1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
17 use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
18 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
19 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
20 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelSigner, EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource};
21 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
22 use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
23 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
24 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
25 use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
26 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
27 use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
28 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
29 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
31 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
32 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
33 use crate::util::test_utils;
34 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
35 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
36 use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
37 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
39 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
43 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
44 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
45 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxMerkleNode, TxOut, Witness};
46 use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
54 use crate::prelude::*;
55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
56 use core::default::Default;
57 use core::iter::repeat;
58 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
59 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
61 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
62 use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
65 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
66 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
67 use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
68 let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
69 cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
70 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
71 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
72 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
73 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
75 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
77 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
78 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
79 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
81 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
82 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
84 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
85 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
87 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
88 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
89 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
90 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
91 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
92 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
93 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
94 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
96 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
97 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
99 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
101 } else { assert!(false); }
104 use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
106 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
107 insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
108 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
110 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
112 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
114 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
116 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
118 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
120 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
122 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
126 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
127 // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
129 use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
130 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
131 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
132 *node_cfgs[1].override_init_features.borrow_mut() = Some(channelmanager::provided_init_features(&test_default_channel_config()).clear_wumbo());
133 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
134 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
136 match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
137 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
138 assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
144 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
145 // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
146 // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
147 // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
148 // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
149 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
150 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
151 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
152 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
153 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
155 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
156 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
157 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
158 let opt_anchors = false;
159 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
160 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
162 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
163 let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
164 if !send_from_initiator {
165 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
166 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
168 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
170 // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
171 let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
172 if send_from_initiator {
173 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
174 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
176 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
178 let sender_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] };
179 let counterparty_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
180 let mut sender_node_per_peer_lock;
181 let mut sender_node_peer_state_lock;
182 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
183 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
184 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
187 let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
188 let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
189 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
191 // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
192 // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
193 if send_from_initiator {
194 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
195 // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
196 // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
197 // well as an additional HTLC.
198 - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
200 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
205 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
206 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
207 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
211 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
212 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
213 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
214 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
215 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
216 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
219 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
223 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
224 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
225 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
226 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
227 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
228 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
229 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
230 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
231 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
232 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
234 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
236 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
238 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
240 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
243 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
244 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
246 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
247 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
248 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
249 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
250 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
252 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
255 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
257 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
258 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
259 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
260 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
262 let payment_event = {
263 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
264 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
265 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
267 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
268 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
270 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
271 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
272 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
273 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
274 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
275 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
277 // deliver(1), generate (3):
278 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
279 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
280 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
281 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
283 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
284 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
285 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
286 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
287 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
288 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
289 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
290 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
292 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
293 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
294 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
295 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
296 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
297 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
298 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
299 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
301 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
302 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
303 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
304 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
306 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
307 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
308 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
310 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
311 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
313 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
314 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
316 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
317 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
320 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
321 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
325 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
326 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
327 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
328 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
329 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
330 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
331 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
332 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
335 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
337 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
339 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
342 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
343 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
345 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
346 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
347 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
348 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
351 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
354 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
356 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
357 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
358 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
359 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
361 let payment_event = {
362 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
363 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
364 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
366 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
367 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
369 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
370 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
371 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
372 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
373 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
374 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
376 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
377 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
379 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
383 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
384 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
385 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
386 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
387 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
388 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
391 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
392 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
393 // update_fee (never committed) ->
395 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
396 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
397 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
398 // <- (1) RAA delivered
399 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
400 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
401 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
402 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
404 // B should send no response here
405 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
406 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
409 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
412 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
413 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
414 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
416 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
417 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
419 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
420 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
421 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
422 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
423 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
425 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
428 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
429 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
430 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
431 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
432 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
434 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
437 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
438 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
440 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
441 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
442 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
444 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
445 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
446 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
447 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
450 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
452 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
454 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
456 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
457 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
458 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
459 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
460 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
461 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
462 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
463 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
464 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
465 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
466 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
468 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
469 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
470 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
472 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
474 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
475 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
476 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
479 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
480 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
481 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
483 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
484 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
485 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
487 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
488 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
489 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
490 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
492 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
493 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
494 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
497 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
498 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
499 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
500 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
503 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
504 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
505 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
506 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
508 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
510 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
513 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
514 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
517 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
518 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
519 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
521 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
522 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
523 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
525 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
526 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
528 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
530 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
531 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
532 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
533 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
535 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
536 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
538 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
539 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
540 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
541 added_monitors.clear();
543 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
545 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
546 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
548 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
549 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
550 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
551 added_monitors.clear();
554 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
555 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
557 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
558 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
560 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
561 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
562 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
563 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
564 expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
568 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
569 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
570 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
571 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
572 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
573 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
574 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
575 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
576 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
577 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
578 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
579 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
580 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
581 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
582 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
583 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
584 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
585 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
586 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
590 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
591 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
592 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
593 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
594 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
595 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
598 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
601 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
602 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
604 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
605 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
606 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
607 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
608 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
610 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
612 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
614 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
615 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
616 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
618 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
619 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
620 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
622 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
623 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
624 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
625 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
627 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
628 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
629 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
633 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
634 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
635 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
636 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
637 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
638 let channel_value = 5000;
640 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000);
641 let channel_id = chan.2;
642 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
643 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
644 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
646 let opt_anchors = false;
648 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
649 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
650 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
652 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
653 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
655 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
656 *feerate_lock = feerate;
658 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
659 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
660 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
662 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
664 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
666 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
668 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
670 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
671 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
672 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
673 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
674 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
675 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
679 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
680 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
683 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
684 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
685 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
687 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
689 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
690 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
691 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
692 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
693 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
694 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
695 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
696 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
697 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
698 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
700 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
701 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
702 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
703 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
704 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
705 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
706 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
707 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
708 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
711 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
712 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
713 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
716 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
717 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
718 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
719 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
720 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
721 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
722 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
724 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
725 opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
726 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
727 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
729 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
731 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
734 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
737 htlc_signatures: res.1
740 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
742 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
745 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
747 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
748 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
749 //Should produce and error.
750 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
751 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
752 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
753 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
754 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
758 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
759 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
760 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
761 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
762 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
763 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
766 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
769 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
772 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
773 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
775 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
776 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
777 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
778 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
779 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
781 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
783 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
784 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
785 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
786 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
788 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
790 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
791 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
793 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
794 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
795 added_monitors.clear();
797 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
798 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
799 // node[1] has nothing to do
801 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
802 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
803 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
805 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
806 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
807 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
808 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
809 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
810 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
811 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
813 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
814 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
815 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
816 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
817 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
818 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
820 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
821 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
822 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
823 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
825 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
826 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
827 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
829 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
830 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
831 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
832 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
834 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
835 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
836 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
838 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
840 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
841 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
843 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => { },
844 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
847 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
849 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
850 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
851 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
852 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
853 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
857 fn test_update_fee() {
858 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
859 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
860 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
861 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
862 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
863 let channel_id = chan.2;
866 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
867 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
868 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
869 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
870 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
871 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
872 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
873 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
874 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
875 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
876 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
879 // Create and deliver (1)...
882 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
883 feerate = *feerate_lock;
884 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
886 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
887 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
889 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
890 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
891 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
892 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
893 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
895 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
897 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
899 // Generate (2) and (3):
900 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
901 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
902 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
905 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
906 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
907 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
909 // Create and deliver (4)...
911 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
912 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
914 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
916 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
917 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
918 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
919 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
920 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
922 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
925 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
926 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
929 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
930 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
932 // Handle (3), creating (6):
933 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
934 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
935 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
936 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
939 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
940 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
941 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
943 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
944 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
945 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
946 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
947 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
948 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
949 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
950 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
951 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
954 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
955 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
956 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
957 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
959 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
960 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
961 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
963 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
964 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
965 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
966 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
967 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
971 fn fake_network_test() {
972 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
973 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
974 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
975 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
976 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
977 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
979 // Create some initial channels
980 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
981 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
982 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
984 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
985 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
986 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
987 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
988 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
990 // Send some more payments
991 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
992 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
993 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
995 // Test failure packets
996 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
997 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
999 // Add a new channel that skips 3
1000 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1002 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1003 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1004 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1005 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1006 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1007 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1008 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1010 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1011 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1012 hops.push(RouteHop {
1013 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1014 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1015 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1016 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1018 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1020 hops.push(RouteHop {
1021 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1022 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1023 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1024 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1026 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1028 hops.push(RouteHop {
1029 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1030 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1031 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1032 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1034 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1036 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1037 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1038 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1040 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1041 hops.push(RouteHop {
1042 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1043 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1044 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1045 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1047 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1049 hops.push(RouteHop {
1050 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1051 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1052 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1053 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1055 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1057 hops.push(RouteHop {
1058 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1059 node_features: nodes[1].node.node_features(),
1060 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1061 channel_features: nodes[1].node.channel_features(),
1063 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1065 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1066 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1067 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1069 // Claim the rebalances...
1070 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1071 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1073 // Close down the channels...
1074 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1075 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1076 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1077 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1078 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1079 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1080 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1081 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1082 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1083 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1084 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1085 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1089 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1090 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1091 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1092 // commitment dance rounds.
1093 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1094 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1095 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1096 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1097 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1098 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
1100 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1101 for _ in 0..crate::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1102 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1103 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
1104 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1106 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1108 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1109 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1110 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1111 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1113 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1114 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1116 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1118 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1119 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1120 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1121 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1124 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1125 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1127 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
1128 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1131 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1132 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1133 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1134 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1136 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1137 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1138 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1139 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1140 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1141 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
1142 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1144 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1145 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1146 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1148 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1150 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1151 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1152 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1153 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1155 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1156 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1157 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1158 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1160 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1162 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1164 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1165 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1167 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1168 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1169 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1170 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1171 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1173 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1174 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1175 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1176 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1177 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1179 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1180 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1182 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1184 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1185 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1186 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1188 &Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1189 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1191 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1195 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1196 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1199 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1203 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1204 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1205 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1206 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1207 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1208 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1209 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1211 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1212 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3);
1213 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3);
1214 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
1215 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
1216 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
1218 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1220 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1221 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1223 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1224 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1226 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1227 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1228 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1232 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1233 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1234 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1235 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1236 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1237 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1238 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1239 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1241 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
1244 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1246 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1248 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1249 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
1250 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1252 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1253 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1254 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, 800_000);
1255 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1257 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1258 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1260 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1261 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1262 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1263 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1264 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1265 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1266 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1269 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1271 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1273 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1274 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1276 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1277 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 3);
1279 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]); // Immediate HTLC claim with preimage
1280 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
1281 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
1282 let preimage_tx = &claim_txn[0];
1283 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if claim_txn[1].input[0].previous_output == preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output {
1284 (&claim_txn[1], &claim_txn[2])
1286 (&claim_txn[2], &claim_txn[1])
1289 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1290 assert_eq!(preimage_bump_tx.input.len(), 1);
1292 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input.len(), 1);
1293 assert_eq!(preimage_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1294 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[preimage_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1296 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input.len(), 1);
1297 assert_eq!(timeout_tx.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1298 check_spends!(timeout_tx, remote_txn[0]);
1299 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1301 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1302 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1305 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1306 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1307 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1308 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1310 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1311 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1312 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1313 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1314 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1315 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1317 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1323 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1324 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1325 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1326 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1327 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1328 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1330 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1331 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1333 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1334 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2));
1335 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1336 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1337 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).err().unwrap();
1339 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(ref fails) => {
1341 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1342 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1343 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1346 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1348 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1349 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1351 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1355 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1356 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1357 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1358 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1359 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1360 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1362 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1363 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1364 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1365 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1367 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1369 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1370 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1371 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1372 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1375 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1376 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1377 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1378 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1381 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1383 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1384 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1385 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1387 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1389 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1391 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1392 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1393 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1394 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1395 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1396 let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1397 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1398 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1399 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1401 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1402 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1403 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1404 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1405 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1407 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1408 let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1409 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1410 let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1411 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1412 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1413 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1414 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1415 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1418 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1419 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1420 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
1422 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1423 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1424 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1426 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1428 amount_msat: 3460001,
1429 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1431 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1434 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1437 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1438 let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
1439 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1440 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1441 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1445 local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1446 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1448 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1449 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1451 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1454 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1457 htlc_signatures: res.1
1460 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1461 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1462 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1464 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1465 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1467 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1468 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1470 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1472 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1473 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1474 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1476 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1477 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1478 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1480 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1482 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1483 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1485 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1489 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1490 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1491 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1492 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1493 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1495 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1496 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1497 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1498 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1499 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1500 let opt_anchors = false;
1502 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1503 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1505 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1507 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1509 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1510 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1511 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1514 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1515 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1516 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1517 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1518 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1519 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1523 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1524 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1525 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1526 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1527 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1528 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1529 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1530 let opt_anchors = false;
1532 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1533 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1534 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1535 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1536 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1537 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1538 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt);
1540 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1541 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1542 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1545 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1546 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1547 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1548 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1549 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1550 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1551 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1552 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1553 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1555 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1556 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1557 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1558 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1559 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1562 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1563 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1564 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1565 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1566 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1567 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1568 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1569 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1573 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1574 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1575 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1576 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1577 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1579 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1580 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1581 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1582 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1583 let opt_anchors = false;
1585 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1586 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1587 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1588 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1589 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1590 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1591 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt);
1593 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1594 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1595 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1596 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1597 // commitment transaction fee.
1598 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1600 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1601 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1602 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1605 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1606 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1607 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1608 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1612 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1613 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1614 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1615 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1616 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1617 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1618 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1619 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1620 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1621 let opt_anchors = false;
1623 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1625 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1626 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1627 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1628 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1630 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1631 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1632 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
1633 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1634 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1635 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1636 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
1638 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1639 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1640 match msg_events[0] {
1641 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1642 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1644 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1649 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1650 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1651 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1652 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1653 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1654 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1655 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1656 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000);
1658 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1659 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1660 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1661 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1662 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1663 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1665 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1666 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1667 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1668 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1669 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1670 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1672 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1673 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1674 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1675 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1679 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1680 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1681 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1682 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1683 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1684 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1685 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
1688 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1689 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1690 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1691 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
1693 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1694 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1695 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1696 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1698 // Add a pending HTLC.
1699 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1700 let payment_event_1 = {
1701 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1702 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1704 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1705 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1706 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1708 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1710 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1711 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1712 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1713 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1714 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1716 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1717 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1718 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1719 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1720 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1721 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1722 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1723 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1726 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1727 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1728 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1729 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1732 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1733 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1734 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1735 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1736 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1737 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1738 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1739 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1743 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1744 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1745 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1746 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1747 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1748 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
1749 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1750 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1751 let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1752 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1753 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1755 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config);
1756 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1757 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1759 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1760 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1763 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1764 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1768 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1769 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1770 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1771 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1772 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1773 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1774 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1775 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1776 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1777 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001);
1778 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001);
1780 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1781 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1783 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1784 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1786 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1788 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1789 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1790 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1791 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1796 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1797 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1798 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1799 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1801 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1803 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1805 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1806 .with_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1807 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
1808 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1809 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1811 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1812 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1813 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1814 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1817 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1818 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1820 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1821 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1822 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1823 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1824 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1825 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1826 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1830 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
1831 .with_features(nodes[2].node.invoice_features()).with_max_channel_saturation_power_of_half(0);
1832 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, recv_value_0, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
1833 let (payment_preimage, ..) = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], recv_value_0);
1834 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
1836 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1837 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1838 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1839 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1840 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1843 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1844 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1845 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1846 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1847 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1850 // adding pending output.
1851 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1852 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1853 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1854 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1855 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1856 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1857 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1858 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1859 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1861 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1862 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1863 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1865 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1866 let payment_event_1 = {
1867 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
1868 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1870 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1871 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1872 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1874 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1876 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1877 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1879 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1880 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1881 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1882 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1885 // split the rest to test holding cell
1886 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1887 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1888 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1889 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1891 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1892 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1895 // now see if they go through on both sides
1896 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1897 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1898 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_21.0)).unwrap();
1899 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1900 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1901 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1903 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1905 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1906 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1907 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1908 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1909 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1912 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1913 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1914 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22), PaymentId(our_payment_hash_22.0)).unwrap();
1915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1916 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1917 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1919 // flush the pending htlc
1920 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1921 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1922 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1924 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1925 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1927 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1929 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1930 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1931 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1932 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1934 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1935 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1938 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1940 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1941 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1942 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1944 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1945 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1947 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1948 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1949 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1950 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1951 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1952 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1954 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1955 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1956 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1957 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1959 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1960 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1962 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1963 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1965 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
1966 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1967 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amount_msat);
1968 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
1969 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
1971 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1972 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1973 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1975 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1978 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1981 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
1982 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1983 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amount_msat);
1984 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), receiver_node_id.unwrap());
1985 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
1987 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1988 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1989 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1991 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1994 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1997 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1998 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1999 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
2001 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
2002 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
2003 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
2005 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
2006 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2007 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2008 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2009 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2011 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], nodes[1], chan_2.2);
2012 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2016 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2017 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2018 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2019 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2020 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2021 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2022 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2023 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2025 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2026 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2027 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2028 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2029 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2030 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2031 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
2032 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2034 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2035 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2036 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2037 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2038 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2039 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2040 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2041 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2042 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2043 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2045 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2046 // Route the first two HTLCs.
2047 let payment_value_1 = b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000;
2048 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_value_1);
2049 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20_000);
2051 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2052 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2054 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3), PaymentId(payment_hash_3.0)).unwrap();
2055 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2056 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2057 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2058 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2061 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2062 // initial fulfill/CS.
2063 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
2064 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, payment_value_1);
2065 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2066 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2068 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2069 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2070 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2);
2071 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, 20_000);
2072 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2073 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2075 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2076 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2077 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2078 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2079 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2081 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2082 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2083 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2084 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2085 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2087 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2088 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2089 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2091 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2092 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2093 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2095 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2096 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2097 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2099 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2100 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2101 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2102 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2103 // on-chain as necessary).
2104 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2105 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2106 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2107 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2108 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2110 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2112 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2114 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2115 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2117 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2118 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2119 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2120 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2121 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2122 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2124 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2125 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2126 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2128 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4), PaymentId(payment_hash_4.0)).unwrap();
2129 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2130 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2131 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2132 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2135 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2136 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2137 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2138 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2140 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2142 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2144 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2146 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2147 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2149 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2151 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2152 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2154 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2155 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2156 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2158 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2159 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2161 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2162 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2164 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2165 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2169 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2170 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2171 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2172 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2173 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2174 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2175 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2177 // Create some initial channels
2178 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2179 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2180 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
2181 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
2183 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2184 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2185 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2186 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2187 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2188 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2190 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2191 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2192 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2193 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2194 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2196 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2197 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_1.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2198 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2199 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2201 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2202 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2203 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2205 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2207 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2208 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2209 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2210 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2211 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2213 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2214 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 3_000_000);
2216 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2217 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2218 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_2.2, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2219 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2220 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2222 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2223 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2224 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2225 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2226 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2227 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, Some(node_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2229 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2230 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2231 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2232 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2233 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2235 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2236 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
2238 $node.node.claim_funds($preimage);
2239 expect_payment_claimed!($node, $payment_hash, 3_000_000);
2240 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2242 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2243 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2245 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2246 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2247 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2248 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2250 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2256 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2257 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2258 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_3.2, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
2259 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2260 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2261 let node2_commitment_txid;
2263 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2264 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2265 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2266 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2268 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2269 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1);
2270 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2272 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2274 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2275 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2276 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2277 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2278 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2280 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2281 // confusing us in the following tests.
2282 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2284 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2285 let (payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[3], &[&nodes[4]], 3_000_000);
2286 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2289 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2290 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2291 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2292 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2293 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2294 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2297 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2300 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2301 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2303 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2305 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2307 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2309 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2310 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2311 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2317 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2319 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2320 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2);
2322 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2323 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2324 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2325 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2326 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2329 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2332 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2333 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2335 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2337 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2338 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2340 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2341 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2342 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2344 nodes[3].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2345 nodes[4].gossip_sync.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2346 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2347 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2349 assert_eq!(nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon),
2350 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
2351 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2352 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2356 fn test_justice_tx() {
2357 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2358 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2359 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2360 alice_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2361 alice_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2362 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2363 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
2364 bob_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2365 bob_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2366 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2367 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2368 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2369 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2370 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2371 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2372 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2373 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen;
2374 // Create some new channels:
2375 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2377 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2378 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2379 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2380 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2381 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2382 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2383 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2384 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2385 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2386 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2387 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2388 // Revoke the old state
2389 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2392 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2394 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2395 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2396 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2398 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2399 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2401 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2402 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2403 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2405 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2406 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2407 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2408 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2409 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2410 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2411 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2412 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2413 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2415 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2417 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2418 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2420 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2421 // Create some new channels:
2422 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2424 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2428 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2429 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2430 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2431 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2432 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2433 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2434 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2435 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2436 // Revoke the old state
2437 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2439 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2441 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2442 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2443 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2445 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2446 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2448 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2449 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::NONE);
2451 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2452 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2453 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2454 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2455 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2456 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2457 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2459 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2460 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2461 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2465 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2466 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2467 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2468 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2469 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2470 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2471 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2472 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2473 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2474 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2475 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2476 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2477 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2478 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2479 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2481 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2482 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2483 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2484 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2485 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2486 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output
2488 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2490 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2491 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2492 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2493 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2494 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2498 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2499 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2500 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2501 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2502 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2503 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2504 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2506 // Create some new channel:
2507 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2509 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2510 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2511 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2512 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2513 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2515 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2516 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2517 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2518 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2519 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2520 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2521 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2522 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2523 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2525 //Revoke the old state
2526 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2529 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2530 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2531 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2532 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2533 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2534 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2535 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2536 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2538 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2539 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx
2541 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2542 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2544 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2545 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2546 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2547 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2548 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2549 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2550 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2551 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2553 // Finally, mine the penalty transaction and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2554 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2555 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
2556 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2557 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2559 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2560 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2561 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2565 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2566 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2567 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2568 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2569 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2570 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2571 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2573 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2575 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2576 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8_000_000);
2577 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2578 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2579 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
2580 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
2582 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2583 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2585 //Revoke the old state
2586 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2589 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2590 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2591 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2592 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2593 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2594 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2595 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2596 match events.last().unwrap() {
2597 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2598 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2601 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2602 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
2604 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2605 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 7);
2607 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2608 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2609 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2610 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2611 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2612 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2613 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2615 // Justice transactions are indices 2-3-4
2616 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2617 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2618 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2620 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2621 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2622 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2624 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2625 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2626 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2627 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2628 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2629 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2630 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2631 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2633 // Finally, mine the penalty transactions and check that we get an HTLC failure after
2634 // ANTI_REORG_DELAY confirmations.
2635 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[2]);
2636 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[3]);
2637 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[4]);
2638 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2639 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, false);
2641 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2642 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2643 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2647 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2648 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2649 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2650 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2651 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2652 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2653 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2654 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2655 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2657 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2658 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2659 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2660 // PaymentSent event).
2662 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2663 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2664 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2665 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2667 // Create some initial channels
2668 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2669 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2671 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2672 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2673 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2674 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2675 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2677 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2678 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2679 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2681 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2682 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
2684 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2685 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2686 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2687 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2688 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2689 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2690 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_1, 3_000_000);
2691 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2692 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, 3_000_000);
2693 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2694 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2695 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2696 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2697 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2698 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2700 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2701 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2702 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2703 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2704 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2705 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2706 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2707 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2708 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2709 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2710 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2711 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2712 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2713 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2715 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2716 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2717 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
2718 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2720 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2721 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2722 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2723 added_monitors.clear();
2725 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2726 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2727 match forwarded_events[0] {
2728 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2729 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2731 let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2732 match forwarded_events[1] {
2733 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2734 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2735 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2736 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2737 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2741 match forwarded_events[2] {
2742 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
2743 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2744 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, chan_id);
2745 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2746 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
2750 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2752 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2753 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2754 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2755 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2756 added_monitors.clear();
2758 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2760 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2761 let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
2763 match nodes_2_event {
2764 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2765 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2768 match nodes_0_event {
2769 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2770 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2771 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2772 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2773 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2774 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2776 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2779 // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
2781 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2782 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2785 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2786 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr) => { {
2787 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2788 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2789 // Node[1]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2790 // Node[0]: 2 * HTLC-timeout tx
2791 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $commitment_tx);
2792 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2793 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0);
2794 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time.0, 0);
2796 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2797 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2798 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2799 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2801 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2802 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2803 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2804 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2809 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2810 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0]);
2812 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2813 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2814 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2815 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2816 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2817 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2818 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2819 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2820 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2821 assert!(node_txn.len() == 1 || node_txn.len() == 3); // HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn
2822 let commitment_spend =
2823 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2826 // Certain `ConnectStyle`s will cause RBF bumps of the previous HTLC transaction to be broadcast.
2827 // FullBlockViaListen
2828 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2829 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2830 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2831 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2834 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2835 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2836 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2841 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2842 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2843 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2844 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2845 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time.0, 0);
2846 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2847 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2848 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2850 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2851 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2852 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2853 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2854 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2855 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2856 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2857 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2858 let mut first_claimed = false;
2859 for event in events {
2861 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2862 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2863 assert!(!first_claimed);
2864 first_claimed = true;
2866 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2867 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2870 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2871 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2872 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2875 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2878 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2879 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2880 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2881 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2882 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2883 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2885 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2887 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2888 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2889 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2890 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2891 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2892 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2893 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2895 // Create some intial channels
2896 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
2897 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
2899 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2900 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2901 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2903 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2905 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2906 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2907 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2908 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2909 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2910 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }]);
2911 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2913 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2914 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2916 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2917 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2918 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2919 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2920 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2921 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2923 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2925 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2926 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2928 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2929 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2930 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2932 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2933 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2934 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2935 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2936 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2939 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2940 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2942 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2943 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2945 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2946 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2947 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2948 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2950 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2954 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2955 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2956 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2958 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2960 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
2961 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2962 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2963 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2965 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2966 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2967 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2968 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2969 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2970 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2972 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2975 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2976 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2977 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2979 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2980 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2982 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2983 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2984 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2985 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // 1 timeout tx
2986 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2987 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2988 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2992 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2993 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2994 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2995 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2999 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
3000 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
3001 // and fail backward accordingly.
3003 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3004 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3005 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3006 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3008 // Create some initial channels
3009 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3010 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3012 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3013 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3014 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3015 // Revoke the old state
3016 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3018 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3020 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3021 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3022 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3023 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3024 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3026 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
3027 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3028 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3029 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3031 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3032 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3033 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3034 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3035 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3036 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3038 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3039 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3040 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3042 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3046 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3047 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3048 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3049 // commitment transaction anymore.
3050 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3051 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3052 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3053 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3054 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3055 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3057 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3058 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3059 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3060 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3061 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3062 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3063 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3064 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3065 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3067 // Create some initial channels
3068 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3069 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3071 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3072 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3073 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3074 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3075 // Revoke the old state
3076 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3078 let value = if use_dust {
3079 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3080 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3081 nodes[2].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
3082 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3085 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3086 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3087 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3089 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash);
3090 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: first_payment_hash }]);
3091 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3092 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3093 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3094 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3095 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3096 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3097 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3098 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3099 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3100 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3102 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash);
3103 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: second_payment_hash }]);
3104 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3105 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3106 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3107 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3108 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3109 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3110 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3111 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3112 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3113 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3114 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3115 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3116 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3117 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3119 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash);
3120 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: third_payment_hash }]);
3121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3122 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3123 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3124 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3125 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3126 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3127 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3128 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3129 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3130 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3131 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3132 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3133 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3134 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3135 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3136 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3138 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3139 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3140 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3141 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret), PaymentId(fourth_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3142 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3143 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3144 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3147 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3148 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3149 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3151 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3152 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3154 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3155 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3158 Event::HTLCHandlingFailed { .. } => { },
3159 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3161 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3162 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3165 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3166 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3168 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3170 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3172 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3173 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 3 + nodes.len() - 1 } else { 4 + nodes.len() });
3175 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3176 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3179 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3180 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3182 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3185 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3186 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3188 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3191 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3192 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3194 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3195 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3198 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3199 match nodes_2_event {
3200 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3201 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3202 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3203 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3204 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3205 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3207 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3211 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3212 match nodes_2_event {
3213 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3214 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3215 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3217 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3220 let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
3221 match nodes_0_event {
3222 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3223 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3224 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3225 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3226 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3227 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3229 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3230 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3231 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3233 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3235 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3236 assert_eq!(events.len(), 6);
3238 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref failure, .. } => {
3239 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3240 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3241 // that we should update our routing table for.
3242 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3243 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure { } else { panic!("Unexpected path failure") }
3246 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3249 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3250 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, first_payment_hash);
3252 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3255 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3256 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3258 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3261 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3262 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
3264 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3267 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) }, .. } => {
3268 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3270 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3273 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3274 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, third_payment_hash);
3276 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3279 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3282 // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
3284 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3285 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3288 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3289 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3290 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3294 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3295 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3296 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3297 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3298 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3302 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3303 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3304 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3305 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3306 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3310 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3311 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3312 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3313 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3314 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3315 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000);
3317 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3319 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3320 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3321 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3323 let payment_event = {
3324 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3325 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3326 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3328 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3329 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3332 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3333 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3335 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret), PaymentId(failed_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3336 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3338 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3341 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3343 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3345 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3346 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3347 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3348 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3349 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3350 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3352 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3353 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3359 onion_routing_packet,
3361 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3363 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3364 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3365 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3367 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3368 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3370 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3373 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3374 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3376 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3379 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3380 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3382 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3384 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3389 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3390 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3391 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3392 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3393 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3394 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3395 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3396 if *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow() == ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen {
3397 // We rely on the ability to connect a block redundantly, which isn't allowed via
3398 // `chain::Listen`, so we never run the test if we randomly get assigned that
3402 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3404 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3405 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3406 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3407 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3408 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3409 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3411 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
3412 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3413 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3415 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3416 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3417 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3418 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3419 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3421 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3422 // registering new transactions
3423 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3427 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3428 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3429 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3430 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3431 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3432 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3433 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3434 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3436 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3438 let mut payment_event = {
3439 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
3440 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3442 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3443 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3444 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3447 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3448 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3450 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3452 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3453 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3454 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3455 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3457 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3458 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3459 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3460 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3461 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3463 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3464 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3465 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3467 nodes[2].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
3468 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3469 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3470 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3472 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3473 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3474 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3475 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3476 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3480 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3482 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3483 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3484 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3485 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3487 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3489 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3490 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator), &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3492 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3493 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3494 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3495 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3496 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3497 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3498 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3500 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3504 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3505 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3506 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3507 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3508 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3510 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3511 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3512 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3513 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3514 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3516 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3518 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
3519 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_000_000);
3520 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3521 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3522 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3523 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3525 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3526 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3528 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3529 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3533 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3534 // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3535 // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3536 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3537 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3538 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3539 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3541 // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3542 // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3543 let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3544 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3545 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
3546 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3547 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
3549 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3550 assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3552 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
3554 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3555 assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3557 // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3558 // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3561 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3564 // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3565 // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3566 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3567 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3569 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3570 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3574 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3575 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3576 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3577 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3578 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3579 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3580 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3581 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
3583 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3584 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3585 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3587 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3588 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3589 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3590 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3592 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3593 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3594 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3596 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3597 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3598 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3599 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3601 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3602 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3604 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3605 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3607 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3609 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3610 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
3612 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3613 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3614 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3616 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3619 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3620 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3623 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, payment_failed_permanently, .. } => {
3624 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3625 assert!(payment_failed_permanently);
3627 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3630 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3631 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3633 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3637 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3638 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3641 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3642 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3643 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3644 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3645 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3646 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3648 let mut as_channel_ready = None;
3649 let channel_id = if messages_delivered == 0 {
3650 let (channel_ready, chan_id, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001);
3651 as_channel_ready = Some(channel_ready);
3652 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the channel_ready message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3653 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3654 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3657 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2
3660 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1_000_000);
3662 let payment_event = {
3663 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
3664 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3666 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3667 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3668 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3670 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3672 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3673 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3675 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3676 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3677 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3678 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3679 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3681 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3682 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3683 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3684 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3686 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3687 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3688 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3689 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3690 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3692 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3693 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3694 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3695 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3702 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3703 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3704 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3705 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3706 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a channel_ready prior to a
3707 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to channel_ready time.
3709 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a channel_ready immediately on
3710 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate channel_ready sent
3711 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3713 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3714 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3716 // Even if the channel_ready messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3717 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3718 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3719 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3720 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3721 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3722 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3723 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3724 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3725 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3726 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3727 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3728 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3729 // Everything was delivered...
3730 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3733 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3734 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3735 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 2);
3737 Event::ChannelReady { .. } => { },
3738 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3741 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3742 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3745 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3747 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3748 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3752 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3753 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3754 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3756 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3758 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3759 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3761 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id, via_channel_id, via_user_channel_id: _ } => {
3762 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3763 assert_eq!(amount_msat, 1_000_000);
3764 assert_eq!(receiver_node_id.unwrap(), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3765 assert_eq!(via_channel_id, Some(channel_id));
3767 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3768 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3769 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3771 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3774 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3777 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3778 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3779 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3781 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3782 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3783 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3784 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3785 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3786 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3787 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3788 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3789 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3790 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3791 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3793 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3796 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3797 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3799 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3800 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3802 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3803 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3804 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3806 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3809 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3810 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3811 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3812 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3814 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3815 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3816 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3817 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3819 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3820 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3821 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3822 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3823 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3825 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3826 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3827 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3828 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3835 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3836 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3837 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3838 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3839 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3840 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3842 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3844 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3845 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3846 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3847 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3848 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3849 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3850 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3851 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3852 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3853 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3854 // Everything was delivered...
3855 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3858 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3859 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3861 if messages_delivered <= 5 {
3862 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3863 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3865 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3867 if messages_delivered > 2 {
3868 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3871 // Channel should still work fine...
3872 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3873 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3874 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3878 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3879 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3880 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3881 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3882 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3886 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3887 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3888 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3889 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3890 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3894 fn test_channel_ready_without_best_block_updated() {
3895 // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
3896 // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
3897 // generate a channel_ready until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
3898 // channel_ready immediately instead.
3899 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3900 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3901 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3902 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3903 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
3905 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0);
3907 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
3908 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
3909 let block_txn = [funding_tx];
3910 let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
3911 let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
3912 nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
3914 // Ensure nodes[0] generates a channel_ready after the transactions_confirmed
3915 let as_channel_ready = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3916 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_ready(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_channel_ready);
3920 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3921 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3922 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3923 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3924 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3925 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3926 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3927 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
3929 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_000_000);
3931 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3932 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3933 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
3934 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3936 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3937 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3939 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3940 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3943 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3944 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, 1_000_000);
3945 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3947 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3948 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3950 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3951 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3952 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3953 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3954 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3955 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3956 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3958 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3959 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3960 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3962 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3963 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3964 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3966 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3969 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3970 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3971 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3972 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3974 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3977 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3978 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3980 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
3981 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3982 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3983 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
3984 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3985 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3987 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3988 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3989 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3990 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3992 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
3993 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
3995 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
3996 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
3998 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4000 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4001 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4002 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4003 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4004 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4005 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4006 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4007 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4008 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4009 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4011 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4012 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4013 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4014 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4015 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4016 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4017 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4018 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4020 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4021 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4022 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4023 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4024 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4025 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4026 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4027 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4029 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4030 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4031 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4032 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4034 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4035 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4036 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4037 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4039 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4040 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4041 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4043 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4045 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4046 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4048 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4049 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4051 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4052 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4053 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4055 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4058 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4061 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4062 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4063 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4065 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4066 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4069 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4070 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4071 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4072 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4073 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4074 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4075 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4077 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4079 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4080 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4081 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4082 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4083 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4084 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4085 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &route).unwrap();
4086 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
4087 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4088 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4089 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4090 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4091 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentClaimable event(s).
4092 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4095 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4098 let mut block = Block {
4099 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4102 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4103 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4104 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4105 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4106 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4107 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4108 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4111 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
4113 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4114 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4115 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4116 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4117 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4118 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4120 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4121 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4122 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4123 let mut expected_failure_data = (100_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4124 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&(block_count - 1).to_be_bytes());
4125 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4129 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4130 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4131 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4134 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4135 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4136 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4137 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4138 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4139 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4140 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4141 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4143 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4144 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4145 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4146 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4148 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4149 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4151 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret), PaymentId(first_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4153 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4154 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4156 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4157 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4158 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4159 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret), PaymentId(second_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
4161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4162 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4163 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4164 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4165 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4167 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4169 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4170 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4171 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4172 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4175 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4176 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4177 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4178 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4179 match fail_commit[0] {
4180 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4181 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4182 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4184 _ => unreachable!(),
4186 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4188 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, false);
4193 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4194 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4195 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4198 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4199 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4201 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4202 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4203 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4204 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4205 for event in events.drain(..) {
4207 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4208 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4209 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4210 all_outputs.push(outp);
4213 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4216 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4217 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4227 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4228 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4229 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4230 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4231 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4232 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4234 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4235 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4236 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4237 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4238 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4239 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4240 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4241 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4242 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4244 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4245 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4247 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4248 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4249 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4250 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4251 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4255 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4256 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4257 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4258 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4259 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4260 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4261 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4263 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000);
4264 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
4265 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4266 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4267 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4269 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4270 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4271 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4272 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4274 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4275 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4276 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4277 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4278 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4280 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4281 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4282 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4286 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4287 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4288 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4290 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4291 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4292 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4293 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4295 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000);
4296 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4297 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4298 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4299 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4301 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4302 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4303 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4304 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4305 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4307 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4308 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4309 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4311 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4312 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4313 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4314 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4315 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4319 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4320 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4321 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4322 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4323 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4325 // Create some initial channels
4326 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4328 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
4330 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4331 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4332 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4334 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4335 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4336 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4337 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4338 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4339 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4340 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4342 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4343 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4346 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4347 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4350 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4351 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4352 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4353 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4354 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4356 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4357 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4358 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4360 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4361 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4362 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4366 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4367 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4368 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4369 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4370 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4372 // Create some initial channels
4373 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4375 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4376 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4378 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4380 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4381 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4382 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4384 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4385 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4386 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4387 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4389 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4390 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4392 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4394 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4395 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4396 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4397 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4398 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4400 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4401 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4402 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4403 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, false);
4405 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4406 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4407 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4408 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4409 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4413 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4414 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4415 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4416 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4417 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4419 // Create some initial channels
4420 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4422 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4423 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4424 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4425 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4427 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4429 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4430 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4431 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4432 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4434 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4435 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4436 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4437 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4439 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4440 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4442 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4443 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4444 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4448 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4449 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4450 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4451 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4452 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4453 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4455 // Create some initial channels
4456 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4458 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4459 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4460 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4461 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4463 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4465 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4466 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4467 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4469 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4470 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4472 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4473 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4474 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4475 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4476 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4477 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4479 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4480 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4481 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4482 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4483 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4484 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4486 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4487 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs
4488 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4489 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4490 // transactions next...
4491 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4492 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4494 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4495 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4496 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4497 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4499 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4500 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4503 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4504 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4506 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4507 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4508 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4509 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4510 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4514 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4515 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4516 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4517 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4518 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4519 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4521 // Create some initial channels
4522 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4524 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4525 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4526 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4527 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4529 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4530 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4532 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4534 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4535 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4536 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4537 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4538 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4539 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4541 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 1);
4542 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4543 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4544 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4546 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4547 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4548 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4550 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4551 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4552 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4553 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4554 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4555 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4557 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4558 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success
4560 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4561 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4562 // transactions next...
4563 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4564 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4565 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4566 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4568 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4569 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4572 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4573 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4575 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4576 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4578 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4579 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4581 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4582 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4583 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4584 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4585 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4586 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4587 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4588 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4592 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4593 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4594 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4595 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4596 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4598 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4601 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4602 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4603 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4604 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4606 // Create some initial channels
4607 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4608 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4610 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
4611 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4612 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4613 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4614 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4616 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4617 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4618 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
4620 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
4621 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4622 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
4623 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4624 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
4625 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4626 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4627 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4628 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4629 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4630 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4632 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
4633 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
4634 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
4635 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4637 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelMonitor: 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
4638 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 1);
4639 check_spends!(c_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4640 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4641 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
4642 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4644 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
4645 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
4646 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![commitment_tx[0].clone(), c_txn[0].clone()]});
4647 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4648 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4649 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4651 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
4652 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4655 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, prev_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx, next_channel_id } => {
4656 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
4657 assert_eq!(prev_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
4658 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
4659 assert_eq!(next_channel_id, Some(chan_2.2));
4661 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4663 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4664 let mut msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4665 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
4666 let nodes_2_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4667 let nodes_0_event = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut msg_events);
4669 match nodes_2_event {
4670 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
4671 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4674 match nodes_0_event {
4675 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
4676 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4677 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4678 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4679 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4680 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
4682 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4685 // Ensure that the last remaining message event is the BroadcastChannelUpdate msg for chan_2
4686 match msg_events[0] {
4687 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4688 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4691 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
4692 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4693 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4694 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4695 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4696 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx
4697 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
4698 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4699 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4700 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
4701 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time.0, 0); // Success tx
4703 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4704 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4708 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
4709 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
4710 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
4711 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
4712 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
4713 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4714 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4715 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4716 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4717 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4718 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4719 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
4720 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4721 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4723 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4724 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4725 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4727 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
4728 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4729 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4730 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4731 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
4733 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 900_000);
4735 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
4736 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
4737 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
4738 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
4739 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40)
4740 .with_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features());
4741 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 800_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
4742 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 800_000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
4744 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
4745 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4746 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
4748 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
4749 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4750 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4751 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4752 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4754 let htlc_timeout_tx;
4755 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
4756 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4757 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 2-or-3
4758 assert!(node_txn.len() == 2 || node_txn.len() == 3);
4760 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4761 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4762 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
4764 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4765 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4766 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4767 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
4768 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4770 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
4771 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4772 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
4773 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
4775 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4776 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4777 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
4778 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4781 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4782 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4783 // Assign htlc_timeout_tx to the forwarded HTLC (with value ~800 sats). The received HTLC
4784 // (with value 900 sats) will be claimed in the below `claim_funds` call.
4785 if node_txn.len() > 2 {
4786 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4787 htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[2].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[2].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
4789 htlc_timeout_tx = if node_txn[0].output[0].value < 900 { node_txn[1].clone() } else { node_txn[0].clone() };
4793 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
4794 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], duplicate_payment_hash, 900_000);
4796 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
4797 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
4798 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4799 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4801 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4802 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4805 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4806 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4808 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4809 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
4810 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
4811 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
4812 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4813 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4814 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4815 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4816 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4817 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
4819 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
4820 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4821 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
4822 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4823 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4824 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4825 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
4826 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4827 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4828 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4830 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4831 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4833 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
4835 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
4837 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
4838 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[1]);
4839 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], Some(196), true, true);
4840 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4841 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4842 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4843 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4844 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
4845 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4846 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4848 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4849 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
4851 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4853 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4854 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
4855 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
4857 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4862 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
4863 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4864 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4865 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4866 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4868 // Create some initial channels
4869 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
4871 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
4872 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4873 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
4874 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4875 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4877 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
4878 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
4879 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
4880 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4882 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
4883 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4884 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4885 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4887 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4888 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4891 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4892 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4895 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4896 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4897 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4898 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4899 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
4903 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
4904 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4906 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
4907 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4908 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4909 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4910 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
4911 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4914 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
4915 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
4916 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
4917 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
4918 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
4919 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
4920 // use the same payment hashes.
4921 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
4926 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
4927 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
4928 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
4929 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
4930 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
4931 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
4932 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
4933 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
4934 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
4935 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4937 let _chan_0_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
4938 let _chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
4939 let chan_2_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3);
4940 let chan_3_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4);
4941 let chan_3_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5);
4943 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
4944 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
4945 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
4946 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
4948 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id())
4949 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan_2_3.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
4951 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4953 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4954 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
4956 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4958 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4960 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4962 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4963 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
4965 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
4967 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
4970 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
4972 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
4973 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200, None).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4976 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
4978 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
4979 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200, None).unwrap());
4981 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
4982 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
4983 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
4984 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2).len(), 1);
4985 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
4987 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
4988 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
4989 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1);
4990 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3);
4991 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5);
4992 nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6);
4993 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
4995 let failed_destinations = vec![
4996 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_1 },
4997 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_3 },
4998 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_5 },
4999 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_6 },
5001 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[4], failed_destinations);
5002 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5004 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5005 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5006 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5007 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5008 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5009 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5011 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5012 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
5013 nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4);
5014 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5016 let failed_destinations_2 = vec![
5017 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 },
5018 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_4 },
5020 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[5], failed_destinations_2);
5021 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5023 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5024 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5025 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5026 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5028 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5030 // After 4 and 2 removes respectively above in nodes[4] and nodes[5], nodes[3] should receive 6 PaymentForwardedFailed events
5031 let failed_destinations_3 = vec![
5032 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5033 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5034 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5035 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_4.2 },
5036 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5037 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_3_5.2 },
5039 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations_3);
5040 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5041 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5042 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5043 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5044 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5045 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5046 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5047 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5048 if deliver_last_raa {
5049 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5051 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5054 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5055 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5056 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5057 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5059 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5060 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5061 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5063 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5064 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5065 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan_2_3.2);
5067 if announce_latest {
5068 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5070 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5072 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5073 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5074 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2 + 6);
5075 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5077 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5078 events.last().clone().unwrap()
5081 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5082 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5085 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5086 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5087 if deliver_last_raa {
5088 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5090 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(3).collect();
5091 expect_htlc_handling_failed_destinations!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events(), expected_destinations);
5093 let expected_destinations: Vec<HTLCDestination> = if announce_latest {
5094 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(9).collect()
5096 repeat(HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }).take(6).collect()
5099 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], expected_destinations);
5101 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5103 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5104 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5105 let mut a_done = false;
5106 for msg in cs_msgs {
5108 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5109 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5110 // should be failed-backwards here.
5111 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5112 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5113 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5114 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5116 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5121 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5122 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5123 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5125 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5126 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5129 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5130 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5131 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5132 if announce_latest {
5133 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5134 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5135 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5138 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5140 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5144 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5145 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 10 } else { 6 });
5146 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5147 let mut as_updates = 0;
5148 for event in as_events.iter() {
5149 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5150 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5151 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5152 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5154 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5156 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5159 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5160 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5162 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5163 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5164 if announce_latest {
5165 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5166 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5168 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5170 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5171 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 8 } else { 6 });
5172 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5173 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5174 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5175 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, ref failure, .. } = event {
5176 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5177 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5178 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, deliver_last_raa);
5180 assert!(!payment_failed_permanently);
5182 if let PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(_) } = failure {
5185 } else if let &Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = event {
5186 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5188 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5189 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5190 if announce_latest {
5191 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5193 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5195 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5196 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5197 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5198 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5199 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5200 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5204 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5205 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5209 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5210 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5214 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5215 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5216 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5217 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5221 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5222 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5223 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5224 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5225 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5227 // Create some initial channels
5228 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5230 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5231 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5232 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5233 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5235 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5236 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5237 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5238 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5239 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5240 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5242 let htlc_timeout = {
5243 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5244 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5245 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5246 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5247 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5251 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5252 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5253 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5255 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5256 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5257 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5258 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5259 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5260 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5261 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5262 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5263 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5264 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5265 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5269 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5270 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with a key
5271 // manager rotation to test that `channel_keys_id` returned in
5272 // [`SpendableOutputDescriptor::DelayedPaymentOutput`] let us re-derive the channel key set to
5273 // then derive a `delayed_payment_key`.
5275 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5277 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5278 let seed = [42; 32];
5279 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5280 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5281 let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(Network::Testnet, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger));
5282 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
5283 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(network_graph.clone(), &scorer);
5284 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, router, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph, node_seed: seed, override_init_features: alloc::rc::Rc::new(core::cell::RefCell::new(None)) };
5285 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5286 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5287 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5289 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5290 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5292 // Create some initial channels
5293 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5295 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2);
5296 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5297 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5299 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5300 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5301 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5302 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5303 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5305 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5306 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5307 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5308 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5309 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5311 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5312 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5313 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5314 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5315 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5316 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5317 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5318 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5321 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5322 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5323 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5324 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5325 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5326 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5328 let htlc_timeout = {
5329 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5330 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
5331 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5332 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5333 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5337 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5338 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5339 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
5341 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5342 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5343 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5344 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5345 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5346 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5347 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5348 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence.0, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5349 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5350 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5351 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5352 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence.0 == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5356 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5357 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5358 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5359 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5360 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5362 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5364 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5365 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5367 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5368 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5369 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5371 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5372 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5373 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5375 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5376 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5377 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5379 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5380 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5381 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5384 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5385 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5386 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5387 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5388 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5389 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5391 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5393 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5394 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5395 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5396 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5397 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3_000_000 });
5399 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5400 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5401 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5403 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5404 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5405 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5406 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5407 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5409 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5410 let mut block = Block {
5411 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5414 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5415 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5416 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5418 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5419 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5420 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5421 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5424 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5425 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5426 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5427 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5428 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5429 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5431 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5432 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5433 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5435 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5437 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5438 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5439 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5441 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5442 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5444 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5445 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5446 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5448 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5449 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5450 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5451 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5454 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5455 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5456 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5457 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5458 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5459 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
5461 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5462 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5463 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5464 // actually revoked.
5465 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5466 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5467 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
5468 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
5469 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5471 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5472 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5473 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5474 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5475 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5476 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5477 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5478 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5479 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5480 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5482 if check_revoke_no_close {
5483 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5484 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5487 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5488 let mut block = Block {
5489 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5492 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5493 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5494 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5496 if !check_revoke_no_close {
5497 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5498 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5499 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5500 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5502 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5506 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5507 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5508 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5509 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5510 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5511 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5512 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5514 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5515 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5516 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5518 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5519 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5520 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5522 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5523 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5527 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5528 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5529 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5530 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5531 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5536 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5537 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5538 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5539 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5540 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5541 // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
5542 for node in nodes.iter() {
5543 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5546 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5547 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5548 let push_msat=10001;
5549 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5550 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5551 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5552 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5554 // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
5555 // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
5556 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5560 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5561 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5562 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5563 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5564 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5566 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5567 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5568 let push_msat=10001;
5569 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5571 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5572 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5573 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5574 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5575 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5577 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5578 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5579 let push_msat=10001;
5580 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5581 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5582 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5584 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5585 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5586 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5588 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5589 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5590 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5592 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5593 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5594 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5596 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5597 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5598 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5599 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5600 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5601 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5605 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5606 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5607 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5608 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5609 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5611 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5612 let push_msat=10001;
5613 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5614 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5615 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5616 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5618 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5619 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5620 let err_msg = match events[0] {
5621 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5624 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5626 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5629 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5630 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5631 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5632 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5634 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5635 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5636 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5637 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5638 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5639 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5641 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5642 // pending_update_fee.
5644 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5645 *feerate_lock += 20;
5647 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5648 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5650 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5651 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5652 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5653 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5654 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5656 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5659 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5661 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5662 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5663 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5664 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5666 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5667 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
5668 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
5670 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5671 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5672 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5673 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5675 // Flush the pending fee update.
5676 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5677 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5678 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5679 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
5680 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5682 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
5683 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
5684 // us to surface its failure to the user.
5685 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5686 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5687 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5688 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5689 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5690 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5692 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
5693 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5694 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5696 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5697 assert_eq!(PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0), *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5698 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5699 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5700 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
5702 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5705 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5706 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
5708 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5712 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
5713 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
5714 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
5716 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
5717 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5718 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5719 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5720 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5721 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5723 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5724 // pending_update_fee.
5726 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5727 *feerate_lock += 200;
5729 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5730 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5732 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5733 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5734 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5735 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5736 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5738 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5741 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5743 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5744 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5745 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5746 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5748 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
5750 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
5751 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
5752 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
5754 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
5755 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1), PaymentId(payment_hash_1.0)).unwrap();
5756 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5757 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
5758 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId(nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5759 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), payment_id_2).unwrap();
5760 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5761 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
5763 // Flush the pending fee update.
5764 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5765 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5766 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5767 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
5768 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5769 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
5771 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
5772 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
5773 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
5774 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
5775 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
5776 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
5777 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
5778 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
5779 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
5781 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
5782 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5783 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5785 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref payment_failed_permanently, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: None }, ref short_channel_id, .. } => {
5786 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
5787 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5788 assert_eq!(*payment_failed_permanently, false);
5789 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, Some(route_2.paths[0][0].short_channel_id));
5791 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5794 &Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5795 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
5797 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5800 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
5801 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
5802 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5803 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
5804 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
5806 let raa = match send_raa_event {
5807 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
5808 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5810 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5811 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5812 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5813 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5814 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5815 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5817 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5818 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5820 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5821 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5822 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5824 Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => {},
5825 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5827 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
5828 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5829 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_1, amt_1);
5831 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5832 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5833 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
5834 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
5837 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
5838 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
5839 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
5842 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
5843 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5844 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5845 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5846 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5847 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5848 config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5849 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5850 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5851 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5852 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000);
5854 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5855 // pending_update_fee.
5857 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5858 *feerate_lock += 20;
5860 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5861 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5863 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5864 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5865 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5866 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5867 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5869 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5872 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
5874 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5875 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
5876 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5877 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan_0_1.2);
5879 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
5881 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
5882 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
5883 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
5884 let payment_event = {
5885 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
5886 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5888 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5889 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5891 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
5893 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5894 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5895 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5896 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5898 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[2], chan_1_2.2);
5899 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
5901 // Flush the pending fee update.
5902 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
5903 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5904 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5905 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5906 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5907 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5909 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
5910 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5911 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5913 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
5914 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
5917 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5920 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
5921 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5922 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5924 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
5925 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5926 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 2);
5927 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
5928 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
5929 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5932 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
5933 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
5934 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5936 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
5937 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5938 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
5939 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
5940 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
5941 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
5942 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
5943 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
5944 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5945 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
5947 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5950 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
5951 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
5952 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5954 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
5955 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5956 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5957 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5958 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
5959 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5960 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5961 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
5962 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
5963 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
5964 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5966 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
5967 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
5968 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5971 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
5972 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
5973 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
5976 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
5977 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
5978 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5979 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5980 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5981 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5982 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
5984 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
5985 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
5987 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
5988 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
5989 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5990 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
5994 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
5995 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
5996 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5997 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5998 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5999 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6000 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6002 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6003 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6004 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6005 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6007 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6008 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6012 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6013 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6014 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6015 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6016 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6017 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6018 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6020 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6021 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6022 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6023 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6024 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6026 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6027 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6028 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6029 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6030 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6034 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6035 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6036 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6037 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6038 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6039 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6040 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6041 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6043 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0)
6044 .with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
6045 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6046 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6047 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::InvalidRoute { ref err },
6048 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6052 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6053 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6054 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6055 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6056 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6057 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6058 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6059 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6060 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0);
6061 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6062 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6064 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6065 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6066 let payment_event = {
6067 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6068 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6070 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6071 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6072 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6073 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6077 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6079 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6080 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6081 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6083 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6084 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6086 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6087 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6088 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6090 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6091 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6095 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6096 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6097 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6098 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6099 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6100 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6101 let channel_value = 100000;
6102 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0);
6103 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6105 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6107 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6108 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6110 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6111 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6112 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6114 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6115 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6117 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6120 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6122 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6123 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6124 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6125 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6126 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6127 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6128 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6129 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6131 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6132 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6133 let channel = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6134 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6137 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6138 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6139 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6140 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6141 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6142 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6143 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6144 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6145 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6146 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6147 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6151 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6152 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6153 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6154 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6155 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6156 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6157 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6159 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6160 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6161 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6162 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], nodes[1], chan.2);
6163 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6164 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6166 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6167 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6168 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6170 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6172 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6173 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6174 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6175 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6176 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6178 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6179 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6180 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6181 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6182 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6186 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6187 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6188 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6189 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6190 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6191 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6192 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6193 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6195 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6196 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6197 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6198 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6199 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6200 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6202 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6206 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6207 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6208 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6211 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6212 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6213 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6215 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6216 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6218 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6219 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6220 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6221 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6222 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6226 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6227 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6228 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6229 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6230 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6231 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6232 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6234 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6235 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6236 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6237 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6238 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6239 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6241 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6242 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6243 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6244 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6245 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6249 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6250 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6251 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6252 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6253 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6254 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6256 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000);
6257 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6258 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6259 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6260 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6261 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6262 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6264 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6265 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6266 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6268 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6272 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6273 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6274 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6275 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6276 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6277 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6278 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6279 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6281 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6282 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6283 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6284 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6285 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6286 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6288 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6289 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6290 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6291 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
6292 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6293 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6294 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
6295 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6296 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6297 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6298 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6299 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6300 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6303 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6304 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6305 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6307 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6309 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6311 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6312 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6313 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6314 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6315 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6319 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6320 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6322 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6323 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6324 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6325 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6326 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6327 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6328 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6330 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6331 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6332 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6334 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6337 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6340 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6342 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6343 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6344 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6345 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6346 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6350 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6351 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6353 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6354 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6355 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6356 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6357 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6359 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6360 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6361 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6362 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6363 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6365 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6368 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6371 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6373 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6374 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6375 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6376 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6377 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6381 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6382 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6384 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6385 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6386 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6387 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6388 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6390 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6391 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6392 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6393 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6394 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6395 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6398 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6399 failure_code: 0x8000,
6402 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6404 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6405 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6406 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6407 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6408 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6412 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6413 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6415 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6416 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6417 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6418 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6419 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6421 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6423 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6424 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6425 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6427 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6428 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6429 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6431 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6432 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6433 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6434 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6435 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6436 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6437 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6439 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6443 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6445 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6447 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6448 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6449 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6450 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6451 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6455 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6456 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6458 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6459 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6460 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6461 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6462 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6464 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000);
6466 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6467 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6468 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 100_000);
6470 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6471 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6472 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6474 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6475 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6476 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6477 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6478 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6479 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6480 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6482 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6486 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6488 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6490 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6491 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6492 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6493 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6494 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6498 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6499 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6501 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6502 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6503 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6504 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6505 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6507 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6508 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6509 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6511 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6512 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6514 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6515 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6516 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6518 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6520 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6522 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6523 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6524 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6525 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6526 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6527 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6528 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6530 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6533 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6534 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6536 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6537 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6538 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6539 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6540 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6544 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6545 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6546 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6548 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6549 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6550 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6551 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6552 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000);
6553 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000);
6555 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6558 let mut payment_event = {
6559 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6560 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6561 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6562 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6563 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6565 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6566 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6567 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6568 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6569 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6570 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6571 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6572 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6573 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6576 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6577 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6578 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6579 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6581 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6582 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6583 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6585 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6586 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6587 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6588 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6589 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6590 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6591 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6593 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6597 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6599 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6600 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6601 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6602 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6603 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6605 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6607 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6608 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6609 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6610 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6611 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6612 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6614 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6617 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6621 fn test_channel_failed_after_message_with_badonion_node_perm_bits_set() {
6622 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6623 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6624 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6625 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6626 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6627 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
6629 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100_000);
6632 let mut payment_event = {
6633 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6634 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6635 SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[0])
6638 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6639 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6640 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6641 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6642 payment_event = SendEvent::from_node(&nodes[1]);
6643 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6646 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; // Trigger an invalid_onion_version error
6647 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6648 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6649 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6651 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6652 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6654 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6655 let mut update_msg = updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone();
6656 // Set the NODE bit (BADONION and PERM already set in invalid_onion_version error)
6657 update_msg.failure_code |= 0x2000;
6659 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6660 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6662 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6665 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1],
6666 vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
6667 node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2.2 }]);
6668 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6669 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6670 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6673 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6674 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6675 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6677 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6680 let events_5 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6681 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 2);
6683 // Expect a PaymentPathFailed event with a ChannelFailure network update for the channel between
6684 // the node originating the error to its next hop.
6686 Event::PaymentPathFailed { error_code, failure: PathFailure::OnPath { network_update: Some(NetworkUpdate::ChannelFailure { short_channel_id, is_permanent }) }, ..
6688 assert_eq!(short_channel_id, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id);
6689 assert!(is_permanent);
6690 assert_eq!(error_code, Some(0x8000|0x4000|0x2000|4));
6692 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6695 Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6696 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
6698 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6701 // TODO: Test actual removal of channel from NetworkGraph when it's implemented.
6704 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6705 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6706 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6707 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6709 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6710 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6711 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6712 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6713 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6714 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6716 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6717 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6719 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6720 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6721 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6722 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6724 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6725 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6727 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6728 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2);
6729 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6730 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
6731 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6733 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6734 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6735 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6736 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6738 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6739 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6741 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6743 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6744 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6746 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6749 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6750 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6752 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6755 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6756 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6757 if announce_latest {
6758 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6760 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6763 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6764 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6765 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6767 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6768 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6769 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6770 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
6771 assert_eq!(events.len(), 4);
6772 let mut first_failed = false;
6773 for event in events {
6775 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
6776 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
6777 assert!(!first_failed);
6778 first_failed = true;
6780 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
6783 Event::PaymentFailed { .. } => {}
6784 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6790 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
6791 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
6792 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
6795 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
6796 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
6797 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
6798 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6799 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
6800 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
6801 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
6803 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6804 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6805 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6806 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6807 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6809 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
6810 .unwrap().lock().unwrap().channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6812 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6813 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6815 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6816 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
6818 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
6820 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6821 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
6824 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
6826 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
6827 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
6828 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6829 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6830 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6832 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
6833 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6834 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6835 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6836 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].clone());
6837 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6838 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
6839 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6840 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6841 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6842 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6844 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
6845 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6846 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
6847 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6848 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6849 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6851 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
6852 timeout_tx = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().drain(..)
6853 .filter(|tx| tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == bs_commitment_tx[0].txid()).collect();
6854 check_spends!(timeout_tx[0], bs_commitment_tx[0]);
6855 // For both a revoked or non-revoked commitment transaction, after ANTI_REORG_DELAY the
6856 // dust HTLC should have been failed.
6857 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, false);
6860 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
6862 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].lock_time.0, 0);
6864 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout/revocation-claim tx
6865 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
6866 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
6867 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
6868 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, false);
6873 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
6874 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
6875 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
6876 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
6880 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
6881 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
6883 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6884 low_our_to_self_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
6885 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
6886 high_their_to_self_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
6887 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
6888 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6889 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6890 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
6891 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6893 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
6894 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6895 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
6896 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
6899 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6900 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6902 } else { assert!(false) }
6904 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6905 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6906 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6907 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6908 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6909 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6910 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6913 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6914 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6916 } else { assert!(false); }
6918 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
6919 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6920 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
6921 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6922 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6923 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
6925 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
6927 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
6928 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
6929 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
6933 } else { panic!(); }
6934 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
6936 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
6937 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
6938 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6939 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
6940 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }),
6941 &nodes[0].keys_manager, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].node.channel_type_features(), &nodes[1].node.init_features(), &open_channel, 0,
6942 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
6945 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
6946 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6948 } else { assert!(false); }
6952 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
6953 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
6954 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
6955 // to B, B should refuse payment.
6957 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6958 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6959 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6960 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6962 // Create some initial channels
6963 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
6965 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
6966 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
6967 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV).with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
6968 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
6969 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
6970 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
6971 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
6972 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6974 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6975 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6976 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
6977 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6978 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6980 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
6981 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
6982 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6983 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
6985 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
6986 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
6987 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6989 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6990 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6991 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6992 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6993 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6994 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6995 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6996 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6997 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6998 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7000 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7002 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7004 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7005 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7007 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7008 let mut expected_failure_data = (10_000 as u64).to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7009 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH.to_be_bytes());
7010 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7014 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7015 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7016 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7018 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7019 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7020 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7021 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7023 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7024 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0);
7025 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
7028 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7029 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7031 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7032 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7033 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7034 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7035 let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7036 for e in msg_events {
7038 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7039 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7040 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7041 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7042 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7045 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7049 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
7050 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7051 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7052 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
7053 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7054 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7056 // Reestablish chan_1
7057 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7058 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7059 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7060 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7061 // Reestablish chan_2
7062 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7063 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7064 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7065 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7066 // Reestablish chan_3
7067 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7068 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7069 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7070 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7072 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7073 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7074 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7075 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7076 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7077 for e in msg_events {
7079 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7080 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7081 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7082 // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7084 Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7085 None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7088 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7091 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7092 assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7096 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7097 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7098 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7100 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7101 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7102 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7103 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7105 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7107 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7108 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 30)
7109 .with_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features());
7110 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7111 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7113 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7114 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7115 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7116 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7117 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7118 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7120 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7121 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7122 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7123 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7127 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7128 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7130 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7131 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7132 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7133 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7134 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7136 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7140 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7141 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor)
7142 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7143 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7144 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7145 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7146 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7147 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7151 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7152 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7153 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7154 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7156 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7157 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7158 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7159 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7160 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7161 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7162 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7163 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7164 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7165 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7166 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7167 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7168 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7172 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7174 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7175 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7177 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7179 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7180 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7181 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7182 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7183 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7184 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7185 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7186 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7187 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7188 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7189 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7190 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7191 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7195 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7197 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7198 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7202 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7203 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7204 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7206 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7207 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7208 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7209 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7210 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7212 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7213 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7214 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
7215 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
7216 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7217 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7218 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7219 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7220 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 50).with_features(nodes[0].node.invoice_features());
7221 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7222 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7223 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7225 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7226 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7227 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7229 // Revoke local commitment tx
7230 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7232 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7233 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7234 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7235 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7236 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7237 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7238 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7240 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
7241 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
7243 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7244 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7245 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7247 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7248 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7249 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].output.len(), 1);
7250 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7252 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7253 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7254 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7255 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7256 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7257 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
7258 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7259 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7260 match events.last().unwrap() {
7261 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7262 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7268 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7269 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7270 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7272 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7273 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7274 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7275 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7277 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7278 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7279 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7280 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7281 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7282 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7284 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7285 // available, which we check here:
7286 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7287 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7288 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7290 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7291 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7293 // node_txn[3] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7294 // output, checked above).
7295 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 2);
7296 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].output.len(), 1);
7297 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7299 first = node_txn[3].txid();
7300 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7301 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[3].output[0].value;
7302 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[3].weight() as u64;
7303 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7307 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7308 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7309 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7310 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7311 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7313 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7314 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7315 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7316 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7318 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7319 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7321 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7322 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
7323 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7324 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7325 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[1].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7326 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7327 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7328 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7332 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7333 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7334 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7335 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7337 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7338 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7339 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7340 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7341 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7342 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7343 // up bumped justice generation.
7344 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7347 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7348 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7352 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7353 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7354 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7357 // Provide preimage for one
7358 // Check aggregation
7360 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7361 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7362 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7363 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7365 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7366 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000);
7367 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7369 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7370 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7371 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7372 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7373 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7375 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7376 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7377 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
7378 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7379 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7380 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7382 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7386 let feerate_timeout;
7387 let feerate_preimage;
7389 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7390 // 3 transactions including:
7391 // preimage and timeout sweeps from remote commitment + preimage sweep bump
7392 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
7393 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7394 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7395 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7396 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7397 check_spends!(node_txn[1], remote_txn[0]);
7398 check_spends!(node_txn[2], remote_txn[0]);
7400 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7401 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7402 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7403 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7405 let (preimage_bump_tx, timeout_tx) = if node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output == node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7406 (node_txn[2].clone(), node_txn[1].clone())
7408 (node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone())
7411 preimage_bump = preimage_bump_tx;
7412 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7413 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output);
7415 timeout = timeout_tx.txid();
7416 let index = timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7417 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - timeout_tx.output[0].value;
7418 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / timeout_tx.weight() as u64;
7422 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7423 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7425 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7426 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7428 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7429 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7430 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7431 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7432 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7433 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7435 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7436 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7437 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
7438 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7439 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7441 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7442 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7443 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7444 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7445 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7450 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7451 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7455 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7456 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7457 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7458 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7459 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7460 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7461 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7462 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7464 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7465 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7466 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7467 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7468 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).2;
7470 let per_commitment_secret;
7471 let next_per_commitment_point;
7473 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7474 let mut guard = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7475 let keys = guard.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7477 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7479 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7480 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7481 per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
7483 // Must revoke without gaps
7484 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7485 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
7487 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7488 next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
7489 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
7492 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
7493 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
7494 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
7495 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7496 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
7500 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
7501 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
7502 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7504 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7505 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7506 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7507 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7509 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000);
7510 // Lock HTLC in both directions
7511 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000);
7512 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000);
7514 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7515 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7516 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7518 // Revoke local commitment tx
7519 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
7521 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7522 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
7523 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[0], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash_2 }]);
7524 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
7526 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
7527 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7528 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7529 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7531 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7532 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3
7533 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7534 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7535 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7536 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
7540 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7541 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7542 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7544 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
7545 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
7546 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
7551 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
7552 // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
7553 // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
7554 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7555 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7556 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7557 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7558 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
7560 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000);
7561 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7562 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 1_010_000);
7563 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7564 let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7566 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7567 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
7568 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
7569 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7570 let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7572 // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
7573 // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
7574 // can get our balance.
7576 // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
7577 // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
7578 // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
7579 let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
7580 route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
7581 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7582 let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7583 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2), PaymentId(payment_hash_2.0)).unwrap();
7585 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
7589 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
7590 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
7591 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
7592 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7593 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7594 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7595 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7597 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000);
7599 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
7600 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
7601 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
7602 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
7603 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7605 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
7606 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
7607 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7608 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7610 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7611 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7612 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
7613 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7614 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
7616 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
7617 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7618 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
7620 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7625 fn test_override_channel_config() {
7626 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7627 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7628 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7629 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7631 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
7632 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
7633 override_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
7635 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
7637 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
7638 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7639 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
7640 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
7644 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
7645 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
7646 zero_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
7647 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7648 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7649 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
7650 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7652 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
7653 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7654 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7656 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7657 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7658 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7662 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
7663 // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
7664 // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
7665 // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
7666 // 90% of the `channel_value`.
7667 // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
7669 let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
7670 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7671 config_30_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
7672 let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
7673 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7674 config_50_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
7675 let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
7676 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7677 config_95_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
7678 let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
7679 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = true;
7680 config_100_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
7682 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7683 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7684 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
7685 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7687 let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
7688 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7689 let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
7690 let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
7691 let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
7693 let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7694 let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001);
7696 // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7697 // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7698 assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_50_percent_msat);
7699 // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7700 // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
7701 assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_30_percent_msat);
7703 // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7704 // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
7706 assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7707 // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
7708 // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
7710 assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, channel_value_90_percent_msat);
7714 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
7715 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7716 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7717 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7718 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7719 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7720 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7722 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7723 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7725 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7727 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7728 // accepting the inbound channel request.
7729 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7731 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7733 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7734 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap();
7736 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7739 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7740 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7742 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7743 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7744 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7746 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7749 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7751 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7752 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7754 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7756 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
7757 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
7759 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7764 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
7765 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7766 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7767 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7768 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7769 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7770 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7772 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7773 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7775 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7777 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7778 // rejecting the inbound channel request.
7779 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7781 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7783 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7784 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
7786 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7789 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7790 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7792 match close_msg_ev[0] {
7793 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
7794 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7796 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7798 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7802 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
7803 // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
7804 // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
7805 // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
7806 // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
7807 // and the channel should be closed.
7808 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7809 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7810 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7811 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7812 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7813 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7815 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7816 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7817 let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
7819 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7821 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
7822 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7824 // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
7825 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7827 // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
7828 // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
7829 // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
7830 // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
7831 // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
7832 let accept_chan_msg = {
7833 let mut node_1_per_peer_lock;
7834 let mut node_1_peer_state_lock;
7835 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], nodes[0], node_1_per_peer_lock, node_1_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
7836 channel.get_accept_channel_message()
7838 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
7840 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
7842 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
7843 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7845 // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
7846 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
7848 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7849 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7851 let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
7852 match close_msg_ev[0] {
7853 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
7854 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
7855 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7856 assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
7858 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7861 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
7865 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
7866 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
7867 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
7868 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7869 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7870 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
7871 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7873 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
7874 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7876 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &res);
7878 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
7879 // accepting the inbound channel request.
7880 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7882 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7884 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
7885 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0).unwrap();
7886 let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7888 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
7889 assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
7891 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
7892 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7895 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7898 // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
7899 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7900 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
7902 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
7903 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
7904 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7906 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7911 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
7912 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7913 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
7914 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
7915 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
7917 let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
7918 let api_res = nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 0);
7920 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
7921 assert_eq!(err, format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(unknown_channel_id), nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7923 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
7924 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
7929 fn test_simple_mpp() {
7930 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
7931 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7932 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7933 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7934 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7936 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7937 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7938 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7939 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7941 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7942 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7943 route.paths.push(path);
7944 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7945 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7946 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7947 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7948 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7949 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7950 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
7951 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
7955 fn test_preimage_storage() {
7956 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
7957 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7958 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7959 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7960 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7962 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7965 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200, None).unwrap();
7966 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7967 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
7968 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7969 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7970 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7971 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7972 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7974 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
7975 // values from previous calls.
7976 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7977 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7978 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7980 Event::PaymentClaimable { ref purpose, .. } => {
7982 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
7983 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
7985 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
7988 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7993 #[allow(deprecated)]
7994 fn test_secret_timeout() {
7995 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
7996 // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
7997 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7998 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7999 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8000 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8002 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8004 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8006 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8007 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8008 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8009 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8010 } else { panic!(); }
8012 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8014 header: BlockHeader {
8016 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8017 merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(),
8018 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8022 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8023 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8024 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8025 } else { panic!(); }
8027 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8028 // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8029 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8030 block.header.time += 1;
8031 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8032 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8033 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8036 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8037 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8038 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8039 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8040 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8041 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8042 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8044 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8045 // values from previous calls.
8046 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8047 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8048 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8050 Event::PaymentClaimable { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8051 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8052 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8053 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8055 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8060 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8061 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8062 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8063 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8064 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8065 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8067 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8069 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8070 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8071 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2, None).unwrap();
8072 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8074 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8075 // resulting events.
8076 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8077 ($payment_hash: expr) => {
8078 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8079 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8080 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8081 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8082 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8084 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8085 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8086 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8087 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash: $payment_hash }]);
8088 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8090 // We should fail the payment back
8091 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8092 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8093 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8094 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8095 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8097 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8102 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8103 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8104 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8106 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8107 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8108 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(our_payment_hash);
8109 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8111 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8112 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8113 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8114 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8116 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8117 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret), PaymentId(random_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8118 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!(random_payment_hash);
8119 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8123 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8124 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8125 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8126 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus
8129 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8130 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8131 // commitment at same time.
8133 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8134 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8135 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8136 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8138 // Create some initial channel
8139 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8140 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8142 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8143 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8145 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8146 let (preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 9_000_000);
8148 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8149 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8150 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8151 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8154 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8155 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8156 &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8157 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8160 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8161 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8164 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8165 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8166 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8167 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8168 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (block.clone(), 0));
8169 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, 200);
8171 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8172 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage);
8173 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8174 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], payment_hash, 9_000_000);
8176 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8177 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8178 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8180 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8181 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8182 let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
8183 if let Ok(update) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8184 assert_eq!(watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8185 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8186 } else { assert!(false); }
8188 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8189 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8190 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8191 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8195 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8196 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8197 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8198 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8199 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8201 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8202 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8203 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8204 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8206 // Create some initial channel
8207 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8208 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8210 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8211 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8213 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8214 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8216 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8217 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8218 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8219 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8220 let watchtower_alice = {
8222 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8223 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8224 &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8225 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8228 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8229 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8232 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8233 let block = Block { header, txdata: vec![] };
8234 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8235 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8236 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (block.clone(), 0));
8237 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&block, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8239 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8241 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8242 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8246 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8247 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8248 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8249 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8250 let watchtower_bob = {
8252 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8253 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8254 &mut io::Cursor::new(&monitor.encode()), (nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[0].keys_manager)).unwrap().1;
8255 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8258 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8259 assert_eq!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8262 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8263 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8265 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8266 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8268 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8270 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8272 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8273 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8274 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8276 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
8277 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
8278 let mut channel = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, chan_1.2);
8279 if let Ok(update) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8280 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8281 assert_eq!(watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure);
8282 assert_eq!(watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8283 assert_eq!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, &update), ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
8284 } else { assert!(false); }
8286 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8287 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8289 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8290 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8291 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8293 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8296 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8297 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8298 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8302 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8303 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BlockHash::all_zeros(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8304 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8306 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8307 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 1);
8308 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8313 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8314 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8315 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8318 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8319 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8321 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8322 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8323 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8324 // before receiving funding_signed.
8325 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8326 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8327 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8328 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8330 // Create an initial channel
8331 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8332 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8333 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8334 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8335 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_chan_msg);
8337 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8338 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8340 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8341 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8343 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8344 let channel_id = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8345 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8346 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8347 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8351 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8352 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8353 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8354 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8355 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8356 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8357 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8359 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8360 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8361 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8362 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8364 // Create some initial channels
8365 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8367 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8368 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8369 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8370 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8371 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8372 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8374 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8375 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8376 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8377 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8378 // this test before #653 fix.
8379 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8380 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8381 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8382 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8383 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8385 let htlc_timeout = {
8386 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8387 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8388 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8389 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8390 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
8394 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8395 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8396 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8397 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false);
8400 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8401 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8402 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8403 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8405 // Steps of the test:
8406 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8407 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8408 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8409 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8410 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8411 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8412 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8413 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8414 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8415 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8416 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8417 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8419 // Create some initial channels
8420 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8421 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001);
8423 // Steps (1) and (2):
8424 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8425 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3_000_000);
8427 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8428 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8429 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8430 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8431 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8432 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8433 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8435 // Steps (3) and (4):
8436 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8437 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8438 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8439 let mut counterparty_node = 1; // Bob if Alice force-closes
8442 if !broadcast_alice {
8443 force_closing_node = 1;
8444 counterparty_node = 0;
8446 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_ab.2, &nodes[counterparty_node].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8447 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8448 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8449 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8450 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8451 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8452 true => alice_txn.clone(),
8453 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8455 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8456 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8457 if broadcast_alice {
8458 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8459 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8460 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8465 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8466 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8467 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8469 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[2], payment_hash, 3_000_000);
8471 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8472 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8473 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8474 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8475 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8476 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8478 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8479 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], nodes[2], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false, false);
8480 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8481 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8482 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8483 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8485 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8486 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8488 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8491 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8492 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8493 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8494 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8496 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8497 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8498 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8499 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8500 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8503 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8505 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8506 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8507 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8510 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8513 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8514 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8515 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8516 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8518 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8519 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8520 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8521 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8522 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8525 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8527 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8528 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8530 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8531 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8532 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8533 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8534 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8535 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8536 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8537 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8538 if broadcast_alice {
8539 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8540 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8541 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8543 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8544 if broadcast_alice {
8545 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8546 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8548 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8549 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8554 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8555 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8557 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8558 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8559 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8561 // If Alice force-closed, Bob only broadcasts a HTLC-output-claiming transaction. Otherwise,
8562 // Bob force-closed and broadcasts the commitment transaction along with a
8563 // HTLC-output-claiming transaction.
8564 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8565 if broadcast_alice {
8566 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8567 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8568 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8570 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8571 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8572 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8578 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8579 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8580 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8581 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8582 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8586 fn test_duplicate_temporary_channel_id_from_different_peers() {
8587 // Tests that we can accept two different `OpenChannel` requests with the same
8588 // `temporary_channel_id`, as long as they are from different peers.
8589 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8590 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8591 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8592 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8594 // Create an first channel channel
8595 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8596 let mut open_chan_msg_chan_1_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8598 // Create an second channel
8599 nodes[2].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 43, None).unwrap();
8600 let mut open_chan_msg_chan_2_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8602 // Modify the `OpenChannel` from `nodes[2]` to `nodes[0]` to ensure that it uses the same
8603 // `temporary_channel_id` as the `OpenChannel` from nodes[1] to nodes[0].
8604 open_chan_msg_chan_2_0.temporary_channel_id = open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id;
8606 // Assert that `nodes[0]` can accept both `OpenChannel` requests, even though they use the same
8607 // `temporary_channel_id` as they are from different peers.
8608 nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_1_0);
8610 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8611 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8613 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8614 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8615 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8617 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8621 nodes[0].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg_chan_2_0);
8623 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8624 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8626 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { node_id, msg } => {
8627 assert_eq!(node_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8628 assert_eq!(msg.temporary_channel_id, open_chan_msg_chan_1_0.temporary_channel_id);
8630 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8636 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8637 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8638 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8640 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8641 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8642 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8643 // updating logic for the existing channel.
8644 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8645 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8646 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8647 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8649 // Create an initial channel
8650 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8651 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8652 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8653 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8655 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8656 // that it is rejected.
8657 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8659 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8660 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8662 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8663 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8664 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8665 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8666 // move forward with it.
8667 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8668 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8670 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8674 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8675 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8677 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8678 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8680 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8681 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8683 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8684 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8685 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8686 added_monitors.clear();
8688 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8690 let funding_outpoint = crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8691 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8693 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8696 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8697 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8698 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8699 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8700 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_msg);
8702 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8703 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8705 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8706 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8707 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8708 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8709 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8711 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8715 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8716 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8717 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8718 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8719 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8720 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8722 let funding_created = {
8723 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8724 let mut a_peer_state = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8725 // Once we call `get_outbound_funding_created` the channel has a duplicate channel_id as
8726 // another channel in the ChannelManager - an invalid state. Thus, we'd panic later when we
8727 // try to create another channel. Instead, we drop the channel entirely here (leaving the
8728 // channelmanager in a possibly nonsense state instead).
8729 let mut as_chan = a_peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8730 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8731 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8733 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8734 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8735 // At this point we'll look up if the channel_id is present and immediately fail the channel
8736 // without trying to persist the `ChannelMonitor`.
8737 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8739 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8741 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8742 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8744 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8745 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8746 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8747 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8748 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8750 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8754 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8755 // everything is functional.
8756 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8758 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8759 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8760 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8761 added_monitors.clear();
8764 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8765 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8766 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8767 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8769 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8770 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8771 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8773 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8777 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8778 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8780 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8781 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8782 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8783 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8784 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8785 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8786 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8788 // Create some initial channels
8789 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8790 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8791 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001);
8793 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8794 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8795 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8797 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8798 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8799 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8801 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8802 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8803 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8804 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8805 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8806 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8807 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8808 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8809 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8811 // A null channel ID should close all channels
8812 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
8813 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8814 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8815 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8816 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8817 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8819 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8820 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8822 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8825 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8826 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8828 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8830 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
8831 // peer_disconnected.
8832 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8833 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8835 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8836 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8837 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8841 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
8842 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
8844 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
8845 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
8846 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
8847 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
8849 // Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
8850 // previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
8851 // gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
8852 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8853 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8854 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8855 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8857 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8858 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8859 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8861 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
8863 // Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
8864 // 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
8865 // a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
8867 let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
8868 let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.into();
8869 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
8870 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
8871 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
8874 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
8875 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8876 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8878 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8879 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8881 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8882 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
8884 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8885 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
8886 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
8888 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
8889 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
8890 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8891 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8892 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8893 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
8894 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
8895 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8896 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
8897 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
8898 } else { panic!(); }
8899 } else { panic!(); }
8900 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
8902 // Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
8903 // long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
8904 // as its not 32 bytes long.
8905 let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
8906 version: 2i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
8907 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
8908 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
8912 script_sig: Script::new(),
8913 sequence: Sequence::ENABLE_RBF_NO_LOCKTIME,
8914 witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
8916 output: vec![TxOut {
8918 script_pubkey: Script::new(),
8921 check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
8922 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
8925 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
8926 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
8927 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
8928 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
8929 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
8930 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
8931 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
8932 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
8933 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
8934 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
8935 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
8936 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
8937 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
8938 // until we learned about an additional block.
8940 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
8941 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
8942 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8943 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8944 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8945 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8946 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
8948 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8949 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);
8950 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
8951 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8952 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8954 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8955 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8956 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8957 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8958 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8959 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
8961 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
8962 if !test_height_before_timelock {
8963 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
8965 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8966 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
8967 if test_height_before_timelock {
8968 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
8969 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
8970 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8971 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
8973 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
8974 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
8975 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
8976 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
8977 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
8978 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
8980 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
8981 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
8983 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
8984 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
8985 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
8986 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
8987 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
8988 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: channel_id }]);
8989 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8991 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8992 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8993 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8994 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8995 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8996 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8997 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8998 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8999 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9004 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9005 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9006 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9009 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9010 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9011 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9012 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9013 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9015 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9017 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9018 .with_features(nodes[1].node.invoice_features());
9019 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9021 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9024 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9025 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9026 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9027 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9028 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9029 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9030 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9032 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9033 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9036 // Note that we use a different PaymentId here to allow us to duplicativly pay
9037 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_secret.0)).unwrap();
9038 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9039 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9040 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9041 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9042 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9043 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9044 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9045 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9046 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9047 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9050 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9051 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9053 if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9054 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9055 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9057 let expected_destinations = vec![
9058 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9059 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash },
9061 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], expected_destinations);
9062 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9064 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9065 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9066 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9068 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9069 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9070 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9072 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9073 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 4);
9074 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9075 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9076 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[2] {} else { panic!(); }
9077 if let Event::PaymentFailed { .. } = failure_events[3] {} else { panic!(); }
9079 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9080 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9081 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9083 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9084 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9085 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9086 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9088 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new());
9090 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9095 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9096 // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9097 // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentClaimable` event.
9098 // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9099 // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9100 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9104 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9105 // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9106 // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9107 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9111 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9112 // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9113 // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9114 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9115 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9116 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9117 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9119 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9120 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9121 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9122 let chan_2_3 =create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9124 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9125 .with_features(nodes[3].node.invoice_features());
9126 let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9127 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9128 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9129 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9130 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9131 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9133 let payment_params_opt = Some(payment_params);
9135 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9137 let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9138 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9140 let session_privs = {
9141 // We create a fake route here so that we start with three pending HTLCs, which we'll
9142 // ultimately have, just not right away.
9143 let mut dup_route = route.clone();
9144 dup_route.paths.push(route.paths[1].clone());
9145 nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), payment_id, &dup_route).unwrap()
9147 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9148 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9151 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9152 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9153 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9155 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9157 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9158 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9161 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9162 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9163 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9165 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9166 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9168 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9171 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9172 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9173 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9175 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9176 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9177 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9179 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9180 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9181 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9183 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9184 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9185 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed_ignore!(nodes[3], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9186 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9190 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9191 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9192 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9194 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[2], vec![HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id()), channel_id: chan_2_3.2 }]);
9195 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9197 let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9198 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9199 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9201 expect_payment_failed_conditions(&nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9203 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[2]).unwrap();
9204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9206 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9207 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9208 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9210 do_claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9211 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9212 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
9214 Event::PaymentSent { payment_hash, .. } => { // The payment was abandoned earlier, so the fee paid will be None
9215 assert_eq!(payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
9217 _ => panic!("Unexpected event")
9220 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_hash, .. } => {
9221 assert_eq!(payment_hash.unwrap(), our_payment_hash);
9223 _ => panic!("Unexpected event")
9226 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_hash, .. } => {
9227 assert_eq!(payment_hash.unwrap(), our_payment_hash);
9229 _ => panic!("Unexpected event")
9234 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9235 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9236 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9237 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9238 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9240 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001);
9241 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9242 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9243 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9244 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9245 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
9246 final_value_msat: 10000,
9248 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9249 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9250 let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9252 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9253 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9254 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9255 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9256 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9257 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9258 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9259 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9260 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9264 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9265 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9266 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9267 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9268 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9270 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9271 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9273 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9274 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9275 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
9276 final_value_msat: 10000,
9278 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
9279 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9280 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9281 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9282 let route = find_route(
9283 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9284 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
9287 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9288 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(test_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9290 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9291 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9292 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9293 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9294 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9295 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9299 fn test_double_partial_claim() {
9300 // Test what happens if a node receives a payment, generates a PaymentClaimable event, the HTLCs
9301 // time out, the sender resends only some of the MPP parts, then the user processes the
9302 // PaymentClaimable event, ensuring they don't inadvertently claim only part of the full payment
9304 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9305 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9306 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9307 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9309 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0);
9310 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0);
9311 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0);
9312 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0);
9314 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], 15_000_000);
9315 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9316 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9317 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9318 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9319 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9322 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
9323 // nodes[3] has now received a PaymentClaimable event...which it will take some (exorbitant)
9324 // amount of time to respond to.
9326 // Connect some blocks to time out the payment
9327 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
9328 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV); // To get the same height for sending later
9330 let failed_destinations = vec![
9331 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9332 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash },
9334 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[3], failed_destinations);
9336 pass_failed_payment_back(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_hash);
9338 // nodes[1] now retries one of the two paths...
9339 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9340 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9342 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9343 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9344 let node_1_msgs = remove_first_msg_event_to_node(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &mut events);
9345 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), node_1_msgs, false, None);
9347 // At this point nodes[3] has received one half of the payment, and the user goes to handle
9348 // that PaymentClaimable event they got hours ago and never handled...we should refuse to claim.
9349 nodes[3].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9350 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9351 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9354 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9355 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9356 enum ExposureEvent {
9357 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9359 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9361 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9362 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9365 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9366 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9369 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9370 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9371 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9372 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9373 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9374 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9375 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9376 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9378 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9379 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9380 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9381 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9382 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9383 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9385 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9386 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9387 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9388 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9390 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9392 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
9393 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9394 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9396 let opt_anchors = false;
9398 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9401 let mut node_0_per_peer_lock;
9402 let mut node_0_peer_state_lock;
9403 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(nodes[0], nodes[1], node_0_per_peer_lock, node_0_peer_state_lock, temporary_channel_id);
9404 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9407 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9408 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9409 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9411 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9412 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9414 let (channel_ready, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9415 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
9416 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9418 let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9419 let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9420 let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9421 let chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9422 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9424 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9425 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9427 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9428 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9430 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9431 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9434 if dust_outbound_balance {
9435 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9436 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9437 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9438 for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9439 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9440 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9443 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9444 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9445 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9446 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9447 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9451 if dust_outbound_balance {
9452 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9453 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9454 for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9455 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9456 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9459 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9460 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9461 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9462 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9467 let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9468 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9469 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9470 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9471 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9473 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9474 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9475 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9477 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9479 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9480 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9481 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9483 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9484 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9485 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9486 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9487 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9489 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9490 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9491 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9492 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9494 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9495 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9497 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9498 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9499 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9501 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9502 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9504 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9505 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9506 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9509 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9510 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9511 added_monitors.clear();
9515 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9516 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9517 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9518 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9519 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9520 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9521 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9522 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9523 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9524 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9525 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9526 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9527 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9531 fn test_non_final_funding_tx() {
9532 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9533 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9534 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9535 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9537 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9538 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9539 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
9540 let accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9541 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
9543 let best_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
9545 let chan_id = *nodes[0].network_chan_count.borrow();
9546 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9547 let input = TxIn { previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint::null(), script_sig: bitcoin::Script::new(), sequence: Sequence(1), witness: Witness::from_vec(vec!(vec!(1))) };
9548 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9549 let mut tx = match events[0] {
9550 Event::FundingGenerationReady { ref channel_value_satoshis, ref output_script, .. } => {
9551 // Timelock the transaction _beyond_ the best client height + 2.
9552 Transaction { version: chan_id as i32, lock_time: PackedLockTime(best_height + 3), input: vec![input], output: vec![TxOut {
9553 value: *channel_value_satoshis, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9556 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9558 // Transaction should fail as it's evaluated as non-final for propagation.
9559 match nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()) {
9560 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
9561 assert_eq!(format!("Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final"), err);
9566 // However, transaction should be accepted if it's in a +2 headroom from best block.
9567 tx.lock_time = PackedLockTime(tx.lock_time.0 - 1);
9568 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temp_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).is_ok());
9569 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9573 fn accept_busted_but_better_fee() {
9574 // If a peer sends us a fee update that is too low, but higher than our previous channel
9575 // feerate, we should accept it. In the future we may want to consider closing the channel
9576 // later, but for now we only accept the update.
9577 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9578 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9579 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9580 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9582 create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9584 // Set nodes[1] to expect 5,000 sat/kW.
9586 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9587 *feerate_lock = 5000;
9590 // If nodes[0] increases their feerate, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept it.
9592 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9593 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9595 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9596 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9598 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9599 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9601 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9602 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9603 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9605 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9608 // If nodes[0] increases their feerate further, even if its not enough, nodes[1] should accept
9611 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9612 *feerate_lock = 2000;
9614 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9615 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9617 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9618 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9620 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
9621 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9622 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], commitment_signed, false);
9624 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9627 // However, if nodes[0] decreases their feerate, nodes[1] should reject it and close the
9630 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9631 *feerate_lock = 1000;
9633 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9634 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9636 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9637 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9639 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
9640 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_fee.as_ref().unwrap());
9641 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
9642 err: "Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: 1000. Our expected lower limit: 5000 (- 250)".to_owned() });
9643 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9644 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9646 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9650 fn do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(valid_delta: bool, use_user_hash: bool) {
9651 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9652 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9653 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9654 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9655 let min_final_cltv_expiry_delta = 120;
9656 let final_cltv_expiry_delta = if valid_delta { min_final_cltv_expiry_delta + 2 } else {
9657 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta - 2 };
9658 let recv_value = 100_000;
9660 create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
9662 let payment_parameters = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32);
9663 let (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = if use_user_hash {
9664 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[1],
9665 Some(recv_value), Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta));
9666 (payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret)
9668 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(recv_value), 7200, Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)).unwrap();
9669 (payment_hash, nodes[1].node.get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret).unwrap(), payment_secret)
9671 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_parameters, recv_value, final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32).unwrap();
9672 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9673 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9674 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9675 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9676 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9677 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9678 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9679 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9682 expect_payment_claimable!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, recv_value, if use_user_hash {
9683 None } else { Some(payment_preimage) }, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9685 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
9687 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9689 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9691 let fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9692 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9693 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
9695 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9700 fn test_payment_with_custom_min_cltv_expiry_delta() {
9701 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, false);
9702 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(false, true);
9703 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, false);
9704 do_payment_with_custom_min_final_cltv_expiry(true, true);