         //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
 768         //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
 769         //Should produce and error.
 770         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
 771         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
 772         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 773         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
 774         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") },
 775                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], channel_value);
 776 }
 777
 778 #[test]
 779 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
 780         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 781         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 782         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 783         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 784         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 785
 786         // balancing
 787         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
 788
 789         {
 790                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 791                 *feerate_lock += 20;
 792         }
 793         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 794         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 795
 796         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 797         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 798         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 799                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 800                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 801                 },
 802                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 803         };
 804         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 805         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 806         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 807         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 808
 809         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
 810
 811         // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
 812         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
 813                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
 814         {
 815                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
 816                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
 817                 added_monitors.clear();
 818         }
 819         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
 820         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 821         // node[1] has nothing to do
 822
 823         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 824         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 825         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 826
 827         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 828         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 829         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 830         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 831         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 832         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 833         // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
 834
 835         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 836         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
 837         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
 838         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
 839         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
 840         assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
 841
 842         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
 843         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 844         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 845         let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 846
 847         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 848         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 849         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 850
 851         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
 852         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 853         let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 854         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 855
 856         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
 857         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 858         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 859
 860         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
 861
 862         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
 863         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
 864         match events[0] {
 865                 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => { },
 866                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 867         };
 868
 869         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
 870
 871         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
 872         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
 873         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 874         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
 875         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
 876 }
 877
 878 #[test]
 879 fn test_update_fee() {
 880         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
 881         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
 882         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
 883         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
 884         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
 885         let channel_id = chan.2;
 886
 887         // A                                        B
 888         // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 889         //                                       <- (2) revoke_and_ack
 890         //                                       .- send (3) commitment_signed
 891         // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed      ->
 892         //                                       .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
 893         //                                       <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
 894         // send (6) revoke_and_ack               -.
 895         //                                       <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
 896         // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack            ->
 897         //                                       .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
 898         //                                       <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
 899         // revoke_and_ack                        ->
 900
 901         // Create and deliver (1)...
 902         let feerate;
 903         {
 904                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 905                 feerate = *feerate_lock;
 906                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
 907         }
 908         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 909         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 910
 911         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 912         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 913         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 914                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 915                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 916                 },
 917                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 918         };
 919         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 920
 921         // Generate (2) and (3):
 922         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 923         let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 924         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 925
 926         // Deliver (2):
 927         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 928         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 929         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 930
 931         // Create and deliver (4)...
 932         {
 933                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
 934                 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
 935         }
 936         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
 937         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 938         let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
 939         assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
 940         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
 941                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
 942                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
 943                 },
 944                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
 945         };
 946
 947         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
 948         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
 949         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 950         // ... creating (5)
 951         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 952         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 953
 954         // Handle (3), creating (6):
 955         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
 956         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 957         let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 958         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 959
 960         // Deliver (5):
 961         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 962         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 963         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 964
 965         // Deliver (6), creating (7):
 966         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
 967         let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
 968         assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
 969         assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
 970         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
 971         assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
 972         assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
 973         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 974
 975         // Deliver (7)
 976         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
 977         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
 978         let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
 979         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
 980
 981         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
 982         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
 983         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
 984
 985         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 986         assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
 987         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
 988         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
 989         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
 990 }
 991
 992 #[test]
 993 fn fake_network_test() {
 994         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
 995         // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
 996         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
 997         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
 998         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
 999         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1000
1001         // Create some initial channels
1002         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1003         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1004         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1005
1006         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
1007         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1008         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1009         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1010         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1011
1012         // Send some more payments
1013         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1014         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
1015         send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
1016
1017         // Test failure packets
1018         let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
1019         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
1020
1021         // Add a new channel that skips 3
1022         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1023
1024         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1025         send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1026         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1027         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1028         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1029         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1030         send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1031
1032         // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1033         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1034         hops.push(RouteHop {
1035                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1036                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1037                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1038                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1039                 fee_msat: 0,
1040                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1041                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1042         });
1043         hops.push(RouteHop {
1044                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1045                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1046                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1047                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1048                 fee_msat: 0,
1049                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1050                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1051         });
1052         hops.push(RouteHop {
1053                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1054                 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1055                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1056                 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1057                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1058                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1059                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1060         });
1061         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1062         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1063         let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1],
1064                 Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], route_params: None },
1065                         &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1066
1067         let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1068         hops.push(RouteHop {
1069                 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1070                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1071                 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1072                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1073                 fee_msat: 0,
1074                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1075                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1076         });
1077         hops.push(RouteHop {
1078                 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1079                 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1080                 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1081                 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1082                 fee_msat: 0,
1083                 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32,
1084                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1085         });
1086         hops.push(RouteHop {
1087                 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1088                 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1089                 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1090                 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1091                 fee_msat: 1000000,
1092                 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1093                 maybe_announced_channel: true,
1094         });
1095         hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1096         hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1097         let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1],
1098                 Route { paths: vec![Path { hops, blinded_tail: None }], route_params: None },
1099                         &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1100
1101         // Claim the rebalances...
1102         fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1103         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1104
1105         // Close down the channels...
1106         close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1107         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1108         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1109         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1110         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1111         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1112         close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1113         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1114         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1115         close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1116         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1117         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1118 }
1119
1120 #[test]
1121 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1122         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1123         // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1124         // commitment dance rounds.
1125         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1126         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1127         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1128         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1129         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1130         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1131
1132         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
1133         let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1134
1135         let mut payments = Vec::new();
1136         for _ in 0..50 {
1137                 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1138                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
1139                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1140                 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1141         }
1142         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1143
1144         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1145         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1146         let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1147         assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1148
1149         // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1150         // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1151         // another HTLC.
1152         {
1153                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
1154                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)
1155                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1156                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1157         }
1158
1159         // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1160         let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1161         {
1162                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
1163                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1164                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1165         }
1166
1167         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1168         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1169         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1170         assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1171
1172         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1173         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1174         // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1175         // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1176         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1177         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1178         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1179
1180         let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1181         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1182         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1183
1184         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1185
1186         // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1187         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1188         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1189         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1190
1191         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1192         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1193         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1194         let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1195
1196         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1197         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1198         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1199
1200         for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1201                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1202         }
1203         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1204         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1205         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1206         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1207         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1208
1209         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1210         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1211         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1212         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1213         let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1214
1215         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1216         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1217
1218         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1219
1220         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1221         assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1222         for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1223                 match event {
1224                         &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1225                                 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1226                         },
1227                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1228                 };
1229         }
1230
1231         for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1232                 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1233         }
1234
1235         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1236 }
1237
1238 #[test]
1239 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1240         // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1241         // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1242         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1243         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1244         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1245         let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1246
1247         // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1248         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
1249         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1250         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1251         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
1252         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
1253
1254         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1255
1256         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1257         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1258
1259         *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1260         assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1261
1262         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1263         fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1264         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1265 }
1266
1267 #[test]
1268 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1269         // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1270         // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1271         // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1272         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1273         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1274         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1275         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1276
1277         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1278
1279         // balancing
1280         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1281
1282         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1283
1284         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1285         let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
1286         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1287
1288         // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1289         nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1290         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1291         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1292
1293         // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1294         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1295
1296         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1297         let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1298         for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1299                 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1300                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1301                 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1302                         has_both_htlcs += 1;
1303                 }
1304         }
1305         assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1306
1307         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1308         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1309         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1310         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1311
1312         let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1313         assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 3);
1314
1315         check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1316         check_spends!(claim_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
1317         check_spends!(claim_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
1318         let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1319         let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1320                 (&claim_txn[1], &claim_txn[2])
1321         } else {
1322                 (&claim_txn[2], &claim_txn[1])
1323         };
1324
1325         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1326         assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1327
1328         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1329         assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1330         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1331
1332         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1333         assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1334         check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1335         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1336
1337         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1338         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1339         for e in events {
1340                 match e {
1341                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1342                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { ref msg } } => {
1343                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1344                                 assert_eq!(msg.as_ref().unwrap().data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1345                         },
1346                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1347                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1348                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1349                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1350                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1351                                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1352                         },
1353                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1354                 }
1355         }
1356 }
1357
1358 #[test]
1359 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1360         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1361         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1362         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1363         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1364         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1365
1366         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1367         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1368
1369         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1370         let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2), 1 + 1, &get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2));
1371         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1372         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1373                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
1374         route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1375         let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1376                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1377         match err {
1378                 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
1379                         if let &APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. } = &fails[0] {}
1380                         else { panic!("Unexpected error variant"); }
1381                 },
1382                 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1383         }
1384         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1385
1386         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1387 }
1388
1389 #[test]
1390 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1391         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1392         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1393         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1394         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1395         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1396
1397         let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
1398                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460000);
1399         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
1400         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1401         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1402         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1403
1404         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1405
1406         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1407         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1408                 3460001, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1409         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1410         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1411                 channel_id: chan.2,
1412                 htlc_id: 0,
1413                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1414                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1415                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1416                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1417                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1418         };
1419
1420         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1421
1422         // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1423         // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1424         // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1425
1426         let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1427
1428         const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1429
1430         // Get the TestChannelSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1431         // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1432         let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1433                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1434                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1435                 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
1436                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
1437                 ).flatten().unwrap();
1438                 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1439                 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1440                 chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1441
1442                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
1443                 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1444                  chan_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1445                  chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1446                  chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1447         };
1448         let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1449                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1450                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1451                 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
1452                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
1453                 ).flatten().unwrap();
1454                 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1455                 let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
1456                 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1457                  chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1458                  chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1459         };
1460
1461         // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1462         let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1463                 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
1464
1465         // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1466         // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1467         let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1468
1469         let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1470                 offered: false,
1471                 amount_msat: 3460001,
1472                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1473                 payment_hash,
1474                 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1475         };
1476
1477         let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1478
1479         let res = {
1480                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1481                 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1482                 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
1483                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
1484                 ).flatten().unwrap();
1485                 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1486                 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1487                         commitment_number,
1488                         95000,
1489                         local_chan_balance,
1490                         local_funding, remote_funding,
1491                         commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1492                         feerate_per_kw,
1493                         &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1494                         &local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1495                 );
1496                 local_chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1497         };
1498
1499         let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1500                 channel_id: chan.2,
1501                 signature: res.0,
1502                 htlc_signatures: res.1,
1503                 #[cfg(taproot)]
1504                 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
1505         };
1506
1507         // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1508         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1509         let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1510
1511         // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1512         let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1513                 channel_id: chan.2,
1514                 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1515                 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point,
1516                 #[cfg(taproot)]
1517                 next_local_nonce: None,
1518         };
1519         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1520
1521         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1522         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1523         // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1524         match events[0] {
1525                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1526                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1527                         update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1528                 },
1529                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1530         };
1531         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1532                 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", raa_msg.channel_id), 1);
1533
1534         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1535 }
1536
1537 #[test]
1538 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1539         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1540         // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1541         // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1542         // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1543         // this situation.
1544         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1545         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1546         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1547         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1548         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1549         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1550
1551         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1552         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1553
1554         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1555
1556         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1557
1558         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
1559         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1560         // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1561         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1562                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1563         }
1564
1565         // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1566         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1567                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1568                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1569         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1570 }
1571
1572 #[test]
1573 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1574         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1575         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1576         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1577         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1578         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1579         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1580         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1581
1582         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1583         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1584         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1585         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1586         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1587         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1588         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1589
1590         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1591         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1592                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1593         }
1594
1595         let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
1596                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1000);
1597         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 700_000;
1598         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1599         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1600         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1601         let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1602         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1603         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0],
1604                 700_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1605         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
1606         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1607                 channel_id: chan.2,
1608                 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1609                 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1610                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1611                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1612                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1613                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1614         };
1615
1616         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1617         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1618         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1619         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1620         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1621         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1622         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1623         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() },
1624                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1625 }
1626
1627 #[test]
1628 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1629         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1630         // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1631         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1632         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1633
1634         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1635         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1636         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1637         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1638         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1639
1640         // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1641         // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1642         // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1643         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1644         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1645         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1646         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt);
1647
1648         let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1649                 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1650         // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1651         // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1652         // commitment transaction fee.
1653         route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1654
1655         // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1656         for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1657                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1658         }
1659
1660         // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1661         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1662                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt);
1663         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat += 1;
1664         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1665                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1666                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1667 }
1668
1669 #[test]
1670 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1671         // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1672         // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1673         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1674         let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1675         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1676         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1677         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1678         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1679         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1680
1681         // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1682         // HTLC.
1683         let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1684         push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, &channel_type_features);
1685         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None, None).unwrap_err(),
1686                 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1687
1688         // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1689         // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1690         push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1691         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None, None).unwrap();
1692         let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1693         open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1694         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
1695
1696         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1697         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1698         match msg_events[0] {
1699                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1700                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1701                 },
1702                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1703         }
1704 }
1705
1706 #[test]
1707 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1708         // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1709         // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1710         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1711         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1712         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1713         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1714         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000);
1715
1716         let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1717         // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1718         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1719         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1720         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1721         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1722
1723         // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1724         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1725         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1726         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1727         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1728         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1729
1730         // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1731         // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1732         // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1733         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1734 }
1735
1736 #[test]
1737 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1738         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1739         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1740         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1741         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1742         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1743         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
1744
1745         let feemsat = 239;
1746         let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1747         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1748         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1749         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1750
1751         // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1752         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1753         let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1754         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1755
1756         // Add a pending HTLC.
1757         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1758         let payment_event_1 = {
1759                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1760                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1761                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1762
1763                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1764                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1765                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1766         };
1767         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1768
1769         // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1770         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, &channel_type_features);
1771         let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1772         let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1773         let mut route_2 = route_1.clone();
1774         route_2.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = amt_msat_2;
1775
1776         // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1777         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1778         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1779         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1780         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1781         let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
1782                 &route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1783         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1).unwrap();
1784         let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1785                 channel_id: chan.2,
1786                 htlc_id: 1,
1787                 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1788                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1789                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1790                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1791                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
1792         };
1793
1794         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1795         // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1796         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1797         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1798         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1799         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1800         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1801         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() },
1802                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
1803 }
1804
1805 #[test]
1806 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1807         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1808         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1809         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1810         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1811         let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1812         let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1813         let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1814         let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1815         assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1816         assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1817
1818         let reserve = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1819         assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1820         assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1821
1822         assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1823         assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1824 }
1825
1826 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
1827         (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1828 }
1829
1830 #[test]
1831 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1832         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1833         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1834         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1835         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1836         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1837         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1838         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1839         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1840         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001);
1841         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001);
1842
1843         let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1844         let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1845
1846         let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1847         let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1848
1849         macro_rules! expect_forward {
1850                 ($node: expr) => {{
1851                         let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1852                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1853                         check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1854                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1855                         payment_event
1856                 }}
1857         }
1858
1859         let feemsat = 239; // set above
1860         let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1861         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1862         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1863
1864         let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1865
1866         // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1867         {
1868                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1869                         .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1870                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0);
1871                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1872                 assert!(route.paths[0].hops.iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1873
1874                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1875                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1876                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1877                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1878         }
1879
1880         // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1881         // nodes[0]'s wealth
1882         loop {
1883                 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1884                 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1885                 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1886                 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1887                 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1888                 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1889                 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1890                         break;
1891                 }
1892
1893                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1894                         .with_bolt11_features(nodes[2].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap().with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1895                 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0).unwrap();
1896                 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1897                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1898
1899                 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1900                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1901                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1902                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1903                         get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1904                 );
1905
1906                 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1907                 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1908                 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1909                 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1910                 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1911         }
1912
1913         // adding pending output.
1914         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1915         // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1916         // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1917         // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1918         // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1919         // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1920         // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1921         // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1922         // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1923         // policy.
1924         let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1925         let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1926         let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1927
1928         let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1929         let payment_event_1 = {
1930                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1,
1931                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1932                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1933
1934                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1935                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1936                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1937         };
1938         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1939
1940         // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1941         let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1942         {
1943                 let mut route = route_1.clone();
1944                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = recv_value_2 + 1;
1945                 let (_, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[2]);
1946                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1947                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1948                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1949                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1950         }
1951
1952         // split the rest to test holding cell
1953         let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, &channel_type_features);
1954         let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1955         let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1956         let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1957         {
1958                 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1959                 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1960         }
1961
1962         // now see if they go through on both sides
1963         let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1964         // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1965         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21,
1966                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
1967         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1968         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1969         assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1970
1971         // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1972         {
1973                 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
1974                         get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1975                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1976                 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
1977                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
1978                         ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
1979                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1980         }
1981
1982         let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1983         // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1984         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22,
1985                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
1986         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1987         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1988         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1989
1990         // flush the pending htlc
1991         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1992         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1993         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1994
1995         // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1996         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1997         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1998         let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1999
2000         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
2001         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2002         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
2003         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2004
2005         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
2006         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2007         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2008
2009         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2010
2011         let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
2012         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
2013         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
2014
2015         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2016         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
2017
2018         // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
2019         assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
2020         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
2021         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
2022         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
2023         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2024
2025         let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
2026         assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
2027         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
2028         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
2029
2030         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
2031         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2032
2033         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2034         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2035         match events[0] {
2036                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2037                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
2038                         assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
2039                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2040                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2041                         match &purpose {
2042                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2043                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2044                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
2045                                 },
2046                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2047                         }
2048                 },
2049                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2050         }
2051         match events[1] {
2052                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
2053                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
2054                         assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
2055                         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
2056                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2057                         match &purpose {
2058                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
2059                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
2060                                         assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
2061                                 },
2062                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
2063                         }
2064                 },
2065                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2066         }
2067
2068         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
2069         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
2070         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2071
2072         let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, &channel_type_features);
2073         let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2074         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2075
2076         let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
2077         let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2078         let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2079         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2080         assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2081
2082         let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
2083         assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2084 }
2085
2086 #[test]
2087 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2088         // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2089         // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2090         // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2091         // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2092         // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2093         // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2094         // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2095         // To test this we:
2096         //  * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2097         //    you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2098         //    you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2099         //  * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2100         //  * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2101         //    the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2102         //  * deliver the first fulfill from B
2103         //  * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2104         //    claim,
2105         //  * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2106         //    This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2107         //    removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2108         //  * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2109         //    of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2110         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2111         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2112         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2113         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2114         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2115
2116         let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2117         // Route the first two HTLCs.
2118         let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2119         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2120         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2121
2122         // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2123         let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2124         let send_1 = {
2125                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_3,
2126                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2127                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2128                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2129                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2130                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2131         };
2132
2133         // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2134         // initial fulfill/CS.
2135         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2136         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2137         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2138         let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2139
2140         // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2141         // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2142         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2143         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2144         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2145         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2146
2147         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2148         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2149         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2150         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2151         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_1, None, false, false);
2152
2153         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2154         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2155         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2156         // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2157         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2158
2159         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2160         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2161         let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2162
2163         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2164         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2165         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2166
2167         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2168         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2169         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2170
2171         // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2172         // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2173         // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2174         // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2175         // on-chain as necessary).
2176         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2177         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2178         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2179         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2180         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage_2, None, false, false);
2181
2182         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2183         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2184         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2185
2186         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2187         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2188
2189         // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2190         // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2191         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2192         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2193         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2194         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2195
2196         // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2197         // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2198         let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2199         let send_2 = {
2200                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_4,
2201                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2202                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2203                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2204                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2205                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2206         };
2207
2208         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2209         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2210         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2211         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2212
2213         // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2214
2215         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2216         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2217         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2218
2219         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2220         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2221
2222         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2223         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2224         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2225         let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2226
2227         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2228         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2229         let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2230
2231         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2232         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2233
2234         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2235         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2236
2237         claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2238         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2239 }
2240
2241 #[test]
2242 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2243         // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2244         // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2245         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2246         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2247         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2248         let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2249
2250         // Create some initial channels
2251         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2252         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2253         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2254         let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
2255
2256         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2257         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2258         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2259         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2260         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2261         connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2262
2263         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2264         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2265         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2266         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2267         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2268
2269         // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2270         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2271         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2272         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2273         {
2274                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2275                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2276                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2277                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2278                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2279         }
2280         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2281         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2282         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2283         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2284         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2285
2286         // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2287         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2288
2289         // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2290         // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2291         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2292         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2293         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2294         {
2295                 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2296                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2297                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2298                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2299                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2300                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2301         }
2302         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2303         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2304         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2305         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2306         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2307
2308         macro_rules! claim_funds {
2309                 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2310                         {
2311                                 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2312                                 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2313                                 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2314
2315                                 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2316                                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2317                                 match events[0] {
2318                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2319                                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2320                                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2321                                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2322                                         },
2323                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2324                                 };
2325                         }
2326                 }
2327         }
2328
2329         // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2330         // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2331         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2332         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2333         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2334         let node2_commitment_txid;
2335         {
2336                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2337                 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2338                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2339                 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2340
2341                 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2342                 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2343                 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2344                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2345                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2346         }
2347         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2348         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2349         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2350         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2351         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2352
2353         // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2354         // confusing us in the following tests.
2355         let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2356
2357         // One pending HTLC to time out:
2358         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2359         // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2360         // buffer space).
2361
2362         let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2363                 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2364                 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2365                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2366                 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2367                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2368                                 msg.clone()
2369                         },
2370                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2371                 };
2372                 match events[1] {
2373                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id } => {
2374                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2375                         },
2376                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2377                 }
2378                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2379
2380                 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2381                 {
2382                         let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2383                         node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2384                                 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2385                                         false
2386                                 } else { true }
2387                         });
2388                 }
2389
2390                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2391
2392                 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2393                 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2394
2395                 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2396                 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2397                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2398                 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2399                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2400                                 msg.clone()
2401                         },
2402                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2403                 };
2404                 match events[1] {
2405                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id } => {
2406                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2407                         },
2408                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2409                 }
2410                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2411                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2412                 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2413
2414                 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2415                 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2416                 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2417         };
2418         nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2419         nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2420         assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2421         assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2422
2423         assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2424                 Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
2425         check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2426 }
2427
2428 #[test]
2429 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_timeout() {
2430         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Timeout tx, against both sides
2431         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2432         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2433         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2434         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2435         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2436         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2437         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2438         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2439         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2440         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2441         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2442         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2443         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2444         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2445         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2446         // Create some new channels:
2447         let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2448
2449         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2450         let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2451         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2452         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2453         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2454         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2455         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2456         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2457         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2458         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2459         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2460         // Revoke the old state
2461         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2462
2463         {
2464                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2465                 {
2466                         let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2467                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2468                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2469                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2470                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2471                 }
2472                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2473                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2474                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2475
2476                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2477                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2478                 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2479                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2480                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2481                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2482                 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2483                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2484                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2485         }
2486         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2487         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2488         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2489 }
2490
2491 #[test]
2492 fn test_justice_tx_htlc_success() {
2493         // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2494         let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2495         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2496         alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2497         alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2498         let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2499         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2500         bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2501         bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2502         let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2503         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2504         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2505         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2506         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2507         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2508         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2509         // Create some new channels:
2510         let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2511
2512         // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2513         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2514         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2515         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2516         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2517         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2518         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2519         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2520         // Revoke the old state
2521         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2522         {
2523                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2524                 {
2525                         let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2526                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2527                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2528
2529                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2530                         node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2531                 }
2532                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2533                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2534
2535                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2536                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2537                 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2538                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2539                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2540                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2541                 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2542         }
2543         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2544         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2545         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2546 }
2547
2548 #[test]
2549 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2550         // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2551         // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2552         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2553         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2554         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2555         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2556         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2557         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2558         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2559         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2560         // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2561         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2562         // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2563         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2564
2565         // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2566         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2567         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2568         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2569         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2570         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output
2571
2572         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2573
2574         // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2575         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2576         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2577         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2578         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2579 }
2580
2581 #[test]
2582 fn test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates() {
2583         do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(true);
2584         do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(false);
2585 }
2586
2587 fn do_test_forming_justice_tx_from_monitor_updates(broadcast_initial_commitment: bool) {
2588         // Simple test to make sure that the justice tx formed in WatchtowerPersister
2589         // is properly formed and can be broadcasted/confirmed successfully in the event
2590         // that a revoked commitment transaction is broadcasted
2591         // (Similar to `revoked_output_claim` test but we get the justice tx + broadcast manually)
2592         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2593         let destination_script0 = chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.get_destination_script().unwrap();
2594         let destination_script1 = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_destination_script().unwrap();
2595         let persisters = vec![WatchtowerPersister::new(destination_script0),
2596                 WatchtowerPersister::new(destination_script1)];
2597         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs_with_persisters(2, &chanmon_cfgs, persisters.iter().collect());
2598         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2599         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2600         let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2601         let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 };
2602
2603         if !broadcast_initial_commitment {
2604                 // Send a payment to move the channel forward
2605                 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5_000_000);
2606         }
2607
2608         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output.
2609         // We'll keep this commitment transaction to broadcast once it's revoked.
2610         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], channel_id);
2611         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2612         let revoked_commitment_tx = &revoked_local_txn[0];
2613
2614         // Send another payment, now revoking the previous commitment tx
2615         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5_000_000);
2616
2617         let justice_tx = persisters[1].justice_tx(funding_txo, &revoked_commitment_tx.txid()).unwrap();
2618         check_spends!(justice_tx, revoked_commitment_tx);
2619
2620         mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[revoked_commitment_tx, &justice_tx]);
2621         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[revoked_commitment_tx, &justice_tx]);
2622
2623         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2624         check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2625                 &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100_000);
2626         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 1, 0);
2627
2628         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2629         check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false,
2630                 &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100_000);
2631
2632         // Check that the justice tx has sent the revoked output value to nodes[1]
2633         let monitor = get_monitor!(nodes[1], channel_id);
2634         let total_claimable_balance = monitor.get_claimable_balances().iter().fold(0, |sum, balance| {
2635                 match balance {
2636                         channelmonitor::Balance::ClaimableAwaitingConfirmations { amount_satoshis, .. } => sum + amount_satoshis,
2637                         _ => panic!("Unexpected balance type"),
2638                 }
2639         });
2640         // On the first commitment, node[1]'s balance was below dust so it didn't have an output
2641         let node1_channel_balance = if broadcast_initial_commitment { 0 } else { revoked_commitment_tx.output[0].value };
2642         let expected_claimable_balance = node1_channel_balance + justice_tx.output[0].value;
2643         assert_eq!(total_claimable_balance, expected_claimable_balance);
2644 }
2645
2646
2647 #[test]
2648 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2649         // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2650         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2651         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2652         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2653         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2654         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2655
2656         // Create some new channel:
2657         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2658
2659         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2660         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2661         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2662         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2663         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2664
2665         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2666         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2667         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2668         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2669         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2670         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2671         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2672         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2673         check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2674
2675         //Revoke the old state
2676         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2677
2678         {
2679                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2680                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2681                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2682                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2683                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2684                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2685                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2686                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2687
2688                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2689                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2690
2691                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2692                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2693
2694                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2695                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2696                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2697                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2698                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2699                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2700                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2701                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2702
2703                 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2704                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2705                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2706                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2707                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2708         }
2709         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2710         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2711         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2712 }
2713
2714 #[test]
2715 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2716         // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2717         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2718         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2719         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2720         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2721         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2722
2723         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2724
2725         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2726         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2727         // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2728         // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2729         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2730         let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2731
2732         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2733         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2734
2735         //Revoke the old state
2736         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2737
2738         {
2739                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2740                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2741                 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2742                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2743                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2744                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2745                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2746                 match events.last().unwrap() {
2747                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2748                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2749                 }
2750
2751                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2752                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2753
2754                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
2755
2756                 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2757                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2758                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2759                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2760                 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2761                 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2762                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2763
2764                 // Filter out any non justice transactions.
2765                 node_txn.retain(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2766                 assert!(node_txn.len() > 3);
2767
2768                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2769                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2770                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2771
2772                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2773                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2774                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2775
2776                 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2777                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2778                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2779                 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2780                 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2781                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2782                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2783                 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2784
2785                 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2786                 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2787                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2788                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2789                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2790                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2791                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2792         }
2793         get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2794         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2795         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2796 }
2797
2798 #[test]
2799 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2800         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2801         // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2802         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2803         // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2804         // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2805         // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2806         // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2807         // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2808         // towards B.
2809         // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2810         // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2811         // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2812         // PaymentSent event).
2813
2814         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2815         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2816         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2817         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2818
2819         // Create some initial channels
2820         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2821         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2822
2823         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2824         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2825         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2826         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2827         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2828
2829         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2830         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2831         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2832
2833         let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2834         let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2835
2836         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2837         // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2838         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2839         assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2840         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2841         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2842         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2843         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2844         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2845         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2846         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2847         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2848         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2849         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2850         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2851
2852         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2853         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2854         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2855         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2856         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2857         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2858         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2859         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2860         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2861         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2862         assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2863         assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2864         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2865         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2866
2867         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2868         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]));
2869         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2870         {
2871                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2872                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2873                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2874                 added_monitors.clear();
2875         }
2876         let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2877         assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2878         match forwarded_events[0] {
2879                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2880                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2881         }
2882         let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2883         match forwarded_events[1] {
2884                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
2885                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2886                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2887                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2888                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2889                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2890                 },
2891                 _ => panic!()
2892         }
2893         match forwarded_events[2] {
2894                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
2895                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2896                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2897                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2898                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2899                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
2900                 },
2901                 _ => panic!()
2902         }
2903         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2904         {
2905                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2906                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2907                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2908                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2909                 added_monitors.clear();
2910         }
2911         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2912
2913         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2914         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2915
2916         match nodes_2_event {
2917                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2918                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2919         }
2920
2921         match nodes_0_event {
2922                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2923                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2924                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2925                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2926                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2927                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2928                 },
2929                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2930         };
2931
2932         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
2933         match events[0] {
2934                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2935                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2936         }
2937
2938         macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2939                 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => { {
2940                         let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2941                         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2942                         // Node[1]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2943                         // Node[0]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2944                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx);
2945                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2946                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2947                         assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO);
2948                         if $htlc_offered {
2949                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2950                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2951                                 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2952                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2953                         } else {
2954                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2955                                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2956                                 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2957                                 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2958                         }
2959                         node_txn.clear();
2960                 } }
2961         }
2962         // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2963         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0]);
2964
2965         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2966         // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx  on A's chain
2967         let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2968         check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2969         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2970         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2971         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2972         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
2973         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2974         assert!(node_txn.len() == 1 || node_txn.len() == 3); // HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn
2975         let commitment_spend =
2976                 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2977                         &node_txn[0]
2978                 } else {
2979                         // Certain `ConnectStyle`s will cause RBF bumps of the previous HTLC transaction to be broadcast.
2980                         // FullBlockViaListen
2981                         if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2982                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2983                                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2984                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2985                                 &node_txn[0]
2986                         } else {
2987                                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2988                                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2989                                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2990                                 &node_txn[2]
2991                         }
2992                 };
2993
2994         check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2995         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2996         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2997         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2998         assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2999         assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
3000         // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
3001         // we already checked the same situation with A.
3002
3003         // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
3004         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()]));
3005         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3006         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3007         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3008         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3009         assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
3010         let mut first_claimed = false;
3011         for event in events {
3012                 match event {
3013                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3014                                 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
3015                                         assert!(!first_claimed);
3016                                         first_claimed = true;
3017                                 } else {
3018                                         assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
3019                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
3020                                 }
3021                         },
3022                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3023                         Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
3024                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3025                 }
3026         }
3027         check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
3028 }
3029
3030 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
3031         // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
3032         // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
3033         // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
3034         // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
3035         //    B's commitment tx                 C's commitment tx
3036         //            \                                  \
3037         //         B's HTLC timeout tx               B's timeout tx
3038
3039         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3040         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3041         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3042         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3043         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
3044         *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
3045         *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
3046
3047         // Create some intial channels
3048         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3049         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3050
3051         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
3052         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
3053         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
3054
3055         let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
3056
3057         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
3058         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3059         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
3060         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
3061         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
3062         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
3063         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3064
3065         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3066         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3067         match events[0] {
3068                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3069                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3070                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3071                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3072                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3073                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3074                 },
3075                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3076         };
3077         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
3078         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3079         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3080         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3081         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
3082         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
3083
3084         // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
3085         // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
3086         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
3087         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false
3088                 , [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3089         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
3090         let timeout_tx = {
3091                 let mut txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
3092                 if nodes[1].connect_style.borrow().skips_blocks() {
3093                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
3094                 } else {
3095                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 3); // Two extra fee bumps for timeout transaction
3096                 }
3097                 txn.iter().for_each(|tx| check_spends!(tx, commitment_tx[0]));
3098                 assert_eq!(txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3099                 txn.remove(0)
3100         };
3101
3102         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
3103         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3104         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3105
3106         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3107
3108         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3109         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3110         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3111         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3112         match events[0] {
3113                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3114                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3115                         assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3116                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3117                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3118                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3119                 },
3120                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3121         };
3122
3123         // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
3124         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
3125         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
3126
3127         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
3128         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
3129
3130         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3131         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3132         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3133         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // 1 timeout tx
3134         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3135         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
3136         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
3137 }
3138
3139 #[test]
3140 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
3141         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
3142         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
3143         do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
3144 }
3145
3146 #[test]
3147 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3148         // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3149         // and fail backward accordingly.
3150
3151         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3152         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3153         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3154         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3155
3156         // Create some initial channels
3157         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3158         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3159
3160         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3161         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3162         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3163         // Revoke the old state
3164         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3165
3166         let (_, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3167
3168         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3169         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3170         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3171         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3172         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3173
3174         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3175         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3176         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3177         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3178         match events[0] {
3179                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3180                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3181                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3182                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3183                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3184                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3185
3186                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3187                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3188                         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3189                 },
3190                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3191         }
3192 }
3193
3194 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3195         // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3196         // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3197         // commitment transaction anymore.
3198         // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3199         // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3200         // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3201         // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3202         // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3203         // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3204         // transactions:
3205         // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3206         //   commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3207         // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3208         //   and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3209         //   commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3210         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3211         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3212         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3213         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3214
3215         // Create some initial channels
3216         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3217         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3218
3219         let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3220         // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3221         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3222         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3223         // Revoke the old state
3224         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3225
3226         let value = if use_dust {
3227                 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3228                 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3229                 nodes[2].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
3230                         .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3231         } else { 3000000 };
3232
3233         let (_, first_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3234         let (_, second_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3235         let (_, third_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3236
3237         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3238         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3239         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3240         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3241         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3242         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3243         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3244         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3245         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3246         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3247         let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3248         // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3249
3250         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3251         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3252         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3253         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3254         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3255         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3256         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3257         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3258         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3259         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3260         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3261         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3262         // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3263         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3264         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3265         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3266
3267         nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3268         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3269         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3270         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3271         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3272         assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3273         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3274         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3275         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3276         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3277         // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3278         // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3279         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3280         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3281         // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3282         let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3283         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3284         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3285
3286         // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3287         // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3288         let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3289         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, fourth_payment_hash,
3290                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3291         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3292         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3293         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3294
3295         if deliver_bs_raa {
3296                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3297                 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3298                 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3299                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3300                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3301                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3302                 match events[0] {
3303                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3304                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3305                 };
3306                 match events[1] {
3307                         Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3308                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3309                 }
3310                 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3311                 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3312         }
3313
3314         let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3315         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3316
3317         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3318         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3319         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3320
3321         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3322         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
3323         match events[0] {
3324                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3325                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3326         }
3327         match events[1] {
3328                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3329                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3330                 },
3331                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3332         }
3333         match events[2] {
3334                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3335                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3336                 },
3337                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3338         }
3339
3340         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3341         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3342
3343         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3344         assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3345
3346         if deliver_bs_raa {
3347                 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3348                 match nodes_2_event {
3349                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3350                                 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3351                                 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3352                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3353                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3354                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3355                         },
3356                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3357                 }
3358         }
3359
3360         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3361         match nodes_2_event {
3362                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data }) }, node_id: _ } => {
3363                         assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3364                         assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3365                 },
3366                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3367         }
3368
3369         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3370         match nodes_0_event {
3371                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3372                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3373                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3374                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3375                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3376                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3377
3378                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3379                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3380                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3381
3382                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3383
3384                         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3385                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
3386                         match events[0] {
3387                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref failure, .. } => {
3388                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3389                                         // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3390                                         // that we should update our routing table for.
3391                                         if !deliver_bs_raa {
3392                                                 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure { } else { panic!("Unexpected path failure") }
3393                                         }
3394                                 },
3395                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3396                         }
3397                         match events[1] {
3398                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3399                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, first_payment_hash);
3400                                 },
3401                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3402                         }
3403                         match events[2] {
3404                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3405                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3406                                 },
3407                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3408                         }
3409                         match events[3] {
3410                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3411                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
3412                                 },
3413                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3414                         }
3415                         match events[4] {
3416                                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3417                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3418                                 },
3419                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3420                         }
3421                         match events[5] {
3422                                 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3423                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, third_payment_hash);
3424                                 },
3425                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3426                         }
3427                 },
3428                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3429         }
3430
3431         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
3432         match events[0] {
3433                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3434                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3435         }
3436
3437         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3438         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3439         assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3440 }
3441
3442 #[test]
3443 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3444         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3445         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3446         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3447         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3448 }
3449
3450 #[test]
3451 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3452         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3453         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3454         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3455         do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3456 }
3457
3458 #[test]
3459 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3460         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3461         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3462         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3463         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3464         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
3465
3466         // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3467         {
3468                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3469                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
3470                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3471                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3472
3473                 let payment_event = {
3474                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3475                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3476                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3477                 };
3478                 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3479                 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3480         }
3481
3482         // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3483         let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3484         {
3485                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, failed_payment_hash,
3486                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3487                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3488
3489                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3490         }
3491
3492         // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3493         {
3494                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3495
3496                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3497                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3498                 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3499                 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
3500                         &route.paths[0], 50_000, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3501                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3502                 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash).unwrap();
3503
3504                 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3505                 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3506                         channel_id: chan.2,
3507                         htlc_id: 0,
3508                         amount_msat: 0,
3509                         payment_hash,
3510                         cltv_expiry,
3511                         onion_routing_packet,
3512                         skimmed_fee_msat: None,
3513                 };
3514                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3515         }
3516         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3517         assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3518         // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3519         match events[0] {
3520                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3521                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3522                 },
3523                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3524         }
3525         match events[1] {
3526                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3527                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3528                 },
3529                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3530         }
3531         match events[2] {
3532                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3533                         assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3534                 },
3535                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3536         }
3537         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3538         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3539 }
3540
3541 #[test]
3542 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3543         // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3544         // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3545         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3546         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3547         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3548         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3549         if *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
3550                 // We rely on the ability to connect a block redundantly, which isn't allowed via
3551                 // `chain::Listen`, so we never run the test if we randomly get assigned that
3552                 // connect_style.
3553                 return;
3554         }
3555         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3556
3557         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3558         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3559         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3560         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3561         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3562         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3563
3564         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3565         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3566         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].txid(), node_txn[1].txid());
3567
3568         let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]);
3569         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3570         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3571         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3572         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3573
3574         // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3575         // registering new transactions
3576         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
3577 }
3578
3579 #[test]
3580 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3581         // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3582         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3583         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3584         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3585         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3586         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3587         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3588
3589         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3590
3591         let mut payment_event = {
3592                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
3593                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3594                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3595
3596                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3597                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3598                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3599         };
3600
3601         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3602         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3603
3604         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3605
3606         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3607         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3608         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3609         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3610
3611         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3612         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3613         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3614         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3615         let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3616
3617         // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3618         // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3619         // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3620
3621         nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3622         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3623         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3624         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3625         let tx = {
3626                 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3627                 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3628                 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3629                 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3630                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3631                 node_txn.remove(0)
3632         };
3633
3634         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3635
3636         // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3637         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3638         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3639         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
3640
3641         // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3642         {
3643                 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3644                         .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3645         }
3646         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3647         let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3648         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3649         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3650         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3651         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3652         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3653
3654         check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3655 }
3656
3657 #[test]
3658 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3659         // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3660         // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3661         // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3662         // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3663
3664         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3665         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3666         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3667         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3668         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3669
3670         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3671
3672         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3673         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3674         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3675         let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3676         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3677         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
3678
3679         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3680         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3681
3682         let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3683         reconnect_args.pending_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
3684         reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3685         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3686 }
3687
3688 #[test]
3689 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3690         // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3691         // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3692         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3693         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3694         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3695         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3696
3697         // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3698         // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3699         let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
3700         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3701         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
3702         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3703         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
3704
3705         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3706         assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3707
3708         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3709
3710         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3711         assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3712
3713         // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3714         // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3715         // broadcasted.
3716         {
3717                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3718         }
3719
3720         // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3721         // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3722         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3723         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3724
3725         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, true
3726                 , [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
3727         check_closed_event!(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer, false
3728                 , [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
3729 }
3730
3731 #[test]
3732 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3733         // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3734         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3735         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3736         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3737         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3738         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3739         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3740
3741         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3742         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3743         let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3744         reconnect_args.send_channel_ready = (true, true);
3745         reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3746
3747         let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3748         let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3749         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3750         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3751
3752         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3753         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3754         reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3755
3756         let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3757         let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3758         let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3759         let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3760
3761         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3762         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3763
3764         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3765         fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3766
3767         let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3768         reconnect_args.pending_cell_htlc_fails.0 = 1;
3769         reconnect_args.pending_cell_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
3770         reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3771         {
3772                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3773                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
3774                 match events[0] {
3775                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3776                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3777                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3778                         },
3779                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3780                 }
3781                 match events[1] {
3782                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3783                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3784                 }
3785                 match events[2] {
3786                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3787                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3788                                 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3789                         },
3790                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3791                 }
3792                 match events[3] {
3793                         Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3794                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3795                         },
3796                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3797                 }
3798         }
3799         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
3800
3801         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3802         fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3803 }
3804
3805 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3806         // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3807         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3808         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3809         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3810         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3811
3812         let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3813         let channel_id = if messages_delivered == 0 {
3814                 let (channel_ready, chan_id, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
3815                 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3816                 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3817                 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3818                 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3819                 chan_id
3820         } else {
3821                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2
3822         };
3823
3824         let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3825
3826         let payment_event = {
3827                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_1,
3828                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3829                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3830
3831                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3832                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3833                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3834         };
3835         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3836
3837         if messages_delivered < 2 {
3838                 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3839         } else {
3840                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3841                 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3842                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3843                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3844                         let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3845
3846                         if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3847                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3848                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3849                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3850
3851                                 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3852                                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3853                                         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3854                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3855                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3856
3857                                         if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3858                                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3859                                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3860                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3861                                         }
3862                                 }
3863                         }
3864                 }
3865         }
3866
3867         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3868         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3869         if messages_delivered < 3 {
3870                 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3871                         // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3872                         // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3873                         //
3874                         // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3875                         // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3876                         // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3877                         //
3878                         // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3879                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3880                 }
3881                 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3882                 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3883                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3884                 reconnect_args.send_channel_ready = (true, true);
3885                 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_adds.1 = 1;
3886                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3887         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3888                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3889                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3890                 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.0 = true;
3891                 reconnect_args.pending_raa.0 = true;
3892                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3893         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3894                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3895                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3896                 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.0 = true;
3897                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3898         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3899                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3900                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
3901                 reconnect_args.pending_raa.1 = true;
3902                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
3903         } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3904                 // Everything was delivered...
3905                 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3906         }
3907
3908         let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3909         if messages_delivered == 0 {
3910                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3911                 match events_1[0] {
3912                         Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3913                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3914                 };
3915                 match events_1[1] {
3916                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3917                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3918                 };
3919         } else {
3920                 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3921                 match events_1[0] {
3922                         Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3923                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3924                 };
3925         }
3926
3927         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3928         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3929         reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
3930
3931         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3932
3933         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3934         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3935         match events_2[0] {
3936                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, .. } => {
3937                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3938                         assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3939                         assert_eq!(receiver_node_id.unwrap(), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3940                         assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(channel_id));
3941                         match &purpose {
3942                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3943                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3944                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3945                                 },
3946                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3947                         }
3948                 },
3949                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3950         }
3951
3952         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3953         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3954         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3955
3956         let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3957         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3958         let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3959                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3960                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3961                         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3962                         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3963                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3964                         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3965                         assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3966                         (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3967                 },
3968                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3969         };
3970
3971         if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3972                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3973
3974                 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3975                 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3976                 match events_4[0] {
3977                         Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3978                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3979                                 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3980                         },
3981                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3982                 }
3983
3984                 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3985                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3986                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3987                         let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3988
3989                         if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3990                                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3991                                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3992                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3993
3994                                 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3995                                         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3996                                         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3997                                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3998                                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3999
4000                                         if messages_delivered >= 5 {
4001                                                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4002                                                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4003                                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4004                                         }
4005                                 }
4006                         }
4007                 }
4008         }
4009
4010         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4011         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4012         if messages_delivered < 2 {
4013                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4014                 reconnect_args.pending_htlc_claims.0 = 1;
4015                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4016                 if messages_delivered < 1 {
4017                         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
4018                 } else {
4019                         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4020                 }
4021         } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
4022                 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
4023                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4024                 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.1 = true;
4025                 reconnect_args.pending_raa.1 = true;
4026                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4027         } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
4028                 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
4029                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4030                 reconnect_args.pending_responding_commitment_signed.1 = true;
4031                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4032         } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
4033                 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
4034                 let mut reconnect_args = ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
4035                 reconnect_args.pending_raa.0 = true;
4036                 reconnect_nodes(reconnect_args);
4037         } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
4038                 // Everything was delivered...
4039                 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
4040         }
4041
4042         if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
4043                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4044         }
4045         if messages_delivered <= 5 {
4046                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4047                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4048         }
4049         reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
4050
4051         if messages_delivered > 2 {
4052                 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4053         }
4054
4055         // Channel should still work fine...
4056         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4057         let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
4058         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4059 }
4060
4061 #[test]
4062 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
4063         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
4064         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
4065         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
4066         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
4067 }
4068
4069 #[test]
4070 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
4071         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
4072         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
4073         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
4074         do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
4075 }
4076
4077 #[test]
4078 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
4079         // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
4080         // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
4081         // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
4082         // channel_ready immediately instead.
4083         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4084         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4085         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4086         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4087         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
4088
4089         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
4090
4091         let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4092         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4093         let block_txn = [funding_tx];
4094         let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
4095         let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
4096         nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
4097
4098         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4099         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4100         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4101 }
4102
4103 #[test]
4104 fn test_channel_monitor_skipping_block_when_channel_manager_is_leading() {
4105         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4106         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4107         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4108         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4109
4110         // Let channel_manager get ahead of chain_monitor by 1 block.
4111         // This is to emulate race-condition where newly added channel_monitor skips processing 1 block,
4112         // in case where client calls block_connect on channel_manager first and then on chain_monitor.
4113         let height_1 = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4114         let mut block_1 = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), height_1, Vec::new());
4115
4116         nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().push((block_1.clone(), height_1));
4117         nodes[0].node.block_connected(&block_1, height_1);
4118
4119         // Create channel, and it gets added to chain_monitor in funding_created.
4120         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
4121
4122         // Now, newly added channel_monitor in chain_monitor hasn't processed block_1,
4123         // but it's best_block is block_1, since that was populated by channel_manager, and channel_manager
4124         // was running ahead of chain_monitor at the time of funding_created.
4125         // Later on, subsequent blocks are connected to both channel_manager and chain_monitor.
4126         // Hence, this channel's channel_monitor skipped block_1, directly tries to process subsequent blocks.
4127         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &funding_tx, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
4128         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4129
4130         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4131         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4132         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4133 }
4134
4135 #[test]
4136 fn test_channel_monitor_skipping_block_when_channel_manager_is_lagging() {
4137         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4138         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4139         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4140         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4141
4142         // Let chain_monitor get ahead of channel_manager by 1 block.
4143         // This is to emulate race-condition where newly added channel_monitor skips processing 1 block,
4144         // in case where client calls block_connect on chain_monitor first and then on channel_manager.
4145         let height_1 = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4146         let mut block_1 = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), height_1, Vec::new());
4147
4148         nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().push((block_1.clone(), height_1));
4149         nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block_1, height_1);
4150
4151         // Create channel, and it gets added to chain_monitor in funding_created.
4152         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
4153
4154         // channel_manager can't really skip block_1, it should get it eventually.
4155         nodes[0].node.block_connected(&block_1, height_1);
4156
4157         // Now, newly added channel_monitor in chain_monitor hasn't processed block_1, it's best_block is
4158         // the block before block_1, since that was populated by channel_manager, and channel_manager was
4159         // running behind at the time of funding_created.
4160         // Later on, subsequent blocks are connected to both channel_manager and chain_monitor.
4161         // Hence, this channel's channel_monitor skipped block_1, directly tries to process subsequent blocks.
4162         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &funding_tx, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
4163         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4164
4165         // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
4166         let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4167         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
4168 }
4169
4170 #[test]
4171 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4172         // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4173         // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4174         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4175         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4176         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4177         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4178         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4179
4180         let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
4181
4182         // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4183         let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4184         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_2,
4185                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
4186         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4187
4188         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4189         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4190         match events_1[0] {
4191                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4192                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4193         }
4194
4195         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
4196         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
4197         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4198
4199         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4200         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4201         match events_2[0] {
4202                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4203                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4204                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4205                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4206                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4207                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4208                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4209
4210                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4211                         let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4212                         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4213                         match events_3[0] {
4214                                 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4215                                         assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4216                                         assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4217                                 },
4218                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4219                         }
4220
4221                         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4222                         let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4223                         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4224                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4225                 },
4226                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4227         }
4228
4229         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4230         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4231
4232         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
4233                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
4234         }, true).unwrap();
4235         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4236         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4237         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
4238                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
4239         }, false).unwrap();
4240         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4241         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4242
4243         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4244         let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4245         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4246         let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4247
4248         assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4249         assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4250
4251         assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4252         assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4253
4254         assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4255
4256         assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4257         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4258         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4259         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4260         assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4261         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4262         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4263         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4264         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4265         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4266
4267         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4268         let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4269         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4270         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4271         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4272         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4273         assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4274         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4275
4276         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4277         let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4278         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4279         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4280         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4281         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4282         assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4283         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4284
4285         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4286         let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4287         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4288         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4289
4290         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4291         let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4292         // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4293         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4294
4295         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4296         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4297         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4298
4299         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4300
4301         let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4302         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4303         match events_5[0] {
4304                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4305                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4306                         match &purpose {
4307                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4308                                         assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4309                                         assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4310                                 },
4311                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4312                         }
4313                 },
4314                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4315         }
4316
4317         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4318         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4319         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4320
4321         expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4322         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4323 }
4324
4325 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4326         // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4327         // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4328         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4329         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4330         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4331         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4332
4333         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4334
4335         let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4336                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4337                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4338                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4339                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4340                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4341                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
4342                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4343                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
4344                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id,
4345                         &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4346                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4347                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4348                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4349                 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4350                 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentClaimable event(s).
4351                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4352                 our_payment_hash
4353         } else {
4354                 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4355         };
4356
4357         let mut block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
4358         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4359         connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4360         let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4361         for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4362                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4363                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4364                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4365         }
4366
4367         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4368
4369         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4370         let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4371         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4372         assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4373         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4374         assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4375
4376         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4377         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4378         // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4379         let mut expected_failure_data = (100_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4380         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&(block_count - 1).to_be_bytes());
4381         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4382 }
4383
4384 #[test]
4385 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4386         do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4387         do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4388 }
4389
4390 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4391         // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4392         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4393         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4394         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4395         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4396         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4397         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4398
4399         // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4400         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4401         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4402         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4403
4404         // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4405         let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4406         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, first_payment_hash,
4407                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4408         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4409         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4410
4411         // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4412         let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4413         let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4414         sending_node.node.send_payment_with_route(&route, second_payment_hash,
4415                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4416         if forwarded_htlc {
4417                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4418                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4419                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4420                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4421                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4422         }
4423         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4424
4425         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4426         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4427         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4428         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4429
4430         if forwarded_htlc {
4431                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4432                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4433                 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4434                 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4435                 match fail_commit[0] {
4436                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4437                                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4438                                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4439                         },
4440                         _ => unreachable!(),
4441                 }
4442                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4443         } else {
4444                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4445         }
4446 }
4447
4448 #[test]
4449 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4450         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4451         do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4452 }
4453
4454 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4455         ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4456                 {
4457                         let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4458                         let mut txn = Vec::new();
4459                         let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4460                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4461                         for event in events.drain(..) {
4462                                 match event {
4463                                         Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs, channel_id: _ } => {
4464                                                 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4465                                                         txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4466                                                         all_outputs.push(outp);
4467                                                 }
4468                                         },
4469                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4470                                 };
4471                         }
4472                         if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4473                                 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, None, &secp_ctx) {
4474                                         txn.push(tx);
4475                                 }
4476                         }
4477                         txn
4478                 }
4479         }
4480 }
4481
4482 #[test]
4483 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4484         // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4485         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4486         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4487         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4488         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4489
4490         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4491         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4492         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4493         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4494         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4495         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4496         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4497         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4498         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4499
4500         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4501         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4502
4503         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4504         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4505         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4506         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4507         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4508 }
4509
4510 #[test]
4511 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4512         // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4513         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4514         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4515         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4516         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4517         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4518
4519         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4520         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4521         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4522         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4523         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4524
4525         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4526         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4527         check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4528         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4529
4530         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4531         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4532         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4533         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4534         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4535
4536         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4537         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4538         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4539 }
4540
4541 #[test]
4542 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4543         // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4544         // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4545
4546         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4547         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4548         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4549         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4550
4551         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
4552         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4553         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4554         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4555         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4556
4557         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4558         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4559         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4560         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4561         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4562
4563         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4564         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4565         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4566
4567         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4568         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4569         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4570         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4571         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4572 }
4573
4574 #[test]
4575 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4576         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4577         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4578         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4579         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4580
4581         // Create some initial channels
4582         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4583
4584         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4585
4586         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4587         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4588         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4589
4590         // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4591         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4592         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4593         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4594         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4595         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4596         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4597         match events[0] {
4598                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4599                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4600         }
4601         match events[1] {
4602                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4603                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4604         }
4605
4606         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4607         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4608         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4609         check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4610         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4611
4612         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4613         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4614         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4615
4616         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4617         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4618         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4619 }
4620
4621 #[test]
4622 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4623         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4624         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4625         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4626         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4627
4628         // Create some initial channels
4629         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4630
4631         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4632         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4633
4634         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4635
4636         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4637         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4638         assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4639
4640         // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4641         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4642         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4643         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4644         match events[0] {
4645                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4646                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4647         }
4648         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4649
4650         // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4651         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4652         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4653         check_spends!(node_txn[0],  commitment_tx[0].clone());
4654         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4655
4656         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4657         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4658         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4659         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4660
4661         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4662         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4663         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4664         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4665         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4666 }
4667
4668 #[test]
4669 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4670         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4671         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4672         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4673         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4674
4675         // Create some initial channels
4676         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4677
4678         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4679         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4680         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4681         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4682
4683         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4684
4685         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4686         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4687         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4688         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4689
4690         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4691         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4692         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4693         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4694
4695         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4696         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4697
4698         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4699         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4700         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4701 }
4702
4703 #[test]
4704 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4705         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4706         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4707         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4708         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4709         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4710
4711         // Create some initial channels
4712         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4713
4714         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4715         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4716         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4717         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4718
4719         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4720
4721         // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4722         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4723         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4724         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4725         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4726         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4727
4728         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4729         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4730         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4731         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4732         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4733         assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // HTLC-Timeout
4734
4735         // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4736         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4737         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4738         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4739         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4740
4741         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4742         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs
4743         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4744         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4745         // transactions next...
4746         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4747         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4748
4749         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4750         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4751         if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4752                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4753         } else {
4754                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4755                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4756         }
4757
4758         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4759         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4760
4761         // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4762         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4763         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4764         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4765         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4766 }
4767
4768 #[test]
4769 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4770         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4771         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4772         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4773         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4774         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4775
4776         // Create some initial channels
4777         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4778
4779         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4780         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4781         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4782         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4783
4784         // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4785         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4786
4787         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4788
4789         // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4790         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4791         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4792         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4793         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4794         let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4795
4796         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4797         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4798         assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4799         check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4800
4801         // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4802         let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4803         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4804
4805         // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4806         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()]));
4807         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4808         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4809         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4810
4811         let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4812         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success
4813
4814         // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4815         // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4816         // transactions next...
4817         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4818         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4819         if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4820                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4821         } else {
4822                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4823                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4824         }
4825
4826         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4827         check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4828
4829         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4830         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4831
4832         // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4833         // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4834
4835         // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4836         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4837         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4838         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4839         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4840         assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4841         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4842         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4843 }
4844
4845 #[test]
4846 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4847         // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4848         // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4849         // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4850         // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4851         // channel.
4852         // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4853         // gets broadcast.
4854
4855         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4856         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4857         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4858         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4859
4860         // Create some initial channels
4861         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4862         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4863
4864         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4865         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4866         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4867         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4868         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4869
4870         // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4871         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4872         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4873
4874         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
4875         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4876         check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4877         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4878         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4879         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4880         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4881         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4882         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4883         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4884         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4885
4886         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4887         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4888         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4889         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4890
4891         let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4892         assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 1);
4893         check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4894         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4895         assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4896         assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, LockTime::ZERO); // Success tx
4897
4898         // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4899         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), c_txn[0].clone()]));
4900         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4901         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4902         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4903         match events[0] {
4904                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4905                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4906         }
4907         match events[1] {
4908                 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id, outbound_amount_forwarded_msat } => {
4909                         assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4910                         assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
4911                         assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4912                         assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
4913                         assert_eq!(outbound_amount_forwarded_msat, Some(3000000));
4914                 },
4915                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4916         }
4917         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4918         let mut msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4919         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4920         let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4921         let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4922
4923         match nodes_2_event {
4924                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4925                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4926         }
4927
4928         match nodes_0_event {
4929                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4930                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4931                         assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4932                         assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4933                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4934                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4935                 },
4936                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4937         };
4938
4939         // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
4940         match msg_events[0] {
4941                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4942                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4943         }
4944
4945         // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4946         let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4947         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4948         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
4949         let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4950         // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx
4951         assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4952         check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4953         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4954         assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4955         assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), nodes[1].best_block_info().1); // Success tx
4956
4957         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4958         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4959 }
4960
4961 #[test]
4962 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4963         // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4964         // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4965         // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4966         // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4967         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4968         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4969         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4970         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4971         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4972         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4973         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
4974                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4975         let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4976
4977         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4978         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4979         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4980
4981         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4982         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4983         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4984         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4985         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
4986
4987         let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
4988
4989         let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
4990         // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
4991         // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
4992         // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
4993         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40)
4994                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
4995         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 800_000);
4996         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 800_000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
4997
4998         let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4999         assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5000         check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5001
5002         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5003         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5004         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5005         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5006         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5007
5008         let htlc_timeout_tx;
5009         { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5010                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5011                 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3
5012                 assert!(node_txn.len() == 2 || node_txn.len() == 3);
5013
5014                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5015                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5016                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
5017
5018                 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
5019                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5020                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5021                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
5022                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5023
5024                         check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5025                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5026                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
5027                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5028                 } else {
5029                         check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5030                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5031                         assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
5032                         assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5033                 }
5034
5035                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5036                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5037                 // Assign htlc_timeout_tx to the forwarded HTLC (with value ~800 sats). The received HTLC
5038                 // (with value 900 sats) will be claimed in the below `claim_funds` call.
5039                 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
5040                         assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5041                         htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[2].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[2].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
5042                 } else {
5043                         htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[0].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[1].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
5044                 }
5045         }
5046
5047         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5048         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
5049
5050         mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5051         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5052         check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5053         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5054         match events[0] {
5055                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5056                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5057         }
5058         match events[1] {
5059                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5060                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5061         }
5062         let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5063         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5064         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5065         check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5066         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5067         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5068         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5069         assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5070         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5071         assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5072
5073         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5074         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5075         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
5076         let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5077         assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5078         assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5079         let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5080         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5081         assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5082         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5083
5084         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5085         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5086         {
5087                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5088         }
5089         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5090
5091         // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5092         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[1]);
5093         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196), true, true);
5094         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5095         assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5096         assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5097         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5098         assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5099         assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5100         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5101
5102         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5103         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5104         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, None, true, true);
5105 }
5106
5107 #[test]
5108 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5109         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5110         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5111         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5112         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5113
5114         // Create some initial channels
5115         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5116
5117         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
5118         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5119         assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5120         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5121         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5122
5123         // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5124         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5125         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
5126         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5127
5128         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5129         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5130         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5131         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5132         match events[0] {
5133                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5134                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5135         }
5136         match events[1] {
5137                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5138                 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5139         }
5140         let node_tx = {
5141                 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5142                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5143                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5144                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5145                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5146                 node_txn[0].clone()
5147         };
5148
5149         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5150         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5151
5152         // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5153         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5154         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5155         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5156         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5157         assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5158 }
5159
5160 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5161         // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5162         // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5163         // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5164         // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5165         // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5166         // use the same payment hashes.
5167         // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5168         //
5169         // A \         / E
5170         //    - C - D -
5171         // B /         \ F
5172         // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5173         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5174         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5175         // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5176         // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5177         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5178         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5179         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5180                 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5181         let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5182
5183         let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5184         let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
5185         let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
5186         let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
5187         let chan_3_5  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
5188
5189         // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5190         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5191         send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5192         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5193
5194         let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
5195                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5196         // 0th HTLC:
5197         let (_, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5198         // 1st HTLC:
5199         let (_, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5200         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5201         // 2nd HTLC:
5202         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5203         // 3rd HTLC:
5204         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5205         // 4th HTLC:
5206         let (_, payment_hash_3, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5207         // 5th HTLC:
5208         let (_, payment_hash_4, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5209         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5210         // 6th HTLC:
5211         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5212         // 7th HTLC:
5213         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5214
5215         // 8th HTLC:
5216         let (_, payment_hash_5, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5217         // 9th HTLC:
5218         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5219         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5220
5221         // 10th HTLC:
5222         let (_, payment_hash_6, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5223         // 11th HTLC:
5224         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5225         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
5226
5227         // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5228         // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5229         // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5230         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
5231         assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5232
5233         // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5234         // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5235         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
5236         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
5237         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
5238         nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
5239         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5240
5241         let failed_destinations = vec![
5242                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
5243                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
5244                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
5245                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
5246         ];
5247         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
5248         check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5249
5250         let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5251         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5252         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5253         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5254         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5255         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5256
5257         // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5258         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5259         nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5260         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5261
5262         let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5263                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5264                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5265         ];
5266         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5267         check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5268
5269         let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5270         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5271         nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5272         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5273
5274         let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5275
5276         // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5277         let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5278                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5279                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5280                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5281                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5282                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5283                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5284         ];
5285         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5286         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5287         let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5288         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5289         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5290         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5291         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5292         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5293         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5294         if deliver_last_raa {
5295                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5296         } else {
5297                 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5298         }
5299
5300         // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5301         // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5302         // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5303         // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5304         //
5305         // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5306         // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5307         // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5308         //
5309         // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5310         // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5311         let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5312
5313         if announce_latest {
5314                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5315         } else {
5316                 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5317         }
5318         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5319         let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5320                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5321                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5322         } else {
5323                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5324                 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5325         };
5326         match close_event {
5327                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5328                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5329         }
5330
5331         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5332         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5333         if deliver_last_raa {
5334                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5335
5336                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5337                 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5338         } else {
5339                 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5340                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5341                 } else {
5342                         repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5343                 };
5344
5345                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5346         }
5347         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5348
5349         let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5350         assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5351         let mut a_done = false;
5352         for msg in cs_msgs {
5353                 match msg {
5354                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5355                                 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5356                                 // should be failed-backwards here.
5357                                 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5358                                         // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5359                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5360                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5361                                         }
5362                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5363                                         assert!(!a_done);
5364                                         a_done = true;
5365                                         &nodes[0]
5366                                 } else {
5367                                         // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5368                                         for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5369                                                 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5370                                         }
5371                                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5372                                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5373                                         &nodes[1]
5374                                 };
5375                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5376                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5377                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5378                                 if announce_latest {
5379                                         target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5380                                         if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5381                                                 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5382                                         }
5383                                 }
5384                                 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5385                         },
5386                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5387                 }
5388         }
5389
5390         let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5391         assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 10 } else { 6 });
5392         let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5393         let mut as_updates = 0;
5394         for event in as_events.iter() {
5395                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5396                         assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5397                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5398                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5399                         } else {
5400                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5401                         }
5402                         if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5403                                 as_updates += 1;
5404                         }
5405                 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5406                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5407         }
5408         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5409         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5410         if announce_latest {
5411                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5412                 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5413         }
5414         assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5415
5416         let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5417         assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 8 } else { 6 });
5418         let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5419         let mut bs_updates = 0;
5420         for event in bs_events.iter() {
5421                 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5422                         assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5423                         if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5424                                 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5425                         } else {
5426                                 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5427                         }
5428                         if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5429                                 bs_updates += 1;
5430                         }
5431                 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5432                 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5433         }
5434         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5435         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5436         if announce_latest {
5437                 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5438         }
5439         assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5440
5441         // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5442         // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5443         // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5444         // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5445         assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5446         assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5447 }
5448
5449 #[test]
5450 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5451         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5452 }
5453
5454 #[test]
5455 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5456         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5457 }
5458
5459 #[test]
5460 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5461         do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5462         // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5463         // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5464 }
5465
5466 #[test]
5467 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5468         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5469         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5470         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5471         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5472
5473         // Create some initial channels
5474         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5475
5476         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5477         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5478         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5479         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5480
5481         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5482         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5483         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5484         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5485         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5486         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5487
5488         let htlc_timeout = {
5489                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5490                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5491                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5492                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5493                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5494                 node_txn[0].clone()
5495         };
5496
5497         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5498         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5499         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5500
5501         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5502         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5503         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5504         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5505         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5506         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5507         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5508         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5509         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5510         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5511                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5512 }
5513
5514 #[test]
5515 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5516         // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with a key
5517         // manager rotation to test that `channel_keys_id` returned in
5518         // [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] let us re-derive the channel key set to
5519         // then derive a `delayed_payment_key`.
5520
5521         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5522
5523         // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5524         let seed = [42; 32];
5525         let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5526         let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5527         let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger));
5528         let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
5529         let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), &scorer);
5530         let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, router, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, override_init_features: alloc::rc::Rc::new(core::cell::RefCell::new(None)) };
5531         let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5532         node_cfgs.remove(0);
5533         node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5534
5535         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5536         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5537
5538         // Create some initial channels
5539         // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5540         // for node 0
5541         let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5542         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5543         assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5544
5545         // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5546         let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5547         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5548         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5549         connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5550
5551         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5552         let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5553         let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5554         assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5555         check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5556
5557         // We check funding pubkey are unique
5558         let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5559         let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5560         if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5561             || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5562             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5563             || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5564                 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5565         }
5566
5567         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5568         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5569         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5570         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5571         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5572         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5573
5574         let htlc_timeout = {
5575                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5576                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5577                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5578                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5579                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5580                 node_txn[0].clone()
5581         };
5582
5583         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5584         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5585         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5586
5587         // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5588         let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5589         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5590         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5591         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5592         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5593         check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5594         assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5595         assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5596         check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5597         assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5598                 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5599 }
5600
5601 #[test]
5602 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5603         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5604         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5605         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5606         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5607
5608         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5609
5610         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5611         let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5612
5613         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5614         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5615         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5616
5617         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5618         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5619         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5620
5621         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5622         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5623         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5624
5625         let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5626         assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5627         check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5628 }
5629
5630 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5631         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5632         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5633         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5634         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5635         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5636
5637         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5638
5639         // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5640         // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5641         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5642         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5643         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5644
5645         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5646         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5647         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
5648
5649         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5650         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5651         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5652         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5653         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5654
5655         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5656         let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5657         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5658                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5659                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5660         }
5661         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5662         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5663         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5664         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5665 }
5666
5667 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5668         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5669         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5670         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5671         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5672         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5673
5674         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5675         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
5676                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5677         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5678
5679         let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5680
5681         // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5682         // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5683         // to "time out" the HTLC.
5684
5685         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5686         let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5687
5688         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5689                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5690                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5691         }
5692         test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5693         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5694         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5695         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5696 }
5697
5698 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5699         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5700         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5701         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5702         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5703         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5704
5705         // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5706         // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5707         // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5708         // actually revoked.
5709         let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5710         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5711         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5712         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
5713         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5714
5715         let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5716         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5717         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5718         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5719         let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5720         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5721         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5722         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5723         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5724         let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5725
5726         if check_revoke_no_close {
5727                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5728                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5729         }
5730
5731         let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5732         let mut block = create_dummy_block(starting_block.0, 42, Vec::new());
5733         for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5734                 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5735                 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5736         }
5737         if !check_revoke_no_close {
5738                 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5739                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5740                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5741                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
5742         } else {
5743                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5744         }
5745 }
5746
5747 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5748 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5749 //  * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5750 //    broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5751 //  * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5752 //  * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5753 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5754 // non-dust HTLCs.
5755 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5756 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5757 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5758 #[test]
5759 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5760         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5761         do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5762
5763         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5764         do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5765 }
5766
5767 #[test]
5768 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5769         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5770         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5771         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5772         do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5773 }
5774
5775 #[test]
5776 #[should_panic]
5777 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5778         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5779         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5780         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5781         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5782         // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5783         for node in nodes.iter() {
5784                 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5785         }
5786
5787         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5788         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5789         let push_msat=10001;
5790         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
5791         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5792         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5793         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5794
5795         // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5796         // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5797         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
5798 }
5799
5800 #[test]
5801 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5802         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5803         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5804         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5805         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5806
5807         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5808         let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5809         let push_msat=10001;
5810         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
5811
5812         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5813         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5814         // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5815         let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5816         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_err());
5817
5818         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5819         let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5820         let push_msat=10001;
5821         assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5822         let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5823         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5824
5825         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5826         // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5827         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5828
5829         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5830         assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5831         assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5832
5833         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5834         let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(Network::Testnet);
5835         assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash, chain_hash);
5836
5837         // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5838         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5839         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5840         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5841         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5842         assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5843 }
5844
5845 #[test]
5846 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5847         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5848         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5849         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5850         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5851
5852         let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5853         let push_msat=10001;
5854         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
5855         let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5856         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5857         node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5858
5859         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5860         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5861         let err_msg = match events[0] {
5862                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5863                         msg.clone()
5864                 },
5865                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5866         };
5867         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5868 }
5869
5870 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5871 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5872 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5873 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5874 #[test]
5875 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5876         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5877         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5878         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5879         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5880         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5881
5882         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5883         // pending_update_fee.
5884         {
5885                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5886                 *feerate_lock += 20;
5887         }
5888         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5889         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5890
5891         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5892         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5893         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5894                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5895                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5896                 },
5897                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5898         };
5899
5900         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5901
5902         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5903         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5904         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5905         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5906
5907         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5908         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
5909         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5910
5911         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5912         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
5913                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5914         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5915         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5916
5917         // Flush the pending fee update.
5918         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5919         let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5920         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5921         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5922         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5923
5924         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5925         // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5926         // us to surface its failure to the user.
5927         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5928         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5929         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", chan.2), 1);
5930
5931         // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5932         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5933         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5934         match &events[0] {
5935                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5936                         assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5937                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5938                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5939                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
5940                 },
5941                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5942         }
5943         match &events[1] {
5944                 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5945                         assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5946                 },
5947                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5948         }
5949 }
5950
5951 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5952 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5953 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5954 #[test]
5955 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5956         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5957         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5958         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5959         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5960         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5961
5962         // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5963         // pending_update_fee.
5964         {
5965                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5966                 *feerate_lock += 200;
5967         }
5968         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5969         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5970
5971         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5972         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5973         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5974                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5975                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5976                 },
5977                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5978         };
5979
5980         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5981
5982         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5983         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5984         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5985         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5986
5987         // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5988         let amt_1 = 20000;
5989         let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, &channel_type_features) - amt_1;
5990         let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
5991         let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
5992
5993         // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
5994         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_1, payment_hash_1,
5995                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
5996         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5997         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
5998         let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5999         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route_2, payment_hash_2,
6000                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
6001         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6002         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6003
6004         // Flush the pending fee update.
6005         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6006         let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6007         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6008         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6009         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6010         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6011
6012         // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6013         // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6014         // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6015         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6016         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6017         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", chan.2), 1);
6018
6019         // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6020         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6021         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
6022         match &events[0] {
6023                 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
6024                         assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6025                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6026                         assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
6027                         assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id));
6028                 },
6029                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6030         }
6031         match &events[1] {
6032                 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
6033                         assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6034                 },
6035                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6036         }
6037
6038         // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6039         let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6040                 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6041                 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6042                 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6043         };
6044         let raa = match send_raa_event {
6045                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6046                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6047         };
6048         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6049         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6050         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6051         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6052         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6053         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6054         match events[0] {
6055                 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6056                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6057         }
6058         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6059         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6060         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6061         match events[0] {
6062                 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => {},
6063                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6064         }
6065         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6066         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6067         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
6068
6069         let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6070         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6071         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6072         expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6073 }
6074
6075 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6076 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6077 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6078 // once it's freed.
6079 #[test]
6080 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6081         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6082         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6083         // Avoid having to include routing fees in calculations
6084         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6085         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 0;
6086         config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
6087         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6088         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6089         let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6090         let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
6091
6092         // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6093         // pending_update_fee.
6094         {
6095                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6096                 *feerate_lock += 20;
6097         }
6098         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6099         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6100
6101         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6102         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6103         let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6104                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6105                         (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6106                 },
6107                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6108         };
6109
6110         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6111
6112         let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
6113         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6114         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
6115         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
6116
6117         // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6118         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
6119         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6120         let payment_event = {
6121                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6122                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6123                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6124
6125                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6126                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6127
6128                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6129         };
6130         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6131         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6132         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6133         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6134
6135         chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_1_2.2);
6136         assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6137
6138         // Flush the pending fee update.
6139         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6140         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6141         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6142         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6143         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6144         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6145
6146         // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6147         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6148         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6149
6150         let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6151                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6152                         msg.clone()
6153                 },
6154                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6155         };
6156
6157         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6158         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6159         assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6160
6161         // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6162         let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6163         assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
6164         match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6165                 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6166                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6167         }
6168
6169         // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6170         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6171         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6172
6173         // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6174         let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6175         assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6176         let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6177                 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6178                         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6179                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6180                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6181                         assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6182                         (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6183                 },
6184                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6185         };
6186
6187         // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6188         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6189         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6190
6191         // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6192         let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6193         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6194         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6195         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6196         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6197         let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6198         assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6199         let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6200                 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6201                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6202         };
6203         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6204         expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6205         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6206 }
6207
6208 #[test]
6209 fn test_payment_route_reaching_same_channel_twice() {
6210         //A route should not go through the same channel twice
6211         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6212         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6213         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6214         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6215         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6216         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6217
6218         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6219                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
6220         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000);
6221
6222         // Extend the path by itself, essentially simulating route going through same channel twice
6223         let cloned_hops = route.paths[0].hops.clone();
6224         route.paths[0].hops.extend_from_slice(&cloned_hops);
6225
6226         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6227                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6228         ), false, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6229         assert_eq!(err, &"Path went through the same channel twice"));
6230 }
6231
6232 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6233 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6234 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6235
6236 #[test]
6237 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6238         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6239         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6240         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6241         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6242         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6243         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6244
6245         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6246         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 100;
6247
6248         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6249                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6250                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6251         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6252 }
6253
6254 #[test]
6255 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6256         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6257         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6258         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6259         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6260         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6261         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6262
6263         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6264         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = 0;
6265         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6266                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)),
6267                 true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6268                 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6269
6270         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6271         nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC", 1);
6272 }
6273
6274 #[test]
6275 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6276         //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6277         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6278         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6279         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6280         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6281         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6282
6283         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6284         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6285                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6286         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6287         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6288         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6289
6290         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6291         nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6292         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6293         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6294         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() },
6295                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6296 }
6297
6298 #[test]
6299 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6300         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6301         //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6302         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6303         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6304         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6305         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6306         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6307
6308         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6309                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
6310         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000);
6311         route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6312         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6313                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6314                 ), true, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6315                 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6316 }
6317
6318 #[test]
6319 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6320         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6321         //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6322         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6323         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6324         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6325         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6326         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6327         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6328         let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6329                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6330
6331         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
6332         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6333         for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6334                 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6335                 let payment_event = {
6336                         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6337                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6338                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6339
6340                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6341                         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6342                         if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6343                                 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6344                         } else {
6345                                 assert!(false);
6346                         }
6347                         SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6348                 };
6349                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6350                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6351                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6352
6353                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6354                 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6355         }
6356         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6357                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6358                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6359
6360         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6361 }
6362
6363 #[test]
6364 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6365         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6366         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6367         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6368         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6369         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6370         let channel_value = 100000;
6371         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0);
6372         let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6373
6374         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6375
6376         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6377         // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6378         // limits us to.
6379         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat =  max_in_flight + 1;
6380         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6381                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)
6382                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
6383         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6384
6385         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6386 }
6387
6388 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6389 #[test]
6390 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6391         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6392         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6393         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6394         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6395         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6396         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6397         let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6398         {
6399                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6400                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6401                 let channel = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6402                 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.context().get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6403         }
6404
6405         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6406         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6407                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6408         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6409         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6410         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6411         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6412         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6413         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6414         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6415         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6416         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6417 }
6418
6419 #[test]
6420 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6421         //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6422         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6423         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6424         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6425         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6426         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6427
6428         let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6429         let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6430         let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6431         let channel_type_features = get_channel_type_features!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6432         // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6433         let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, &channel_type_features);
6434
6435         let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6436         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6437         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6438                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6439         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6440         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6441
6442         // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6443         // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6444         // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6445         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6446         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6447
6448         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6449         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6450         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6451         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6452         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6453 }
6454
6455 #[test]
6456 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6457         //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6458         //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6459         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6460         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6461         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6462         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6463         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6464
6465         let send_amt = 3999999;
6466         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) =
6467                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
6468         route.paths[0].hops[0].fee_msat = send_amt;
6469         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6470         let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6471         let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6472         let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(
6473                 &route.paths[0], send_amt, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6474         let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
6475
6476         let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6477                 channel_id: chan.2,
6478                 htlc_id: 0,
6479                 amount_msat: 1000,
6480                 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6481                 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6482                 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6483                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6484         };
6485
6486         for i in 0..50 {
6487                 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6488                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6489         }
6490         msg.htlc_id = (50) as u64;
6491         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6492
6493         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6494         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6495         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6496         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6497         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6498 }
6499
6500 #[test]
6501 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6502         //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6503         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6504         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6505         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6506         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6507         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6508
6509         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6510         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6511                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6512         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6513         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6514         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6515         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6516
6517         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6518         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6519         assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6520         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6521         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
6522 }
6523
6524 #[test]
6525 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6526         //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6527         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6528         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6529         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6530         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6531
6532         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6533         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6534         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6535                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6536         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6537         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6538         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6539         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6540
6541         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6542         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6543         assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6544         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6545         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6546 }
6547
6548 #[test]
6549 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6550         //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6551         // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6552         // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6553         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6554         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6555         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6556         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6557
6558         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6559         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6560         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6561                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6562         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6563         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6564         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6565
6566         //Disconnect and Reconnect
6567         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6568         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6569         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
6570                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
6571         }, true).unwrap();
6572         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6573         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6574         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
6575                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
6576         }, false).unwrap();
6577         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6578         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6579         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6580         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6581         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6582         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6583
6584         //Resend HTLC
6585         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6586         assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6587         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6588         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6589         let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6590
6591         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6592
6593         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6594         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6595         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6596         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6597         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6598 }
6599
6600 #[test]
6601 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6602         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6603
6604         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6605         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6606         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6607         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6608         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6609         let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6610         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6611                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6612
6613         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6614         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6615         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6616
6617         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6618                 channel_id: chan.2,
6619                 htlc_id: 0,
6620                 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6621         };
6622
6623         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6624
6625         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6626         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6627         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6628         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6629         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6630 }
6631
6632 #[test]
6633 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6634         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6635
6636         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6637         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6638         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6639         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6640         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6641
6642         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6643         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6644                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6645         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6646         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6647         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6648
6649         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6650                 channel_id: chan.2,
6651                 htlc_id: 0,
6652                 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6653         };
6654
6655         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6656
6657         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6658         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6659         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6660         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6661         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6662 }
6663
6664 #[test]
6665 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6666         //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions:     MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6667
6668         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6669         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6670         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6671         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6672         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6673
6674         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6675         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6676                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6677         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6678         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6679         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6680         let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6681                 channel_id: chan.2,
6682                 htlc_id: 0,
6683                 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6684                 failure_code: 0x8000,
6685         };
6686
6687         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6688
6689         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6690         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6691         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6692         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6693         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6694 }
6695
6696 #[test]
6697 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6698         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6699
6700         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6701         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6702         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6703         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6704         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6705
6706         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6707
6708         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6709         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6710         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6711
6712         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6713         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6714         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6715                 match events[0] {
6716                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6717                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6718                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6719                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6720                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6721                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6722                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6723                         },
6724                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6725                 }
6726         };
6727
6728         update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6729
6730         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6731
6732         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6733         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6734         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6735         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6736         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6737 }
6738
6739 #[test]
6740 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6741         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6742
6743         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6744         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6745         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6746         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6747         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6748
6749         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6750
6751         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6752         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6753         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6754
6755         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6756         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6757         let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6758                 match events[0] {
6759                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6760                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6761                                 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6762                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6763                                 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6764                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6765                                 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6766                         },
6767                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6768                 }
6769         };
6770
6771         update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6772
6773         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6774
6775         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6776         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6777         assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6778         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6779         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
6780 }
6781
6782 #[test]
6783 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6784         //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6785
6786         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6787         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6788         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6789         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6790         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6791
6792         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6793         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6794                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6795         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6796
6797         let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6798         updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6799
6800         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6801         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6802         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6803
6804         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6805
6806         let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6807                 match events[0] {
6808                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6809                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6810                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6811                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6812                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6813                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6814                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6815                         },
6816                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6817                 }
6818         };
6819         update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6820         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6821
6822         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6823         let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6824         assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6825         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6826         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
6827 }
6828
6829 #[test]
6830 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6831         //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6832         //    * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6833
6834         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6835         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6836         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6837         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6838         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6839         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000);
6840
6841         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6842
6843         //First hop
6844         let mut payment_event = {
6845                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6846                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6847                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6848                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6849                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6850                 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6851         };
6852         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6853         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6854         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6855         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6856         let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6857         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6858         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6859         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6860         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6861
6862         //Second Hop
6863         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6864         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6865         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6866         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6867
6868         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6869         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6870         let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6871                 match events_3[0] {
6872                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6873                                 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6874                                 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6875                                 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6876                                 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6877                                 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6878                                 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6879                         },
6880                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6881                 }
6882         };
6883
6884         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6885
6886         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6887         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6888         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6889         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6890         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6891
6892         //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6893         match events_4[0] {
6894                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6895                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6896                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6897                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6898                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6899                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6900                 },
6901                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6902         };
6903
6904         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6905 }
6906
6907 #[test]
6908 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
6909         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6910         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6911         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6912         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6913         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6914         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6915
6916         let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
6917
6918         // First hop
6919         let mut payment_event = {
6920                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
6921                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6922                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6923                 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
6924         };
6925
6926         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6927         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6928         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6929         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6930         payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
6931         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6932
6933         // Second Hop
6934         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
6935         nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6936         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6937         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6938
6939         let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6940         assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6941         match events_3[0] {
6942                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6943                         let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
6944                         // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
6945                         update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
6946
6947                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6948                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6949                 },
6950                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6951         }
6952
6953         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
6954                 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
6955                         node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6956         let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6957         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6958         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6959
6960         match events_4[0] {
6961                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6962                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6963                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6964                 },
6965                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6966         }
6967
6968         let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6969         assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 2);
6970
6971         // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
6972         // the node originating the error to its next hop.
6973         match events_5[0] {
6974                 Event::PaymentPathFailed { error_code, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }) }, ..
6975                 } => {
6976                         assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
6977                         assert!(is_permanent);
6978                         assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
6979                 },
6980                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6981         }
6982         match events_5[1] {
6983                 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6984                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6985                 },
6986                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6987         }
6988
6989         // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
6990 }
6991
6992 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6993         // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6994         // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6995         // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6996
6997         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6998         chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6999         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7000         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7001         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7002         let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7003
7004         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7005                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7006
7007         // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7008         let (_, payment_hash_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7009         let (_, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7010         route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7011
7012         // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7013         let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7014
7015         // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7016         nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
7017         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7018         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7019         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7020
7021         let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7022         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7023         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7024         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7025
7026         // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7027         let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7028
7029         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7030         match events[0] {
7031                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7032                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7033                 },
7034                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7035         }
7036         match events[1] {
7037                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7038                         assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7039                 },
7040                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7041         }
7042
7043         assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7044         // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7045         if announce_latest {
7046                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7047         } else {
7048                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7049         }
7050
7051         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7052         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7053         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7054
7055         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7056         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7057         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7058         // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7059         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
7060         let mut first_failed = false;
7061         for event in events {
7062                 match event {
7063                         Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7064                                 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7065                                         assert!(!first_failed);
7066                                         first_failed = true;
7067                                 } else {
7068                                         assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7069                                 }
7070                         },
7071                         Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {}
7072                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7073                 }
7074         }
7075 }
7076
7077 #[test]
7078 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7079         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7080         do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7081 }
7082
7083 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7084         // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7085         // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7086         // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7087         // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7088         // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7089         // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7090
7091         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7092         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7093         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7094         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7095         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7096
7097         let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7098                 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().context().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7099
7100         let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7101         let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7102
7103         let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7104         let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7105
7106         // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7107         if revoked {
7108                 let (payment_preimage_3, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7109                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7110         }
7111
7112         let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7113         if local {
7114                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7115                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7116                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7117                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7118                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7119
7120                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7121                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7122                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7123                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7124                 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
7125                 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7126                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7127                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7128                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7129                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7130                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7131         } else {
7132                 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7133                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7134                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7135                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7136                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7137                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7138
7139                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7140                 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
7141                         .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
7142                 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7143                 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
7144                 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
7145                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
7146
7147                 if !revoked {
7148                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7149                 } else {
7150                         assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.to_consensus_u32(), 11);
7151                 }
7152                 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
7153                 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7154                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7155                 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7156                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
7157         }
7158 }
7159
7160 #[test]
7161 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7162         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7163         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7164         do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7165 }
7166
7167 #[test]
7168 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7169         // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7170
7171         let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7172         low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7173         let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7174         high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7175         let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7176         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7177         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7178         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7179         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7180
7181         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in OutboundV1Channel::new()
7182         if let Err(error) = OutboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7183                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7184                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42, None)
7185         {
7186                 match error {
7187                         APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7188                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7189                 }
7190         } else { assert!(false) }
7191
7192         // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
7193         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
7194         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7195         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7196         if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7197                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7198                 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7199         {
7200                 match error {
7201                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str()));  },
7202                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7203                 }
7204         } else { assert!(false); }
7205
7206         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7207         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
7208         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7209         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7210         accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7211         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
7212         let reason_msg;
7213         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7214                 match action {
7215                         &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7216                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7217                                 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7218                         },
7219                         _ => { panic!(); }
7220                 }
7221         } else { panic!(); }
7222         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg }, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7223
7224         // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in InboundV1Channel::new()
7225         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
7226         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7227         open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7228         if let Err(error) = InboundV1Channel::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
7229                 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
7230                 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7231         {
7232                 match error {
7233                         ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7234                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7235                 }
7236         } else { assert!(false); }
7237 }
7238
7239 #[test]
7240 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7241         // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7242         // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7243         // to B, B should refuse payment.
7244
7245         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7246         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7247         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7248         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7249
7250         // Create some initial channels
7251         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7252
7253         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7254         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7255         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
7256                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7257         let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000);
7258         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(),
7259                 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7260         let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7261         let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
7262         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
7263                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7264         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7265
7266         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7267         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7268         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7269         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7270         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7271
7272         // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7273         // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7274         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7275         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7276
7277         // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7278         // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7279         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7280
7281         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7282         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7283         let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7284                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7285                         assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7286                         assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7287                         assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7288                         assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7289                         assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7290                         (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7291                 },
7292                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7293         };
7294         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7295
7296         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7297         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7298
7299         // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7300         let mut expected_failure_data = (10_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7301         expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH.to_be_bytes());
7302         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7303 }
7304
7305 #[test]
7306 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7307         // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7308         // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7309
7310         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7311         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7312         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7313         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7314
7315         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7316         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0);
7317         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7318
7319         // Disconnect peers
7320         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7321         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7322
7323         for _ in 0..DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS + 1 {
7324                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7325         }
7326         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7327         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7328         let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7329         for e in msg_events {
7330                 match e {
7331                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7332                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7333                                 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7334                                 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7335                                         panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7336                                 }
7337                         },
7338                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7339                 }
7340         }
7341         // Reconnect peers
7342         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
7343                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
7344         }, true).unwrap();
7345         let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7346         assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7347         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
7348                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
7349         }, false).unwrap();
7350         let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7351         assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7352
7353         // Reestablish chan_1
7354         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7355         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7356         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7357         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7358         // Reestablish chan_2
7359         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7360         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7361         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7362         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7363         // Reestablish chan_3
7364         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7365         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7366         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7367         handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7368
7369         for _ in 0..ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
7370                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7371         }
7372         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7373         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7374         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7375         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7376         for e in msg_events {
7377                 match e {
7378                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7379                                 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7380                                 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7381                                         // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7382                                         // the old one.
7383                                         Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7384                                         None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7385                                 }
7386                         },
7387                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7388                 }
7389         }
7390         // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7391         assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7392 }
7393
7394 #[test]
7395 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7396         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7397         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7398
7399         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7400         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7401         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7402         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7403
7404         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7405
7406         let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7407         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 30)
7408                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7409         let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000);
7410         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7411
7412         let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7413         // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7414         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7415         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7416         assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7417         let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7418
7419         let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7420         for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7421                 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7422                         penalty_sum += outp.value;
7423                 }
7424         }
7425
7426         // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7427         let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7428
7429         // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7430         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7431         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(header_114, 42, vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()]));
7432         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7433
7434         // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7435         let penalty_1;
7436         let feerate_1;
7437         {
7438                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7439                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor)
7440                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7441                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7442                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7443                 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7444                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7445                 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7446                 node_txn.clear();
7447         };
7448
7449         // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7450         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7451         let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7452         let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7453         {
7454                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7455                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7456                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7457                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7458                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7459                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7460                         penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7461                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7462                         assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7463                         let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7464                         feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7465                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7466                         assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7467                         node_txn.clear();
7468                 }
7469         }
7470         assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7471
7472         // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7473         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7474         let penalty_3;
7475         let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7476         {
7477                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7478                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7479                 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7480                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7481                         assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7482                         check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7483                         penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7484                         // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7485                         assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7486                         let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7487                         feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7488                         // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7489                         assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7490                         node_txn.clear();
7491                 }
7492         }
7493         assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7494
7495         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7496         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7497 }
7498
7499 #[test]
7500 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7501         // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7502         // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7503
7504         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7505         chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7506         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7507         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7508         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7509
7510         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7511         // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7512         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7513         let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7514         let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7515         let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 3_000_000);
7516         let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7517                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7518         let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7519         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 50)
7520                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[0].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
7521         let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 3_000_000);
7522         let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7523                 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7524         send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7525
7526         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7527         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7528         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7529
7530         // Revoke local commitment tx
7531         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7532
7533         // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7534         connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]));
7535         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7536         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7537         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7538         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 50); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7539
7540         let revoked_htlc_txn = {
7541                 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.unique_txn_broadcast();
7542                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
7543
7544                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7545                 assert_eq!(txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7546                 check_spends!(txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7547
7548                 assert_eq!(txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7549                 assert_eq!(txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7550                 assert_eq!(txn[1].output.len(), 1);
7551                 check_spends!(txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7552
7553                 txn
7554         };
7555
7556         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7557         let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7558         let block_11 = create_dummy_block(hash_128, 42, vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()]);
7559         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_11);
7560         let block_129 = create_dummy_block(block_11.block_hash(), 42, vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()]);
7561         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_129);
7562         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7563         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7564         match events.last().unwrap() {
7565                 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7566                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7567         }
7568         let first;
7569         let feerate_1;
7570         let penalty_txn;
7571         {
7572                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7573                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7574                 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7575
7576                 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7577                 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7578                 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7579                 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7580                 // future).
7581                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7582                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7583                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7584                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7585                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7586                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7587
7588                 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7589                 // available, which we check here:
7590                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7591                 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7592                 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7593
7594                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7595                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7596
7597                 // node_txn[3] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7598                 // output, checked above).
7599                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 2);
7600                 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].output.len(), 1);
7601                 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7602
7603                 first = node_txn[3].txid();
7604                 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7605                 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[3].output[0].value;
7606                 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight().to_wu();
7607                 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7608                 node_txn.clear();
7609         }
7610
7611         // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7612         let block_130 = create_dummy_block(block_129.block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn);
7613         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_130);
7614         let block_131 = create_dummy_block(block_130.block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
7615         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block_131);
7616
7617         // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7618         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7619         assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7620         let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7621         let node_txn = {
7622                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7623                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7624
7625                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7626                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7627                 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7628                 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7629                 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7630                 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7631                 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7632                 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7633                 node_txn.clear();
7634                 txn
7635         };
7636         // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7637         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(header_144, 42, node_txn));
7638         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7639         {
7640                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7641                 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7642                 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7643                 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7644                 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7645                 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7646                 // up bumped justice generation.
7647                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7648                 node_txn.clear();
7649         }
7650         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7651         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7652 }
7653
7654 #[test]
7655 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7656         // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7657         // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7658
7659         // Create 2 HTLCs
7660         // Provide preimage for one
7661         // Check aggregation
7662
7663         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7664         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7665         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7666         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7667
7668         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7669         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7670         route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7671
7672         // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7673         let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7674         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7675         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7676         assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7677
7678         // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7679         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7680         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7681         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7682         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7683         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7684
7685         // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7686         let timeout;
7687         let preimage;
7688         let preimage_bump;
7689         let feerate_timeout;
7690         let feerate_preimage;
7691         {
7692                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7693                 // 3 transactions including:
7694                 //   preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
7695                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7696                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7697                 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7698                 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7699                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7700                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
7701                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
7702
7703                 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7704                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7705                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7706                 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7707
7708                 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7709                         (node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[1].clone())
7710                 } else {
7711                         (node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone())
7712                 };
7713
7714                 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
7715                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7716                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
7717
7718                 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
7719                 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7720                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
7721                 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight().to_wu();
7722
7723                 node_txn.clear();
7724         };
7725         assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7726         assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7727
7728         // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7729         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7730         {
7731                 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7732                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7733                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7734                 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7735                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7736                 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7737
7738                 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7739                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7740                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight().to_wu();
7741                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7742                 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7743
7744                 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7745                 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7746                 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight().to_wu();
7747                 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7748                 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7749
7750                 node_txn.clear();
7751         }
7752
7753         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7754         nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7755 }
7756
7757 #[test]
7758 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7759         // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7760         // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7761         // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7762         // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7763         // TestChannelSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7764         // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7765         // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7766         // implement that).
7767         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7768         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7769         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7770         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7771         let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
7772
7773         let per_commitment_secret;
7774         let next_per_commitment_point;
7775         {
7776                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7777                 let mut guard = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7778                 let keys = guard.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).map(
7779                         |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7780                 ).flatten().unwrap().get_signer();
7781
7782                 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7783
7784                 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7785                 keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7786                 per_commitment_secret = keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7787
7788                 // Must revoke without gaps
7789                 keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7790                 keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7791
7792                 keys.as_ecdsa().unwrap().get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7793                 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7794                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7795         }
7796
7797         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7798                 &msgs::RevokeAndACK {
7799                         channel_id,
7800                         per_commitment_secret,
7801                         next_per_commitment_point,
7802                         #[cfg(taproot)]
7803                         next_local_nonce: None,
7804                 });
7805         assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7806         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7807         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() }
7808                 , [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
7809 }
7810
7811 #[test]
7812 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7813         // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7814         // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7815
7816         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7817         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7818         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7819         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7820
7821         let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7822         // Lock HTLC in both directions
7823         let (payment_preimage_1, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
7824         let (_, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
7825
7826         let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7827         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7828         assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7829
7830         // Revoke local commitment tx
7831         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
7832
7833         // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7834         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7835         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7836         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7837
7838         mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7839         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7840         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7841         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7842         let penalty_txn = {
7843                 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7844                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3
7845                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7846                 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7847                 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7848                 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7849                 node_txn.clear();
7850                 penalty_txn
7851         };
7852         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, penalty_txn));
7853         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7854         {
7855                 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7856                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7857                 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7858         }
7859 }
7860
7861 #[test]
7862 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7863         // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7864         // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7865         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7866         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7867         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7868         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7869
7870         let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000);
7871
7872         // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7873         // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7874         // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7875         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7876         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7877
7878         // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7879         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7880         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7881         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7882
7883         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7884         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7885         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
7886         let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7887         assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7888         match close_ev[0] {
7889                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7890                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7891                         assert_eq!(msg.as_ref().unwrap().data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7892                 },
7893                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7894         }
7895 }
7896
7897 #[test]
7898 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7899         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7900         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7901         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7902         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7903
7904         // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7905         let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7906         override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7907
7908         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, None, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7909
7910         // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7911         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7912         assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
7913         assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
7914 }
7915
7916 #[test]
7917 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7918         let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7919         zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7920         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7921         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7922         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7923         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7924
7925         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, None, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7926         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7927         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7928
7929         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7930         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7931         assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7932 }
7933
7934 #[test]
7935 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
7936         // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
7937         // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
7938         // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
7939         // 90% of the `channel_value`.
7940         // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
7941
7942         let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
7943         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7944         config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
7945         let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
7946         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7947         config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
7948         let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
7949         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7950         config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
7951         let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
7952         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7953         config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
7954
7955         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7956         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7957         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
7958         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7959
7960         let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
7961         let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7962         let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
7963         let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
7964         let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
7965
7966         let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7967         let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _)  = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7968
7969         // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7970         // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7971         assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
7972         // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7973         // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7974         assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
7975
7976         // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7977         // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
7978         // `channel_value`.
7979         assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7980         // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7981         // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
7982         // `channel_value`.
7983         assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7984 }
7985
7986 #[test]
7987 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
7988         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7989         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7990         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7991         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7992         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7993         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7994
7995         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7996         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7997
7998         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7999
8000         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8001         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8002         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8003
8004         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8005         match events[0] {
8006                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8007                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
8008                 }
8009                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8010         }
8011
8012         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8013         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8014
8015         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8016                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8017                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8018                 }
8019                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8020         }
8021
8022         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8023
8024         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8025         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8026
8027         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8028         match events[0] {
8029                 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
8030                         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
8031                 }
8032                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8033         }
8034 }
8035
8036 #[test]
8037 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
8038         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8039         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8040         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8041         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8042         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8043         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8044
8045         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8046         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8047
8048         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
8049
8050         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8051         // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8052         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8053
8054         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8055         match events[0] {
8056                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8057                         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8058                 }
8059                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8060         }
8061
8062         let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8063         assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8064
8065         match close_msg_ev[0] {
8066                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8067                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8068                 }
8069                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8070         }
8071
8072         // There should be no more events to process, as the channel was never opened.
8073         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8074 }
8075
8076 #[test]
8077 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8078         let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8079         manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8080         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8081         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8082         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8083         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8084
8085         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8086         let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8087
8088         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
8089
8090         // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8091         // accepting the inbound channel request.
8092         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8093
8094         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8095         match events[0] {
8096                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8097                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
8098                         let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8099                         match api_res {
8100                                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8101                                         assert_eq!(err, "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.");
8102                                 },
8103                                 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8104                                 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected Error {:?}", e),
8105                         }
8106                 }
8107                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8108         }
8109
8110         // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8111         let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8112         assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8113
8114         match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8115                 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8116                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8117                 }
8118                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8119         }
8120 }
8121
8122 #[test]
8123 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8124         let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8125         let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
8126         let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
8127         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
8128
8129         let unknown_channel_id = ChannelId::new_zero();
8130         let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
8131         match api_res {
8132                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8133                         assert_eq!(err, "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.");
8134                 },
8135                 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8136                 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected Error: {:?}", e),
8137         }
8138 }
8139
8140 #[test]
8141 fn test_onion_value_mpp_set_calculation() {
8142         // Test that we use the onion value `amt_to_forward` when
8143         // calculating whether we've reached the `total_msat` of an MPP
8144         // by having a routing node forward more than `amt_to_forward`
8145         // and checking that the receiving node doesn't generate
8146         // a PaymentClaimable event too early
8147         let node_count = 4;
8148         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8149         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8150         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8151         let mut nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8152
8153         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8154         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8155         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8156         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8157
8158         let total_msat = 100_000;
8159         let expected_paths: &[&[&Node]] = &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]];
8160         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], total_msat);
8161         let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8162
8163         let mut path_1 = sample_path.clone();
8164         path_1.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8165         path_1.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8166         path_1.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
8167         path_1.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8168         path_1.hops[1].fee_msat = 100_000;
8169         route.paths.push(path_1);
8170
8171         let mut path_2 = sample_path.clone();
8172         path_2.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8173         path_2.hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8174         path_2.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id();
8175         path_2.hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8176         path_2.hops[1].fee_msat = 1_000;
8177         route.paths.push(path_2);
8178
8179         // Send payment
8180         let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8181         let onion_session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8182                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8183         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8184                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8185         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], expected_paths.len());
8186
8187         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8188         assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8189
8190         // First path
8191         let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[0][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8192         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8193         let mut prev_node = &nodes[0];
8194
8195         for (idx, &node) in expected_paths[0].iter().enumerate() {
8196                 assert_eq!(node.node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
8197
8198                 if idx == 0 { // routing node
8199                         let session_priv = [3; 32];
8200                         let height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
8201                         let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv).unwrap();
8202                         let mut onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::new(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
8203                         let (mut onion_payloads, _, _) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 100_000,
8204                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), height + 1, &None).unwrap();
8205                         // Edit amt_to_forward to simulate the sender having set
8206                         // the final amount and the routing node taking less fee
8207                         if let msgs::OutboundOnionPayload::Receive { ref mut amt_msat, .. } = onion_payloads[1] {
8208                                 *amt_msat = 99_000;
8209                         } else { panic!() }
8210                         let new_onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash).unwrap();
8211                         payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet = new_onion_packet;
8212                 }
8213
8214                 node.node.handle_update_add_htlc(&prev_node.node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8215                 check_added_monitors!(node, 0);
8216                 commitment_signed_dance!(node, prev_node, payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8217                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(node);
8218
8219                 if idx == 0 {
8220                         let mut events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8221                         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8222                         check_added_monitors!(node, 1);
8223                         payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
8224                         assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
8225                 } else {
8226                         let events_2 = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8227                         assert!(events_2.is_empty());
8228                 }
8229
8230                 prev_node = node;
8231         }
8232
8233         // Second path
8234         let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_paths[1][0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8235         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], expected_paths[1], 101_000, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, true, None);
8236
8237         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8238 }
8239
8240 fn do_test_overshoot_mpp(msat_amounts: &[u64], total_msat: u64) {
8241
8242         let routing_node_count = msat_amounts.len();
8243         let node_count = routing_node_count + 2;
8244
8245         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(node_count);
8246         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(node_count, &chanmon_cfgs);
8247         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(node_count, &node_cfgs, &vec![None; node_count]);
8248         let nodes = create_network(node_count, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8249
8250         let src_idx = 0;
8251         let dst_idx = 1;
8252
8253         // Create channels for each amount
8254         let mut expected_paths = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8255         let mut src_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8256         let mut dst_chan_ids = Vec::with_capacity(routing_node_count);
8257         for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8258                 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8259                 let src_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, src_idx, routing_node).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8260                 src_chan_ids.push(src_chan_id);
8261                 let dst_chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, routing_node, dst_idx).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8262                 dst_chan_ids.push(dst_chan_id);
8263                 let path = vec![&nodes[routing_node], &nodes[dst_idx]];
8264                 expected_paths.push(path);
8265         }
8266         let expected_paths: Vec<&[&Node]> = expected_paths.iter().map(|route| route.as_slice()).collect();
8267
8268         // Create a route for each amount
8269         let example_amount = 100000;
8270         let (mut route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[src_idx], nodes[dst_idx], example_amount);
8271         let sample_path = route.paths.pop().unwrap();
8272         for i in 0..routing_node_count {
8273                 let routing_node = 2 + i;
8274                 let mut path = sample_path.clone();
8275                 path.hops[0].pubkey = nodes[routing_node].node.get_our_node_id();
8276                 path.hops[0].short_channel_id = src_chan_ids[i];
8277                 path.hops[1].pubkey = nodes[dst_idx].node.get_our_node_id();
8278                 path.hops[1].short_channel_id = dst_chan_ids[i];
8279                 path.hops[1].fee_msat = msat_amounts[i];
8280                 route.paths.push(path);
8281         }
8282
8283         // Send payment with manually set total_msat
8284         let payment_id = PaymentId(nodes[src_idx].keys_manager.backing.get_secure_random_bytes());
8285         let onion_session_privs = nodes[src_idx].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8286                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
8287         nodes[src_idx].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, our_payment_hash,
8288                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs).unwrap();
8289         check_added_monitors!(nodes[src_idx], expected_paths.len());
8290
8291         let mut events = nodes[src_idx].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8292         assert_eq!(events.len(), expected_paths.len());
8293         let mut amount_received = 0;
8294         for (path_idx, expected_path) in expected_paths.iter().enumerate() {
8295                 let ev = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&expected_path[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
8296
8297                 let current_path_amount = msat_amounts[path_idx];
8298                 amount_received += current_path_amount;
8299                 let became_claimable_now = amount_received >= total_msat && amount_received - current_path_amount < total_msat;
8300                 pass_along_path(&nodes[src_idx], expected_path, amount_received, our_payment_hash.clone(), Some(our_payment_secret), ev, became_claimable_now, None);
8301         }
8302
8303         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[src_idx], &expected_paths, false, our_payment_preimage);
8304 }
8305
8306 #[test]
8307 fn test_overshoot_mpp() {
8308         do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 101_000], 200_000);
8309         do_test_overshoot_mpp(&[100_000, 10_000, 100_000], 200_000);
8310 }
8311
8312 #[test]
8313 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8314         // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8315         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8316         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8317         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8318         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8319
8320         let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8321         let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8322         let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8323         let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8324
8325         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8326         let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8327         route.paths.push(path);
8328         route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8329         route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8330         route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8331         route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8332         route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8333         route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8334         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8335         claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8336 }
8337
8338 #[test]
8339 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8340         // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8341         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8342         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8343         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8344         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8345
8346         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8347
8348         {
8349                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
8350                 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8351                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8352                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8353                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8354                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8355                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8356                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8357                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8358         }
8359         // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8360         // values from previous calls.
8361         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8362         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8363         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8364         match events[0] {
8365                 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref purpose, .. } => {
8366                         match &purpose {
8367                                 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8368                                         claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8369                                 },
8370                                 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8371                         }
8372                 },
8373                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8374         }
8375 }
8376
8377 #[test]
8378 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8379         // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8380         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8381         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8382         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8383         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8384
8385         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8386
8387         let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8388         let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8389         let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, None).unwrap();
8390         let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8391
8392         // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8393         // resulting events.
8394         macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8395                 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8396                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8397                         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8398                         let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8399                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8400                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8401
8402                         // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8403                         // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8404                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8405                         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8406                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8407
8408                         // We should fail the payment back
8409                         let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8410                         match events.pop().unwrap() {
8411                                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8412                                         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8413                                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8414                                 },
8415                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8416                         }
8417                 }
8418         }
8419
8420         let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8421         // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8422         let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8423
8424         // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8425         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
8426                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8427         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8428         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8429
8430         // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8431         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8432                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8433         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8434         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8435
8436         // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8437         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, random_payment_hash,
8438                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8439         handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8440         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8441 }
8442
8443 #[test]
8444 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8445         // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8446         // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8447         // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8448         // error.
8449         //
8450         // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8451         // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8452         // commitment at same time.
8453
8454         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8455         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8456         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8457         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8458
8459         // Create some initial channel
8460         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8461         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8462
8463         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8464         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8465
8466         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8467         let (preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8468
8469         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8470         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8471         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8472         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8473         let watchtower = {
8474                 let new_monitor = {
8475                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8476                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
8477                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8478                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8479                         new_monitor
8480                 };
8481                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8482                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
8483                 watchtower
8484         };
8485         let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8486         // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8487         // transaction lock time requirements here.
8488         chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 200));
8489         watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8490
8491         // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8492         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8493         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8494         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8495
8496         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8497         assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8498         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8499         {
8500                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8501                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8502                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut channel) = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2) {
8503                         if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8504                                 assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
8505                                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8506                         } else { assert!(false); }
8507                 } else {
8508                         assert!(false);
8509                 }
8510         }
8511         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8512         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8513         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8514         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8515 }
8516
8517 #[test]
8518 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8519         // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8520         // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8521         // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8522         // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8523
8524         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8525         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8526         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8527         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8528
8529         // Create some initial channel
8530         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8531         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8532
8533         // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8534         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8535
8536         // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8537         route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8538
8539         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8540         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8541         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8542         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8543         let alice_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(
8544                 Arc::new(Mutex::new(nodes[0].blocks.lock().unwrap().clone())),
8545         );
8546         let watchtower_alice = {
8547                 let new_monitor = {
8548                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8549                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
8550                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8551                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8552                         new_monitor
8553                 };
8554                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &alice_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8555                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
8556                 watchtower
8557         };
8558         let block = create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new());
8559         // Make Alice aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating transaction lock time
8560         // requirements here.
8561         const HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST: u32 = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8562         alice_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST) as usize, (block.clone(), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST));
8563         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8564
8565         // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8566         let alice_state = {
8567                 let mut txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8568                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8569                 txn.remove(0)
8570         };
8571
8572         // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8573         let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8574         let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8575         let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8576         let bob_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::with_blocks(Arc::clone(&alice_broadcaster.blocks));
8577         let watchtower_bob = {
8578                 let new_monitor = {
8579                         let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8580                         let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<TestChannelSigner>)>::read(
8581                                         &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8582                         assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8583                         new_monitor
8584                 };
8585                 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &bob_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8586                 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), Ok(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed));
8587                 watchtower
8588         };
8589         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST - 1);
8590
8591         // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8592         let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8593         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8594                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8595         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8596
8597         let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8598         assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8599         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8600         {
8601                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8602                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8603                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut channel) = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2) {
8604                         if let Ok(Some(update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8605                                 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8606                                 assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
8607                                 assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8608                                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8609                         } else { assert!(false); }
8610                 } else {
8611                         assert!(false);
8612                 }
8613         }
8614         // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8615         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8616
8617         //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8618         watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, Vec::new()), HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST);
8619
8620         // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8621         let bob_state_y;
8622         {
8623                 let mut txn = bob_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8624                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8625                 bob_state_y = txn.remove(0);
8626         };
8627
8628         // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8629         let height = HTLC_TIMEOUT_BROADCAST + 1;
8630         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
8631         check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
8632         check_closed_event!(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false,
8633                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8634         watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&create_dummy_block(BlockHash::all_zeros(), 42, vec![bob_state_y.clone()]), height);
8635         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
8636         {
8637                 let htlc_txn = alice_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
8638                 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8639                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8640                 // Alice doesn't clean up the old HTLC claim since it hasn't seen a conflicting spend for
8641                 // it. However, she should, because it now has an invalid parent.
8642                 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], alice_state);
8643         }
8644 }
8645
8646 #[test]
8647 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8648         // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8649         // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8650         // message).
8651         //
8652         // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8653         // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8654         //
8655         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8656         // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8657         // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8658         // before receiving funding_signed.
8659         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8660         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8661         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8662         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8663
8664         // Create an initial channel
8665         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
8666         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8667         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8668         let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8669         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
8670
8671         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8672         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8673
8674         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8675         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8676
8677         let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8678         let channel_id = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8679         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8680         assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8681         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("Hi".to_string()) }, true,
8682                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8683 }
8684
8685 #[test]
8686 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8687         // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8688         // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8689         // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8690         // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8691         // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8692         // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8693
8694         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8695         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8696         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8697         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8698
8699         // Create some initial channels
8700         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8701
8702         send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8703         let (_, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8704         let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8705         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8706         assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8707         check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8708
8709         // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8710         let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![local_txn[0].clone()]);
8711         connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
8712         // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8713         // this test before #653 fix.
8714         chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &block, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8715         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8716         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8717         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8718         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
8719
8720         let htlc_timeout = {
8721                 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8722                 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8723                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8724                 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8725                 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
8726                 node_txn[0].clone()
8727         };
8728
8729         connect_block(&nodes[0], &create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![htlc_timeout.clone()]));
8730         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8731         expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
8732 }
8733
8734 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8735         // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8736         // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8737         // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8738         //
8739         // Steps of the test:
8740         // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8741         // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8742         // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8743         // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8744         // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8745         //    but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8746         // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8747         // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8748         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8749         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8750         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8751         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8752
8753         // Create some initial channels
8754         let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8755         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001);
8756
8757         // Steps (1) and (2):
8758         // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8759         let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8760
8761         // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8762         let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8763         check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8764         assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8765         check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8766         assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8767         assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8768
8769         // Steps (3) and (4):
8770         // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8771         // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8772         let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8773         let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8774
8775         // Bob force-closes
8776         if !broadcast_alice {
8777                 force_closing_node = 1;
8778                 counterparty_node = 0;
8779         }
8780         nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8781         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8782         check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8783         check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8784         if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8785                 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8786                         true => alice_txn.clone(),
8787                         false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8788                 };
8789                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8790                 if broadcast_alice {
8791                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8792                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8793                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8794                 }
8795         }
8796
8797         // Step (5):
8798         // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8799         // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8800         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8801         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8802         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8803
8804         let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8805         assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8806         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8807         assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8808         assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8809         assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8810
8811         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8812         let went_onchain = go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1;
8813         expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if went_onchain { None } else { Some(1000) }, went_onchain, false);
8814         // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8815         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8816                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8817                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8818                 match events[0] {
8819                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8820                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8821                         },
8822                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8823                 };
8824         }
8825         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8826         // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8827         // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8828         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8829
8830         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8831         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8832         let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8833                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8834                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8835                         (*msg).clone()
8836                 },
8837                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8838         };
8839         let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8840                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8841                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8842                         (*updates).clone()
8843                 },
8844                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8845         };
8846
8847         nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8848         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8849         nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8850         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8851
8852         let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8853         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8854         let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8855                 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8856                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8857                         (*msg).clone()
8858                 },
8859                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8860         };
8861         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8862         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8863
8864         // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8865         // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8866         let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8867         if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8868         if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8869                 connect_block(&nodes[1], &create_dummy_block(nodes[1].best_block_hash(), 42, vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]));
8870                 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8871                 if broadcast_alice {
8872                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8873                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8874                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
8875                 }
8876                 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8877                 if broadcast_alice {
8878                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8879                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8880                 } else {
8881                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8882                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8883                 }
8884         }
8885
8886         // Step (6):
8887         // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8888         // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8889         {
8890                 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8891                         true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8892                         false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8893                 };
8894                 // If Alice force-closed, Bob only broadcasts a HTLC-output-claiming transaction. Otherwise,
8895                 // Bob force-closed and broadcasts the commitment transaction along with a
8896                 // HTLC-output-claiming transaction.
8897                 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8898                 if broadcast_alice {
8899                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8900                         check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8901                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8902                 } else {
8903                         assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8904                         check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8905                         assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8906                 }
8907         }
8908 }
8909
8910 #[test]
8911 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8912         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8913         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8914         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8915         do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8916 }
8917
8918 #[test]
8919 fn test_duplicate_temporary_channel_id_from_different_peers() {
8920         // Tests that we can accept two different `OpenChannel` requests with the same
8921         // `temporary_channel_id`, as long as they are from different peers.
8922         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8923         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8924         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8925         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8926
8927         // Create an first channel channel
8928         nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
8929         let mut open_chan_msg_chan_1_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8930
8931         // Create an second channel
8932         nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None, None).unwrap();
8933         let mut open_chan_msg_chan_2_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8934
8935         // Modify the `OpenChannel` from `nodes[2]` to `nodes[0]` to ensure that it uses the same
8936         // `temporary_channel_id` as the `OpenChannel` from nodes[1] to nodes[0].
8937         open_chan_msg_chan_2_0.temporary_channel_id = open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id;
8938
8939         // Assert that `nodes[0]` can accept both `OpenChannel` requests, even though they use the same
8940         // `temporary_channel_id` as they are from different peers.
8941         nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_1_0);
8942         {
8943                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8944                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8945                 match &events[0] {
8946                         MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8947                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8948                                 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8949                         },
8950                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8951                 }
8952         }
8953
8954         nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_2_0);
8955         {
8956                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8957                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8958                 match &events[0] {
8959                         MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8960                                 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8961                                 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8962                         },
8963                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8964                 }
8965         }
8966 }
8967
8968 #[test]
8969 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8970         // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8971         // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8972         //
8973         // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8974         // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8975         // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8976         // updating logic for the existing channel.
8977         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8978         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8979         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8980         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8981
8982         // Create an initial channel
8983         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
8984         let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8985         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8986         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8987
8988         // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8989         // that it is rejected.
8990         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8991         {
8992                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8993                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8994                 match events[0] {
8995                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8996                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8997                                 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8998                                 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8999                                 // move forward with it.
9000                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9001                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9002                         },
9003                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9004                 }
9005         }
9006
9007         // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9008         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9009
9010         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9011         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9012
9013         let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9014         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9015         {
9016                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9017                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9018                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9019                 added_monitors.clear();
9020         }
9021         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9022
9023         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9024
9025         let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
9026         let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
9027
9028         // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
9029         // temporary one).
9030
9031         // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
9032         // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
9033         // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
9034         open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
9035         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
9036         {
9037                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9038                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9039                 match events[0] {
9040                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9041                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9042                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9043                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9044                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9045                         },
9046                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9047                 }
9048         }
9049
9050         // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9051         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9052         let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9053         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9054         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9055         create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9056
9057         let (_, funding_created) = {
9058                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9059                 let mut a_peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9060                 // Once we call `get_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
9061                 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
9062                 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
9063                 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
9064                 match a_peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap() {
9065                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
9066                                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9067                                 chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap()
9068                         },
9069                         _ => panic!("Unexpected ChannelPhase variant"),
9070                 }
9071         };
9072         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9073         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created.unwrap());
9074         // At this point we'll look up if the channel_id is present and immediately fail the channel
9075         // without trying to persist the `ChannelMonitor`.
9076         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9077
9078         // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9079         {
9080                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9081                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9082                 match events[0] {
9083                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9084                                 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9085                                 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9086                                 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9087                                 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9088                         },
9089                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9090                 }
9091         }
9092
9093         // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9094         // everything is functional.
9095         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9096         {
9097                 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9098                 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9099                 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9100                 added_monitors.clear();
9101         }
9102         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9103
9104         let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9105         assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9106         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9107         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9108
9109         let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9110         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9111         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9112
9113         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9114 }
9115
9116 #[test]
9117 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9118         // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9119         //
9120         // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9121         // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9122         // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9123         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9124         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9125         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9126         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9127
9128         // Create some initial channels
9129         let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9130         let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9131         let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001);
9132
9133         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9134         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9135         assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9136
9137         // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9138         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9139         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9140
9141         // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9142         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9143         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9144         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9145         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) },
9146                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9147         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9148         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9149         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9150         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9151
9152         // A null channel ID should close all channels
9153         let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9154         nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: ChannelId::new_zero(), data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9155         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9156         check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString("ERR".to_string()) },
9157                 [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(); 2], 100000);
9158         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9159         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9160         match events[0] {
9161                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9162                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9163                 },
9164                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9165         }
9166         match events[1] {
9167                 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9168                         assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9169                 },
9170                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9171         }
9172         // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9173         // peer_disconnected.
9174         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9175         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9176
9177         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9178         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9179         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9180 }
9181
9182 #[test]
9183 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9184         // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9185         //
9186         // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9187         // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9188         // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9189         // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9190         //
9191         // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
9192         // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
9193         // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
9194         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9195         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9196         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9197         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9198
9199         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9200         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9201         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9202
9203         let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9204
9205         // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
9206         // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
9207         // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
9208         // its length.
9209         let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
9210         let wit_program_script: ScriptBuf = wit_program.into();
9211         for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9212                 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9213                 output.script_pubkey = ScriptBuf::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
9214         }
9215
9216         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9217         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9218         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9219         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9220
9221         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9222         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9223         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9224
9225         let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9226         assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9227
9228         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9229         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9230         nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9231
9232         let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9233         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9234         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() },
9235                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9236         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9237         let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9238         assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9239         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9240                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9241                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg } = action {
9242                         assert_eq!(msg.as_ref().unwrap().data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9243                 } else { panic!(); }
9244         } else { panic!(); }
9245         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9246
9247         // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
9248         // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
9249         // as its not 32 bytes long.
9250         let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
9251                 version: 2i32, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
9252                 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
9253                         previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
9254                                 txid: tx.txid(),
9255                                 vout: idx as u32,
9256                         },
9257                         script_sig: ScriptBuf::new(),
9258                         sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
9259                         witness: Witness::from_slice(&channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
9260                 }).collect(),
9261                 output: vec![TxOut {
9262                         value: 1000,
9263                         script_pubkey: ScriptBuf::new(),
9264                 }]
9265         };
9266         check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
9267         mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
9268 }
9269
9270 #[test]
9271 fn test_coinbase_funding_tx() {
9272         // Miners are able to fund channels directly from coinbase transactions, however
9273         // by consensus rules, outputs of a coinbase transaction are encumbered by a 100
9274         // block maturity timelock. To ensure that a (non-0conf) channel like this is enforceable
9275         // on-chain, the minimum depth is updated to 100 blocks for coinbase funding transactions.
9276         //
9277         // Note that 0conf channels with coinbase funding transactions are unaffected and are
9278         // immediately operational after opening.
9279         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9280         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9281         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9282         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9283
9284         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9285         let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9286
9287         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9288         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9289
9290         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9291
9292         // Create the coinbase funding transaction.
9293         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_coinbase_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9294
9295         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9296         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9297         let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9298
9299         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9300         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9301         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9302
9303         let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9304
9305         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9306         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9307
9308         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9309         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9310
9311         // Starting at height 0, we "confirm" the coinbase at height 1.
9312         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 1);
9313         // We connect 98 more blocks to have 99 confirmations for the coinbase transaction.
9314         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], COINBASE_MATURITY - 2);
9315         // Check that we have no pending message events (we have not queued a `channel_ready` yet).
9316         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9317         // Now connect one more block which results in 100 confirmations of the coinbase transaction.
9318         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 1);
9319         // There should now be a `channel_ready` which can be handled.
9320         let _ = &nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(&nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9321
9322         confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9323         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], COINBASE_MATURITY - 2);
9324         assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9325         connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
9326         expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9327         create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9328 }
9329
9330 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9331         // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9332         // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9333         // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9334         // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9335         // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9336         // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9337         // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9338         // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9339         // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9340         // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9341         // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9342         // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9343         // until we learned about an additional block.
9344         //
9345         // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9346         // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9347         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9348         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9349         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9350         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9351         *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9352
9353         create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9354         let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
9355         let (_, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9356         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9357         nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9358
9359         nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9360         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9361         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
9362         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9363         let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9364         assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9365
9366         let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9367         if !test_height_before_timelock {
9368                 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9369         }
9370         nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9371                 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9372         if test_height_before_timelock {
9373                 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9374                 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9375                 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9376                 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9377         } else {
9378                 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9379                 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9380                 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9381                 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0].txid(), node_txn[0].txid());
9382                 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9383                 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9384                 // timelock is up).
9385                 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9386                 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9387
9388                 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9389                 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9390                 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9391                 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9392                         &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9393                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
9394                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9395
9396                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9397                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9398                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9399                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9400                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9401                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9402                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9403                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9404                 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9405         }
9406 }
9407
9408 #[test]
9409 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9410         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9411         do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9412 }
9413
9414 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9415         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9416         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9417         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9418         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9419
9420         let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9421
9422         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9423                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[1].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
9424         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000).unwrap();
9425
9426         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9427
9428         {
9429                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9430                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9431                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9432                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9433                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9434                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9435                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9436                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9437         }
9438         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9439         expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9440
9441         {
9442                 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
9443                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
9444                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
9445                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9446                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9447                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9448                 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9449                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9450                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9451                 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9452                 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9453                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9454                 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9455         }
9456
9457         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9458         nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9459
9460         if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9461                 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9462                 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9463
9464                 let expected_destinations = vec![
9465                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9466                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9467                 ];
9468                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1],  expected_destinations);
9469                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9470
9471                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9472                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9473                 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9474
9475                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9476                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9477                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9478
9479                 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9480                 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 4);
9481                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9482                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9483                 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
9484                 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
9485         } else {
9486                 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9487                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9488                 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9489
9490                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9491                 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9492                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9493                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9494
9495                 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
9496
9497                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9498         }
9499 }
9500
9501 #[test]
9502 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9503         // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9504         // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentClaimable` event.
9505         // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9506         // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9507         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9508 }
9509
9510 #[test]
9511 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9512         // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9513         // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9514         do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9515 }
9516
9517 #[test]
9518 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9519         // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9520         // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9521         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9522         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9523         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9524         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9525
9526         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9527         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9528         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9529         let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9530
9531         let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9532                 .with_bolt11_features(nodes[3].node.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
9533         let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000).unwrap();
9534         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9535         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9536                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9537                 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9538                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9539         });
9540
9541         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9542
9543         let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9544         let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9545
9546         let session_privs = {
9547                 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
9548                 // ultimately have, just not right away.
9549                 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
9550                 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9551                 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9552                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9553         };
9554         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9555                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9556                 &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9557         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9558
9559         {
9560                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9561                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9562                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9563         }
9564         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9565
9566         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9567                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9568         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9569
9570         {
9571                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9572                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9573                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9574
9575                 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9576                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9577
9578                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9579                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9580
9581                 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9582                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9583                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9584
9585                 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9586                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9587                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9588
9589                 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9590                 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9591                 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9592         }
9593         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9594         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9595         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9596         nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9597
9598         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9599
9600         let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9601         nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9602         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9603
9604         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9605         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9606
9607         let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9608         nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9609         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9610
9611         expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9612
9613         nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9614                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id,
9615                 &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9616         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9617
9618         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9619         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9620         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9621
9622         do_claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9623         expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], our_payment_preimage, Some(None), true, true);
9624 }
9625
9626 #[test]
9627 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9628         // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentClaimable event, the HTLCs
9629         // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9630         // PaymentClaimable event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9631         // amount.
9632         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9633         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9634         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9635         let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9636
9637         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9638         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9639         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9640         create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9641
9642         let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9643         assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9644         route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9645                 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9646                 if path_a.hops[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9647                         core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9648         });
9649
9650         send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9651         // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentClaimable event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9652         // amount of time to respond to.
9653
9654         // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9655         connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9656         connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9657
9658         let failed_destinations = vec![
9659                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9660                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9661         ];
9662         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
9663
9664         pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash, PaymentFailureReason::RecipientRejected);
9665
9666         // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9667         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9668                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9669         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9670
9671         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9672         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9673         let node_1_msgs = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
9674         pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), node_1_msgs, false, None);
9675
9676         // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9677         // that PaymentClaimable event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9678         nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9679         check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9680         assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9681 }
9682
9683 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9684 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9685 enum ExposureEvent {
9686         /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9687         AtHTLCForward,
9688         /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9689         AtHTLCReception,
9690         /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9691         AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9692 }
9693
9694 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool, multiplier_dust_limit: bool) {
9695         // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9696         // policy.
9697         //
9698         // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9699         // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9700         // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9701         // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9702         // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9703         // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9704         // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9705         // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9706
9707         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9708         let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9709         config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = if multiplier_dust_limit {
9710                 // Default test fee estimator rate is 253 sat/kw, so we set the multiplier to 5_000_000 / 253
9711                 // to get roughly the same initial value as the default setting when this test was
9712                 // originally written.
9713                 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253)
9714         } else { MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(5_000_000) }; // initial default setting value
9715         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9716         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9717         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9718
9719         nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9720         let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9721         open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9722         open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9723         if on_holder_tx {
9724                 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9725         }
9726         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9727         let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9728         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9729
9730         let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9731
9732         let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9733
9734         if on_holder_tx {
9735                 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
9736                 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
9737                 match get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id) {
9738                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
9739                                 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9740                         },
9741                         _ => panic!("Unexpected ChannelPhase variant"),
9742                 }
9743         }
9744
9745         nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9746         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9747         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9748         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9749
9750         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9751         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9752         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9753
9754         let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9755         let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9756         update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9757
9758         // Fetch a route in advance as we will be unable to once we're unable to send.
9759         let (mut route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) =
9760                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000);
9761
9762         let (dust_buffer_feerate, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat) = {
9763                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9764                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9765                 let chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9766                 (chan.context().get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64,
9767                 chan.context().get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator(nodes[0].fee_estimator)))
9768         };
9769         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9770         let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9771
9772         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(&channel_type_features) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9773         let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9774
9775         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 4;
9776         let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9777
9778         if on_holder_tx {
9779                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9780                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9781                         // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9782                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9783                         for _ in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9784                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9785                                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9786                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9787                         }
9788                 } else {
9789                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9790                         // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9791                         // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9792                         for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9793                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9794                         }
9795                 }
9796         } else {
9797                 if dust_outbound_balance {
9798                         // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9799                         // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9800                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
9801                                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9802                                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9803                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9804                         }
9805                 } else {
9806                         // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9807                         // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9808                         for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1 {
9809                                 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9810                         }
9811                 }
9812         }
9813
9814         if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9815                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat =
9816                         if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 1 };
9817                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9818                 if on_holder_tx {
9819                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9820                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
9821                                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
9822                 } else {
9823                         unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9824                                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)
9825                                 ), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { .. }, {});
9826                 }
9827         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9828                 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 4 });
9829                 nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9830                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9831                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9832                 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9833                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9834                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9835                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9836                 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9837                 if on_holder_tx {
9838                         // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9839                         let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9840                         let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9841                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9842                 } else {
9843                         // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9844                         nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
9845                                 format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
9846                                         dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx - 1) + dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat + 4,
9847                                         max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9848                 }
9849         } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9850                 route.paths[0].hops.last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat = 2_500_000;
9851                 // For the multiplier dust exposure limit, since it scales with feerate,
9852                 // we need to add a lot of HTLCs that will become dust at the new feerate
9853                 // to cross the threshold.
9854                 for _ in 0..20 {
9855                         let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash(&nodes[1], Some(1_000), None);
9856                         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9857                                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9858                 }
9859                 {
9860                         let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9861                         *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9862                 }
9863                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9864                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9865                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel", "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure", 1);
9866         }
9867
9868         let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9869         let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9870         added_monitors.clear();
9871 }
9872
9873 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(multiplier_dust_limit: bool) {
9874         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
9875         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
9876         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
9877         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
9878         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
9879         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
9880         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
9881         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
9882         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
9883         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
9884         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false, multiplier_dust_limit);
9885         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true, multiplier_dust_limit);
9886 }
9887
9888 #[test]
9889 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9890         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(false);
9891         do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure_by_threshold_type(true);
9892 }
9893
9894 #[test]
9895 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
9896         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9897         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9898         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9899         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9900
9901         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9902         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9903         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
9904         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9905         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
9906
9907         let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
9908
9909         let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
9910         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9911         let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::ScriptBuf::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_slice(&[&[1]]) };
9912         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9913         let mut tx = match events[0] {
9914                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
9915                         // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 1.
9916                         Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: LockTime::from_height(best_height + 2).unwrap(), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
9917                                 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9918                         }]}
9919                 },
9920                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9921         };
9922         // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
9923         match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
9924                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9925                         assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
9926                 },
9927                 _ => panic!()
9928         }
9929         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9930         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9931         match events[0] {
9932                 Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, .. } => {
9933                         assert_eq!(channel_id, temp_channel_id);
9934                 },
9935                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9936         }
9937 }
9938
9939 #[test]
9940 fn test_non_final_funding_tx_within_headroom() {
9941         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9942         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9943         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9944         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9945
9946         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
9947         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9948         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
9949         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9950         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
9951
9952         let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
9953
9954         let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
9955         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9956         let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::ScriptBuf::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_slice(&[[1]]) };
9957         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9958         let mut tx = match events[0] {
9959                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
9960                         // Timelock the transaction within a +1 headroom from the best block.
9961                         Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: LockTime::from_consensus(best_height + 1), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
9962                                 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9963                         }]}
9964                 },
9965                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9966         };
9967
9968         // Transaction should be accepted if it's in a +1 headroom from best block.
9969         assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
9970         get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9971 }
9972
9973 #[test]
9974 fn accept_busted_but_better_fee() {
9975         // If a peer sends us a fee update that is too low, but higher than our previous channel
9976         // feerate, we should accept it. In the future we may want to consider closing the channel
9977         // later, but for now we only accept the update.
9978         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9979         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9980         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9981         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9982
9983         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9984
9985         // Set nodes[1] to expect 5,000 sat/kW.
9986         {
9987                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9988                 *feerate_lock = 5000;
9989         }
9990
9991         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept it.
9992         {
9993                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9994                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9995         }
9996         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9997         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9998
9999         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10000         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10001         match events[0] {
10002                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
10003                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10004                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
10005                 },
10006                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10007         };
10008
10009         // If nodes[0] increases their feerate further, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept
10010         // it.
10011         {
10012                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10013                 *feerate_lock = 2000;
10014         }
10015         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10016         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10017
10018         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10019         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10020         match events[0] {
10021                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
10022                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10023                         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
10024                 },
10025                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10026         };
10027
10028         // However, if nodes[0] decreases their feerate, nodes[1] should reject it and close the
10029         // channel.
10030         {
10031                 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
10032                 *feerate_lock = 1000;
10033         }
10034         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10035         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10036
10037         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10038         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10039         match events[0] {
10040                 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
10041                         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10042                         check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
10043                                 err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000".to_owned() },
10044                                 [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10045                         check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
10046                         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10047                 },
10048                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10049         };
10050 }
10051
10052 fn do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(valid_delta: bool, use_user_hash: bool) {
10053         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10054         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10055         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10056         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10057         let min_final_cltv_expiry_delta = 120;
10058         let final_cltv_expiry_delta = if valid_delta { min_final_cltv_expiry_delta + 2 } else {
10059                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta - 2 };
10060         let recv_value = 100_000;
10061
10062         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10063
10064         let payment_parameters = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32);
10065         let (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = if use_user_hash {
10066                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1],
10067                         Some(recv_value), Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta));
10068                 (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret)
10069         } else {
10070                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(recv_value), 7200, Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)).unwrap();
10071                 (payment_hash, nodes[1].node.get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret).unwrap(), payment_secret)
10072         };
10073         let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_parameters, recv_value).unwrap();
10074         nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10075                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10076         check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10077         let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10078         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10079         let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
10080         nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10081         commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10082         expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10083
10084         if valid_delta {
10085                 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, recv_value, if use_user_hash {
10086                         None } else { Some(payment_preimage) }, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10087
10088                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
10089         } else {
10090                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10091
10092                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10093
10094                 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10095                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10096                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
10097
10098                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10099         }
10100 }
10101
10102 #[test]
10103 fn test_payment_with_custom_min_cltv_expiry_delta() {
10104         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, false);
10105         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, true);
10106         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, false);
10107         do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, true);
10108 }
10109
10110 #[test]
10111 fn test_disconnects_peer_awaiting_response_ticks() {
10112         // Tests that nodes which are awaiting on a response critical for channel responsiveness
10113         // disconnect their counterparty after `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10114         let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10115         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10116         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10117         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10118
10119         // Asserts a disconnect event is queued to the user.
10120         let check_disconnect_event = |node: &Node, should_disconnect: bool| {
10121                 let disconnect_event = node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
10122                         if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action, .. } = event {
10123                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning { .. } = action {
10124                                         Some(())
10125                                 } else {
10126                                         None
10127                                 }
10128                         } else {
10129                                 None
10130                         }
10131                 );
10132                 assert_eq!(disconnect_event.is_some(), should_disconnect);
10133         };
10134
10135         // Fires timer ticks ensuring we only attempt to disconnect peers after reaching
10136         // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10137         let check_disconnect = |node: &Node| {
10138                 // No disconnect without any timer ticks.
10139                 check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10140
10141                 // No disconnect with 1 timer tick less than required.
10142                 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS - 1 {
10143                         node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10144                         check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10145                 }
10146
10147                 // Disconnect after reaching the required ticks.
10148                 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10149                 check_disconnect_event(node, true);
10150
10151                 // Disconnect again on the next tick if the peer hasn't been disconnected yet.
10152                 node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10153                 check_disconnect_event(node, true);
10154         };
10155
10156         create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10157
10158         // We'll start by performing a fee update with Alice (nodes[0]) on the channel.
10159         *nodes[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap() *= 2;
10160         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10161         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
10162         let alice_fee_update = get_htlc_update_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10163         nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), alice_fee_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
10164         nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_fee_update.commitment_signed);
10165         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[1], 1);
10166
10167         // This will prompt Bob (nodes[1]) to respond with his `CommitmentSigned` and `RevokeAndACK`.
10168         let (bob_revoke_and_ack, bob_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(&nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10169         nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revoke_and_ack);
10170         check_added_monitors!(&nodes[0], 1);
10171         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_commitment_signed);
10172         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10173
10174         // Alice then needs to send her final `RevokeAndACK` to complete the commitment dance. We
10175         // pretend Bob hasn't received the message and check whether he'll disconnect Alice after
10176         // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10177         let alice_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10178         check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
10179
10180         // Now, we'll reconnect them to test awaiting a `ChannelReestablish` message.
10181         //
10182         // Note that since the commitment dance didn't complete above, Alice is expected to resend her
10183         // final `RevokeAndACK` to Bob to complete it.
10184         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10185         nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10186         let bob_init = msgs::Init {
10187                 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10188         };
10189         nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_init, true).unwrap();
10190         let alice_init = msgs::Init {
10191                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10192         };
10193         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_init, true).unwrap();
10194
10195         // Upon reconnection, Alice sends her `ChannelReestablish` to Bob. Alice, however, hasn't
10196         // received Bob's yet, so she should disconnect him after reaching
10197         // `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10198         let alice_channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
10199                 nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()
10200         );
10201         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_channel_reestablish);
10202         check_disconnect(&nodes[0]);
10203
10204         // Bob now sends his `ChannelReestablish` to Alice to resume the channel and consider it "live".
10205         let bob_channel_reestablish = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().iter().find_map(|event|
10206                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = event {
10207                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10208                         Some(msg.clone())
10209                 } else {
10210                         None
10211                 }
10212         ).unwrap();
10213         nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_channel_reestablish);
10214
10215         // Sanity check that Alice won't disconnect Bob since she's no longer waiting for any messages.
10216         for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
10217                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10218                 check_disconnect_event(&nodes[0], false);
10219         }
10220
10221         // However, Bob is still waiting on Alice's `RevokeAndACK`, so he should disconnect her after
10222         // reaching `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`.
10223         check_disconnect(&nodes[1]);
10224
10225         // Finally, have Bob process the last message.
10226         nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &alice_revoke_and_ack);
10227         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10228
10229         // At this point, neither node should attempt to disconnect each other, since they aren't
10230         // waiting on any messages.
10231         for node in &nodes {
10232                 for _ in 0..DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS {
10233                         node.node.timer_tick_occurred();
10234                         check_disconnect_event(node, false);
10235                 }
10236         }
10237 }
10238
10239 #[test]
10240 fn test_remove_expired_outbound_unfunded_channels() {
10241         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10242         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10243         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10244         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10245
10246         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10247         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10248         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10249         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10250         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10251
10252         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10253         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10254         match events[0] {
10255                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => (),
10256                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10257         };
10258
10259         // Asserts the outbound channel has been removed from a nodes[0]'s peer state map.
10260         let check_outbound_channel_existence = |should_exist: bool| {
10261                 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10262                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10263                 assert_eq!(chan_lock.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temp_channel_id), should_exist);
10264         };
10265
10266         // Channel should exist without any timer ticks.
10267         check_outbound_channel_existence(true);
10268
10269         // Channel should exist with 1 timer tick less than required.
10270         for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS - 1 {
10271                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10272                 check_outbound_channel_existence(true)
10273         }
10274
10275         // Remove channel after reaching the required ticks.
10276         nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10277         check_outbound_channel_existence(false);
10278
10279         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10280         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10281         match msg_events[0] {
10282                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
10283                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake");
10284                 },
10285                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10286         }
10287         check_closed_event(&nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10288 }
10289
10290 #[test]
10291 fn test_remove_expired_inbound_unfunded_channels() {
10292         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10293         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10294         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10295         let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10296
10297         let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
10298         let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10299         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
10300         let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10301         nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
10302
10303         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10304         assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10305         match events[0] {
10306                 Event::FundingGenerationReady { .. } => (),
10307                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10308         };
10309
10310         // Asserts the inbound channel has been removed from a nodes[1]'s peer state map.
10311         let check_inbound_channel_existence = |should_exist: bool| {
10312                 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10313                 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10314                 assert_eq!(chan_lock.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temp_channel_id), should_exist);
10315         };
10316
10317         // Channel should exist without any timer ticks.
10318         check_inbound_channel_existence(true);
10319
10320         // Channel should exist with 1 timer tick less than required.
10321         for _ in 0..UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS - 1 {
10322                 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10323                 check_inbound_channel_existence(true)
10324         }
10325
10326         // Remove channel after reaching the required ticks.
10327         nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10328         check_inbound_channel_existence(false);
10329
10330         let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10331         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10332         match msg_events[0] {
10333                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
10334                         assert_eq!(msg.data, "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake");
10335                 },
10336                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10337         }
10338         check_closed_event(&nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10339 }
10340
10341 fn do_test_multi_post_event_actions(do_reload: bool) {
10342         // Tests handling multiple post-Event actions at once.
10343         // There is specific code in ChannelManager to handle channels where multiple post-Event
10344         // `ChannelMonitorUpdates` are pending at once. This test exercises that code.
10345         //
10346         // Specifically, we test calling `get_and_clear_pending_events` while there are two
10347         // PaymentSents from different channels and one channel has two pending `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s
10348         // - one from an RAA and one from an inbound commitment_signed.
10349         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10350         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10351         let (persister, chain_monitor);
10352         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10353         let nodes_0_deserialized;
10354         let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10355
10356         let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
10357         let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).2;
10358
10359         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
10360         send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
10361
10362         let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
10363         let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
10364
10365         nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
10366         check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10367         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 1_000_000);
10368
10369         nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
10370         check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
10371         expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 1_000_000);
10372
10373         for dest in &[1, 2] {
10374                 let htlc_fulfill_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[*dest], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10375                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[*dest].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fulfill_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10376                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[*dest], htlc_fulfill_updates.commitment_signed, false);
10377                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 0);
10378         }
10379
10380         let (route, payment_hash_3, _, payment_secret_3) =
10381                 get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 100_000);
10382         let payment_id = PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0);
10383         nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash_3,
10384                 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret_3), payment_id).unwrap();
10385         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10386
10387         let send_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
10388         nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.msgs[0]);
10389         nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_event.commitment_msg);
10390         assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
10391
10392         if do_reload {
10393                 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
10394                 let chan_0_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).encode();
10395                 let chan_1_monitor_serialized = get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_2).encode();
10396                 reload_node!(nodes[0], test_default_channel_config(), &nodes_0_serialized, &[&chan_0_monitor_serialized, &chan_1_monitor_serialized], persister, chain_monitor, nodes_0_deserialized);
10397
10398                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10399                 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10400
10401                 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]));
10402                 reconnect_nodes(ReconnectArgs::new(&nodes[0], &nodes[2]));
10403         }
10404
10405         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10406         assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
10407         if let Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } = events[0] {
10408                 assert!(payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage || payment_preimage == payment_preimage_2);
10409         } else { panic!(); }
10410         if let Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, .. } = events[1] {
10411                 assert!(payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage || payment_preimage == payment_preimage_2);
10412         } else { panic!(); }
10413         if let Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } = events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
10414         if let Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } = events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
10415
10416         // After the events are processed, the ChannelMonitorUpdates will be released and, upon their
10417         // completion, we'll respond to nodes[1] with an RAA + CS.
10418         get_revoke_commit_msgs(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10419         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 3);
10420 }
10421
10422 #[test]
10423 fn test_multi_post_event_actions() {
10424         do_test_multi_post_event_actions(true);
10425         do_test_multi_post_event_actions(false);
10426 }
10427
10428 #[test]
10429 fn test_batch_channel_open() {
10430         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10431         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10432         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10433         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10434
10435         // Initiate channel opening and create the batch channel funding transaction.
10436         let (tx, funding_created_msgs) = create_batch_channel_funding(&nodes[0], &[
10437                 (&nodes[1], 100_000, 0, 42, None),
10438                 (&nodes[2], 200_000, 0, 43, None),
10439         ]);
10440
10441         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 1.
10442         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[0]);
10443         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10444         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10445
10446         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10447         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10448         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10449
10450         // The transaction should not have been broadcast before all channels are ready.
10451         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10452
10453         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 2.
10454         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[1]);
10455         check_added_monitors(&nodes[2], 1);
10456         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[2], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10457
10458         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10459         chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
10460         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10461         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10462
10463         // The transaction should not have been broadcast before persisting all monitors has been
10464         // completed.
10465         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
10466         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
10467
10468         // Complete the persistence of the monitor.
10469         nodes[0].chain_monitor.complete_sole_pending_chan_update(
10470                 &OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 }.to_channel_id()
10471         );
10472         let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10473
10474         // The transaction should only have been broadcast now.
10475         let broadcasted_txs = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
10476         assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs.len(), 1);
10477         assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0], tx);
10478
10479         assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10480         assert!(events.iter().any(|e| matches!(
10481                 *e,
10482                 crate::events::Event::ChannelPending {
10483                         ref counterparty_node_id,
10484                         ..
10485                 } if counterparty_node_id == &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
10486         )));
10487         assert!(events.iter().any(|e| matches!(
10488                 *e,
10489                 crate::events::Event::ChannelPending {
10490                         ref counterparty_node_id,
10491                         ..
10492                 } if counterparty_node_id == &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
10493         )));
10494 }
10495
10496 #[test]
10497 fn test_disconnect_in_funding_batch() {
10498         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10499         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10500         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10501         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10502
10503         // Initiate channel opening and create the batch channel funding transaction.
10504         let (tx, funding_created_msgs) = create_batch_channel_funding(&nodes[0], &[
10505                 (&nodes[1], 100_000, 0, 42, None),
10506                 (&nodes[2], 200_000, 0, 43, None),
10507         ]);
10508
10509         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 1.
10510         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[0]);
10511         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10512         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10513
10514         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10515         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10516         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10517
10518         // The transaction should not have been broadcast before all channels are ready.
10519         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
10520
10521         // The remaining peer in the batch disconnects.
10522         nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
10523
10524         // The channels in the batch will close immediately.
10525         let channel_id_1 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id();
10526         let channel_id_2 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 }.to_channel_id();
10527         check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[
10528                 ExpectedCloseEvent {
10529                         channel_id: Some(channel_id_1),
10530                         discard_funding: true,
10531                         ..Default::default()
10532                 },
10533                 ExpectedCloseEvent {
10534                         channel_id: Some(channel_id_2),
10535                         discard_funding: true,
10536                         ..Default::default()
10537                 },
10538         ]);
10539
10540         // The monitor should become closed.
10541         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10542         {
10543                 let mut monitor_updates = nodes[0].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
10544                 let monitor_updates_1 = monitor_updates.get(&channel_id_1).unwrap();
10545                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1.len(), 1);
10546                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1[0].update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
10547         }
10548
10549         // The funding transaction should not have been broadcast, and therefore, we don't need
10550         // to broadcast a force-close transaction for the closed monitor.
10551         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
10552
10553         // Ensure the channels don't exist anymore.
10554         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
10555 }
10556
10557 #[test]
10558 fn test_batch_funding_close_after_funding_signed() {
10559         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10560         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10561         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10562         let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10563
10564         // Initiate channel opening and create the batch channel funding transaction.
10565         let (tx, funding_created_msgs) = create_batch_channel_funding(&nodes[0], &[
10566                 (&nodes[1], 100_000, 0, 42, None),
10567                 (&nodes[2], 200_000, 0, 43, None),
10568         ]);
10569
10570         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 1.
10571         nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[0]);
10572         check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
10573         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10574
10575         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10576         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10577         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10578
10579         // Go through the funding_created and funding_signed flow with node 2.
10580         nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msgs[1]);
10581         check_added_monitors(&nodes[2], 1);
10582         expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[2], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10583
10584         let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10585         chanmon_cfgs[0].persister.set_update_ret(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress);
10586         nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
10587         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
10588
10589         // The transaction should not have been broadcast before all channels are ready.
10590         assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast().len(), 0);
10591
10592         // Force-close the channel for which we've completed the initial monitor.
10593         let channel_id_1 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id();
10594         let channel_id_2 = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 1 }.to_channel_id();
10595         nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id_1, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10596         check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 2);
10597         {
10598                 let mut monitor_updates = nodes[0].chain_monitor.monitor_updates.lock().unwrap();
10599                 let monitor_updates_1 = monitor_updates.get(&channel_id_1).unwrap();
10600                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1.len(), 1);
10601                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_1[0].update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
10602                 let monitor_updates_2 = monitor_updates.get(&channel_id_2).unwrap();
10603                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_2.len(), 1);
10604                 assert_eq!(monitor_updates_2[0].update_id, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID);
10605         }
10606         let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10607         match msg_events[0] {
10608                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => (),
10609                 _ => panic!("Unexpected message."),
10610         }
10611
10612         // We broadcast the commitment transaction as part of the force-close.
10613         {
10614                 let broadcasted_txs = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
10615                 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs.len(), 1);
10616                 assert!(broadcasted_txs[0].txid() != tx.txid());
10617                 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input.len(), 1);
10618                 assert_eq!(broadcasted_txs[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
10619         }
10620
10621         // All channels in the batch should close immediately.
10622         check_closed_events(&nodes[0], &[
10623                 ExpectedCloseEvent {
10624                         channel_id: Some(channel_id_1),
10625                         discard_funding: true,
10626                         ..Default::default()
10627                 },
10628                 ExpectedCloseEvent {
10629                         channel_id: Some(channel_id_2),
10630                         discard_funding: true,
10631                         ..Default::default()
10632                 },
10633         ]);
10634
10635         // Ensure the channels don't exist anymore.
10636         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
10637 }
10638
10639 fn do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(confirm_remote_commitment: bool) {
10640         // Tests that a node will forget the channel (when it only requires 1 confirmation) if the
10641         // funding and commitment transaction confirm in the same block.
10642         let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10643         let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10644         let mut min_depth_1_block_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10645         min_depth_1_block_cfg.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
10646         let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(min_depth_1_block_cfg), Some(min_depth_1_block_cfg)]);
10647         let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10648
10649         let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
10650         let chan_id = chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id();
10651
10652         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
10653         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
10654
10655         let (closing_node, other_node) = if confirm_remote_commitment {
10656                 (&nodes[1], &nodes[0])
10657         } else {
10658                 (&nodes[0], &nodes[1])
10659         };
10660
10661         closing_node.node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &other_node.node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10662         let mut msg_events = closing_node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10663         assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
10664         match msg_events.pop().unwrap() {
10665                 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { .. }, .. } => {},
10666                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10667         }
10668         check_added_monitors(closing_node, 1);
10669         check_closed_event(closing_node, 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, false, &[other_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
10670
10671         let commitment_tx = {
10672                 let mut txn = closing_node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
10673                 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
10674                 let commitment_tx = txn.pop().unwrap();
10675                 check_spends!(commitment_tx, funding_tx);
10676                 commitment_tx
10677         };
10678
10679         mine_transactions(&nodes[0], &[&funding_tx, &commitment_tx]);
10680         mine_transactions(&nodes[1], &[&funding_tx, &commitment_tx]);
10681
10682         check_closed_broadcast(other_node, 1, true);
10683         check_added_monitors(other_node, 1);
10684         check_closed_event(other_node, 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, false, &[closing_node.node.get_our_node_id()], 1_000_000);
10685
10686         assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
10687         assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
10688 }
10689
10690 #[test]
10691 fn test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block() {
10692         do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(false);
10693         do_test_funding_and_commitment_tx_confirm_same_block(true);
10694 }