1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use chain::channelmonitor;
17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
19 use chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
21 use ln::channel::{COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
25 use ln::chan_utils::{HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
26 use routing::network_graph::{NetworkUpdate, RoutingFees};
27 use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RouteHint, RouteHintHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
28 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
30 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
31 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
32 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
33 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
34 use util::errors::APIError;
35 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
36 use util::config::UserConfig;
38 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
39 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
42 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
43 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
45 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
46 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
48 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
49 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
55 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
56 use core::default::Default;
57 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
59 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
60 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
63 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
64 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
65 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
66 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
67 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
68 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
70 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
72 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
73 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
74 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
76 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
77 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
79 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
80 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
82 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
83 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
84 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
85 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
86 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
87 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
88 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
89 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
91 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
92 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
94 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
96 } else { assert!(false); }
99 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
100 use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
102 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
103 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS; msg });
105 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
107 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than funding value \d+", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
109 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
111 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
113 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
115 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
117 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
120 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
121 // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
122 // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
123 // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
124 // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
125 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
126 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
127 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
128 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
130 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
131 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
132 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
133 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
134 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
136 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
137 let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
138 if !send_from_initiator {
139 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
140 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
142 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
144 // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
145 let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
146 if send_from_initiator {
147 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
148 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
150 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
153 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
154 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
155 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
158 let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
159 let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
160 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
162 // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
163 // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
164 if send_from_initiator {
165 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
166 // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
167 // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
168 // well as an additional HTLC.
169 - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2));
171 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
176 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
177 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
178 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
182 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
183 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
184 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
185 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
186 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
187 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
190 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
194 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
195 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
196 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
197 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
198 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
199 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
200 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
201 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
202 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
203 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
205 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
207 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
209 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
211 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
214 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
215 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
217 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
218 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
219 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
220 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
221 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
223 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
226 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
228 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
229 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
230 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
231 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
233 let payment_event = {
234 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
235 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
236 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
238 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
239 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
241 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
242 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
243 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
244 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
245 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
246 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
248 // deliver(1), generate (3):
249 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
250 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
251 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
252 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
254 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
255 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
256 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
257 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
258 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
259 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
260 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
261 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
263 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
264 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
265 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
266 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
267 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
268 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
269 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
270 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
272 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
273 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
274 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
275 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
277 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
278 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
281 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
282 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
284 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
285 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
287 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
288 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
291 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
292 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
296 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
297 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
298 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
299 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
300 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
301 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
302 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
303 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
306 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
308 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
310 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
313 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
314 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
316 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
317 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
318 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
319 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
322 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
325 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
327 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
328 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
329 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
330 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
332 let payment_event = {
333 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
334 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
335 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
337 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
338 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
340 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
341 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
342 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
343 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
344 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
345 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
347 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
348 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
350 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
354 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
355 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
356 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
357 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
358 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
359 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
362 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
363 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
364 // update_fee (never committed) ->
366 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
367 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
368 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
369 // <- (1) RAA delivered
370 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
371 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
372 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
373 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
375 // B should send no response here
376 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
377 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
380 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
383 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
384 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
385 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
387 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
388 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
390 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
391 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
392 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
393 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
394 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
396 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
399 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
400 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
401 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
402 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
403 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
405 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
408 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
409 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
411 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
412 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
413 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
415 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
416 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
417 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
418 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
421 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
423 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
425 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
427 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
428 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
429 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
430 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
431 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
432 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
433 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
434 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
435 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
436 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
437 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
439 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
440 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
441 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
442 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
443 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
445 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
446 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
447 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
450 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
451 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
452 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
454 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
455 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
458 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
459 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
460 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
461 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
463 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
464 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
465 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
468 fn do_test_1_conf_open(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
469 // Previously, if the minium_depth config was set to 1, we'd never send a funding_locked. This
470 // tests that we properly send one in that case.
471 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
472 alice_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
473 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
474 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
475 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
476 bob_config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
477 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
478 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
479 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
480 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
481 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)]);
482 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
483 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
485 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
486 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
487 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
489 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
490 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
491 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
494 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
495 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
496 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
500 fn test_1_conf_open() {
501 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirst);
502 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirst);
503 do_test_1_conf_open(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
506 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
507 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
508 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
509 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
512 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
513 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
514 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
515 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
517 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
519 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
522 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
523 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
526 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
527 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
528 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
530 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
531 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
532 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
534 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
535 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
537 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
539 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
540 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
541 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
542 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
544 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
545 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
547 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
548 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
549 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
550 added_monitors.clear();
552 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
554 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
555 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
557 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
558 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
559 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
560 added_monitors.clear();
563 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
564 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
566 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
567 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
569 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
570 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
571 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
572 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
576 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
577 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
578 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
579 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
580 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
581 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
582 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
583 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
584 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
585 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
586 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
587 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
588 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
589 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
590 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
591 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
592 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
593 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
594 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
598 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
599 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
600 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
601 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
602 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
603 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
606 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
609 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
610 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
612 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
613 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
614 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
615 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
616 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
618 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
620 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
622 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
623 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
624 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
626 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
627 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
628 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
630 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
631 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
632 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
633 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
635 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
636 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
637 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
641 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
642 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
643 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
644 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
645 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
646 let channel_value = 5000;
648 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
649 let channel_id = chan.2;
650 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
651 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value);
653 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
654 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
655 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
657 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
658 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT) as u32;
660 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
661 *feerate_lock = feerate;
663 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
664 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
665 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
667 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
669 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
671 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
673 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
675 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
676 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
677 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0) / 1000;
678 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
679 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
680 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
684 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
685 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
688 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
689 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
690 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
692 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
694 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
695 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
696 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
697 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
698 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
699 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
700 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
701 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
702 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
704 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
705 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
706 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
707 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
708 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
709 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
710 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
711 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
714 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
715 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
716 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
719 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
720 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
721 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
722 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
723 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
724 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
726 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0) / 1000,
727 false, local_funding, remote_funding,
728 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
729 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
731 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
733 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
736 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
739 htlc_signatures: res.1
742 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
744 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
747 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
749 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
750 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
751 //Should produce and error.
752 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
753 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
754 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
755 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
756 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
760 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
761 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
762 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
763 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
764 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
765 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
768 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
771 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
774 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
775 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
777 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
778 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
779 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
780 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
781 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
783 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
785 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
786 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
787 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
788 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
790 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
792 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
793 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
795 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
796 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
797 added_monitors.clear();
799 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
800 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
801 // node[1] has nothing to do
803 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
804 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
805 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
807 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
808 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
809 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
810 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
811 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
812 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
813 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
815 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
816 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
817 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
818 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
819 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
820 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
822 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
823 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
824 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
825 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
827 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
828 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
829 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
831 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
832 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
833 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
834 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
836 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
837 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
838 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
840 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
842 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
843 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
845 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
846 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
849 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
851 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
852 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
853 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
854 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
855 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
859 fn test_update_fee() {
860 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
861 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
862 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
863 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
864 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
865 let channel_id = chan.2;
868 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
869 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
870 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
871 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
872 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
873 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
874 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
875 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
876 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
877 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
878 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
881 // Create and deliver (1)...
884 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
885 feerate = *feerate_lock;
886 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
888 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
889 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
891 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
892 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
893 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
894 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
895 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
897 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
899 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
901 // Generate (2) and (3):
902 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
903 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
904 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
907 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
908 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
909 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
911 // Create and deliver (4)...
913 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
914 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
916 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
917 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
918 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
919 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
920 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
921 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
922 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
924 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
927 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
928 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
929 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
931 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
932 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
934 // Handle (3), creating (6):
935 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
937 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
938 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
941 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
942 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
943 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
945 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
946 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
947 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
948 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
949 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
950 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
951 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
952 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
953 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
956 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
957 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
958 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
959 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
961 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
962 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
963 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
965 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
966 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
967 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
968 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
969 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
973 fn fake_network_test() {
974 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
975 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
976 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
977 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
978 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
979 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
981 // Create some initial channels
982 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
983 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
984 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
986 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
987 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
988 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
989 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
990 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
992 // Send some more payments
993 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
994 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
995 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
997 // Test failure packets
998 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
999 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
1001 // Add a new channel that skips 3
1002 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1004 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1005 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
1006 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1007 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1008 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1009 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1010 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
1012 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
1013 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1014 hops.push(RouteHop {
1015 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1016 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1017 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1018 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1020 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1022 hops.push(RouteHop {
1023 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1024 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1025 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1026 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1028 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1030 hops.push(RouteHop {
1031 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1032 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1033 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1034 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1036 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1038 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1039 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1040 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1042 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1043 hops.push(RouteHop {
1044 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1045 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1046 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1047 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1049 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1051 hops.push(RouteHop {
1052 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1053 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1054 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1055 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1057 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1059 hops.push(RouteHop {
1060 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1061 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1062 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1063 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1065 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1067 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1068 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1069 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payee: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1071 // Claim the rebalances...
1072 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1073 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1075 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1076 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1078 // Send some payments across both channels
1079 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1080 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1081 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1084 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1085 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1086 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1087 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1089 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1091 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1092 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1093 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1095 // Close down the channels...
1096 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1097 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1098 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1099 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1100 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1101 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1102 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1103 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1104 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1105 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1106 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1107 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1108 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1109 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1110 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1114 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1115 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1116 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1117 // commitment dance rounds.
1118 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1119 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1120 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1121 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1122 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1123 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1125 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1126 for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1127 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1128 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1129 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1131 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1133 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1134 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1135 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1136 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1138 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1139 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1141 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1143 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1144 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1145 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1146 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1149 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1150 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1152 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1153 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1156 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1157 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1158 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1159 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1161 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1162 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1163 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1164 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1165 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1166 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1167 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1169 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1170 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1171 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1173 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1175 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1176 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1177 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1178 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1180 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1181 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1182 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1183 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1185 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1186 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1187 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1189 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1190 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1192 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1193 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1194 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1195 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1196 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1198 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1200 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1201 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1202 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1204 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1205 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1207 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1209 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1210 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1211 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1213 &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1214 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1216 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1220 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1221 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1224 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1228 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1229 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1230 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1231 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1232 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1233 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1234 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1236 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1237 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1238 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1239 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1240 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1241 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1243 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1245 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1246 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1248 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1249 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1251 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1252 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1253 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1257 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1258 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1259 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1260 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1261 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1262 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1263 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1264 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1266 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1269 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1271 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1273 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1274 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1275 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1277 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1278 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1281 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1282 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1284 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1285 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1286 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1287 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1288 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1289 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1290 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1293 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1295 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1296 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1297 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1298 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1300 // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1301 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1302 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1303 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1304 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1305 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1306 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1307 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1309 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1310 assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1311 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1313 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1314 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1315 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1316 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1317 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1318 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1319 check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1320 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1322 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1323 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1326 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1327 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1328 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1329 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1331 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1332 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1333 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1334 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1335 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1336 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1338 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1344 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1345 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1346 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1347 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1348 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1349 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1351 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1352 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1354 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1355 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1);
1356 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1357 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1358 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1360 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1362 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1363 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1364 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1367 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1369 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1370 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1372 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1376 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1377 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1378 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1379 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1380 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1381 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1383 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1384 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1385 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1386 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1388 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1390 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1391 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1392 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1393 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1396 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1397 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1398 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1399 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1402 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1404 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1405 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1406 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1408 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1410 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1412 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1413 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1414 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1415 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1416 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1417 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1418 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1419 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1421 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1422 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1423 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1424 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1425 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1427 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1428 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1429 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1430 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1431 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1432 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1433 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1434 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1437 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1438 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1439 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1441 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1442 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1443 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1445 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1447 amount_msat: 3460001,
1448 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1450 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1453 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1456 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1457 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1458 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1459 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1463 false, local_funding, remote_funding,
1464 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1466 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1467 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1469 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1472 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1475 htlc_signatures: res.1
1478 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1479 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1480 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1482 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1483 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1485 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1486 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1488 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1490 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1491 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1492 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1494 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1495 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1496 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1498 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1500 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1501 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1503 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1507 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1508 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1509 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1510 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1511 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1513 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1514 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1515 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1516 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1518 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1519 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1520 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1522 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1524 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1525 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1526 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1529 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1530 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1531 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1532 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1533 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1534 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1538 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1539 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1540 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1541 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1542 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1543 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1545 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1546 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1547 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1548 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1549 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1550 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1551 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1553 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1554 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1555 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1558 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1559 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1560 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1561 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1562 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1563 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1564 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1565 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1566 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1568 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1569 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1570 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1571 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1572 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1575 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1576 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1577 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1578 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1579 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1580 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1581 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1582 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1586 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1587 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1588 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1589 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1590 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1592 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1593 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1594 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1596 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1597 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1598 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1599 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1600 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1601 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1602 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1604 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1605 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1606 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1607 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1608 // commitment transaction fee.
1609 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1611 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1612 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1613 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1616 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1617 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1618 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1619 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1623 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1624 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1625 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1626 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1627 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1628 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1629 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1630 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1632 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1634 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1635 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64);
1636 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1637 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1639 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1640 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1641 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1642 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1643 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1644 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1645 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg);
1647 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1648 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1649 match msg_events[0] {
1650 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1651 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1653 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1658 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1659 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1660 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1661 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1662 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1663 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1664 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1665 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1667 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1668 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1669 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1670 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1671 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1672 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1674 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1675 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1676 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1677 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1678 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1679 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1681 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1682 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1683 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1684 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1688 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1689 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1690 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1691 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1692 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1693 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1694 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1697 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1698 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1699 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1701 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1702 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1703 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1704 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1706 // Add a pending HTLC.
1707 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1708 let payment_event_1 = {
1709 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1710 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1712 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1713 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1714 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1716 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1718 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1719 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2);
1720 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1721 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1722 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1724 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1725 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1726 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1727 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1728 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1729 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1730 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1731 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1734 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1735 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1736 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1737 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1740 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1741 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1742 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1743 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1744 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1745 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1746 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1747 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1751 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1752 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1753 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1754 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1755 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1756 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1757 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1758 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1759 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1760 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1762 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1763 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1764 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1766 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1767 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1770 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64) -> u64 {
1771 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1775 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1776 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1777 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1778 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1779 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1780 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1781 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1782 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1783 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1784 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1785 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1787 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1788 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1790 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1791 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1793 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1795 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1796 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1797 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1798 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1803 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1804 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1805 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1807 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1809 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1811 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1812 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1813 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1814 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1815 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1816 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1817 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1820 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1821 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1823 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1824 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1825 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1826 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1827 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1828 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1829 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1832 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1834 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1835 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1836 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1837 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1838 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1841 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1842 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1843 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1844 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1845 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1848 // adding pending output.
1849 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1850 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1851 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1852 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1853 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1854 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1855 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1856 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1857 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1859 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1);
1860 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1861 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1863 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1864 let payment_event_1 = {
1865 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1866 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1868 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1869 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1870 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1872 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1874 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1875 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1877 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1878 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1879 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1880 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1883 // split the rest to test holding cell
1884 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1);
1885 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1886 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1887 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1889 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1890 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1893 // now see if they go through on both sides
1894 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1895 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1896 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1897 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1898 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1899 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1901 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1903 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1904 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1905 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1906 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1907 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1910 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1911 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1912 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1913 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1914 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1915 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1917 // flush the pending htlc
1918 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1919 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1920 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1922 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1923 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1924 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1925 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1927 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1928 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1929 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1930 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1932 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1933 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1934 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1936 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1938 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1939 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1940 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1942 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1943 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1945 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1946 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1947 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1948 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1949 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1950 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1952 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1953 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1954 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1955 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1957 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1958 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1960 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1961 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1963 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1964 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1965 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
1967 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1968 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1969 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1971 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1974 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1977 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1978 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1979 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
1981 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1982 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1983 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1985 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1988 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1991 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1992 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1993 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1995 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1);
1996 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1997 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1999 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
2000 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
2001 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2002 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
2003 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
2005 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2006 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2010 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2011 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2012 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2013 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2014 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2015 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2016 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2017 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2019 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2020 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2021 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2022 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2023 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2024 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2025 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
2026 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2028 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2029 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2030 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2031 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2032 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2033 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2034 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2035 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2036 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2037 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2039 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2040 // Route the first two HTLCs.
2041 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
2042 let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
2044 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2045 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2047 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
2048 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2049 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2050 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2051 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2054 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2055 // initial fulfill/CS.
2056 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
2057 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2058 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2060 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2061 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2062 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
2063 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2064 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2066 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2067 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2068 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2069 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2070 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2072 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2073 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2074 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2075 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2076 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2078 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2079 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2080 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2082 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2083 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2084 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2086 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2087 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2088 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2090 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2091 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2092 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2093 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2094 // on-chain as necessary).
2095 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2096 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2097 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2098 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2099 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2101 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2102 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2103 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2105 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2106 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2108 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2109 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2110 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2112 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2113 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2115 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2116 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2117 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2119 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2120 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2121 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2122 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2123 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2126 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2127 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2128 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2129 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2131 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2133 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2134 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2135 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2137 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2140 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2141 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2142 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2143 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2145 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2146 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2147 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2149 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2152 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2153 expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2155 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2156 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2160 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2161 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2162 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2163 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2164 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2165 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2166 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2168 // Create some initial channels
2169 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2170 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2171 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2172 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2174 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2175 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2176 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2177 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2178 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2179 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2181 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2182 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2183 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2184 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2185 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2187 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2188 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2189 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2190 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2192 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2193 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2194 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2195 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2196 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2198 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2199 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2200 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2201 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2202 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2204 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2205 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2207 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2208 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2209 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2210 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2211 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2213 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2214 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2215 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2216 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2217 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2218 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2220 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2221 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2222 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2223 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2224 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2226 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2227 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2229 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2230 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2232 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2233 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2235 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2236 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2237 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2238 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2240 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2246 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2247 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2248 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2249 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2250 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
2251 let node2_commitment_txid;
2253 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2254 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2255 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2256 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2258 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2259 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2260 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2261 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2262 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2264 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2265 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2266 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2267 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2268 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2270 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2271 // confusing us in the following tests.
2272 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2274 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2275 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2276 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2279 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2280 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2281 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2282 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2283 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2284 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2287 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2290 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2291 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2293 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2295 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2297 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2299 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2300 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2301 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2307 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2309 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2310 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2312 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2313 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2314 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2315 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2316 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2319 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2322 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2323 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2325 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2327 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2328 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2330 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2331 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2332 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2334 nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2335 nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2336 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2337 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2339 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2340 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2341 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2345 fn test_justice_tx() {
2346 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2347 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2348 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2349 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2350 alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2351 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2352 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2353 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2354 bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2355 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2356 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2357 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2358 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2359 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2360 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2361 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2362 // Create some new channels:
2363 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2365 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2366 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2367 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2368 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2369 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2370 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2371 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2372 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2373 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2374 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2375 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2376 // Revoke the old state
2377 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2380 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2382 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2383 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2384 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2386 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2387 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2388 node_txn.truncate(1);
2390 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2391 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2392 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2394 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2395 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2396 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2397 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2398 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2399 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2400 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2401 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2402 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2404 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2406 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2407 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2409 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2410 // Create some new channels:
2411 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2413 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2417 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2418 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2419 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2420 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2421 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2422 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2423 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2424 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2425 // Revoke the old state
2426 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2428 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2430 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2431 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2432 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2434 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2435 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2437 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2438 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2440 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2441 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2442 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2443 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2444 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2445 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2446 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2448 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2449 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2450 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2454 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2455 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2456 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2457 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2458 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2459 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2460 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2461 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2462 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2463 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2464 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2465 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2466 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2467 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2468 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2470 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2471 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2472 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2473 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2474 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2475 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2477 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2478 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2480 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2481 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2482 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2483 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2484 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2488 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2489 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2490 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2491 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2492 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2493 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2494 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2496 // Create some new channel:
2497 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2499 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2500 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2501 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2502 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2503 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2505 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2506 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2507 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2508 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2509 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2510 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2511 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2512 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2513 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2515 //Revoke the old state
2516 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2519 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2520 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2521 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2522 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2523 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2524 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2525 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2526 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2528 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2529 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2531 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2532 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2534 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2535 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2536 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2537 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2538 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2539 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2540 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2541 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2543 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2544 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2545 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2547 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2548 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2549 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2553 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2554 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2555 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2556 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2557 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2558 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2559 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2561 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2563 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2564 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2565 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2566 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2567 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2568 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2570 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2571 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2573 //Revoke the old state
2574 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2577 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2578 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2579 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2580 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2581 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2582 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2583 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2585 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2586 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2589 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2590 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2592 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2593 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2594 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2595 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2596 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2597 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2599 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2600 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2601 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2602 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2603 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2604 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2605 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2607 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2608 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2609 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2610 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2612 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2613 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2614 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2616 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2617 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2618 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2619 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2620 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2621 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2622 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2623 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2625 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2626 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2627 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2631 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2632 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2633 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2634 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2635 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2636 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2637 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2638 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2639 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2641 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2642 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2643 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2644 // PaymentSent event).
2646 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2647 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2648 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2649 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2651 // Create some initial channels
2652 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2653 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2655 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2656 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2657 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2658 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2659 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2661 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2662 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2663 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2665 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2666 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2668 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2669 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2670 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2671 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2672 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2673 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2674 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2675 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2676 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2677 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2678 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2679 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2680 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2682 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2683 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2684 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2685 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2686 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2687 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2688 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2689 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2690 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2691 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2692 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2693 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2694 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2695 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2696 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2697 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2698 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2700 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2701 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2702 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2703 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2705 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2706 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2707 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2708 added_monitors.clear();
2710 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2711 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2712 match forwarded_events[0] {
2713 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2714 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2716 if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[1] {
2717 } else { panic!(); }
2718 if let Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat: Some(1000), claim_from_onchain_tx: true } = forwarded_events[2] {
2719 } else { panic!(); }
2720 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2722 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2723 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2724 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2725 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2726 added_monitors.clear();
2728 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2730 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2731 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2734 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2735 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2739 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2740 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2741 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2742 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2743 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2744 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2746 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2748 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2749 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2750 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2751 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2752 // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2753 // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2754 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2755 check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2756 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2757 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2759 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2760 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2761 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2762 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2764 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2765 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2766 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2767 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2769 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2770 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2774 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2775 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2776 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2777 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2779 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2780 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2781 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2782 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2783 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2784 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2785 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2786 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2787 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2788 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2789 let commitment_spend =
2790 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2791 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2792 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2793 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2796 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2797 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2798 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2802 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2803 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2804 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2805 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2806 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2807 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2808 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2809 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2810 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2811 check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2812 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2813 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2815 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2816 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2817 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2818 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2819 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2820 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2821 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2822 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2823 let mut first_claimed = false;
2824 for event in events {
2826 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2827 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2828 assert!(!first_claimed);
2829 first_claimed = true;
2831 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2832 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2835 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2836 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2837 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2840 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2843 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2844 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2845 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2846 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2847 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2848 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2850 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2852 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2853 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2854 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2855 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2856 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2857 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2858 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2860 // Create some intial channels
2861 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2862 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2864 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2865 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2866 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2868 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2870 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2871 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2872 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2873 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2874 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2875 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2876 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2878 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2879 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2881 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2882 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2883 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2884 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2885 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2886 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2888 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2890 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2891 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2892 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2893 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2894 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2895 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2896 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2897 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2899 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2900 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2901 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2902 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2903 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2906 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2907 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2908 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2909 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2911 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2912 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2914 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2915 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2916 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2917 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2919 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2923 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2924 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2925 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2927 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2928 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2929 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2930 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2933 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2935 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2936 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2937 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2938 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2939 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2940 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2941 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2943 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2947 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2948 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2949 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2950 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2952 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2953 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2954 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2955 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2956 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2957 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2959 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2962 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2963 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2964 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2966 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2967 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2969 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2970 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2971 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2972 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2973 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2974 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2975 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2976 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2977 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2981 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2982 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2983 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2984 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2988 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
2989 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
2990 // and fail backward accordingly.
2992 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2993 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2994 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2995 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2997 // Create some initial channels
2998 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2999 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3001 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3002 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3003 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3004 // Revoke the old state
3005 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3007 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3009 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3010 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3011 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3012 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3013 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3015 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3016 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3017 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3018 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3020 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3021 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3022 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3023 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3024 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3025 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3027 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3028 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3029 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3031 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3035 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3036 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3037 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3038 // commitment transaction anymore.
3039 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3040 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3041 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3042 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3043 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3044 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3046 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3047 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3048 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3049 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3050 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3051 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3052 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3053 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3054 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3056 // Create some initial channels
3057 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3058 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3060 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3061 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3062 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3063 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3064 // Revoke the old state
3065 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3067 let value = if use_dust {
3068 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3069 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3070 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3073 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3074 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3075 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3077 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
3078 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3079 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3080 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3081 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3082 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3083 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3084 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3085 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3086 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3087 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3088 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3090 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
3091 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3092 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3093 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3094 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3095 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3096 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3097 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3098 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3099 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3100 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3101 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3102 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3103 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3104 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3107 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
3108 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3109 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3110 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3111 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3112 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3113 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3114 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3115 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3116 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3117 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3118 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3119 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3120 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3121 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3122 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3123 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3124 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3126 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3127 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3128 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3129 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3130 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3131 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3132 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3135 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3136 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3137 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3139 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3140 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3142 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3143 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3145 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3146 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3149 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3150 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3152 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3153 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3154 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3156 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3157 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 3 });
3159 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3160 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3163 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3164 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3166 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3168 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3170 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3171 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3174 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3175 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3177 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3178 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3179 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3180 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3181 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3183 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3184 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3185 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3186 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3188 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3192 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3193 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3194 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3195 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3196 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3197 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3199 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3202 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3203 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3204 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3205 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3206 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3207 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3208 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3210 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3211 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3212 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3214 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3216 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3217 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3219 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3220 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3221 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3222 // that we should update our routing table for.
3223 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3224 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3227 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3230 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3231 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3232 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3234 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3237 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3238 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3239 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3241 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3244 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3247 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3248 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3249 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3253 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3254 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3255 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3256 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3257 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3261 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3262 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3263 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3264 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3265 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3269 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3270 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3271 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3272 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3273 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3274 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3276 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3278 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3279 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3280 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3282 let payment_event = {
3283 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3284 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3285 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3287 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3288 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3291 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3292 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3294 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3295 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3297 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3300 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3302 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3304 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3305 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3306 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3307 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3308 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3309 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3311 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3312 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3318 onion_routing_packet,
3320 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3322 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3323 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3324 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3326 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3327 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3329 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3332 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3333 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3335 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3337 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3338 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3342 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3343 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3344 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3345 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3346 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3347 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3348 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3349 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3351 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3352 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
3353 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3354 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3355 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3356 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3358 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3359 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3360 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3362 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3363 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3364 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3365 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3366 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3368 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3369 // registering new transactions
3370 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3371 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3375 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3376 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3377 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3378 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3379 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3380 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3381 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3382 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3384 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3386 let mut payment_event = {
3387 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3388 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3390 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3391 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3392 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3395 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3396 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3398 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3400 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3401 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3402 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3403 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3405 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3406 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3407 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3408 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3409 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3411 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3412 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3413 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3415 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
3416 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3417 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3418 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3420 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3421 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3422 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3423 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3424 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3428 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3430 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3431 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3432 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3433 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3435 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3437 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3438 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3440 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3441 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3442 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3443 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3444 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3445 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3446 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3448 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3452 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3453 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3454 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3455 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3456 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3458 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3459 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3460 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3461 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3462 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3464 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3466 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3467 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3468 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3469 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3470 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3472 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3473 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3475 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3476 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3480 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3481 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3482 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3483 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3484 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3485 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3486 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3487 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3489 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3490 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3491 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3493 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3494 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3495 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3496 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3498 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3499 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3500 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3502 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3503 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3504 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3505 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3507 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3508 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3510 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3511 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3513 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3515 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3516 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3518 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3519 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3520 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3522 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3525 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3526 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3527 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3529 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3532 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3533 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3537 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3538 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3541 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3542 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3543 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3544 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3545 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3546 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3548 let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3549 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3550 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3551 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3552 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3553 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3554 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3556 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3559 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3561 let payment_event = {
3562 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3563 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3565 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3566 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3567 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3569 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3571 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3572 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3574 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3575 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3576 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3577 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3578 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3580 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3581 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3582 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3583 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3585 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3586 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3587 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3588 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3589 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3591 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3592 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3593 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3594 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3601 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3602 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3603 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3604 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3605 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3606 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3608 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3609 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3610 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3612 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3613 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3615 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3616 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3617 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3618 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3619 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3620 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3621 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3622 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3623 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3624 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3625 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3626 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3627 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3628 // Everything was delivered...
3629 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3632 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3633 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3635 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3636 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3639 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3640 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3641 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3643 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3645 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3646 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3648 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3649 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3650 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3652 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3653 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3654 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3656 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3659 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3662 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3663 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3665 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3666 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3667 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3668 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3669 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3670 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3671 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3672 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3673 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3674 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3675 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3677 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3680 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3681 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3683 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3684 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3686 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3687 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3688 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3690 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3693 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3694 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3695 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3696 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3698 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3699 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3700 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3701 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3703 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3704 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3705 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3706 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3707 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3709 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3710 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3711 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3712 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3719 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3720 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3721 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3722 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3723 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3724 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3726 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3728 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3729 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3730 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3731 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3732 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3733 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3734 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3735 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3736 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3737 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3738 // Everything was delivered...
3739 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3742 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3743 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3746 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3747 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3748 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3750 if messages_delivered > 2 {
3751 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3754 // Channel should still work fine...
3755 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3756 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3757 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3761 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3762 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3763 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3764 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3765 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3769 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3770 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3771 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3772 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3773 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3777 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3778 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3779 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3780 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3781 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3782 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3783 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3784 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3785 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3786 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3788 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3789 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3791 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3792 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3794 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3796 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3797 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3798 chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3800 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3803 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3805 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3806 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3808 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3809 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3810 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 2);
3811 let funding_locked = match events_2[0] {
3812 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3813 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3816 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3818 let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_2[1] {
3819 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3820 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3823 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3826 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3828 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_locked);
3829 nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3830 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3831 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 2);
3832 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_3[0] {
3833 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3834 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3837 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3839 let (as_announcement, as_update) = match events_3[1] {
3840 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3841 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3843 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3846 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3847 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3848 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3849 let (_, bs_update) = match events_4[0] {
3850 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3851 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3853 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3856 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&as_announcement).unwrap();
3857 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3858 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3860 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3861 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3862 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3864 // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3865 // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3866 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3868 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3869 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3870 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3872 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3873 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3874 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3875 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3876 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3877 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3878 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3879 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3881 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3882 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3883 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3884 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3885 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3886 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3888 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3889 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3890 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3891 logger: nodes[0].logger,
3895 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
3896 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
3898 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
3899 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
3900 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3902 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3904 // as_announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
3905 nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
3906 let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3907 let mut found_announcement = false;
3908 for event in msgs.iter() {
3910 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
3911 if *msg == as_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
3913 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
3914 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3917 assert!(found_announcement);
3921 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
3922 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
3923 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
3924 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3925 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3926 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3927 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3928 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3930 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
3932 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
3933 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3934 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
3935 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3937 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3938 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3940 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
3941 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3944 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
3945 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3947 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3948 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3950 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
3951 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3952 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3953 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3954 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3955 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3956 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
3958 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3959 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3960 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3962 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3963 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
3964 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
3966 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3969 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
3970 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3971 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3972 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3974 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3977 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3978 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3980 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3981 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3982 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
3983 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
3984 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3985 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
3987 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
3988 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
3989 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
3990 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
3992 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
3993 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
3995 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
3996 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
3998 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4000 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4001 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4002 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4003 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4004 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4005 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4006 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4007 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4008 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4009 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4011 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4012 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4013 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4014 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4015 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4016 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4017 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4018 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4020 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4021 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4022 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4023 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4024 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4025 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4026 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4027 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4029 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4030 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4031 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4032 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4034 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4035 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4036 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4037 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4039 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4040 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4041 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4043 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4045 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4046 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4048 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4049 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4051 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4052 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4053 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4055 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4058 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4061 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4062 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4063 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4065 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4066 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4069 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4070 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4071 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4072 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4073 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4074 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4075 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4077 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4079 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4080 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4081 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4082 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4083 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4084 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4085 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4086 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4087 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4088 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4089 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4090 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4091 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4094 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4097 let mut block = Block {
4098 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4101 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4102 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4103 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4104 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4105 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4106 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4107 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4110 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4112 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4113 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4114 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4115 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4116 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4117 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4119 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4120 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4121 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4122 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4123 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4124 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4128 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4129 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4130 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4133 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4134 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4135 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4136 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4137 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4138 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4139 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4140 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4142 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4143 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4144 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4145 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4147 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4148 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4150 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4152 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4153 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4155 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4156 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4157 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4158 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4161 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4162 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4163 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4164 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4166 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4168 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4169 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4170 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4171 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4174 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4175 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4176 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4177 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4178 match fail_commit[0] {
4179 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4180 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4181 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4183 _ => unreachable!(),
4185 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4187 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], second_payment_hash, true);
4192 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4193 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4194 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4198 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4199 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4200 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4201 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4202 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4203 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4204 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4205 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4206 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4207 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4209 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4211 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4213 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4214 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4215 get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4216 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4218 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4219 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4220 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4221 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4222 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4223 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4224 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4225 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4226 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4227 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4229 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4230 let config = UserConfig::default();
4231 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4232 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4233 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4234 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4235 default_config: config,
4237 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4238 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4239 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4244 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4245 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4247 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4248 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4249 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4250 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4252 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4253 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4254 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4255 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4257 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4258 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4259 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4260 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4262 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4263 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4264 for node in nodes.iter() {
4265 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4266 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4267 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4270 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4274 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4275 // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4276 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4277 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4278 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4279 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4280 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4281 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4282 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4283 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4284 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4286 // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4287 let channel_value = 100000;
4288 let push_msat = 10001;
4289 let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4290 let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4291 let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4292 let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4293 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4294 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4295 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4297 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, channel_value, 42);
4299 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4300 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4302 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4304 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4305 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4306 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4307 added_monitors.clear();
4310 let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4311 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4313 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4314 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4315 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4316 added_monitors.clear();
4318 // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4323 // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4324 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4325 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4326 get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4328 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4329 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4330 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4331 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4332 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4333 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4334 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4335 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4336 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4337 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4339 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4340 let config = UserConfig::default();
4341 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4342 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4343 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4344 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4345 default_config: config,
4347 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4348 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4349 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4354 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4355 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4357 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4359 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4360 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4362 // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4363 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4364 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4365 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4366 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4368 // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4369 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4370 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4372 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4373 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4374 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4375 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4377 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4378 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4379 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4380 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4382 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4383 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4384 for node in nodes.iter() {
4385 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4386 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4387 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4390 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4394 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4395 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4396 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4397 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4398 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4399 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4400 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4401 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4402 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4403 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4404 let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4406 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4407 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4409 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4411 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4412 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4413 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4415 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4416 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4417 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4418 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4419 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4420 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4421 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4422 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4423 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4424 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4426 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4427 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4428 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4429 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4430 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4431 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4433 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4434 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4435 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4440 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4441 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4443 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4444 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4445 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4447 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4449 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4450 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4454 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4455 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4456 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4457 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4458 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4459 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4460 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4461 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4462 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4463 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4464 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4465 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4466 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4467 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4469 let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4470 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4471 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4472 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4473 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4476 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4478 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4479 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4481 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4482 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4483 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4484 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4486 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4488 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4489 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4490 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4491 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4492 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4495 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4496 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4497 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4498 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4499 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4500 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4503 let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4504 for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4505 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4506 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4507 assert!(read.is_empty());
4508 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4511 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4512 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4513 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4514 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4515 assert!(read.is_empty());
4516 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4519 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4520 if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4521 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4522 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4524 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4525 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4526 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4528 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4530 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4533 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4534 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4535 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4536 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4538 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4539 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4540 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4542 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4544 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4545 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4547 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4548 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4549 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4550 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4551 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4554 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4555 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4556 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4558 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4559 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4561 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4562 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4563 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4564 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4565 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4567 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4568 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4569 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
4570 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4571 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4572 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4573 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4575 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4576 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4578 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4583 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4584 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4586 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4587 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4588 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4589 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4590 for event in events.drain(..) {
4592 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4593 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4594 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4595 all_outputs.push(outp);
4598 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4601 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4602 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4612 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4613 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4614 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4615 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4616 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4617 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4619 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4620 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4621 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4622 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4623 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4624 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4625 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4626 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4627 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4629 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4630 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4632 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4633 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4634 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4635 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4636 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4640 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4641 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4642 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4643 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4644 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4645 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4646 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4648 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4649 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4650 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4651 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4652 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4654 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4655 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4656 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4657 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4659 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4660 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4661 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4662 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4663 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4665 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4666 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4667 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4671 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4672 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4673 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4675 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4676 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4677 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4678 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4680 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4681 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4682 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4683 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4684 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4686 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4687 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4688 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4689 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4690 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4692 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4693 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4694 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4696 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4697 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4698 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4699 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4700 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4704 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4705 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4706 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4707 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4708 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4710 // Create some initial channels
4711 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4713 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4715 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4716 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4717 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4719 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4720 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4721 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4722 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4723 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4724 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4726 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4727 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4730 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4731 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4734 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4735 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4736 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4737 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4738 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4739 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4740 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4742 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4743 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4744 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4746 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4747 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4748 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4752 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4753 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4754 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4755 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4756 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4758 // Create some initial channels
4759 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4761 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4762 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4764 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4766 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4767 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4768 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4770 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4771 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4772 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4773 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4775 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4776 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4778 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4780 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4781 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4782 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4783 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4784 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4785 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4787 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4788 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4789 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4790 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4792 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4793 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4794 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4795 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4796 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4800 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4801 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4802 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4803 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4804 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4806 // Create some initial channels
4807 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4809 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4810 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4811 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4812 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4814 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4816 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4817 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4818 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4819 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4821 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4822 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4823 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4824 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4826 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4827 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4829 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4830 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4831 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4835 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4836 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4837 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4838 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4839 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4840 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4842 // Create some initial channels
4843 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4845 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4846 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4847 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4848 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4850 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4852 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4853 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4854 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4855 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4856 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4857 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4859 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4860 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4861 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4862 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4863 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4864 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4865 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4867 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4868 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4869 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
4870 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4871 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4872 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4874 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4875 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4876 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4877 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4878 // transactions next...
4879 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
4880 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4882 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
4883 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
4884 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
4885 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4887 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
4888 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
4891 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
4892 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4894 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4895 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4897 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4898 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4899 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4900 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4901 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
4905 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
4906 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4907 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4908 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4909 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4910 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4912 // Create some initial channels
4913 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4915 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4916 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
4917 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4918 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4920 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
4921 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
4923 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4925 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
4926 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4927 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4928 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4929 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4930 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4932 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4933 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4934 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4935 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4937 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
4938 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
4939 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
4941 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
4942 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
4943 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
4944 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4945 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4946 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4948 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4949 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
4951 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
4952 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
4953 // transactions next...
4954 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4955 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4956 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
4957 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4959 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
4960 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4963 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4964 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
4966 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
4968 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
4969 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4971 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
4972 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
4974 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
4975 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
4976 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4977 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4978 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
4979 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
4980 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
4981 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
4985 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
4986 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
4987 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
4988 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
4989 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
4991 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
4994 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4995 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4996 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4997 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4999 // Create some initial channels
5000 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5001 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5003 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5004 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5005 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5006 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5007 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5009 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5010 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5011 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5013 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
5014 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5015 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5016 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5017 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5018 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5019 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5020 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5021 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5022 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5024 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5025 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5026 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5027 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5029 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5030 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5031 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5032 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5033 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5034 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5035 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5036 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5037 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5038 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5040 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5041 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5042 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5043 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5044 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5045 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5047 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5048 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5051 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
5052 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5053 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5055 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5058 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5059 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5060 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5061 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5064 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5065 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5066 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5067 match msg_events[0] {
5068 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5069 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5071 match msg_events[1] {
5072 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5073 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5075 match msg_events[2] {
5076 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5077 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5078 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5079 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5080 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5081 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5083 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5085 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5086 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5087 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5088 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5089 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5090 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5091 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5092 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5093 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5094 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5095 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5096 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5097 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5099 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5100 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5104 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5105 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5106 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5107 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5108 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5109 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5110 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5111 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5112 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5113 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5114 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5115 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5116 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5117 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5119 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5120 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5121 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5123 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5124 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5125 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5126 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5127 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5129 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
5131 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5132 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5133 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5134 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5135 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], vec![], 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5136 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5138 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5139 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5140 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5142 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5143 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5144 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5145 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5146 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5148 let htlc_timeout_tx;
5149 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5150 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5151 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5152 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5153 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5155 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5156 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5157 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5158 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5159 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5160 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5161 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5163 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5164 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5165 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5166 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5169 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5170 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5171 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5172 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5173 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5175 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5176 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5179 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5180 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5182 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5183 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5184 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5185 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5186 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5187 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5188 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5189 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5190 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5191 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5192 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5193 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5194 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5196 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5197 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5198 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5199 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5200 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5201 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5202 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5203 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5204 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5205 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5207 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5208 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5210 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5212 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5214 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5215 // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5216 // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5217 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5218 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], Some(196*2), true);
5219 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5220 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5221 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5222 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5223 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5224 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5225 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5227 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5228 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5230 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5232 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5233 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5234 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5236 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5241 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5242 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5243 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5244 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5245 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5247 // Create some initial channels
5248 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5250 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5251 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5252 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5253 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5254 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5256 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5257 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5258 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5259 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5260 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5261 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5262 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5264 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5265 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5268 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5269 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5272 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5273 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5274 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5275 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5276 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5277 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5278 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5282 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5283 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5285 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5286 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5287 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5288 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5289 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5290 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5293 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5294 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5295 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5296 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5297 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5298 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5299 // use the same payment hashes.
5300 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5305 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5306 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5307 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5308 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5309 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5310 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5311 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5312 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5313 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5314 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5316 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5317 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5318 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5319 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5320 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5322 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5323 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5324 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5325 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5327 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5329 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5331 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5332 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5334 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5336 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5338 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5340 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5341 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5343 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5345 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5348 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5350 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5351 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5354 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5356 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5357 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5359 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5360 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5361 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5362 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5363 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5365 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5366 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5367 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5368 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5369 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5370 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5371 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5372 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5373 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5375 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5376 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5377 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5378 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5379 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5380 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5382 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5383 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5384 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5385 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5386 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5387 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5389 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5390 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5391 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5392 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5394 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5396 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5397 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5398 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5399 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5400 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5401 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5402 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5403 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5404 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5405 if deliver_last_raa {
5406 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5408 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5411 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5412 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5413 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5414 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5416 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5417 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5418 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5420 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5421 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5422 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5424 if announce_latest {
5425 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5427 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5429 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5430 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5431 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5434 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5438 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5439 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5442 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5443 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5444 if deliver_last_raa {
5445 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5447 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5449 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5451 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5452 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5453 let mut a_done = false;
5454 for msg in cs_msgs {
5456 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5457 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5458 // should be failed-backwards here.
5459 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5460 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5461 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5462 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5464 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5469 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5470 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5471 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5473 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5474 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5477 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5478 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5479 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5480 if announce_latest {
5481 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5482 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5483 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5486 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5488 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5492 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5493 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5494 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5495 let mut as_updates = 0;
5496 for event in as_events.iter() {
5497 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5498 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5499 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5500 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5502 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5504 if network_update.is_some() {
5507 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5509 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5510 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5511 if announce_latest {
5512 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5513 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5515 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5517 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5518 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5519 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5520 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5521 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5522 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5523 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5524 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5525 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5527 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5529 if network_update.is_some() {
5532 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5534 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5535 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5536 if announce_latest {
5537 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5539 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5541 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5542 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5543 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5544 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5545 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5546 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5550 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5551 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5555 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5556 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5560 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5561 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5562 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5563 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5567 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5568 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5569 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5570 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5571 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5573 // Create some initial channels
5574 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5576 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5577 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5578 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5579 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5581 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5582 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5583 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5584 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5585 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5586 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5588 let htlc_timeout = {
5589 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5590 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5591 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5592 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5593 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5594 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5598 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5599 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5600 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5602 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5603 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5604 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5605 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5606 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5607 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5608 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5609 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5610 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5611 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5612 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5616 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5617 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5618 // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5619 // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5621 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5623 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5624 let seed = [42; 32];
5625 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5626 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5627 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph: &chanmon_cfgs[0].network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5628 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5629 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5630 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5632 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5633 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5635 // Create some initial channels
5636 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5638 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5639 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5640 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5642 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5643 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5644 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5645 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5646 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5648 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5649 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5650 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5651 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5652 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5654 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5655 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5656 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness[3][36..69]));
5657 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5658 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5659 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5660 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5661 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5664 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5665 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5666 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5667 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5668 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5669 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5671 let htlc_timeout = {
5672 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5673 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5674 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5675 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5679 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5680 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5681 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5683 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5684 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5685 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5686 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5687 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5688 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5689 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5690 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5691 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5692 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5693 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5694 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5698 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5699 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5700 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5701 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5702 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5704 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5706 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5707 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5709 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5710 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5711 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5713 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5714 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5715 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5717 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5718 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5719 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5721 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5722 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5723 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5726 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5727 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5728 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5729 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5730 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5731 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5733 let (payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5735 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5736 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5737 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5738 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5740 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5741 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5742 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5744 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5745 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5746 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5747 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5748 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5750 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5751 let mut block = Block {
5752 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5755 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5756 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5757 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5759 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5760 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5761 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5762 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5765 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5766 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5767 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5768 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5769 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5770 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5772 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5773 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5774 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5776 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5778 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5779 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5780 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5782 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5783 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5785 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5786 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5787 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5789 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5790 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5791 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5792 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5795 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5796 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5797 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5798 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5799 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5800 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5802 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5803 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5804 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5805 // actually revoked.
5806 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5807 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5808 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5809 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5810 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5812 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5813 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5814 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5815 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5816 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5817 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5818 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5819 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5820 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5821 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5823 if check_revoke_no_close {
5824 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5825 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5828 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5829 let mut block = Block {
5830 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5833 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5834 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5835 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5837 if !check_revoke_no_close {
5838 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5839 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5840 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5841 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5843 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5847 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5848 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5849 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5850 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5851 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5852 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5853 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5855 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5856 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5857 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
5859 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
5860 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
5861 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
5863 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
5864 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
5868 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
5869 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
5870 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
5871 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
5872 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
5877 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
5878 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5879 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5880 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5881 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5882 //Force duplicate channel ids
5883 for node in nodes.iter() {
5884 *node.keys_manager.override_channel_id_priv.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
5887 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
5888 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5889 let push_msat=10001;
5890 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5891 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5892 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5894 //Create a second channel with a channel_id collision
5895 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5899 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
5900 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5901 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5902 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5903 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5905 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
5906 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
5907 let push_msat=10001;
5908 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5910 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
5911 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5912 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
5913 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
5914 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
5916 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
5917 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
5918 let push_msat=10001;
5919 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
5920 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5921 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
5923 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
5924 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
5925 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
5927 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
5928 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
5929 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5931 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
5932 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
5933 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
5935 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
5936 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
5937 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5938 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5939 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
5940 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
5944 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
5945 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5946 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5947 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5948 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5950 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
5951 let push_msat=10001;
5952 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
5953 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5954 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
5955 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
5957 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
5958 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5959 let err_msg = match events[0] {
5960 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
5963 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5965 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
5968 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
5969 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
5970 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
5971 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
5973 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
5974 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5975 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5976 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5977 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5978 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5980 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
5981 // pending_update_fee.
5983 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
5984 *feerate_lock += 20;
5986 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
5987 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5989 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5990 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5991 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
5992 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
5993 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
5995 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5998 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6000 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6001 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6002 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6004 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6005 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
6006 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6008 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6009 let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6010 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6011 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6013 // Flush the pending fee update.
6014 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6015 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6016 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6017 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6018 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6020 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6021 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6022 // us to surface its failure to the user.
6023 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6024 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6025 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6026 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6027 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6028 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6030 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6031 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6032 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6034 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6035 assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6036 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6037 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6038 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6039 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6040 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6041 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6042 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6044 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6048 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6049 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6050 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6052 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6053 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6054 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6055 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6056 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6057 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6059 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6060 // pending_update_fee.
6062 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6063 *feerate_lock += 200;
6065 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6066 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6068 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6069 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6070 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6071 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6072 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6074 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6077 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6079 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6080 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6081 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6083 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6085 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1) - amt_1;
6086 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6087 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6089 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6090 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6091 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6092 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6093 let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6094 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6095 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6097 // Flush the pending fee update.
6098 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6099 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6100 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6101 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6102 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6103 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6105 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6106 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6107 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6108 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6109 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6110 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6111 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6112 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6113 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6115 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6116 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6117 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6119 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6120 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6121 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6122 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6123 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6124 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6125 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6126 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6127 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6129 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6132 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6133 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6134 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6135 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6136 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6138 let raa = match send_raa_event {
6139 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6140 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6142 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6144 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6145 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6146 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6147 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6149 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6150 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6152 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6153 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6154 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6156 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6157 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6159 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6160 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6161 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6162 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6163 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6164 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6167 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6168 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6169 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6172 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6173 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6174 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6175 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6176 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6177 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6178 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6179 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6180 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6181 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6182 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6184 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6185 // pending_update_fee.
6187 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6188 *feerate_lock += 20;
6190 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6191 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6193 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6194 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6195 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6196 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6197 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6199 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6202 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6204 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6205 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6206 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6208 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6210 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6211 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6212 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6213 let payment_event = {
6214 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6215 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6217 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6218 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6220 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6222 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6224 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6225 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6227 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6228 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6230 // Flush the pending fee update.
6231 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6232 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6233 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6234 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6235 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6236 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6238 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6239 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6240 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6242 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6243 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6246 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6249 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6250 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6251 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6253 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6254 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6255 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6256 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6257 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6258 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6261 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6262 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6263 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6265 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6266 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6267 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6268 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6269 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6270 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6271 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6272 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6273 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6274 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6276 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6279 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6280 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6281 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6283 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6284 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6285 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6286 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6287 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6288 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6289 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6290 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6291 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6292 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6293 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6295 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6296 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6297 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6300 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6301 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6302 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6305 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6306 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6307 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6308 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6309 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6310 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6311 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6313 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6314 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6316 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6317 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6318 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6319 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6323 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6324 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6325 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6326 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6327 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6328 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6329 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6331 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6332 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6333 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6334 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6336 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6337 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6341 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6342 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6343 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6344 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6345 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6346 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6347 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6349 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6350 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6351 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6352 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6353 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6355 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6356 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6357 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6358 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6359 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6363 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6364 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6365 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6366 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6367 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6368 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6369 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6370 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6372 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], vec![], 100000000, 500000001);
6373 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6374 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6378 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6379 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6380 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6381 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6382 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6383 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6384 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6385 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6386 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6387 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6389 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6390 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6391 let payment_event = {
6392 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6393 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6395 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6396 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6397 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6398 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6402 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6404 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6405 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6406 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6408 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6409 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6411 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6412 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6413 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6415 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6416 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6420 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6421 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6422 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6423 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6424 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6425 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6426 let channel_value = 100000;
6427 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6428 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6430 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6432 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6433 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6435 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6436 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6437 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6439 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6440 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6442 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6445 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6447 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6448 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6449 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6450 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6451 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6452 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6453 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6454 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6456 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6457 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6458 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6461 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6462 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6463 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6464 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6465 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6466 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6467 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6468 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6469 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6470 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6471 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6475 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6476 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6477 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6478 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6479 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6480 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6481 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6483 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6484 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6485 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6486 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6487 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1);
6489 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6490 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6491 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6492 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6493 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6495 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6496 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6497 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6498 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6499 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6501 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6502 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6503 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6504 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6505 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6509 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6510 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6511 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6512 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6513 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6514 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6515 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6516 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6518 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6519 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6520 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6521 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6522 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6523 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6525 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6529 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6530 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6531 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6534 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6535 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6536 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6538 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6539 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6541 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6542 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6543 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6544 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6545 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6549 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6550 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6551 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6552 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6553 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6554 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6555 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6557 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6558 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6559 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6560 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6561 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6562 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6564 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6565 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6566 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6567 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6568 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6572 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6573 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6574 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6575 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6576 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6577 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6579 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6580 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6581 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6582 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6583 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6584 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6585 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6587 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6588 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6589 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6590 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6591 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6595 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6596 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6597 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6598 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6599 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6600 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6601 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6602 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6604 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6605 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6606 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6607 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6608 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6609 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6611 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6612 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6613 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6614 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6615 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6616 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6617 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
6618 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6619 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6620 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6621 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6622 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6623 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6626 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6627 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6628 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6629 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6630 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6632 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6634 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6635 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6636 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6637 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6638 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6642 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6643 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6645 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6646 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6647 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6648 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6649 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6650 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6651 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6653 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6654 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6655 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6657 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6660 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6663 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6665 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6666 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6667 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6668 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6669 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6673 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6674 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6676 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6677 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6678 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6679 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6680 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6682 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6683 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6684 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6685 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6686 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6688 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6691 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6694 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6696 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6697 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6698 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6699 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6700 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6704 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6705 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6707 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6708 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6709 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6710 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6711 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6713 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6714 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6715 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6716 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6717 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6718 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6721 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6722 failure_code: 0x8000,
6725 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6727 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6728 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6729 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6730 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6731 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6735 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6736 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6738 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6739 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6740 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6741 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6742 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6744 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6746 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6747 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6749 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6750 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6751 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6753 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6754 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6755 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6756 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6757 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6758 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6759 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6761 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6765 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6767 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6769 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6770 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6771 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6772 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6773 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6777 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6778 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6780 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6781 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6782 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6783 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6784 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6786 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6788 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6789 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6791 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6792 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6793 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6795 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6796 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6797 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6798 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6799 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6800 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6801 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6803 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6807 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6809 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6811 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6812 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6813 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6814 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6815 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6819 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6820 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6822 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6823 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6824 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6825 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6826 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6828 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6829 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6830 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6832 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6833 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6835 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6836 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6837 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6839 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6841 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6843 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6844 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6845 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6846 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6847 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6848 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6849 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
6851 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6854 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
6855 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6857 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6858 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6859 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
6860 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6861 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6865 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
6866 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
6867 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
6869 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6870 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6871 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6872 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6873 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6874 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6876 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
6879 let mut payment_event = {
6880 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6881 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6882 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6883 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6884 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6886 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6887 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6888 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6889 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6890 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6891 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
6892 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6893 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
6894 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
6897 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6898 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6899 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
6900 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
6902 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6903 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
6904 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
6906 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
6907 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6908 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6909 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6910 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6911 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6912 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
6914 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6918 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
6920 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6921 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
6922 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6923 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6924 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
6926 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
6928 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6929 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6930 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6931 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6932 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6933 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6935 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6938 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6941 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
6942 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
6943 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
6944 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
6946 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6947 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
6948 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6949 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6950 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6951 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6953 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6955 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
6956 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6957 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
6958 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
6960 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
6961 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6963 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
6964 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
6965 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6966 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6967 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6969 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6970 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6971 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
6972 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6974 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
6975 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6977 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6979 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
6980 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6982 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6985 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
6986 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6988 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6991 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
6992 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
6993 if announce_latest {
6994 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
6996 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
6999 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7000 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7001 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7003 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7004 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7005 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7006 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7007 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7008 let mut first_failed = false;
7009 for event in events {
7011 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7012 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7013 assert!(!first_failed);
7014 first_failed = true;
7016 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7019 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7025 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7026 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7027 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7030 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7031 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7032 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7033 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7034 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7035 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7036 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7038 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7039 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7040 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7041 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7042 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7044 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7046 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7047 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7049 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7050 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7052 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7054 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7055 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7058 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7060 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7061 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7062 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7063 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7064 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7066 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7067 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7068 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7069 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7070 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7071 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7072 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7073 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7074 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7075 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7076 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7078 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7079 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7080 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7081 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7082 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7083 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7084 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7085 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7087 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7088 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7089 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
7090 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7091 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7092 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7093 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7095 // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
7097 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7098 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7101 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7102 if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7103 else { first = false; }
7105 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7108 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7109 if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7110 else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7112 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7119 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7120 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7121 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7122 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7126 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7127 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7129 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7130 low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7131 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7132 high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7133 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7134 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7135 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7136 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7137 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7139 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7140 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0) {
7142 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7143 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7145 } else { assert!(false) }
7147 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7148 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7149 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7150 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7151 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger) {
7153 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7154 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7156 } else { assert!(false); }
7158 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7159 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7160 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7161 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7162 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7163 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7165 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7167 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7168 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7169 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7173 } else { panic!(); }
7174 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7176 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7177 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7178 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7179 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7180 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) }, &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0, &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger) {
7182 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7183 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7185 } else { assert!(false); }
7189 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7190 // We want to be sure that :
7191 // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7192 // (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7193 // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7194 // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7195 // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7201 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7202 // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7203 // during signing due to revoked tx
7204 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7205 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7208 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7209 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7210 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7212 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7214 // Cache node A state before any channel update
7215 let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7216 let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7217 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7219 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7220 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7222 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7223 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7225 // Restore node A from previous state
7226 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7227 let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7228 chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7229 tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7230 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7231 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7232 monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7234 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7235 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7236 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7237 keys_manager: keys_manager,
7238 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7239 chain_monitor: &monitor,
7241 tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7242 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7246 nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7247 assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7248 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7249 nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7251 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7253 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7254 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7256 let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7258 // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7259 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7260 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7263 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7264 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7267 let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7268 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7269 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7270 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7271 reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7272 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7273 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7275 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7276 assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7278 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7281 panic!("Unexpected event")
7285 // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7286 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7287 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_string() });
7288 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction");
7289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7291 // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7292 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7293 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7294 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
7295 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
7296 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
7297 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7298 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting".to_string() });
7299 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
7300 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
7301 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
7305 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7306 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7307 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7308 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7310 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7311 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7312 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7313 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7315 // Create some initial channels
7316 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7318 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7319 let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7320 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[0].network_graph, None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7321 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7322 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7323 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7324 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7326 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7327 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7328 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7329 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7330 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7332 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7333 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7334 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7335 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7337 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7338 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7339 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7341 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7342 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7343 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7344 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7345 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7346 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7347 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7348 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7349 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7350 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7352 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7354 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7356 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7357 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7359 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7360 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7361 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7362 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7366 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7367 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7368 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7370 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7371 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7372 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7373 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7375 let short_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7376 let short_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7377 let short_id_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7380 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7381 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7383 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7384 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7385 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7386 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7387 let mut chans_disabled: HashSet<u64> = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7388 for e in msg_events {
7390 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7391 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7392 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7393 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7394 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7397 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7401 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7402 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7403 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7404 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7405 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7406 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7408 // Reestablish chan_1
7409 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7410 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7411 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7412 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7413 // Reestablish chan_2
7414 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7415 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7416 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7417 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7418 // Reestablish chan_3
7419 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7420 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7421 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7422 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7424 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7425 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7426 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7427 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7428 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7429 chans_disabled = [short_id_1, short_id_2, short_id_3].iter().map(|a| *a).collect();
7430 for e in msg_events {
7432 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7433 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7434 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7435 if !chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7436 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7439 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7445 fn test_priv_forwarding_rejection() {
7446 // If we have a private channel with outbound liquidity, and
7447 // UserConfig::accept_forwards_to_priv_channels is set to false, we should reject any attempts
7448 // to forward through that channel.
7449 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7450 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7451 let mut no_announce_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
7452 no_announce_cfg.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
7453 no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = false;
7454 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(no_announce_cfg), None]);
7455 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
7456 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
7457 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
7458 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7460 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7462 // Note that the create_*_chan functions in utils requires announcement_signatures, which we do
7463 // not send for private channels.
7464 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7465 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7466 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
7467 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7468 nodes[1].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7470 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[1], 1_000_000, 42);
7471 nodes[1].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7472 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id()));
7473 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
7475 let cs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7476 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_funding_signed);
7477 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7479 let conf_height = core::cmp::max(nodes[1].best_block_info().1 + 1, nodes[2].best_block_info().1 + 1);
7480 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, conf_height);
7481 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7482 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[2], &tx, conf_height);
7483 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH - 1);
7484 let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7485 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7486 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7487 nodes[2].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
7488 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7490 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7491 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
7492 assert!(!nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels()[0].is_public);
7494 // We should always be able to forward through nodes[1] as long as its out through a public
7496 send_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[0]], 10_000);
7498 // ... however, if we send to nodes[2], we will have to pass the private channel from nodes[1]
7499 // to nodes[2], which should be rejected:
7500 let route_hint = RouteHint(vec![RouteHintHop {
7501 src_node_id: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
7502 short_channel_id: nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(),
7503 fees: RoutingFees { base_msat: 1000, proportional_millionths: 0 },
7504 cltv_expiry_delta: MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
7505 htlc_minimum_msat: None,
7506 htlc_maximum_msat: None,
7508 let last_hops = vec![route_hint];
7509 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], last_hops, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV);
7511 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7512 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7513 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
7514 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7515 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7517 let htlc_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7518 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7519 assert_eq!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7520 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7521 assert!(htlc_fail_updates.update_fee.is_none());
7523 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7524 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_fail_updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7525 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, nodes[2].node.list_channels()[0].short_channel_id.unwrap(), true);
7527 // Now disconnect nodes[1] from its peers and restart with accept_forwards_to_priv_channels set
7528 // to true. Sadly there is currently no way to change it at runtime.
7530 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7531 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7533 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
7534 let mut monitor_a_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7535 let mut monitor_b_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7536 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut monitor_a_serialized).unwrap();
7537 get_monitor!(nodes[1], cs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut monitor_b_serialized).unwrap();
7539 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7540 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
7541 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7542 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
7544 let mut monitor_a_read = &monitor_a_serialized.0[..];
7545 let mut monitor_b_read = &monitor_b_serialized.0[..];
7546 let (_, mut monitor_a) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_a_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7547 let (_, mut monitor_b) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut monitor_b_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
7548 assert!(monitor_a_read.is_empty());
7549 assert!(monitor_b_read.is_empty());
7551 no_announce_cfg.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels = true;
7553 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
7554 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
7555 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7556 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_a);
7557 channel_monitors.insert(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, &mut monitor_b);
7558 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7559 default_config: no_announce_cfg,
7561 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
7562 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
7563 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
7564 logger: nodes[1].logger,
7568 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
7569 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
7571 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_a.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_a).is_ok());
7572 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor_b.get_funding_txo().0, monitor_b).is_ok());
7573 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7574 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
7576 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7577 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7578 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7579 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7580 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
7581 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7582 get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7583 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7585 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7586 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty() });
7587 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7588 let cs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7589 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
7590 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &cs_reestablish);
7591 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
7592 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7594 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7595 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7596 pass_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], 10_000, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret);
7597 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], our_payment_preimage);
7601 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7602 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7603 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7605 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7606 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7607 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7608 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7610 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7612 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7613 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], vec![], 3000000, 30);
7614 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7616 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7617 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7618 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7619 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7620 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7621 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7623 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7624 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7625 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7626 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7630 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7631 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7633 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7634 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7635 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7636 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7637 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7639 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7643 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7644 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7645 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7646 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7647 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7648 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7649 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7650 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7654 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7655 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7656 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7657 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7659 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7660 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7661 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7662 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7663 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7664 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7665 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7666 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7667 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7668 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7669 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7670 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7671 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7675 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7677 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7678 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7680 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7682 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7683 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7684 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7685 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7686 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7687 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7688 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7689 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7690 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7691 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7692 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7693 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7694 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7698 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7700 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7701 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7705 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7706 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7707 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7709 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7710 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7711 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7712 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7713 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7715 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7716 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7717 let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7718 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7719 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &nodes[0].network_graph, None,
7720 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7721 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7722 let payee = Payee::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7723 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payee, nodes[1].network_graph, None,
7724 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
7725 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7727 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7728 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7729 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7731 // Revoke local commitment tx
7732 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7734 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7735 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7736 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7737 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7738 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7739 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7740 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7742 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7743 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7744 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7746 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7747 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7748 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7750 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7751 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7752 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7753 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7755 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7756 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7757 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7758 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7759 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7760 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7761 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7762 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7764 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7765 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7771 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7772 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7773 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7775 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7776 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7777 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7778 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7780 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7781 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7782 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7783 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7784 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7785 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7787 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7788 // available, which we check here:
7789 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7790 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7791 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7793 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7794 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7796 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7797 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7798 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7799 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7801 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7802 // output, checked above).
7803 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7804 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7805 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7807 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7808 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7809 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7810 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].get_weight() as u64;
7811 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7815 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7816 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7817 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7818 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7819 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7821 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7822 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7824 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7825 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7826 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7827 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7828 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7830 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7831 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7837 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7838 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7839 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7840 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7842 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7843 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7845 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7846 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7847 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7848 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7849 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7850 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7851 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7852 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7856 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7857 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7858 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7859 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7861 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7862 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7863 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7864 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7865 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7866 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7867 // up bumped justice generation.
7868 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7871 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7872 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7876 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7877 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7878 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7881 // Provide preimage for one
7882 // Check aggregation
7884 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7885 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7886 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7887 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7889 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7890 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7891 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7893 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7894 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7895 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7896 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7897 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7899 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7900 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7901 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7902 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7903 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7905 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7909 let feerate_timeout;
7910 let feerate_preimage;
7912 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7913 // 9 transactions including:
7914 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
7915 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
7916 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
7918 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
7919 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7920 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
7921 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7922 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
7923 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
7924 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
7926 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
7927 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
7928 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
7929 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
7931 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
7932 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7933 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
7934 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].get_weight() as u64;
7936 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7937 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7938 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7939 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7943 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7944 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7946 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7947 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7949 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7950 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7951 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7952 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7953 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7954 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7956 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7957 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7958 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.get_weight() as u64;
7959 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7960 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7962 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7963 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7964 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].get_weight() as u64;
7965 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
7966 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
7971 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7972 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7976 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
7977 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
7978 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
7979 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
7980 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
7981 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
7982 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
7983 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
7985 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7986 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7987 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7988 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7989 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
7991 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7992 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
7994 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
7996 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
7997 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
7998 let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
8000 // Must revoke without gaps
8001 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8002 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
8004 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8005 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
8006 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
8008 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
8009 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
8010 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
8011 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8012 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
8016 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
8017 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
8018 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
8020 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8021 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8022 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8023 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8025 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8026 // Lock HTLC in both directions
8027 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8028 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8030 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
8031 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8032 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8034 // Revoke local commitment tx
8035 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8037 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
8038 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
8039 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
8040 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8042 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
8043 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8044 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8045 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8047 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8048 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
8049 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8050 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8051 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8052 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8056 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8057 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8058 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8060 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8061 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8062 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8067 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8068 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8069 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8070 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8071 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8072 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8073 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8075 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8077 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8078 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8079 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8080 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8081 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8083 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8084 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8085 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8086 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8088 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8089 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8090 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8091 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8092 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8094 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8095 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8096 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8098 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8103 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8104 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8105 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8106 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8107 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8109 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8110 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8111 override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8113 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8115 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8116 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8117 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8118 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8122 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8123 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8124 zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8125 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8126 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8127 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8128 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8130 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8131 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8132 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8134 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8135 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8136 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8140 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8141 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8142 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8143 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8144 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8145 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8147 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8148 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8149 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8150 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8152 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8153 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8154 route.paths.push(path);
8155 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8156 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8157 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8158 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8159 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8160 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8161 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8162 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8166 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8167 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8168 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8169 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8170 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8171 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8173 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8176 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200);
8177 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8178 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8179 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8180 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8181 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8182 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8183 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8185 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8186 // values from previous calls.
8187 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8188 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8189 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8191 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8193 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8194 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8196 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8199 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8204 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8205 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs
8206 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8207 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8208 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8209 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8211 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8213 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2);
8215 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8216 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8217 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8218 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8219 } else { panic!(); }
8221 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8223 header: BlockHeader {
8225 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8226 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8227 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8231 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8232 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8233 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8234 } else { panic!(); }
8236 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8237 // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8238 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8239 block.header.time += 1;
8240 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8241 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8242 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8245 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8246 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8247 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8248 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8249 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8250 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8251 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8253 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8254 // values from previous calls.
8255 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8256 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8257 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8259 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8260 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8261 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8262 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8264 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8269 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8270 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8271 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8272 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8273 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8274 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8276 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8278 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8279 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8280 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2);
8281 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8283 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8284 // resulting events.
8285 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8287 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8288 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8289 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8290 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8291 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8293 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8294 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8295 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8296 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8297 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8299 // We should fail the payment back
8300 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8301 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8302 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8303 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8304 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8306 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8311 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8312 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8313 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8315 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8316 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8317 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8318 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8320 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8321 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8322 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8323 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8325 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8326 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8327 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8328 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8332 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8333 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8334 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8335 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8337 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8338 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8339 // commitment at same time.
8341 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8342 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8343 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8344 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8346 // Create some initial channel
8347 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8348 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8350 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8351 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8353 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8354 let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8356 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8357 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8358 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8359 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8361 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8362 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8363 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8364 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8365 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8366 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8367 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8368 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8371 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8372 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8373 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8374 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8375 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8377 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8378 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8379 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8380 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8381 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8382 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8383 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8384 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8385 if let Err(_) = watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8386 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8387 } else { assert!(false); }
8388 } else { assert!(false); };
8389 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8390 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8391 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8392 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8396 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8397 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8398 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8399 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8400 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8402 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8403 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8404 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8405 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8407 // Create some initial channel
8408 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8409 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8411 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8412 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8414 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8415 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8417 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8418 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8419 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8420 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8421 let watchtower_alice = {
8422 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8423 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8424 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8425 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8426 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8427 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8428 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8429 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8432 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8433 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8434 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8435 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8436 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8438 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8440 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8441 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8445 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8446 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8447 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8448 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8449 let watchtower_bob = {
8450 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8451 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8452 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8453 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8454 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8455 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8456 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8457 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8460 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8461 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8463 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8464 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8466 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8468 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8470 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8471 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8472 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8473 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8474 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8475 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8476 if let Err(_) = watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8477 if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8478 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8479 } else { assert!(false); }
8480 } else { assert!(false); };
8481 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8484 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8485 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8486 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8488 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8491 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8492 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8493 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8497 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8498 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8499 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8501 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8502 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8503 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8504 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8505 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8506 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8511 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8512 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8513 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8516 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8517 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8519 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8520 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8521 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8522 // before receiving funding_signed.
8523 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8524 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8525 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8526 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8528 // Create an initial channel
8529 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8530 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8531 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8532 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8533 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8535 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8536 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8538 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8539 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8541 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8542 let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8543 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8544 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8545 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8549 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8550 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8551 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8552 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8553 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8554 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8555 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8557 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8558 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8559 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8560 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8562 // Create some initial channels
8563 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8565 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8566 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8567 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8568 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8569 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8570 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8572 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8573 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8574 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8575 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8576 // this test before #653 fix.
8577 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8578 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8579 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8580 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8581 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8583 let htlc_timeout = {
8584 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8585 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8586 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8587 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8591 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8592 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8593 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8594 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8597 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8598 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8599 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8600 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8602 // Steps of the test:
8603 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8604 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8605 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8606 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8607 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8608 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8609 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8610 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8611 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8612 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8613 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8614 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8616 // Create some initial channels
8617 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8618 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8620 // Steps (1) and (2):
8621 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8622 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8624 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8625 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8626 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8627 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8628 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8629 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8630 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8632 // Steps (3) and (4):
8633 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8634 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8635 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8636 if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
8637 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
8638 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8639 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8640 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8641 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8642 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8643 true => alice_txn.clone(),
8644 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8646 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8647 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8648 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8649 if broadcast_alice {
8650 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8651 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8652 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8654 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8655 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8659 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
8660 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
8661 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
8662 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8663 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8664 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8665 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8666 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8667 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
8668 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8670 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8671 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false);
8672 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
8673 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
8674 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8675 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8677 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
8678 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8680 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8683 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
8684 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
8685 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
8686 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8688 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8689 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8690 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
8691 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8692 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8695 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8697 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
8698 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
8699 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
8702 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8705 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
8706 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8707 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
8708 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
8710 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8711 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8712 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
8713 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
8714 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8717 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8719 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
8720 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8722 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
8723 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
8724 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
8725 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
8726 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8727 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8728 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8729 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
8730 if broadcast_alice {
8731 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8732 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8733 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8735 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8736 if broadcast_alice {
8737 // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
8738 // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
8739 // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
8740 // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
8742 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
8743 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
8745 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8746 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8751 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
8752 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
8754 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8755 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8756 // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
8757 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
8759 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
8760 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
8761 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
8763 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
8764 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
8765 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
8766 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
8767 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8768 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8769 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8771 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
8772 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
8778 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
8779 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
8780 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
8781 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
8782 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
8786 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
8787 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
8788 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
8790 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
8791 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
8792 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
8793 // updating logic for the existing channel.
8794 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8795 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8796 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8797 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8799 // Create an initial channel
8800 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8801 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8802 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8803 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8805 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
8806 // that it is rejected.
8807 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8809 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8810 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8812 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8813 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
8814 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
8815 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
8816 // move forward with it.
8817 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8818 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8820 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8824 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8825 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42);
8827 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8828 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8830 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8831 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8833 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8834 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8835 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8836 added_monitors.clear();
8838 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8840 let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
8841 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
8843 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
8846 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
8847 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
8848 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
8849 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
8850 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8852 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8853 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8855 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8856 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8857 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8858 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
8859 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8861 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8865 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
8866 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8867 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8868 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
8869 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8870 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
8872 let funding_created = {
8873 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8874 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8875 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8876 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
8878 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8879 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
8880 // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
8881 // still needs to be cleared here.
8882 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8884 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
8886 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8887 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8889 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
8890 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
8891 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
8892 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
8893 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8895 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8899 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
8900 // everything is functional.
8901 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
8903 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
8904 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
8905 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
8906 added_monitors.clear();
8909 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8910 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
8911 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
8912 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
8914 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8915 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
8916 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
8917 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
8921 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
8922 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
8924 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
8925 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
8926 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
8927 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8928 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8929 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8930 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8932 // Create some initial channels
8933 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8934 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8935 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8937 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8938 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8939 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8941 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
8942 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8943 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
8945 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
8946 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8947 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8948 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
8949 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8950 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
8951 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
8952 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
8953 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8955 // A null channel ID should close all channels
8956 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8957 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
8958 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
8959 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
8960 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8961 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
8963 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8964 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8966 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8969 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
8970 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
8972 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8974 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
8975 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
8976 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
8977 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
8978 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8979 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8981 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
8982 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
8983 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
8987 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
8988 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
8990 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
8991 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
8992 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
8993 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
8994 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8995 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8996 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8997 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8999 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9000 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9001 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9003 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 100_000, 42);
9004 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9005 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9006 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
9009 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9010 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9011 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9013 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9014 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9016 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9017 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9019 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9020 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9021 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9023 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9024 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9025 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9026 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9027 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9028 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9029 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9030 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9031 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9032 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9033 } else { panic!(); }
9034 } else { panic!(); }
9035 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9038 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9039 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9040 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9041 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9042 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9043 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9044 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9045 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9046 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9047 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9048 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9049 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9050 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9051 // until we learned about an additional block.
9053 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9054 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9055 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9056 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9057 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9058 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9059 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9061 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9062 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9063 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9064 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9065 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9067 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
9068 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9069 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9070 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9071 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9072 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9074 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9075 if !test_height_before_timelock {
9076 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9078 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9079 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9080 if test_height_before_timelock {
9081 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9082 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9083 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9084 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9086 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9087 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9088 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9089 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9090 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9091 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9093 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9094 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9096 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9097 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9098 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9099 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9100 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9101 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9102 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9104 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9105 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9106 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9107 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9108 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9109 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9110 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9111 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9112 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9117 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9118 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9119 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9123 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9124 // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9125 // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9127 // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9129 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9130 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9131 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9132 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9133 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9134 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9135 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9136 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9137 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9139 // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9140 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9141 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9142 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9144 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9145 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9146 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9147 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9148 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9150 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9152 // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9153 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9154 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9155 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9157 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9158 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9159 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9160 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9161 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9163 // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9165 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9167 // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9168 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9169 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9171 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9172 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9173 let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9174 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9175 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9177 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9178 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9179 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9180 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9182 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9183 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9184 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9185 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9186 let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9187 let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9188 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9189 assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9191 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9192 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9193 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9194 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9195 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9196 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9197 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9199 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9200 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9201 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9202 logger: nodes[1].logger,
9206 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9207 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9209 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9210 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9211 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9212 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9214 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9215 // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9216 // the commitment state.
9217 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9219 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9221 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9222 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9223 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9225 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9226 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9227 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9228 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9229 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9230 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9231 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9233 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9234 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9238 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9239 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9240 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9241 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9242 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9244 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9245 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9246 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9247 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9248 let params = RouteParameters {
9249 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9250 final_value_msat: 10000,
9251 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9253 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9254 let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer).unwrap();
9256 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9257 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9258 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9259 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9260 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9261 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9262 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9263 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9264 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9268 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9269 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9270 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9271 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9272 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9274 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9275 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9276 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9277 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
9279 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9280 let params = RouteParameters {
9281 payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9282 final_value_msat: 10000,
9283 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9285 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9286 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9287 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
9288 let route = find_route(
9289 &payer_pubkey, ¶ms, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9290 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
9293 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9294 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9295 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9296 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9297 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9298 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9299 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9300 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9301 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9304 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9305 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9306 enum ExposureEvent {
9307 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9309 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9311 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9312 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9315 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9316 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9319 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9320 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9321 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9322 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9323 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9324 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9325 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9326 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9328 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9329 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9330 config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9331 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9332 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9333 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9335 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9336 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9337 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9338 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9340 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9342 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
9343 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9344 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
9346 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], 1_000_000, 42);
9349 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9350 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9354 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9355 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9358 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9359 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9361 let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9362 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9363 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9365 let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9366 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9367 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9368 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9370 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9371 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9373 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9374 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9376 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9377 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9380 if dust_outbound_balance {
9381 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9382 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9383 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9384 for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9385 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9386 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9389 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9390 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9391 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9392 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9393 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9397 if dust_outbound_balance {
9398 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9399 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9400 for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9401 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9402 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9405 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9406 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9407 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9408 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9413 let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9414 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9415 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9416 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9417 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9419 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9420 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9421 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9423 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9425 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9426 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9427 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9428 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9429 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9430 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9431 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9432 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9433 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9435 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9436 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9437 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9438 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9440 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9441 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9443 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9444 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9445 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9447 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9448 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9450 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9451 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9452 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9455 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9456 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9457 added_monitors.clear();
9461 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9462 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9463 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9464 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9465 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9466 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9467 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
9468 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
9469 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
9470 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
9471 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9472 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
9473 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);