1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
11 //! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
12 //! claim outputs on-chain.
15 use chain::{Confirm, Listen, Watch};
16 use chain::channelmonitor;
17 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
18 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
19 use chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, KeysInterface};
20 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
21 use ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT};
22 use ln::channelmanager::{ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS };
23 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
24 use ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
25 use ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
26 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, find_route, get_route};
27 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures, NodeFeatures};
29 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, OptionalField, ErrorAction};
30 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
31 use util::{byte_utils, test_utils};
32 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason};
33 use util::errors::APIError;
34 use util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
35 use util::config::UserConfig;
37 use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
38 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
39 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
40 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
41 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
42 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
44 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
45 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
51 use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
52 use core::default::Default;
53 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
55 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
56 use ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
59 fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
60 // Stand up a network of 2 nodes
61 use ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
62 let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
63 cfg.peer_channel_config_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
64 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
65 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
66 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
67 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
69 // Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
71 let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
72 let channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat);
73 let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
75 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
76 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
78 // Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
79 let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
81 // Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
82 // that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
83 let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
84 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
85 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
86 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
87 let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
88 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
90 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
91 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), expected_regex, 1);
93 _ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
95 } else { assert!(false); }
98 use ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
100 // Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
101 insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
102 insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
104 insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
106 insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
108 insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
110 insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
112 insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
114 insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
116 insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
120 fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
121 // Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
123 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
124 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
125 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
126 node_cfgs[1].features = InitFeatures::known().clear_wumbo();
127 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
128 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
130 match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None) {
131 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
132 assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
138 fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
139 // A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
140 // but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
141 // substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
142 // in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
143 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
144 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
145 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
146 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
148 // Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
149 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
150 let feerate_per_kw = 253;
151 let opt_anchors = false;
152 push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
153 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
155 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None).unwrap();
156 let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
157 if !send_from_initiator {
158 open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
159 open_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
161 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_message);
163 // Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
164 let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
165 if send_from_initiator {
166 accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
167 accept_channel_message.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
169 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel_message);
172 let mut chan = get_channel_ref!(if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] }, lock, temp_channel_id);
173 chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
174 chan.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
177 let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
178 let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
179 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
181 // nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
182 // security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
183 if send_from_initiator {
184 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
185 // Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
186 // "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
187 // well as an additional HTLC.
188 - FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, opt_anchors));
190 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
195 fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
196 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
197 do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
201 fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
202 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
203 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
204 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
205 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
206 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
209 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
213 // send (1) commitment_signed -.
214 // <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
215 // send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
216 // (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
217 // .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
218 // (2) RAA is delivered ->
219 // .- send (4) commitment_signed
220 // <- (3) RAA is delivered
221 // send (5) commitment_signed -.
222 // <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
224 // (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
226 // (6) RAA is delivered ->
228 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
230 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
233 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
234 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
236 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
237 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
238 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
239 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
240 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
242 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
245 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
247 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
248 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
249 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
250 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
252 let payment_event = {
253 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
254 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
255 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
257 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
258 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
260 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
261 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
262 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
263 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
264 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
265 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
267 // deliver(1), generate (3):
268 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
269 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
270 // nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
273 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
274 let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
275 assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
276 assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
277 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
278 assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
279 assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
280 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
282 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
283 let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
284 assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
285 assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
286 assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
287 assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
288 assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
291 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
292 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
293 // only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
294 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
296 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
297 let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
298 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
300 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
303 let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
304 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
306 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
307 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
310 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
311 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
315 fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
316 // Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
317 // crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
318 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
319 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
320 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
321 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
322 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
325 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
327 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
329 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
332 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
333 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
335 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
336 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
337 let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
338 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
341 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
344 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
346 // ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
347 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
348 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
349 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
351 let payment_event = {
352 let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
353 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
354 SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
356 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
357 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
359 // ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
360 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
361 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
362 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
363 // nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
364 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
366 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
367 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
369 // We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
373 fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
374 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
375 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
376 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
377 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
378 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
381 // update_fee/commitment_signed ->
382 // .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
383 // update_fee (never committed) ->
385 // We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
386 // don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
387 // AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
388 // <- (1) RAA delivered
389 // (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
390 // Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
391 // know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
392 // <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
394 // B should send no response here
395 // (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
396 // <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
399 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
402 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
403 initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
404 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
406 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
407 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
409 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
410 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
411 let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
412 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
413 (update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
415 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
418 // Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
419 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
420 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
421 let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
422 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
424 // nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
427 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
428 *feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
430 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
431 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
432 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
434 // Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
435 let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
436 channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
437 feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
440 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
442 update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
444 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
446 // Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
447 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
448 let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
449 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
450 assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
451 assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
452 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
453 assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
454 // Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
455 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
456 assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
458 // Deliver (2) commitment_signed
459 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
460 let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
461 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
462 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
464 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
465 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
466 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
469 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
470 let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
471 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
473 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
474 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
475 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
477 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
478 let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
479 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
480 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
482 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
483 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
484 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
487 fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
488 // Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
489 // after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
490 // serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
493 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
494 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
495 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
496 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
498 if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
500 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
503 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
504 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
507 if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
508 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
509 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
511 if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
512 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
513 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
515 if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
516 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
518 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
520 if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
521 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
522 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
523 let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
525 if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
526 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
528 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
529 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
530 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
531 added_monitors.clear();
533 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
535 if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
536 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
538 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
539 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
540 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
541 added_monitors.clear();
544 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
545 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
547 if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
548 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
550 if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
551 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
552 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
553 create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
557 fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
558 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
559 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
560 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
561 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
562 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
563 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
564 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
565 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
566 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
567 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
568 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
569 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
570 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
571 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
572 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
573 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
574 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
575 do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
579 fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
580 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
581 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
582 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
583 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
584 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
587 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
590 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
591 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
593 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
594 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
595 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
596 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
597 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
599 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
601 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
603 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
604 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
605 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
607 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
608 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
609 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
611 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
612 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
613 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
614 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
616 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
617 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
618 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
622 fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
623 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
624 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
625 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
626 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
627 let channel_value = 5000;
629 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
630 let channel_id = chan.2;
631 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
632 let bs_channel_reserve_sats = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value);
634 let opt_anchors = false;
636 // Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
637 // CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
638 // calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
640 let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
641 let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors)) as u32;
643 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
644 *feerate_lock = feerate;
646 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
647 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
648 let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
650 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
652 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
654 // Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
656 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
658 //We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
659 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
660 let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000;
661 let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
662 actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
663 assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
667 // Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
668 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
671 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
672 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
673 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
675 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
677 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
678 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
679 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
680 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
681 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
682 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
683 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
684 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
685 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
687 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
688 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
689 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
690 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
691 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
692 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
693 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
694 pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
697 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
698 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
699 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
702 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
703 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
704 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
705 let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
706 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
707 INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
709 channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, opt_anchors) / 1000,
710 opt_anchors, local_funding, remote_funding,
711 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
712 non_buffer_feerate + 4,
714 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
716 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
719 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
722 htlc_signatures: res.1
725 let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
727 feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
730 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
732 //While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
733 //check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
734 //Should produce and error.
735 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
736 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_string(), 1);
737 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
738 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
739 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") });
743 fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
744 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
745 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
746 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
747 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
748 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
751 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
754 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
757 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
758 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
760 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
761 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
762 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
763 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
764 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
766 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
768 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
769 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
770 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
771 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
773 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
775 // nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
776 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
778 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
779 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
780 added_monitors.clear();
782 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
783 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
784 // node[1] has nothing to do
786 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
787 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
788 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
790 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
791 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
792 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
793 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
794 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
795 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
796 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
798 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
799 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
800 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
801 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
802 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
803 assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
805 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
806 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
807 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
808 let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
810 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
811 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
812 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
814 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
815 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
816 let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
817 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
819 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
820 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
821 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
823 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
825 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
826 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
828 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => { },
829 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
832 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
834 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
835 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
836 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
837 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
838 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
842 fn test_update_fee() {
843 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
844 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
845 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
846 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
847 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
848 let channel_id = chan.2;
851 // (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
852 // <- (2) revoke_and_ack
853 // .- send (3) commitment_signed
854 // (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
855 // .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
856 // <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
857 // send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
858 // <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
859 // (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
860 // .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
861 // <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
864 // Create and deliver (1)...
867 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
868 feerate = *feerate_lock;
869 *feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
871 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
872 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
874 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
875 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
876 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
877 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
878 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
880 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
882 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
884 // Generate (2) and (3):
885 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
886 let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
887 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
890 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
891 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
892 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
894 // Create and deliver (4)...
896 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
897 *feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
899 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
900 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
901 let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
902 assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
903 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
904 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
905 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
907 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
910 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
911 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
912 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
914 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
915 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
917 // Handle (3), creating (6):
918 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
919 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
920 let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
921 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
924 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
925 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
928 // Deliver (6), creating (7):
929 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
930 let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
931 assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
932 assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
933 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
934 assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
935 assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
936 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
939 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
941 let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
942 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
944 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
945 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
946 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
948 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
949 assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
950 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
951 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
952 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
956 fn fake_network_test() {
957 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
958 // tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
959 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
960 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
961 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
962 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
964 // Create some initial channels
965 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
966 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
967 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
969 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
970 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
971 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
972 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
973 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
975 // Send some more payments
976 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
977 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1], &nodes[0])[..], 1000000);
978 send_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000);
980 // Test failure packets
981 let payment_hash_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000).1;
982 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], payment_hash_1);
984 // Add a new channel that skips 3
985 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
987 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
988 send_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000);
989 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
990 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
991 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
992 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
993 send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 8000000);
995 // Do some rebalance loop payments, simultaneously
996 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
998 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
999 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1000 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1001 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1003 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.0.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1005 hops.push(RouteHop {
1006 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1007 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1008 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1009 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1011 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_4.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1013 hops.push(RouteHop {
1014 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1015 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1016 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1017 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1019 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1021 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_4.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_4.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1022 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.0.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.0.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1023 let payment_preimage_1 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).0;
1025 let mut hops = Vec::with_capacity(3);
1026 hops.push(RouteHop {
1027 pubkey: nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(),
1028 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1029 short_channel_id: chan_4.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1030 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1032 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_3.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1034 hops.push(RouteHop {
1035 pubkey: nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(),
1036 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(),
1037 short_channel_id: chan_3.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1038 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
1040 cltv_expiry_delta: chan_2.1.contents.cltv_expiry_delta as u32
1042 hops.push(RouteHop {
1043 pubkey: nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(),
1044 node_features: NodeFeatures::known(),
1045 short_channel_id: chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id,
1046 channel_features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
1048 cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
1050 hops[1].fee_msat = chan_2.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_2.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[2].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1051 hops[0].fee_msat = chan_3.1.contents.fee_base_msat as u64 + chan_3.1.contents.fee_proportional_millionths as u64 * hops[1].fee_msat as u64 / 1000000;
1052 let payment_hash_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[1], Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None }, &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], 1000000).1;
1054 // Claim the rebalances...
1055 fail_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[2], &nodes[1])[..], payment_hash_2);
1056 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
1058 // Add a duplicate new channel from 2 to 4
1059 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1061 // Send some payments across both channels
1062 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1063 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1064 let payment_preimage_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
1067 route_over_limit(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000);
1068 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1069 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1070 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap(), 1);
1072 //TODO: Test that routes work again here as we've been notified that the channel is full
1074 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_3);
1075 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_4);
1076 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage_5);
1078 // Close down the channels...
1079 close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan_1.2, chan_1.3, true);
1080 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1081 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1082 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &chan_2.2, chan_2.3, false);
1083 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1084 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1085 close_channel(&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &chan_3.2, chan_3.3, true);
1086 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1087 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1088 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_4.2, chan_4.3, false);
1089 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1090 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1091 close_channel(&nodes[1], &nodes[3], &chan_5.2, chan_5.3, false);
1092 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1093 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
1097 fn holding_cell_htlc_counting() {
1098 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell count towards the pending HTLC limits on outbound HTLCs
1099 // to ensure we don't end up with HTLCs sitting around in our holding cell for several
1100 // commitment dance rounds.
1101 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1102 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1103 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1104 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1105 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1106 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1108 let mut payments = Vec::new();
1109 for _ in 0..::ln::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
1110 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1111 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
1112 payments.push((payment_preimage, payment_hash));
1114 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1116 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1117 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1118 let initial_payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1119 assert_eq!(initial_payment_event.node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1121 // There is now one HTLC in an outbound commitment transaction and (OUR_MAX_HTLCS - 1) HTLCs in
1122 // the holding cell waiting on B's RAA to send. At this point we should not be able to add
1124 let (route, payment_hash_1, _, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
1126 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1127 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1128 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1129 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
1132 // This should also be true if we try to forward a payment.
1133 let (route, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
1135 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
1136 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1139 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1140 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1141 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
1142 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1144 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
1145 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
1146 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
1147 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward.
1148 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1149 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1150 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1152 let bs_fail_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1153 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_fail_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
1154 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], bs_fail_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
1156 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash_2, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
1158 // Now forward all the pending HTLCs and claim them back
1159 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.msgs[0]);
1160 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &initial_payment_event.commitment_msg);
1161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1163 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1164 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1165 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1166 let as_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1168 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1169 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1170 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1172 for ref update in as_updates.update_add_htlcs.iter() {
1173 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update);
1175 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.commitment_signed);
1176 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1177 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
1178 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1179 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1181 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1182 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1183 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
1184 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1185 let as_final_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
1187 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_final_raa);
1188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
1190 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1192 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1193 assert_eq!(events.len(), payments.len());
1194 for (event, &(_, ref hash)) in events.iter().zip(payments.iter()) {
1196 &Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
1197 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, *hash);
1199 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1203 for (preimage, _) in payments.drain(..) {
1204 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2]], preimage);
1207 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1000000);
1211 fn duplicate_htlc_test() {
1212 // Test that we accept duplicate payment_hash HTLCs across the network and that
1213 // claiming/failing them are all separate and don't affect each other
1214 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
1215 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
1216 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None, None]);
1217 let mut nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1219 // Create some initial channels to route via 3 to 4/5 from 0/1/2
1220 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1221 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1222 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1223 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1224 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1226 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 1000000);
1228 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1229 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1231 *nodes[0].network_payment_count.borrow_mut() -= 1;
1232 assert_eq!(route_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], 1000000).0, payment_preimage);
1234 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], payment_preimage);
1235 fail_payment(&nodes[2], &vec!(&nodes[3], &nodes[5])[..], payment_hash);
1236 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[3])[..], payment_preimage);
1240 fn test_duplicate_htlc_different_direction_onchain() {
1241 // Test that ChannelMonitor doesn't generate 2 preimage txn
1242 // when we have 2 HTLCs with same preimage that go across a node
1243 // in opposite directions, even with the same payment secret.
1244 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1245 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1246 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1247 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1249 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1252 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
1254 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 900_000);
1256 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800_000);
1257 let node_a_payment_secret = nodes[0].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
1258 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[0]]], 800_000, payment_hash, node_a_payment_secret);
1260 // Provide preimage to node 0 by claiming payment
1261 nodes[0].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1262 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1264 // Broadcast node 1 commitment txn
1265 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1267 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4); // 1 local, 1 remote, 1 htlc inbound, 1 htlc outbound
1268 let mut has_both_htlcs = 0; // check htlcs match ones committed
1269 for outp in remote_txn[0].output.iter() {
1270 if outp.value == 800_000 / 1000 {
1271 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1272 } else if outp.value == 900_000 / 1000 {
1273 has_both_htlcs += 1;
1276 assert_eq!(has_both_htlcs, 2);
1278 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &remote_txn[0]);
1279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1280 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
1281 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
1283 // Check we only broadcast 1 timeout tx
1284 let claim_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
1285 assert_eq!(claim_txn.len(), 8);
1286 assert_eq!(claim_txn[1], claim_txn[4]);
1287 assert_eq!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[5]);
1288 check_spends!(claim_txn[1], chan_1.3);
1289 check_spends!(claim_txn[2], claim_txn[1]);
1290 check_spends!(claim_txn[7], claim_txn[1]);
1292 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1293 assert_eq!(claim_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
1294 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, claim_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
1296 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
1297 assert_eq!(claim_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 1 <--> 0, preimage tx
1298 check_spends!(claim_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
1299 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 800);
1300 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
1301 assert_eq!(claim_txn[6].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC 0 <--> 1, timeout tx
1302 check_spends!(claim_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
1303 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output[claim_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize].value, 900);
1305 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1306 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
1309 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
1310 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } } => {
1311 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1312 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
1314 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
1315 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
1316 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
1317 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
1318 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
1319 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
1321 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1327 fn test_basic_channel_reserve() {
1328 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1329 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1330 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1331 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1332 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1334 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1335 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
1337 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
1338 let commit_tx_fee = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2), 1 + 1, get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2));
1339 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee;
1340 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send + 1);
1341 let err = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).err().unwrap();
1343 PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(ref fails) => {
1345 &APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ref err} =>
1346 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)),
1347 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1350 _ => panic!("Unexpected error variant"),
1352 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1353 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1355 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1]], max_can_send);
1359 fn test_fee_spike_violation_fails_htlc() {
1360 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1361 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1362 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1363 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1364 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1366 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3460001);
1367 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1368 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1369 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).expect("RNG is bad!");
1371 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1373 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1374 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3460001, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1375 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1376 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1379 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1380 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1381 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1382 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1385 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1387 // Now manually create the commitment_signed message corresponding to the update_add
1388 // nodes[0] just sent. In the code for construction of this message, "local" refers
1389 // to the sender of the message, and "remote" refers to the receiver.
1391 let feerate_per_kw = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1393 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
1395 // Get the EnforcingSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
1396 // needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
1397 let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_secret, next_local_point, local_funding) = {
1398 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1399 let local_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1400 let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1401 // Make the signer believe we validated another commitment, so we can release the secret
1402 chan_signer.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
1404 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1405 (pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1406 chan_signer.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER),
1407 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2, &secp_ctx),
1408 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1410 let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint, remote_point, remote_funding) = {
1411 let chan_lock = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1412 let remote_chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1413 let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
1414 let pubkeys = chan_signer.pubkeys();
1415 (pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
1416 chan_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
1417 chan_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1420 // Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
1421 let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
1422 &remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1424 // Build the remote commitment transaction so we can sign it, and then later use the
1425 // signature for the commitment_signed message.
1426 let local_chan_balance = 1313;
1428 let accepted_htlc_info = chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1430 amount_msat: 3460001,
1431 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1433 transaction_output_index: Some(1),
1436 let commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1;
1439 let local_chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1440 let local_chan = local_chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
1441 let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
1442 let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1446 local_chan.opt_anchors(), local_funding, remote_funding,
1447 commit_tx_keys.clone(),
1449 &mut vec![(accepted_htlc_info, ())],
1450 &local_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
1452 local_chan_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
1455 let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
1458 htlc_signatures: res.1
1461 // Send the commitment_signed message to the nodes[1].
1462 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
1463 let _ = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1465 // Send the RAA to nodes[1].
1466 let raa_msg = msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1468 per_commitment_secret: local_secret,
1469 next_per_commitment_point: next_local_point
1471 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
1473 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1474 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1475 // Make sure the HTLC failed in the way we expect.
1477 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, .. }, .. } => {
1478 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
1479 update_fail_htlcs[0].clone()
1481 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1483 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(),
1484 format!("Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", ::hex::encode(raa_msg.channel_id)), 1);
1486 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
1490 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_outbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1491 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1492 // Set the fee rate for the channel very high, to the point where the fundee
1493 // sending any above-dust amount would result in a channel reserve violation.
1494 // In this test we check that we would be prevented from sending an HTLC in
1496 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1497 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1498 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1499 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1501 let opt_anchors = false;
1503 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1504 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1505 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1507 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1509 // Sending exactly enough to hit the reserve amount should be accepted
1510 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1511 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1514 // However one more HTLC should be significantly over the reserve amount and fail.
1515 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 1_000_000);
1516 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1517 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1518 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1519 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1523 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_outbound_channel() {
1524 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1525 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1526 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1527 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1528 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1530 let opt_anchors = false;
1532 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1533 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1534 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1535 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1536 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1537 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1538 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1540 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1541 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1542 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1545 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 700_000);
1546 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1547 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1548 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1549 let cur_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1550 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1551 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 700_000, &Some(payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1552 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
1553 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1555 htlc_id: MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64,
1556 amount_msat: htlc_msat,
1557 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1558 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1559 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1562 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1563 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1564 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1565 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
1566 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
1567 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value");
1568 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1569 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string() });
1573 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_outbound_chan() {
1574 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an outbound channel, they don't count when
1575 // calculating our commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1576 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1577 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1579 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1580 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1581 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1583 let opt_anchors = false;
1585 // Set nodes[0]'s balance such that they will consider any above-dust received HTLC to be a
1586 // channel reserve violation (so their balance is channel reserve (1000 sats) + commitment
1587 // transaction fee with 0 HTLCs (183 sats)).
1588 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1589 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1590 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1591 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, push_amt, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1593 let dust_amt = crate::ln::channel::MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS * 1000
1594 + feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 * 1000 - 1;
1595 // In the previous code, routing this dust payment would cause nodes[0] to perceive a channel
1596 // reserve violation even though it's a dust HTLC and therefore shouldn't count towards the
1597 // commitment transaction fee.
1598 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_amt);
1600 // Send four HTLCs to cover the initial push_msat buffer we're required to include
1601 for _ in 0..MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT {
1602 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], 1_000_000);
1605 // One more than the dust amt should fail, however.
1606 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], dust_amt + 1);
1607 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1608 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value"));
1612 fn test_chan_init_feerate_unaffordability() {
1613 // Test that we will reject channel opens which do not leave enough to pay for any HTLCs due to
1614 // channel reserve and feerate requirements.
1615 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1616 let feerate_per_kw = *chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
1617 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1618 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1619 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1621 let opt_anchors = false;
1623 // Set the push_msat amount such that nodes[0] will not be able to afford to add even a single
1625 let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
1626 push_amt -= commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT as u64, opt_anchors);
1627 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt + 1, 42, None).unwrap_err(),
1628 APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Funding amount (356) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of 357.".to_string() });
1630 // During open, we don't have a "counterparty channel reserve" to check against, so that
1631 // requirement only comes into play on the open_channel handling side.
1632 push_amt -= Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000) * 1000;
1633 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, push_amt, 42, None).unwrap();
1634 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1635 open_channel_msg.push_msat += 1;
1636 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg);
1638 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1639 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
1640 match msg_events[0] {
1641 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
1642 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve");
1644 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1649 fn test_chan_reserve_dust_inbound_htlcs_inbound_chan() {
1650 // Test that if we receive many dust HTLCs over an inbound channel, they don't count when
1651 // calculating our counterparty's commitment transaction fee (this was previously broken).
1652 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1653 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1654 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1655 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1656 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 98000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1658 let payment_amt = 46000; // Dust amount
1659 // In the previous code, these first four payments would succeed.
1660 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1661 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1662 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1663 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1665 // Then these next 5 would be interpreted by nodes[1] as violating the fee spike buffer.
1666 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1667 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1668 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1669 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1670 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1672 // And this last payment previously resulted in nodes[1] closing on its inbound-channel
1673 // counterparty, because it counted all the previous dust HTLCs against nodes[0]'s commitment
1674 // transaction fee and therefore perceived this next payment as a channel reserve violation.
1675 let (_, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_amt);
1679 fn test_chan_reserve_violation_inbound_htlc_inbound_chan() {
1680 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1681 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1682 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
1683 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1684 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1685 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1688 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1689 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1690 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1691 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
1693 // Add a 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1694 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1695 let recv_value_1 = (chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlc)/2;
1696 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1698 // Add a pending HTLC.
1699 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, _, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_1);
1700 let payment_event_1 = {
1701 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1702 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1704 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1705 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1706 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1708 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1710 // Attempt to trigger a channel reserve violation --> payment failure.
1711 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2, opt_anchors);
1712 let recv_value_2 = chan_stat.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat - total_routing_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs + 1;
1713 let amt_msat_2 = recv_value_2 + total_routing_fee_msat;
1714 let (route_2, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], amt_msat_2);
1716 // Need to manually create the update_add_htlc message to go around the channel reserve check in send_htlc()
1717 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1718 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
1719 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1720 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route_2.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
1721 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route_2.paths[0], recv_value_2, &None, cur_height, &None).unwrap();
1722 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash_1);
1723 let msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
1726 amount_msat: htlc_msat + 1,
1727 payment_hash: our_payment_hash_1,
1728 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
1729 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet,
1732 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
1733 // Check that the payment failed and the channel is closed in response to the malicious UpdateAdd.
1734 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string(), 1);
1735 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
1736 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
1737 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
1738 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1739 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_string() });
1743 fn test_inbound_outbound_capacity_is_not_zero() {
1744 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
1745 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
1746 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
1747 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1748 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1749 let channels0 = node_chanmgrs[0].list_channels();
1750 let channels1 = node_chanmgrs[1].list_channels();
1751 assert_eq!(channels0.len(), 1);
1752 assert_eq!(channels1.len(), 1);
1754 let reserve = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100000);
1755 assert_eq!(channels0[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1756 assert_eq!(channels1[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1758 assert_eq!(channels0[0].outbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1759 assert_eq!(channels1[0].inbound_capacity_msat, 100000 * 1000 - 95000000 - reserve*1000);
1762 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate: u32, num_htlcs: u64, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1763 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1767 fn test_channel_reserve_holding_cell_htlcs() {
1768 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
1769 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
1770 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
1771 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
1772 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
1773 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 239;
1774 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
1775 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
1776 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1777 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 190000, 1001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
1779 let mut stat01 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1780 let mut stat11 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
1782 let mut stat12 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2);
1783 let mut stat22 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1785 macro_rules! expect_forward {
1787 let mut events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1788 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1789 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
1790 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
1795 let feemsat = 239; // set above
1796 let total_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
1797 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1798 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1800 let recv_value_0 = stat01.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - total_fee_msat;
1802 // attempt to send amt_msat > their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1804 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_0);
1805 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().fee_msat += 1;
1806 assert!(route.paths[0].iter().rev().skip(1).all(|h| h.fee_msat == feemsat));
1807 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1808 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1809 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1810 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
1813 // channel reserve is bigger than their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat so loop to deplete
1814 // nodes[0]'s wealth
1816 let amt_msat = recv_value_0 + total_fee_msat;
1817 // 3 for the 3 HTLCs that will be sent, 2* and +1 for the fee spike reserve.
1818 // Also, ensure that each payment has enough to be over the dust limit to
1819 // ensure it'll be included in each commit tx fee calculation.
1820 let commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1821 let ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer = 3 * (stat01.counterparty_dust_limit_msat + 1000);
1822 if stat01.value_to_self_msat < stat01.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_all_htlcs + ensure_htlc_amounts_above_dust_buffer + amt_msat {
1825 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_0);
1827 let (stat01_, stat11_, stat12_, stat22_) = (
1828 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2),
1829 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2),
1830 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_2.2),
1831 get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2),
1834 assert_eq!(stat01_.value_to_self_msat, stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat);
1835 assert_eq!(stat11_.value_to_self_msat, stat11.value_to_self_msat + amt_msat);
1836 assert_eq!(stat12_.value_to_self_msat, stat12.value_to_self_msat - (amt_msat - feemsat));
1837 assert_eq!(stat22_.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + (amt_msat - feemsat));
1838 stat01 = stat01_; stat11 = stat11_; stat12 = stat12_; stat22 = stat22_;
1841 // adding pending output.
1842 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee for the fee spike reserve.
1843 // The reason we're dividing by two here is as follows: the dividend is the total outbound liquidity
1844 // after fees, the channel reserve, and the fee spike buffer are removed. We eventually want to
1845 // divide this quantity into 3 portions, that will each be sent in an HTLC. This allows us
1846 // to test channel channel reserve policy at the edges of what amount is sendable, i.e.
1847 // cases where 1 msat over X amount will cause a payment failure, but anything less than
1848 // that can be sent successfully. So, dividing by two is a somewhat arbitrary way of getting
1849 // the amount of the first of these aforementioned 3 payments. The reason we split into 3 payments
1850 // is to test the behavior of the holding cell with respect to channel reserve and commit tx fee
1852 let commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors);
1853 let recv_value_1 = (stat01.value_to_self_msat - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs)/2;
1854 let amt_msat_1 = recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat;
1856 let (route_1, our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_preimage_1, our_payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_1);
1857 let payment_event_1 = {
1858 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, our_payment_hash_1, &Some(our_payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
1859 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1861 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
1862 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
1863 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
1865 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.msgs[0]);
1867 // channel reserve test with htlc pending output > 0
1868 let recv_value_2 = stat01.value_to_self_msat - amt_msat_1 - stat01.channel_reserve_msat - total_fee_msat - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1870 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_2 + 1);
1871 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1872 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1873 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1876 // split the rest to test holding cell
1877 let commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 3 + 1, opt_anchors);
1878 let additional_htlc_cost_msat = commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs;
1879 let recv_value_21 = recv_value_2/2 - additional_htlc_cost_msat/2;
1880 let recv_value_22 = recv_value_2 - recv_value_21 - total_fee_msat - additional_htlc_cost_msat;
1882 let stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1883 assert_eq!(stat.value_to_self_msat - (stat.pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat + total_fee_msat + commit_tx_fee_3_htlcs), stat.channel_reserve_msat);
1886 // now see if they go through on both sides
1887 let (route_21, our_payment_hash_21, our_payment_preimage_21, our_payment_secret_21) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_21);
1888 // but this will stuck in the holding cell
1889 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_21, our_payment_hash_21, &Some(our_payment_secret_21)).unwrap();
1890 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1891 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1892 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
1894 // test with outbound holding cell amount > 0
1896 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22+1);
1897 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
1898 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
1899 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1900 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_string(), 2);
1903 let (route_22, our_payment_hash_22, our_payment_preimage_22, our_payment_secret_22) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], recv_value_22);
1904 // this will also stuck in the holding cell
1905 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_22, our_payment_hash_22, &Some(our_payment_secret_22)).unwrap();
1906 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
1907 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
1908 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1910 // flush the pending htlc
1911 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_1.commitment_msg);
1912 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
1913 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1915 // the pending htlc should be promoted to committed
1916 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
1917 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1918 let commitment_update_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1920 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
1921 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
1922 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
1923 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
1925 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
1926 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
1927 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
1929 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1931 let ref payment_event_11 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1932 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_11.msgs[0]);
1933 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event_11.commitment_msg, false);
1935 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1936 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], our_payment_hash_1, our_payment_secret_1, recv_value_1);
1938 // flush the htlcs in the holding cell
1939 assert_eq!(commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs.len(), 2);
1940 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[0]);
1941 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update_2.update_add_htlcs[1]);
1942 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], &commitment_update_2.commitment_signed, false);
1943 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
1945 let ref payment_event_3 = expect_forward!(nodes[1]);
1946 assert_eq!(payment_event_3.msgs.len(), 2);
1947 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[0]);
1948 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event_3.msgs[1]);
1950 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], &payment_event_3.commitment_msg, false);
1951 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
1953 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
1954 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
1956 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1957 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_21, *payment_hash);
1958 assert_eq!(recv_value_21, amt);
1960 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1961 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1962 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_21, *payment_secret);
1964 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1967 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1970 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
1971 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash_22, *payment_hash);
1972 assert_eq!(recv_value_22, amt);
1974 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
1975 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
1976 assert_eq!(our_payment_secret_22, *payment_secret);
1978 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
1981 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
1984 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_1);
1985 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_21);
1986 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), our_payment_preimage_22);
1988 let commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1, opt_anchors);
1989 let recv_value_3 = commit_tx_fee_2_htlcs - commit_tx_fee_0_htlcs - total_fee_msat;
1990 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec![&nodes[1], &nodes[2]][..], recv_value_3);
1992 let commit_tx_fee_1_htlc = 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
1993 let expected_value_to_self = stat01.value_to_self_msat - (recv_value_1 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_21 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_22 + total_fee_msat) - (recv_value_3 + total_fee_msat);
1994 let stat0 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
1995 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, expected_value_to_self);
1996 assert_eq!(stat0.value_to_self_msat, stat0.channel_reserve_msat + commit_tx_fee_1_htlc);
1998 let stat2 = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
1999 assert_eq!(stat2.value_to_self_msat, stat22.value_to_self_msat + recv_value_1 + recv_value_21 + recv_value_22 + recv_value_3);
2003 fn channel_reserve_in_flight_removes() {
2004 // In cases where one side claims an HTLC, it thinks it has additional available funds that it
2005 // can send to its counterparty, but due to update ordering, the other side may not yet have
2006 // considered those HTLCs fully removed.
2007 // This tests that we don't count HTLCs which will not be included in the next remote
2008 // commitment transaction towards the reserve value (as it implies no commitment transaction
2009 // will be generated which violates the remote reserve value).
2010 // This was broken previously, and discovered by the chanmon_fail_consistency fuzz test.
2012 // * route two HTLCs from A to B (note that, at a high level, this test is checking that, when
2013 // you consider the values of both of these HTLCs, B may not send an HTLC back to A, but if
2014 // you only consider the value of the first HTLC, it may not),
2015 // * start routing a third HTLC from A to B,
2016 // * claim the first two HTLCs (though B will generate an update_fulfill for one, and put
2017 // the other claim in its holding cell, as it immediately goes into AwaitingRAA),
2018 // * deliver the first fulfill from B
2019 // * deliver the update_add and an RAA from A, resulting in B freeing the second holding cell
2021 // * deliver A's response CS and RAA.
2022 // This results in A having the second HTLC in AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke, but B having
2023 // removed it fully. B now has the push_msat plus the first two HTLCs in value.
2024 // * Now B happily sends another HTLC, potentially violating its reserve value from A's point
2025 // of view (if A counts the AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke HTLC).
2026 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2027 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2028 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2029 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2030 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2032 let b_chan_values = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2033 // Route the first two HTLCs.
2034 let (payment_preimage_1, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], b_chan_values.channel_reserve_msat - b_chan_values.value_to_self_msat - 10000);
2035 let (payment_preimage_2, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 20000);
2037 // Start routing the third HTLC (this is just used to get everyone in the right state).
2038 let (route, payment_hash_3, payment_preimage_3, payment_secret_3) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
2040 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_3, &Some(payment_secret_3)).unwrap();
2041 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2042 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2043 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2044 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2047 // Now claim both of the first two HTLCs on B's end, putting B in AwaitingRAA and generating an
2048 // initial fulfill/CS.
2049 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
2050 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2051 let bs_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2053 // This claim goes in B's holding cell, allowing us to have a pending B->A RAA which does not
2054 // remove the second HTLC when we send the HTLC back from B to A.
2055 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_2));
2056 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2057 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2059 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2060 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_removes.commitment_signed);
2061 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2062 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2063 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
2065 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.msgs[0]);
2066 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_1.commitment_msg);
2067 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2068 // B is already AwaitingRAA, so cant generate a CS here
2069 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2071 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2072 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2073 let bs_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2075 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2076 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2077 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2079 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2080 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2081 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2083 // The second HTLCis removed, but as A is in AwaitingRAA it can't generate a CS here, so the
2084 // RAA that B generated above doesn't fully resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2085 // However, the RAA A generates here *does* fully resolve the HTLC from B's point of view (as A
2086 // can no longer broadcast a commitment transaction with it and B has the preimage so can go
2087 // on-chain as necessary).
2088 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
2089 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_cs.commitment_signed);
2090 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2091 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2092 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_2);
2094 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2095 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2096 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
2098 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2099 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash_3, payment_secret_3, 100000);
2101 // Note that as this RAA was generated before the delivery of the update_fulfill it shouldn't
2102 // resolve the second HTLC from A's point of view.
2103 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2104 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2105 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2106 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2108 // Now that B doesn't have the second RAA anymore, but A still does, send a payment from B back
2109 // to A to ensure that A doesn't count the almost-removed HTLC in update_add processing.
2110 let (route, payment_hash_4, payment_preimage_4, payment_secret_4) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 10000);
2112 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_4, &Some(payment_secret_4)).unwrap();
2113 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2114 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2115 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2116 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
2119 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.msgs[0]);
2120 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &send_2.commitment_msg);
2121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2122 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2124 // Now just resolve all the outstanding messages/HTLCs for completeness...
2126 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2127 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2128 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2130 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
2131 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2133 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2134 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2135 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
2136 let as_cs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2138 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_cs.commitment_signed);
2139 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2140 let bs_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
2142 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
2143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2145 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
2146 expect_payment_received!(nodes[0], payment_hash_4, payment_secret_4, 10000);
2148 claim_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], payment_preimage_4);
2149 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_3);
2153 fn channel_monitor_network_test() {
2154 // Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
2155 // tests that ChannelMonitor is able to recover from various states.
2156 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(5);
2157 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(5, &chanmon_cfgs);
2158 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(5, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None, None]);
2159 let nodes = create_network(5, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2161 // Create some initial channels
2162 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2163 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2164 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2165 let chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2167 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
2168 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2169 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2170 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2171 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
2172 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], 4*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[4].best_block_info().1);
2174 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2175 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2176 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2177 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2178 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4])[..], 8000000);
2180 // Simple case with no pending HTLCs:
2181 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2182 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2183 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2185 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2186 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2187 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[0]);
2188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2189 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_1, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2191 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2192 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2193 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2194 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2195 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2197 // One pending HTLC is discarded by the force-close:
2198 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[2], &nodes[3])[..], 3000000).0;
2200 // Simple case of one pending HTLC to HTLC-Timeout (note that the HTLC-Timeout is not
2201 // broadcasted until we reach the timelock time).
2202 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2203 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
2204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2206 let mut node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2207 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2208 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2209 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &node_txn[0]);
2210 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2211 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_2, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2213 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2214 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2215 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2216 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2217 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2219 macro_rules! claim_funds {
2220 ($node: expr, $prev_node: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
2222 assert!($node.node.claim_funds($preimage));
2223 check_added_monitors!($node, 1);
2225 let events = $node.node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2226 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2228 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, .. } } => {
2229 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2230 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2231 assert_eq!(*node_id, $prev_node.node.get_our_node_id());
2233 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2239 // nodes[3] gets the preimage, but nodes[2] already disconnected, resulting in a nodes[2]
2240 // HTLC-Timeout and a nodes[3] claim against it (+ its own announces)
2241 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
2242 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2243 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], false);
2244 let node2_commitment_txid;
2246 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2247 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 + 1);
2248 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[2], &chan_3, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2249 node2_commitment_txid = node_txn[0].txid();
2251 // Claim the payment on nodes[3], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2252 claim_funds!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_preimage_1);
2253 mine_transaction(&nodes[3], &node_txn[0]);
2254 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2255 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[3], &node_txn);
2257 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[3], true);
2258 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2259 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
2260 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
2261 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2263 // Drop the ChannelMonitor for the previous channel to avoid it broadcasting transactions and
2264 // confusing us in the following tests.
2265 let chan_3_mon = nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.remove_monitor(&OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 });
2267 // One pending HTLC to time out:
2268 let payment_preimage_2 = route_payment(&nodes[3], &vec!(&nodes[4])[..], 3000000).0;
2269 // CLTV expires at TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 1 (current height) + 1 (added in send_payment for
2272 let (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2) = {
2273 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
2274 let events = nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2275 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2276 let close_chan_update_1 = match events[0] {
2277 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2280 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2283 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2284 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id());
2286 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2288 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
2290 // Clear bumped claiming txn spending node 2 commitment tx. Bumped txn are generated after reaching some height timer.
2292 let mut node_txn = nodes[3].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2293 node_txn.retain(|tx| {
2294 if tx.input[0].previous_output.txid == node2_commitment_txid {
2300 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[3], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2302 // Claim the payment on nodes[4], giving it knowledge of the preimage
2303 claim_funds!(nodes[4], nodes[3], payment_preimage_2);
2305 connect_blocks(&nodes[4], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + 2);
2306 let events = nodes[4].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2307 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
2308 let close_chan_update_2 = match events[0] {
2309 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
2312 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2315 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id } => {
2316 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
2318 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2320 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
2321 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[4], &chan_4, None, HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2323 mine_transaction(&nodes[4], &node_txn[0]);
2324 check_preimage_claim(&nodes[4], &node_txn);
2325 (close_chan_update_1, close_chan_update_2)
2327 nodes[3].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_2).unwrap();
2328 nodes[4].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&close_chan_update_1).unwrap();
2329 assert_eq!(nodes[3].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2330 assert_eq!(nodes[4].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2332 nodes[3].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan_3.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chan_3_mon).unwrap();
2333 check_closed_event!(nodes[3], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2334 check_closed_event!(nodes[4], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2338 fn test_justice_tx() {
2339 // Test justice txn built on revoked HTLC-Success tx, against both sides
2340 let mut alice_config = UserConfig::default();
2341 alice_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2342 alice_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2343 alice_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 5;
2344 let mut bob_config = UserConfig::default();
2345 bob_config.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
2346 bob_config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference = false;
2347 bob_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6 * 24 * 3;
2348 let user_cfgs = [Some(alice_config), Some(bob_config)];
2349 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2350 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2351 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2352 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2353 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
2354 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2355 // Create some new channels:
2356 let chan_5 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2358 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2359 let payment_preimage_3 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2360 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[0]
2361 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_5.2);
2362 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // First commitment tx, then HTLC tx
2363 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2364 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_5.3.txid());
2365 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to 0 are present
2366 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2367 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2368 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2369 // Revoke the old state
2370 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
2373 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2375 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2376 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2377 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2); // We should claim the revoked output and the HTLC output
2379 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2380 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2381 node_txn.truncate(1);
2383 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2384 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2385 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_5, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2387 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2388 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2389 // Verify broadcast of revoked HTLC-timeout
2390 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_5, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::TIMEOUT);
2391 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2392 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2393 // Broadcast revoked HTLC-timeout on node 1
2394 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
2395 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2397 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2399 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2400 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2402 // We test justice_tx build by A on B's revoked HTLC-Success tx
2403 // Create some new channels:
2404 let chan_6 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2406 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2410 // A pending HTLC which will be revoked:
2411 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2412 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from B
2413 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_6.2);
2414 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1); // Only commitment tx
2415 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2416 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_6.3.txid());
2417 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // Only HTLC and output back to A are present
2418 // Revoke the old state
2419 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_4);
2421 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2423 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2424 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); //ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2425 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1); // We claim the received HTLC output
2427 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2428 node_txn.swap_remove(0);
2430 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2431 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan_6, None, HTLCType::NONE);
2433 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2434 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2435 let node_txn = test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan_6, Some(revoked_local_txn[0].clone()), HTLCType::SUCCESS);
2436 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2437 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
2438 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2439 test_revoked_htlc_claim_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], node_txn[1].clone(), revoked_local_txn[0].clone());
2441 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2442 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2443 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2447 fn revoked_output_claim() {
2448 // Simple test to ensure a node will claim a revoked output when a stale remote commitment
2449 // transaction is broadcast by its counterparty
2450 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2451 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2452 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2453 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2454 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2455 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim the revoked output
2456 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2457 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 1);
2458 // Only output is the full channel value back to nodes[0]:
2459 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
2460 // Send a payment through, updating everyone's latest commitment txn
2461 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 5000000);
2463 // Inform nodes[1] that nodes[0] broadcast a stale tx
2464 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2465 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2466 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2467 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2468 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx against revoked to_local output, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
2470 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2471 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
2473 // Inform nodes[0] that a watchtower cheated on its behalf, so it will force-close the chan
2474 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2475 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2476 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2477 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2481 fn claim_htlc_outputs_shared_tx() {
2482 // Node revoked old state, htlcs haven't time out yet, claim them in shared justice tx
2483 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2484 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2485 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2486 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2487 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2489 // Create some new channel:
2490 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2492 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2493 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2494 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx
2495 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2496 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2498 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2499 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2500 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn.len(), 2); // commitment tx + 1 HTLC-Timeout tx
2501 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2502 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2503 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2504 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_local_txn[0].txid());
2505 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // HTLC-Timeout
2506 check_spends!(revoked_local_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2508 //Revoke the old state
2509 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2512 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2513 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2514 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2515 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
2516 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2517 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2518 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2519 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2521 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2522 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelMonitor: penalty tx, ChannelManager: local commitment
2524 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Claim the revoked output + both revoked HTLC outputs
2525 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2527 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2528 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2529 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2530 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[0].input[2].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2531 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2532 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2533 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2534 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2536 // Next nodes[1] broadcasts its current local tx state:
2537 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2538 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid()); //Spending funding tx unique txouput, tx broadcasted by ChannelManager
2540 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2541 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2542 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2546 fn claim_htlc_outputs_single_tx() {
2547 // Node revoked old state, htlcs have timed out, claim each of them in separated justice tx
2548 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
2549 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
2550 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
2551 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
2552 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2554 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2556 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
2557 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
2558 // node[0] is gonna to revoke an old state thus node[1] should be able to claim both offered/received HTLC outputs on top of commitment tx, but this
2559 // time as two different claim transactions as we're gonna to timeout htlc with given a high current height
2560 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
2561 let (_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
2563 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from node[0]
2564 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2566 //Revoke the old state
2567 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_1);
2570 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2571 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2572 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0], 100);
2573 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2574 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2575 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2576 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
2578 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2579 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2582 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2583 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], payment_hash_2, true);
2585 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2586 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 9);
2587 // ChannelMonitor: justice tx revoked offered htlc, justice tx revoked received htlc, justice tx revoked to_local (3)
2588 // ChannelManager: local commmitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2589 // ChannelMonitor: bumped justice tx, after one increase, bumps on HTLC aren't generated not being substantial anymore, bump on revoked to_local isn't generated due to more room for expiration (2)
2590 // ChannelMonitor: local commitment + local HTLC-timeout (2)
2592 // Check the pair local commitment and HTLC-timeout broadcast due to HTLC expiration
2593 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
2594 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2595 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
2596 let witness_script = node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap();
2597 assert_eq!(witness_script.len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); //Spending an offered htlc output
2598 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2600 // Justice transactions are indices 1-2-4
2601 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
2602 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input.len(), 1);
2603 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 1);
2605 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2606 check_spends!(node_txn[3], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2607 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_local_txn[0]);
2609 let mut witness_lens = BTreeSet::new();
2610 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2611 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2612 witness_lens.insert(node_txn[4].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len());
2613 assert_eq!(witness_lens.len(), 3);
2614 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(0).next().unwrap(), 77); // revoked to_local
2615 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(1).next().unwrap(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked offered HTLC
2616 assert_eq!(*witness_lens.iter().skip(2).next().unwrap(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT); // revoked received HTLC
2618 get_announce_close_broadcast_events(&nodes, 0, 1);
2619 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2620 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
2624 fn test_htlc_on_chain_success() {
2625 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and pass
2626 // the preimage backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2627 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2628 // We test with two HTLCs simultaneously as that was not handled correctly in the past.
2629 // A --------------------> B ----------------------> C (preimage)
2630 // First, C should claim the HTLC outputs via HTLC-Success when its own latest local
2631 // commitment transaction was broadcast.
2632 // Then, B should learn the preimage from said transactions, attempting to claim backwards
2634 // B should be able to claim via preimage if A then broadcasts its local tx.
2635 // Finally, when A sees B's latest local commitment transaction it should be able to claim
2636 // the HTLC outputs via the preimage it learned (which, once confirmed should generate a
2637 // PaymentSent event).
2639 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2640 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2641 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2642 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2644 // Create some initial channels
2645 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2646 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2648 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
2649 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
2650 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
2651 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
2652 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2654 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels...
2655 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2656 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2658 let (our_payment_preimage, payment_hash_1, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2659 let (our_payment_preimage_2, payment_hash_2, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2661 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2662 // Broadcast HTLC Success transaction by C on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2663 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2664 assert_eq!(commitment_tx.len(), 1);
2665 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2666 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
2667 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage_2);
2668 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
2669 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
2670 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2671 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2672 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2673 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2675 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2676 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2677 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2678 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2679 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx, 2*htlc-success tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (2 * HTLC-Success tx)
2680 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5);
2681 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2682 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2683 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2684 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2685 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2686 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2687 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2688 assert!(node_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2689 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2690 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0);
2691 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2693 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from HTLC Success tx and pass it backward
2694 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2695 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: node_txn});
2696 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2698 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2699 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
2700 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_2.3.txid());
2701 added_monitors.clear();
2703 let forwarded_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2704 assert_eq!(forwarded_events.len(), 3);
2705 match forwarded_events[0] {
2706 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
2707 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2709 let chan_id = Some(chan_1.2);
2710 match forwarded_events[1] {
2711 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, source_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
2712 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2713 assert_eq!(source_channel_id, chan_id);
2714 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2718 match forwarded_events[2] {
2719 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, source_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
2720 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
2721 assert_eq!(source_channel_id, chan_id);
2722 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
2726 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2728 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
2729 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 2);
2730 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2731 assert_eq!(added_monitors[1].0.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
2732 added_monitors.clear();
2734 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
2736 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
2737 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2740 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
2741 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2745 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2746 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2747 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2748 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
2749 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2750 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2752 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2754 macro_rules! check_tx_local_broadcast {
2755 ($node: expr, $htlc_offered: expr, $commitment_tx: expr, $chan_tx: expr) => { {
2756 let mut node_txn = $node.tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2757 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
2758 // Node[1]: ChannelManager: 3 (commitment tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 (timeout tx)
2759 // Node[0]: ChannelManager: 3 (commtiemtn tx, 2*HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor: 2 HTLC-timeout
2760 check_spends!(node_txn[1], $commitment_tx);
2761 check_spends!(node_txn[2], $commitment_tx);
2762 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].lock_time, 0);
2763 assert_ne!(node_txn[2].lock_time, 0);
2765 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2766 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2767 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2768 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
2770 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2771 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2772 assert!(node_txn[1].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2773 assert!(node_txn[2].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2775 check_spends!(node_txn[0], $chan_tx);
2776 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2780 // nodes[1] now broadcasts its own local state as a fallback, suggesting an alternate
2781 // commitment transaction with a corresponding HTLC-Timeout transactions, as well as a
2782 // timeout-claim of the output that nodes[2] just claimed via success.
2783 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[1], false, commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2785 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from A on B's chain
2786 // Broadcast preimage tx by B on offered output from A commitment tx on A's chain
2787 let node_a_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
2788 check_spends!(node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2789 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2790 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2791 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2792 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2793 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
2794 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 6); // ChannelManager : 3 (commitment tx + HTLC-Sucess * 2), ChannelMonitor : 3 (HTLC-Success, 2* RBF bumps of above HTLC txn)
2795 let commitment_spend =
2796 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == node_a_commitment_tx[0].txid() {
2797 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2798 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2799 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2802 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2803 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2804 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.vout);
2808 check_spends!(commitment_spend, node_a_commitment_tx[0]);
2809 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input.len(), 2);
2810 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2811 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.input[1].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2812 assert_eq!(commitment_spend.lock_time, 0);
2813 assert!(commitment_spend.output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
2814 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan_1.3);
2815 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2816 check_spends!(node_txn[4], node_txn[3]);
2817 check_spends!(node_txn[5], node_txn[3]);
2818 // We don't bother to check that B can claim the HTLC output on its commitment tx here as
2819 // we already checked the same situation with A.
2821 // Verify that A's ChannelManager is able to extract preimage from preimage tx and generate PaymentSent
2822 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
2823 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_a_commitment_tx[0].clone(), commitment_spend.clone()] });
2824 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2825 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2826 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2827 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
2828 assert_eq!(events.len(), 5);
2829 let mut first_claimed = false;
2830 for event in events {
2832 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
2833 if payment_preimage == our_payment_preimage && payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
2834 assert!(!first_claimed);
2835 first_claimed = true;
2837 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage_2);
2838 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
2841 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
2842 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {},
2843 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2846 check_tx_local_broadcast!(nodes[0], true, node_a_commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2849 fn do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(connect_style: ConnectStyle) {
2850 // Test that in case of a unilateral close onchain, we detect the state of output and
2851 // timeout the HTLC backward accordingly. So here we test that ChannelManager is
2852 // broadcasting the right event to other nodes in payment path.
2853 // A ------------------> B ----------------------> C (timeout)
2854 // B's commitment tx C's commitment tx
2856 // B's HTLC timeout tx B's timeout tx
2858 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2859 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
2860 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
2861 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
2862 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2863 *nodes[1].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2864 *nodes[2].connect_style.borrow_mut() = connect_style;
2866 // Create some intial channels
2867 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2868 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
2870 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment thorugh all the channels...
2871 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2872 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
2874 let (_payment_preimage, payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
2876 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from C on B's chain
2877 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
2878 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
2879 nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash);
2880 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
2881 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
2882 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2884 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2885 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2887 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2888 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2889 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2890 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2891 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2892 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2894 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2896 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
2897 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
2898 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
2899 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2900 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 (commitment tx)
2901 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2902 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2903 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2905 // Broadcast timeout transaction by B on received output from C's commitment tx on B's chain
2906 // Verify that B's ChannelManager is able to detect that HTLC is timeout by its own tx and react backward in consequence
2907 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 200 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
2908 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
2909 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2912 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
2913 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Timeout tx), ChannelMonitor : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-timeout), 1 timeout tx
2914 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[3]);
2915 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
2917 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_tx[0]);
2918 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2920 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2921 check_spends!(node_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
2922 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2923 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2925 timeout_tx = node_txn[2].clone();
2929 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &timeout_tx);
2930 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2931 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
2933 // B will rebroadcast a fee-bumped timeout transaction here.
2934 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2935 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
2936 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
2939 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
2941 // B may rebroadcast its own holder commitment transaction here, as a safeguard against
2942 // some incredibly unlikely partial-eclipse-attack scenarios. That said, because the
2943 // original commitment_tx[0] (also spending chan_2.3) has reached ANTI_REORG_DELAY B really
2944 // shouldn't broadcast anything here, and in some connect style scenarios we do not.
2945 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
2946 if node_txn.len() == 1 {
2947 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
2949 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
2953 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
2954 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
2955 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
2956 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
2958 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
2959 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
2960 assert!(!update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
2961 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
2962 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
2963 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
2965 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
2968 // Broadcast legit commitment tx from B on A's chain
2969 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
2970 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_1.3);
2972 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &commitment_tx[0]);
2973 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
2975 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
2976 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
2977 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
2978 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 1 commitment tx, ChannelMonitor : 1 timeout tx
2979 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
2980 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
2981 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), 71);
2982 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]);
2983 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].clone().input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
2987 fn test_htlc_on_chain_timeout() {
2988 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks);
2989 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::TransactionsFirstSkippingBlocks);
2990 do_test_htlc_on_chain_timeout(ConnectStyle::FullBlockViaListen);
2994 fn test_simple_commitment_revoked_fail_backward() {
2995 // Test that in case of a revoked commitment tx, we detect the resolution of output by justice tx
2996 // and fail backward accordingly.
2998 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
2999 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3000 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3001 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3003 // Create some initial channels
3004 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3005 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3007 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3008 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3009 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3010 // Revoke the old state
3011 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3013 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 3000000);
3015 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3016 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3017 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3018 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3019 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3021 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3022 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3023 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3024 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3026 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3027 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3028 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3029 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3030 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3031 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3033 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3034 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3035 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
3037 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3041 fn do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(deliver_bs_raa: bool, use_dust: bool, no_to_remote: bool) {
3042 // Test that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked commitment transaction we fail all
3043 // pending HTLCs on that channel backwards even if the HTLCs aren't present in our latest
3044 // commitment transaction anymore.
3045 // To do this, we have the peer which will broadcast a revoked commitment transaction send
3046 // a number of update_fail/commitment_signed updates without ever sending the RAA in
3047 // response to our commitment_signed. This is somewhat misbehavior-y, though not
3048 // technically disallowed and we should probably handle it reasonably.
3049 // Note that this is pretty exhaustive as an outbound HTLC which we haven't yet
3050 // failed/fulfilled backwards must be in at least one of the latest two remote commitment
3052 // * Once we move it out of our holding cell/add it, we will immediately include it in a
3053 // commitment_signed (implying it will be in the latest remote commitment transaction).
3054 // * Once they remove it, we will send a (the first) commitment_signed without the HTLC,
3055 // and once they revoke the previous commitment transaction (allowing us to send a new
3056 // commitment_signed) we will be free to fail/fulfill the HTLC backwards.
3057 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3058 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3059 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3060 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3062 // Create some initial channels
3063 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3064 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3066 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], if no_to_remote { 10_000 } else { 3_000_000 });
3067 // Get the will-be-revoked local txn from nodes[2]
3068 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
3069 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), if no_to_remote { 1 } else { 2 });
3070 // Revoke the old state
3071 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage);
3073 let value = if use_dust {
3074 // The dust limit applied to HTLC outputs considers the fee of the HTLC transaction as
3075 // well, so HTLCs at exactly the dust limit will not be included in commitment txn.
3076 nodes[2].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_2.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000
3079 let (_, first_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3080 let (_, second_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3081 let (_, third_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], value);
3083 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&first_payment_hash));
3084 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3085 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3086 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3087 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3088 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3089 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3090 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3091 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3092 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3093 let bs_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
3094 // Drop the last RAA from 3 -> 2
3096 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&second_payment_hash));
3097 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3098 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3099 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3100 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3101 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3102 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3103 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3104 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3105 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3106 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3107 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3108 // Note that nodes[1] is in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3109 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3110 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3113 assert!(nodes[2].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&third_payment_hash));
3114 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
3115 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3116 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3117 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3118 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3119 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3120 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
3121 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3122 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3123 // At this point first_payment_hash has dropped out of the latest two commitment
3124 // transactions that nodes[1] is tracking...
3125 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
3126 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3127 // Note that nodes[1] is (still) in AwaitingRAA, so won't send a CS
3128 let as_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
3129 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_raa);
3130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3132 // Add a fourth HTLC, this one will get sequestered away in nodes[1]'s holding cell waiting
3133 // on nodes[2]'s RAA.
3134 let (route, fourth_payment_hash, _, fourth_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 1000000);
3135 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, fourth_payment_hash, &Some(fourth_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3136 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3137 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3138 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
3141 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_raa);
3142 // One monitor for the new revocation preimage, no second on as we won't generate a new
3143 // commitment transaction for nodes[0] until process_pending_htlc_forwards().
3144 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3145 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3146 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3148 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3149 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3151 // Deliberately don't process the pending fail-back so they all fail back at once after
3152 // block connection just like the !deliver_bs_raa case
3155 let mut failed_htlcs = HashSet::new();
3156 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
3158 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
3159 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3160 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
3161 assert!(ANTI_REORG_DELAY > PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS); // We assume payments will also expire
3163 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3164 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 4 });
3166 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => { },
3167 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
3170 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3171 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3173 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3175 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3177 Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3178 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, fourth_payment_hash);
3180 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3183 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3184 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3187 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3190 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3191 assert_eq!(events.len(), if deliver_bs_raa { 4 } else { 3 });
3192 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 1 } else { 0 }] {
3193 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg: msgs::ChannelUpdate { .. } } => {},
3194 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3196 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 2 } else { 1 }] {
3197 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, ref data } }, node_id: _ } => {
3198 assert_eq!(channel_id, chan_2.2);
3199 assert_eq!(data.as_str(), "Channel closed because commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.");
3201 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3205 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
3206 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3207 assert_eq!(update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
3208 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3209 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3210 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3212 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3215 match events[if deliver_bs_raa { 3 } else { 2 }] {
3216 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. } } => {
3217 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3218 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 3);
3219 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
3220 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3221 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
3223 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
3224 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[1]);
3225 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[2]);
3227 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
3229 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3230 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3232 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3233 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3234 // If we delivered B's RAA we got an unknown preimage error, not something
3235 // that we should update our routing table for.
3236 if !deliver_bs_raa {
3237 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3240 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3243 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3244 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3245 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3247 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3250 Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, rejected_by_dest: _, ref network_update, .. } => {
3251 assert!(failed_htlcs.insert(payment_hash.0));
3252 assert!(network_update.is_some());
3254 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3257 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3260 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&first_payment_hash.0));
3261 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&second_payment_hash.0));
3262 assert!(failed_htlcs.contains(&third_payment_hash.0));
3266 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_a() {
3267 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, false);
3268 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, false);
3269 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, false);
3270 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, false);
3274 fn test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive_b() {
3275 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, true, true);
3276 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, true, true);
3277 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(false, false, true);
3278 do_test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive(true, false, true);
3282 fn fail_backward_pending_htlc_upon_channel_failure() {
3283 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3284 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3285 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3286 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3287 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3289 // Alice -> Bob: Route a payment but without Bob sending revoke_and_ack.
3291 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3292 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
3293 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3295 let payment_event = {
3296 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3297 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3298 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3300 assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3301 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3304 // Alice -> Bob: Route another payment but now Alice waits for Bob's earlier revoke_and_ack.
3305 let (route, failed_payment_hash, _, failed_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 50_000);
3307 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, failed_payment_hash, &Some(failed_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3308 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
3310 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3313 // Alice <- Bob: Send a malformed update_add_htlc so Alice fails the channel.
3315 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 50_000);
3317 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3318 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
3319 let current_height = nodes[1].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3320 let (onion_payloads, _amount_msat, cltv_expiry) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 50_000, &Some(payment_secret), current_height, &None).unwrap();
3321 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&secp_ctx, &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
3322 let onion_routing_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &payment_hash);
3324 // Send a 0-msat update_add_htlc to fail the channel.
3325 let update_add_htlc = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3331 onion_routing_packet,
3333 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_add_htlc);
3335 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3336 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
3337 // Check that Alice fails backward the pending HTLC from the second payment.
3339 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
3340 assert_eq!(payment_hash, failed_payment_hash);
3342 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3345 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { ref err }, .. } => {
3346 assert_eq!(err, "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC");
3348 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events[1]),
3350 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3351 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3355 fn test_htlc_ignore_latest_remote_commitment() {
3356 // Test that HTLC transactions spending the latest remote commitment transaction are simply
3357 // ignored if we cannot claim them. This originally tickled an invalid unwrap().
3358 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3359 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3360 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3361 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3362 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3364 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 10000000);
3365 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].channel_id).unwrap();
3366 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + 1);
3367 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
3368 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3369 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3371 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3372 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
3373 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
3375 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
3376 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone()]});
3377 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3378 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3379 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3381 // Duplicate the connect_block call since this may happen due to other listeners
3382 // registering new transactions
3383 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
3384 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()]});
3388 fn test_force_close_fail_back() {
3389 // Check which HTLCs are failed-backwards on channel force-closure
3390 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3391 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3392 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3393 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3394 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3395 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3397 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 1000000);
3399 let mut payment_event = {
3400 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
3401 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3403 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3404 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3405 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3408 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3409 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
3411 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
3413 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3414 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3415 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
3416 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
3418 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3419 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3420 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3421 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3422 let (_, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3424 // nodes[2] now has the latest commitment transaction, but hasn't revoked its previous
3425 // state or updated nodes[1]' state. Now force-close and broadcast that commitment/HTLC
3426 // transaction and ensure nodes[1] doesn't fail-backwards (this was originally a bug!).
3428 nodes[2].node.force_close_channel(&payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id).unwrap();
3429 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
3430 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
3431 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
3433 let mut node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3434 // Note that we don't bother broadcasting the HTLC-Success transaction here as we don't
3435 // have a use for it unless nodes[2] learns the preimage somehow, the funds will go
3436 // back to nodes[1] upon timeout otherwise.
3437 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3441 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3443 // Note no UpdateHTLCs event here from nodes[1] to nodes[0]!
3444 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
3445 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3446 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
3448 // Now check that if we add the preimage to ChannelMonitor it broadcasts our HTLC-Success..
3450 get_monitor!(nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg.channel_id)
3451 .provide_payment_preimage(&our_payment_hash, &our_payment_preimage, &node_cfgs[2].tx_broadcaster, &node_cfgs[2].fee_estimator, &node_cfgs[2].logger);
3453 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &tx);
3454 let node_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
3455 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
3456 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
3457 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, tx.txid());
3458 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3459 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.len(), 5); // Must be an HTLC-Success
3461 check_spends!(node_txn[0], tx);
3465 fn test_dup_events_on_peer_disconnect() {
3466 // Test that if we receive a duplicative update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect we do
3467 // not generate a corresponding duplicative PaymentSent event. This did not use to be the case
3468 // as we used to generate the event immediately upon receipt of the payment preimage in the
3469 // update_fulfill_htlc message.
3471 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3472 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3473 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3474 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3475 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3477 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3479 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
3480 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3481 let claim_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3482 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &claim_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
3483 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
3485 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3486 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3488 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3489 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3493 fn test_peer_disconnected_before_funding_broadcasted() {
3494 // Test that channels are closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` if the peer disconnects
3495 // before the funding transaction has been broadcasted.
3496 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3497 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3498 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3499 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3501 // Open a channel between `nodes[0]` and `nodes[1]`, for which the funding transaction is never
3502 // broadcasted, even though it's created by `nodes[0]`.
3503 let expected_temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
3504 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3505 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
3506 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3507 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
3509 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
3510 assert_eq!(temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3512 assert!(nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).is_ok());
3514 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3515 assert_eq!(funding_created_msg.temporary_channel_id, expected_temporary_channel_id);
3517 // Even though the funding transaction is created by `nodes[0]`, the `FundingCreated` msg is
3518 // never sent to `nodes[1]`, and therefore the tx is never signed by either party nor
3521 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
3524 // Ensure that the channel is closed with `ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer` when the peers are
3525 // disconnected before the funding transaction was broadcasted.
3526 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3527 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3529 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3530 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
3534 fn test_simple_peer_disconnect() {
3535 // Test that we can reconnect when there are no lost messages
3536 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
3537 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
3538 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
3539 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3540 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3541 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3543 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3544 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3545 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3547 let payment_preimage_1 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3548 let payment_hash_2 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3549 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_2);
3550 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_1);
3552 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3553 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3554 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3556 let (payment_preimage_3, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000);
3557 let payment_preimage_4 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).0;
3558 let payment_hash_5 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3559 let payment_hash_6 = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 1000000).1;
3561 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3562 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3564 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_preimage_3);
3565 fail_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]]], true, payment_hash_5);
3567 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 0), (false, false));
3569 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3570 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
3572 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage, payment_hash, .. } => {
3573 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, payment_preimage_3);
3574 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_3);
3576 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3579 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, rejected_by_dest, .. } => {
3580 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_5);
3581 assert!(rejected_by_dest);
3583 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3586 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { .. } => {},
3587 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3591 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_preimage_4);
3592 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), payment_hash_6);
3595 fn do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(messages_delivered: u8, simulate_broken_lnd: bool) {
3596 // Test that we can reconnect when in-flight HTLC updates get dropped
3597 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3598 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3599 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3600 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3602 let mut as_funding_locked = None;
3603 if messages_delivered == 0 {
3604 let (funding_locked, _, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_a(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3605 as_funding_locked = Some(funding_locked);
3606 // nodes[1] doesn't receive the funding_locked message (it'll be re-sent on reconnect)
3607 // Note that we store it so that if we're running with `simulate_broken_lnd` we can deliver
3608 // it before the channel_reestablish message.
3610 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3613 let (route, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3615 let payment_event = {
3616 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
3617 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3619 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3620 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
3621 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
3623 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), payment_event.node_id);
3625 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3626 // Drop the payment_event messages, and let them get re-generated in reconnect_nodes!
3628 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
3629 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3630 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
3631 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3632 let (bs_revoke_and_ack, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3634 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3635 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3636 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3637 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3639 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3640 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
3641 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3642 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3643 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3645 if messages_delivered >= 6 {
3646 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3647 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3648 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3655 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3656 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3657 if messages_delivered < 3 {
3658 if simulate_broken_lnd {
3659 // lnd has a long-standing bug where they send a funding_locked prior to a
3660 // channel_reestablish if you reconnect prior to funding_locked time.
3662 // Here we simulate that behavior, delivering a funding_locked immediately on
3663 // reconnect. Note that we don't bother skipping the now-duplicate funding_locked sent
3664 // in `reconnect_nodes` but we currently don't fail based on that.
3666 // See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
3667 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked.as_ref().unwrap().0);
3669 // Even if the funding_locked messages get exchanged, as long as nothing further was
3670 // received on either side, both sides will need to resend them.
3671 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (true, true), (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3672 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3673 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3674 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3675 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3676 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3677 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (-1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3678 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3679 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3680 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3681 } else if messages_delivered == 6 {
3682 // Everything was delivered...
3683 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3686 let events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3687 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
3689 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => { },
3690 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3693 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3694 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3695 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3697 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
3699 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3700 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
3702 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, amt } => {
3703 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3704 assert_eq!(amt, 1000000);
3706 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
3707 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
3708 assert_eq!(payment_secret_1, *payment_secret);
3710 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
3713 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3716 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
3717 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3719 let events_3 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3720 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3721 let (update_fulfill_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events_3[0] {
3722 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
3723 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3724 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
3725 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
3726 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
3727 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
3728 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
3729 (updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
3731 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3734 if messages_delivered >= 1 {
3735 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlc);
3737 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
3738 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
3740 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
3741 assert_eq!(payment_preimage_1, *payment_preimage);
3742 assert_eq!(payment_hash_1, *payment_hash);
3744 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
3747 if messages_delivered >= 2 {
3748 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
3749 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3750 let (as_revoke_and_ack, as_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3752 if messages_delivered >= 3 {
3753 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
3754 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3755 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3757 if messages_delivered >= 4 {
3758 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed);
3759 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3760 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
3761 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
3763 if messages_delivered >= 5 {
3764 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
3765 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3766 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
3773 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3774 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3775 if messages_delivered < 2 {
3776 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3777 if messages_delivered < 1 {
3778 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
3780 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
3782 } else if messages_delivered == 2 {
3783 // nodes[0] still wants its RAA + commitment_signed
3784 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, true));
3785 } else if messages_delivered == 3 {
3786 // nodes[0] still wants its commitment_signed
3787 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, -1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3788 } else if messages_delivered == 4 {
3789 // nodes[1] still wants its final RAA
3790 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (true, false));
3791 } else if messages_delivered == 5 {
3792 // Everything was delivered...
3793 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3796 if messages_delivered == 1 || messages_delivered == 2 {
3797 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3800 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3801 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3802 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3804 if messages_delivered > 2 {
3805 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
3808 // Channel should still work fine...
3809 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3810 let payment_preimage_2 = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3811 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
3815 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_a() {
3816 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, true);
3817 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(0, false);
3818 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(1, false);
3819 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(2, false);
3823 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_b() {
3824 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(3, false);
3825 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(4, false);
3826 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(5, false);
3827 do_test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect(6, false);
3831 fn test_funding_peer_disconnect() {
3832 // Test that we can lock in our funding tx while disconnected
3833 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
3834 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
3835 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
3836 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
3837 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
3838 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
3839 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
3840 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
3842 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3843 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3845 confirm_transaction(&nodes[0], &tx);
3846 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3847 assert!(events_1.is_empty());
3849 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
3851 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3852 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3854 confirm_transaction(&nodes[1], &tx);
3855 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3856 assert!(events_2.is_empty());
3858 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
3859 let as_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3860 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
3861 let bs_reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3863 // nodes[0] hasn't yet received a funding_locked, so it only sends that on reconnect.
3864 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_reestablish);
3865 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3866 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
3867 let as_funding_locked = match events_3[0] {
3868 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3869 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3872 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_3[0]),
3875 // nodes[1] received nodes[0]'s funding_locked on the first reconnect above, so it should send
3876 // announcement_signatures as well as channel_update.
3877 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_reestablish);
3878 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3879 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 3);
3881 let bs_funding_locked = match events_4[0] {
3882 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3883 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3884 chan_id = msg.channel_id;
3887 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[0]),
3889 let bs_announcement_sigs = match events_4[1] {
3890 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3891 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3894 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[1]),
3897 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3898 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3900 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_4[2]),
3903 // Re-deliver nodes[0]'s funding_locked, which nodes[1] can safely ignore. It currently
3904 // generates a duplicative private channel_update
3905 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
3906 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3907 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
3909 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, msg: _ } => {
3910 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
3912 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_5[0]),
3915 // When we deliver nodes[1]'s funding_locked, however, nodes[0] will generate its
3916 // announcement_signatures.
3917 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_locked);
3918 let events_6 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3919 assert_eq!(events_6.len(), 1);
3920 let as_announcement_sigs = match events_6[0] {
3921 MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
3922 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
3925 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_6[0]),
3928 // When we deliver nodes[1]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[0], nodes[0] should immediately
3929 // broadcast the channel announcement globally, as well as re-send its (now-public)
3931 nodes[0].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_announcement_sigs);
3932 let events_7 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3933 assert_eq!(events_7.len(), 1);
3934 let (chan_announcement, as_update) = match events_7[0] {
3935 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3936 (msg.clone(), update_msg.clone())
3938 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_7[0]),
3941 // Finally, deliver nodes[0]'s announcement_signatures to nodes[1] and make sure it creates the
3942 // same channel_announcement.
3943 nodes[1].node.handle_announcement_signatures(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_announcement_sigs);
3944 let events_8 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
3945 assert_eq!(events_8.len(), 1);
3946 let bs_update = match events_8[0] {
3947 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, ref update_msg } => {
3948 assert_eq!(*msg, chan_announcement);
3951 _ => panic!("Unexpected event {:?}", events_8[0]),
3954 // Provide the channel announcement and public updates to the network graph
3955 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&chan_announcement).unwrap();
3956 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
3957 nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
3959 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
3960 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 1000000).0;
3961 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
3963 // Check that after deserialization and reconnection we can still generate an identical
3964 // channel_announcement from the cached signatures.
3965 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
3967 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
3968 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
3969 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
3971 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
3972 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
3973 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[0].logger, node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
3974 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
3975 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
3976 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
3977 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
3978 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
3980 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
3981 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
3982 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
3983 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
3984 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
3985 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
3987 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[0].fee_estimator,
3988 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
3989 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
3990 logger: nodes[0].logger,
3994 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
3995 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
3997 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
3998 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
3999 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4001 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4003 // The channel announcement should be re-generated exactly by broadcast_node_announcement.
4004 nodes[0].node.broadcast_node_announcement([0, 0, 0], [0; 32], Vec::new());
4005 let msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4006 let mut found_announcement = false;
4007 for event in msgs.iter() {
4009 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { ref msg, .. } => {
4010 if *msg == chan_announcement { found_announcement = true; }
4012 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => {},
4013 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4016 assert!(found_announcement);
4020 fn test_funding_locked_without_best_block_updated() {
4021 // Previously, if we were offline when a funding transaction was locked in, and then we came
4022 // back online, calling best_block_updated once followed by transactions_confirmed, we'd not
4023 // generate a funding_locked until a later best_block_updated. This tests that we generate the
4024 // funding_locked immediately instead.
4025 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4026 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4027 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4028 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4029 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
4031 let funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4033 let conf_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1;
4034 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
4035 let block_txn = [funding_tx];
4036 let conf_txn: Vec<_> = block_txn.iter().enumerate().collect();
4037 let conf_block_header = nodes[0].get_block_header(conf_height);
4038 nodes[0].node.transactions_confirmed(&conf_block_header, &conf_txn[..], conf_height);
4040 // Ensure nodes[0] generates a funding_locked after the transactions_confirmed
4041 let as_funding_locked = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4042 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_locked(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_funding_locked);
4046 fn test_drop_messages_peer_disconnect_dual_htlc() {
4047 // Test that we can handle reconnecting when both sides of a channel have pending
4048 // commitment_updates when we disconnect.
4049 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4050 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4051 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4052 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4053 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4055 let (payment_preimage_1, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4057 // Now try to send a second payment which will fail to send
4058 let (route, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
4059 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
4060 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4062 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4063 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
4065 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4066 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4069 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1));
4070 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4072 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4073 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
4075 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
4076 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4077 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4078 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
4079 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4080 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4081 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
4083 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
4084 let events_3 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4085 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
4087 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
4088 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, payment_preimage_1);
4089 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, payment_hash_1);
4091 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4094 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
4095 let _ = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4096 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4097 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4099 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4102 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4103 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4105 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4106 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4107 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
4108 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4109 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4110 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
4112 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4113 let as_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4114 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4115 let bs_resp = handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4117 assert!(as_resp.0.is_none());
4118 assert!(bs_resp.0.is_none());
4120 assert!(bs_resp.1.is_none());
4121 assert!(bs_resp.2.is_none());
4123 assert!(as_resp.3 == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
4125 assert_eq!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
4126 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4127 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4128 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4129 assert!(as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_fee.is_none());
4130 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().update_add_htlcs[0]);
4131 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_resp.2.as_ref().unwrap().commitment_signed);
4132 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4133 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4134 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4136 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), as_resp.1.as_ref().unwrap());
4137 let bs_second_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4138 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4139 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4140 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4141 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4142 assert!(bs_second_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4143 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4145 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
4146 let as_commitment_signed = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4147 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4148 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
4149 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
4150 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4151 assert!(as_commitment_signed.update_fee.is_none());
4152 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4154 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4155 let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
4156 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4157 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4159 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_commitment_signed.commitment_signed);
4160 let bs_second_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4161 // No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
4162 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4164 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
4165 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4166 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4168 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4170 let events_5 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4171 assert_eq!(events_5.len(), 1);
4173 Event::PaymentReceived { ref payment_hash, ref purpose, .. } => {
4174 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2, *payment_hash);
4176 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret, .. } => {
4177 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
4178 assert_eq!(payment_secret_2, *payment_secret);
4180 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
4183 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4186 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke_and_ack);
4187 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4188 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4190 expect_payment_path_successful!(nodes[0]);
4191 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage_2);
4194 fn do_test_htlc_timeout(send_partial_mpp: bool) {
4195 // If the user fails to claim/fail an HTLC within the HTLC CLTV timeout we fail it for them
4196 // to avoid our counterparty failing the channel.
4197 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4198 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4199 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4200 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4202 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4204 let our_payment_hash = if send_partial_mpp {
4205 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
4206 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
4207 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
4208 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
4209 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
4210 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
4211 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4212 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4213 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
4214 // Now do the relevant commitment_signed/RAA dances along the path, noting that the final
4215 // hop should *not* yet generate any PaymentReceived event(s).
4216 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
4219 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).1
4222 let mut block = Block {
4223 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
4226 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4227 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4228 let block_count = TEST_FINAL_CLTV + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4229 for _ in CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2..block_count {
4230 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
4231 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
4232 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
4235 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4237 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4238 let htlc_timeout_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4239 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
4240 assert_eq!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
4241 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
4242 assert!(htlc_timeout_updates.update_fee.is_none());
4244 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_timeout_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4245 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_timeout_updates.commitment_signed, false);
4246 // 100_000 msat as u64, followed by the height at which we failed back above
4247 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(100_000).to_vec();
4248 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(block_count - 1));
4249 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000 | 15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
4253 fn test_htlc_timeout() {
4254 do_test_htlc_timeout(true);
4255 do_test_htlc_timeout(false);
4258 fn do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(forwarded_htlc: bool) {
4259 // Tests that HTLCs in the holding cell are timed out after the requisite number of blocks.
4260 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
4261 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
4262 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
4263 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4264 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4265 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4267 // Make sure all nodes are at the same starting height
4268 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
4269 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
4270 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], 2*CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
4272 // Route a first payment to get the 1 -> 2 channel in awaiting_raa...
4273 let (route, first_payment_hash, _, first_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[2], 100000);
4275 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, first_payment_hash, &Some(first_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4277 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().len(), 1);
4278 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4280 // Now attempt to route a second payment, which should be placed in the holding cell
4281 let sending_node = if forwarded_htlc { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
4282 let (route, second_payment_hash, _, second_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(sending_node, nodes[2], 100000);
4283 sending_node.node.send_payment(&route, second_payment_hash, &Some(second_payment_secret)).unwrap();
4285 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4286 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().remove(0));
4287 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
4288 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
4289 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4291 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
4293 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
4294 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4295 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
4296 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
4299 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
4300 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4301 let fail_commit = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4302 assert_eq!(fail_commit.len(), 1);
4303 match fail_commit[0] {
4304 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fail_htlcs, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
4305 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
4306 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, true, true);
4308 _ => unreachable!(),
4310 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], second_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
4312 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4313 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
4314 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
4315 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4316 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4317 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
4318 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, second_payment_hash);
4319 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
4324 fn test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts() {
4325 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(false);
4326 do_test_holding_cell_htlc_add_timeouts(true);
4330 fn test_no_txn_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4331 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4332 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4333 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4334 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4335 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4336 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4337 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4338 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4339 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4341 let tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4343 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4345 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4346 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4347 get_monitor!(nodes[0], OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 }.to_channel_id())
4348 .write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4350 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4351 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4352 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4353 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4354 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4355 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4356 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4357 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4358 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4359 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4361 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4362 let config = UserConfig::default();
4363 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4364 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4365 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4366 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4367 default_config: config,
4369 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4370 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4371 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4376 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4377 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4379 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4380 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4381 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4382 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4384 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4385 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4386 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4387 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4389 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4390 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4391 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4392 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4394 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4395 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4396 for node in nodes.iter() {
4397 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4398 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4399 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4402 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4406 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_events() {
4407 // This test makes sure the events field in ChannelManager survives de/serialization
4408 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4409 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4410 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4411 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4412 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4413 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4414 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4415 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4416 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4418 // Start creating a channel, but stop right before broadcasting the funding transaction
4419 let channel_value = 100000;
4420 let push_msat = 10001;
4421 let a_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4422 let b_flags = InitFeatures::known();
4423 let node_a = nodes.remove(0);
4424 let node_b = nodes.remove(0);
4425 node_a.node.create_channel(node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
4426 node_b.node.handle_open_channel(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), a_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4427 node_a.node.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), b_flags, &get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.node.get_our_node_id()));
4429 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&node_a, &node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value, 42);
4431 node_a.node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
4432 check_added_monitors!(node_a, 0);
4434 node_b.node.handle_funding_created(&node_a.node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.node.get_our_node_id()));
4436 let mut added_monitors = node_b.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4437 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4438 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4439 added_monitors.clear();
4442 let bs_funding_signed = get_event_msg!(node_b, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.node.get_our_node_id());
4443 node_a.node.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_funding_signed);
4445 let mut added_monitors = node_a.chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
4446 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
4447 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
4448 added_monitors.clear();
4450 // Normally, this is where node_a would broadcast the funding transaction, but the test de/serializes first instead
4455 // Start the de/seriailization process mid-channel creation to check that the channel manager will hold onto events that are serialized
4456 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4457 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4458 get_monitor!(nodes[0], bs_funding_signed.channel_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4460 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4461 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4462 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4463 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4464 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4465 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4466 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4467 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4468 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4469 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4471 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4472 let config = UserConfig::default();
4473 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4474 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4475 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4476 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4477 default_config: config,
4479 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4480 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4481 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4486 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4487 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4489 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4491 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4492 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4494 // After deserializing, make sure the funding_transaction is still held by the channel manager
4495 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4496 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
4497 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
4498 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
4500 // Make sure the channel is functioning as though the de/serialization never happened
4501 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().len(), 1);
4502 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4504 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4505 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
4506 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4507 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
4509 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
4510 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4511 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
4512 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
4514 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
4515 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
4516 for node in nodes.iter() {
4517 assert!(node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&announcement).unwrap());
4518 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&as_update).unwrap();
4519 node.net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&bs_update).unwrap();
4522 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4526 fn test_simple_manager_serialize_deserialize() {
4527 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4528 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4529 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4530 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4531 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4532 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4533 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4534 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4535 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4536 let chan_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4538 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4539 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
4541 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4543 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4544 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4545 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
4547 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4548 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4549 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4550 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4551 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4552 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4553 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
4554 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
4555 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4556 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
4558 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4559 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) = {
4560 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
4561 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
4562 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4563 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4565 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4566 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4567 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4572 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4573 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4575 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
4576 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4577 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4579 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4581 fail_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_hash);
4582 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4586 fn test_manager_serialize_deserialize_inconsistent_monitor() {
4587 // Test deserializing a ChannelManager with an out-of-date ChannelMonitor
4588 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
4589 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
4590 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
4591 let logger: test_utils::TestLogger;
4592 let fee_estimator: test_utils::TestFeeEstimator;
4593 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
4594 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
4595 let nodes_0_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
4596 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4597 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4598 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
4599 let (_, _, channel_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4601 let mut node_0_stale_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4602 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4603 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4604 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4605 node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4608 let (our_payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], 1000000);
4610 // Serialize the ChannelManager here, but the monitor we keep up-to-date
4611 let nodes_0_serialized = nodes[0].node.encode();
4613 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[3]], 1000000);
4614 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4615 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4616 nodes[3].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
4618 // Now the ChannelMonitor (which is now out-of-sync with ChannelManager for channel w/
4620 let mut node_0_monitors_serialized = Vec::new();
4621 for chan_id_iter in &[chan_id_1, chan_id_2, channel_id] {
4622 let mut writer = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
4623 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan_id_iter).write(&mut writer).unwrap();
4624 node_0_monitors_serialized.push(writer.0);
4627 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
4628 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
4629 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
4630 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
4631 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[0].chain_source), nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(), &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
4632 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
4635 let mut node_0_stale_monitors = Vec::new();
4636 for serialized in node_0_stale_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4637 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4638 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4639 assert!(read.is_empty());
4640 node_0_stale_monitors.push(monitor);
4643 let mut node_0_monitors = Vec::new();
4644 for serialized in node_0_monitors_serialized.iter() {
4645 let mut read = &serialized[..];
4646 let (_, monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut read, keys_manager).unwrap();
4647 assert!(read.is_empty());
4648 node_0_monitors.push(monitor);
4651 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4652 if let Err(msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue) =
4653 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4654 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4656 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4657 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4658 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4660 channel_monitors: node_0_stale_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4662 panic!("If the monitor(s) are stale, this indicates a bug and we should get an Err return");
4665 let mut nodes_0_read = &nodes_0_serialized[..];
4666 let (_, nodes_0_deserialized_tmp) =
4667 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_0_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
4668 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
4670 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
4671 chain_monitor: nodes[0].chain_monitor,
4672 tx_broadcaster: nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
4674 channel_monitors: node_0_monitors.iter_mut().map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect(),
4676 nodes_0_deserialized = nodes_0_deserialized_tmp;
4677 assert!(nodes_0_read.is_empty());
4679 { // Channel close should result in a commitment tx
4680 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4681 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
4682 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
4683 assert_eq!(txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, funding_tx.txid());
4686 for monitor in node_0_monitors.drain(..) {
4687 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor).is_ok());
4688 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4690 nodes[0].node = &nodes_0_deserialized;
4691 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
4693 // nodes[1] and nodes[2] have no lost state with nodes[0]...
4694 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4695 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[2], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
4696 //... and we can even still claim the payment!
4697 claim_payment(&nodes[2], &[&nodes[0], &nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
4699 nodes[3].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4700 let reestablish = get_event_msg!(nodes[3], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
4701 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
4702 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish);
4703 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4704 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
4705 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
4707 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
4708 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
4710 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
4715 macro_rules! check_spendable_outputs {
4716 ($node: expr, $keysinterface: expr) => {
4718 let mut events = $node.chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events();
4719 let mut txn = Vec::new();
4720 let mut all_outputs = Vec::new();
4721 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4722 for event in events.drain(..) {
4724 Event::SpendableOutputs { mut outputs } => {
4725 for outp in outputs.drain(..) {
4726 txn.push($keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&[&outp], Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx).unwrap());
4727 all_outputs.push(outp);
4730 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4733 if all_outputs.len() > 1 {
4734 if let Ok(tx) = $keysinterface.backing.spend_spendable_outputs(&all_outputs.iter().map(|a| a).collect::<Vec<_>>(), Vec::new(), Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_RETURN).into_script(), 253, &secp_ctx) {
4744 fn test_claim_sizeable_push_msat() {
4745 // Incidentally test SpendableOutput event generation due to detection of to_local output on commitment tx
4746 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4747 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4748 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4749 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4751 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4752 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4753 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4754 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4755 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4756 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4757 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4758 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4759 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4761 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4762 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
4764 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4765 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4766 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4767 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4768 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
4772 fn test_claim_on_remote_sizeable_push_msat() {
4773 // Same test as previous, just test on remote commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4774 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4775 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4776 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4777 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4778 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4780 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 98_000_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4781 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel(&chan.2).unwrap();
4782 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4783 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4784 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4786 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4787 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
4788 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan.3);
4789 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 2); // We can't force trimming of to_remote output as channel_reserve_satoshis block us to do so at channel opening
4791 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4792 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4793 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4794 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4795 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4797 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4798 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4799 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4803 fn test_claim_on_remote_revoked_sizeable_push_msat() {
4804 // Same test as previous, just test on remote revoked commitment tx, as per_commitment_point registration changes following you're funder/fundee and
4805 // to_remote output is encumbered by a P2WPKH
4807 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4808 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4809 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4810 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4812 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4813 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4814 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
4815 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4816 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
4818 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4819 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4820 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4821 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4822 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4824 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4825 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4826 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4828 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4829 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
4830 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // to_remote output on revoked remote commitment_tx
4831 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
4832 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[0]); // Both outputs
4836 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_preimage_tx() {
4837 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4838 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4839 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4840 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4842 // Create some initial channels
4843 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4845 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4847 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4848 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4849 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4851 // Settle A's commitment tx on B's chain
4852 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
4853 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4854 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4855 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4856 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4858 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
4859 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4862 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4863 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
4866 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for preimage tx on A's commitment tx
4867 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (local commitment tx + HTLC-Success), ChannelMonitor: preimage tx
4868 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
4869 check_spends!(node_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4870 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4871 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan_1.3);
4872 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
4874 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4875 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4876 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4878 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4879 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4880 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4884 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_timeout_tx() {
4885 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4886 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4887 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4888 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4890 // Create some initial channels
4891 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4893 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
4894 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
4896 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3_000_000);
4898 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4899 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input.len(), 1);
4900 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4902 // Settle A's commitment tx on B' chain
4903 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
4904 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4905 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
4907 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
4908 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
4910 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4912 // Check B's monitor was able to send back output descriptor event for timeout tx on A's commitment tx
4913 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
4914 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // ChannelManager : 1 local commitent tx, ChannelMonitor: timeout tx
4915 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3.clone());
4916 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0].clone());
4917 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4919 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
4920 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4921 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4922 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, true);
4924 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4925 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3); // SpendableOutput: remote_commitment_tx.to_remote, timeout_tx.output
4926 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
4927 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]);
4928 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], node_txn[1], commitment_tx[0]); // All outputs
4932 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_commitment_tx() {
4933 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4934 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4935 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4936 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4938 // Create some initial channels
4939 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4941 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4942 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4943 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4944 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4946 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4948 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4949 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
4950 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
4951 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4953 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
4954 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
4955 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
4956 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4958 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[0]);
4959 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
4961 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
4962 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
4963 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
4967 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_timeout_tx() {
4968 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
4969 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
4970 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
4971 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
4972 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
4974 // Create some initial channels
4975 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
4977 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
4978 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
4979 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
4980 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
4982 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
4984 // A will generate HTLC-Timeout from revoked commitment tx
4985 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
4986 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
4987 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
4988 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4989 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
4991 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
4992 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
4993 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], chan_1.3);
4994 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
4995 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
4996 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
4997 assert_ne!(revoked_htlc_txn[1].lock_time, 0); // HTLC-Timeout
4999 // B will generate justice tx from A's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5000 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5001 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[1].clone()] });
5002 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5003 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5004 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5006 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5007 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: bogus justice tx, justice tx on revoked outputs, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5008 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5009 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[1]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5010 // transactions next...
5011 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3);
5012 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5014 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 2);
5015 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[1]);
5016 if node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid() {
5017 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5019 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[1].txid());
5020 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5023 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5024 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5026 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_txn[1]);
5027 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5029 // Check B's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5030 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5031 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5032 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5033 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_txn[1]);
5037 fn test_static_spendable_outputs_justice_tx_revoked_htlc_success_tx() {
5038 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5039 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
5040 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5041 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5042 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5044 // Create some initial channels
5045 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5047 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
5048 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5049 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5050 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan_1.3.txid());
5052 // The to-be-revoked commitment tx should have one HTLC and one to_remote output
5053 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
5055 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
5057 // B will generate HTLC-Success from revoked commitment tx
5058 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
5059 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5060 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5061 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5062 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5064 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 2);
5065 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5066 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5067 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
5069 // Check that the unspent (of two) outputs on revoked_local_txn[0] is a P2WPKH:
5070 let unspent_local_txn_output = revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout as usize ^ 1;
5071 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].output[unspent_local_txn_output].script_pubkey.len(), 2 + 20); // P2WPKH
5073 // A will generate justice tx from B's revoked commitment/HTLC tx
5074 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5075 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone()] });
5076 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5077 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5078 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5080 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5081 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3); // ChannelMonitor: justice tx on revoked commitment, justice tx on revoked HTLC-success, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5083 // The first transaction generated is bogus - it spends both outputs of revoked_local_txn[0]
5084 // including the one already spent by revoked_htlc_txn[0]. That's OK, we'll spend with valid
5085 // transactions next...
5086 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
5087 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5088 if node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output.txid == revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid() {
5089 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5091 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, revoked_htlc_txn[0].txid());
5092 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[1].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5095 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5096 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_htlc_txn[0]);
5098 check_spends!(node_txn[2], chan_1.3);
5100 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &node_txn[1]);
5101 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5103 // Note that nodes[0]'s tx_broadcaster is still locked, so if we get here the channelmonitor
5104 // didn't try to generate any new transactions.
5106 // Check A's ChannelMonitor was able to generate the right spendable output descriptor
5107 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5108 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5109 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5110 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]); // spending to_remote output from revoked local tx
5111 assert_ne!(spend_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
5112 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], node_txn[1]); // spending justice tx output on the htlc success tx
5113 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0], node_txn[1]); // Both outputs
5117 fn test_onchain_to_onchain_claim() {
5118 // Test that in case of channel closure, we detect the state of output and claim HTLC
5119 // on downstream peer's remote commitment tx.
5120 // First, have C claim an HTLC against its own latest commitment transaction.
5121 // Then, broadcast these to B, which should update the monitor downstream on the A<->B
5123 // Finally, check that B will claim the HTLC output if A's latest commitment transaction
5126 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5127 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5128 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5129 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5131 // Create some initial channels
5132 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5133 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5135 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5136 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5137 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5138 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5139 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5141 // Rebalance the network a bit by relaying one payment through all the channels ...
5142 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5143 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 8000000);
5145 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3000000);
5146 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5147 check_spends!(commitment_tx[0], chan_2.3);
5148 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5149 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5150 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5151 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5152 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5153 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5154 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5156 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_tx[0]);
5157 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5158 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
5159 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5161 let c_txn = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone(); // ChannelManager : 2 (commitment tx, HTLC-Success tx), ChannelMonitor : 1 (HTLC-Success tx)
5162 assert_eq!(c_txn.len(), 3);
5163 assert_eq!(c_txn[0], c_txn[2]);
5164 assert_eq!(commitment_tx[0], c_txn[1]);
5165 check_spends!(c_txn[1], chan_2.3);
5166 check_spends!(c_txn[2], c_txn[1]);
5167 assert_eq!(c_txn[1].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), 71);
5168 assert_eq!(c_txn[2].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5169 assert!(c_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh()); // revokeable output
5170 assert_eq!(c_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5172 // So we broadcast C's commitment tx and HTLC-Success on B's chain, we should successfully be able to extract preimage and update downstream monitor
5173 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
5174 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![c_txn[1].clone(), c_txn[2].clone()]});
5175 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5176 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5177 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5179 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5180 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5183 Event::PaymentForwarded { fee_earned_msat, source_channel_id, claim_from_onchain_tx } => {
5184 assert_eq!(fee_earned_msat, Some(1000));
5185 assert_eq!(source_channel_id, Some(chan_1.2));
5186 assert_eq!(claim_from_onchain_tx, true);
5188 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5191 let mut b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5192 // ChannelMonitor: claim tx
5193 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 1);
5194 check_spends!(b_txn[0], chan_2.3); // B local commitment tx, issued by ChannelManager
5197 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5198 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5199 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
5200 match msg_events[0] {
5201 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5202 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5204 match msg_events[1] {
5205 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. }, node_id: _ } => {},
5206 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5208 match msg_events[2] {
5209 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, .. } } => {
5210 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5211 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5212 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5213 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5214 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), *node_id);
5216 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5218 // Broadcast A's commitment tx on B's chain to see if we are able to claim inbound HTLC with our HTLC-Success tx
5219 let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5220 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_tx[0]);
5221 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5222 let b_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5223 // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success tx, ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success tx
5224 assert_eq!(b_txn.len(), 3);
5225 check_spends!(b_txn[1], chan_1.3);
5226 check_spends!(b_txn[2], b_txn[1]);
5227 check_spends!(b_txn[0], commitment_tx[0]);
5228 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].input[0].witness.clone().last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5229 assert!(b_txn[0].output[0].script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh()); // direct payment
5230 assert_eq!(b_txn[0].lock_time, 0); // Success tx
5232 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5233 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5237 fn test_duplicate_payment_hash_one_failure_one_success() {
5238 // Topology : A --> B --> C --> D
5239 // We route 2 payments with same hash between B and C, one will be timeout, the other successfully claim
5240 // Note that because C will refuse to generate two payment secrets for the same payment hash,
5241 // we forward one of the payments onwards to D.
5242 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5243 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5244 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5245 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5246 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5247 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5248 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs,
5249 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5250 let mut nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5252 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5253 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5254 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5256 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5257 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5258 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5259 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5260 connect_blocks(&nodes[3], node_max_height - nodes[3].best_block_info().1);
5262 let (our_payment_preimage, duplicate_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2])[..], 900000);
5264 let payment_secret = nodes[3].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(duplicate_payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
5265 // We reduce the final CLTV here by a somewhat arbitrary constant to keep it under the one-byte
5266 // script push size limit so that the below script length checks match
5267 // ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT.
5268 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
5269 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
5270 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[3], payment_params, 900000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40);
5271 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 900000, duplicate_payment_hash, payment_secret);
5273 let commitment_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[2], chan_2.2);
5274 assert_eq!(commitment_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5275 check_spends!(commitment_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5277 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &commitment_txn[0]);
5278 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5279 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5280 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5281 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 40 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5283 let htlc_timeout_tx;
5284 { // Extract one of the two HTLC-Timeout transaction
5285 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5286 // ChannelMonitor: timeout tx * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
5287 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4);
5288 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_2.3);
5290 check_spends!(node_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5291 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5292 check_spends!(node_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5293 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
5294 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
5295 check_spends!(node_txn[3], commitment_txn[0]);
5296 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
5298 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5299 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5300 assert_eq!(node_txn[3].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5301 htlc_timeout_tx = node_txn[1].clone();
5304 nodes[2].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
5305 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &commitment_txn[0]);
5306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 2);
5307 check_closed_event!(nodes[2], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5308 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5310 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5311 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5314 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5315 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5317 let htlc_success_txn: Vec<_> = nodes[2].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
5318 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn.len(), 5); // ChannelMonitor: HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs), ChannelManager: local commitment tx + HTLC-Success txn (*2 due to 2-HTLC outputs)
5319 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[0], commitment_txn[0]);
5320 check_spends!(htlc_success_txn[1], commitment_txn[0]);
5321 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5322 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5323 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5324 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5325 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_success_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
5326 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[2], commitment_txn[0]);
5327 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[3], htlc_success_txn[0]);
5328 assert_eq!(htlc_success_txn[4], htlc_success_txn[1]);
5329 assert_ne!(htlc_success_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].previous_output);
5331 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_timeout_tx);
5332 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5333 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5334 let htlc_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5335 assert!(htlc_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5336 assert_eq!(htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5337 let first_htlc_id = htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].htlc_id;
5338 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5339 assert!(htlc_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5340 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5342 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &htlc_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5343 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
5345 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &htlc_updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5347 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], duplicate_payment_hash, false, chan_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, true);
5349 // Solve 2nd HTLC by broadcasting on B's chain HTLC-Success Tx from C
5350 // Note that the fee paid is effectively double as the HTLC value (including the nodes[1] fee
5351 // and nodes[2] fee) is rounded down and then claimed in full.
5352 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &htlc_success_txn[0]);
5353 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], Some(196*2), true);
5354 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5355 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5356 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5357 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
5358 assert_ne!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0].htlc_id, first_htlc_id);
5359 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5360 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5362 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5363 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], &updates.commitment_signed, false);
5365 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5367 Event::PaymentSent { ref payment_preimage, ref payment_hash, .. } => {
5368 assert_eq!(*payment_preimage, our_payment_preimage);
5369 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, duplicate_payment_hash);
5371 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5376 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_success_tx() {
5377 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5378 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5379 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5380 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5382 // Create some initial channels
5383 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5385 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000).0;
5386 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_1.2);
5387 assert_eq!(local_txn.len(), 1);
5388 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5389 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5391 // Give B knowledge of preimage to be able to generate a local HTLC-Success Tx
5392 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
5393 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5394 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &local_txn[0]);
5395 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5396 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5397 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5399 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => {},
5400 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5403 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
5404 _ => panic!("Unexepected event"),
5407 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5408 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 3);
5409 assert_eq!(node_txn[0], node_txn[2]);
5410 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5411 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5412 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5413 check_spends!(node_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5417 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &node_tx);
5418 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5420 // Verify that B is able to spend its own HTLC-Success tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5421 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5422 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5423 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5424 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], node_tx);
5425 assert_eq!(spend_txn[0].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5428 fn do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(deliver_last_raa: bool, announce_latest: bool) {
5429 // Test that we fail backwards the full set of HTLCs we need to when remote broadcasts an
5430 // unrevoked commitment transaction.
5431 // This includes HTLCs which were below the dust threshold as well as HTLCs which were awaiting
5432 // a remote RAA before they could be failed backwards (and combinations thereof).
5433 // We also test duplicate-hash HTLCs by adding two nodes on each side of the target nodes which
5434 // use the same payment hashes.
5435 // Thus, we use a six-node network:
5440 // And test where C fails back to A/B when D announces its latest commitment transaction
5441 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(6);
5442 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(6, &chanmon_cfgs);
5443 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
5444 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
5445 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
5446 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
5447 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(6, &node_cfgs,
5448 &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
5449 let nodes = create_network(6, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5451 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5452 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5453 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5454 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 4, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5455 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 3, 5, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5457 // Rebalance and check output sanity...
5458 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 500000);
5459 send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]], 500000);
5460 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 2);
5462 let ds_dust_limit = nodes[3].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5464 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5466 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5467 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5469 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_1, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_1, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5471 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_2, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_2, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5473 let (_, payment_hash_3, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5475 let (_, payment_hash_4, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5476 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5478 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route.clone(), &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_3, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_3, None, 7200).unwrap());
5480 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_4, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_4, None, 7200).unwrap());
5483 let (_, payment_hash_5, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], 1000000);
5485 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], ds_dust_limit*1000);
5486 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], ds_dust_limit*1000, payment_hash_5, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_5, None, 7200).unwrap()); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5489 let (_, payment_hash_6, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[4]], ds_dust_limit*1000); // not added < dust limit + HTLC tx fee
5491 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[5], 1000000);
5492 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[1], route, &[&[&nodes[2], &nodes[3], &nodes[5]]], 1000000, payment_hash_6, nodes[5].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash_6, None, 7200).unwrap());
5494 // Double-check that six of the new HTLC were added
5495 // We now have six HTLCs pending over the dust limit and six HTLCs under the dust limit (ie,
5496 // with to_local and to_remote outputs, 8 outputs and 6 HTLCs not included).
5497 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2).len(), 1);
5498 assert_eq!(get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2)[0].output.len(), 8);
5500 // Now fail back three of the over-dust-limit and three of the under-dust-limit payments in one go.
5501 // Fail 0th below-dust, 4th above-dust, 8th above-dust, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5502 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_1));
5503 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_3));
5504 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_5));
5505 assert!(nodes[4].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_6));
5506 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 0);
5507 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[4]);
5508 check_added_monitors!(nodes[4], 1);
5510 let four_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[4], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5511 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5512 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5513 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5514 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[4].node.get_our_node_id(), &four_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5515 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[4], four_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5517 // Fail 3rd below-dust and 7th above-dust HTLCs
5518 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
5519 assert!(nodes[5].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_4));
5520 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 0);
5521 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[5]);
5522 check_added_monitors!(nodes[5], 1);
5524 let two_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[5], nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id());
5525 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5526 nodes[3].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[5].node.get_our_node_id(), &two_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5527 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[5], two_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5529 let ds_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5531 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[3]);
5532 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
5533 let six_removes = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
5534 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5535 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5536 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5537 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5538 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5539 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &six_removes.update_fail_htlcs[5]);
5540 if deliver_last_raa {
5541 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false);
5543 let _cs_last_raa = commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], six_removes.commitment_signed, false, true, false, true);
5546 // D's latest commitment transaction now contains 1st + 2nd + 9th HTLCs (implicitly, they're
5547 // below the dust limit) and the 5th + 6th + 11th HTLCs. It has failed back the 0th, 3rd, 4th,
5548 // 7th, 8th, and 10th, but as we haven't yet delivered the final RAA to C, the fails haven't
5549 // propagated back to A/B yet (and D has two unrevoked commitment transactions).
5551 // We now broadcast the latest commitment transaction, which *should* result in failures for
5552 // the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th HTLCs, ie all the below-dust HTLCs and
5553 // the non-broadcast above-dust HTLCs.
5555 // Alternatively, we may broadcast the previous commitment transaction, which should only
5556 // result in failures for the below-dust HTLCs, ie the 0th, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 9th, and 10th HTLCs.
5557 let ds_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[3], chan.2);
5559 if announce_latest {
5560 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_last_commitment_tx[0]);
5562 mine_transaction(&nodes[2], &ds_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
5564 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5565 let close_event = if deliver_last_raa {
5566 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5569 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5573 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
5574 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5577 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5578 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[2], true);
5579 if deliver_last_raa {
5580 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[2], events[0..1], true);
5582 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
5584 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 3);
5586 let cs_msgs = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5587 assert_eq!(cs_msgs.len(), 2);
5588 let mut a_done = false;
5589 for msg in cs_msgs {
5591 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
5592 // Both under-dust HTLCs and the one above-dust HTLC that we had already failed
5593 // should be failed-backwards here.
5594 let target = if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5595 // If announce_latest, expect 0th, 1st, 4th, 8th, 10th HTLCs, else only 0th, 1st, 10th below-dust HTLCs
5596 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5597 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 6 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 3 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 } else { false });
5599 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5604 // If announce_latest, expect 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th HTLCs, else only 2nd, 3rd, 9th below-dust HTLCs
5605 for htlc in &updates.update_fail_htlcs {
5606 assert!(htlc.htlc_id == 1 || htlc.htlc_id == 2 || htlc.htlc_id == 5 || if announce_latest { htlc.htlc_id == 4 } else { false });
5608 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5609 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5612 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5613 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
5614 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[2]);
5615 if announce_latest {
5616 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[3]);
5617 if *node_id == nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id() {
5618 target.node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[4]);
5621 commitment_signed_dance!(target, nodes[2], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
5623 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5627 let as_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5628 assert_eq!(as_events.len(), if announce_latest { 5 } else { 3 });
5629 let mut as_failds = HashSet::new();
5630 let mut as_updates = 0;
5631 for event in as_events.iter() {
5632 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5633 assert!(as_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5634 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_2 {
5635 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5637 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5639 if network_update.is_some() {
5642 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5644 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5645 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5646 if announce_latest {
5647 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_3));
5648 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5650 assert!(as_failds.contains(&payment_hash_6));
5652 let bs_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5653 assert_eq!(bs_events.len(), if announce_latest { 4 } else { 3 });
5654 let mut bs_failds = HashSet::new();
5655 let mut bs_updates = 0;
5656 for event in bs_events.iter() {
5657 if let &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, .. } = event {
5658 assert!(bs_failds.insert(*payment_hash));
5659 if *payment_hash != payment_hash_1 && *payment_hash != payment_hash_5 {
5660 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, deliver_last_raa);
5662 assert!(!rejected_by_dest);
5664 if network_update.is_some() {
5667 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5669 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_1));
5670 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_2));
5671 if announce_latest {
5672 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_4));
5674 assert!(bs_failds.contains(&payment_hash_5));
5676 // For each HTLC which was not failed-back by normal process (ie deliver_last_raa), we should
5677 // get a NetworkUpdate. A should have gotten 4 HTLCs which were failed-back due to
5678 // unknown-preimage-etc, B should have gotten 2. Thus, in the
5679 // announce_latest && deliver_last_raa case, we should have 5-4=1 and 4-2=2 NetworkUpdates.
5680 assert_eq!(as_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 1 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 5 });
5681 assert_eq!(bs_updates, if deliver_last_raa { 2 } else if !announce_latest { 3 } else { 4 });
5685 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_a() {
5686 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, true);
5690 fn test_fail_backwards_latest_remote_announce_b() {
5691 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(true, true);
5695 fn test_fail_backwards_previous_remote_announce() {
5696 do_test_fail_backwards_unrevoked_remote_announce(false, false);
5697 // Note that true, true doesn't make sense as it implies we announce a revoked state, which is
5698 // tested for in test_commitment_revoked_fail_backward_exhaustive()
5702 fn test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx() {
5703 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5704 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5705 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5706 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5708 // Create some initial channels
5709 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5711 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5712 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5713 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
5714 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5716 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5717 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn[0]);
5718 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5719 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5720 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5721 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5723 let htlc_timeout = {
5724 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5725 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2);
5726 check_spends!(node_txn[0], chan_1.3);
5727 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5728 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5729 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
5733 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5734 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5735 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5737 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5738 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5739 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5740 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn[0]);
5741 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5742 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5743 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5744 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5745 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn[0], htlc_timeout);
5746 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5747 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5751 fn test_key_derivation_params() {
5752 // This test is a copy of test_dynamic_spendable_outputs_local_htlc_timeout_tx, with
5753 // a key manager rotation to test that key_derivation_params returned in DynamicOutputP2WSH
5754 // let us re-derive the channel key set to then derive a delayed_payment_key.
5756 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5758 // We manually create the node configuration to backup the seed.
5759 let seed = [42; 32];
5760 let keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5761 let chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &chanmon_cfgs[0].persister, &keys_manager);
5762 let node = NodeCfg { chain_source: &chanmon_cfgs[0].chain_source, logger: &chanmon_cfgs[0].logger, tx_broadcaster: &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, fee_estimator: &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, chain_monitor, keys_manager: &keys_manager, network_graph: &chanmon_cfgs[0].network_graph, node_seed: seed, features: InitFeatures::known() };
5763 let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5764 node_cfgs.remove(0);
5765 node_cfgs.insert(0, node);
5767 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5768 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5770 // Create some initial channels
5771 // Create a dummy channel to advance index by one and thus test re-derivation correctness
5773 let chan_0 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5774 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5775 assert_ne!(chan_0.3.output[0].script_pubkey, chan_1.3.output[0].script_pubkey);
5777 // Ensure all nodes are at the same height
5778 let node_max_height = nodes.iter().map(|node| node.blocks.lock().unwrap().len()).max().unwrap() as u32;
5779 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], node_max_height - nodes[0].best_block_info().1);
5780 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], node_max_height - nodes[1].best_block_info().1);
5781 connect_blocks(&nodes[2], node_max_height - nodes[2].best_block_info().1);
5783 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9000000);
5784 let local_txn_0 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_0.2);
5785 let local_txn_1 = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
5786 assert_eq!(local_txn_1[0].input.len(), 1);
5787 check_spends!(local_txn_1[0], chan_1.3);
5789 // We check funding pubkey are unique
5790 let (from_0_funding_key_0, from_0_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_0[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5791 let (from_1_funding_key_0, from_1_funding_key_1) = (PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][2..35]), PublicKey::from_slice(&local_txn_1[0].input[0].witness.to_vec()[3][36..69]));
5792 if from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_0
5793 || from_0_funding_key_0 == from_1_funding_key_1
5794 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_0
5795 || from_0_funding_key_1 == from_1_funding_key_1 {
5796 panic!("Funding pubkeys aren't unique");
5799 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
5800 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &local_txn_1[0]);
5801 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
5802 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5803 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5804 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5806 let htlc_timeout = {
5807 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
5808 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5809 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
5810 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn_1[0]);
5814 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &htlc_timeout);
5815 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 - 1);
5816 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5818 // Verify that A is able to spend its own HTLC-Timeout tx thanks to spendable output event given back by its ChannelMonitor
5819 let new_keys_manager = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, Network::Testnet);
5820 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], new_keys_manager);
5821 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 3);
5822 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], local_txn_1[0]);
5823 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
5824 check_spends!(spend_txn[1], htlc_timeout);
5825 assert_eq!(spend_txn[1].input[0].sequence, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5826 assert_eq!(spend_txn[2].input.len(), 2);
5827 check_spends!(spend_txn[2], local_txn_1[0], htlc_timeout);
5828 assert!(spend_txn[2].input[0].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32 ||
5829 spend_txn[2].input[1].sequence == BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT as u32);
5833 fn test_static_output_closing_tx() {
5834 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5835 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5836 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5837 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5839 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5841 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
5842 let closing_tx = close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true).2;
5844 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &closing_tx);
5845 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5846 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5848 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[0], node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
5849 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5850 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5852 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &closing_tx);
5853 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5854 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
5856 let spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
5857 assert_eq!(spend_txn.len(), 1);
5858 check_spends!(spend_txn[0], closing_tx);
5861 fn do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5862 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5863 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5864 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5865 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5866 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5868 let (payment_preimage, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5870 // Claim the payment, but don't deliver A's commitment_signed, resulting in the HTLC only being
5871 // present in B's local commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5872 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5873 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5875 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5876 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5877 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
5879 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5880 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5881 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5882 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5883 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5885 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5886 let mut block = Block {
5887 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5890 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5891 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
5892 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5894 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[1], &chan, None, if use_dust { HTLCType::NONE } else { HTLCType::SUCCESS });
5895 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
5896 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5897 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5900 fn do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool) {
5901 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5902 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5903 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5904 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5905 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5907 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 });
5908 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5909 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5911 let _as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5913 // As far as A is concerned, the HTLC is now present only in the latest remote commitment
5914 // transaction, however it is not in A's latest local commitment, so we can just broadcast that
5915 // to "time out" the HTLC.
5917 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5918 let mut header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
5920 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + starting_block.1 + 2 {
5921 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: Vec::new()});
5922 header.prev_blockhash = header.block_hash();
5924 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5925 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5926 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5927 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5930 fn do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(use_dust: bool, check_revoke_no_close: bool) {
5931 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5932 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5933 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5934 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5935 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5937 // Fail the payment, but don't deliver A's final RAA, resulting in the HTLC only being present
5938 // in B's previous (unrevoked) commitment transaction, but none of A's commitment transactions.
5939 // Also optionally test that we *don't* fail the channel in case the commitment transaction was
5940 // actually revoked.
5941 let htlc_value = if use_dust { 50000 } else { 3000000 };
5942 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], htlc_value);
5943 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash));
5944 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5945 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5947 let bs_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5948 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5949 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_updates.commitment_signed);
5950 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5951 let as_updates = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5952 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.0);
5953 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5954 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_updates.1);
5955 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5956 let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5958 if check_revoke_no_close {
5959 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack);
5960 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5963 let starting_block = nodes[1].best_block_info();
5964 let mut block = Block {
5965 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: starting_block.0, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
5968 for _ in starting_block.1 + 1..TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 {
5969 connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
5970 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.block_hash();
5972 if !check_revoke_no_close {
5973 test_txn_broadcast(&nodes[0], &chan, None, HTLCType::NONE);
5974 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
5975 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5976 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5978 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5979 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
5980 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[0] {
5981 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5982 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5983 if let Event::PaymentFailed { ref payment_hash, .. } = events[1] {
5984 assert_eq!(*payment_hash, our_payment_hash);
5985 } else { panic!("Unexpected event"); }
5989 // Test that we close channels on-chain when broadcastable HTLCs reach their timeout window.
5990 // There are only a few cases to test here:
5991 // * its not really normative behavior, but we test that below-dust HTLCs "included" in
5992 // broadcastable commitment transactions result in channel closure,
5993 // * its included in an unrevoked-but-previous remote commitment transaction,
5994 // * its included in the latest remote or local commitment transactions.
5995 // We test each of the three possible commitment transactions individually and use both dust and
5997 // Note that we don't bother testing both outbound and inbound HTLC failures for each case, and we
5998 // assume they are handled the same across all six cases, as both outbound and inbound failures are
5999 // tested for at least one of the cases in other tests.
6001 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_a() {
6002 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(true);
6003 do_htlc_claim_local_commitment_only(false);
6005 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(true);
6006 do_htlc_claim_current_remote_commitment_only(false);
6010 fn htlc_claim_single_commitment_only_b() {
6011 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, false);
6012 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, false);
6013 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(true, true);
6014 do_htlc_claim_previous_remote_commitment_only(false, true);
6019 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part1() { //This test needs to be on its own as we are catching a panic
6020 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6021 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6022 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6023 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6024 // Force duplicate randomness for every get-random call
6025 for node in nodes.iter() {
6026 *node.keys_manager.override_random_bytes.lock().unwrap() = Some([0; 32]);
6029 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure temporary_channel_id is unique from any other channel ID with the same peer.
6030 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6031 let push_msat=10001;
6032 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6033 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6034 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6035 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6037 // Create a second channel with the same random values. This used to panic due to a colliding
6038 // channel_id, but now panics due to a colliding outbound SCID alias.
6039 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6043 fn bolt2_open_channel_sending_node_checks_part2() {
6044 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6045 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6046 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6047 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6049 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_satoshis to less than 2^24 satoshis
6050 let channel_value_satoshis=2^24;
6051 let push_msat=10001;
6052 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6054 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set push_msat to equal or less than 1000 * funding_satoshis
6055 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6056 // Test when push_msat is equal to 1000 * funding_satoshis.
6057 let push_msat=1000*channel_value_satoshis+1;
6058 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_err());
6060 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set set channel_reserve_satoshis greater than or equal to dust_limit_satoshis
6061 let channel_value_satoshis=10000;
6062 let push_msat=10001;
6063 assert!(nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).is_ok()); //Create a valid channel
6064 let node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6065 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis>=node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis);
6067 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set undefined bits in channel_flags to 0
6068 // Only the least-significant bit of channel_flags is currently defined resulting in channel_flags only having one of two possible states 0 or 1
6069 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_flags<=1);
6071 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node should set to_self_delay sufficient to ensure the sender can irreversibly spend a commitment transaction output, in case of misbehaviour by the receiver.
6072 assert!(BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT>0);
6073 assert!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.to_self_delay==BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6075 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must ensure the chain_hash value identifies the chain it wishes to open the channel within.
6076 let chain_hash=genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.block_hash();
6077 assert_eq!(node0_to_1_send_open_channel.chain_hash,chain_hash);
6079 // BOLT #2 spec: Sending node must set funding_pubkey, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint, payment_basepoint, and delayed_payment_basepoint to valid DER-encoded, compressed, secp256k1 pubkeys.
6080 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.funding_pubkey.serialize()).is_ok());
6081 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.revocation_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6082 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.htlc_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6083 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.payment_point.serialize()).is_ok());
6084 assert!(PublicKey::from_slice(&node0_to_1_send_open_channel.delayed_payment_basepoint.serialize()).is_ok());
6088 fn bolt2_open_channel_sane_dust_limit() {
6089 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6090 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6091 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6092 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6094 let channel_value_satoshis=1000000;
6095 let push_msat=10001;
6096 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, 42, None).unwrap();
6097 let mut node0_to_1_send_open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6098 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 547;
6099 node0_to_1_send_open_channel.channel_reserve_satoshis = 100001;
6101 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &node0_to_1_send_open_channel);
6102 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6103 let err_msg = match events[0] {
6104 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id: _ } => {
6107 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6109 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "dust_limit_satoshis (547) is greater than the implementation limit (546)");
6112 // Test that if we fail to send an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell, and the HTLC
6113 // originated from our node, its failure is surfaced to the user. We trigger this failure to
6114 // free the HTLC by increasing our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC
6115 // is no longer affordable once it's freed.
6117 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free() {
6118 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6119 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6120 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6121 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6122 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6124 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6125 // pending_update_fee.
6127 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6128 *feerate_lock += 20;
6130 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6131 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6133 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6134 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6135 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6136 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6137 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6139 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6142 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6144 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6145 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6146 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6147 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6149 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6150 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6151 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6153 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6154 let our_payment_id = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6155 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6156 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6158 // Flush the pending fee update.
6159 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6160 let (as_revoke_and_ack, _) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6161 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6162 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack);
6163 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6165 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell
6166 // HTLC, but now that the fee has been raised the payment will now fail, causing
6167 // us to surface its failure to the user.
6168 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6169 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6170 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 1 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6171 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6172 hex::encode(our_payment_hash.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6173 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6175 // Check that the payment failed to be sent out.
6176 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6177 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6179 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6180 assert_eq!(our_payment_id, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6181 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash.clone(), *payment_hash);
6182 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6183 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6184 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6185 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6186 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6187 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6189 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6193 // Test that if multiple HTLCs are released from the holding cell and one is
6194 // valid but the other is no longer valid upon release, the valid HTLC can be
6195 // successfully completed while the other one fails as expected.
6197 fn test_free_and_fail_holding_cell_htlcs() {
6198 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6199 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6200 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6201 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6202 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6204 // First nodes[0] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6205 // pending_update_fee.
6207 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6208 *feerate_lock += 200;
6210 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6211 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6213 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6214 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6215 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6216 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6217 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6219 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6222 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6224 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6225 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6226 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6227 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6229 // 2* and +1 HTLCs on the commit tx fee calculation for the fee spike reserve.
6231 let amt_2 = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 2 + 1, opt_anchors) - amt_1;
6232 let (route_1, payment_hash_1, payment_preimage_1, payment_secret_1) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_1);
6233 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, _, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], amt_2);
6235 // Send 2 payments which pass reserve checks but get stuck in the holding cell.
6236 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_1, payment_hash_1, &Some(payment_secret_1)).unwrap();
6237 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6238 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1);
6239 let payment_id_2 = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
6240 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6241 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, amt_1 + amt_2);
6243 // Flush the pending fee update.
6244 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6245 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6246 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6247 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_and_ack);
6248 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6249 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
6251 // Upon receipt of the RAA, there will be an attempt to resend the holding cell HTLCs,
6252 // but now that the fee has been raised the second payment will now fail, causing us
6253 // to surface its failure to the user. The first payment should succeed.
6254 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6255 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, 0);
6256 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Freeing holding cell with 2 HTLC updates in channel {}", hex::encode(chan.2)), 1);
6257 let failure_log = format!("Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({}) in channel {}",
6258 hex::encode(payment_hash_2.0), chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat, hex::encode(chan.2));
6259 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), failure_log.to_string(), 1);
6261 // Check that the second payment failed to be sent out.
6262 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6263 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6265 &Event::PaymentPathFailed { ref payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref rejected_by_dest, ref network_update, ref all_paths_failed, ref short_channel_id, ref error_code, ref error_data, .. } => {
6266 assert_eq!(payment_id_2, *payment_id.as_ref().unwrap());
6267 assert_eq!(payment_hash_2.clone(), *payment_hash);
6268 assert_eq!(*rejected_by_dest, false);
6269 assert_eq!(*all_paths_failed, true);
6270 assert_eq!(*network_update, None);
6271 assert_eq!(*short_channel_id, None);
6272 assert_eq!(*error_code, None);
6273 assert_eq!(*error_data, None);
6275 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6278 // Complete the first payment and the RAA from the fee update.
6279 let (payment_event, send_raa_event) = {
6280 let mut msgs = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6281 assert_eq!(msgs.len(), 2);
6282 (SendEvent::from_event(msgs.remove(0)), msgs.remove(0))
6284 let raa = match send_raa_event {
6285 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { msg, .. } => msg,
6286 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6288 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6290 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6291 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6292 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6293 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6295 Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6296 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6298 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6299 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6300 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6302 Event::PaymentReceived { .. } => {},
6303 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6305 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage_1);
6306 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6307 let update_msgs = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6308 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msgs.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6309 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], update_msgs.commitment_signed, false, true);
6310 expect_payment_sent!(nodes[0], payment_preimage_1);
6313 // Test that if we fail to forward an HTLC that is being freed from the holding cell that the
6314 // HTLC is failed backwards. We trigger this failure to forward the freed HTLC by increasing
6315 // our fee while the HTLC is in the holding cell such that the HTLC is no longer affordable
6318 fn test_fail_holding_cell_htlc_upon_free_multihop() {
6319 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6320 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6321 // When this test was written, the default base fee floated based on the HTLC count.
6322 // It is now fixed, so we simply set the fee to the expected value here.
6323 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
6324 config.channel_options.forwarding_fee_base_msat = 196;
6325 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone()), Some(config.clone())]);
6326 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6327 let chan_0_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6328 let chan_1_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6330 // First nodes[1] generates an update_fee, setting the channel's
6331 // pending_update_fee.
6333 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[1].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
6334 *feerate_lock += 20;
6336 nodes[1].node.timer_tick_occurred();
6337 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6339 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6340 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6341 let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
6342 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
6343 (update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
6345 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6348 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
6350 let mut chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6351 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6352 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6353 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan_0_1.2);
6355 // Send a payment which passes reserve checks but gets stuck in the holding cell.
6357 let total_routing_fee_msat = (nodes.len() - 2) as u64 * feemsat;
6358 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - 2*commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors) - total_routing_fee_msat;
6359 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], max_can_send);
6360 let payment_event = {
6361 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6362 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6364 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6365 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6367 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6369 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6370 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6371 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6372 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6374 chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan_1_2.2);
6375 assert_eq!(chan_stat.holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat, max_can_send);
6377 // Flush the pending fee update.
6378 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
6379 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6380 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6381 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6382 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6383 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6385 // A final RAA message is generated to finalize the fee update.
6386 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6387 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6389 let raa_msg = match &events[0] {
6390 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => {
6393 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6396 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa_msg);
6397 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
6398 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6400 // nodes[1]'s ChannelManager will now signal that we have HTLC forwards to process.
6401 let process_htlc_forwards_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6402 assert_eq!(process_htlc_forwards_event.len(), 1);
6403 match &process_htlc_forwards_event[0] {
6404 &Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } => {},
6405 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6408 // In response, we call ChannelManager's process_pending_htlc_forwards
6409 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
6410 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6412 // This causes the HTLC to be failed backwards.
6413 let fail_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6414 assert_eq!(fail_event.len(), 1);
6415 let (fail_msg, commitment_signed) = match &fail_event[0] {
6416 &MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref updates, .. } => {
6417 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 0);
6418 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
6419 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
6420 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6421 (updates.update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), updates.commitment_signed.clone())
6423 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6426 // Pass the failure messages back to nodes[0].
6427 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_msg);
6428 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6430 // Complete the HTLC failure+removal process.
6431 let (raa, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6432 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6433 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6434 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
6435 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6436 let final_raa_event = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6437 assert_eq!(final_raa_event.len(), 1);
6438 let raa = match &final_raa_event[0] {
6439 &MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref msg, .. } => msg.clone(),
6440 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6442 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6443 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, false, chan_1_2.0.contents.short_channel_id, false);
6444 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6447 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Sender when constructing and sending an update_add_htlc message.
6448 // BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat it cannot pay for in the remote commitment transaction at the current feerate_per_kw (see "Updating Fees") while maintaining its channel reserve.
6449 //TODO: I don't believe this is explicitly enforced when sending an HTLC but as the Fee aspect of the BOLT specs is in flux leaving this as a TODO.
6452 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_value_below_minimum_msat() {
6453 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST NOT offer amount_msat below the receiving node's htlc_minimum_msat (same validation check catches both of these)
6454 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6455 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6456 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6457 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6458 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6460 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6461 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 100;
6463 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6464 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6465 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6466 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value".to_string(), 1);
6470 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_zero_value_msat() {
6471 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6472 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6473 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6474 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6475 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6476 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6478 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6479 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = 0;
6480 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6481 assert_eq!(err, "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC"));
6483 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6484 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6488 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_zero_value_msat() {
6489 //BOLT2 Requirement: MUST offer amount_msat greater than 0.
6490 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6491 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6492 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6493 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6494 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6496 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6497 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6498 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6499 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6500 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = 0;
6502 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6503 nodes[1].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string(), 1);
6504 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6505 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6506 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_string() });
6510 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_cltv_expiry_too_high() {
6511 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST set cltv_expiry less than 500000000.
6512 //It is enforced when constructing a route.
6513 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6514 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6515 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6516 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6517 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6519 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
6520 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
6521 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], payment_params, 100000000, 0);
6522 route.paths[0].last_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = 500000001;
6523 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::RouteError { ref err },
6524 assert_eq!(err, &"Channel CLTV overflowed?"));
6528 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_num_and_htlc_id_increment() {
6529 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if result would be offering more than the remote's max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs, in the remote commitment transaction: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6530 //BOLT 2 Requirement: for the first HTLC it offers MUST set id to 0.
6531 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST increase the value of id by 1 for each successive offer.
6532 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6533 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6534 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6535 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6536 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6537 let max_accepted_htlcs = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u64;
6539 for i in 0..max_accepted_htlcs {
6540 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6541 let payment_event = {
6542 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6543 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6545 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6546 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6547 if let MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate{ update_add_htlcs: ref htlcs, .. }, } = events[0] {
6548 assert_eq!(htlcs[0].htlc_id, i);
6552 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
6554 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6555 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6556 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6558 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6559 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 100000);
6561 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100000);
6562 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6563 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6565 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6566 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs".to_string(), 1);
6570 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_sender_exceed_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
6571 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if the sum of total offered HTLCs would exceed the remote's max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: MUST NOT add an HTLC.
6572 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6573 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6574 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6575 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6576 let channel_value = 100000;
6577 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6578 let max_in_flight = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat;
6580 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], max_in_flight);
6582 let (mut route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_in_flight);
6583 // Manually create a route over our max in flight (which our router normally automatically
6585 route.paths[0][0].fee_msat = max_in_flight + 1;
6586 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err },
6587 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err)));
6589 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
6590 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept".to_string(), 1);
6592 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], max_in_flight);
6595 // BOLT 2 Requirements for the Receiver when handling an update_add_htlc message.
6597 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_amount_received_more_than_min() {
6598 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat equal to 0, OR less than its own htlc_minimum_msat -> SHOULD fail the channel.
6599 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6600 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6601 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6602 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6603 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6604 let htlc_minimum_msat: u64;
6606 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6607 let channel = chan_lock.by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap();
6608 htlc_minimum_msat = channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat();
6611 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], htlc_minimum_msat);
6612 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6613 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6614 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6615 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = htlc_minimum_msat-1;
6616 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6617 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6618 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6619 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value\. Lower limit: \(\d+\)\. Actual: \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6620 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6621 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6625 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_sender_can_afford_amount_sent() {
6626 //BOLT2 Requirement: receiving an amount_msat that the sending node cannot afford at the current feerate_per_kw (while maintaining its channel reserve): SHOULD fail the channel
6627 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6628 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6629 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6630 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6631 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6633 let chan_stat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6634 let channel_reserve = chan_stat.channel_reserve_msat;
6635 let feerate = get_feerate!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6636 let opt_anchors = get_opt_anchors!(nodes[0], chan.2);
6637 // The 2* and +1 are for the fee spike reserve.
6638 let commit_tx_fee_outbound = 2 * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 1 + 1, opt_anchors);
6640 let max_can_send = 5000000 - channel_reserve - commit_tx_fee_outbound;
6641 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], max_can_send);
6642 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6643 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6644 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6646 // Even though channel-initiator senders are required to respect the fee_spike_reserve,
6647 // at this time channel-initiatee receivers are not required to enforce that senders
6648 // respect the fee_spike_reserve.
6649 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = max_can_send + commit_tx_fee_outbound + 1;
6650 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6652 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6653 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6654 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value");
6655 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6656 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6660 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_htlc_limit() {
6661 //BOLT 2 Requirement: if a sending node adds more than its max_accepted_htlcs HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6662 //BOLT 2 Requirement: MUST allow multiple HTLCs with the same payment_hash.
6663 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6664 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6665 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6666 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6667 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6669 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 3999999);
6670 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
6671 let cur_height = nodes[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
6672 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &route.paths[0], &session_priv).unwrap();
6673 let (onion_payloads, _htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route.paths[0], 3999999, &Some(our_payment_secret), cur_height, &None).unwrap();
6674 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, [0; 32], &our_payment_hash);
6676 let mut msg = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6680 payment_hash: our_payment_hash,
6681 cltv_expiry: htlc_cltv,
6682 onion_routing_packet: onion_packet.clone(),
6685 for i in 0..super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS {
6686 msg.htlc_id = i as u64;
6687 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6689 msg.htlc_id = (super::channel::OUR_MAX_HTLCS) as u64;
6690 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
6692 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6693 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6694 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs \(\d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6695 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6696 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6700 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_max_in_flight_msat() {
6701 //OR adds more than its max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat worth of offered HTLCs to its local commitment transaction: SHOULD fail the channel
6702 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6703 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6704 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6705 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6706 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6708 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6709 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6710 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6711 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6712 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].amount_msat = get_channel_value_stat!(nodes[1], chan.2).counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat + 1;
6713 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6715 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6716 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6717 assert!(regex::Regex::new("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6718 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6719 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6723 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_cltv_expiry() {
6724 //BOLT2 Requirement: if sending node sets cltv_expiry to greater or equal to 500000000: SHOULD fail the channel.
6725 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6726 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6727 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6728 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6730 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 95000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6731 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6732 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6733 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6734 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6735 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].cltv_expiry = 500000000;
6736 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6738 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6739 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6740 assert_eq!(err_msg.data,"Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height");
6741 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6742 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6746 fn test_update_add_htlc_bolt2_receiver_check_repeated_id_ignore() {
6747 //BOLT 2 requirement: if the sender did not previously acknowledge the commitment of that HTLC: MUST ignore a repeated id value after a reconnection.
6748 // We test this by first testing that that repeated HTLCs pass commitment signature checks
6749 // after disconnect and that non-sequential htlc_ids result in a channel failure.
6750 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6751 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6752 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6753 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6755 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6756 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6757 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6758 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6759 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6760 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6762 //Disconnect and Reconnect
6763 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6764 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
6765 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
6766 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6767 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 1);
6768 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
6769 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6770 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 1);
6771 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
6772 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
6773 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
6774 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
6777 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6778 assert_eq!(updates.commitment_signed.htlc_signatures.len(), 1);
6779 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6780 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6781 let _bs_responses = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6783 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6785 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6786 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap();
6787 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote skipped HTLC ID \(skipped ID: \d+\)").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6788 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6789 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6793 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fulfill_htlc_before_commitment() {
6794 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6796 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6797 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6798 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6799 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6800 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6801 let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6802 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6804 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6805 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6806 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6808 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC{
6811 payment_preimage: our_payment_preimage,
6814 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6816 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6817 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6818 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6819 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6820 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6824 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_htlc_before_commitment() {
6825 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6827 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6828 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6829 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6830 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6831 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6833 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6834 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6835 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6836 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6837 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6839 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC{
6842 reason: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new()},
6845 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6847 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6848 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6849 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6850 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6851 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6855 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_update_fail_malformed_htlc_before_commitment() {
6856 //BOLT 2 Requirement: until the corresponding HTLC is irrevocably committed in both sides' commitment transactions: MUST NOT send an update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
6858 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6859 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6860 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6861 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6862 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6864 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6865 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6866 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6867 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6868 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6869 let update_msg = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC{
6872 sha256_of_onion: [1; 32],
6873 failure_code: 0x8000,
6876 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
6878 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6879 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6880 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC \(\d+\) before it had been committed").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6881 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6882 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6886 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_incorrect_htlc_id() {
6887 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the id does not correspond to an HTLC in its current commitment transaction MUST fail the channel.
6889 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6890 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6891 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6892 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6893 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6895 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6897 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6898 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6900 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6901 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6902 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6904 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6905 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6906 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6907 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6908 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6909 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6910 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6912 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6916 update_fulfill_msg.htlc_id = 1;
6918 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6920 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6921 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6922 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find");
6923 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6924 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6928 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_wrong_preimage() {
6929 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the payment_preimage value in update_fulfill_htlc doesn't SHA256 hash to the corresponding HTLC payment_hash MUST fail the channel.
6931 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6932 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6933 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6934 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6935 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6937 let our_payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100000).0;
6939 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(our_payment_preimage);
6940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6942 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6943 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6944 let mut update_fulfill_msg: msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC = {
6946 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6947 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6948 assert_eq!(update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
6949 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6950 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6951 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
6952 update_fulfill_htlcs[0].clone()
6954 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6958 update_fulfill_msg.payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([1; 32]);
6960 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fulfill_msg);
6962 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
6963 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
6964 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Remote tried to fulfill HTLC \(\d+\) with an incorrect preimage").unwrap().is_match(err_msg.data.as_str()));
6965 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6966 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
6970 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_missing_badonion_bit_for_malformed_htlc_message() {
6971 //BOLT 2 Requirement: A receiving node: if the BADONION bit in failure_code is not set for update_fail_malformed_htlc MUST fail the channel.
6973 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6974 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6975 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6976 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6977 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6979 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 1000000);
6980 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
6981 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6983 let mut updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6984 updates.update_add_htlcs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
6986 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6987 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6988 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], updates.commitment_signed, false, true);
6990 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6992 let mut update_msg: msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC = {
6994 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
6995 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6996 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6997 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6998 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
6999 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7000 update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone()
7002 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7005 update_msg.failure_code &= !0x8000;
7006 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg);
7008 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_channels().is_empty());
7009 let err_msg = check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true).unwrap();
7010 assert_eq!(err_msg.data, "Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
7011 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7012 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_msg.data });
7016 fn test_update_fulfill_htlc_bolt2_after_malformed_htlc_message_must_forward_update_fail_htlc() {
7017 //BOLT 2 Requirement: a receiving node which has an outgoing HTLC canceled by update_fail_malformed_htlc:
7018 // * MUST return an error in the update_fail_htlc sent to the link which originally sent the HTLC, using the failure_code given and setting the data to sha256_of_onion.
7020 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7021 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7022 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7023 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7024 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7025 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7027 let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 100000);
7030 let mut payment_event = {
7031 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7032 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7033 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7034 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7035 SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0))
7037 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7038 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7039 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7040 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7041 let mut events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7042 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
7043 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7044 payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events_2.remove(0));
7045 assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
7048 payment_event.msgs[0].onion_routing_packet.version = 1; //Produce a malformed HTLC message
7049 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7050 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 0);
7051 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false, true);
7053 let events_3 = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7054 assert_eq!(events_3.len(), 1);
7055 let update_msg : (msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned) = {
7057 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7058 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7059 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7060 assert!(update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7061 assert_eq!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 1);
7062 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7063 (update_fail_malformed_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed.clone())
7065 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7069 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.0);
7071 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7072 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[2], update_msg.1, false, true);
7073 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7074 let events_4 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7075 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 1);
7077 //Confirm that handlinge the update_malformed_htlc message produces an update_fail_htlc message to be forwarded back along the route
7079 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, .. } } => {
7080 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7081 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7082 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7083 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7084 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7086 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7089 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7092 fn do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(announce_latest: bool) {
7093 // Dust-HTLC failure updates must be delayed until failure-trigger tx (in this case local commitment) reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY
7094 // We can have at most two valid local commitment tx, so both cases must be covered, and both txs must be checked to get them all as
7095 // HTLC could have been removed from lastest local commitment tx but still valid until we get remote RAA
7097 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7098 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7099 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7100 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7101 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7102 let chan =create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7104 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7106 // We route 2 dust-HTLCs between A and B
7107 let (_, payment_hash_1, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7108 let (_, payment_hash_2, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7109 route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7111 // Cache one local commitment tx as previous
7112 let as_prev_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7114 // Fail one HTLC to prune it in the will-be-latest-local commitment tx
7115 assert!(nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment_hash_2));
7116 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7117 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7118 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7120 let remove = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7121 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7122 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &remove.commitment_signed);
7123 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7125 // Cache one local commitment tx as lastest
7126 let as_last_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7128 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7130 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { node_id, .. } => {
7131 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7133 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7136 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, .. } => {
7137 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7139 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7142 assert_ne!(as_prev_commitment_tx, as_last_commitment_tx);
7143 // Fail the 2 dust-HTLCs, move their failure in maturation buffer (htlc_updated_waiting_threshold_conf)
7144 if announce_latest {
7145 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_last_commitment_tx[0]);
7147 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_prev_commitment_tx[0]);
7150 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7151 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7152 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7154 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7155 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7156 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7157 // Only 2 PaymentPathFailed events should show up, over-dust HTLC has to be failed by timeout tx
7158 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7159 let mut first_failed = false;
7160 for event in events {
7162 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7163 if payment_hash == payment_hash_1 {
7164 assert!(!first_failed);
7165 first_failed = true;
7167 assert_eq!(payment_hash, payment_hash_2);
7170 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7176 fn test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment() {
7177 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(true);
7178 do_test_failure_delay_dust_htlc_local_commitment(false);
7181 fn do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(revoked: bool, local: bool) {
7182 // Outbound HTLC-failure updates must be cancelled if we get a reorg before we reach ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
7183 // Broadcast of revoked remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust/non-dust HTLCs
7184 // Broadcast of remote commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7185 // Broadcast of timeout tx on remote commitment tx, trigger failure-udate of non-dust HTLCs
7186 // Broadcast of local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of dust-HTLCs
7187 // Broadcast of HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx, trigger failure-update of non-dust HTLCs
7189 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7190 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7191 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7192 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7193 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7195 let bs_dust_limit = nodes[1].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan.2).unwrap().holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
7197 let (_payment_preimage_1, dust_hash, _payment_secret_1) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], bs_dust_limit*1000);
7198 let (_payment_preimage_2, non_dust_hash, _payment_secret_2) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7200 let as_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7201 let bs_commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7203 // We revoked bs_commitment_tx
7205 let (payment_preimage_3, _, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1000000);
7206 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage_3);
7209 let mut timeout_tx = Vec::new();
7211 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of local commitment tx
7212 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &as_commitment_tx[0]);
7213 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7214 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7215 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7217 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - ANTI_REORG_DELAY);
7218 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7219 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7220 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7221 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7222 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7223 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local HTLC-timeout tx on local commitment tx
7224 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7225 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7226 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7227 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7229 // We fail dust-HTLC 1 by broadcast of remote commitment tx. If revoked, fail also non-dust HTLC
7230 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &bs_commitment_tx[0]);
7231 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7232 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7233 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7234 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7235 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7236 timeout_tx.push(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[1].clone());
7238 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], dust_hash, true);
7239 assert_eq!(timeout_tx[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7240 // We fail non-dust-HTLC 2 by broadcast of local timeout tx on remote commitment tx
7241 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &timeout_tx[0]);
7242 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().len(), 0);
7243 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
7244 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], non_dust_hash, true);
7246 // If revoked, both dust & non-dust HTLCs should have been failed after ANTI_REORG_DELAY confs of revoked
7248 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7249 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
7252 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7253 if payment_hash == dust_hash { first = true; }
7254 else { first = false; }
7256 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7259 Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_hash, .. } => {
7260 if first { assert_eq!(payment_hash, non_dust_hash); }
7261 else { assert_eq!(payment_hash, dust_hash); }
7263 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7270 fn test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update() {
7271 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, true);
7272 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(false, false);
7273 do_test_sweep_outbound_htlc_failure_update(true, false);
7277 fn test_user_configurable_csv_delay() {
7278 // We test our channel constructors yield errors when we pass them absurd csv delay
7280 let mut low_our_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7281 low_our_to_self_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 6;
7282 let mut high_their_to_self_config = UserConfig::default();
7283 high_their_to_self_config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay = 100;
7284 let user_cfgs = [Some(high_their_to_self_config.clone()), None];
7285 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7286 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7287 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &user_cfgs);
7288 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7290 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_outbound()
7291 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_outbound(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
7292 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), 1000000, 1000000, 0,
7293 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, 42)
7296 APIError::APIMisuseError { err } => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7297 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7299 } else { assert!(false) }
7301 // We test config.our_to_self > BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7302 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7303 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7304 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7305 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
7306 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0,
7307 &low_our_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7310 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay \(\d+\) putting user funds at risks").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7311 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7313 } else { assert!(false); }
7315 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Chanel::accept_channel()
7316 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7317 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
7318 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7319 accept_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7320 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
7322 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events()[0] {
7324 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7325 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(msg.data.as_str()));
7326 reason_msg = msg.data.clone();
7330 } else { panic!(); }
7331 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: reason_msg });
7333 // We test msg.to_self_delay <= config.their_to_self_delay is enforced in Channel::new_from_req()
7334 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 1000000, 1000000, 42, None).unwrap();
7335 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7336 open_channel.to_self_delay = 200;
7337 if let Err(error) = Channel::new_from_req(&&test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) },
7338 &nodes[0].keys_manager, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel, 0,
7339 &high_their_to_self_config, 0, &nodes[0].logger, 42)
7342 ChannelError::Close(err) => { assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period\. Upper limit: \d+\. Actual: \d+").unwrap().is_match(err.as_str())); },
7343 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7345 } else { assert!(false); }
7349 fn test_data_loss_protect() {
7350 // We want to be sure that :
7351 // * we don't broadcast our Local Commitment Tx in case of fallen behind
7352 // (but this is not quite true - we broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr)
7353 // * we close channel in case of detecting other being fallen behind
7354 // * we are able to claim our own outputs thanks to to_remote being static
7355 // TODO: this test is incomplete and the data_loss_protect implementation is incomplete - see issue #775
7361 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7362 // We broadcast during Drop because chanmon is out of sync with chanmgr, which would cause a panic
7363 // during signing due to revoked tx
7364 chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7365 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[0].keys_manager;
7368 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7369 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7370 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7372 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 1000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7374 // Cache node A state before any channel update
7375 let previous_node_state = nodes[0].node.encode();
7376 let mut previous_chain_monitor_state = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
7377 get_monitor!(nodes[0], chan.2).write(&mut previous_chain_monitor_state).unwrap();
7379 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7380 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
7382 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7383 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7385 // Restore node A from previous state
7386 logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
7387 let mut chain_monitor = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_chain_monitor_state.0), keys_manager).unwrap().1;
7388 chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
7389 tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster { txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())) };
7390 fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7391 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
7392 monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &tx_broadcaster, &logger, &fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
7394 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
7395 channel_monitors.insert(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, &mut chain_monitor);
7396 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut io::Cursor::new(previous_node_state), ChannelManagerReadArgs {
7397 keys_manager: keys_manager,
7398 fee_estimator: &fee_estimator,
7399 chain_monitor: &monitor,
7401 tx_broadcaster: &tx_broadcaster,
7402 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
7406 nodes[0].node = &node_state_0;
7407 assert!(monitor.watch_channel(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }, chain_monitor).is_ok());
7408 nodes[0].chain_monitor = &monitor;
7409 nodes[0].chain_source = &chain_source;
7411 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7413 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7414 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7416 let reestablish_0 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7418 // Check we don't broadcast any transactions following learning of per_commitment_point from B
7419 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_0[0]);
7420 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7423 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7424 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7427 let mut reestablish_1 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7428 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7429 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, ref msg } = msg {
7430 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7431 reestablish_1.push(msg.clone());
7432 } else if let MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } = msg {
7433 } else if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7435 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7436 assert_eq!(msg.data, "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting");
7438 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7441 panic!("Unexpected event")
7445 // Check we close channel detecting A is fallen-behind
7446 // Check that we sent the warning message when we detected that A has fallen behind,
7447 // and give the possibility for A to recover from the warning.
7448 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7449 let warn_msg = "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned();
7450 assert!(check_warn_msg!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), chan.2).contains(&warn_msg));
7452 // Check A is able to claim to_remote output
7453 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
7454 // The node B should not broadcast the transaction to force close the channel!
7455 assert!(node_txn.is_empty());
7456 // B should now detect that there is something wrong and should force close the channel.
7457 let exp_err = "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can\'t do any automated broadcasting";
7458 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: exp_err.to_string() });
7460 // after the warning message sent by B, we should not able to
7461 // use the channel, or reconnect with success to the channel.
7462 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7463 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7464 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7465 let retry_reestablish = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7467 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &retry_reestablish[0]);
7468 let mut err_msgs_0 = Vec::with_capacity(1);
7469 for msg in nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events() {
7470 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg {
7472 &ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg } => {
7473 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Failed to find corresponding channel");
7474 err_msgs_0.push(msg.clone());
7476 _ => panic!("Unexpected event!"),
7479 panic!("Unexpected event!");
7482 assert_eq!(err_msgs_0.len(), 1);
7483 nodes[1].node.handle_error(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &err_msgs_0[0]);
7484 assert!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().is_empty());
7485 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7486 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned() });
7487 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], false);
7491 fn test_check_htlc_underpaying() {
7492 // Send payment through A -> B but A is maliciously
7493 // sending a probe payment (i.e less than expected value0
7494 // to B, B should refuse payment.
7496 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7497 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7498 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7499 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7501 // Create some initial channels
7502 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7504 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7505 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7506 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7507 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7508 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
7509 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(our_payment_hash, Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
7510 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
7511 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7513 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7514 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7515 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
7516 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7517 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7519 // Note that we first have to wait a random delay before processing the receipt of the HTLC,
7520 // and then will wait a second random delay before failing the HTLC back:
7521 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7522 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7524 // Node 3 is expecting payment of 100_000 but received 10_000,
7525 // it should fail htlc like we didn't know the preimage.
7526 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
7528 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7529 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7530 let (update_fail_htlc, commitment_signed) = match events[0] {
7531 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _ , updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_add_htlcs, ref update_fulfill_htlcs, ref update_fail_htlcs, ref update_fail_malformed_htlcs, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
7532 assert!(update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7533 assert!(update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7534 assert_eq!(update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7535 assert!(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7536 assert!(update_fee.is_none());
7537 (update_fail_htlcs[0].clone(), commitment_signed)
7539 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7541 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7543 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlc);
7544 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false, true);
7546 // 10_000 msat as u64, followed by a height of CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u32
7547 let mut expected_failure_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(10_000).to_vec();
7548 expected_failure_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH));
7549 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, 0x4000|15, &expected_failure_data[..]);
7553 fn test_announce_disable_channels() {
7554 // Create 2 channels between A and B. Disconnect B. Call timer_tick_occurred and check for generated
7555 // ChannelUpdate. Reconnect B, reestablish and check there is non-generated ChannelUpdate.
7557 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7558 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7559 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7560 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7562 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7563 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7564 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7567 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7568 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
7570 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // Enabled -> DisabledStaged
7571 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred(); // DisabledStaged -> Disabled
7572 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7573 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7574 let mut chans_disabled = HashMap::new();
7575 for e in msg_events {
7577 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7578 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 1<<1); // The "channel disabled" bit should be set
7579 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7580 if chans_disabled.insert(msg.contents.short_channel_id, msg.contents.timestamp).is_some() {
7581 panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!");
7584 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7588 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7589 let reestablish_1 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7590 assert_eq!(reestablish_1.len(), 3);
7591 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::empty(), remote_network_address: None });
7592 let reestablish_2 = get_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7593 assert_eq!(reestablish_2.len(), 3);
7595 // Reestablish chan_1
7596 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[0]);
7597 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7598 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[0]);
7599 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7600 // Reestablish chan_2
7601 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[1]);
7602 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7603 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[1]);
7604 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7605 // Reestablish chan_3
7606 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_2[2]);
7607 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1]);
7608 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &reestablish_1[2]);
7609 handle_chan_reestablish_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0]);
7611 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7612 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
7613 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
7614 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7615 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 3);
7616 for e in msg_events {
7618 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
7619 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & (1<<1), 0); // The "channel disabled" bit should be off
7620 match chans_disabled.remove(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7621 // Each update should have a higher timestamp than the previous one, replacing
7623 Some(prev_timestamp) => assert!(msg.contents.timestamp > prev_timestamp),
7624 None => panic!("Generated ChannelUpdate for wrong chan!"),
7627 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7630 // Check that each channel gets updated exactly once
7631 assert!(chans_disabled.is_empty());
7635 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_commitment() {
7636 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7637 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7639 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7640 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7641 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7642 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7644 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7646 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7647 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id())
7648 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7649 let (route,_, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_params, 3000000, 30);
7650 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000);
7652 let revoked_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7653 // Revoked commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7654 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7655 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7656 assert_eq!(revoked_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7657 let revoked_txid = revoked_txn[0].txid();
7659 let mut penalty_sum = 0;
7660 for outp in revoked_txn[0].output.iter() {
7661 if outp.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
7662 penalty_sum += outp.value;
7666 // Connect blocks to change height_timer range to see if we use right soonest_timelock
7667 let header_114 = connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 14);
7669 // Actually revoke tx by claiming a HTLC
7670 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7671 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_114, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7672 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_txn[0].clone()] });
7673 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7675 // One or more justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7679 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7680 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // justice tx (broadcasted from ChannelMonitor) + local commitment tx
7681 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7682 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7683 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7684 let fee_1 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7685 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7686 penalty_1 = node_txn[0].txid();
7690 // After exhaustion of height timer, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7691 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7692 let mut penalty_2 = penalty_1;
7693 let mut feerate_2 = 0;
7695 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7696 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7697 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7698 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7699 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7700 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7701 penalty_2 = node_txn[0].txid();
7702 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7703 assert_ne!(penalty_2, penalty_1);
7704 let fee_2 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7705 feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7706 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7707 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 >= feerate_1 * 125);
7711 assert_ne!(feerate_2, 0);
7713 // After exhaustion of height timer for a 2nd time, a new bumped justice tx should have been broadcast, check it
7714 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
7716 let mut feerate_3 = 0;
7718 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7719 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7720 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid == revoked_txid {
7721 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 3); // Penalty txn claims to_local, offered_htlc and received_htlc outputs
7722 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].output.len(), 1);
7723 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_txn[0]);
7724 penalty_3 = node_txn[0].txid();
7725 // Verify new bumped tx is different from last claiming transaction, we don't want spurrious rebroadcast
7726 assert_ne!(penalty_3, penalty_2);
7727 let fee_3 = penalty_sum - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7728 feerate_3 = fee_3 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7729 // Verify 25% bump heuristic
7730 assert!(feerate_3 * 100 >= feerate_2 * 125);
7734 assert_ne!(feerate_3, 0);
7736 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7737 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7741 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_revoked_htlcs() {
7742 // In case of penalty txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to sure
7743 // we're able to claim outputs on revoked HTLC transactions before timelocks expiration
7745 let mut chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7746 chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.disable_revocation_policy_check = true;
7747 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7748 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7749 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7751 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7752 // Lock HTLC in both directions (using a slightly lower CLTV delay to provide timely RBF bumps)
7753 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7754 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
7755 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
7756 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[0].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7757 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7758 let payment_preimage = send_along_route(&nodes[0], route, &[&nodes[1]], 3_000_000).0;
7759 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7760 let route = get_route(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &nodes[1].network_graph.read_only(), None,
7761 3_000_000, 50, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
7762 send_along_route(&nodes[1], route, &[&nodes[0]], 3_000_000);
7764 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
7765 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7766 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7768 // Revoke local commitment tx
7769 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
7771 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7772 // B will generate both revoked HTLC-timeout/HTLC-preimage txn from revoked commitment tx
7773 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7774 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
7775 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7776 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
7777 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 49); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires (note CLTV was explicitly 50 above)
7779 let revoked_htlc_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7780 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn.len(), 3);
7781 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[1], chan.3);
7783 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7784 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7785 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7787 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7788 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
7789 assert_eq!(revoked_htlc_txn[2].output.len(), 1);
7790 check_spends!(revoked_htlc_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7792 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
7793 let hash_128 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 40);
7794 let header_11 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: hash_128, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7795 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_11, txdata: vec![revoked_local_txn[0].clone()] });
7796 let header_129 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_11.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7797 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_129, txdata: vec![revoked_htlc_txn[0].clone(), revoked_htlc_txn[2].clone()] });
7798 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
7799 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_from_events!(nodes[0], events[0..1], true);
7801 Event::ChannelClosed { reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed, .. } => {}
7802 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
7808 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7809 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 5); // 3 penalty txn on revoked commitment tx + A commitment tx + 1 penalty tnx on revoked HTLC txn
7810 // Verify claim tx are spending revoked HTLC txn
7812 // node_txn 0-2 each spend a separate revoked output from revoked_local_txn[0]
7813 // Note that node_txn[0] and node_txn[1] are bogus - they double spend the revoked_htlc_txn
7814 // which are included in the same block (they are broadcasted because we scan the
7815 // transactions linearly and generate claims as we go, they likely should be removed in the
7817 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7818 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7819 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
7820 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7821 assert_eq!(node_txn[2].input.len(), 1);
7822 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7824 // Each of the three justice transactions claim a separate (single) output of the three
7825 // available, which we check here:
7826 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output);
7827 assert_ne!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7828 assert_ne!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7830 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7831 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7833 // node_txn[3] is the local commitment tx broadcast just because (and somewhat in case of
7834 // reorgs, though its not clear its ever worth broadcasting conflicting txn like this when
7835 // a remote commitment tx has already been confirmed).
7836 check_spends!(node_txn[3], chan.3);
7838 // node_txn[4] spends the revoked outputs from the revoked_htlc_txn (which only have one
7839 // output, checked above).
7840 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].input.len(), 2);
7841 assert_eq!(node_txn[4].output.len(), 1);
7842 check_spends!(node_txn[4], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7844 first = node_txn[4].txid();
7845 // Store both feerates for later comparison
7846 let fee_1 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[4].output[0].value;
7847 feerate_1 = fee_1 * 1000 / node_txn[4].weight() as u64;
7848 penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[2].clone()];
7852 // Connect one more block to see if bumped penalty are issued for HTLC txn
7853 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_129.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7854 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
7855 let header_131 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_130.block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7856 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_131, txdata: Vec::new() });
7858 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7859 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 2); // 2 bumped penalty txn on revoked commitment tx
7861 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7862 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
7863 // Note that these are both bogus - they spend outputs already claimed in block 129:
7864 if node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output == revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output {
7865 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7867 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[2].input[0].previous_output);
7868 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].previous_output, revoked_htlc_txn[0].input[0].previous_output);
7874 // Few more blocks to confirm penalty txn
7875 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 4);
7876 assert!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
7877 let header_144 = connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 9);
7879 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7880 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7882 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 2);
7883 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[0], revoked_htlc_txn[2]);
7884 // Verify bumped tx is different and 25% bump heuristic
7885 assert_ne!(first, node_txn[0].txid());
7886 let fee_2 = revoked_htlc_txn[0].output[0].value + revoked_htlc_txn[2].output[0].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7887 let feerate_2 = fee_2 * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7888 assert!(feerate_2 * 100 > feerate_1 * 125);
7889 let txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone()];
7893 // Broadcast claim txn and confirm blocks to avoid further bumps on this outputs
7894 let header_145 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: header_144, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
7895 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_145, txdata: node_txn });
7896 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 20);
7898 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7899 // We verify than no new transaction has been broadcast because previously
7900 // we were buggy on this exact behavior by not tracking for monitoring remote HTLC outputs (see #411)
7901 // which means we wouldn't see a spend of them by a justice tx and bumped justice tx
7902 // were generated forever instead of safe cleaning after confirmation and ANTI_REORG_SAFE_DELAY blocks.
7903 // Enforce spending of revoked htlc output by claiming transaction remove request as expected and dry
7904 // up bumped justice generation.
7905 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 0);
7908 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
7909 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7913 fn test_bump_penalty_txn_on_remote_commitment() {
7914 // In case of claim txn with too low feerates for getting into mempools, RBF-bump them to be sure
7915 // we're able to claim outputs on remote commitment transaction before timelocks expiration
7918 // Provide preimage for one
7919 // Check aggregation
7921 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7922 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7923 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7924 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7926 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7927 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 3000000).0;
7928 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 3000000).0;
7930 // Remote commitment txn with 4 outputs : to_local, to_remote, 1 outgoing HTLC, 1 incoming HTLC
7931 let remote_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan.2);
7932 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].output.len(), 4);
7933 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7934 assert_eq!(remote_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
7936 // Claim a HTLC without revocation (provide B monitor with preimage)
7937 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7938 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &remote_txn[0]);
7939 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7940 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1); // Confirm blocks until the HTLC expires
7942 // One or more claim tx should have been broadcast, check it
7946 let feerate_timeout;
7947 let feerate_preimage;
7949 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7950 // 9 transactions including:
7951 // 1*2 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success
7952 // 1*3 ChannelManager local broadcasts of commitment + HTLC-Success + HTLC-Timeout
7953 // 2 * HTLC-Success (one RBF bump we'll check later)
7955 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 8);
7956 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7957 assert_eq!(node_txn[6].input.len(), 1);
7958 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7959 check_spends!(node_txn[6], remote_txn[0]);
7960 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output, node_txn[3].input[0].previous_output);
7961 preimage_bump = node_txn[3].clone();
7963 check_spends!(node_txn[1], chan.3);
7964 check_spends!(node_txn[2], node_txn[1]);
7965 assert_eq!(node_txn[1], node_txn[4]);
7966 assert_eq!(node_txn[2], node_txn[5]);
7968 timeout = node_txn[6].txid();
7969 let index = node_txn[6].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7970 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[6].output[0].value;
7971 feerate_timeout = fee * 1000 / node_txn[6].weight() as u64;
7973 preimage = node_txn[0].txid();
7974 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
7975 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
7976 feerate_preimage = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
7980 assert_ne!(feerate_timeout, 0);
7981 assert_ne!(feerate_preimage, 0);
7983 // After exhaustion of height timer, new bumped claim txn should have been broadcast, check it
7984 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 15);
7986 let mut node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
7987 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
7988 assert_eq!(node_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
7989 assert_eq!(preimage_bump.input.len(), 1);
7990 check_spends!(node_txn[0], remote_txn[0]);
7991 check_spends!(preimage_bump, remote_txn[0]);
7993 let index = preimage_bump.input[0].previous_output.vout;
7994 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - preimage_bump.output[0].value;
7995 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / preimage_bump.weight() as u64;
7996 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_timeout * 125);
7997 assert_ne!(timeout, preimage_bump.txid());
7999 let index = node_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.vout;
8000 let fee = remote_txn[0].output[index as usize].value - node_txn[0].output[0].value;
8001 let new_feerate = fee * 1000 / node_txn[0].weight() as u64;
8002 assert!(new_feerate * 100 > feerate_preimage * 125);
8003 assert_ne!(preimage, node_txn[0].txid());
8008 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8009 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8013 fn test_counterparty_raa_skip_no_crash() {
8014 // Previously, if our counterparty sent two RAAs in a row without us having provided a
8015 // commitment transaction, we would have happily carried on and provided them the next
8016 // commitment transaction based on one RAA forward. This would probably eventually have led to
8017 // channel closure, but it would not have resulted in funds loss. Still, our
8018 // EnforcingSigner would have panicked as it doesn't like jumps into the future. Here, we
8019 // check simply that the channel is closed in response to such an RAA, but don't check whether
8020 // we decide to punish our counterparty for revoking their funds (as we don't currently
8022 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8023 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8024 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8025 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8026 let channel_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
8028 let mut guard = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
8029 let keys = guard.by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).unwrap().get_signer();
8031 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
8033 // Make signer believe we got a counterparty signature, so that it allows the revocation
8034 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8035 let per_commitment_secret = keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
8037 // Must revoke without gaps
8038 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8039 keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1);
8041 keys.get_enforcement_state().last_holder_commitment -= 1;
8042 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
8043 &SecretKey::from_slice(&keys.release_commitment_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2)).unwrap());
8045 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(),
8046 &msgs::RevokeAndACK { channel_id, per_commitment_secret, next_per_commitment_point });
8047 assert_eq!(check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true).unwrap().data, "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack");
8048 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8049 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_string() });
8053 fn test_bump_txn_sanitize_tracking_maps() {
8054 // Sanitizing pendning_claim_request and claimable_outpoints used to be buggy,
8055 // verify we clean then right after expiration of ANTI_REORG_DELAY.
8057 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8058 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8059 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8060 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8062 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 1000000, 59000000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8063 // Lock HTLC in both directions
8064 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8065 route_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8067 let revoked_local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan.2);
8068 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8069 assert_eq!(revoked_local_txn[0].input[0].previous_output.txid, chan.3.txid());
8071 // Revoke local commitment tx
8072 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], payment_preimage);
8074 // Broadcast set of revoked txn on A
8075 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV + 2 - CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
8076 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[0]);
8077 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8079 mine_transaction(&nodes[0], &revoked_local_txn[0]);
8080 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8081 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8082 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8084 let mut node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8085 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 4); //ChannelMonitor: justice txn * 3, ChannelManager: local commitment tx
8086 check_spends!(node_txn[0], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8087 check_spends!(node_txn[1], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8088 check_spends!(node_txn[2], revoked_local_txn[0]);
8089 let penalty_txn = vec![node_txn[0].clone(), node_txn[1].clone(), node_txn[2].clone()];
8093 let header_130 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8094 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_130, txdata: penalty_txn });
8095 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8097 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(OutPoint { txid: chan.3.txid(), index: 0 }).unwrap();
8098 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.pending_claim_requests.is_empty());
8099 assert!(monitor.inner.lock().unwrap().onchain_tx_handler.claimable_outpoints.is_empty());
8104 fn test_pending_claimed_htlc_no_balance_underflow() {
8105 // Tests that if we have a pending outbound HTLC as well as a claimed-but-not-fully-removed
8106 // HTLC we will not underflow when we call `Channel::get_balance_msat()`.
8107 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8108 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8109 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8110 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8111 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8113 let payment_preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 1_010_000).0;
8114 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8115 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8116 let fulfill_ev = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8118 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8119 expect_payment_sent_without_paths!(nodes[0], payment_preimage);
8120 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fulfill_ev.commitment_signed);
8121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8122 let (_raa, _cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8124 // At this point nodes[1] has received 1,010k msat (10k msat more than their reserve) and can
8125 // send an HTLC back (though it will go in the holding cell). Send an HTLC back and check we
8126 // can get our balance.
8128 // Get a route from nodes[1] to nodes[0] by getting a route going the other way and then flip
8129 // the public key of the only hop. This works around ChannelDetails not showing the
8130 // almost-claimed HTLC as available balance.
8131 let (mut route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 10_000);
8132 route.payment_params = None; // This is all wrong, but unnecessary
8133 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8134 let (_, payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(nodes[0]);
8135 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
8137 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].balance_msat, 1_000_000);
8141 fn test_channel_conf_timeout() {
8142 // Tests that, for inbound channels, we give up on them if the funding transaction does not
8143 // confirm within 2016 blocks, as recommended by BOLT 2.
8144 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8145 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8146 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8147 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8149 let _funding_tx = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_init(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 1_000_000, 100_000, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8151 // The outbound node should wait forever for confirmation:
8152 // This matches `channel::FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS` and BOLT 2's suggested timeout, thus is
8153 // copied here instead of directly referencing the constant.
8154 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], 2016);
8155 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8157 // The inbound node should fail the channel after exactly 2016 blocks
8158 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 2015);
8159 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8160 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8162 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 1);
8163 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8164 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
8165 let close_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8166 assert_eq!(close_ev.len(), 1);
8168 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id } => {
8169 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8170 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because funding transaction failed to confirm within 2016 blocks");
8172 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8177 fn test_override_channel_config() {
8178 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8179 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8180 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8181 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8183 // Node0 initiates a channel to node1 using the override config.
8184 let mut override_config = UserConfig::default();
8185 override_config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay = 200;
8187 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(override_config)).unwrap();
8189 // Assert the channel created by node0 is using the override config.
8190 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8191 assert_eq!(res.channel_flags, 0);
8192 assert_eq!(res.to_self_delay, 200);
8196 fn test_override_0msat_htlc_minimum() {
8197 let mut zero_config = UserConfig::default();
8198 zero_config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat = 0;
8199 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8200 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8201 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(zero_config.clone())]);
8202 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8204 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 16_000_000, 12_000_000, 42, Some(zero_config)).unwrap();
8205 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8206 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8208 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8209 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8210 assert_eq!(res.htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8214 fn test_channel_update_has_correct_htlc_maximum_msat() {
8215 // Tests that the `ChannelUpdate` message has the correct values for `htlc_maximum_msat` set.
8216 // Bolt 7 specifies that if present `htlc_maximum_msat`:
8217 // 1. MUST be set to less than or equal to the channel capacity. In LDK, this is capped to
8218 // 90% of the `channel_value`.
8219 // 2. MUST be set to less than or equal to the `max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer.
8221 let mut config_30_percent = UserConfig::default();
8222 config_30_percent.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
8223 config_30_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 30;
8224 let mut config_50_percent = UserConfig::default();
8225 config_50_percent.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
8226 config_50_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 50;
8227 let mut config_95_percent = UserConfig::default();
8228 config_95_percent.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
8229 config_95_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 95;
8230 let mut config_100_percent = UserConfig::default();
8231 config_100_percent.channel_options.announced_channel = true;
8232 config_100_percent.own_channel_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 100;
8234 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8235 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8236 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config_30_percent), Some(config_50_percent), Some(config_95_percent), Some(config_100_percent)]);
8237 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8239 let channel_value_satoshis = 100000;
8240 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8241 let channel_value_30_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.3) as u64;
8242 let channel_value_50_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.5) as u64;
8243 let channel_value_90_percent_msat = (channel_value_msat as f64 * 0.9) as u64;
8245 let (node_0_chan_update, node_1_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8246 let (node_2_chan_update, node_3_chan_update, _, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, channel_value_satoshis, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8248 // Assert that `node[0]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 50 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8249 // that's the value of `node[1]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8250 assert_eq!(node_0_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_50_percent_msat));
8251 // Assert that `node[1]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 30 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8252 // that's the value of `node[0]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
8253 assert_eq!(node_1_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_30_percent_msat));
8255 // Assert that `node[2]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8256 // the value of `node[3]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (100%), exceeds 90% of the
8258 assert_eq!(node_2_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_90_percent_msat));
8259 // Assert that `node[3]`'s `ChannelUpdate` is capped at 90 percent of the `channel_value`, as
8260 // the value of `node[2]`'s `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` (95%), exceeds 90% of the
8262 assert_eq!(node_3_chan_update.contents.htlc_maximum_msat, OptionalField::Present(channel_value_90_percent_msat));
8266 fn test_manually_accept_inbound_channel_request() {
8267 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8268 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8269 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8270 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8271 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8272 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8274 let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8275 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8277 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8279 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8280 // accepting the inbound channel request.
8281 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8283 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8285 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8286 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, 23).unwrap();
8288 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8291 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8292 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8294 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8295 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8296 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8298 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8301 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&temp_channel_id).unwrap();
8303 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8304 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8306 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8308 Event::ChannelClosed { user_channel_id, .. } => {
8309 assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 23);
8311 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8316 fn test_manually_reject_inbound_channel_request() {
8317 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8318 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8319 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8320 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8321 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8322 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8324 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8325 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8327 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8329 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8330 // rejecting the inbound channel request.
8331 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8333 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8335 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8336 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
8338 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8341 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8342 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8344 match close_msg_ev[0] {
8345 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => {
8346 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8348 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8350 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8354 fn test_reject_funding_before_inbound_channel_accepted() {
8355 // This tests that when `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` is set to true, inbound
8356 // channels must to be manually accepted through `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel` by
8357 // the node operator before the counterparty sends a `FundingCreated` message. If a
8358 // `FundingCreated` message is received before the channel is accepted, it should be rejected
8359 // and the channel should be closed.
8360 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8361 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8362 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8363 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8364 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8365 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8367 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8368 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8369 let temp_channel_id = res.temporary_channel_id;
8371 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8373 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in the `msg_events`.
8374 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8376 // Clear the `Event::OpenChannelRequest` event without responding to the request.
8377 nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8379 // Get the `AcceptChannel` message of `nodes[1]` without calling
8380 // `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`, which generates a
8381 // `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` event. The message is passed to `nodes[0]`
8382 // `handle_accept_channel`, which is required in order for `create_funding_transaction` to
8383 // succeed when `nodes[0]` is passed to it.
8386 let channel = get_channel_ref!(&nodes[1], lock, temp_channel_id);
8387 let accept_chan_msg = channel.get_accept_channel_message();
8388 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8391 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8393 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8394 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8396 // The `funding_created_msg` should be rejected by `nodes[1]` as it hasn't accepted the channel
8397 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8399 let close_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8400 assert_eq!(close_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8402 let expected_err = "FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted";
8403 match close_msg_ev[0] {
8404 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, ref node_id, } => {
8405 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, temp_channel_id);
8406 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8407 assert_eq!(msg.data, expected_err);
8409 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8412 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
8416 fn test_can_not_accept_inbound_channel_twice() {
8417 let mut manually_accept_conf = UserConfig::default();
8418 manually_accept_conf.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
8419 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8420 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8421 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(manually_accept_conf.clone())]);
8422 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8424 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, Some(manually_accept_conf)).unwrap();
8425 let res = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8427 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &res);
8429 // Assert that `nodes[1]` has no `MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel` in `msg_events` before
8430 // accepting the inbound channel request.
8431 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
8433 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8435 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
8436 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, 0).unwrap();
8437 let api_res = nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, 0);
8439 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8440 assert_eq!(err, "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.");
8442 Ok(_) => panic!("Channel shouldn't be possible to be accepted twice"),
8443 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8446 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8449 // Ensure that the channel wasn't closed after attempting to accept it twice.
8450 let accept_msg_ev = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8451 assert_eq!(accept_msg_ev.len(), 1);
8453 match accept_msg_ev[0] {
8454 MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => {
8455 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8457 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8462 fn test_can_not_accept_unknown_inbound_channel() {
8463 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
8464 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
8465 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
8466 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr)[0].node;
8468 let unknown_channel_id = [0; 32];
8469 let api_res = node.accept_inbound_channel(&unknown_channel_id, 0);
8471 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8472 assert_eq!(err, "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist");
8474 Ok(_) => panic!("It shouldn't be possible to accept an unkown channel"),
8475 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8480 fn test_simple_mpp() {
8481 // Simple test of sending a multi-path payment.
8482 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8483 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8484 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8485 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8487 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8488 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8489 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8490 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8492 let (mut route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8493 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8494 route.paths.push(path);
8495 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8496 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8497 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8498 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8499 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8500 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8501 send_along_route_with_secret(&nodes[0], route, &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], 200_000, payment_hash, payment_secret);
8502 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, payment_preimage);
8506 fn test_preimage_storage() {
8507 // Simple test of payment preimage storage allowing no client-side storage to claim payments
8508 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8509 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8510 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8511 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8513 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8516 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 7200).unwrap();
8517 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8518 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8519 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8520 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8521 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8522 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8523 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8525 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8526 // values from previous calls.
8527 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8528 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8529 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8531 Event::PaymentReceived { ref purpose, .. } => {
8533 PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, .. } => {
8534 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage.unwrap());
8536 _ => panic!("expected PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment")
8539 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8544 #[allow(deprecated)]
8545 fn test_secret_timeout() {
8546 // Simple test of payment secret storage time outs. After
8547 // `create_inbound_payment(_for_hash)_legacy` is removed, this test will be removed as well.
8548 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8549 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8550 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8551 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8553 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8555 let (payment_hash, payment_secret_1) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_legacy(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8557 // We should fail to register the same payment hash twice, at least until we've connected a
8558 // block with time 7200 + CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1.
8559 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8560 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8561 } else { panic!(); }
8563 let node_1_blocks = nodes[1].blocks.lock().unwrap();
8565 header: BlockHeader {
8567 prev_blockhash: node_1_blocks.last().unwrap().0.block_hash(),
8568 merkle_root: Default::default(),
8569 time: node_1_blocks.len() as u32 + 7200, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8573 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8574 if let Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2) {
8575 assert_eq!(err, "Duplicate payment hash");
8576 } else { panic!(); }
8578 // If we then connect the second block, we should be able to register the same payment hash
8579 // again (this time getting a new payment secret).
8580 block.header.prev_blockhash = block.header.block_hash();
8581 block.header.time += 1;
8582 connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
8583 let our_payment_secret = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(payment_hash, Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8584 assert_ne!(payment_secret_1, our_payment_secret);
8587 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8588 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8589 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8590 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8591 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8592 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8593 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8595 // Note that after leaving the above scope we have no knowledge of any arguments or return
8596 // values from previous calls.
8597 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8598 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8599 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8601 Event::PaymentReceived { purpose: PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage, payment_secret }, .. } => {
8602 assert!(payment_preimage.is_none());
8603 assert_eq!(payment_secret, our_payment_secret);
8604 // We don't actually have the payment preimage with which to claim this payment!
8606 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8611 fn test_bad_secret_hash() {
8612 // Simple test of unregistered payment hash/invalid payment secret handling
8613 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8614 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8615 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8616 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8618 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8620 let random_payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
8621 let random_payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8622 let (our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = nodes[1].node.create_inbound_payment(Some(100_000), 2).unwrap();
8623 let (route, _, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8625 // All the below cases should end up being handled exactly identically, so we macro the
8626 // resulting events.
8627 macro_rules! handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data {
8629 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8630 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8631 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
8632 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8633 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8635 // We have to forward pending HTLCs once to process the receipt of the HTLC and then
8636 // again to process the pending backwards-failure of the HTLC
8637 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8638 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8639 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8641 // We should fail the payment back
8642 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8643 match events.pop().unwrap() {
8644 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id: _, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_fail_htlcs, commitment_signed, .. } } => {
8645 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8646 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], commitment_signed, false);
8648 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8653 let expected_error_code = 0x4000|15; // incorrect_or_unknown_payment_details
8654 // Error data is the HTLC value (100,000) and current block height
8655 let expected_error_data = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0x86, 0xa0, 0, 0, 0, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH as u8];
8657 // Send a payment with the right payment hash but the wrong payment secret
8658 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8659 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8660 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8662 // Send a payment with a random payment hash, but the right payment secret
8663 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8664 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8665 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8667 // Send a payment with a random payment hash and random payment secret
8668 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, random_payment_hash, &Some(random_payment_secret)).unwrap();
8669 handle_unknown_invalid_payment_data!();
8670 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], random_payment_hash, true, expected_error_code, expected_error_data);
8674 fn test_update_err_monitor_lockdown() {
8675 // Our monitor will lock update of local commitment transaction if a broadcastion condition
8676 // has been fulfilled (either force-close from Channel or block height requiring a HTLC-
8677 // timeout). Trying to update monitor after lockdown should return a ChannelMonitorUpdateErr.
8679 // This scenario may happen in a watchtower setup, where watchtower process a block height
8680 // triggering a timeout while a slow-block-processing ChannelManager receives a local signed
8681 // commitment at same time.
8683 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8684 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8685 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8686 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8688 // Create some initial channel
8689 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8690 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8692 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8693 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8695 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8696 let preimage = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8698 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate a watchtower and update block height of node 0 until its ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8699 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8700 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", 0));
8701 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8703 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8704 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8705 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8706 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8707 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8708 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8709 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8710 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8713 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8714 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8715 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8716 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize(200, (header, 0));
8717 watchtower.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, 200);
8719 // Try to update ChannelMonitor
8720 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(preimage));
8721 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8722 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8723 assert_eq!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
8724 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8725 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8726 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8727 if let Err(_) = watchtower.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8728 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8729 } else { assert!(false); }
8730 } else { assert!(false); };
8731 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8732 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8733 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8734 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8738 fn test_concurrent_monitor_claim() {
8739 // Watchtower A receives block, broadcasts state N, then channel receives new state N+1,
8740 // sending it to both watchtowers, Bob accepts N+1, then receives block and broadcasts
8741 // the latest state N+1, Alice rejects state N+1, but Bob has already broadcast it,
8742 // state N+1 confirms. Alice claims output from state N+1.
8744 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8745 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8746 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8747 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8749 // Create some initial channel
8750 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8751 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: chan_1.3.txid(), index: 0 };
8753 // Rebalance the network to generate htlc in the two directions
8754 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 10_000_000);
8756 // Route a HTLC from node 0 to node 1 (but don't settle)
8757 route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 9_000_000).0;
8759 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Alice and update block height her ChannelMonitor timeout HTLC onchain
8760 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8761 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Alice"));
8762 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8763 let watchtower_alice = {
8764 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8765 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8766 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8767 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8768 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8769 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8770 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8771 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8774 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8775 // Make the tx_broadcaster aware of enough blocks that it doesn't think we're violating
8776 // transaction lock time requirements here.
8777 chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.blocks.lock().unwrap().resize((CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as usize, (header, 0));
8778 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8780 // Watchtower Alice should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8782 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8783 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8787 // Copy ChainMonitor to simulate watchtower Bob and make it receive a commitment update first.
8788 let chain_source = test_utils::TestChainSource::new(Network::Testnet);
8789 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id(format!("node {}", "Bob"));
8790 let persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
8791 let watchtower_bob = {
8792 let monitor = nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_monitor(outpoint).unwrap();
8793 let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
8794 monitor.write(&mut w).unwrap();
8795 let new_monitor = <(BlockHash, channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
8796 &mut io::Cursor::new(&w.0), &test_utils::OnlyReadsKeysInterface {}).unwrap().1;
8797 assert!(new_monitor == *monitor);
8798 let watchtower = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(&chain_source), &chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster, &logger, &chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator, &persister, &node_cfgs[0].keys_manager);
8799 assert!(watchtower.watch_channel(outpoint, new_monitor).is_ok());
8802 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8803 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8805 // Route another payment to generate another update with still previous HTLC pending
8806 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 3000000);
8808 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
8810 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8812 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8813 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8814 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8815 if let Some(ref mut channel) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&chan_1.2) {
8816 if let Ok((_, _, update)) = channel.commitment_signed(&updates.commitment_signed, &node_cfgs[0].logger) {
8817 // Watchtower Alice should already have seen the block and reject the update
8818 if let Err(_) = watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8819 if let Ok(_) = watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update.clone()) {} else { assert!(false); }
8820 if let Ok(_) = nodes[0].chain_monitor.update_channel(outpoint, update) {} else { assert!(false); }
8821 } else { assert!(false); }
8822 } else { assert!(false); };
8823 // Our local monitor is in-sync and hasn't processed yet timeout
8824 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8826 //// Provide one more block to watchtower Bob, expect broadcast of commitment and HTLC-Timeout
8827 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8828 watchtower_bob.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8830 // Watchtower Bob should have broadcast a commitment/HTLC-timeout
8833 let mut txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8834 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 2);
8835 bob_state_y = txn[0].clone();
8839 // We confirm Bob's state Y on Alice, she should broadcast a HTLC-timeout
8840 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: Default::default(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8841 watchtower_alice.chain_monitor.block_connected(&Block { header, txdata: vec![bob_state_y.clone()] }, CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 2 + TEST_FINAL_CLTV + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS);
8843 let htlc_txn = chanmon_cfgs[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8844 // We broadcast twice the transaction, once due to the HTLC-timeout, once due
8845 // the onchain detection of the HTLC output
8846 assert_eq!(htlc_txn.len(), 2);
8847 check_spends!(htlc_txn[0], bob_state_y);
8848 check_spends!(htlc_txn[1], bob_state_y);
8853 fn test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update() {
8854 // Test that if a peer closes a channel in response to a funding_created message we don't
8855 // generate a channel update (as the channel cannot appear on chain without a funding_signed
8858 // Doing so would imply a channel monitor update before the initial channel monitor
8859 // registration, violating our API guarantees.
8861 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to hit this case by opening then closing a channel,
8862 // then opening a second channel with the same funding output as the first (which is not
8863 // rejected because the first channel does not exist in the ChannelManager) and closing it
8864 // before receiving funding_signed.
8865 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8866 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8867 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8868 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8870 // Create an initial channel
8871 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
8872 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8873 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
8874 let accept_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8875 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_chan_msg);
8877 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
8878 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
8880 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
8881 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
8883 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8884 let channel_id = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index }.to_channel_id();
8885 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: "Hi".to_owned() });
8886 assert!(nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
8887 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "Hi".to_string() }, true);
8891 fn test_htlc_no_detection() {
8892 // This test is a mutation to underscore the detection logic bug we had
8893 // before #653. HTLC value routed is above the remaining balance, thus
8894 // inverting HTLC and `to_remote` output. HTLC will come second and
8895 // it wouldn't be seen by pre-#653 detection as we were enumerate()'ing
8896 // on a watched outputs vector (Vec<TxOut>) thus implicitly relying on
8897 // outputs order detection for correct spending children filtring.
8899 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8900 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8901 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8902 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8904 // Create some initial channels
8905 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8907 send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 1_000_000);
8908 let (_, our_payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 2_000_000);
8909 let local_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_1.2);
8910 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].input.len(), 1);
8911 assert_eq!(local_txn[0].output.len(), 3);
8912 check_spends!(local_txn[0], chan_1.3);
8914 // Timeout HTLC on A's chain and so it can generate a HTLC-Timeout tx
8915 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8916 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] });
8917 // We deliberately connect the local tx twice as this should provoke a failure calling
8918 // this test before #653 fix.
8919 chain::Listen::block_connected(&nodes[0].chain_monitor.chain_monitor, &Block { header, txdata: vec![local_txn[0].clone()] }, nodes[0].best_block_info().1 + 1);
8920 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8921 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8922 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8923 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], TEST_FINAL_CLTV - 1);
8925 let htlc_timeout = {
8926 let node_txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
8927 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input.len(), 1);
8928 assert_eq!(node_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8929 check_spends!(node_txn[1], local_txn[0]);
8933 let header_201 = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[0].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
8934 connect_block(&nodes[0], &Block { header: header_201, txdata: vec![htlc_timeout.clone()] });
8935 connect_blocks(&nodes[0], ANTI_REORG_DELAY - 1);
8936 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8939 fn do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(broadcast_alice: bool, go_onchain_before_fulfill: bool) {
8940 // If we route an HTLC, then learn the HTLC's preimage after the upstream channel has been
8941 // force-closed, we must claim that HTLC on-chain. (Given an HTLC forwarded from Alice --> Bob -->
8942 // Carol, Alice would be the upstream node, and Carol the downstream.)
8944 // Steps of the test:
8945 // 1) Alice sends a HTLC to Carol through Bob.
8946 // 2) Carol doesn't settle the HTLC.
8947 // 3) If broadcast_alice is true, Alice force-closes her channel with Bob. Else Bob force closes.
8948 // Steps 4 and 5 may be reordered depending on go_onchain_before_fulfill.
8949 // 4) Bob sees the Alice's commitment on his chain or vice versa. An offered output is present
8950 // but can't be claimed as Bob doesn't have yet knowledge of the preimage.
8951 // 5) Carol release the preimage to Bob off-chain.
8952 // 6) Bob claims the offered output on the broadcasted commitment.
8953 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8954 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8955 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8956 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8958 // Create some initial channels
8959 let chan_ab = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8960 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
8962 // Steps (1) and (2):
8963 // Send an HTLC Alice --> Bob --> Carol, but Carol doesn't settle the HTLC back.
8964 let (payment_preimage, _payment_hash, _payment_secret) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1], &nodes[2]), 3_000_000);
8966 // Check that Alice's commitment transaction now contains an output for this HTLC.
8967 let alice_txn = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[0], chan_ab.2);
8968 check_spends!(alice_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
8969 assert_eq!(alice_txn[0].output.len(), 2);
8970 check_spends!(alice_txn[1], alice_txn[0]); // 2nd transaction is a non-final HTLC-timeout
8971 assert_eq!(alice_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT);
8972 assert_eq!(alice_txn.len(), 2);
8974 // Steps (3) and (4):
8975 // If `go_onchain_before_fufill`, broadcast the relevant commitment transaction and check that Bob
8976 // responds by (1) broadcasting a channel update and (2) adding a new ChannelMonitor.
8977 let mut force_closing_node = 0; // Alice force-closes
8978 if !broadcast_alice { force_closing_node = 1; } // Bob force-closes
8979 nodes[force_closing_node].node.force_close_channel(&chan_ab.2).unwrap();
8980 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[force_closing_node], true);
8981 check_added_monitors!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1);
8982 check_closed_event!(nodes[force_closing_node], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8983 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
8984 let txn_to_broadcast = match broadcast_alice {
8985 true => alice_txn.clone(),
8986 false => get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2)
8988 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
8989 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
8990 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
8991 if broadcast_alice {
8992 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
8993 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8994 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
8996 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 1);
8997 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9001 // Carol then claims the funds and sends an update_fulfill message to Bob, and they go through the
9002 // process of removing the HTLC from their commitment transactions.
9003 assert!(nodes[2].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
9004 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9005 let carol_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9006 assert!(carol_updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9007 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
9008 assert!(carol_updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9009 assert!(carol_updates.update_fee.is_none());
9010 assert_eq!(carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 1);
9012 nodes[1].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9013 expect_payment_forwarded!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if go_onchain_before_fulfill || force_closing_node == 1 { None } else { Some(1000) }, false);
9014 // If Alice broadcasted but Bob doesn't know yet, here he prepares to tell her about the preimage.
9015 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill && broadcast_alice {
9016 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9017 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9019 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => {
9020 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9022 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9025 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_updates.commitment_signed);
9026 // One monitor update for the preimage to update the Bob<->Alice channel, one monitor update
9027 // Carol<->Bob's updated commitment transaction info.
9028 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9030 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9031 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9032 let bob_revocation = match events[0] {
9033 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9034 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9037 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9039 let bob_updates = match events[1] {
9040 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, ref updates } => {
9041 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9044 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9047 nodes[2].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_revocation);
9048 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9049 nodes[2].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bob_updates.commitment_signed);
9050 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9052 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9053 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9054 let carol_revocation = match events[0] {
9055 MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, ref msg } => {
9056 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9059 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9061 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &carol_revocation);
9062 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9064 // If this test requires the force-closed channel to not be on-chain until after the fulfill,
9065 // here's where we put said channel's commitment tx on-chain.
9066 let mut txn_to_broadcast = alice_txn.clone();
9067 if !broadcast_alice { txn_to_broadcast = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], chan_ab.2); }
9068 if !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9069 let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: nodes[1].best_block_hash(), merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42};
9070 connect_block(&nodes[1], &Block { header, txdata: vec![txn_to_broadcast[0].clone()]});
9071 // If Bob was the one to force-close, he will have already passed these checks earlier.
9072 if broadcast_alice {
9073 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9074 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9075 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
9077 let mut bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap();
9078 if broadcast_alice {
9079 // In `connect_block()`, the ChainMonitor and ChannelManager are separately notified about a
9080 // new block being connected. The ChannelManager being notified triggers a monitor update,
9081 // which triggers broadcasting our commitment tx and an HTLC-claiming tx. The ChainMonitor
9082 // being notified triggers the HTLC-claiming tx redundantly, resulting in 3 total txs being
9084 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 3);
9085 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], chan_ab.3);
9087 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9088 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], chan_ab.3);
9093 // Finally, check that Bob broadcasted a preimage-claiming transaction for the HTLC output on the
9094 // broadcasted commitment transaction.
9096 let bob_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clone();
9097 if go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9098 // Bob should now have an extra broadcasted tx, for the preimage-claiming transaction.
9099 assert_eq!(bob_txn.len(), 2);
9101 let script_weight = match broadcast_alice {
9102 true => OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT,
9103 false => ACCEPTED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT
9105 // If Alice force-closed and Bob didn't receive her commitment transaction until after he
9106 // received Carol's fulfill, he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction first. Else if
9107 // Bob force closed or if he found out about Alice's commitment tx before receiving Carol's
9108 // fulfill, then he broadcasts the HTLC-output-claiming transaction second.
9109 if broadcast_alice && !go_onchain_before_fulfill {
9110 check_spends!(bob_txn[0], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9111 assert_eq!(bob_txn[0].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9113 check_spends!(bob_txn[1], txn_to_broadcast[0]);
9114 assert_eq!(bob_txn[1].input[0].witness.last().unwrap().len(), script_weight);
9120 fn test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close() {
9121 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, true);
9122 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, true); // Technically redundant, but may as well
9123 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(true, false);
9124 do_test_onchain_htlc_settlement_after_close(false, false);
9128 fn test_duplicate_chan_id() {
9129 // Test that if a given peer tries to open a channel with the same channel_id as one that is
9130 // already open we reject it and keep the old channel.
9132 // Previously, full_stack_target managed to figure out that if you tried to open two channels
9133 // with the same funding output (ie post-funding channel_id), we'd create a monitor update for
9134 // the existing channel when we detect the duplicate new channel, screwing up our monitor
9135 // updating logic for the existing channel.
9136 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9137 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9138 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9139 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9141 // Create an initial channel
9142 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9143 let mut open_chan_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9144 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9145 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9147 // Try to create a second channel with the same temporary_channel_id as the first and check
9148 // that it is rejected.
9149 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9151 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9152 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9154 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9155 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both the
9156 // first (valid) and second (invalid) channels are closed, given they both have
9157 // the same non-temporary channel_id. However, currently we do not, so we just
9158 // move forward with it.
9159 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9160 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9162 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9166 // Move the first channel through the funding flow...
9167 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
9169 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9170 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9172 let mut funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9173 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9175 let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9176 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9177 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9178 added_monitors.clear();
9180 let funding_signed_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9182 let funding_outpoint = ::chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: funding_created_msg.funding_txid, index: funding_created_msg.funding_output_index };
9183 let channel_id = funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
9185 // Now we have the first channel past funding_created (ie it has a txid-based channel_id, not a
9188 // First try to open a second channel with a temporary channel id equal to the txid-based one.
9189 // Technically this is allowed by the spec, but we don't support it and there's little reason
9190 // to. Still, it shouldn't cause any other issues.
9191 open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id = channel_id;
9192 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_msg);
9194 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9195 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9197 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9198 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9199 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9200 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, open_chan_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9201 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9203 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9207 // Now try to create a second channel which has a duplicate funding output.
9208 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None).unwrap();
9209 let open_chan_2_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9210 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_chan_2_msg);
9211 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9212 create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42); // Get and check the FundingGenerationReady event
9214 let funding_created = {
9215 let mut a_channel_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9216 let mut as_chan = a_channel_lock.by_id.get_mut(&open_chan_2_msg.temporary_channel_id).unwrap();
9217 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9218 as_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap()
9220 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
9221 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
9222 // At this point we'll try to add a duplicate channel monitor, which will be rejected, but
9223 // still needs to be cleared here.
9224 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9226 // ...still, nodes[1] will reject the duplicate channel.
9228 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9229 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9231 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { action: ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { ref msg }, node_id } => {
9232 // Technically, at this point, nodes[1] would be justified in thinking both
9233 // channels are closed, but currently we do not, so we just move forward with it.
9234 assert_eq!(msg.channel_id, channel_id);
9235 assert_eq!(node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9237 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9241 // finally, finish creating the original channel and send a payment over it to make sure
9242 // everything is functional.
9243 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed_msg);
9245 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9246 assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
9247 assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
9248 added_monitors.clear();
9251 let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9252 assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
9253 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9254 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0].txid(), funding_output.txid);
9256 let (funding_locked, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9257 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9258 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9259 send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 8000000);
9263 fn test_error_chans_closed() {
9264 // Test that we properly handle error messages, closing appropriate channels.
9266 // Prior to #787 we'd allow a peer to make us force-close a channel we had with a different
9267 // peer. The "real" fix for that is to index channels with peers_ids, however in the mean time
9268 // we can test various edge cases around it to ensure we don't regress.
9269 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9270 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9271 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9272 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9274 // Create some initial channels
9275 let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9276 let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9277 let chan_3 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9279 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9280 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9281 assert_eq!(nodes[2].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9283 // Closing a channel from a different peer has no effect
9284 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_3.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9285 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 3);
9287 // Closing one channel doesn't impact others
9288 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_2.2, data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9289 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9290 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], false);
9291 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9292 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0).len(), 1);
9293 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 2);
9294 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_1.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_1.2);
9295 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2 || nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[1].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9297 // A null channel ID should close all channels
9298 let _chan_4 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9299 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: [0; 32], data: "ERR".to_owned() });
9300 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 2);
9301 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 2, ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: "ERR".to_string() });
9302 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9303 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9305 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9306 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9308 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9311 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { ref msg } => {
9312 assert_eq!(msg.contents.flags & 2, 2);
9314 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9316 // Note that at this point users of a standard PeerHandler will end up calling
9317 // peer_disconnected with no_connection_possible set to false, duplicating the
9318 // close-all-channels logic. That's OK, we don't want to end up not force-closing channels for
9319 // users with their own peer handling logic. We duplicate the call here, however.
9320 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9321 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9323 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), true);
9324 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels().len(), 1);
9325 assert!(nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels()[0].channel_id == chan_3.2);
9329 fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
9330 // Test that we properly handle invalid funding transactions sent to us from a peer.
9332 // Previously, all other major lightning implementations had failed to properly sanitize
9333 // funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
9334 // security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
9335 // un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
9336 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9337 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9338 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9339 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9341 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 10_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9342 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9343 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9345 let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9346 for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
9347 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
9348 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
9351 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
9352 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9353 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9355 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9356 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9358 let events_1 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9359 assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 0);
9361 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
9362 assert_eq!(nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[0], tx);
9363 nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().clear();
9365 let expected_err = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
9366 confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[1], &tx, 1);
9367 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: expected_err.to_string() });
9368 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9369 let events_2 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9370 assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
9371 if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } = &events_2[0] {
9372 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9373 if let msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } = action {
9374 assert_eq!(msg.data, "Channel closed because of an exception: ".to_owned() + expected_err);
9375 } else { panic!(); }
9376 } else { panic!(); }
9377 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);
9380 fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
9381 // In the first version of the chain::Confirm interface, after a refactor was made to not
9382 // broadcast CSV-locked transactions until their CSV lock is up, we wouldn't reliably broadcast
9383 // transactions after a `transactions_confirmed` call. Specifically, if the chain, provided via
9384 // `best_block_updated` is at height N, and a transaction output which we wish to spend at
9385 // height N-1 (due to a CSV to height N-1) is provided at height N, we will not broadcast the
9386 // spending transaction until height N+1 (or greater). This was due to the way
9387 // `ChannelMonitor::transactions_confirmed` worked, only checking if we should broadcast a
9388 // spending transaction at the height the input transaction was confirmed at, not whether we
9389 // should broadcast a spending transaction at the current height.
9390 // A second, similar, issue involved failing HTLCs backwards - because we only provided the
9391 // height at which transactions were confirmed to `OnchainTx::update_claims_view`, it wasn't
9392 // aware that the anti-reorg-delay had, in fact, already expired, waiting to fail-backwards
9393 // until we learned about an additional block.
9395 // As an additional check, if `test_height_before_timelock` is set, we instead test that we
9396 // aren't broadcasting transactions too early (ie not broadcasting them at all).
9397 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9398 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9399 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9400 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9401 *nodes[0].connect_style.borrow_mut() = ConnectStyle::BestBlockFirstSkippingBlocks;
9403 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9404 let (chan_announce, _, channel_id, _) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9405 let (_, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], 1_000_000);
9406 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9407 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9409 nodes[1].node.force_close_channel(&channel_id).unwrap();
9410 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
9411 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9412 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9413 let node_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9414 assert_eq!(node_txn.len(), 1);
9416 let conf_height = nodes[1].best_block_info().1;
9417 if !test_height_before_timelock {
9418 connect_blocks(&nodes[1], 24 * 6);
9420 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9421 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height), &[(0, &node_txn[0])], conf_height);
9422 if test_height_before_timelock {
9423 // If we confirmed the close transaction, but timelocks have not yet expired, we should not
9424 // generate any events or broadcast any transactions
9425 assert!(nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().is_empty());
9426 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9428 // We should broadcast an HTLC transaction spending our funding transaction first
9429 let spending_txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
9430 assert_eq!(spending_txn.len(), 2);
9431 assert_eq!(spending_txn[0], node_txn[0]);
9432 check_spends!(spending_txn[1], node_txn[0]);
9433 // We should also generate a SpendableOutputs event with the to_self output (as its
9435 let descriptor_spend_txn = check_spendable_outputs!(nodes[1], node_cfgs[1].keys_manager);
9436 assert_eq!(descriptor_spend_txn.len(), 1);
9438 // If we also discover that the HTLC-Timeout transaction was confirmed some time ago, we
9439 // should immediately fail-backwards the HTLC to the previous hop, without waiting for an
9440 // additional block built on top of the current chain.
9441 nodes[1].chain_monitor.chain_monitor.transactions_confirmed(
9442 &nodes[1].get_block_header(conf_height + 1), &[(0, &spending_txn[1])], conf_height + 1);
9443 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9444 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9446 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9447 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9448 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9449 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9450 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9451 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9452 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9453 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9454 expect_payment_failed_with_update!(nodes[0], payment_hash, false, chan_announce.contents.short_channel_id, true);
9459 fn test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast() {
9460 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(false);
9461 do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(true);
9465 fn test_forwardable_regen() {
9466 // Tests that if we reload a ChannelManager while forwards are pending we will regenerate the
9467 // PendingHTLCsForwardable event automatically, ensuring we don't forget to forward/receive
9469 // We test it for both payment receipt and payment forwarding.
9471 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9472 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9473 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9474 let persister: test_utils::TestPersister;
9475 let new_chain_monitor: test_utils::TestChainMonitor;
9476 let nodes_1_deserialized: ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>;
9477 let mut nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9478 let chan_id_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9479 let chan_id_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).2;
9481 // First send a payment to nodes[1]
9482 let (route, payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9483 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9484 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9486 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9487 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9488 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9489 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9490 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9492 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9494 // Next send a payment which is forwarded by nodes[1]
9495 let (route_2, payment_hash_2, payment_preimage_2, payment_secret_2) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[2], 200_000);
9496 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route_2, payment_hash_2, &Some(payment_secret_2)).unwrap();
9497 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9499 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9500 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9501 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9502 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9503 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9505 // There is already a PendingHTLCsForwardable event "pending" so another one will not be
9507 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9509 // Now restart nodes[1] and make sure it regenerates a single PendingHTLCsForwardable
9510 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9511 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), false);
9513 let nodes_1_serialized = nodes[1].node.encode();
9514 let mut chan_0_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9515 let mut chan_1_monitor_serialized = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
9516 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_1).write(&mut chan_0_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9517 get_monitor!(nodes[1], chan_id_2).write(&mut chan_1_monitor_serialized).unwrap();
9519 persister = test_utils::TestPersister::new();
9520 let keys_manager = &chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager;
9521 new_chain_monitor = test_utils::TestChainMonitor::new(Some(nodes[1].chain_source), nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(), nodes[1].logger, node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator, &persister, keys_manager);
9522 nodes[1].chain_monitor = &new_chain_monitor;
9524 let mut chan_0_monitor_read = &chan_0_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9525 let (_, mut chan_0_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9526 &mut chan_0_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9527 assert!(chan_0_monitor_read.is_empty());
9528 let mut chan_1_monitor_read = &chan_1_monitor_serialized.0[..];
9529 let (_, mut chan_1_monitor) = <(BlockHash, ChannelMonitor<EnforcingSigner>)>::read(
9530 &mut chan_1_monitor_read, keys_manager).unwrap();
9531 assert!(chan_1_monitor_read.is_empty());
9533 let mut nodes_1_read = &nodes_1_serialized[..];
9534 let (_, nodes_1_deserialized_tmp) = {
9535 let mut channel_monitors = HashMap::new();
9536 channel_monitors.insert(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_0_monitor);
9537 channel_monitors.insert(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, &mut chan_1_monitor);
9538 <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<EnforcingSigner, &test_utils::TestChainMonitor, &test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &test_utils::TestKeysInterface, &test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &test_utils::TestLogger>)>::read(&mut nodes_1_read, ChannelManagerReadArgs {
9539 default_config: UserConfig::default(),
9541 fee_estimator: node_cfgs[1].fee_estimator,
9542 chain_monitor: nodes[1].chain_monitor,
9543 tx_broadcaster: nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.clone(),
9544 logger: nodes[1].logger,
9548 nodes_1_deserialized = nodes_1_deserialized_tmp;
9549 assert!(nodes_1_read.is_empty());
9551 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_0_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_0_monitor).is_ok());
9552 assert!(nodes[1].chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan_1_monitor.get_funding_txo().0, chan_1_monitor).is_ok());
9553 nodes[1].node = &nodes_1_deserialized;
9554 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9556 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], (false, false), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9557 // Note that nodes[1] and nodes[2] resend their funding_locked here since they haven't updated
9558 // the commitment state.
9559 reconnect_nodes(&nodes[1], &nodes[2], (true, true), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (false, false));
9561 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
9563 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9564 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], payment_hash, payment_secret, 100_000);
9565 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9567 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9568 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9569 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9570 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9571 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[1], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9572 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9573 expect_payment_received!(nodes[2], payment_hash_2, payment_secret_2, 200_000);
9575 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], payment_preimage);
9576 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[2]], payment_preimage_2);
9579 fn do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(test_for_second_fail_panic: bool) {
9580 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9581 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9582 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9583 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9585 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9587 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id())
9588 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
9589 let route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9591 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
9594 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9595 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9596 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9597 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9598 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9599 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9600 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9602 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9603 expect_payment_received!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret, 10_000);
9606 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret)).unwrap();
9607 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9608 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9609 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9610 let mut payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9611 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9612 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9613 // At this point, nodes[1] would notice it has too much value for the payment. It will
9614 // assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9615 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC. Previously, it'd also have failed back
9616 // the first HTLC delivered above.
9619 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9620 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9622 if test_for_second_fail_panic {
9623 // Now we go fail back the first HTLC from the user end.
9624 nodes[1].node.fail_htlc_backwards(&our_payment_hash);
9626 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9627 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9629 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9630 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9631 assert_eq!(fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 2);
9633 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9634 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[1]);
9635 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9637 let failure_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9638 assert_eq!(failure_events.len(), 2);
9639 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[0] {} else { panic!(); }
9640 if let Event::PaymentPathFailed { .. } = failure_events[1] {} else { panic!(); }
9642 // Let the second HTLC fail and claim the first
9643 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[1]);
9644 nodes[1].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9646 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9647 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9648 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9649 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9651 expect_payment_failed_conditions!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9653 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], our_payment_preimage);
9658 fn test_dup_htlc_second_fail_panic() {
9659 // Previously, if we received two HTLCs back-to-back, where the second overran the expected
9660 // value for the payment, we'd fail back both HTLCs after generating a `PaymentReceived` event.
9661 // Then, if the user failed the second payment, they'd hit a "tried to fail an already failed
9662 // HTLC" debug panic. This tests for this behavior, checking that only one HTLC is auto-failed.
9663 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(true);
9667 fn test_dup_htlc_second_rejected() {
9668 // Test that if we receive a second HTLC for an MPP payment that overruns the payment amount we
9669 // simply reject the second HTLC but are still able to claim the first HTLC.
9670 do_test_dup_htlc_second_rejected(false);
9674 fn test_inconsistent_mpp_params() {
9675 // Test that if we recieve two HTLCs with different payment parameters we fail back the first
9676 // such HTLC and allow the second to stay.
9677 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
9678 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
9679 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
9680 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9682 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9683 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 2, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9684 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 1, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9685 create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 2, 3, 100_000, 0, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9687 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id())
9688 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
9689 let mut route = get_route!(nodes[0], payment_params, 15_000_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV).unwrap();
9690 assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), 2);
9691 route.paths.sort_by(|path_a, _| {
9692 // Sort the path so that the path through nodes[1] comes first
9693 if path_a[0].pubkey == nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id() {
9694 core::cmp::Ordering::Less } else { core::cmp::Ordering::Greater }
9696 let payment_params_opt = Some(payment_params);
9698 let (our_payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, our_payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
9700 let cur_height = nodes[0].best_block_info().1;
9701 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9703 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9704 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9706 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9707 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9708 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), false, None);
9710 assert!(nodes[3].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
9713 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 14_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9714 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9716 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9717 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9718 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9720 nodes[2].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9721 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9723 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9724 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9726 let mut events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9727 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9728 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.pop().unwrap());
9730 nodes[3].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9731 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 0);
9732 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[3], nodes[2], payment_event.commitment_msg, true, true);
9734 // At this point, nodes[3] should notice the two HTLCs don't contain the same total payment
9735 // amount. It will assume the second is a privacy attack (no longer particularly relevant
9736 // post-payment_secrets) and fail back the new HTLC.
9738 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9739 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9740 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_ignore!(nodes[3]);
9741 nodes[3].node.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
9743 check_added_monitors!(nodes[3], 1);
9745 let fail_updates_1 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[3], nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
9746 nodes[2].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_1.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9747 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[2], nodes[3], fail_updates_1.commitment_signed, false);
9749 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[2]);
9750 check_added_monitors!(nodes[2], 1);
9752 let fail_updates_2 = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[2], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9753 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &fail_updates_2.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9754 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[2], fail_updates_2.commitment_signed, false);
9756 expect_payment_failed_conditions!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true, PaymentFailedConditions::new().mpp_parts_remain());
9758 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[1], &payment_params_opt, &our_payment_hash, &Some(our_payment_secret), 15_000_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
9759 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9761 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9762 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9763 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]], 15_000_000, our_payment_hash, Some(our_payment_secret), events.pop().unwrap(), true, None);
9765 claim_payment_along_route(&nodes[0], &[&[&nodes[1], &nodes[3]], &[&nodes[2], &nodes[3]]], false, our_payment_preimage);
9769 fn test_keysend_payments_to_public_node() {
9770 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9771 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9772 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9773 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9775 let _chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, 100000, 10001, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9776 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9777 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9778 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9779 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9780 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9781 final_value_msat: 10000,
9782 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9784 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9785 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9786 let route = find_route(&payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
9788 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9789 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9790 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9791 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9792 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9793 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9794 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9795 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9796 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9800 fn test_keysend_payments_to_private_node() {
9801 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9802 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9803 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9804 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9806 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
9807 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
9808 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
9809 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known(), remote_network_address: None });
9811 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
9812 let route_params = RouteParameters {
9813 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
9814 final_value_msat: 10000,
9815 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
9817 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
9818 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
9819 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
9820 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9821 let route = find_route(
9822 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
9823 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
9826 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9827 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
9828 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9829 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9830 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9831 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9832 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9833 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 10000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(test_preimage));
9834 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &path, test_preimage);
9837 /// The possible events which may trigger a `max_dust_htlc_exposure` breach
9838 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
9839 enum ExposureEvent {
9840 /// Breach occurs at HTLC forwarding (see `send_htlc`)
9842 /// Breach occurs at HTLC reception (see `update_add_htlc`)
9844 /// Breach occurs at outbound update_fee (see `send_update_fee`)
9845 AtUpdateFeeOutbound,
9848 fn do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(dust_outbound_balance: bool, exposure_breach_event: ExposureEvent, on_holder_tx: bool) {
9849 // Test that we properly reject dust HTLC violating our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`
9852 // At HTLC forward (`send_payment()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC inbound and
9853 // trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new payment as included on next
9854 // counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll reject the
9855 // update. At HTLC reception (`update_add_htlc()`), if the sum of the trimmed-to-dust HTLC
9856 // inbound and trimmed-to-dust HTLC outbound balance and this new received HTLC as included
9857 // on next counterparty commitment are above our `max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat`, we'll fail
9858 // the update. Note, we return a `temporary_channel_failure` (0x1000 | 7), as the channel
9859 // might be available again for HTLC processing once the dust bandwidth has cleared up.
9861 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9862 let mut config = test_default_channel_config();
9863 config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = 5_000_000; // default setting value
9864 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9865 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(config), None]);
9866 let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9868 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9869 let mut open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9870 open_channel.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 50_000_000;
9871 open_channel.max_accepted_htlcs = 60;
9873 open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9875 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel);
9876 let mut accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9877 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &accept_channel);
9879 let opt_anchors = false;
9881 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
9884 if let Some(mut chan) = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&temporary_channel_id) {
9885 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9889 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
9890 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
9891 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9893 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
9894 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9896 let (funding_locked, channel_id) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
9897 let (announcement, as_update, bs_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_locked);
9898 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &as_update, &bs_update);
9900 let dust_buffer_feerate = {
9901 let chan_lock = nodes[0].node.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
9902 let chan = chan_lock.by_id.get(&channel_id).unwrap();
9903 chan.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64
9905 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9906 let dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9908 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat: u64 = (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors) / 1000 + open_channel.dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9909 let dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9911 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx: u64 = 25;
9912 let dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat: u64 = config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat / dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx;
9915 if dust_outbound_balance {
9916 // Outbound dust threshold: 2223 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9917 // Outbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9918 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2132 sats
9919 for i in 0..dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9920 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9921 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9924 // Inbound dust threshold: 2324 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + holder's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9925 // Inbound dust balance: 4372 sats
9926 // Note, we need sent payment to be above outbound dust threshold on counterparty_tx of 2031 sats
9927 for _ in 0..dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx {
9928 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat);
9932 if dust_outbound_balance {
9933 // Outbound dust threshold: 2132 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9934 // Outbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9935 for i in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9936 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9937 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at dust HTLC {}", i); }
9940 // Inbound dust threshold: 2031 sats (`dust_buffer_feerate` * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000 + counteparty's `dust_limit_satoshis`)
9941 // Inbound dust balance: 5000 sats
9942 for _ in 0..dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx {
9943 route_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat);
9948 let dust_overflow = dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat * (dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx + 1);
9949 if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward {
9950 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], if on_holder_tx { dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9951 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9952 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9954 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9955 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9956 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9958 unwrap_send_err!(nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)), true, APIError::ChannelUnavailable { ref err }, assert_eq!(err, &format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
9960 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception {
9961 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], if on_holder_tx { dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat } else { dust_htlc_on_counterparty_tx_msat });
9962 nodes[1].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
9963 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9964 let mut events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9965 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9966 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(events.remove(0));
9967 nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9968 // With default dust exposure: 5000 sats
9970 // Outbound dust balance: 6399 sats
9971 let dust_inbound_overflow = dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * (dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + 1);
9972 let dust_outbound_overflow = dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat * dust_outbound_htlc_on_holder_tx + dust_inbound_htlc_on_holder_tx_msat;
9973 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx", if dust_outbound_balance { dust_outbound_overflow } else { dust_inbound_overflow }, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9975 // Outbound dust balance: 5200 sats
9976 nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), format!("Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx", dust_overflow, config.channel_options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat), 1);
9978 } else if exposure_breach_event == ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound {
9979 let (route, payment_hash, _, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[0], nodes[1], 2_500_000);
9980 if let Err(_) = nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)) { panic!("Unexpected event at update_fee-swallowed HTLC", ); }
9982 let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
9983 *feerate_lock = *feerate_lock * 10;
9985 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
9986 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9987 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channel".to_string(), "Cannot afford to send new feerate at 2530 without infringing max dust htlc exposure".to_string(), 1);
9990 let _ = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9991 let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
9992 added_monitors.clear();
9996 fn test_max_dust_htlc_exposure() {
9997 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9998 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, true);
9999 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10000 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10001 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10002 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, false);
10003 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCReception, true);
10004 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtHTLCForward, false);
10005 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);
10006 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(true, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10007 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, false);
10008 do_test_max_dust_htlc_exposure(false, ExposureEvent::AtUpdateFeeOutbound, true);